One Egalitarianism or Several? Two Decades of Gender-Role Attitude Change in Europe[1]

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This article challenges the implicit assumption of many cross-national studies that gender-role attitudes fall along a single continuum between traditional and egalitarian. The authors argue that this approach obscures theoretically important distinctions in attitudes and renders analyses of change over time incomplete. Using latent class analysis, they investigate the multidimensional nature of gender-role attitudes in 17 postindustrial European countries. They identify three distinct varieties of egalitarianism that they designate as liberal egalitarianism, egalitarian familism, and flexible egalitarianism. They show that while traditional gender-role attitudes have precipitously and uniformly declined in accordance with the "rising tide" narrative toward greater egalitarianism, the relative prevalence of different egalitarianisms varies markedly across countries. Furthermore, they find that European nations are not converging toward one dominant egalitarian model but rather, remain differentiated by varieties of egalitarianism.

INTRODUCTION

The steady rise of gender-egalitarian attitudes seemed to be a foregone conclusion through the mid-1990s. Over the course of the previous two decades,

women increased their participation in the labor force, entered the political sphere in greater numbers, and adopted more egalitarian roles in the home and workplace. Such changes—documented both in the United States (Brewster and Padavic 2000; Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001; Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004; Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman 2011) and beyond (Stier, Lewin-Epstein, and Braun 2001; Breen and Cooke 2005; Pettit and Hook 2005; Dorius and Firebaugh 2010; Charles 2011)—led proponents of modernization theory such as Inglehart and Norris to assert that "human development brings changed cultural attitudes toward gender equality in virtually any society that experiences the various forms of modernization linked with economic development. Modernization brings systematic, *predictable* changes in gender roles" (2003, p. 10; italics in original). Terming this the "rising tide" of support for gender equality, Inglehart and Norris argue that increased egalitarianism is consistent with a model of industrialization that predicts cultural convergence across nations.

Despite the decline in inegalitarian attitudes and behaviors during the three decades leading up to the 1990s, change on all fronts stalled by the mid-1990s. This has been a source of puzzlement for modernization theory's staunchest supporters and a source of concern for scholars who had been following gender inequality's demise (Grusky and Levanon 2008). Stagnation in the narrowing of the gender wage gap and in the decline of occupational sex segregation has been accompanied by a slow pace of change in men's participation in the domestic sphere (Hook 2010) and in men's movement into traditionally female-typed occupations (Blau, Brinton, and Grusky 2006; England 2006; Blau and Kahn 2007). Thus, many gender inequality scholars now speak of a stalled gender revolution or even the "end" of the gender revolution (England 2010; Cotter et al. 2011).

While the past decades cast doubt on modernization theory's implicit assumption of a linear transition from gender-role traditionalism to egalitarianism, gender inequality scholars have also begun to question the coherence of egalitarianism itself. The discrepancy between women's gains in the labor force and their continued care-giving roles in the "second shift" at home (Hochschild 2012) signals the importance of distinguishing between attitudes about male primacy on the one hand and attitudes about gender essentialism on the other. While advocacy of male primacy—attitudes privileging men over women—has undeniably decreased since the 1960s, gender-essentialist attitudes—the notion that men and women have fundamentally different traits (Charles and Bradley 2009; Ridgeway 2009)—have demon-

strated greater resilience (Charles and Grusky 2004). Disagreements about whether gender equality requires gender symmetry have led to the increasing recognition that gender egalitarianism itself is "a contested notion" (Verloo 2007, p. 22). Among gender scholars, egalitarianism has been alternately cast as requiring symmetry in gender roles (e.g., Gornick and Meyers 2008), as affirming difference between men and women (e.g., Gilligan 1982), or as promoting the sexes' autonomous choices about taking on care-giving and bread-winning roles (e.g., Orloff 2008). Consequently, there is increasing acknowledgment that the path of gender-role attitudinal change may be considerably more complicated than previously imagined.

   This article addresses the question of how to account for macrolevel changes in gender-role attitudes given their complexity and possible multi-dimensionality. We argue that conventional approaches to cross-national models of gender-role attitude change face difficulties in adequately depicting the historical trajectory of change because they assume that attitudes are best characterized as falling along a linear continuum from traditionalism to liberal egalitarianism. This approach, which posits liberal egalitarianism as a universal endpoint, characterizes change that falls short of this endpoint as stalled or transitional, a classification that obscures the possible rise of other cultural frames that represent different constellations of gender-role attitudes (Cotter et al. 2011). We draw from the theoretical and empirical literature on gender inequality to postulate how gender-role attitudes may group into additional classes that represent more nuanced configurations of attitudes about men's and women's family and workplace roles. Using latent class analysis (LCA), we examine how gender-role attitudes cluster into coherent configurations and how the prevalence of these configurations changes over time and across countries. We argue that by attending to multidimensionality, we can better understand trajectories of gender-role attitudinal change to interrogate the modernization hypothesis of cultural convergence to liberal egalitarianism.

   This article uses data from postindustrial European countries, a sample that allows us to broaden the analysis of the "stalled gender revolution" beyond the United States. Our results demonstrate strong support for a theoretical perspective that acknowledges that gender-egalitarian and gender-essentialist attitudes need not necessarily conflict with one another within the constellation of a given individual's beliefs. Furthermore, our results belie a linear continuum of attitudes from traditional to egalitarian. Instead, we find that egalitarian and essentialist stances combine with norms of choice in diverse ways to form four coherent classes of attitudes in postindustrial Europe. While traditionalism has declined over the past two decades in all 17 European countries in our study, in no country have traditional gender-role attitudes been replaced by a liberal egalitarian stance that involves a straightforward rejection of gender essentialism and a repu-

diation of gender role asymmetry. Instead, our analysis demonstrates trajectories of attitudinal change that reflect the increasing prevalence of three varieties of egalitarianism that we designate as liberal egalitarianism, egalitarian familism, and flexible egalitarianism. While liberal egalitarianism most closely mirrors the egalitarianism commonly referenced in the literature, egalitarian familism and flexible egalitarianism together account for about 50% of individuals in our pooled sample and an even larger percentage in a number of countries. We find that as traditionalism has waned, European nations remain differentiated by their relative support for these three varieties of gender egalitarianism. Our analyses demonstrate the complexity of gender-role attitudes and their trajectories of change over time and suggest that convergence toward liberal egalitarianism is unlikely to be an immediate prospect in postindustrial Europe.

ATTITUDINAL CHANGE AND GENDER-ROLE EGALITARIANISM

Three general strands of research inform the study of trajectories of change in gender-role attitudes. The first is empirical work, typically using large-scale surveys, which has revealed a marked increase in gender-egalitarian attitudes over the past several decades (Mason and Lu 1988; Rindfuss, Brewster, and Kavee 1996; Brewster and Padavic 2000; Ciabattari 2001; Lueptow, Garovich-Szabo, and Lueptow 2001; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Davis and Greenstein 2009). For example, Brooks and Bolzendahl characterize attitudinal change as occurring in a "consistently liberal direction," with "large and generally monotonic" gains for egalitarianism (2004, p. 107). Studies note that as later cohorts have replaced earlier, more conservative cohorts, gender-role attitudes have become less traditional across a wide variety of metrics (Mason and Lu 1988; Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004). These empirical trends are consistent with modernization theorists' expectation of a decline in gender inequality and an attitudinal convergence toward gender egalitarianism. Increased support for gender egalitarianism is viewed by modernization theory as "coherent and predictable" (Inglehart and Norris 2003, p. 18), and the decline in gender inequality is seen as a worldwide phenomenon associated with "conditions or processes intrinsic to the development of modern institutions" (Jackson 1998, p. 19).

A second strand of research, developed by gender inequality scholars, adopts a less sanguine view. These scholars see gender inequality as reproduced through norms and durable institutional structures that persist even in the face of large-scale political and economic changes. They argue that the strength of patriarchal norms, the uneven distribution of resources across the sexes, and cultural beliefs that pattern microlevel interactions act to institutionalize a system of difference (Hartmann 1981; Ridgeway 1997; Ridgeway and Correll 2004). While theories of industrialism and

1488

modernization emphasize rising egalitarianism, perspectives that focus on men's and women's institutionalized cultural roles theorize how hegemonic cultural beliefs about gender perpetuate essentialist attitudes. In Ridgeway and Correll's words, "descriptive beliefs about the attributes of the 'typical' man or woman are still largely shared and largely unchanged since the 1970s" (Ridgeway and Correll 2004). These beliefs act to justify different social roles for men and women through the logic that the two sexes are best suited for different tasks or have preferences that legitimate their taking on different social roles (Charles and Grusky 2004).[2]

Recent empirical research supports gender inequality scholars' depiction of a stalled gender revolution. Despite modernization theorists' assertion of growing egalitarianism (Jackson 2006), studies of gender-role attitudes have found that increases in egalitarianism have slowed markedly. For example, Hochschild's classic *Second Shift* (2012) identified a preponderance of individuals whom she described as inhabiting a "transitional" gender ideology, neither traditional nor fully egalitarian. More recent studies support the endurance of traditionalism in some countries.[3] Cotter et al. (2011) test a number of explanations that might account for the leveling-off of egalitarianism after the mid-1990s, but similar to other researchers (Brewster and Padavic 2000; Bolzendahl and Myers 2004), they find little support for any particular explanation. They conclude that broad support seems to have developed for a cultural frame that combines "elements of both traditional familism and feminist egalitarianism" (2011, p. 283). These newer empirical studies complicate the standard narrative of modernization theory's "rising tide" by pointing to the persistence of gender-essentialist conceptions of women's care-giving role alongside seemingly egalitarian attitudes.

A third strand of research questions the theoretical conceptualization of egalitarianism itself. Verloo documents that despite the potentially homogenizing force of uniform European Union guidelines on gender equality, European nations have pursued various policies that evince a "diversity of meanings," rendering gender egalitarianism a "contested notion" (2007, p. 22). Orloff argues that as Europe and North America move away from a male breadwinner model, feminists' visions of equality vary across political contexts, and she notes that in certain countries (including the United States) gender egalitarianism may take the form of "decisional autonomy" and "choice" (2008, p. 131). That these political and philosophical differ-

[2] A controversial example of this latter viewpoint is Hakim's preference theory, which asserts that women's choices vis-à-vis employment are strongly determined by a distribution of lifestyle preferences that is different from men's (Hakim 1998, 2002).

[3] A particularly stark example is Eastern Europe, where the fall of Communist regimes, the growing strength of the Catholic Church, and new regulations against abortion have led some scholars to speak of potential "retraditionalisation" (Pascall and Lewis 2004, p. 375).

1489

ences may be mirrored in popular opinion is suggested by qualitative work on gender-role attitudes that finds that individuals may prefer asymmetrical roles when such roles are seen as freely chosen "individualized solutions" (Williams 2000; Braun 2008). This work suggests that as the transition to liberal egalitarianism slows, more complex gender schemas that combine traditional and egalitarian elements may gain support.

In all, existing research suggests three possible trajectories of gender-role attitude change: convergence to egalitarianism, the continued hold of traditionalism, or divergence across distinct gender schemas.[4] Nevertheless, a number of questions remain unresolved. Which of these accounts best represents the trajectory of gender-role attitudes among postindustrial nations? If gender-role attitudes do indeed evince a greater complexity than earlier empirical studies have allowed for, what is the implication for theories of cross-national trajectories of attitudinal change? Are "mixed gender ideologies" that combine elements of traditionalism and egalitarianism best characterized as transitional, or as coherent and distinctive gender schemas that may have a more enduring presence? Comparative studies of gender-role attitude change are less common than studies of change in the United States, partly because of the difficulties of assembling a panel of data with equivalent questions across time and nations. However, testing theories of attitudinal convergence requires such a comparative approach. Moreover, if we do not expect to find a linear pathway toward egalitarianism, then comparative research is particularly important for characterizing the various pathways that gender beliefs might follow. We turn now to further consider the theoretical basis for the multidimensionality of gender-role attitudes and to formulate consequent hypotheses about the patterning of change.

The Multidimensionality of Gender-Role Attitudes

Studies of gender-role attitudes typically draw on survey questions that ask individuals to indicate their level of support for statements that tap into beliefs about male primacy, gender essentialism, and the appropriate division of familial roles and paid labor between men and women (Davis and Greenstein 2009). Examples include belief in the importance of being a wife and mother for women's personal fulfillment, the privileging of men's education and careers over women's, the normative imperative for both spouses to contribute to household income, and the ability of working women to maintain strong relationships with their children. Studies vary in terms of how they use these items to measure egalitarianism, with some researchers

[4] By "gender schemas," we refer to cultural models that individuals use to "define and organize" (Blair-Loy 2003) as well as "perceive, order, and evaluate" gender practices (Gorman 2005). In our analysis, we consider the gender-role classes identified by LCA as measures of these schemas.

1490

choosing to combine as many questions as possible (Kaufman 2000; McDaniel 2008) and others choosing to analyze attitudes toward family and labor market roles separately (Bolzendahl and Meyers 2004).

While separating attitudes into those that deal with the public sphere of work and those dealing with the private sphere of family is an improvement over summing all gender-related attitudes into one index, it does not resolve one of the main issues raised by many gender scholars: that gender-egalitarian and gender-essentialist attitudes may be compatible with each other and that views on egalitarianism may vary. As Charles and Grusky (2004) argue in the context of the labor market, adherence to gender egalitarianism does not necessarily lead to the rejection of gender essentialism; there is no necessary dissonance between the belief that men and women are equal and the belief that they are on balance different. If this is the case, then it is inappropriate to collapse egalitarianism and antiessentialism into a single construct, even if this construct is measured separately for the spheres of work and family.

The gender egalitarian/essentialist distinction is not the only one that tends to be collapsed in large-scale survey research. The presumed association of gender essentialism with traditionalism on the one hand and of egalitarianism with gender-role symmetry on the other belies a frame that emphasizes the importance of individuals' autonomous choice. As Cotter et al. point out, "choosing a stay-at-home mother role could represent as much of a feminist choice as pursuing an independent career" (Cotter et al. 2011, p. 283; see also Williams 2000). Similarly, beliefs about the importance of self-expression can, at the same time, reinforce occupational sex segregation when individual choices in practice reflect cultural stereotypes about what men and women should want (Charles and Bradley 2009).

The inverse of freedom of choice is a normative imperative that the genders should align with certain roles. Theoretical work on cultural schemas (Blair-Loy 2003) emphasizes that perceived gender differences can imply not only an essentializing component that supplies the "essence" of difference (men are this way, women are that way) but also a normative component that suggests what each sex should therefore do (men ought to do this, women ought to do that). In her study of elite businesswomen, Blair-Loy (2003) found that those who had left their careers to raise children adopted a "family devotion" cultural schema that conceived of marriage and motherhood as a woman's primary obligation. However, even those women who rejected essentialist notions of the primacy of motherhood still adopted a schema of obligation. These women adopted a "schema of work devotion" in which career orientation is seen as necessary for giving meaning and purpose to life.

Accordingly, we suggest that in addition to distinguishing between egalitarianism and essentialism, it is necessary to consider the dimension of free-

dom of choice or normative imperative that is associated with gender roles. This dimension crosscuts essentialism and egalitarianism. For example, consider a cultural frame in which men and women are considered equal (i.e., male primacy is denied), sex-based differences in abilities and predispositions are presumed to be trivial (i.e., gender essentialism is denied), and the imperative to enact symmetrical roles is emphasized (i.e., both men and women should participate in the labor force and should divide household labor equally). Second-wave feminism could be considered an example of this type of egalitarian frame. By contrast, an alternative cultural frame that is similarly egalitarian and similarly antiessentialist can be distinguished from this on the basis of individual choice. Such a frame would argue that nonessentialism does not necessarily obligate the genders to perform the same roles; rather, this view would support gender-role difference when such difference arises from autonomous individual choices. Finally, contrasting with both of these variants of egalitarianism is, of course, a traditional set of attitudes supporting men's natural priority in higher-status endeavors, espousing essentialist views on men and women's innate differences, and advocating the normative imperative of the sexes to fulfill distinct roles.

When the dimension of individual choice/normative imperative is considered alongside attitudes of gender egalitarianism and essentialism, a more complex mapping of attitudes is suggested. In particular, we predict that the combination of attitudes toward egalitarianism, essentialism, and individual choice will result in gender attitude schemas that cohere into distinct ideologies that cannot be understood as variants along a traditional to egalitarian spectrum. We make the following prediction regarding how gender-role attitudes will cohere:

Hypothesis 1.—*Attitudes toward gender egalitarianism and essentialism do not cluster into contrasting binary "traditional" and "egalitarian" categories. Rather, individuals in postindustrial societies cluster into groups representing different combinations of beliefs vis-à-vis egalitarianism, essentialism, and the normative imperative that men and women should take on certain social roles.*

Attitudinal Convergence: One Pathway or Many?

What are the implications for theories of gender-role attitudinal change when gender schemas are conceptualized as varying along dimensions of egalitarianism, essentialism, and individual choice/normative imperative? Macrolevel theories posit convergence toward liberal egalitarianism. Theories proffered by scholars of gender inequality, on the other hand, imply that gender-role attitudes cluster in complicated ways that vary on the three dimensions of egalitarianism, essentialism, and individual choice/normative imperative. We predict that identifying types of gender schemas will

provide evidence of convergence across countries toward egalitarianism in general while simultaneously revealing attitudinal configurations that defy a straightforward attitudinal convergence trajectory.

HYPOTHESIS 2.—*Cross-national comparison will reveal convergence toward egalitarianism only in the sense that the belief in male primacy is declining. This will be indicated by a general movement away from gender-role traditionalism but not necessarily toward a single liberal egalitarianism that does not have elements of gender essentialism.*

We expect to see a number of initial differences across regions of Europe, as well as regional differences in patterns of change over time that contradict a straightforward convergence narrative.[5] For example, the socialist legacy of the transitional societies of Eastern Europe prioritizes paid work for men and women but also values women's role as unpaid care workers at home (Pascall and Manning 2000). Meanwhile, most Southern European countries are characterized by relatively low rates of married women's labor force participation, a low level of state support for child care and parental leave compared to other parts of Europe, and, consequently, an emphasis on the family (especially women) as the locus of care (Ferrera 1996; Bettio and Plantenga 2004; Karamessini 2008; Tavora 2012). Scandinavian countries are characterized by welfare state ideologies that prioritize gender equality and the participation of both men and women in the labor force and at home (Leira 2006; Ellingsaeter and Leira 2007; Earles 2011); those ideologies are complemented by significant state investment in childcare and parental leave programs. Western European economies such as France, Germany, and the Netherlands exhibit varied patterns of mothers' labor force participation and work-family reconciliation policies. The variations across European countries, often reflective of institutional arrangements and state policies (Hook 2006; Cha and Thébaud 2009; Pedulla and Thébaud 2015), lead us to predict divergence in the prevalence of particular gender-role schemas across European countries:

HYPOTHESIS 3.—*Rather than convergence toward liberal egalitarianism (a rising tide) or a flattening of the liberalizing trend (a stalled revolution), we expect to see divergence in the prevalence of different gender-role attitude schemas across European countries.*

In sum, we suggest that while there may be a general trend across postindustrial Europe toward gender egalitarianism in its narrowest sense (i.e., away from traditionalism and the belief in male primacy), there will be a continued plurality of egalitarianisms; some individuals will support greater similarity between men and women (less gender essentialist) and others will

[5] Given that Esping-Andersen's (2009) typology of welfare states has received heavy criticism from a gender perspective and did not originally incorporate Southern Europe or the transitional societies of Eastern Europe (Pascall and Manning 2000), we refer to a regional rather than a welfare-state typology.

1493

emphasize the distinct characteristics of men and women (more gender essentialist). Further, there will be variation in adherence to an individual choice model or a normative imperative model.

Gender-role attitude questions in social surveys typically focus on women's roles in the domestic and labor market spheres and are less focused on querying the suitability of these roles for men. Our main empirical analysis therefore principally concerns how individuals in different countries evaluate women's roles. We then supplement this with an analysis of attitudes toward men's roles, using recent survey data that include these questions.

METHODS

World Values and European Values Surveys

Conducting a cross-national, temporal comparison of inductively derived gender-role attitude schemas presents a significant empirical challenge. Few panel surveys consistently ask the same set of gender-role questions over time. Our data, a merged panel of the World Values Survey (WVS) and European Values Survey (EVS), maximizes the number of gender-related questions over the longest possible period for the largest possible number of advanced industrial nations. Our aggregate data set is built from wave 2, wave 4, and wave 6 of the Integrated Values Surveys (EVS 2012; WVS 2012). This data set combines wave 2 of the WVS/EVS (1990–92), wave 3 of the EVS and wave 4 of the WVS (1999–2000), and wave 4 of the EVS (2008–9). The data include 17 OECD countries in Europe.[6] We restrict the sample to individuals who are age 20 or older at the time of the survey. Our final sample consists of 72,859 observations.[7]

To assess constellations of gender-role attitudes, we selected questions that reflect individuals' views toward women's roles in the workforce and at home and that were asked in each country in our sample in each time period. These questions are considered "valid and reliable" indicators of gender beliefs (Davis and Greenstein 2009, p. 89) as well as good measures of egalitarian gender ideologies (Davis, Greenstein, and Marks 2007). Respondents indicated their agreement or disagreement with the following statements:[8]

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[6] West and East Germany are combined into "Germany" in our analysis.

[7] We repeated this analysis with a subsample including only those individuals in their prime family formation years (20–49). Removing the older cohorts from the sample resulted in a smaller proportion of individuals with traditional attitudes. Otherwise, results were not meaningfully different. These results are available from the authors by request.

[8] In some of the original WVS and EVS questions, respondents were asked not only whether they agreed but also the strength of their opinion (i.e., whether they "strongly agreed," "agreed," "disagreed," or "strongly disagreed"). Following Yamaguchi (2000),

1494

Q1. A woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled.
Q2. A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relation-ship with her children as a mother who does not work.
Q3. Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay.
Q4. Both husband and wife should contribute to household income.
Q5. A job is all right but what most women really want is a home and children.
Q6. Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person.
Q7. When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women.

These indicators tap attitudes about egalitarianism in the labor force (i.e., the importance of a job for a woman's independence, the primacy of a man's job over a woman's job) and women's "essential" nature as mothers and wives (i.e., the necessity of children for women's fulfillment, the nature of women's "real" desires as located in the domestic sphere).[9] Crosscutting these dimensions is the notion of individual choice/normative imperative in

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we dichotomized these variables as indicating agreement or disagreement. With LCA, ordered categories can lead to classes that are relatively unstable and evince more mixed response patterns. Moreover, ordered categories make no assumptions about the degree of difference between categories. By contrast, with dichotomization we assume that the distinction between "somewhat agree" and "somewhat disagree" is stronger than that between "strongly agree" and "somewhat agree." However, as Yamaguchi (2000) explains, this is mostly an analytic choice as it results in fewer latent classes with more strongly differentiated attitudes than when maintaining the four ordered categories. All questions, with the exception of Q1, were reverse coded and dichotomized so that 0 represents disagreement with the statement and 1 represents agreement (Q1 was originally dichotomized).

[9] The use of WVS and EVS survey questions to analyze gender egalitarianism raises a measurement issue. Some researchers (notably Braun 2008) argue that such items are better indicators of traditionalism than egalitarianism. Because there are a variety of egalitarian stances an individual may take, disagreement with any given egalitarian statement may reflect either a traditional attitude or an egalitarian stance that does not support the particular egalitarian statement in question. Several features of our empirical strategy and data mitigate the concern that such items cannot be used to measure egalitarianism. First, we select questions that have been shown in previous studies to be valid and reliable indicators of gender ideology (Davis and Greenstein 2009) as well as useful in predicting egalitarian behaviors, such as the division of household labor (Davis et al. 2007). Second, we include several egalitarian-slanted items (Q2, Q4, Q6) as well as traditional-slanted items. Third, we associate types of egalitarianism with patterns of responses. That is, while disagreement with a single egalitarian-slanted question may not be a good indicator of egalitarianism, a pattern of disagreement with specific traditional-slanted questions and egalitarian-slanted questions may provide indication of a type of egalitarianism. Fourth, in the section on distal outcomes we test the assumption that patterns of responses indicate types of egalitarianism by identifying whether these patterns can successfully predict responses on a supplementary battery of egalitarian-slanted items that were asked in later waves.

taking on certain roles (i.e., whether both husband and wife should contribute to income, whether a job is the best way for women to be independent). Table 1 presents the weighted frequency distributions of responses by wave and pooled across countries.

Analytic Approach

We conducted four types of analyses. First, we identified distinct classes of gender-role attitudes. Second, we investigated the demographic correlates of each class. Third, we verified the robustness of these classes by using class membership to predict additional attitudes about egalitarian behaviors and men's roles. Fourth, we analyzed changes over time and assessed convergence or divergence in attitude classes across the 17 countries.

Inductive identification of schemas: Latent class analysis.—We begin by conducting an LCA with the gender-role survey questions (hereafter "indicators"). Latent class analysis allows researchers to cluster observations into subgroups based on their patterns of responses across a set of observed indicators (Vermunt and Magidson 2002; Bakk, Tekle, and Vermunt 2013). Latent class models treat observed indicators as measures of some unobserved (i.e., latent) categorical grouping that, once accounted for, explains the covariance relationships among indicators. Latent class analysis differs from related cluster and factor analytic techniques in several important respects. For instance, LCA differs from traditional clustering methods in that it is model based; that is, rather than determine class assignment based on a distance measure, LCA assumes that the sample data are drawn from underlying probability distributions and use maximum likelihood (ML) to

TABLE 1
MEANS OF GENDER ROLE ATTITUDE QUESTIONS, BY WAVE

	Wave		
	2	4	6
Q1. A woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled.	.59	.50	.47
Q2. A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.	.69	.76	.82
Q3. Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay.	.61	.61	.57
Q4. Both husband and wife should contribute to income.	.77	.78	.83
Q5. A job is all right but what most women really want is a home and children.	.65	.56	.52
Q6. Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person.	.67	.74	.77
Q7. When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women.	.38	.23	.17
N of observations	26,858	21,316	24,685

NOTE.—Means reflect proportion of sample in agreement with the question, weighted with population-equilibrated weights.

1496

estimate the parameters of these distributions (i.e., the number of classes, class sizes, and probabilities that cases are members of a given latent class). Latent class analysis also differs from factor analysis in that LCA estimates discrete latent classes whereas factor analysis estimates continuous latent variables. Therefore, LCA is particularly well suited to identifying theoretically informed typologies (McCutcheon 1987; Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016).

To estimate whether a given response pattern is evidence of latent class membership, LCA models the probability of observing an individual i observed at time period t with response pattern y, $P(y_i \mid t)$, as follows:

$$P(y_i \mid t) = \sum_{x=1}^{C} P(x \mid t) \prod_{l=1}^{L} P(y_{il} \mid x, t).$$

In the case of repeated cross-sectional data, as we have here, the probability of an observed response pattern is calculated as the product of the probability of belonging to a class conditional on the time period, $P(x \mid t)$, and the probability density of the responses of the subject across each indicator l, conditional on the latent class x and period, $P(y_{il} \mid x, t)$ (Vermunt, Tran, and Magidson 2008).

A strength of LCA is that posterior probabilities can be calculated for each individual. That is, rather than assuming that a respondent is either a member of a given class or not, the estimation procedure assigns the respondent a probability of membership into each class based upon her response set. Whereas some will be clear members of a class, others' response sets may provide evidence consistent with membership in various classes.

In this analysis, we follow Vermunt (2010) in first constructing a basic latent class model for repeated cross-sectional data. We then extend this model by analyzing the relationship between latent classes, demographic covariates, and additional indicators (i.e., "distal outcomes"). When analyzing how latent classes relate to external variables (variables not included in the original analyses), Vermunt (2010) advocates a modified version of a three-step approach that involves (1) building the basic latent class model; (2) assigning subjects to latent classes based on their posterior probabilities; and (3) exploring the association between latent classes, covariates, and distal outcomes. The benefit of this approach (rather than including covariates in the original model) is that it avoids difficult model-building decisions in which the number of latent classes and their composition change depending upon the set of covariates added to the model.[10] We include sample- and population-equilibrated

[10] Additionally, the "one-step" approach that includes covariates in the latent class model makes the strong assumption that the covariate effects on indicators are fully mediated by the latent classes (i.e., that covariates have no effect on the indicators once class membership is controlled for).

1497

weights to ensure that all countries contribute equally to the analysis.[11] Finally, we include cases with incomplete data for one or more indicators.[12]

Demographic correlates of class membership.—In order to explore the relationship between classes and demographic covariates, we use the bias-adjusted three-step technique developed by Bakk et al. (2013) described above. Whereas earlier, step-wise versions of the "three-step" approach underestimated the relationship between classes and external variables (Bolck, Croon, and Hagenaars 2004), this technique allows for unbiased and efficient estimation by taking into account classification error (the error that arises from cases in which individuals are imprecisely assigned to classes; Vermunt 2010).

Using this procedure, we regress the estimated posterior probabilities of class membership on demographic covariates using logistic regression with proportional class assignment. We include a battery of demographic correlates, including sex, marital status, age, whether the individual has a child, education (measured as age when completed education), whether the individual is employed full-time, self-reported political ideology (measured on a 1–10 right- to left-leaning scale), whether the individual is a member of a religious denomination, and a three-category, self-reported household income score (where 1 equals low income and 3 equals high income).[13]

Class membership and a broader set of attitudes.—We use the latent classes to predict a distinct set of attitudes (distal outcomes) not included in the original analysis. This provides additional assurance that the latent classes reflect real ideological differences rather than statistical artifacts. In other words, if membership in the traditional class is predictive of traditional attitudes on an additional distinct set of questions, this provides further evidence that the class reflects a meaningful ideological position. This method also allows us to examine attitudes on questions not included in our panel design. For example, the WVS and EVS questions primarily addressed women's roles, and four out of seven questions asked respondents to indicate support for a traditional, rather than egalitarian, position. But gender-role schemas are clearly also composed of attitudes regarding men's roles and egalitarian behaviors. More recent waves of the EVS include such questions. This analysis affords us the opportunity to test our interpretations, as well as the predictive power, of the classes.

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[11] The population-equilibrated weight reweight the data such that $N = 1,000$ in each country.

[12] Latent Gold handles missing data by estimating parameters using all available indicators in specifying the classes. While we recognize that the missing at random (MAR) assumption is strong, we believe it to be preferable to list-wise deletion, which requires that data be missing completely at random (MCAR).

[13] See app. table B1 for descriptive statistics on demographic covariates. See EVS, GESIS (2011) for more information on variable construction.

1498

In particular, we investigate how class membership relates to attitudes regarding gender roles in the household (sharing chores in marriage, men's responsibility for children and the home, and father's suitability to look after children), work-family balance (the importance of a family-friendly job), and the need for family (men need to have children to be fulfilled and the idea that one has a duty to society to have children).[14] We use a three-step ordinal logistic LCA model to regress these distal attitudes on class posterior probabilities as well as demographic controls; this allows us to assess the relationship between class membership and supplemental attitudes, controlling for demographic differences between classes.

Change over time.—Finally, we turn to the question of convergence of gender-role attitude schemas across countries. To examine convergence or divergence across countries, we look at country-level means and between-country standard deviations for each of the four classes across the three waves of data (Plümper and Scheider 2009).[15]

RESULTS

Inductive Identification of Schemas

We begin by estimating a latent class model with seven indicators. Generally, researchers use measures of goodness of fit, particularly the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), in order to select the model that best balances model fit with parsimony. Based on the BIC, our analysis yielded a four-class model. We then conducted a series of robustness checks and sensitivity analyses, including an investigation of models with a varying number of classes. We provide more detail on model selection and robustness checks in appendix A.

Once a four-class model was selected, we tested for measurement invariance. The basic LCA estimation procedure sets model parameters equally across countries so that classes can be compared. However, a perennial concern of comparative research is whether such comparability is appropriate—that is, whether a pooled model including all countries obscures incommensurability across countries. Moreover, a fully homogeneous model requires strong assumptions that all parameters are invariant across countries. To check for comparability, we compare the model fit of the pooled,

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[14] Descriptive statistics for these outcome variables can be found in app. table B3. Variables were reverse coded so that higher values indicated agreement with the statement. Precise wording for these questions is as follows: (1) Important for a successful marriage: sharing household chores; (2) Men should take as much responsibility as women for the home and children; (3) In general, fathers are as well-suited as mothers to look after children; (4) Important in a job: family friendly; (5) A man has to have children in order to be fulfilled; It is a duty toward society to have children.

[15] Between-country variance is calculated using population weights.

homogeneous sample with a "heterogeneous" sample in which the slope and intercept of each country are allowed to vary (this is equivalent to an LCA run on each country independently). If it is the case that the data lack comparability (i.e., that each country has a unique class solution), then the heterogeneous model will outperform the homogeneous model. Following Kankaras, Moors, and Vermunt (2011), we test for measurement invariance by comparing BIC scores, where lower scores indicate better fit. On this metric, we find that a partially homogeneous model, with intercepts that vary by country, outperforms both the fully heterogeneous and fully homogeneous models. A partially homogeneous model allows for the estimation of the latent classes with country-specific intercepts. More important, since there are no country-specific interactions (i.e., slopes do not vary by country), classes can be meaningfully compared (McCutcheon and Hagenaars 1997). Table 2 shows the fit statistics for these models.

To interpret the content of the classes, we calculate the predicted responses across the indicators, conditional on class. Figure 1 presents the means of the seven indicators by class. To aid in interpretation, we label the four classes as (1) traditionalism, (2) liberal egalitarianism, (3) egalitarian familism, and (4) flexible egalitarianism.

Class 1: Traditionalism

Class 1 comprises 20% of the pooled sample and is composed of individuals who generally hold traditional views on women's roles in the workforce and family. Respondents in this class tend to agree that being a housewife is as fulfilling as working for pay (Q3, mean of 0.78), agree that having a family is the best way for a woman to be fulfilled (Q1, mean of 0.76), disagree that a job is the best way for a woman to be independent (Q6 of 0.41), and agree that while it is all right for women to have a job, most women "really" want a family and children (Q5, mean of 0.87). Additionally, fewer members of this class than of any other group support the statement that working mothers can establish as close a relationship with their children as nonworking mothers (Q2, mean of 0.45). Members of this class are also the least likely to agree that husbands and wives should both contribute to income (Q4,

TABLE 2
Goodness-of-Fit Criteria, Measurement Invariance

| Model	BIC (LL)
Fully homogeneous.	368,967
Fully heterogeneous	345,789
Partially homogeneous	344,070

1500

Fig. 1.—Question responses by class, pooled (for responses, see table 1)

mean of 0.57). Finally, individuals in the traditional class constitute the only group in which the majority agrees with the statement that when jobs are scarce, men should have a greater right to jobs than women (Q7, mean of 0.57). These responses lead to an overall picture of this class as one that supports a degree of male primacy and holds gender-essentialist views that prescribe women's primary responsibility as located in the home.

Class 2: Liberal Egalitarianism

Class 2 is the largest class, comprising 30% of the pooled sample. This class is most closely associated with the typical depiction of gender egalitarianism in which nonessentialist and egalitarian views combine in strong support of women's labor force participation. Nearly all members of this class agree that both husband and wife should contribute to income (Q4, mean of 0.91) and that having a job is the best way for a woman to be independent (Q6, mean of 0.91). The vast majority (87%) of this class agrees that working mothers can establish just as close a relationship with their children as nonworking mothers (Q2). Associated with these prowork attitudes is a preference against women being housewives; this is the only class whose members on average disagree that being a housewife is as fulfilling as working for pay (Q3, mean of 0.22). Accordingly, members of this class reject both essentialism and male primacy, disagreeing that women require children to be fulfilled (Q1, mean of 0.39), disputing that what women "really" want is a family (Q5, mean of 0.16), and overwhelmingly disagreeing that men have more right to a job than women in times of economic distress (Q7, mean of 0.09).

Together, the traditional and liberal egalitarian classes comprise the classic bookends of a linear approach to gender egalitarianism. On the one hand, views of male primacy and gender essentialism support traditional family and work values; on the other hand, non-gender-essentialist attitudes and disagreement with male primacy are supportive of egalitarian family values and prowork attitudes. However, beyond this dichotomy, we identify two classes that evince a more complex attitudinal structure.

Class 3: Egalitarian Familism

The third class comprises 28% of the pooled sample. This class is defined by the dual beliefs that women should be active members of the labor force and that the family and home are essential to women's identity. On several indicators, egalitarian familists' level of support for women's participation in the labor force is indistinguishable from that of liberal egalitarians: nearly all respondents agree that both husband and wife should contribute to household income (Q4, mean of 0.96) and that having a job is the best way for a woman to be independent (Q6, mean of 0.90). Seventy-six percent

1502

of egalitarian familists agree that working mothers can establish just as close a relationship with their children as nonworking mothers (Q2).

Unlike liberal egalitarians, however, egalitarian familists have traditional views about the primacy of the family and the necessity of home and family for women's fulfillment. Seventy-one percent agree that women need a family and children in order to be fulfilled (Q1), and nearly all respondents in this class agree that while a job is all right, most women "really" want children and a home (Q5, mean of 0.95). Moreover, despite egalitarian familists' pro–labor force attitudes, they tend to differ from liberal egalitarians in their agreement that being a housewife can be as fulfilling as working for pay (Q3, mean of 0.73). Finally, while the majority of respondents in this class disagree that men have more right to a job than women in times of economic distress (Q7, mean of 0.37), this is a higher rate of agreement than is found among the respondents in the other two egalitarian classes. Egalitarian familists therefore combine support for many traditional family values with support for women's employment, in effect stressing the importance of women's fulfillment of the dual responsibilities of worker and mother.

Class 4: Flexible Egalitarianism

Class 4 comprises 22% of the pooled sample. This class combines support for women taking on a traditional role in the home and participating in the workforce with a lack of support for statements that imply that either traditional or nontraditional roles are imperative or necessary. Members of this class nearly all disagree that men should have more right to a job than women when times are difficult (Q7, mean of 0.08). Moreover, flexible egalitarians are as likely as liberal egalitarians to agree that working mothers can establish just as good a relationship with their children as stay-at-home mothers (Q2, mean of 0.87).

At the same time, individuals in this class also tend to be supportive of women's traditional family roles. With 76% agreeing that being a housewife can be as fulfilling as being employed (Q3), flexible egalitarians are the most supportive among the egalitarian classes of this more traditional family arrangement. Moreover, flexible egalitarians resemble the traditionalists in their lower rate of support for the question of whether men and women should contribute to income (Q4, mean of 0.60). These attitudes might seem to resemble those of egalitarian familists in combining traditional and nontraditional attitudes. However, where members of this class sharply diverge from egalitarian familists is in their disagreement with statements suggesting that familial roles are of deep importance for women's identity. For instance, 76% of flexible egalitarians disagree that women need children to be fulfilled (Q1) and 58% disagree that women "really want" a home and children (Q5). At the same time, they are closer to the traditional class than to the other two

1503

egalitarian classes in their lower rates of support for the statement that a job is the best way for women to be independent (Q6, mean of 0.53).

We interpret this class as having a flexible set of attitudes with regard to traditional/nontraditional gender roles and as holding strongly anti-essentialist attitudes. Members of this class support women's participation in the workforce but are more skeptical that such participation is necessary for women's independence or fulfillment. Similarly, they support women taking on traditional roles in the home but disagree that these roles are fundamental to women's identity. They therefore differ from the egalitarian familists, who tend to combine support for women's labor market role with traditional beliefs about the importance of motherhood. Instead, this class scores highly on the dimension of privileging autonomous choice in enacting gender roles.

The characteristics of these four classes allow us to test our first hypothesis. We see evidence of a latent class that strongly resembles the conservative (traditional) end of a linear egalitarian scale. Members of the traditional class tend to support male primacy and hold the gender-essentialist attitude that what women "really" want is a home and children. Also consistent with the first hypothesis, we find evidence of considerable variation with regard to egalitarian gender-role attitudes. While the liberal egalitarian class most closely resembles the egalitarian class posited by modernization theorists, the other two egalitarianism classes should not be cast as ordered, in-between states on a traditionalism–liberal egalitarianism continuum. For example, it makes more sense to see egalitarian familists as distinct from traditionalists than to view them as holding watered-down traditional views, as might be concluded from a linear analysis of attitudes. When compared with liberal egalitarians, egalitarian familists are as likely to think that a job is the best way for a woman to be independent and more likely to feel that both husbands and wives should contribute to household income. Members of this class therefore strongly support women's role in the labor force while at the same time holding a belief in the importance of motherhood.

Similarly, flexible egalitarians cannot be placed on a linear continuum alongside traditionalists, egalitarian familists, and liberal egalitarians. Individuals in this class are mixed with regard to the egalitarian model that privileges employment as the chief path to women's independence. What separates flexible egalitarians from the other classes is their higher rates of disagreement with questions stating that women should or have to take on a role or that there is a "best way" to achieve a certain end. Instead, flexible egalitarians appear to have a more permissive conception of the roles for women that warrant ideological support. Rather than combining distinct elements of traditionalism and nontraditionalism (as egalitarian familists do), they simultaneously offer support for traditionalists' and liberal egalitarians' visions of women's roles. In sum, rather than arraying neatly on a linear scale, the four classes represent

1504

distinct positions with regard to gender roles, showing varied combinations of the three dimensions of egalitarianism, gender essentialism, and individual choice/normative imperative.

Demographic Correlates of Class Membership

In this section, we investigate the correspondence between membership in each latent class and individuals' demographic characteristics.[16] As these analyses are cross-sectional, we are not able to establish causality; rather, we aim to examine whether the relationship between particular configurations of gender-role attitudes and the demographic characteristics of their adherents lends validation to our interpretation of the classes. Table 3 presents the ML estimates from a three-step LCA logistic model of class membership on individuals' demographic characteristics.

The first noteworthy pattern is that, all else equal, women, unmarried individuals, full-time employees, those who are unaffiliated with a religious denomination, those with left-leaning political views, and those with higher incomes are more likely to be members of the liberal egalitarian class than any of the other classes. By contrast, men, those who do not work full-time, those who have conservative political views, and those with children are most likely to be in the traditional class.

Egalitarian familists most closely resemble traditionalists in terms of demographics; men, older individuals, less educated individuals, those with more right-leaning political views, members of religious denominations, and those with lower incomes are more likely to be egalitarian familists than to be members of either of the other two egalitarian classes (models 1 and 3). And once country, wave, and other demographic characteristics are controlled, age, education, religiosity, and income level do not distinguish the traditional and egalitarian familist classes (model 2).

By contrast, when comparing flexible egalitarians to egalitarian familists, women, younger individuals, more educated individuals, political liberals, those without religious affiliations, and those with higher income are more likely to belong to the flexible egalitarian class (model 3). While flexible egalitarians fall between the liberal egalitarian and egalitarian familist classes on many demographic dimensions, younger individuals are most likely to be members of the flexible egalitarian class.

Class Membership and a Broader Set of Attitudes

We now turn to the issue of whether class membership is predictive of a supplementary set of attitudes (distal outcomes). As mentioned earlier, gender-role

[16] See app. table B2 for descriptive statistics of demographic characteristics by class.

1505

TABLE 3
THREE-STEP LCA LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF CLASS MEMBERSHIP ON DEMOGRAPHIC CORRELATES

	Liberal vs. Egalitarian Familism (1)	Traditional vs. Egalitarian Familism (2)	Flexible vs. Egalitarian Familism (3)	Traditional vs. Liberal (4)	Flexible vs. Liberal (5)	Flexible vs. Traditional (6)
Female	.695***	−.402***	.200***	−1.097***	−.495***	.602***
	(.050)	(.057)	(.053)	(.054)	(.053)	(.061)
Married.	−.295***	.191**	.093	.486***	.388***	.098
	(.057)	(.068)	(.064)	(.064)	(.063)	(.075)
Age	−.025***	−.002	−.036***	.023***	−.011***	−.034***
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.003)
Has children	−.062	.275***	.100	.337***	.162*	−.175*
	(.067)	(.081)	(.076)	(.076)	(.076)	(.088)
Education	.211***	.009	.185***	−.201***	−.026*	.176***
	(.010)	(.012)	(.012)	(.011)	(.012)	(.013)
Works full time.	.358***	−.177**	.024	−.535***	−.334***	.201**
	(.055)	(.065)	(.060)	(.058)	(.058)	(.067)
Conservative political views	−.123***	.039**	−.061***	.163***	.063***	−.100***
	(.012)	(.014)	(.013)	(.013)	(.013)	(.015)
Member of religious denomination	−.714***	.103	−.441***	.817***	.273***	−.544***
	(.055)	(.068)	(.064)	(.062)	(.060)	(.081)
Household income level	.395***	.024	.249***	−.371***	−.146***	.255***
	(.034)	(.040)	(.039)	(.037)	(.037)	(.044)
Country dummies.	X	X	X	X	X	X
Wave dummies.	X	X	X	X	X	X

NOTE.—All models are weighted with population-equilibrated weights. *N* of observations = 45,987.
* *P* < .05.
** *P* < .01.
*** *P* < .001.

items in large-scale surveys tend to deal almost exclusively with attitudes related to women's roles in the workplace and the home. We take advantage of recent waves of the EVS to examine the relationship between class membership and attitudes toward men's roles.

Tables 4 and 5 present the results for these distal outcomes regressed on class membership, including demographic controls, country dummies, and wave dummies.[17] Table 4 presents the results using effect coding. Here, coefficients indicate the extent to which responses among individuals in a given class differ from the grand mean across classes.[18] Table 5 presents results using dummy coding, alternating the reference category across classes in order to directly compare each class with every other class.

Several results stand out. First, greater membership in the liberal egalitarian and egalitarian familist classes is associated with support for each of the household gender-role items above the grand mean (models 1, 2, and 3). Egalitarian familists are slightly more likely than liberal egalitarians to agree that sharing chores is important and that fathers are as suitable as mothers to look after children (models 7 and 9). These two classes are equally supportive of men having equivalent responsibility as women for the home and children (model 8); additionally, they are more supportive of these arrangements than the other two classes.

Second, flexible egalitarians have more mixed support for questions concerning household roles. Flexible egalitarians are less likely than the other egalitarian classes to think that sharing chores is important (model 1). At the same time, greater membership in the flexible egalitarian class is associated with greater support (above the grand mean) for the idea that men should take the same responsibility as women for the home and children (model 2), although this support is statistically significantly lower than that of the two other egalitarian classes (model 8). Additionally, flexible egalitarians are equally as likely as liberal egalitarians to think that fathers are as suitable to look after children as mothers (model 9). These results bolster our earlier interpretation of the flexible egalitarian class: they show a willingness to support both traditional and nontraditional work and family arrangements and display antiessentialist attitudes that deny that men or women are inherently more suited to particular tasks.

Third, we find that greater membership in the egalitarian familist class is associated with a greater desire for family-friendly employment (model 4). This result is consistent with the finding that this class has the strongest commitment to women taking on both work and familial roles. Given the

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[17] All models were estimated using population-equilibrated weights and robust standard errors.

[18] Class membership was estimated with proportional assignment. Higher scores indicate a greater probability of membership in a class.

1507

TABLE 4
THREE-STEP LCA ORDINAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF CLASS MEMBERSHIP ON DISTAL OUTCOMES, WITH EFFECT CODING AND CONTROLS

	HOUSEHOLD ROLES			WORK-FAMILY BALANCE	NEED FOR FAMILY	
	Sharing Chores in Marriage Is Important[a] (1)	Men Should Take Same Responsibility for Home/Children[a] (2)	Fathers as Suitable as Mothers to Look after Children[b] (3)	Family-Friendly Job Is Important[a] (4)	Men Need to Have Children for Fulfillment[b] (5)	Duty to Society to Have Children (6)
Traditionalist	−.398***	−1.390***	−.738***	−.103	.540***	.251***
	(.026)	(.108)	(.042)	(.083)	(.034)	(.044)
Liberal egalitarian	.156***	.513***	.181***	−.072	−.248***	−.256***
	(.017)	(.041)	(.020)	(.041)	(.058)	(.020)
Egalitarian familist.	.330***	.569***	.383***	.182***	.409***	.360***
	(.023)	(.051)	(.028)	(.049)	(.022)	(.027)
Flexible egalitarian.	−.088***	.308***	.173***	−.007	−.700***	−.356***
	(.020)	(.056)	(.025)	(.052)	(.021)	(.024)
Female	.040***	.135***	.072***	.159***	−.099***	−.098***
	(.008)	(.016)	(.010)	(.019)	(.007)	(.009)
Married.	−.025*	−.053**	−.036**	.063**	.022*	.043***
	(.010)	(.019)	(.011)	(.022)	(.009)	(.011)
Age	−.004***	−.003**	−.011***	−.015***	.002***	.006***
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.002)	(.001)	(.001)

1508

Has children	−.029*	.046*	.031*	.345***	.139***	.054***
	(.012)	(.022)	(.014)	(.027)	(.011)	(.013)
Education	.003	.029***	.010*	.005	−.014***	−.018***
	(.004)	(.007)	(.004)	(.009)	(.003)	(.004)
Works full-time.................	.030**	.029	.028**	−.066**	−.018*	−.032**
	(.009)	(.018)	(.011)	(.021)	(.008)	(.010)
Conservative political views	−.024***	−.046***	−.037***	<.001	.016***	.029***
	(.004)	(.008)	(.005)	(.009)	(.004)	(.005)
Member of religious denomination ...	−.020*	−.026	−.065***	.088***	.078***	.111***
	(.010)	(.019)	(.012)	(.022)	(.009)	(.011)
Household income level	−.049***	−.009	−.022	.027	−.027**	−.043***
	(.012)	(.024)	(.014)	(.027)	(.010)	(.013)
Country dummies.................	X	X	X	X	X	X
Wave dummies...................	X		X		X	
N of observations	45,721	15,606	29,456	15,652	29,612	15,647

NOTE.—Results reflect effect coding where coefficients represent difference between class membership and the grand mean. All models are weighted with population-equilibrated weights.

[a] Outcome asked only in wave 6 (2008–9).

[b] Outcome asked in wave 4 (1999–2000) and wave 6 (2008–9).

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$.

1509

TABLE 5
THREE-STEP LCA ORDINAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF CLASS MEMBERSHIP ON DISTAL OUTCOMES BY REFERENCE CATEGORY

	HOUSEHOLD ROLES			WORK-FAMILY BALANCE	NEED FOR FAMILY	
	Sharing Chores in Marriage Is Important (7)	Men Should Take Same Responsibility for Home/Children[a] (8)	Fathers as Suitable as Mothers to Look after Children[b] (9)	Family-Friendly Job Is Important[a] (10)	Men Need to Have Children for Fulfillment[b] (11)	Duty to Society to Have Children (12)
Traditional	−.728***	−1.959***	−1.121***	−.285*	.131**	−.109
(Egalitarian familist)	(.044)	(.151)	(.065)	(.121)	(.050)	(.062)
Liberal egalitarian	−.174***	−.056	−.202***	−.255***	−.657***	−.617***
(Egalitarian familist)	(.032)	(.054)	(.036)	(.062)	(.027)	(.034)
Flexible egalitarian	−.418***	−.261***	−.210***	−.189**	−1.109***	−.717***
(Egalitarian familist)	(.034)	(.061)	(.036)	(.070)	(.031)	(.035)
Traditional	−.554***	−1.904***	−.919***	−.031	.788***	.507***
(Liberal egalitarian)	(.034)	(.138)	(.053)	(.109)	(.043)	(.056)
Flexible egalitarian	−.244***	−.206***	−.008	.066	−.452***	−.100**
(Liberal egalitarian)	(.030)	(.061)	(.035)	(.069)	(.027)	(.032)
Flexible egalitarian	.310***	1.698***	.911**	.097	−1.240***	−.607***
(Traditional)	(.038)	(.156)	(.061)	(.121)	(.049)	(.062)
Country dummies	X	X	X	X	X	X
Wave dummies	X		X		X	
N of observations	45,721	15,606	29,456	15,652	29,612	15,647

NOTE.—Reference category is in parentheses. All models contain controls for sex, marital status, age, whether the respondent has children, years of education, employment status (full-time employed), political conservativism, whether the respondent is a member of a religious denomination, and income level. All models are weighted with population-equilibrated weights.

a Outcome asked only in wave 6 (2008–9).

b Outcome asked in wave 4 (1999–2000) and wave 6 (2008–9).

* P < .05.

** P < .01.

*** P < .001.

importance of fulfilling both roles, employment arrangements that facilitate these dual responsibilities are of greater importance to this class.

Finally, the three egalitarian classes are differentiated with respect to attitudes about whether men need children (models 5 and 11) and whether individuals have a duty to society to have children (models 6 and 12). Flexible egalitarians are the most likely to disagree that men need to have children for fulfillment and that there is a duty to have children. This is consistent with our interpretation that flexible egalitarians deny the imperative of familial roles, for men as well as for women. In contrast, egalitarian familists are the most likely of the egalitarian classes to agree that men need children for fulfillment and also to agree that there is a duty to have children. Egalitarian familists therefore exhibit an emphasis on the normative imperative of having a family, a value they apply to men as well as women.[19]

These results provide further evidence that egalitarian familism and flexible egalitarianism should not simply be classified as weaker forms of traditionalism or egalitarianism. On the one hand, egalitarian familists are the most likely to agree that sharing chores in a marriage is important and that fathers are as well suited as mothers to take care of children; they are equally as likely as liberal egalitarians to think that men should take the same responsibility for home and children. On the other hand, egalitarian familists are highly likely to think that men require children for fulfillment and are as likely as traditionalists to think that it is a duty to have children. Again, these views are coupled with the value that egalitarian familists place on jobs that are family friendly compared to members of other classes.

Similarly, this analysis provides additional evidence that flexible egalitarians are more likely than the other egalitarian classes to allow gender differentiation in the household, even when differentiation reinforces traditional roles. At the same time, flexible egalitarianism is positively associated with support for fathers' suitability to look after children (on a par with liberal egalitarianism), indicating a nonessentialist attitude about women's innate suitability to take care of children. Similar to the responses about women's roles, when questions are framed in terms of actions that each gender "needs

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[19] The question regarding whether men need children for fulfillment was asked on a 5-point scale (see app. table B3) while the question regarding whether women need children for fulfillment was asked on a dichotomized scale. Therefore, direct comparison of rates of agreement between the sexes should be read with caution. Nevertheless, when the question on men's need for children is dichotomized (with the middle category of "neither agree nor disagree" set to 0.5), responses to the two questions can be compared in the fourth and sixth wave of the EVS (where both questions appear). Both egalitarian familists and traditionalists are slightly more likely to think that women need children for fulfillment than men do. By contrast, both liberal egalitarians and flexible egalitarians are more likely to agree that men rather than women need children for fulfillment. These analyses are available from the authors by request.

1511

to" or "should" take, individuals in this group have a lower rate of agreement than those in other egalitarian classes. These responses show flexible egalitarians to be supportive of gender differentiation in the household, to be nonessentialist, and to see little imperative for the genders to enact certain roles.

Change over Time

Finally, we turn to the temporal analysis and evaluate whether our data best fit the characterization of a rising tide (a movement toward liberal egalitarianism), a stalled revolution (a leveling-off in the increase in egalitarian classes), or divergence across varied egalitarianisms.[20] Figure 2 presents the distribution of classes for the pooled sample across waves.

The first trend to note is the rapid and nearly complete decline of the traditional class. In the two decades covered by the analysis, membership in the traditional class plummeted from nearly 40% of the pooled sample to less than 10%. The near-elimination of the traditional class raises the question of what patterns of beliefs have grown more prominent over time. While the conventional narrative posits a straightforward increase in liberal egalitarianism, or at least a leveling-off in this trend consistent with a stalled gender revolution, change in the distribution of gender-role classes demonstrates that this is only partially the case. While the liberal egalitarian class has grown to be the largest of the egalitarian classes, there have also been increases in the other two egalitarian groups. This supports our second hypothesis regarding divergence over time. What is perhaps most unexpected is that the flexible egalitatian class has grown dramatically over time, though its growth has stagnated over the last decade. The egalitarian familist class has grown modestly, remaining the second largest egalitatian class by wave 6.

To summarize, these results qualify both the modernization and stalled revolution narratives. While there has been a large increase in membership in the liberal egalitarian class, our results indicate that the modernization narrative is complicated by the increase in two other distinct egalitarian classes. And to the extent that we see a stalled revolution in the pooled sample, it appears to be driven *not* by a large number of individuals continuing to hold traditional beliefs nor by a resurgence of membership in the traditional class but by the growth in the two other egalitarian classes, whose members hold views that potentially support more traditional family values and notions about women's familial roles.

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[20] Exact percentages should be read with caution, since precise percentage estimates will depend upon model selection (see fig. A3 in app. A). The model presented here includes country-level direct effects, providing a conservative test of between-country class differences.

FIG. 2.—Change in gender-role attitude class proportions, 1990–2009. Class proportions reflect proportional assignment in each class using population-equilibrated weights. Class model is partially homogeneous model with country-level direct effects.

To capture the distinct trajectories of change, we disaggregate by country. Figure 3 shows the proportion of individuals in each country by gender-role attitude class over time. These results permit several generalizations. First, the traditional class has declined in every country. The most dramatic transition away from traditional gender-role attitudes has occurred in Eastern Europe (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). In most of these countries, the decline of traditionalism in these countries has been met with an increase in egalitarian familism. Second, the increase in liberal egalitarianism has been universal except for Finland (where flexible egalitarianism showed a rapid rise and became the dominant gender-role attitude class). Third, adherence to egalitarian familism varied across countries in the early period (wave 2), and this has continued to be the case; it is quite a large class in some countries and substantially smaller in others. Finally, while flexible egalitarianism was not an especially large class in any of the countries in the early period, its prevalence has largely increased since then.

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Fig. 3.—Change in gender-role class proportions by country, 1990–2009

The results of figure 3 can be summarized by a comparison of between-country standard deviations in the prevalence of the four gender-role attitude classes across the three waves.[21] Figure 4 shows that for the traditional class the standard deviation falls steeply from 0.17 to 0.04, indicating convergence across countries in the size of this class. In contrast, the flexible egalitarian class shows evidence of divergence in its prevalence in different countries, with a large increase in the between-country standard deviation from 0.07 to 0.14. Cross-country variation in the liberal egalitarian class does not significantly change (with an SD of 0.15 in wave 2 and 0.14 in wave 6). Similarly, the standard deviation for egalitarian familists does not change significantly (0.11 in wave 2 and 0.12 in wave 6). In sum, this analysis indicates only weak and partial support for the convergence thesis: though European countries have converged with respect to the decline in traditional gender-role attitudes, they have either diverged or exhibited no evidence of convergence over the past two decades in terms of the prevalence of the three egalitarian gender-role classes.

DISCUSSION

A common assumption of research on gender-role attitudes has been that the endpoint of change over time will be the least gender-essentialist, most egalitarian position. This narrative has been increasingly questioned as evidence has accumulated that the gender revolution seemingly stalled by the mid-1990s, with changes in occupational sex segregation and the gender wage gap significantly slowing and with gender essentialism continuing to underpin many behaviors and attitudes. A central puzzle for scholars has been how to characterize this change—whether stalling indicates the maintenance or even resurgence of traditionalism, the emergence of a new cultural frame, or increasing divergence across attitudes. Attempts to address this question have been hampered by analytic limitations, as the vast majority of large-scale survey analyses continue to treat egalitarianism as one-dimensional. Consequently, scholars have generally been unable to distinguish a slowdown in the uptake of egalitarian attitudes from the emergence and diversification of cultural frames that combine elements of egalitarianism with other dimensions.

This article has built upon previous studies that have suggested the possible coherence of egalitarian attitudes about women's labor force participation with essentialist attitudes about women's role in the home. Drawing

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[21] We present standard deviations rather than coefficients of variation since the mean score for the traditional class falls nearly to zero, inflating the coefficient of variation. Standard deviations are estimated as the country-level effect when individuals, proportionally assigned to classes, are nested in countries.

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Fᴵɢ. 4.—Between-country standard deviations

on insights from gender scholarship on egalitarianism (William 2000; Verloo 2007; Braun 2008; Orloff 2008; Charles and Bradley 2009), we construct a theoretical frame in which gender-role attitudes differ across the dimensions of egalitarianism, essentialism, and individual choice/normative imperative. Our empirical results illustrate that this multidimensional approach corresponds to four main classes of attitudes among survey respondents in postindustrial Europe. In particular, our finding of three distinct constellations of egalitarian attitudes suggests the need for revising accounts of cross-national change in gender-role attitudes vis-à-vis the labor market and family. Contrary to the supposition that gender-role classes align along a continuum, with intermediate classes constituting watered-down versions of traditionalism or egalitarianism, we find that individuals' attitudes cohere in explicable ways that combine egalitarian, essentialist, and individual choice/normative imperative dimensions into distinct configurations of egalitarianism.

Liberal egalitarians, the class that most straightforwardly resembles the liberal egalitarian end of a unidimensional spectrum, support women achieving equality in the workplace as well as contributing equally to family income; they strongly repudiate views that endorse essentialist notions of women. While this set of attitudes is the one most frequently described in the quantitative, cross-national literature on gender-role attitudes, we find important distinctions between this class of attitudes and other egalitarian schemas. The class we designate as egalitarian familists bears some resemblance to what Charles and Grusky (2004) have termed "egalitarian essentialists" in that they combine support for egalitarianism in the workplace with essentialist notions that women, at their core, want a family and children. Nevertheless, our findings differ in important respects from the egalitarian essentialist ideology discussed in prior research. In their analysis of the United States, Cotter and colleagues identify egalitarian essentialists as individuals who combine support for "stay at home mothering with a continued feminist rhetoric of choice and equality" (2011, p. 261). In contrast, we find that the egalitarian familist class adheres to the twin normative imperatives that women should have children and should also have a job. Similarly, Charles and Grusky (2004) refer to egalitarian essentialism as an ideology that promotes equal rights yet sustains essentialist prejudices, particularly those of women's unique care-giving qualities (2004, p. 27). In contrast, we find that egalitarian familists are distinguished from the other classes by their strong belief that men, too, require children for fulfillment.

Our empirical results suggest that egalitarian familism is an ideology that is particularly pronounced in the former socialist societies of Eastern Europe, especially Hungary, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic. Indeed, the comparative nature of our analysis vis-à-vis research on gender-role attitudes that focuses on the United States may be a key reason why egalitarian familism

emerges so prominently as a set of attitudes. Interestingly, our results show that among the 17 European countries in our sample, this class is the smallest in the Netherlands and in the Northern European countries of Denmark and Finland, which are more similar to the United States in their gender-role attitude class distribution (Brinton and Lee 2016). Our ability to utilize more recent data on attitudes regarding men's roles also allows us to go beyond much previous research and identify how certain gender-role ideologies, notably egalitarian familism, prioritize the centrality of the family not only for women's lives but also for men's.

Our framework also identifies an egalitarian class distinct from liberal egalitarianism and egalitarian familism: flexible egalitarianism. This constellation of attitudes is distinguished from the other egalitarian classes in its support for traditional as well as nontraditional arrangements. More important, members of this class reject many of the suppositions of both liberal egalitarianism and egalitarian familism while combining elements from each. For example, like egalitarian familists, flexible egalitarians support the idea of women as housewives as well as workers. Unlike egalitarian familists, however, they tend on average to disagree with questions that imply that women need to take on certain roles, whether those roles involve having children or being employed. Like liberal egalitarians, this class almost universally negates the essentialist supposition that men have a greater right to employment during tough economic times; unlike liberal egalitarians, however, they do not necessarily believe that men's and women's equal right to employment means that both sexes should necessarily contribute to a family's income.

Our analysis complicates the optimistic predictions offered by many scholars up until the early 1990s. While greater acceptance of women's expanded labor market role is indisputable, the decline of traditional attitudes has not been mirrored by a concomitant rise of liberal egalitarian beliefs. But neither can change be characterized simply by a slowdown in movement toward such beliefs nor by the rise of a single alternative type of egalitarianism that retains some elements of gender essentialism. Rather, we find distinct trajectories of change in Europe, marked by increases in adherence to three classes of egalitarian attitudes that are filling the space left by traditionalism.

CONCLUSION

We view our contribution as threefold. First, we have theoretically identified and empirically substantiated a coherent relationship between the dimensions of egalitarianism, gender essentialism, and individual choice/

1518

normative imperative that crystallizes in identifiable gender-role attitude classes. Second, we have demonstrated that the prevalence of these classes varies over time among postindustrial European countries. Third, we have shown that there has not been convergence to one dominant form of gender egalitarianism over the past two decades in European countries.

Given that countries can be distinguished by the particular egalitarian gender-role attitude classes that are gaining in prominence, what does this imply for men and women in different European countries? While it is beyond the scope of this article to specify the implications of these patterns of change, comparative research has paid increasing attention in recent years to how gender equity in "public-oriented institutions" such as the labor market and "private institutions" such as the family affect fertility and other family outcomes (McDonald 2000; Mills 2010). Empirical research has demonstrated relationships between individuals' gender-role attitudes and marital dissolution (Kaufman 2000; Oláh and Gähler 2014), the household division of labor (Coltrane 2000; Oláh and Gähler 2014), and fertility intentions and decisions (Coltrane 2000; Torr and Short 2004; Cooke 2008; Arpino, Esping-Andersen, and Pessin 2015; Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård 2015). Our demonstration of divergent attitudinal trajectories over time in societies in postindustrial Europe points the way toward research agendas that shift the focus toward analyzing how the prevalence of particular forms of gender egalitarianism reflects the cultural norms shaping men's and women's behaviors in the labor market and the household. And just as some scholars of the welfare state have argued for greater attention to the relationship between welfare state policies and underlying cultural logics (Pfau-Effinger 2005), our research on patterns of divergent attitudinal change in postindustrial Europe also suggests the importance of analyzing the interplay between gender-role schemas that advocate a dual-earner model and the social policies and institutions that support such a family model. As an example, the rise of egalitarian familism in most Eastern European countries, while coupled with advocacy of family-friendly jobs, has occurred during a period of declining state revenues and lessened support for social policies that support women as workers and mothers (Pascall and Manning 2000). In contrast, another country with a relatively high proportion of egalitarian familists is France, which has a strong system of state support for employed mothers. It should come as no surprise, then, that the current ability of Eastern European countries to maintain population replacement-level birth rates falls far short of the ability of France to do so. Our analysis thus points the way toward future research that analyzes the joint impact of gender-role ideology and institutional arrangements and social policies on consequential macrolevel outcomes such as national fertility rates.

1519

In conclusion, our analysis demonstrates that in a period marked by a degree of frustration over an "unfinished revolution" (Gerson 2009) and a vibrant public debate over the ability or inability of women to have it all (Slaughter 2012), social scientists must apply a more complex set of theoretical and analytic tools than in the past to discern the coherent patterning of gender-role attitudes from available survey measures. While this article's analysis faces all the inherent limitations of using questions from survey data, we have sought to unpack the ways in which egalitarianism, essentialism, and normative imperatives combine. Far from exhibiting straightforward convergence into a rising tide of liberal egalitarianism, we find that divergence and persistence are equally important to understanding countries' changing gender-role attitudes over the past 20 years.

APPENDIX A

Latent Class Model Selection and Sensitivity

When selecting the appropriate number of latent classes, statistical measures of goodness of fit as well as theoretical assumptions should be taken into account. While several different measures of fit can be used to adjudicate among models, the most common is the BIC. The BIC allows for model comparison by assessing goodness of fit while penalizing additional parameters; a lower BIC indicates a better fit. In general, the most parsimonious model that provides an adequate fit to the data is preferred (Vermunt and Magidson 2005). When selecting models, therefore, it is often useful to draw a scree plot of BIC values to identify an "elbow" or "turning point" where the BIC value (i.e., the information provided by the model) does not change considerably with the inclusion of additional classes (Moors and Wennekers 2003, p. 159).

Figure A1 presents the relationship between BIC and the number of latent classes. We identify four classes as the turning point where additional classes no longer significantly decrease the BIC. While the percentage change in the BIC between three- and four-class models is 0.7%, the percentage change between four and five classes is 0.2%. We can be further assured that a fifth or sixth class does not add to the model by investigating the class content of additional classes. In a five-class model, the traditional class is split into two (with the additional fifth class constituting 9% of the sample). The difference between a four-class and a five-class model is that the five-class model includes two "traditional" subclasses. Both subclasses agree with male primacy—that, on balance, men should have priority when jobs are scarce—and both hold essential attitudes about women's roles as mothers. However, these two variants differ on the question of whether both men

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
Fig. A1.—Bayesian information criterion (BIC) by number of classes. All models are estimated using population weights. BIC reflects a fully homogeneous model with a wave covariate (but no country-level direct effects).

and women should contribute to household income, with one subclass exhibiting more supportive attitudes towards women's role in the labor force. It is important to note that both of these subclasses follow similar trajectories of change over time; both decrease sharply in prevalence to about 5% of the population by wave 6. Therefore, while it would be possible to analyze a five-class structure with fourth and fifth classes that are slightly less and slightly more traditional renditions of the traditional class, this additional complexity would not substantively alter our conclusions.

We can be further assured of the robustness of our model selection by examining how well the model assigns cases into classes (Bonikowski 2013). In general, classification errors (errors that arise from cases in which individuals are imprecisely assigned to classes) increase as the number of classes increases. A model that does a good job of assigning observations to classes will have many observations that have a high probability of assignment into a class, whereas a more ambiguous model will distribute observations more evenly among the classes. Table A1 presents the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values for the distribution of observations' posterior probabilities by class. In each class, the median posterior probability of inclusion into the class is high, ranging from 0.67 for flexible egalitarians to 0.85 for liberal egalitarians. Generally, a probability greater than 0.5 is considered the minimum threshold for unambiguous

1521

TABLE A1
Distribution of Posterior Probabilities of Membership by Class

Name	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max
Traditional	.75	.78	.18	.27	1.00
Liberal egalitarian	.80	.85	.18	.26	.99
Egalitarian familist	.70	.70	.15	.29	.98
Flexible egalitarian	.68	.67	.17	.26	.99

class assignment. This threshold is exceeded for 90% of traditionalists, 90% of egalitarian familists, 92% of liberal egalitarians, and 81% of flexible egalitarians.

To ensure that our results are robust to the inclusion of low-probability estimates, we also performed each analysis on a sample restricted to cases that had a posterior membership probability above 0.50. No meaningful differences were found between these analyses.[22]

Once a four-class model was selected, we then tested for measurement invariance to ensure that the indicators were comparable across countries. While our analysis indicates that a partially homogeneous model better fits the data, previous work has demonstrated the importance of also checking intermediary models (i.e., models that fall between fully heterogeneous, partially heterogeneous, and fully homogeneous). The purpose of checking intermediary models that fall between fully heterogeneous and partially homogeneous is to ensure that each individual indicator is invariant. That is, even if the overall analysis selects the partially homogeneous model, a particular question could be incommensurable across countries (Kankaras et al. 2014). To test for this, we assess the comparability of each indicator separately by iteratively equating each indicator across countries (i.e., by fixing country-level slopes to be equivalent, one indicator at a time). If an indicator can be considered invariant, then the restricted model will fit the data better than the fully heterogeneous model. We find that all indicators have invariant slopes, as indicated by the higher (i.e., worse-fitting) BIC for the heterogeneous model than the restricted models (table A2). Thus, our best-fitting model is a partially homogeneous model that includes country-level intercepts (i.e., country-level direct effects) for each indicator; this assumes that the latent class distributions differ between countries but that the strength of the relationship between latent variables and the indicators is fixed (Vermunt 1996).

[22] Results are available from the authors upon request.

1522

TABLE A2
Fit Statistics for Four-Class Model by Item, Slopes

Model	BIC (LL)
Fully heterogeneous, four classes	345,789
Q1. Women need children for fulfillment	345,615
Q2. Relationship between children and working mother	345,733
Q3. Being a housewife just as fulfilling as working for pay	345,596
Q4. Both men and women should contribute to income	345,338
Q5. Women want a home and family	345,604
Q6. Women's job means independence	345,447
Q7. Men's right to jobs.	345,546

Nevertheless, it is not always necessary to include country-level effects for each indicator. Particularly in the case of models with large numbers of observations, small differences between countries in terms of latent class distributions are likely to be significant (Hagenaars 1990) and might result in rejecting even well-fitting restricted models. Moreover, in general the inclusion of country-level effects decreases observed differences across countries (Kankaras et al. 2014). To test whether an intermediate model between fully homogeneous and partially homogeneous could provide a better fit, we assess BICs with the iterative inclusion of country-level intercepts (see table A3) (Kankaras et al. 2014). We find that while over 90% of the increase in model fit can be achieved by including country-level intercepts on just three indicators (model 4), a model that includes all seven country-level intercepts best fits the data (model 8). We therefore select as our final measurement model a partially homogeneous model that allows comparisons of

TABLE A3
Fit Statistics for 4-Class Model by Item, Intercepts

No.	Model	Indicator Added	BIC (LL)	% Change in BIC
1.	Fully homogeneous		368,967	
2.	1DE	+ Q1: Women fulfilled	349,220	.79
3.	2DE	+ Q4: Both contribute to income	347,071	.88
4.	3DE	+ Q2: Relationship with children	346,070	.92
5.	4DE	+ Q7: Men's right to jobs	344,874	.97
6.	5DE	+ Q6: Women's independence	344,513	.98
7.	6DE	+ Q5: Women want home and children	344,177	1.00
8.	7DE	+ Q3: Housewife as fulfilling	344,070	1.00

F_{IG}. A2.—Coefficients of indicators on latent classes across models. Q1: A woman has to have children to be fulfilled; Q2: Working mothers'relationship with children is just as warm; Q3: Being a housewife is just as fulfilling; Q4: Husband and wife should both contribute to income; Q5: Women want a home and children; Q6: Job is the best way for women to be independent; Q7: Men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce.

classes across countries. This final model has the benefit of including the fewest homogeneity assumptions and thereby providing a conservative test for country-level differences.

To ensure that our results are not overly sensitive to our model selection, we can compare the class content of the clusters across models. Figure A2 shows the class profiles for a fully homogeneous model, a model with three direct effects and, finally, the partially homogeneous model with all seven direct effects that we present in this article. As is evident in the figure, the class content of the latent classes is quite stable across models.

Finally, we compare period effects across models to test for sensitivity in our estimates of change over time (Kankaras et al. 2014). Figure A3 presents the coefficients of the wave indicators on each class across the three models. This shows that there is little difference in period effects for the traditional and liberal egalitarian classes and some difference for the egalitarian familist and flexible egalitarian classes. Most notably, models that assume intercept invariance and allow for fewer country-level direct effects will estimate a smaller flexible egalitarian class.

1524

Fig. A3.—Period effects on latent classes across models. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals

APPENDIX B

Descriptive Statistics for Demographic Controls,
Distal Outcomes, Class Means

TABLE B1
DESCRIPTIVES OF DEMOGRAPHIC CORRELATES

	Covariate Sample		Full Sample	
	N	%	N	%
Male	22,785	.51	33,780	.48
Female	23,202	.49	39,079	.52
Unmarried.................	18,290	.40	29,739	.41
Married...................	27,697	.60	42,811	.59
Age (Mean)	45,987	46.35	72,859	46.51
Does not have children........	11,016	.25	17,921	.26
Has children	34,971	.75	54,325	.74
Age completed education:				
1: <12 years..............	2,319	.05	4,082	.06
2: 13 years...............	753	.02	1,263	.02
3: 14 years...............	6,382	.14	9,653	.14
4: 15 years...............	3,625	.08	5,453	.08
5: 16 years...............	4,515	.09	6,662	.10
6: 17 years...............	3,719	.08	5,261	.08
7: 18 years...............	6,210	.14	9,071	.14
8: 19 years...............	3,935	.09	5,930	.09
9: 20 years...............	2,415	.05	3,428	.05
10: over 21 years...........	12,114	.26	16,668	.24
Does not work full time	24,108	.52	40,030	.54
Works full time..............	21,879	.48	32,446	.46
Left-leaning political view	1,862	.04	2,481	.04
2.........................	1,839	.04	2,370	.04
3.........................	4,864	.10	6,268	.10
4.........................	5,168	.11	6,574	.11
5.........................	14,068	.31	18,067	.31
6.........................	6,174	.14	7,900	.14
7.........................	4,789	.11	6,039	.10
8.........................	4,142	.09	5,417	.09
9.........................	1,320	.03	1,721	.03
Right-leaning political view	1,761	.04	2,289	.04
Does not belong to a religious denomination	15,018	.31	23,035	.31
Belongs to a religious denomination	30,969	.69	49,596	.69
1: Household income, low	13,787	.29	18,555	.31
2: Household income, middle...	17,788	.39	22,275	.39
3: Household income, high.....	14,412	.32	16,890	.30

NOTE.—The full sample includes all respondents. The covariate sample includes only those respondents who had no missing values on any of the covariates. Percentages are weighted with population-equilibrated weights.

	Traditionalist	Liberal egalitarian	Egalitarian familist	Flexible egalitarian
Female	.44	.53	.48	.48
Married	.68	.54	.62	.58
Age	49.08	43.53	49.48	44.52
Has children	.83	.69	.79	.74
Education	5.91	7.16	6.02	7.44
Works full time	.45	.55	.44	.52
Conservative political views . . .	5.61	5.15	5.47	5.39
Member of religious denomination	.75	.67	.72	.69
Income level	1.95	2.11	1.93	2.08

NOTE.—$N = 45,987$. Percentages are weighted with population-equilibrated weights.

		N	%
Important in marriage: sharing chores (reverse-coded):			
1	Not very important	7,191	.15
2	Rather important	21,455	.47
3	Very important	17,075	.38
Men should take as much responsibility as women for the home and children (reverse-coded):			
1	Disagree strongly	97	<.01
2	Disagree	970	.06
3	Agree	7,543	.49
4	Agree strongly	6,996	.44
In general, fathers are as well-suited to look after their children as mothers (reverse-coded):			
1	Disagree strongly	867	.03
2	Disagree	5,775	.19
3	Agree	14,507	.50
4	Agree strongly	8,307	.28
Important in a job: family friendly:			
0	Not mentioned as important	8,958	.57
1	mentioned as important	6,694	.43
A man needs to have a child to be fulfilled (reverse-coded):			
1	Disagree strongly	3,203	.11
2	Disagree	7,791	.28
3	Neither agree nor disagree	5,829	.19
4	Agree	8,049	.26
5	Agree strongly	4,695	.15

TABLE B3 (*Continued*)

		N	%
It is a duty toward society to have children (reverse-coded):			
1	Disagree strongly....................................	3,564	.23
2	Disagree..	5,332	.35
3	Neither agree nor disagree	2,891	.18
4	Agree	2,807	.17
5	Agree strongly......................................	1,053	.06

NOTE.—Percentages are weighted with population-equilibrated weights.

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