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Presidential Address to the  
American Finance Association  
January 7, 2006

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# Household Finance

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# Household Finance

- A field with much interesting research but still lacking in definition and status.
- How do households use financial instruments to attain their objectives?
- Unlike asset pricing, no special status for wealthy or risk-tolerant households.

# Positive vs. Normative

- **Positive household finance:**
  - How **do** households invest?
  - Hard to measure.
- **Normative household finance:**
  - How **should** households invest?
  - Hard to model.
- **Can they be different?**
  - Revealed preference.
  - Investment mistakes.

# Investment Mistakes

- Some decisions are inconsistent with
  - a broad range of standard models, and
  - the advice commonly given by financial planners.
- I will interpret these as investment mistakes.
- Households may make them, but can learn to avoid them.

# Investment Mistakes

- **Who makes them?**
- **What are the welfare costs?**
- **Does financial innovation help?**
- **How can we help?**

# Three Examples

- **Mistake 1:** Failure to participate.
- **Mistake 2:** Failure to diversify.
- **Mistake 3:** Failure to refinance.

**Mistake 1:  
Failure to Participate**



**Figure 1: The US Wealth Distribution**






Figure 2: Participation Rates by Asset Class



**Figure 3: Asset Class Shares in Household Portfolios**



# Who Participates?

2001 Survey of Consumer Finances


Reference	57% participation
High school	<b>15% increase</b>
College	<b>28% increase</b>
Income +1 $\sigma$	<b>43% increase</b>
Wealth +1 $\sigma$	<b>11% increase</b>

**Mistake 2:  
Failure to Diversify**

# The Measurement Challenge

- Surveys do not generally go down to the individual asset level.
- Brokerage account data do not show a household's complete portfolio.
- Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (CCS 2005) use Swedish government data:
  - collected because Sweden has a wealth tax.
  - details of each citizen's portfolio at the end of each year.

**Figure 4: Mean-Variance Efficiency of Swedish Household Portfolios (from Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini 2005)**



• Household Complete Portfolios    ● World Index in USD    ● World Index in SEK    ● Swedish Index in SEK    ○ Swedish T-Bill


# Who Fails to Diversify?

- The median Swedish household does quite well:
  - Sharpe ratio 35% below the hedged world index,
  - but only 14% below the unhedged world index,
  - and 8% above the Swedish index.
- A minority does much worse:
  - The 95<sup>th</sup> percentile Sharpe ratio reduction is 66% relative to the hedged world index,
  - and 55% relative to the unhedged world index.
- The dollar losses can be substantial:
  - 95<sup>th</sup> percentile \$1800/year relative to hedged index,
  - and \$650/year relative to the unhedged index.



# Who Fails to Diversify?

- Older, poorer, less educated households tend to have lower Sharpe ratios.
- But they also tend to invest more cautiously.
- Offsetting effects on return losses from portfolio inefficiency.



# Out of the Frying Pan

- These results suggest that some mistakes may result from attempting to avoid others.
- Less skillful households may take less risk, or may avoid risky assets altogether.
- CCS calculate the portfolio return loss for a typical nonparticipant:
  - 4.0% relative to efficient investing and total risk of a typical participant.
  - 2.2% relative to risk and Sharpe ratio predicted by demographic regression.

# Mistake 3: Failure to Refinance

# The US Mortgage Market

- The mortgage is the largest financial contract for a typical household.
- In the US, nominal fixed-rate mortgages predominate.
- These mortgages carry a valuable option to refinance.
- Some households refinance slowly and pay high rates on old mortgages.

**Figure 5: Fixed Rate Mortgage Share and Mortgage Rates**





Figure 6: Distribution of Mortgage Spreads



# Who Refinances?

American Housing Survey 2001-03

Reference	28%
High school	<b>5% increase</b>
College	<b>9% increase</b>
Income +1 $\sigma$	<b>1% increase</b>
Home val. +1 $\sigma$	<b>7% increase</b>
Age +1 $\sigma$	<b>4% decrease</b>



# Who Moves?

American Housing Survey 2001-03

Reference	5% confirmed
High school	<b>4% increase</b>
College	<b>5% increase</b>
Income +1 $\sigma$	<b>1% increase</b>
Home val. +1 $\sigma$	<b>0% decrease</b>
Age +1 $\sigma$	<b>2% decrease</b>

# Who Misstates Their Rate?

American Housing Survey 2001

Reference	1.3%
High school	<b>0.6% decrease</b>
College	<b>0.5% decrease</b>
Income +1 $\sigma$	<b>0.3% decrease</b>
Home val. +1 $\sigma$	<b>0.1% increase</b>
Age +1 $\sigma$	<b>0.1% decrease</b>

# Equilibrium Household Finance

# Equilibrium Household Finance

- Household investment problems are inherently complex.
- Often, contracts do not make them easier.
- It may not be surprising that households make investment mistakes.
- But why don't easier-to-manage contracts evolve?

# Barriers to Financial Innovation

- **General barriers:**
  - Costs of reaching households.
  - Lack of effective patent protection.
- **Specific barrier to simplifying innovation:**
  - Complex products create cross-subsidy from naïve to sophisticated households.
  - Example: mortgage refinancing option.

# Cross-Subsidy and Equilibrium

- Cross-subsidy permits “shrouded equilibrium” (Gabaix and Laibson 2006).
- Naïve households do not adopt a new product because they do not understand it.
- Sophisticated households lose cross-subsidy if they switch to the new product.
- Innovators do not gain by educating households.
- How important is cross-subsidy in practice?

# Cross-Subsidy in Mortgages

- In the US, fixed mortgage rates are lower because of sluggish refinancing:
  - Total payments made in AHS exceeding current rate + 1%: 53bp in 1997, 43 bp in 1999, 66bp in 2001, and 107bp in 2003.
- This inhibits the development of automatically refinancing or inflation-adjusted mortgages.

# Cross-Subsidy in Mortgages

- Miles Report on UK mortgage finance
- UK adjustable mortgages offer
  - low teaser rate (roughly LIBOR).
  - high standard rate (LIBOR + 175bp).
  - no refinancing penalty.
- This is possible only because of sluggish refinancing
  - almost 1/3 of borrowers paid standard rate in 2003.
- It inhibits the use of fixed-rate mortgages.



# Conclusion

# Investment Mistakes

- **Who makes them?**
  - Poorer and less educated households.
- **What are the welfare costs?**
  - Modest for many, substantial for some.
  - Interactions across mistakes.

# Investment Mistakes

- **Does financial innovation help?**
  - Often proceeds slowly in retail markets.
  - The problem of cross-subsidy.
  - IT may help by allowing cheap customization.
- **How can we help?**
  - Basic financial literacy.
  - Disclosures, default options, and product design: household financial engineering.