@article {620381,
	title = {Quasi-Dependence},
	journal = {Oxford Studies in Metaethics},
	volume = {15},
	year = {2020},
	month = {2020},
	pages = {195{\textendash}218},
	abstract = {Quasi-realists aim to account for many of the trappings of metanormative realism within an expressivist framework. Chief among these is the realist way of responding to the Euthyphro dilemma: quasi-realists want to join realists in being able to say, {\textquotedblleft}It{\textquoteright}s not the case that kicking dogs is wrong because we disapprove of it. Rather, we disapprove of kicking dogs because it{\textquoteright}s wrong.{\textquotedblright} However, the standard quasi-realist way of explaining what we are up to when we assert the first of these two sentences rests on a mistaken identification of metaphysical dependence (or grounding) with counterfactual covariation. I propose a better way for expressivists to understand such sentences, on which they serve to express complex states of mind in which an attitude bears a relation of psychological dependence (or basing) to another state of mind. In slogan form: talk of normative grounding is the expression of attitudinal basing. I argue that this proposal is a natural, versatile, and fruitful approach for expressivists to take that helps them secure the first half of the Euthyphro contrast{\textemdash}but at the cost of making it difficult to see how expressivists can make sense of that contrast{\textquoteright}s second half.},
	author = {Berker, Selim}
}
