%0 Journal Article %J NBER Macroeconomics Annual %D Forthcoming %T Long Term Expectations and Aggregate Fluctuations %A Pedro Bordalo %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Rafael LaPorta %A Matthew OBrien %A Andrei Shleifer %B NBER Macroeconomics Annual %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Review of Economic Studies %D Forthcoming %T Imagining the Future: Memory, Simulation, and Beliefs %A Pedro Bordalo %A Giovanni Burro %A Katie Coffman %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Andrei Shleifer %B Review of Economic Studies %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Political Economy %D Forthcoming %T Belief Overreaction and Stock Market Puzzles %A Pedro Bordalo %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Rafael LaPorta %A Andrei Shleifer %X We construct an index of long term expected earnings growth for S&P500 firms and show that it has remarkable power to jointly predict future errors in these expectations and stock returns, in both the aggregate market and the cross section. The evidence supports a mechanism whereby good news cause investors to become too optimistic about long term earnings growth, for the market as a whole but especially for a subset of firms. This leads to inflated stock prices and, as beliefs are systematically disappointed, to subsequent low returns in the aggregate market and for the subset of firms. Overreaction of long-term expectations helps resolve major asset pricing puzzles without time series or cross-sectional variation in required returns. %B Journal of Political Economy %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 2023 %T Memory and Probability %A Pedro Bordalo %A Conlon, John %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Kwon, Spencer Y. %A Andrei Shleifer %B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 138 %P 265–311 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Perspectives %D 2022 %T Overreaction and Diagnostic Expectations in Macroeconomics %A Pedro Bordalo %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Andrei Shleifer %B Journal of Economic Perspectives %V 36 %P 223–244 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Annual Review of Economics, 2022 %D 2022 %T Salience %A Pedro Bordalo %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Andrei Shleifer %B Annual Review of Economics, 2022 %V 14 %P 521-544 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J The Journal of Law and Economics %D 2022 %T Property Rights and Urban Form %A Andrei Shleifer %A Edward L. Glaesar %A Simeon Djankov %A Valeria Perotti %X How do the different elements in the standard bundle of property rights – such as the right of possession or the right of transfer – differentially impact outcomes, such as urban development? This paper incorporates insecure property rights into a standard model of urban land prices and density, and makes predictions about investment in land and property, informality, and the efficiency of land use. Our empirical analysis links data on institutions related to land titling and transfer with multiple urban outcomes, from 190 countries. The evidence is generally consistent with the model’s predictions, and more broadly with the Demsetz’s (1967) approach to property rights institutions. Indeed, we document world-wide improvements in the quality of institutions facilitating property transfer over time.     %B The Journal of Law and Economics %V 65 %G eng %U https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/718854 %N S1 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Finance %D 2022 %T Predictable Financial Crises %A Robin Greenwood %A Samuel G. Hanson %A Andrei Shleifer %A Jakob Ahm Sørensen %B Journal of Finance %8 April 2022 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review %D 2022 %T Public Procurement in Law and Practice %A Erica Bosio %A Simeon Djankov %A Edward L. Glaeser %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We examine a new data set of laws and practices governing public procurement, as well as procurement outcomes, in 187 countries.  We measure regulation as restrictions on discretion of the procuring agents.  We find that laws and practices are highly correlated with each other across countries, better practices are correlated with better outcomes, but laws themselves are not correlated with outcomes.  To shed light on this puzzle, we present a model of procurement in which both regulation and public sector capacity determine the efficiency of procurement. In the model, regulation is effective in countries with low public sector capacity, and detrimental in countries with high public sector capacity because it inhibits the socially optimal exercise of discretion.  We find evidence broadly consistent with this prediction: regulation of procurement improves outcomes, but only in countries with low public sector capacity.

%B American Economic Review %V 112 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Review of Financial Studies %D 2022 %T Trust and Insurance Contracts %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Rafael LaPorta %A Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We assemble and analyze a new data set of homeowner insurance claims from 28 independently operated country subsidiaries of a multinational insurance company. A fundamental feature of the data is that such claims are often disputed, and lead to rejections or lower payments. We propose a new model of insurance, in which consumers can make invalid claims and firms can deny valid claims. In this environment, trust and honesty are critical factors that shape insurance contracts and the payment of claims, especially when the disputed amounts are too small for courts. We characterize equilibrium insurance contracts, and show how they depend on the quality of the legal system and the level of trust. We then investigate the incidence of claims, disputes and rejections of claims, and payment of claims in our data, as well as the cost and pricing of insurance. The evidence is consistent with the centrality of trust for insurance markets, as predicted by the model.

%B Review of Financial Studies %V 35 %P 5287–5333 %G eng %N 12 %0 Generic %D 2021 %T Memory and Representativeness %A Pedro Bordalo %A Katherine Coffman %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Frederik Schwerter %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We explore the idea that judgment by representativeness reflects the workings of episodic memory, especially interference. In a new laboratory experiment on cued recall, participants are shown two groups of images with different distributions of colors. We find that i) decreasing the frequency of a given color in one group significantly increases the recalled frequency of that color in the other group, ii) for a fixed set of images, different cues for the same objective distribution entail different interference patterns and different probabilistic assessments. Selective retrieval and interference may offer a foundation for the representativeness heuristic, but more generally for understanding the formation of probability judgments from experienced statistical associations.

%B Psychological Review %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Financial Economics %D 2021 %T Diagnostic Bubbles %A Pedro Bordalo %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Spencer Yongwook Kwon %A Andrei Shleifer %X We introduce diagnostic expectations into a standard setting of price formation in which investors learn about the fundamental value of an asset and trade it. We study the interaction of diagnostic expectations with two well-known mechanisms: learning from prices and speculation (buying for resale). With diagnostic (but not with rational) expectations, these mechanisms lead to price paths exhibiting three phases: initial underreaction, followed by overshooting (the bubble), and finally a crash. With learning from prices, the model generates price extrapolation as a byproduct of fast moving beliefs about fundamentals, which lasts only as the bubble builds up. When investors speculate, even mild diagnostic distortions generate substantial bubbles. %B Journal of Financial Economics %V 141 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Political Economy %D 2021 %T Securing Property Rights %A A. Patrick Behrer %A Edward L. Glaeser %A Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto %A Andrei Shleifer %X

A central challenge in securing property rights is the subversion of justice through legal skill, bribery, or physical force by the strong—the state or its powerful citizens—against the weak. We present evidence that undue influence on judges is a common concern in many countries, especially among the poor. We then present a model of a water polluter whose discharges contaminate adjacent land. If this polluter can subvert the assessment of damages caused by his activity, there is an efficiency case for granting the landowner the right to an injunction that stops the polluter, rather than the right to compensation for the harm. If the polluter can subvert even the determination of his responsibility for harm, there is an efficiency case for regulation that restricts pollution regardless of its effects. We then conduct an empirical analysis of water quality in the U.S. before and after the Clean Water Act, and show how regulation brought about cleaner water, particularly in states with higher corruption.

%B Journal of Political Economy %G eng %0 Generic %D 2020 %T Overreaction in Macroeconomic Expectations %A Pedro Bordalo %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Yueran Ma %A Andrei Shleifer %B American Economic Review %V 110 %P 2748-82 %G eng %N 9 %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 2020 %T Memory, Attention, and Choice %A Pedro Bordalo %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Andrei Shleifer %B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 135 %P 1399–1442 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J AER Papers and Proceedings %D 2019 %T Memory and Reference Prices: an Application to Rental Choice %A Pedro Bordalo %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Andrei Shleifer %B AER Papers and Proceedings %V 109 %P 572–576 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review %D 2019 %T Beliefs about Gender %A Pedro Bordalo %A Katie Coffman %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Andrei Shleifer %X We conduct laboratory experiments that explore how gender stereotypes shape beliefs about ability of oneself and others in different categories of knowledge. The data reveal two patterns. First, men’s and women’s beliefs about both oneself and others exceed observed ability on average, particularly in difficult tasks. Second, overestimation of ability by both men and women varies across categories. To understand these patterns, we develop a model that separates gender stereotypes from mis-estimation of ability related to the difficulty of the task. We find that stereotypes contribute to gender gaps in self-confidence, assessments of others, and behavior in a cooperative game. %B American Economic Review %V 109 %P 739-773 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Finance %D 2019 %T Diagnostic Expectations and Stock Returns %A Pedro Bordalo %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Rafael LaPorta %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We revisit La Porta's finding that returns on stocks with the most optimistic analyst long‐term earnings growth forecasts are lower than those on stocks with the most pessimistic forecasts. We document the joint dynamics of fundamentals, expectations, and returns of these portfolios, and explain the facts using a model of belief formation based on the representativeness heuristic. Analysts forecast fundamentals from observed earnings growth, but overreact to news by exaggerating the probability of states that have become more likely. We find support for the model's predictions. A quantitative estimation of the model accounts for the key patterns in the data.

%B Journal of Finance %V 74 %P 2839-2874 %G eng %N 6 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Financial Economics %D 2019 %T Bubbles for Fama %A Robin Greenwood %A Andrei Shleifer %A Yang You %X

We evaluate Eugene Fama’s claim that stock prices do not exhibit price bubbles. Based on US industry returns 1926-2014 and international sector returns 1985-2014, we present four findings: (1) Fama is correct in that a sharp price increase of an industry portfolio does not, on average, predict unusually low returns going forward; (2) such sharp price increases predict a substantially heightened probability of a crash; (3) attributes of the price run-up, including volatility, turnover, issuance, and the price path of the run-up can all help forecast an eventual crash and future returns; and (4) some of these characteristics can help investors earn superior returns by timing the bubble. Results hold similarly in US and international samples.

%B Journal of Financial Economics %V 131 %P 20-43 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Financial Economics %D 2018 %T Extrapolation and Bubbles %A Nicholas Barberis %A Robin Greenwood %A Lawrence Jin %A Andrei Shleifer %B Journal of Financial Economics %V 129 %P 203-227 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Finance %D 2018 %T Diagnostic Expectations and Credit Cycles %A Pedro Bordalo %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We present a model of credit cycles arising from diagnostic expectations – a belief formation mechanism based on Kahneman and Tversky’s (1972) representativeness heuristic. In this formulation, when forming their beliefs agents overweight future outcomes that have become more likely in light of incoming data. The model reconciles extrapolation and neglect of risk in a unified framework. Diagnostic expectations are forward looking, and as such are immune to the Lucas critique and nest rational expectations as a special case. In our model of credit cycles, credit spreads are excessively volatile, over-react to news, and are subject to predictable reversals. These dynamics can account for several features of credit cycles and macroeconomic volatility

%B Journal of Finance %8 February 2018 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics %D 2018 %T Investment Hangover and the Great Recession %A Matthew Rognlie %A Andrei Shleifer %A Alp Simsek %X

We present a model of investment hangover motivated by the Great Recession. Overbuilding of durable capital such as housing requires a reallocation of productive resources to other sectors, which is facilitated by a reduction in the interest rate. When monetary policy is constrained, overbuilding induces a demand-driven recession with limited reallocation and low output. Investment in other capital initially declines due to low demand, but it later booms and induces an asymmetric recovery in which the overbuilt sector is left behind. Welfare can be improved by expost policies that stimulate investment (including in overbuilt capital), and ex-ante policies that restrict investment.

%B American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics %V 10 %P 113-53 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %D 2017 %T A Real Estate Boom with Chinese Characteristics %A Edward Glaeser %A Wei Huang %A Yueran Ma %A Andrei Shleifer %X

Chinese housing prices rose by over 10 percent per year in real terms between 2003 and 2014, and are now between two and ten times higher than the construction cost of apartments. At the same time, Chinese developers built 100 billion square feet of residential real estate. This boom has been accompanied by a large increase in the number of vacant homes, held by both developers and households. This boom may turn out to be a housing bubble followed by a crash, yet that future is far from certain. The demand for real estate in China is so strong that current prices might be sustainable, especially given the sparse alternative investments for Chinese households, so long as the level of new supply is radically curtailed. Whether that happens depends on the policies of the Chinese government, which must weigh the benefits of price stability against the costs of restricting urban growth.

%V 31 %P 93-116 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 2016 %T Stereotypes %A Pedro Bordalo %A Katherine Coffman %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We present a model of stereotypes based on Kahneman and Tversky’s representativeness heuristic. A decision maker assesses a target group by overweighting its representative types, defined as the types that occur more frequently in that group than in a baseline reference group. Stereotypes formed this way contain a ‘‘kernel of truth’’: they are rooted in true differences between groups. Because stereotypes focus on differences, they cause belief distortions, particularly when groups are similar. Stereotypes are also context dependent: beliefs about a group depend on the characteristics of the reference group. In line with our predictions, beliefs in the lab about abstract groups and beliefs in the field about political groups are context dependent and distorted in the direction of representative types. JEL Codes: D03, D83, D84, C91.

%B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 131 %P 1753-1794 %G eng %U http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/131/4/1753.full.pdf?etoc %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Review of Economic Studies %D 2016 %T Competition for Attention %A Pedro Bordalo %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We present a model of market competition in which consumers' attention is drawn to the products' most salient attributes. Firms compete for consumer attention via their choices of quality and price. Strategic positioning of a product affects how all other products are perceived. With this attention externality, depending on the cost of producing quality some markets exhibit “commoditized” price salient equilibria, while others exhibit “de-commoditized” quality salient equilibria. When the costs of quality change, innovation can lead to radical shifts in markets, as in the case of decommoditization of the coffee market by Starbucks. In the context of financial innovation, the model generates the phenomenon of “reaching for yield”.

%B Review of Economic Studies %V 83 %P 481-513 %G eng %N 2 %0 Unpublished Work %D 2016 %T Expectations and Investment %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Yueran Ma %A Andrei Shleifer %X

Using micro data from Duke University quarterly survey of Chief Financial Officers, we show that corporate investment plans as well as actual investment are well explained by CFOs’ expectations of earnings growth. The information in expectations data is not subsumed by traditional variables, such as Tobin’s Q or discount rates. We also show that errors in CFO expectations of earnings growth are predictable from past earnings and other data, pointing to extrapolative structure of expectations and suggesting that expectations may not be rational. This evidence, like earlier findings in finance, points to the usefulness of data on actual expectations for understanding economic behavior.   

%B NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Vol. 30 (2015): 379-442 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %D 2015 %T Neglected Risks: The Psychology of Financial Crises %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert Vishny %B American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %V 105 %P 310-314 %G eng %U http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.p20151091 %N 5 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Financial Economics %D 2015 %T Banks as patient fixed-income investors %A Samuel Hanson %A Andrei Shleifer %A Jeremy C. Stein %A Robert W. Vishny %X

We examine the business model of traditional commercial banks when they compete with shadow banks. While both types of intermediaries create safe “money-like” claims, they go about this in different ways. Traditional banks create money-like claims by holding illiquid fixed-income assets to maturity, and they rely on deposit insurance and costly equity capital to support this strategy. This strategy allows bank depositors to remain “sleepy”: they do not have to pay attention to transient fluctuations in the market value of bank assets. In contrast, shadow banks create money-like claims by giving their investors an early exit option requiring the rapid liquidation of assets. Thus, traditional banks have a stable source of funding, while shadow banks are subject to runs and fire-sale losses. In equilibrium, traditional banks have a comparative advantage at holding fixed-income assets that have only modest fundamental risk but are illiquid and have substantial transitory price volatility, whereas shadow banks tend to hold relatively liquid assets.

%B Journal of Financial Economics %V 117 %P 449-469 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Finance %D 2015 %T Money Doctors %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert Vishny %X

We present a new model of investors delegating portfolio management to professionals based on trust. Trust in the manager reduces an investor’s perception of the riskiness of a given investment, and allows managers to charge fees. Money managers compete for investor funds by setting fees, but because of trust, fees do not fall to costs. In equilibrium, fees are higher for assets with higher expected return, managers on average under perform the market net of fees, but investors nevertheless prefer to hire managers to investing on their own. When investors hold biased expectations, trust causes managers to pander to investor beliefs.

%B Journal of Finance %V 70 %P 91-114 %G eng %U http://authorservices.wiley.com/bauthor/onlineLibraryTPS.asp?DOI=10.1111/jofi.12188&ArticleID=1342396 %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Perspectives %D 2015 %T Matthew Gentzkow, Winner of the 2014 Clark Medal %A Andrei Shleifer %X

The 2014 John Bates Clark Medal of the American Economic Association was awarded to Matthew Gentzkow of the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. The citation recognized Matt’s “fundamental contributions to our understanding of the economic forces driving the creation of media products, the changing nature and role of media in the digital environment, and the effect of media on education and civic engagement.” In addition to his work on the media, Matt has made a number of significant contributions to empirical industrial organization more broadly, as well as to applied economic theory. In this essay, I highlight some of these contributions, which are listed on Table 1. I will be referring to these papers by their number on this list.

Matt earned both his AB in 1997, and, after a brief career in the theatre, his PhD in 2004 from Harvard, where he began to work on the media. At Harvard he also met Jesse Shapiro, his close friend and collaborator. I was one of Matt’s (as well as Jesse’s) thesis advisors. From Harvard, both Matt and Jesse moved to Chicago Booth School, where their research truly thrived and they contributed to a fantastic group of applied economists.

%B Journal of Economic Perspectives %V 29 %P 181-192 %G eng %U http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.29.1.181 %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Legal Studies %D 2015 %T Salience Theory of Judicial Decisions %A Pedro Bordalo %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We present a model of judicial decision making in which the judge overweights the salient facts of the case. The context of the judicial decision, which is comparative by nature, shapes which aspects of the case stand out and draw the judge's attention. By focusing judicial attention on such salient aspects of the case, legally irrelevant information can a ect judicial decisions. Our model accounts for a range of recent experimental evidence bearing on the psychology of judicial decisions, including anchoring e ects in the setting of damages, decoy e ects in choice of legal remedies, and framing e ects in the decision to litigate. The model also o ers a new approach to positive analysis of damage awards in torts.

%B Journal of Legal Studies %V 44 %P S7-S33 %G eng %U http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.1086/676007.pdf?acceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=true %N S1 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Financial Economics %D 2015 %T

X-CAPM: An Extrapolative Capital Asset Pricing Model

%A Nicholas Barberis %A Robin Greenwood %A Lawrence Jin %A Andrei Shleifer %X

Survey evidence suggests that many investors form beliefs about future stock market returns by extrapolating past returns. Such beliefs are hard to reconcile with existing models of the aggregate stock market. We study a consumption-based asset pricing model in which some investors form beliefs about future price changes in the stock market by extrapolating past price changes, while other investors hold fully rational beliefs. We find that the model captures many features of actual prices and returns; importantly, however, it is also consistent with the survey evidence on investor expectations.

%B Journal of Financial Economics %V 115 %P 1-24 %G eng %U http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X14001822 %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Foreign Affairs %D 2014 %T

Normal Countries: The East 25 Years After Communism

%A Andrei Shleifer %A Daniel Treisman %B Foreign Affairs %G eng %U http://fam.ag/1zjndBw %0 Journal Article %J Science %D 2014 %T

Gary Becker (1930–2014)

%A Edward L. Glaeser %A Andrei Shleifer %X

Gary Becker, who died on 3 May 2014 at the age of 83, redefined economics both in its methodology and scope. He radically expanded the sphere of economic analysis. As the range of issues and especially data in economics increased over the last half century, Becker's approach became more and more relevant and modern. He was awarded the 1992 Nobel Prize in Economics for “having extended the domain of microeconomic analysis to a wide range of human behavior and interaction, including nonmarket behavior.”

%B Science %V 344 %P 1233 %G eng %U http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/344/6189/1233?ijkey=nTRluHzI0d5VA&keytype=ref&siteid=sci %N 6189 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Perspectives %D 2014 %T

Informality and Development

%A Rafael LaPorta %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We establish five facts about the informal economy in developing countries.  First, it is huge, reaching about half of the total in the poorest countries.   Second, it has extremely low productivity compared to the formal economy: informal firms are typically small, inefficient, and run by poorly educated entrepreneurs.   Third, although avoidance of taxes and regulations is an important reason for informality, the productivity of informal firms is too low for them to thrive in the formal sector.   Lowering registration costs neither brings many informal firms into the formal sector, nor unleashes economic growth.  Fourth, the informal economy is largely disconnected from the formal economy.   Informal firms rarely transition to formality, and continue their existence, often for years or even decades, without much growth or improvement.   Fifth, as countries grow and develop, the informal economy eventually shrinks, and the formal economy comes to dominate economic life.  These five facts are most consistent with dual models of informality and economic development. 

%B Journal of Economic Perspectives %V 28 %P 109-126 %G eng %U http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.28.3.109 %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Review of Financial Studies %D 2014 %T

Expectations of Returns and Expected Returns

%A Robin Greenwood %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We analyze time series of investor expectations of future stock market returns from six data sources between 1963 and 2011. The six measures of expectations are highly positively correlated with each other, as well as with past stock returns and with the level of the stock market. However, investor expectations are strongly negatively correlated with model-based expected returns. The evidence is not consistent with rational expectations representative investor models of returns.

%B Review of Financial Studies %V 27 %P 714-746 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 2014 %T Finance and the Preservation of Wealth %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert Vishny %X

We introduce the model of asset management developed in Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (GSV, 2014) into a Solow-style neoclassical growth model with diminishing returns to capital. Savers rely on trusted intermediaries to manage their wealth (claims on capital stock), who can charge fees above costs to trusting investors. In this model, the ratio of financial income to GDP increases with the ratio of aggregate wealth to GDP. Both rise along the convergence path to steady state growth. We examine several further implications of the model for management fees, unit costs of finance, and the consequences of shocks to trust and to the capital stock.

%B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 129 %P 1221-1254 %G eng %U http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/129/3/1221.full %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Growth %D 2014 %T

Growth in Regions

%A Nicola Gennaioli %A Rafael LaPorta %A Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We use a newly assembled sample of 1,528 regions from 83 countries to compare the speed of per capita income convergence within and across countries.  Regional growth is shaped by similar factors as national growth, such as geography and human capital.  Regional convergence rate is about 2% per year, comparable to that between countries.   Regional convergence is faster in richer countries, and countries with better capital markets.  A calibration of a neoclassical growth model suggests that significant barriers to factor mobility within countries are needed to account for the evidence. 

%B Journal of Economic Growth %V 19 %P 259-309 %G eng %U http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10887-014-9105-9 %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of European Economic Association %D 2014 %T Letter Grading Government Efficiency %A Chong, Alberto %A Rafael LaPorta %A Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We mailed letters to non-existent business addresses in 159 countries (10 per country), and measured whether they come back to the return address in the US and how long it takes. About 60% of the letters were returned, taking over 6 months, on average. The results provide new objective indicators of government efficiency across countries, based on a simple and universal service, and allow us to shed light on its determinants. The evidence suggests that both technology and management quality influence government efficiency, just as they do that of the private sector.

%B Journal of European Economic Association %V 12 %P 277-299 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %D 2013 %T Salience and Asset Prices %A Pedro Bordalo %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Andrei Shleifer %B American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %V 103 %P 623-628 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Law and Economics %D 2013 %T

Education, Complaints, and Accountability

%A Juan Botero %A Alejandro Ponce %A Andrei Shleifer %X Better-educated countries have better governments, an empirical regularity that holds in both dictatorships and democracies. Possible reasons for this fact are that educated people are more likely to complain about misconduct by government officials and that more frequent complaints encourage better behavior from officials. Newly assembled individual-level survey data from the World Justice Project show that, within countries, better-educated people are more likely to report official misconduct. The results are confirmed using other survey data on reporting crime and corruption. Citizens’ complaints might thus be an operative mechanism that explains the link between education and the quality of government. %B Journal of Law and Economics %V 56 %P 959-996 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Political Economy %D 2013 %T Salience and Consumer Choice %A Pedro Bordalo %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Andrei Shleifer %X We present a theory of context-dependent choice in which a consumer’s attention is drawn to salient attributes of goods, such as quality or price. An attribute is salient for a good when it stands out among the good’s attributes relative to that attribute’s average level in the choice set ðor, more broadly, the choice contextÞ. Consumers attach disproportionately high weight to salient attributes, and their choices are tilted toward goods with higher quality/price ratios. The model accounts for a variety of disparate evidence, including decoy effects and contextdependent willingness to pay. It also suggests a novel theory of misleading sales. %B Journal of Political Economy %V 121 %P 803-843 %G eng %N 5 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Law and Economics %D 2013 %T An Activity-Generating Theory of Regulation %A Joshua Schwartzstein %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We propose an activity-generating theory of regulation. When courts make errors, tort litigation becomes unpredictable and as such imposes risk on firms, thereby discouraging entry, innovation, and other socially desirable activity. When social returns to innovation are higher than private returns, it may pay the society to generate some information ex ante about how risky firms are, and to impose safety standards based on that information. In some situations, compliance with such standards should entirely preempt tort liability; in others, it should merely reduce penalties. By reducing litigation risk, this type of regulation can raise welfare.

%B Journal of Law and Economics %V 56 %P 1-38 %G eng %N 1 %9 Manuscript %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Journal: Applied Economics %D 2013 %T Teaching Practices and Social Capital %A Yann Algan %A Pierre Cahuc %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We use several data sets to consider the effect of teaching practices on student beliefs, as well as on organization of firms and institutions. In student level data, teaching practices (such as teachers lecturing versus students working in groups) exert a substantial influence on student beliefs about cooperation both with each other and with teachers. In cross‐ country data, teaching practices shape both beliefs and institutional outcomes. The relationship between teaching practices and student test performance is nonlinear. The evidence supports the idea that progressive education promotes social capital.

%B American Economic Journal: Applied Economics %V 5 %P 189-210 %G eng %N 3 %9 Manuscript %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 2013 %T

Human Capital and Regional Development

%A Nicola Gennaioli %A Rafael LaPorta %A Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We investigate the determinants of regional development using a newly constructed database of 1569 sub-national regions from 110 countries covering 74 percent of the world’s surface and 96 percent of its GDP. We combine the cross-regional analysis of geographic, institutional, cultural, and human capital determinants of regional development with an examination of productivity in several thousand establishments located in these regions. To organize the discussion, we present a new model of regional development that introduces into a standard migration framework elements of both the Lucas (1978) model of the allocation of talent between entrepreneurship and work, and the Lucas (1988) model of human capital externalities. The evidence points to the paramount importance of human capital in accounting for regional differences in development, but also suggests from model estimation and calibration that entrepreneurial inputs and human capital externalities are essential for understanding the data.

%B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 128 %P 105-164 %G eng %N 1 %9 Manuscript %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Finance %D 2013 %T A Model of Shadow Banking %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %X

We present a model of shadow banking in which banks originate and trade loans, assemble them into diversified portfolios, and finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, bank assets and leverage move together, banks become interconnected through markets, and banks increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce idiosyncratic risk through diversification. The shadow banking system is stable and welfare improving under rational expectations, but vulnerable to crises and liquidity dry-ups when investors neglect tail risks.

%B Journal of Finance %V 68 %P 1331-1363 %G eng %N 4 %9 Manuscript %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Literature %D 2012 %T Psychologists at the Gate: Review of Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow %A Andrei Shleifer %B Journal of Economic Literature %V 50 %P 1080-1091 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %D 2012 %T Salience and Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect %A Pedro Bordalo %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Andrei Shleifer %B American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %V 102 %P 47-52 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 2012 %T Salience Theory of Choice Under Risk %A Pedro Bordalo %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Andrei Shleifer %B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 127 %P 1243-1285 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Financial Economics %D 2012 %T Neglected Risks, Financial Innovation and Financial Fragility %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %X

We present a standard model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries engineer securities with cash flows that investors seek, but modify two assumptions. First, investors (and possibly intermediaries) neglect certain unlikely risks. Second, investors demand securities with safe cash flows. Financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks. Because the risks are neglected, security issuance is excessive. As investors eventually recognize these risks, they fly back to the safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile, even without leverage, precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive.
Copyright 2011 Published by Elsevier B.V.

%B Journal of Financial Economics %V 104 %P 452-468 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Financial Economics %D 2012 %T Chasing Noise %A Brock Mendel %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We present a simple model in which rational but uninformed traders occasionally chase noise as if it were information, thereby amplifying sentiment shocks and moving prices away from fundamental values. In the model, noise traders can have an impact on market equilibrium disproportionate to their size in the market. The model offers a partial explanation for the surprisingly low market price of financial risk in the spring of 2007.
Copyright 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

%B Journal of Financial Economics %V 104 %P 303-320 %G eng %N 2 %0 Book %D 2012 %T The Failure of Judges and the Rise of Regulators %A Andrei Shleifer %I MIT Press %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Perspectives %D 2011 %T Fire Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Journal of Economic Perspectives %V 25 %P 29-48 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Foreign Affairs %D 2011 %T Why Moscow Says No %A Andrei Shleifer %A Daniel Treisman %B Foreign Affairs %V 90 %P 122-138 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Brookings Papers on Economic Activity %D 2010 %T Comments on Gorton and Metrick: Regulating the Shadow Banking System %A Andrei Shleifer %B Brookings Papers on Economic Activity %V 2010 %P 298-303 %G eng %N 2 %0 Book Section %B Regulation vs. Litigation %D 2010 %T Efficient Regulation %A Andrei Shleifer %E Daniel Kessler %X

Regulation of economic activity is ubiquitous around the world, yet standard theories predict it should be rather uncommon. I argue that the ubiquity of regulation is explained not so much by the failure of markets, or by asymmetric information, as by the failure of courts to solve contract and tort disputes cheaply, predictably, and impartially. The approach accounts for the ubiquity of regulation, for its growth over time, as well as for the fact that contracts themselves are heavily regulated. It also makes predictions, both across activities and across jurisdictions, for the efficiency of regulation and litigation as strategies of enforcing efficient conduct.

%B Regulation vs. Litigation %I NBER and University of Chicago Press %P 27-43 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Financial Economics %D 2010 %T Unstable Banking %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %X

We propose a theory of financial intermediaries operating in markets influenced by investor sentiment. In our model, banks make, securitize, distribute, and trade loans, or they hold cash. They also borrow money, using their security holdings as collateral. Banks maximize profits, and there are no conflicts of interest between bank shareholders and creditors. The theory predicts that bank credit and real investment will be volatile when market prices of loans are volatile, but it also points to the instability of banks, especially leveraged banks, participating in markets. Profit- maximizing behavior by banks creates systemic risk.
Copyright 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

%B Journal of Financial Economics %V 97 %P 306-318 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 2010 %T What Comes to Mind %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We present a model of intuitive inference, called “local thinking,” in which an agent combines data received from the external world with information retrieved from memory to evaluate a hypothesis. In this model, selected and limited recall of information follows a version of the representativeness heuristic. The model can account for some of the evidence on judgment biases, including conjunction and dis- junction fallacies, but also for several anomalies related to demand for insurance.

%B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 125 %P 1399-1433 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 2010 %T Regulation and Distrust %A Philippe Aghion %A Yann Algan %A Pierre Cahuc %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We document that, in a cross section of countries, government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with measures of trust. In a simple model ex- plaining this correlation, distrust creates public demand for regulation, whereas regulation in turn discourages formation of trust, leading to multiple equilibria. A key implication of the model is that individuals in low-trust countries want more government intervention even though they know the government is corrupt. We test this and other implications of the model using country- and individual-level data on trust and beliefs about the role of government, as well as on changes in beliefs during the transition from socialism.

%B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 125 %P 1015-1049 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics %D 2010 %T The Effect of Corporate Taxes on Investment and Entrepreneurship %A Simeon Djankov %A Tim Ganser %A Caralee McLiesh %A Rita Ramalho %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We present new data on effective corporate income tax rates in 85 countries in 2004. The data come from a survey, conducted jointly with PricewaterhouseCoopers, of all taxes imposed on “the same” standardized mid-size domestic firm. In a cross-section of countries, our estimates of the effective corporate tax rate have a large adverse impact on aggregate investment, FDI, and entrepreneurial activity. Corporate tax rates are correlated with investment in manufacturing but not services, as well as with the size of the informal economy. The results are robust to the inclusion of many controls. (JEL E22, F23, G31, H25, H32, L26)

%B American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics %V 2 %P 31-64 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Legal Studies %D 2010 %T The Evolution of a Legal Rule %A Anthony Niblett %A Richard A. Posner %A Andrei Shleifer %X

Efficient legal rules are central to efficient resource allocation in a market economy. But the question whether the common law actually converges to efficiency in commercial areas has remained empirically untested. We create a data set of 461 state court appellate decisions involving the economic loss rule in construction disputes and trace the evolution of this law from 1970 to 2005. We find that the law did not converge to any stable resting point and evolved differently in different states. Legal evolution is influenced by plaintiffs’ choice of which legal claims to make, the relative economic power of the parties, and nonbinding federal precedent.

%B Journal of Legal Studies %V 39 %P 325-358 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %D 2010 %T Asset Fire Sales and Credit Easing %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %V 100 %P 46-50 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Journal: Applied Economics %D 2010 %T Disclosure by Politicians %A Simeon Djankov %A Rafael LaPorta %A Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by members of Parliament in 175 countries. Although two- thirds of the countries have some disclosure laws, less than one-third make disclosures available to the public, and less than one-sixth of potentially useful information is publicly available in practice, on average. Countries that are richer, more democratic, and have free press have more disclosure. Public disclosure, but not internal disclosure to parliament, is positively related to government quality, including lower corruption. (JEL J13, I21, I12)

%B American Economic Journal: Applied Economics %V 2 %P 179-209 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Cato Journal %D 2009 %T Peter Bauer and the Failure of Foreign Aid %A Andrei Shleifer %X

Peter Bauer was one of the greatest development economists in liistory. He was an advocate of property rights protection and free trade before tliese ideas became commonplace. He appreciated before otliers did tlie crucial roles of entrepreneurship and trade in development. He was also one of the earliest opponents of the over- population tliesis, recognizing tliat tlie poor like tlie rich should have tlie right to choose the number of children tliey have, tliat many developing countries are underpopulated, and that population growtli will anyhow slow down once they become richer Bauer's writings are remarkable for tlieir deep humanity and commitment to tlie welfare of tlie people in die developing world, but without the fake sanctimony tliat characterizes much of die modem rhetoric.

%B Cato Journal %V 29 %P 379-390 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Journal: Economic Policy %D 2009 %T The Divergence of Legal Procedures %A Aron Balas %A Rafael LaPorta %A Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes %A Andrei Shleifer %X

Simeon Djankov et al. (2003) introduce a measure of the quality of contract enforcement—the formalism of civil procedure—for 109 countries as of 2000. For 40 of these countries, we compute proce- dural formalism every year since 1950. We find that large differences in procedural formalism between common and civil law countries existed in 1950 and widened by 2000. For this area of law, the find- ings are inconsistent with the hypothesis that national legal systems are converging, and support the view that legal origins exert long lasting influence on legal rules. (JEL K41, O17)

%B American Economic Journal: Economic Policy %V 1 %P 138-162 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Literature %D 2009 %T The Age of Milton Friedman %A Andrei Shleifer %X

Between 1980 and 2005, as the world embraced free market policies, living standards rose sharply, while life expectancy, educational attainment, and democracy improved and absolute poverty declined. Is this a coincidence? A collection of essays edited by Balcerowicz and Fischer argues that indeed reliance on free market forces is key to economic growth. A book by Stiglitz and others disagrees. I review and com- pare the two arguments.

%B Journal of Economic Literature %V 47 %P 123-135 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Brookings Papers on Economic Activity %D 2008 %T The Unofficial Economy and Economic Development %A Rafael LaPorta %A Andrei Shleifer %X

In developing countries, informal firms account for up to about half of all economic activity. Using data from World Bank firm-level surveys, we find that informal firms are small and extremely unproductive compared with even the small formal firms in the sample, and especially relative to the larger formal firms. Formal firms are run by much better educated managers than informal ones and use more capital, have different customers, market their products, and use more external finance. Few formal firms have ever operated informally. This evidence supports the dual economy (“Wal-Mart”) theory of development, in which growth comes about from the creation of highly productive formal firms. Informal firms keep millions of people alive but disappear as the economy develops.

%B Brookings Papers on Economic Activity %V 47 %P 123-135 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Political Economy %D 2008 %T Debt Enforcement Around the World %A Simeon Djankov %A Oliver Hart %A Caralee McLiesh %A Andrei Shleifer %X

Insolvency practitioners from 88 countries describe how debt enforcement will proceed against an identical hotel about to default on its debt. We use the data on time, cost, and the likely disposition of the assets (preservation as a going concern vs. piecemeal sale) to construct a measure of the efficiency of debt enforcement in each country. This measure is strongly correlated with per capita income and legal origin and predicts debt market development. Several characteristics of debt enforcement procedures, such as the structure of appeals and avail- ability of floating charge finance, influence efficiency.

%B Journal of Political Economy %V 116 %P 1105-1150 %G eng %N 6 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Financial Economics %D 2008 %T The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing %A Andrei Shleifer %A Simeon Djankov %A Rafael LaPorta %A Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes %X

We present a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index. Assembled with the help of Lex Mundi law firms, the index is calculated for 72 countries based on legal rules prevailing in 2003, and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, that govern a specific self-dealing transaction. This theoretically grounded index predicts a variety of stock market outcomes, and generally works better than the previously introduced index of anti-director rights.
Copyright 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

%B Journal of Financial Economics %V 88 %P 430-465 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Literature %D 2008 %T The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins %A Rafael LaPorta %A Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes %A Andrei Shleifer %X

In the last decade, economists have produced a considerable body of research suggesting that the historical origin of a country’s laws is highly correlated with a broad range of its legal rules and regulations, as well as with economic outcomes. We summarize this evidence and attempt a unified interpretation. We also address several objections to the empirical claim that legal origins matter. Finally, we assess the implications of this research for economic reform.

%B Journal of Economic Literature %V 46 %P 285-332 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 2008 %T Coarse Thinking and Persuasion %A Sendhil Mullainathan %A Joshua Schwartzstein %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We present a model of uninformative persuasion in which individuals “think coarsely”: they group situations into categories, and apply the same model of inference to all situations within a category. Coarse thinking exhibits two features that persuaders take advantage of: (i) transference, whereby individuals transfer the informational content of a given message from situations in a category where it is useful to those where it is not, and (ii) framing, whereby objectively useless information influences individuals’ choice of category. The model sheds light on uninformative advertising and product branding, as well as on some otherwise anomalous evidence on mutual fund advertising.

%B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 123 %P 577-619 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Legal Studies %D 2008 %T Judicial Fact Discretion %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Andrei Shleifer %X

Following legal realists, we model the causes and consequences of trial judges exercising discretion in finding facts in a trial. We identify two motivations for the exercise of such discretion: judicial policy preferences and judges’ aversion to reversal on appeal when the law is unsettled. In the latter case, judges exercising fact discretion find the facts that fit the settled precedents, even when they have no policy preferences. In a standard model of a tort, judicial fact discretion leads to setting of damages unpredictable from true facts of the case but predictable from knowledge of judicial preferences, distorts the number and severity of accidents, and generates welfare losses. It also encourages litigants to take extreme positions in court and raises the incidence of litigation relative to settlement, especially in new and complex disputes for which the law is unsettled.

%B Journal of Legal Studies %V 37 %P 1-35 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Growth %D 2007 %T Why Does Democracy Need Education? %A Edward L. Glaeser %A Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto %A Andrei Shleifer %X

Across countries, education and democracy are highly correlated. We motivate empirically and then model a causal mechanism explaining this correlation. In our model, schooling teaches people to interact with others and raises the benefits of civic participation, including voting and organizing. In the battle between democracy and dictatorship, democracy has a wide potential base of support but offers weak incentives to its defenders. Dictatorship provides stronger incentives to a narrower base. As education raises the benefits of civic engagement, it raises participation in support of a broad-based regime (democracy) relative to that in support of a narrow-based regime (dictatorship). This increases the likelihood of successful democratic revolutions against dictatorships, and reduces that of successful anti-democratic coups.

%B Journal of Economic Growth %V 12 %P 77-99 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Comparative Economics %D 2007 %T Overruling and the Instability of Law %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We investigate the evolution of common law under overruling, a system of precedent change in which appellate courts replace existing legal rules with new ones. We use a legal realist model, in which judges change the law to reflect their own preferences or attitudes, but changing the law is costly to them. The model’s predictions are consistent with the empirical evidence on the overruling behavior of the US Supreme Court and appellate courts. We find that overruling leads to unstable legal rules that rarely converge to efficiency. The selection of disputes for litigation does not change this conclusion. Our findings provide a rationale for the value of precedent, as well as for the general preference of appellate courts for distinguishing rather than overruling as a law-making strategy. Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (2) (2007) 309–328. University of Stockholm, 10691 Stockholm, Sweden; Harvard University, M9 Littauer Center, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
© 2007 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

%B Journal of Comparative Economics %V 35 %P 309-328 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Financial Economics %D 2007 %T Private Credit in 129 Countries %A Simeon Djankov %A Caralee McLiesh %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We investigate cross-country determinants of private credit, using new data on legal creditor rights and private and public credit registries in 129 countries. Both creditor protection through the legal system and information-sharing institutions are associated with higher ratios of private credit to gross domestic product, but the former is relatively more important in the richer countries. An analysis of legal reforms shows that credit rises after improvements in creditor rights and in information sharing. Creditor rights are remarkably stable over time, contrary to the hypothesis that legal rules are converging. Finally, legal origins are an important determinant of both creditor rights and information- sharing institutions. The analysis suggests that public credit registries, which are primarily a feature of French civil law countries, benefit private credit markets in developing countries. Copyright 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

%B Journal of Financial Economics %V 12 %P 77-99 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Political Economy %D 2007 %T The Evolution of Common Law %A Nicola Gennaioli %A Andrei Shleifer %B Journal of Political Economy %V 115 %P 43-68 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Finance %D 2006 %T What Works in Securities Laws? %A Rafael LaPorta %A Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We examine the effect of securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries. We find little evidence that public enforcement benefits stock markets, but strong evidence that laws mandating disclosure and facilitating private enforcement through liability rules benefit stock markets.

%B Journal of Finance %V 61 %P 1-32 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 2005 %T The Extent of the Market and the Supply of Regulation %A Casey Mulligan %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We present a model in which setting up and running a regulatory institution takes a fixed cost. As a consequence, the supply of regulation is limited by the extent of the market. We test three implications of this model. First, jurisdictions with larger populations affected by a given regulation are more likely to have it. Second, jurisdictions with lower incremental fixed costs of introducing and ad- ministering new regulations should regulate more. This implies that regulation spreads from higher to lower population jurisdictions, and that jurisdictions that build up transferable regulatory capabilities should regulate more intensely. Consistent with the model, we find that higher population U. S. states have more pages of legislation and adopt particular laws earlier in their history than do smaller states. We also find that the regulation of entry, the regulation of labor, and the military draft are more extensive in countries with larger populations, as well as in civil law countries, where we argue that the incremental fixed costs are lower.

%B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 120 %P 1445-1473 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J European Financial Management %D 2005 %T Understanding Regulation %A Andrei Shleifer %B European Financial Management %V 11 %P 439-451 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Perspectives %D 2005 %T A Normal Country: Russia after Communism %A Daniel Treisman %A Andrei Shleifer %B Journal of Economic Perspectives %V 19 %P 151-174 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review %D 2005 %T The Market for News %A Sendhil Mullainathan %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We investigate the market for news under two assumptions: that readers hold beliefs which they like to see confirmed, and that newspapers can slant stories toward these beliefs. We show that, on the topics where readers share common beliefs, one should not expect accuracy even from competitive media: competition results in lower prices, but common slanting toward reader biases. On topics where reader beliefs diverge (such as politically divisive issues), however, newspapers segment the market and slant toward extreme positions. Yet in the aggregate, a reader with access to all news sources could get an unbiased perspective. Generally speaking, reader heterogeneity is more important for accuracy in media than competition per se. (JEL D23, L82)

%B American Economic Review %V 95 %P 1031-1053 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J American Law and Economics Review %D 2005 %T Conscription as Regulation %A Casey Mulligan %A Andrei Shleifer %B American Law and Economics Review %V 7 %P 85-111 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization %D 2005 %T The Curley Effect %A Edward L. Glaeser %A Andrei Shleifer %X

James Michael Curley, a four-time mayor of Boston, used wasteful redistribution to his poor Irish constituents and incendiary rhetoric to encourage richer citizens to emigrate from Boston, thereby shaping the electorate in his favor. As a consequence, Boston stagnated, but Curley kept winning elections. We present a model of using redistributive politics to shape the electorate, and show that this model yields a number of predictions opposite from the more standard frameworks of political competition, yet consistent with empirical evidence.

%B Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization %V 21 %P 1-19 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Financial Economics %D 2005 %T Comovement %A Nicholas Barberis %A Andrei Shleifer %A Jeffrey Wurgler %X

Building on Vijh (Rev. Financial Stud. 7 (1994)), we use additions to the S&P 500 to distinguish two views of return comovement: the traditional view, which attributes it to comovement in news about fundamental value, and an alternative view, in which frictions or sentiment delink it from fundamentals. After inclusion, a stock’s beta with the S&P goes up. In bivariate regressions which control for the return of non-S&P stocks, the increase in S&P beta is even larger. These results are generally stronger in more recent data. Our findings cannot easily be explained by the fundamentals-based view and provide new evidence in support of the alternative friction- or sentiment-based view.
Copyright 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

%B Journal of Financial Economics %V 75 %P 283-317 %G eng %N 2 %0 Book %D 2005 %T A Normal Country: Russia after Communism %A Andrei Shleifer %I Harvard University Press %G eng %U http://www.amazon.com/Normal-Country-Russia-after-Communism/dp/0674015827/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1311372602&sr=1-1 %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 2004 %T The Regulation of Labor %A Juan Botero %A Simeon Djankov %A Rafael LaPorta %A Florencio López-de-Silanes %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment, collective relations, and social security laws in 85 countries. We find that the political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems, and that socialist, French, and Scandinavian legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries. However, the effects of legal origins are larger, and explain more of the variation in regulations, than those of politics. Heavier regulation of labor is associated with lower labor force participation and higher unemployment, especially of the young. These results are most naturally consistent with legal theories, according to which countries have pervasive regulatory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems.

%B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 119 %P 1339-1382 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Growth %D 2004 %T Do Institutions Cause Growth? %A Edward L. Glaeser %A Rafael LaPorta %A Florencio López-de-Silanes %A Andrei Shleifer %B Journal of Economic Growth %V 9 %P 271-303 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Foreign Affairs %D 2004 %T A Normal Country %A Daniel Treisman %A Andrei Shleifer %B Foreign Affairs %V 83 %P 20-38 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %D 2004 %T Does Competition Destroy Ethical Behavior? %A Andrei Shleifer %B American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %V 94 %P 414-418 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %D 2004 %T Persuasion in Politics %A Kevin M. Murphy %A Andrei Shleifer %X

Recent research on social psychology and public opinion identifies a number of empirical regularities on how people form beliefs in the political and social spheres. First, beliefs are flexible and can be relatively easily influenced, particularly in areas where people do not have significant personal involvement (Doris Graber, 1984; John Zaller, 1992). Second, social influence shapes decisions: people are often persuaded by those they personally interact with (Mark Grasnovetter, 1973; Robert Cialdini, 1984). Such influence from friends, co-workers, and other “discussants” significantly affects the decisions on whether and how to vote (Paul Beck et al., 2002). Third, in the political arena, voter awareness of specific issues is quite low, and hence susceptibility to persuasion is high (Zaller, 1992).
We present a model of the creation of social networks, and of their use by politicians to obtain support, motivated by these empirical findings. These networks can be political par- ties, trade unions, religious coalitions, political action committees, or even listeners of Rush Limbaugh’s radio show. The key idea is that people are influenced by those inside their net- work, but not by those outside, because those inside a network talk to and persuade each other. Networks are created by entrepreneurs using core issues that are centrally important to members, such as religious beliefs or union wages, but can then be “rented out” to politicians who seek votes as well as support for other initiatives and ideas, which might have little to do with their members’ core beliefs.

%B American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %V 94 %P 435-439 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Political Economy %D 2004 %T Judicial Checks and Balances %A Rafael LaPorta %A Florencio López-de-Silanes %A Cristian Pop-Eleches %A Andrei Shleifer %X

In the Anglo-American constitutional tradition, judicial checks and balances are often seen as crucial guarantees of freedom. Hayek distinguishes two ways in which the judiciary provides such checks and balances: judicial independence and constitutional review. We create a new database of constitutional rules in 71 countries that reflect these provisions. We find strong support for the proposition that both judicial independence and constitutional review are associated with greater freedom. Consistent with theory, judicial independence ac- counts for some of the positive effect of common-law legal origin on measures of economic freedom. The results point to significant benefits of the Anglo-American system of government for freedom.

%B Journal of Political Economy %V 112 %P 445-420 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Comparative Economics %D 2003 %T The New Comparative Economics %A Simeon Djankov %A Edward Glaeser %A Rafael LaPorta %A Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes %A Andrei Shleifer %X

In recent years, the field of comparative economics refocused on the comparison of capitalist economies. The theme of the new research is that institutions exert a profound influence on economic development. We argue that, to understand capitalist institutions, one needs to understand the basic tradeoff between the costs of disorder and those of dictatorship. We apply this logic to study the structure of efficient institutions, the consequences of colonial transplantation, and the politics of institutional choice. Journal of Comparative Economics 31 (4) (2003) 595–619. World Bank, Washington, DC 20433, USA; Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA; Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755, USA; Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520, USA.
Copyright 2003 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

%B Journal of Comparative Economics %V 31 %P 595-619 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %D 2003 %T Will The Sovereign Debt Market Survive? %A Andrei Shleifer %B American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %V 93 %P 85-90 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Financial Economics %D 2003 %T Stock Market Driven Acquisitions %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %X

We present a model of mergers and acquisitions based on stock market misvaluations of the combining firms. The key ingredients of the model are the relative valuations of the merging firms and the market’s perception of the synergies from the combination. The model explains who acquires whom, the choice of the medium of payment, the valuation consequences of mergers, and merger waves. The model is consistent with available empirical findings about characteristics and returns of merging firms, and yields new predictions as well.

%B Journal of Financial Economics %V 70 %P 295-311 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Literature %D 2003 %T The Rise of the Regulatory State %A Edward L. Glaeser %A Andrei Shleifer %B Journal of Economic Literature %V 41 %P 401-425 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 2003 %T Courts %A Simeon Djankov %A Rafael LaPorta %A Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes %A Andrei Shleifer %X

In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent and to collect a bounced check. We use these data to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country. We find that such formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries, and is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, less consistency, less honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and more corruption. These results suggest that legal transplantation may have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism, particularly in developing countries.

%B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 118 %P 453-517 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Law and Economics %D 2003 %T Who Owns the Media? %A Simeon Djankov %A Caralee McLiesh %A Tatiana Nenova %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We examine the patterns of media ownership in 97 countries around the world. We find that almost universally the largest media firms are owned by the government or by private families. Government ownership is more pervasive in broadcasting than in the printed media. We then examine two theories of government ownership of the media: the public interest (Pigouvian) theory, according to which government ownership cures market failures, and the public choice theory, according to which government ownership undermines political and economic freedom. The data support the second theory.

%B Journal of Law and Economics %V 46 %P 341-381 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Finance %D 2003 %T Family Firms %A Michael Burkhart %A Fausto Panunzi %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We present a model of succession in a ¢rm owned and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on what fraction of the company to £oat on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better manager than the heir, and describe how the founder’s decision is shaped by the legal environment. This theory of separation of ownership from management includes the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European patterns of corporate governance as special cases, and generates additional empirical predictions consistent with cross-country evidence.

%B Journal of Finance %V 58 %P 2167-2201 %G eng %N 5 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Monetary Economics %D 2003 %T The Injustice of Inequality %A Andrei Shleifer %A Edward Glaeser %A Jose Scheinkman %X

In many countries, the operation of legal, political and regulatory institutions is subverted by the wealthy and the politically powerful for their own benefit. This subversion takes the form of corruption, intimidation, and other forms of influence. We present a model of such institutional subversion—focusing specifically on courts—and of the effects of inequality in economic and political resources on the magnitude of subversion. We then use the model to analyze the consequences of institutional subversion for the law and order environment in the country, as well as for capital accumulation and growth. We illustrate the model with historical evidence from Gilded Age United States and the transition economies of the 1990s. We also present some cross-country evidence consistent with the basic prediction of the model.

%B Journal of Monetary Economics %V 50 %P 199-222 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Financial Economics %D 2003 %T Style Investing %A Nicholas Barberis %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We study asset prices in an economy where some investors categorize risky assets into different styles and move funds among these styles depending on their relative performance. In our economy, assets in the same style comove too much, assets in different styles comove too little,and reclassifying an asset into a new style raises its correlation with that style. We also predict that style returns exhibit a rich pattern of own- and cross-autocorrelations and that while asset-level momentum and value strategies are profitable, their style-level counterparts are even more so. We use the model to shed light on several style-related empirical anomalies. Copyright 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

%B Journal of Financial Economics %V 68 %P 161-199 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 2002 %T Legal Origins %A Edward L. Glaeser %A Andrei Shleifer %X

A central requirement in the design of a legal system is the protection of law enforcers from coercion by litigants through either violence or bribes. The higher the risk of coercion, the greater the need for protection and control of law enforcers by the state. Such control, however, also makes law enforcers beholden to the state, and politicizes justice. This perspective explains why, starting in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the relativelymore peaceful England developed trials by independent juries, while the less peaceful France relied on state-employed judges to resolve disputes. It may also explain many differences between common and civil law traditions with respect to both the structure of legal systems and the observed social and economic outcomes.

%B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 117 %P 1193-1229 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Financial Economics %D 2002 %T Investor Protection and Equity Markets %A Andrei Shleifer %A Daniel Wolfenzon %X

We present a simple model of an entrepreneur going public in an environment with poor legal protection of outside shareholders. The model incorporates elements of Becker’s (J. Political Econ. 106 (1968) 172) ‘‘crime and punishment’’ framework into a corporate finance environment of Jensen and Meckling (J. Financial Econ. 3 (1976) 305). We examine the entrepreneur’s decision and the market equilibrium. The model is consistent with a number of empirical regularities concerning the relation between investor protection and corporate finance. It also sheds light on the patterns of capital flows between rich and poor countries and on the politics of reform of investor protection.

%B Journal of Financial Economics %V 66 %P 3-27 %G eng %N 1 %0 Conference Paper %B Economic Policy for the Information Economy %D 2002 %T Technology, Information Production, and Market Efficiency %A Gene D’Avolio %A Efi Gildor %A Andrei Shleifer %X

A well functioning securities market relies on the availability of accurate information, a broad base of investors who can process this information, legal protection of these investors’ rights, and a liquid secondary market unencumbered by excessive transaction costs or constraints. When these conditions are satisfied, securities markets are likely to be broader and more efficient, with felicitous consequences for investment and resource allocation. This paper explores the effect of technological advances on these features of the market, emphasizing the incentives facing the producers of financial information.

%B Economic Policy for the Information Economy %I Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Finance %D 2002 %T Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation %A Rafael LaPorta %A Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %X

We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash-flow ownership by the controlling shareholder.

%B Journal of Finance %V 57 %P 1147-1170 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 2002 %T The Regulation of Entry %A Simeon Djankov %A Rafael LaPorta %A Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data cover the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries with heavier regulation of entry have higher corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality of public or private goods. Countries with more democratic and limited governments have lighter regulation of entry. The evidence is inconsistent with public interest theories of regulation, but supports the public choice view that entry regulation benefits politicians and bureaucrats.

%B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 117 %P 1-37 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Finance %D 2002 %T Government Ownership of Banks %A Rafael LaPorta %A Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes %A Andrei Shleifer %B Journal of Finance %V 57 %P 265-301 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %D 2001 %T A Reason for Quantity Regulation %A Andrei Shleifer %A Edward L. Glaeser %B American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %V 91 %P 431-435 %G eng %N 2 %0 Book Section %B Transition Economies: How Much Progress? %D 2001 %T Federalism With and Without Political Centralization: China versus Russia %A Olivier Blanchard %A Andrei Shleifer %X

In China, local governments have actively contributed to the growth of new firms. In Russia, local governments have typically stood in the way, be it through taxation, regulation, or corruption. We argue that the difference can be traced to lies in the degree of political centralization present in China, but not in Russia. In China the central government has been strong and disciplined enough to induce local governments to favor growth. In Russia, it has not. We agree, but with an important caveat. We believe the experience of Russia indicates that another ingredient is crucial, namely political centralization.

%B Transition Economies: How Much Progress? %I IMF Staff Papers %P 171-179 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Public Economics %D 2001 %T Not-for-Profit Entrepreneurs %A Edward L. Glaeser %A Andrei Shleifer %X

Entrepreneurs who start new firms may choose not-for-profit status as a means of committing to soft incentives. Such incentives protect donors, volunteers, consumers and employees from ex post expropriation of profits by the entrepreneur. We derive conditions under which completely self-interested entrepreneurs opt for not-for-profit status, despite the fact that this status limits their ability to enjoy the profits of their enterprises.We also show that even in the absence of tax advantages, unrestricted donations would flow to non-profits rather than for-profit firms because donations have more significant influence on the decisions of the non-profits.

%B Journal of Public Economics %V 81 %P 99-115 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 2001 %T Coase versus the Coasians %A Edward Glaeser %A Simon Johnson %A Andrei Shleifer %B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 116 %P 853-899 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %D 2000 %T Tunneling %A Simon Johnson %A Rafael LaPorta %A Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes %A Andrei Shleifer %B American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %V 90 %P 22-27 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Financial Economics %D 2000 %T Investor Protection and Corporate Governance %A Rafael LaPorta %A Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert Vishny %X

Recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded "rms, in the breadth and depth of capital markets, in dividend policies, and in the access of "rms to external "nance. A common element to the explanations of these di!erences is how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms. We describe the di!erences in laws and the e!ectiveness of their enforcement across countries, discuss the possible origins of these di!erences, summarize their consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform. We argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems

%B Journal of Financial Economics %V 58 %P 3-27 %G eng %N 1-2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Finance %D 2000 %T Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World %A Rafael LaPorta %A Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Journal of Finance %V 55 %P 1-33 %G eng %N 1 %0 Book %D 2000 %T Clarendon Lectures: Inefficient Markets %A Andrei Shleifer %I Oxford University Press %G eng %U http://www.amazon.com/Inefficient-Markets-Introduction-Behavioral-Clarendon/dp/0198292279/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1311372419&sr=1-1 %0 Book %B MIT Press %D 2000 %T Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia %A Andrei Shleifer %A D. Treisman %B MIT Press %I MIT Press %G eng %U http://www.amazon.com/Without-Map-Political-Tactics-Economic/dp/0262692694/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1311372212&sr=1-1 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Finance %D 1999 %T Corporate Ownership Around the World %A Rafael LaPorta %A Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes %A Andrei Shleifer %B Journal of Finance %V 54 %P 471-517 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Law, Economics and Organization %D 1999 %T The Quality of Government %A Rafael LaPorta %A Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert Vishny %B Journal of Law, Economics and Organization %V 15 %P 222-279 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Political Economy %D 1998 %T Law and Finance %A Rafael LaPorta %A Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Journal of Political Economy %V 106 %P 1113-1155 %G eng %N 6 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Perspectives %D 1998 %T State versus Private Ownership %A Andrei Shleifer %B Journal of Economic Perspectives %V 12 %P 133-150 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Financial Economics %D 1998 %T A Model of Investor Sentiment %A Nicholas Barberis %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert Vishny %X

Recent empirical research in finance has uncovered two families of pervasive regularities underreaction of stock prices to news such as earnings announcements, and overreaction of stock prices to a series of good or bad news. In this paper, we present a parsimonious model of investor sentiment, or of how investors form beliefs, which is consistent with the empirical findings. The model is based on psychological evidence and produces both underreaction and overreaction for a wide range of parameter values.

%B Journal of Financial Economics %V 49 %P 307-343 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %D 1998 %T Private Enforcement of Public Laws: a Theory of Legal Reform %A Jonathan R. Hay %A Andrei Shleifer %B American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %V 88 %P 398-403 %G eng %N 2 %0 Book %D 1998 %T The Grabbing Hand %A Andrei Shleifer %A R. Vishny %I Harvard University Press %G eng %U http://www.amazon.com/Grabbing-Hand-Government-Pathologies-Their/dp/0674010140/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1311371780&sr=1-1 %0 Unpublished Work %D 1997 %T What Do Money Managers Do? %A Josef Lakonishok %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert Vishny %G eng %9 Manuscript %0 Journal Article %J Economics of Transition %D 1997 %T Agenda for Russian Reforms %A Andrei Shleifer %B Economics of Transition %V 5 %P 227-231 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Brookings Papers on Economic Activity %D 1997 %T The Unofficial Economy in Transition %A Simon Johnson %A Daniel Kaufmann %A Andrei Shleifer %B Brookings Papers on Economic Activity %V 1997 %P 159-239 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Finance %D 1997 %T Legal Determinants of External Finance %A Rafael LaPorta %A Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Journal of Finance %V 52 %P 1131-1150 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 1997 %T The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons %A Oliver Hart %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %X

When should a government provide a service in-house, and when should it contract out provision? We develop a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of service or reducing cost. If contracts are incomplete, the private provider has a stronger incentive to engage in both quality improvement and cost reduction than a government employee has. However, the private contractor’s incentive to engage in cost reduction is typically too strong because he ignores the adverse effect on noncontractible quality. The model is applied to understanding the costs and beneŽts of prison privatization.

%B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 112 %P 1127-1161 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Rand Journal of Economics %D 1997 %T Privatization in the United States %A Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Rand Journal of Economics %V 28 %P 447-471 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %D 1997 %T Trust in Large Organizations %A Rafael LaPorta %A Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %V 87 %P 333-338 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J European Economic Review %D 1997 %T Schumpeter Lecture: Government in Transition %A Andrei Shleifer %X

The speed of economic reforms is not the only important determinant of the success of the transition to a market economy: the transition of government from a communist state to an institution supporting a market economy is as critical. Survey evidence shows that Russia lags significantly behind Poland in the transition of its government, which may account for its inferior economic performance despite adopting similar economic reforms. I argue that the lack of turnover of old communist politicians, and the creation of inappropriate electoral and fiscal incentives for these politicians, may account for the poor performance of the Russian government, and suggest some strategies for improving the situation.

%B European Economic Review %V 4 %P 385-410 %G eng %N 3-5 %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %D 1997 %T The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand %A Timothy Frye %A Andrei Shleifer %B American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %V 87 %P 354-358 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Finance %D 1997 %T A Survey of Corporate Governance %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Journal of Finance %V 52 %P 737-783 %8 August %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Finance %D 1997 %T Good News for Value Stocks: Further Evidence on Market Efficiency %A Rafael LaPorta %A Josef Lakonishok %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert Vishny %B Journal of Finance %V 52 %P 859-874 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Finance %D 1997 %T The Limits of Arbitrage %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Journal of Finance %V 52 %P 35-55 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Development Economics %D 1997 %T Quality and Trade %A Kevin M. Murphy %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We present a model of trade in which similar countries trade more with each other than with very different countries. The reason is that high human capital countries have a comparative advantage at producing high quality goods, but are also rich enough to want to consume high quality. As a result, countries choose trading partners at a similar level of development, who produce similar quality products. The model helps account for the observed trade patterns, and sheds light on international income comparisons. It also helps explain recent concerns of Eastern European countries that they have 'nothing to sell' to the West.

%B Journal of Development Economics %V 53 %P 1-15 %G eng %N 1997 %0 Journal Article %J Rivista di Politica Economica %D 1996 %T Origins of Bad Policies: Control, Corruption and Confusion %A Andrei Shleifer %B Rivista di Politica Economica %V June %G eng %0 Journal Article %J European Economic Review %D 1996 %T Second Best Economic Advice to a Divided Government %A Maxim Boycko %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B European Economic Review %V 40 %P 767-774 %G eng %N 3-5 %0 Journal Article %J European Economic Review %D 1996 %T Toward A Theory of Legal Reform %A Jonathan R. Hay %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %X

This paper describes some characteristics of a dysfunctional legal system, and then proposes some reforms of the legal rules that would encourage private agents to rely on the legal system rather than mafia to structure their transactions. We argue - using both theory and the example of Russia - that legal rules should accommodate rather than interfere with the existing business practice. Moreover, in the transition stage, good legal rules should enable highly imperfect courts to verify violations of law and tell courts what to do when such violations occur.

%B European Economic Review %V 40 %P 559-567 %G eng %N 3-5 %0 Book Section %B Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia: Volume 2. Insiders and the State %D 1996 %T Management Ownership and Russian Privatization %A Andrei Shleifer %A D. Vasiliev %E R. Frydman %E C. W. Gray %E A. Rapaczynski %B Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia: Volume 2. Insiders and the State %I Central European University Press %C Budapest %G eng %0 Book Section %B Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia: Volume 2. Insiders and the State %D 1996 %T Corporate Governance in Russia: An Initial Look %A Andrei Shleifer %A J. Blasi %E R. Frydman %E C. W. Gray %E A. Rapaczynski %B Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia: Volume 2. Insiders and the State %I Central European University Press %C Budapest %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Political Economy %D 1996 %T How Does Privatization Work: Evidence from the Russian Shops %A Nicholas Barberis %A Maxim Boycko %A Andrei Shleifer %A Natalia Tsukanova %B Journal of Political Economy %V 104 %P 764-790 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Economic Journal %D 1996 %T A Theory of Privatization %A Andrei Shleifer %A Maxim Boycko %A Robert W. Vishny %B Economic Journal %V 106 %P 309-319 %G eng %N 435 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Monetary Economics %D 1995 %T Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Cities %A Edward L. Glaeser %A Jose A. Scheinkman %A Andrei Shleifer %X

We examine the relationship between urban characteristics in 1960 and urban growth between 1960 and 1990. Income and population growth move together, and both types of growth are (l) positively related to initial schooling, (2) negatively related to initial unemployment, and (3) negatively related to the initial share of employment in manufacturing. Racial composition and segregation are uncorrelated with urban growth across all cities, but in cities with large nonwhite communities segregation is positively correlated with population growth. Government expenditures (except for sanitation) are uncorrelated with growth; government debt is positively correlated with later growth.

%B Journal of Monetary Economics %V 36 %P 117-143 %G eng %N 1 %0 Book %D 1995 %T Privatizing Russia %A M. Boycko %A Andrei Shleifer %A R. Vishny %I MIT Press %G eng %U http://www.amazon.com/Privatizing-Russia-Maxim-Boycko/dp/0262522284/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1311371650&sr=8-1 %0 Conference Proceedings %B Proceedings of the Annual Conference on Development Economics %D 1994 %T Establishing Property Rights %A Andrei Shleifer %B Proceedings of the Annual Conference on Development Economics %I World Bank %G eng %0 Book Section %B Russia: Creating Private Enterprises and Efficient Markets %D 1994 %T Next Steps in Privatization: Six Major Challenges %A Maxim Boycko %A Andrei Shleifer %E Ira W. Lieberman %E John Nellis %B Russia: Creating Private Enterprises and Efficient Markets %I The World Bank %C Washington, DC %P 75-86 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 1994 %T Politicians and Firms %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 109 %P 995-1025 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Perspectives %D 1994 %T Politics of Market Socialism %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Journal of Economic Perspectives %V 8 %P 165-176 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Finance %D 1994 %T Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and Risk %A Josef Lakonishok %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Journal of Finance %V 49 %P 1541-1578 %G eng %N 5 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Financial Economics %D 1994 %T What Do Firms Do with Cash Windfalls? %A Olivier J. Blanchard %A Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes %A Andrei Shleifer %X

Suppose that a firm receives a cash windfall which does not change its investment opportunity set or, equivalently, its marginal Tobin’s Q. What will this firm do with the money? We provide empirical answers to this question using a sample of eleven firms with such windfalls in the form of a won or settled lawsuit. We examine a variety of decisions of the firm to shed light on alternative theories of corporate financing and investment. Our evidence is broadly inconsistent with the perfect capital markets model. The results need to be stretched considerably to fit the asymmetric information model in which managers act in the interest of shareholders. The evidence supports the agency model of managerial behavior, in which managers try to ensure the long-run survival and independence of the firms with themselves at the helm.

%B Journal of Financial Economics %V 36 %P 337-360 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Financial Economics %D 1994 %T Voucher Privatization %A Maxim Boycko %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %X

Several Eastern European countries have initiated mass privatization programs to transfer state-owned assets to the genera; population. We show that the decision to pursue mass privatization and even the specific design of the programs are largely dictated by politics. Nonetheless, politically feasible programs can also be made attractive from an economic standpoint in terms of maximizing value, fostering free and efficient markets, and promoting corporate governance. In general, the design of economic institutions is critically shaped by political factors, although satisfactory economic results can be achieved in spite of political constraints.

%B Journal of Financial Economics %V 35 %P 249-266 %G eng %N 2 %0 Book Section %B The Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 2: Restructuring %D 1994 %T Privatization in Russia: First Steps %A Andrei Shleifer %A R. Vishny %E O. J. Blanchard %E K. R. Froot %E J. D. Sachs %B The Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 2: Restructuring %I University of Chicago Press %C Chicago, Illinois %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Brookings Papers on Economic Activity %D 1993 %T Privatizing Russia %A Maxim Boycko %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Brookings Papers on Economic Activity %V 2 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Law and Economics %D 1993 %T Princes or Merchants? City Growth before the Industrial Revolution %A J.Bradford DeLong %A Andrei Shleifer %B Journal of Law and Economics %V 36 %P 671-702 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Economics of Transition %D 1993 %T Needed Mechanisms for Corporate Governance and Finance in Eastern Europe %A Roman Frydman %A Edmund S. Phelps %A Andrzej Rapaczynsk %A Andrei Shleifer %B Economics of Transition %V 1 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %D 1993 %T Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth? %A Kevin M. Murphy %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %V 83 %P 409-414 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Finance %D 1993 %T Yes, Discounts on Closed-End Funds Are a Sentiment Index %A Navin Chopra %A Charles M. C. Lee %A Andrei Shleifer %A Richard H. Thaler %B Journal of Finance %V 48 %P 801-808 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 1993 %T Corruption %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 108 %P 599-617 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Political Economy %D 1993 %T Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets %A J. B. Delong %A Andrei Shleifer %A Lawrence H. Summers %A Robert J. Waldmann %B Journal of Political Economy %V 98 %G eng %N 4 %0 Unpublished Work %D 1992 %T The Waste of Time and Talent under Socialism %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %G eng %9 Manuscript %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Political Economy %D 1992 %T Growth in Cities %A Edward L. Glaeser %A Hedi D. Kallal %A Jose A. Scheinkman %A Andrei Shleifer %B Journal of Political Economy %V 100 %P 1126-1152 %G eng %N 6 %0 Journal Article %J The Rand Journal of Economics %D 1992 %T Pervasive Shortages under Socialism %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B The Rand Journal of Economics %V 23 %P 237-246 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Portfolio Management %D 1992 %T Closed-End Fund Discounts: A Yardstick of Small Investor Sentiment %A Andrei Shleifer %A J.Bradford DeLong %B Journal of Portfolio Management %V Winter %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Financial Economics %D 1992 %T The Impact of Institutional Trading on Stock Prices %A Josef Lakonishok %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %X

This paper uses new data on the holdings of 769 tax-exempt (predominantly pension) funds. to evaluate the potential effect of their trading on stock prices. We address two aspects of trading by these money managers: herding, which refers to buying (selling) simultaneously the same stocks as other managers buy (sell), and positive-feedback trading, which refers to buying past winners and selling past losers. These two aspects of trading are commonly a part of the argument that institutions destabilize stock prices. The evidence suggests that pension managers do not strongly pursue these potentially destabilizing practices.

%B Journal of Financial Economics %V 32 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics %D 1992 %T The Structure and Performance of the Money Management Industry %A Josef Lakonishok %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Finance %D 1992 %T Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Journal of Finance %V 47 %P 1343-1366 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 1992 %T The Transition to a Market Economy: Pitfalls of Partial Reform %A Kevin M. Murphy %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 107 %P 889-906 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Brookings Papers on Economic Activity %D 1991 %T Reversing the Soviet Economic Collapse %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Brookings Papers on Economic Activity %V 22 %P 341-367 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Strategic Management Journal %D 1991 %T Takeovers in the '60s and the '80s: Evidence and Implications %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Strategic Management Journal %V December %P 51-59 %G eng %N 12 %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %D 1991 %T Window Dressing by Pension Fund Managers %A Josef Lakonishok %A Andrei Shleifer %A Richard H. Thaler %A Robert W. Vishny %B American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %V May %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic History %D 1991 %T The Bubble of 1929: Evidence from Closed-End Funds %A J.Bradford DeLong %A Andrei Shleifer %B Journal of Economic History %V 51 %P 675-700 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Finance %D 1991 %T Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle %A Charles M. C. Lee %A Andrei Shleifer %A Richard H. Thaler %B Journal of Finance %V 46 %P 75-109 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Business %D 1991 %T The Survival of Noise Traders in Financial Markets %A J.Bradford DeLong %A Andrei Shleifer %A Lawrence H. Summers %A Robert Waldmann %B Journal of Business %V 64 %P 1-19 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 1991 %T The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth %A Kevin. M. Murphy %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 106 %P 503-530 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J R. Bras. Econ. %D 1990 %T Externalidades como motor do crescimento %A Andrei Shleifer %B R. Bras. Econ. %V 44 %P 297-310 %G eng %U http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/rbe/article/view/457 %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Rand Journal of Economics %D 1990 %T Reversions of Excess Pension Assets after Takeovers %A Jeffrey Pontiff %A Andrei Shleifer %A Michael S. Weisbach %B Rand Journal of Economics %V 21 %P 600-613 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Brookings Papers on Economic Activity %D 1990 %T The Stock Market and Investment: Is the Market a Sideshow? %A Randall Morck %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Brookings Papers on Economic Activity %V 21 %P 157-216 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Perspectives %D 1990 %T Closed End Mutual Funds %A Charles M. C. Lee %A Andrei Shleifer %A Richard H. Thaler %B Journal of Economic Perspectives %V 4 %P 153-164 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Applied Corporate Finance %D 1990 %T The Takeover Wave of the 1980s %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Journal of Applied Corporate Finance %V 4 %P 49-56 %G eng %U http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1745-6622.1991.tb00615.x/full %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %D 1990 %T Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors and Firms %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings %V 80 %P 148-153 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics %D 1990 %T Hostile Takeovers in the 1980s: The Return to Corporate Specialization %A Sanjai Bhagat %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Finance %D 1990 %T Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions? %A Randall Morck %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Journal of Finance %V 45 %P 31-48 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Perspectives %D 1990 %T The Noise Trader Approach to Finance %A Andrei Shleifer %A Lawrence H. Summers %B Journal of Economic Perspectives %V 4 %P 19-33 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Finance %D 1990 %T Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation %A J.Bradford DeLong %A Andrei Shleifer %A Lawrence H. Summers %A Robert J. Waldmann %B Journal of Finance %V 45 %P 379-395 %G eng %N 2 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Business: Merton Miller Conference %D 1990 %T Costs of Financial Distress, Delayed Calls of Convertible Bonds, and the Role of Investment Banks %A Dwight Jaffee %A Andrei Shleifer %B Journal of Business: Merton Miller Conference %V January %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Financial Economics %D 1989 %T Managerial Entrenchment: The Case of Manager-Specific Investments %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %X

We describe how managers can entrench themselves by making manager-specific investments that make it costly for shareholders to replace them. By making manager-specific investments. managers can reduce the probability of being replaced extract higher wages and larger perquisites from shareholders. and obtain more latitude in determining corporate strategy. Our model of entrenchment has empirical implications that are consistent with the evidence on managerial behavior.

%B Journal of Financial Economics %V 25 %P 123-139 %G eng %N 1 %0 Journal Article %J NBER Macroeconomics Annual %D 1989 %T Building Blocks of Market Clearing Business Cycle Models %A Kevin M. Murphy %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B NBER Macroeconomics Annual %V 4 %P 247-287 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Finance %D 1989 %T The Size and Incidence of the Losses from Noise Trading %A J.Bradford DeLong %A Andrei Shleifer %A Lawrence H. Summers %A Robert J. Waldmann %B Journal of Finance %V 44 %P 681-696 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J American Economic Review %D 1989 %T Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control %A Randall Morck %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B American Economic Review %V 79 %P 842-852 %G eng %N 4 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Political Economy %D 1989 %T Industrialization and the Big Push %A Kevin M. Murphy %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Journal of Political Economy %V 97 %P 1003-1026 %G eng %N 5 %0 Journal Article %J Quarterly Journal of Economics %D 1989 %T Income Distribution, Market Size and Industrialization %A Kevin M. Murphy %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Quarterly Journal of Economics %V 104 %P 537-564 %G eng %N 3 %0 Unpublished Work %D 1988 %T Increasing Returns, Durables, and Economic Fluctuations %A Kevin M. Murphy %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %G eng %9 Manuscript %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Political Economy %D 1988 %T The Efficiency of Investment in the Presence of Aggregate Demand Spillovers %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Journal of Political Economy %V 96 %P 1221-1231 %G eng %N 6 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Financial Economics %D 1988 %T Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis %A Randall Morck %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Journal of Financial Economics %V 20 %P 293-315 %G eng %N 1-2 %0 Book Section %B Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences %D 1988 %T Characteristics of Targets of Hostile and Friendly Takeovers %A Randall Morck %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %E Alan J. Auerbach %B Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences %I University of Chicago Press %C Chicago %P 101-136 %G eng %0 Book Section %B Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences. %D 1988 %T Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers %A Andrei Shleifer %A Lawrence H. Summers %E Alan J. Auerbach %B Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences. %I University of Chicago Press %C Chicago %P 33-56 %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Economic Perspectives %D 1988 %T Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Journal of Economic Perspectives %V 2 %P 7-20 %G eng %N 1 %0 Book Section %B Mergers and Acquisitions %D 1987 %T Management Buyouts as a Response to Market Pressure %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %E Alan J. Auerbach %B Mergers and Acquisitions %I University of Chicago Press %C Chicago %G eng %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Political Economy %D 1986 %T Implementation Cycles %A Andrei Shleifer %B Journal of Political Economy %V 94 %P 1163-1190 %G eng %N 6 %0 Journal Article %J Rand Journal of Economics %D 1986 %T Greenmail, White Knights, and Shareholders' Interest %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Rand Journal of Economics %V 17 %P 293-309 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Finance %D 1986 %T Do Demand Curves for Stocks Slope Down? %A Andrei Shleifer %B Journal of Finance %V 41 %P 579-590 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Political Economy %D 1986 %T Large Shareholders and Corporate Control %A Andrei Shleifer %A Robert W. Vishny %B Journal of Political Economy %V 94 %P 461-488 %G eng %N 3 %0 Journal Article %J Journal of Political Economy %D 1985 %T The Strategic Bequest Motive %A B.Douglas Bernheim %A Andrei Shleifer %A Lawrence H. Summers %B Journal of Political Economy %V 93 %P 1045-1076 %G eng %N 6 %0 Journal Article %J Rand Journal of Economics %D 1985 %T A Theory of Yardstick Competition %A Andrei Shleifer %B Rand Journal of Economics %V 16 %P 319-327 %G eng %N 3