@inbook {185156, title = {Does Evolutionary Psychology Show That Normativity Is Mind-Dependent?}, booktitle = {Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics}, year = {2014}, pages = {215{\textendash}52}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, organization = {Oxford University Press}, address = {Oxford}, abstract = {Suppose we grant that evolutionary forces have had a profound effect on the contours of our normative judgments and intuitions. Can we conclude anything from this about the correct metaethical theory? I argue that, for the most part, we cannot. Focusing my attention on Sharon Street{\textquoteright}s justly famous argument that the evolutionary origins of our normative judgments and intuitions cause insuperable epistemological difficulties for a metaethical view she calls "normative realism," I argue that there are two largely independent lines of argument in Street{\textquoteright}s work which need to be teased apart. The first of these involves a genuine appeal to evolutionary considerations, but it can fairly easily be met by her opponents. The second line of argument is more troubling; it raises a significant problem, one of the most difficult in all of philosophy, namely how to justify our reliance on our most basic cognitive faculties without relying on those same faculties in a question-begging manner. However, evolutionary considerations add little to this old problem, and rejecting normative realism is not a way to solve it.}, author = {Berker, Selim}, editor = {Justin D{\textquoteright}Arms and Daniel Jacobson} }