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    Barberis, Nicholas, Robin Greenwood, Lawrence Jin, and Andrei Shleifer. 2015. “X-CAPM: An Extrapolative Capital Asset Pricing Model.” Journal of Financial Economics 115 (1): 1-24. Publisher's Version Abstract

    Survey evidence suggests that many investors form beliefs about future stock market returns by extrapolating past returns. Such beliefs are hard to reconcile with existing models of the aggregate stock market. We study a consumption-based asset pricing model in which some investors form beliefs about future price changes in the stock market by extrapolating past price changes, while other investors hold fully rational beliefs. We find that the model captures many features of actual prices and returns; importantly, however, it is also consistent with the survey evidence on investor expectations.

    Shleifer, Andrei, and Daniel Treisman. 2011. “Why Moscow Says No.” Foreign Affairs 90 (1): 122-138.
    Glaeser, Edward L, Giacomo AM Ponzetto, and Andrei Shleifer. 2007. “Why Does Democracy Need Education?” Journal of Economic Growth 12 (2): 77-99. Abstract

    Across countries, education and democracy are highly correlated. We motivate empirically and then model a causal mechanism explaining this correlation. In our model, schooling teaches people to interact with others and raises the benefits of civic participation, including voting and organizing. In the battle between democracy and dictatorship, democracy has a wide potential base of support but offers weak incentives to its defenders. Dictatorship provides stronger incentives to a narrower base. As education raises the benefits of civic engagement, it raises participation in support of a broad-based regime (democracy) relative to that in support of a narrow-based regime (dictatorship). This increases the likelihood of successful democratic revolutions against dictatorships, and reduces that of successful anti-democratic coups.

    Djankov, Simeon, Caralee McLiesh, Tatiana Nenova, and Andrei Shleifer. 2003. “Who Owns the Media?” Journal of Law and Economics 46 (2): 341-381. Abstract

    We examine the patterns of media ownership in 97 countries around the world. We find that almost universally the largest media firms are owned by the government or by private families. Government ownership is more pervasive in broadcasting than in the printed media. We then examine two theories of government ownership of the media: the public interest (Pigouvian) theory, according to which government ownership cures market failures, and the public choice theory, according to which government ownership undermines political and economic freedom. The data support the second theory.

    LaPorta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2006. “What Works in Securities Laws?” Journal of Finance 61 (1): 1-32. Abstract

    We examine the effect of securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries. We find little evidence that public enforcement benefits stock markets, but strong evidence that laws mandating disclosure and facilitating private enforcement through liability rules benefit stock markets.

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