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    LaPorta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 2000. “Investor Protection and Corporate Governance.” Journal of Financial Economics 58 (1-2): 3-27. Abstract

    Recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded "rms, in the breadth and depth of capital markets, in dividend policies, and in the access of "rms to external "nance. A common element to the explanations of these di!erences is how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms. We describe the di!erences in laws and the e!ectiveness of their enforcement across countries, discuss the possible origins of these di!erences, summarize their consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform. We argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems

    Johnson, Simon, Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2000. “Tunneling.” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 90 (2): 22-27.
    Glaeser, Edward, Simon Johnson, and Andrei Shleifer. 2001. “Coase versus the Coasians.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (3): 853-899.
    Glaeser, Edward L, and Andrei Shleifer. 2001. “Not-for-Profit Entrepreneurs.” Journal of Public Economics 81 (1): 99-115. Abstract

    Entrepreneurs who start new firms may choose not-for-profit status as a means of committing to soft incentives. Such incentives protect donors, volunteers, consumers and employees from ex post expropriation of profits by the entrepreneur. We derive conditions under which completely self-interested entrepreneurs opt for not-for-profit status, despite the fact that this status limits their ability to enjoy the profits of their enterprises.We also show that even in the absence of tax advantages, unrestricted donations would flow to non-profits rather than for-profit firms because donations have more significant influence on the decisions of the non-profits.

    Blanchard, Olivier, and Andrei Shleifer. 2001. “Federalism With and Without Political Centralization: China versus Russia.” Transition Economies: How Much Progress?, 171-179. IMF Staff Papers. Abstract

    In China, local governments have actively contributed to the growth of new firms. In Russia, local governments have typically stood in the way, be it through taxation, regulation, or corruption. We argue that the difference can be traced to lies in the degree of political centralization present in China, but not in Russia. In China the central government has been strong and disciplined enough to induce local governments to favor growth. In Russia, it has not. We agree, but with an important caveat. We believe the experience of Russia indicates that another ingredient is crucial, namely political centralization.

    Djankov, Simeon, Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2002. “The Regulation of Entry.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (1): 1-37. Abstract

    We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data cover the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries with heavier regulation of entry have higher corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality of public or private goods. Countries with more democratic and limited governments have lighter regulation of entry. The evidence is inconsistent with public interest theories of regulation, but supports the public choice view that entry regulation benefits politicians and bureaucrats.

    LaPorta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W Vishny. 2002. “Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation.” Journal of Finance 57 (3): 1147-1170. Abstract

    We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash-flow ownership by the controlling shareholder.

    D’Avolio, Gene, Efi Gildor, and Andrei Shleifer. 2002. “Technology, Information Production, and Market Efficiency.” Economic Policy for the Information Economy. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Abstract

    A well functioning securities market relies on the availability of accurate information, a broad base of investors who can process this information, legal protection of these investors’ rights, and a liquid secondary market unencumbered by excessive transaction costs or constraints. When these conditions are satisfied, securities markets are likely to be broader and more efficient, with felicitous consequences for investment and resource allocation. This paper explores the effect of technological advances on these features of the market, emphasizing the incentives facing the producers of financial information.