@article {29582,
	title = {A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt},
	journal = {The Journal of Political Economy},
	volume = {97},
	year = {1989},
	note = {Reprinted from the JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY published by the  University of Chicago Press, copyright {\textcopyright} 1989 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. One copy may be printed for individual use.},
	pages = {155{\textendash}178},
	abstract = {We present a dynamic model of international lending in which borrowers cannot commit to future repayments and in which debtors can sometimes successfully negotiate partial defaulters or "rescheduling agreements." All parties in a debt rescheduling negotiation realize that today{\textquoteright}s rescheduling agreement may itself have to be renegotiated in the future. Our bargaining-theoretic approach allows us to handle the effects of uncertainty on sovereign debt contracts in a much more satisfactory way than in earlier analyses. The framework is readily extended to analyze the conflicting interests of different lenders and of banks and creditor country taxpayers.},
	author = {Jeremy Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff}
}
