@article {29584,
	title = {Multilateral Negotiations for Rescheduling Developing Country Debt: A Bargaining-Theoretic Framework},
	journal = {International Monetary Fund Staff Papers },
	volume = {35},
	year = {1988},
	note = {Reprinted in Jacob A. Frenkel, Michael P. Dooley and Peter Wickham, eds., Analytical Issues in Debt, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, 1989.},
	pages = {644{\textendash}657},
	abstract = {A dynamic bargaining-theoretic framework is used to analyze multilateral negotiations for rescheduling sovereign debt. The analysis illustrates how various factors, such as the debtor{\textquoteright}s gains from trade and the level of the world interest rates, affect the relative bargaining power of various parties to a rescheduling agreement. If creditor-country taxpayers have a vested interest in maintaining normal levels of trade with debtor countries, then they can sometimes be bargained into making sidepayments. The benefits from unanticipated creditor-country sidepayments accrue to both lenders and borrowers. But the benefits from perfectly anticipated sidepayments accrue entirely to borrowers.},
	author = {Jeremy Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff}
}
