Publications

1997
Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W Vishny. 1997. “Privatization in the United States.” Rand Journal of Economics 28 (3): 447-471.
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LaPorta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W Vishny. 1997. “Trust in Large Organizations.” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 87 (2): 333-338.
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Shleifer, Andrei. 1997. “Schumpeter Lecture: Government in Transition.” European Economic Review 4 (3-5): 385-410. Abstract

The speed of economic reforms is not the only important determinant of the success of the transition to a market economy: the transition of government from a communist state to an institution supporting a market economy is as critical. Survey evidence shows that Russia lags significantly behind Poland in the transition of its government, which may account for its inferior economic performance despite adopting similar economic reforms. I argue that the lack of turnover of old communist politicians, and the creation of inappropriate electoral and fiscal incentives for these politicians, may account for the poor performance of the Russian government, and suggest some strategies for improving the situation.

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Frye, Timothy, and Andrei Shleifer. 1997. “The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand.” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 87 (2): 354-358.
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Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W Vishny. 1997. “A Survey of Corporate Governance.” Journal of Finance 52 (2): 737-783.
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LaPorta, Rafael, Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 1997. “Good News for Value Stocks: Further Evidence on Market Efficiency.” Journal of Finance 52 (2): 859-874.
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Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W Vishny. 1997. “The Limits of Arbitrage.” Journal of Finance 52 (1): 35-55.
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Murphy, Kevin M, and Andrei Shleifer. 1997. “Quality and Trade.” Journal of Development Economics 53 (1997): 1-15. Abstract

We present a model of trade in which similar countries trade more with each other than with very different countries. The reason is that high human capital countries have a comparative advantage at producing high quality goods, but are also rich enough to want to consume high quality. As a result, countries choose trading partners at a similar level of development, who produce similar quality products. The model helps account for the observed trade patterns, and sheds light on international income comparisons. It also helps explain recent concerns of Eastern European countries that they have 'nothing to sell' to the West.

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1996
Shleifer, Andrei. 1996. “Origins of Bad Policies: Control, Corruption and Confusion.” Rivista di Politica Economica June.
Boycko, Maxim, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W Vishny. 1996. “Second Best Economic Advice to a Divided Government.” European Economic Review 40 (3-5): 767-774.
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Hay, Jonathan R, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W Vishny. 1996. “Toward A Theory of Legal Reform.” European Economic Review 40 (3-5): 559-567. Abstract

This paper describes some characteristics of a dysfunctional legal system, and then proposes some reforms of the legal rules that would encourage private agents to rely on the legal system rather than mafia to structure their transactions. We argue - using both theory and the example of Russia - that legal rules should accommodate rather than interfere with the existing business practice. Moreover, in the transition stage, good legal rules should enable highly imperfect courts to verify violations of law and tell courts what to do when such violations occur.

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Shleifer, Andrei, and D Vasiliev. 1996. “Management Ownership and Russian Privatization.” Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia: Volume 2. Insiders and the State, edited by R Frydman, CW Gray, and A Rapaczynski. Budapest: Central European University Press.
Shleifer, Andrei, and J Blasi. 1996. “Corporate Governance in Russia: An Initial Look.” Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia: Volume 2. Insiders and the State, edited by R Frydman, CW Gray, and A Rapaczynski. Budapest: Central European University Press.
Barberis, Nicholas, Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer, and Natalia Tsukanova. 1996. “How Does Privatization Work: Evidence from the Russian Shops.” Journal of Political Economy 104 (4): 764-790.
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Shleifer, Andrei, Maxim Boycko, and Robert W Vishny. 1996. “A Theory of Privatization.” Economic Journal 106 (435): 309-319.
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1995
Glaeser, Edward L, Jose A Scheinkman, and Andrei Shleifer. 1995. “Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Cities.” Journal of Monetary Economics 36 (1): 117-143. Abstract

We examine the relationship between urban characteristics in 1960 and urban growth between 1960 and 1990. Income and population growth move together, and both types of growth are (l) positively related to initial schooling, (2) negatively related to initial unemployment, and (3) negatively related to the initial share of employment in manufacturing. Racial composition and segregation are uncorrelated with urban growth across all cities, but in cities with large nonwhite communities segregation is positively correlated with population growth. Government expenditures (except for sanitation) are uncorrelated with growth; government debt is positively correlated with later growth.

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Privatizing Russia
Boycko, M, Andrei Shleifer, and R Vishny. 1995. Privatizing Russia. MIT Press. Website
1994
Shleifer, Andrei. 1994. “Establishing Property Rights.” Proceedings of the Annual Conference on Development Economics. World Bank.
Boycko, Maxim, and Andrei Shleifer. 1994. “Next Steps in Privatization: Six Major Challenges.” Russia: Creating Private Enterprises and Efficient Markets, edited by Ira W Lieberman and John Nellis, 75-86. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W Vishny. 1994. “Politicians and Firms.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (4): 995-1025.
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