Personhood in U.S. Constitutional Law

Semester: 

Fall

Offered: 

2023

 

According to philosopher Thomas Hobbes, the world—including human life—is selfish, violent, and without justice. Against this imagined state of nature, societies form to establish laws, thereby preserving property, enforcing agreements, serving the general welfare, and securing peace for mutual prosperity. However, a problem arises for Hobbes: if societies thrive upon such governance, it is only insofar as beneficiaries are able and willing to abide by the law. But given that humans are naturally uncooperative in the Hobbesian worldview, societies must invent something that recognizes and is in turn recognized by the law: a “person.” As a result, humans, non-human entities, and corporations can be personated. Jurisprudence consequently grapples with criteria whereby persons are defined. While Hobbes is not the architect of the U.S. Constitution, his influence on the issue of personhood is most apparent when we ask, “who are the ‘we’ in ‘we the people?’” What counts as a person? No question is more urgent in the course of events than when personhood is employed by the Supreme Court. From Dred Scott v. Sandford to Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard, from Buck v. Bell to Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, this course explores numerous landmark decisions that have made and unmade people.