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    Shleifer, Andrei, and Lawrence H Summers. 1988. “Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers.” Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences., edited by Alan J Auerbach, 33-56. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
    Greenwood, Robin, Andrei Shleifer, and Yang You. 2019. “Bubbles for Fama.” Journal of Financial Economics 131 (1): 20-43. Abstract

    We evaluate Eugene Fama’s claim that stock prices do not exhibit price bubbles. Based on US industry returns 1926-2014 and international sector returns 1985-2014, we present four findings: (1) Fama is correct in that a sharp price increase of an industry portfolio does not, on average, predict unusually low returns going forward; (2) such sharp price increases predict a substantially heightened probability of a crash; (3) attributes of the price run-up, including volatility, turnover, issuance, and the price path of the run-up can all help forecast an eventual crash and future returns; and (4) some of these characteristics can help investors earn superior returns by timing the bubble. Results hold similarly in US and international samples.

    Mendel, Brock, and Andrei Shleifer. 2012. “Chasing Noise.” Journal of Financial Economics 104 (2): 303-320. Abstract

    We present a simple model in which rational but uninformed traders occasionally chase noise as if it were information, thereby amplifying sentiment shocks and moving prices away from fundamental values. In the model, noise traders can have an impact on market equilibrium disproportionate to their size in the market. The model offers a partial explanation for the surprisingly low market price of financial risk in the spring of 2007.
    Copyright 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    Lee, Charles MC, Andrei Shleifer, and Richard H Thaler. 1990. “Closed End Mutual Funds.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 4 (4): 153-164.
    Mullainathan, Sendhil, Joshua Schwartzstein, and Andrei Shleifer. 2008. “Coarse Thinking and Persuasion.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 123 (2): 577-619. Abstract

    We present a model of uninformative persuasion in which individuals “think coarsely”: they group situations into categories, and apply the same model of inference to all situations within a category. Coarse thinking exhibits two features that persuaders take advantage of: (i) transference, whereby individuals transfer the informational content of a given message from situations in a category where it is useful to those where it is not, and (ii) framing, whereby objectively useless information influences individuals’ choice of category. The model sheds light on uninformative advertising and product branding, as well as on some otherwise anomalous evidence on mutual fund advertising.

    Glaeser, Edward, Simon Johnson, and Andrei Shleifer. 2001. “Coase versus the Coasians.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (3): 853-899.