Working Papers

Working Paper
Bordalo, Pedro, Katherine Coffman, Nicola Gennaioli, Frederik Schwerter, and Andrei Shleifer. Working Paper. “Memory and Representativeness”. Abstract
We explore the idea that judgment by representativeness reflects the workings
of episodic memory, especially interference. In a new laboratory experiment on cued
recall, participants are shown two groups of images with different distributions of
colors. We find that i) decreasing the frequency of a given color in one group significantly
increases the recalled frequency of that color in the other group, ii) for a
fixed set of images, different cues for the same objective distribution entail different
interference patterns and different probabilistic assessments. Selective retrieval
and interference may offer a foundation for the representativeness heuristic, but
more generally for understanding the formation of probability judgments from experienced
statistical associations.
PDF
Bordalo, Pedro, Nicola Gennaioli, Spencer Yongwook Kwon, and Andrei Shleifer. Working Paper. “Diagnostic Bubbles”. Abstract
We introduce diagnostic expectations into a standard setting of price formation in which investors learn about the fundamental value of an asset and trade it. We study the interaction of diagnostic expectations with two well-known mechanisms: learning from prices and speculation (buying for resale). With diagnostic (but not with rational) expectations, these mechanisms lead to price paths exhibiting three phases: initial underreaction, followed by overshooting (the bubble), and finally a crash. With learning from prices, the model generates price extrapolation as a byproduct of fast moving beliefs about fundamentals, which lasts only as the bubble builds up. When investors speculate, even mild diagnostic distortions generate substantial bubbles.
PDF
Bordalo, Pedro, Nicola Gennaioli, Yueran Ma, and Andrei Shleifer. Working Paper. “Overreaction in Macroeconomic Expectations”. Abstract
We examine the rationality of individual and consensus professional forecasts of macroeconomic and financial variables using the methodology of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015), which focuses on the predictability of forecast errors from earlier forecast revisions. We document two principal findings: forecasters typically over-react to information individual level, while consensus forecasts exhibit under-reaction. To reconcile these findings, we combine the diagnostic expectations model of belief formation from Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2018) with Woodford’s (2003) noisy information model of belief aggregation. The model accounts for the findings, but also yields a number of new implications related to the forward looking nature of diagnostic expectations, which we also test and confirm. Finally, we compare our model to mechanical extrapolation, rational inattention, and natural expectations.
PDF, revised June 2018
Bordalo, Pedro, Nicola Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer. Working Paper. “Memory, Attention, and Choice”. Abstract

We present a theory in which the choice set cues a consumer to recall a norm, and surprise relative to the norm shapes his attention and choice. We model memory based on Kahana (2012), where past experiences that are more recent or more similar to the cue are recalled and crowd out others. We model surprise relative to the norm using our salience model of attention and choice. The model predicts unstable and inconsistent behavior in new contexts, because these are evaluated relative to past norms. Under some conditions, repeated experience causes norms to adapt, inducing stable – sometimes rational –behavior across different contexts. We test some of the model’s predictions using an expanded data set on rental decisions of movers between US cities first analyzed by Simonsohn and Loewenstein (2006).

PDF, current revision, March 2017
Glaeser, Edward L., Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto, and Andrei Shleifer. Working Paper. “Securing Property Rights”. Abstract

A central challenge in securing property rights is the subversion of justice through legal skill, bribery, or physical force by the strong—the state or its powerful citizens—against the weak. We present evidence that the less educated and poorer citizens in many countries feel their property rights are least secure. We then present a model of a farmer and a mine which can pollute his farm in a jurisdiction where the mine can subvert law enforcement. We show that, in this model, injunctions or other forms of property rules work better than compensation for damage or liability rules. The equivalences of the Coase Theorem break down in realistic ways. The case for injunctions is even stronger when parties can invest in power. Our approach sheds light on several controversies in law and economics, but also applies to practical problems in developing countries, such as low demand for formality, law enforcement under uncertain property rights, and unresolved conflicts between environmental damage and development.

PDF, revised September 2016
Bordalo, Pedro, Nicola Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer. Working Paper. “Memory, Attention, and Choice”. Abstract

We present a theory of consumer choice that combines elements of limited recall and of allocation
of attention distorted by salience. The theory helps clarify and organize a variety of evidence dealing
with consumer reaction to information, including surprises in quality and prices, unshrouding of
hidden attributes such as taxes or maintenance costs, and reminders. Our model explains how
consumers under or overreact to information, depending on what draws their attention. It also yields
a normative analysis of reaction to reminders which adjusts the \sucient statistic" methodology.

PDF, original working paper, revised March 2015