Academic Papers

2016
Rogoff, Kenneth. 2016. “Debt Supercycle, Not Secular Stagnation.” Progress and Confusion: The State of Macroeconomic Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 19-28. Version in VoxEU
Kalemli-Ozcan, Sebnem, Carmen Reinhart, and Kenneth Rogoff. 2016. “Sovereign Debt and Financial Crises: Theory and Historical Evidence.” Journal of the European Economic Association 14 (1): 1-6. JEEA
2015
Lo, Stephanie, and Kenneth Rogoff. 2015. “Secular stagnation, debt overhang and other rationales for sluggish growth, six years on”. BIS Working Paper 482
Ferraro, Domenico, Kenneth Rogoff, and Barbara Rossi. 2015. “Can Oil Prices Forecast Exchange Rates?” 54 (June): 116-141. JIMF Abstract

This paper investigates whether oil prices have a reliable and stable out-of-sample relationship with the Canadian/U.S dollar nominal exchange rate. Despite state-of-the-art methodologies, we find little systematic relation between oil prices and the exchange rate at the monthly and quarterly frequencies. In contrast, the main contribution is to show the existence of a very short-term relationship at the daily frequency, which is rather robust and holds no matter whether we use contemporaneous (realized) or lagged oil prices in our regression. However, in the latter case the predictive ability is ephemeral, mostly appearing after instabilities have been appropriately taken into account.

Reinhart, Carmen M, Vincent Reinhart, and Kenneth Rogoff. 2015. “Dealing with Debt.” Journal of International Economics 96, Supplement 1 (July): S43-S55. Publisher's Version; PDF HKS Working Paper Version
Rogoff, Kenneth, and Takeshi Tashiro. 2015. “Japan's Exorbitant Privilege.” Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 35 (March): 43-61. JJIE Abstract
REITI Working Paper 2014 Update Dataset, November 2014 Updated data for Tables 1-3, May 2015.
Rogoff, Kenneth S. 2015. “Costs and Benefits to Phasing Out Paper Currency.” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2014, Vol. 29: 445-456. Macro AnnualAbstract

Despite advances in transactions technologies, paper currency still constitutes a notable percentage of the money supply in most countries. For example, it constitutes roughly 10% of the US Federal Reserve’s main monetary aggregate, M2. Yet, it has important drawbacks. First, it can help facilitate activity in the underground (tax-evading) and illegal economy. Second, its existence creates the artifact of the zero bound on the nominal interest rate. On the other hand, the enduring popularity of paper currency generates many benefits, including substantial seigniorage revenue. This paper explores some of the issues associated with phasing out paper currency, especially large-denomination notes.

NBER Working Paper 20126
2014
Mozaffarian, Dariush, Kenneth S Rogoff, and David S Ludwig. 2014. “The Real Cost of Food: Can Taxes and Subsidies Improve Public Health?.” Journal of the American Medical Association 312 (9): 889-890. JAMA Article
Rogoff, Kenneth. 2014. “How to prevent the next financial crisis: A review of Martin Wolf's "The Shifts and the Shocks"”. Prospect Magazine, August 20 PDF
Reinhart, Carmen M, and Kenneth S Rogoff. 2014. “Recovery from Financial Crises: Evidence from 100 Episodes.” American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 104 (5): 50-55. AER, including data and appendix; Article Postprint Version
Reinhart, Carmen, Kenneth Rogoff, and Miguel Savastano. 2014. “Addicted to Dollars.” Annals of Economics and Finance 15 (1): 1-50. Read online
Dvir, Eyal, and Kenneth Rogoff. 2014. “Demand Effects and Speculation in Oil Markets: Theory and Evidence.” Journal of International Money and Finance 42 (April): 113-128. JIMF Data and Programs.
Reinhart, Carmen M, and Kenneth S Rogoff. 2014. “Financial and Sovereign Debt Crises: Some Lessons Learned and Those Forgotten.” Financial Crises: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses, edited by S. Claessens, M.A. Kose, L. Laeven, and F. Valencia. Presented September 14, 2012, at IMF conference on financial crises, Washington, DC. IMF Abstract

Even after one of the most severe multi-year crisis on record in the advanced economies, the received wisdom in policy circles clings to the notion that high-income countries are completely different from their emerging market counterparts. The current phase of the official policy approach is predicated on the assumption that debt sustainability can be achieved through a mix of austerity, forbearance and growth. The claim is that advanced countries do not need to resort to the standard toolkit of emerging markets, including debt restructurings and conversions, higher inflation, capital controls and other forms of financial repression. As we document, this claim is at odds with the historical track record of most advanced economies, where debt restructuring or conversions, financial repression, and a tolerance for higher inflation or a combination of these were an integral part of the resolution of significant past debt overhangs.

Reinhart, Carmen, and Kenneth Rogoff. 2014. “This Time Is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises.” Annals of Economics and Finance 15 (2). Cambridge: Harvard University: 1065-1188. All Figures, Tables and Data Abstract

This paper offers a “panoramic” analysis of the history of financial crises dating from England’s fourteenth-century default to the current United States sub-prime financial crisis. Our study is based on a new dataset that spans all regions. It incorporates a number of important credit episodes seldom covered in the literature, including for example, defaults and restructurings in India and China. As the first paper employing this data, our aim is to illustrate some of the broad insights that can be gleaned from such a sweeping historical database. We find that serial default is a nearly universal phenomenon as countries struggle to transform themselves from emerging markets to advanced economies. Major default episodes are typically spaced some years (or decades) apart, creating an illusion that “this time is different” among policymakers and investors. A recent example of the “this time is different” syndrome is the false belief that domestic debt is a novel feature of the modern financial landscape. We also confirm that crises frequently emanate from the financial centers with transmission through interest rate shocks and commodity price collapses. Thus, the recent US sub-prime financial crisis is hardly unique. Our data also documents other crises that often accompany default: including inflation, exchange rate crashes, banking crises, and currency debasements.

April 2008 shorter version 2014 Annals Version
2013
Reinhart, Carmen M, and Kenneth S Rogoff. 2013. “Shifting Mandates: The Federal Reserve's First Centennial.” American Economic Review 103 (3): 48-54. Online Data. Abstract

The Federal Reserve's mandate has evolved considerably over the organization's hundred-year history. It was changed from an initial focus in 1913 on financial stability, to fiscal financing in World War II and its aftermath, to a strong anti-inflation focus from the late 1970s, and then back to greater emphasis on financial stability since the Great Contraction. Yet, as the Fed's mandate has expanded in recent years, its range of instruments has narrowed, partly based on a misguided belief in the inherent stability of financial markets. We argue for a return to multiple instruments, including a more active role for reserve requirements.

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