Sean Dorrance Kelly. 2005. “Closing the Gap: Phenomenology and Logical Analysis.” The Harvard Review of Philosophy, XIII, 2. sk_Closing_the_Gap.pdf
Sean Dorrance Kelly. 2005. “The Puzzle of Temporal Experience.” In Cognition and Neuroscience, edited by Andy Brook and Kathleen Akins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2_booksk_the_puzzle_of_temporal_experience.pdf
Sean Dorrance Kelly. 2004. “Reference and Attention: A Difficult Connection.” In Philosophical Studies, 120: Pp. 277-286. Netherlands : Kluwer Academic Publishers. 6_sk_reference_and_attention.pdf
Sean Dorrance Kelly. 2004. “Seeing Things in Merleau-Ponty.” In Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty, edited by Taylor Carman, Pp. 74-110. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1_booksk_seeing_things_in_merleau-ponty.pdf
Sean Dorrance Kelly. 12/4/2002. “Merleau-Ponty on the Body.” In Ratio (new series), 4th ed., XV: Pp. 0034-0006. Oxford, UK and Malden, MA, USA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.Abstract

Abstract : The work of Alan Cowey and Petra Stoerig is often taken to have shown that, following lesions analogous to those that cause blindsight in humans, there is blindsight in monkeys. The present paper reveals a problem in Cowey and Stoerig ’ s case for blindsight in monkeys. The problem is that Cowey and Stoerig ’ s results would only provide good evidence for blindsight if there is no difference between their two experimental paradigms with regard to the sorts of stimuli that are likely to come to consciousness. We show that the paradigms could differ in this respect, given the connections that have been shown to exist between working memory, perceptual load, attention, and consciousness.

Sean Dorrance Kelly. 2002. “Husserl and Phenomenology.” In The Blackwell Guide to Continental Philosophy, edited by Robert Solomon and D Blackwell, Pp. 112-142. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 3_booksk_edmund_husserl_and_phenomenology.pdf
Sean Dorrance Kelly. 7/2001. “Demonstrative Concepts and Experience.” The Philosophical Review, 110, 3, Pp. 397-420. 7_sk_demonstrative_concepts_and_experience.pdf
Sean Dorrance Kelly. 5/2001. “The Non-conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience: Situation Dependance and Fineness of Grain .” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62, 1. 13_sk_what_makes_perceptual_content_non.pdf
Sean Dorrance Kelly, Donald Borrett, and Hon Kwan. 6/2000. “Phenomenology, Dynamical Neural Networks, and Brain Function.” Philosophical Psychology, 13, 2. Publisher's Version 12_sk_phenomenology_dynamical_neural_networks_and_brain_function.pdf
Sean Dorrance Kelly. 1/2000. “Review of Andy Clark: Being There.” Mind, 109, 433, Pp. 138-143. review_of_andy_clark-being_there.pdf
Sean Dorrance Kelly, Donald Borrett, and Hon Kwan. 2000. “Bridging Embodied Cognition and Brain Function: the Role of Phenomenology.” Philosophical Psychology, 13, 2. Publisher's Version 11_sk_bridging_embodied_cognition_and_brain_function_the_role_of_phenomenology.pdf
Sean Dorrance Kelly. 2000. The Relevance of Phenomenology to the Philosophy of Language and Mind. New York: Routledge.
Sean Dorrance Kelly. 2000. “Grasping at Straws: Motor Intentionality and the Cognitive Science of Skilled Behavior.” In Heidegger, Coping, and Cognitive Science: Essays in Honor of Hubert L. Dreyfus - Vol. II, edited by Mark Wrathall and Jeff Malpas, II: Pp. 161-177. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. 4_booksk_grasping_at_straws.pdf
1999. “What do we see (When we do)?” Philosophical Topics (Fall 1999), 27, 2, Pp. 107-128. 10_sk_what_do_we_see_when_we_do.doc
Sean Dorrance Kelly and Mark Wrathall. 1996. “Existential Phenomenology and Cognitive Science.” Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy (special issue devoted to Philosophy and Cognitive Science), spring. 14_sk_existential_phen_and_cog_sci.doc