Deliberative Democracy: Power in Practice

Christopher Celaya Harvard University

Scholarly writing concerning Deliberative Democracy (DD) has extolled a vast array of normative and empirical benefits deriving from the practice ranging from increased legitimacy and empowerment for the former to notions of increased knowledge, sophistication, interpersonal understanding, and political efficacy for the latter. But one facet of DD which has received much less attention is how real-world deliberative programs can impact the American political landscape. More specifically, little if any research has explored how powerful deliberative bodies can be in real-world deliberative programs. This project takes an early approach to answering this question by conducting a series of elite interviews with key figures in various roles connected to two deliberative programs, Participatory Budgeting and the Citizens' Initiative Review. I find that these programs do have some direct political power, but that they are more capable of exerting the second and third dimensions of power as identified by Bachrach and Barats and Steven Lukes. Along with providing evidence to this effect, I also explore the necessary and sufficient conditions for these types of programs to form and become efficacious in the first place, and as such this project also highlights some best practices and pitfalls for current and future deliberative programs.

Introduction

Large-scale deliberative programs capable of impacting real-world policymaking are rare. One of the most promising, and often overlooked, practices of Deliberative Democracy (DD) comes in the form of the New England Town Hall Meeting (Bryan, 2003), but these forms of DD are limited in size as too large a deliberative body becomes unwieldy. As a result, similar programs are essentially non-existent in larger cities, and DD is often treated as niche and insular by much of academia; you don't see articles titled "Comparative Politics…and what else?" or "Against Political Psychology" (Walzer, 2004; Sanders, 1997). Which is unfortunate as the promise of DD is vast. Scholarship shows that deliberation leads to updated policy preferences through knowledge increases (Fishkin & Luskin, 2005). Fishkin (1995, pp. 34) asserts that "a collective process occurs in which the group has a reasonable chance to form its collective, considered judgments." Moreover, List, Luskin, Fishkin, and McLean (2013) find that political deliberation moves participants closer to single-peakedness as a result of information acquisition. Wuthnow (1994) demonstrates that small deliberative groups are more likely to be interested and participate in politics and to reconsider their stance on political issues. In perhaps the most striking finding, Gastil and Dillard (1999) have demonstrated that deliberative discussions increase political sophistication on the part of the discussants. These claims deserve serious consideration. High political knowledge and sophistication are generally only ascribed to the prestigious ranks of the college intellectual and political elites (Converse, 1964), and studies of American politics have largely taken to describing American public opinion as "Uninformed, inconsistent, non-ideological and moderate" (Fiorina, Peterson, Johnson, & Mayer, 2011; Campbell et al, 1980). But while it seems fairly clear that DD

confers a number of potentially beneficial effects for citizen competence and engagement, little is known whether and how these benefits influence American society more generally.

Critics of DD are not wrong to question whether it is worth consideration, and all political science is tasked with answering the notorious "so what?" question. Two relatively recent promising deliberative programs seem likely to provide an answer: the Citizens' Initiative Review (CIR) and Participatory Budgeting (PB). This paper will provide evidence to show that these large-scale, intensive, and professionally operated deliberative programs have real, observable, and wide-ranging impacts on political actions, decisions, and thinking. Through participant and non-participant observation, and interview research, I will go beyond simply answering whether these deliberative projects have a political impact. I will also delve into the conditions necessary to implement projects like these in the first place. Social engineers intending to leverage deliberative programs first need to know the conditions to implement and sustain them.

I leverage sociological theories of power to test whether the CIR and PB actually have an impact. I find that the CIR and PB have limited but real impact on policymaking and coercive power. However, I also find that these programs are more able to access the *second face* of power, agenda setting (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962), as well as the *third dimension* of power, shaping ideology (Lukes, 2005).

The Citizens' Initiative Review and Participatory Budgeting

The Citizens Initiative Review

The Citizens Initiative Review is a project designed and organized by the 501(c)(3) Healthy Democracy. The project grew from the Jefferson Center's Citizens Juries in Minnesota. The CIR is essentially a Citizens Jury designed to digest and regurgitate information surrounding a state's ballot initiative(s) such that it outputs a statement addressing the merits of the initiative from the value perspective of typical voters (https://healthydemocracy.org/cir/). Over the course of three to five days, panelists hear from experts, advocates, and often political leaders of whom they are permitted and encouraged to ask questions. The CIR is a highly structured deliberative process; panelists bounce from task to task, deliberate in small groups and collectively, prepare, review, and ask questions, and give and discuss constant feedback. The tasks are rigidly administered by trained mediators and facilitators, and there is very little leeway in the timing or choice of tasks. In many ways the CIR is similar to Deliberative Polling (DP) done at the Center for Deliberative Democracy at Stanford, though there are some task differences, and the objective is somewhat different: DP seeks to reveal what an informed public opinion would look like about an issue, CIR is designed to provide a more frame-accessible perspective on an a ballot initiative.

The CIR, when implemented, seeks to educate voters before they vote on a ballot initiative, and as such has a lot of potential to affect political decisions from the bottom up. Healthy Democracy has run several iterations of the CIR in multiple states as demonstrations, and the state of Oregon has established a commission to select at least one initiative in general elections and to convene a citizen panel, and then to issue a statement to the voters. Healthy Democracy conducts demonstrations in eligible states (i.e. states that have an initiative process) and advocates for those states to adopt similar adopt and fund the program in full.

Thus, the CIR seems a promising program for trying to determine whether DD can be a politically efficacious component of American society. It is at least as deliberative as DP, the "Gold Standard (Mansbridge, 2010)," and oftentimes more so, it has a reasonable claim to being able to affect political behavior and policy outcomes, and it is reified in at least one state law.

Participatory Budgeting

Unlike the CIR, PB Projects are profuse and have more obvious impacts. Participatory Budgeting is a process imported from Brazil, where it was first implemented in the 1980s. In the United States, the way the process works is that a locality, usually a city or district within a large city, will set aside a (relatively small) portion of its annual budget. That portion is given over to the residents of the locality to spend on projects of their own conception and desire. This process takes place over a much longer time period and is much more intensive than the CIR, overall.

There are two potential stages of deliberation in a PB process: during project ideation and in the process of amending the projects to the constraints of the locality. The ideation process is when residents of the locality initially design the projects they would like to submit to the process. While this part of the process offers the greatest opportunity for deliberation to shine as the ideation task is *generative* (Scharmer, 2001), it is also the area that cities find the most difficult to support. The process of conforming the initial ideas is where deliberation is most often practiced during PB. Usually, but not always, a city will recruit volunteers to serve as budget delegates who pour through the initially submitted ideas and assure that they match whatever standard their locality directs. For example, some localities fund their PB process from a portion of the budget that can only be spent on certain projects, such as parks and roads, and not others, such as beautification. Delegates are also often tasked with combining ideas that are similar, or reforming ideas to make better use of space, or to better address a particular need in a locality while retaining the spirit of the proposal.

Thus, despite not always deliberating for ideation, the deliberative efforts of the budget delegates are still more than sufficient to consider PB a deliberative process. PB delegate deliberations for a single year can last as long as the deliberative sessions in a single 3-5 day CIR, which takes place over a few days. But the character of the deliberation is very different in PB. The meetings take place weekly over the course of a few months, and each week delegates only come together for a couple hours. Delegate meetings are much less structured than CIR deliberations, which better serves the purpose of PB. Group sizes also vary a lot more than in the CIR, and groups are often divided by which projects delegates are interested in.

As mentioned, the political impact of PB programs is much clearer than in the CIR. Delegates often whittle down the number of proposals from the hundreds to a few dozen. Their deliberation directly contributes to how ideas are combined, how they are reformed to comport with their locality's strictures, and how they are redesigned to better realize the spirit of the projects.

Thus, PB also seems a worthy candidate to for trying to determine if DD has efficacy. It is highly deliberative, it has definite impacts, and it is instituted more broadly.

Methods

In order to measure whether these two programs are efficacious, I combine participant and non-participant observational research with elite interviews. I use this mixed-methods approach to help confirm the findings of each method through triangulation (Small, 2011). Thus, I attended two full CIR events for roughly 60 hours of observational research as well as served as a budget delegate for the Cambridge, MA PB program for two years, which entailed about another 60 hours of engagement with that program. To move beyond the limits of personal observation, and to really understand how these programs could be efficacious, I also spoke with the elites involved with each of them. To that end, I interviewed 16 people in 5 different cities. Of course, one concern with interviews is that interviewees don't always have the incentive be completely forthcoming. Thus, I made an effort to get perspectives from people in diverse roles associated with the two programs, and especially diversity in terms of government workers versus advocates. Thus, I was not only able to triangulate based on my personal observations, I was also able to triangulate *across cases* (Gallagher, 2013). When interviewees with different, and especially conflicting, agendas report the same observations, researchers can be more confident in the accuracy of their responses.

Interviews lasted approximately 56 minutes on average and ranged from 14:26 minutes to 87:35 minutes. Interviews were recorded either using a phone call recorder or a voice recorder application depending on the interviewee's location. Calls were hand-transcribed based on these recordings. Interviewees for this study were guaranteed anonymity, but aliases and the actual roles they held are listed below to provide a coherent narrative. All aliases were randomly generated (via www.fakenamegenerator.com) and any similarity they bear to real persons is completely coincidental:

I. Barbara Grant: Candidate for a city's Alderperson and Advocate for PB, now manages PB.
II. Travis Brown: Advocate for a city PB project, played a key role in establishing the program.
III. Angela Carrico: Facilitator for the CIR.
IV. Jodie Cabrera: Ex-facilitator for the CIR.
V. Louis Hernandez: One of the Founders of PB in the United States.
VI. Jimmy Lane: One of the Founders of the CIR.
VII. Pauline Mirabal: Program Director of a city's PB program.
VIII. Renee Jones: One of the Directors of the CIR.
IX. Darrell Krause: City Manager for a city with a PB program.
X. Regina Sanders: Budget Director for a city with a PB program.
XI. Alex Rodriguez: Finance Director for a city with a PB program.
XII. Ivan Nelson: City Councilor for a city with a PB program.
XIII. Justin Simmons: Aide to a city councilor in a city with a PB program.
XIV. Jack McClean: City Council Staff Member for a city with a PB program.
XV. Ramon Fagan: Budget Director for a city with a PB program.
XVI. Eleanor Cook: Researcher studying PB nationally.

The main purpose of this study is to explore how deliberative democratic programs can be efficacious. I operationalize efficacy in this context to mean exercising actual political power, specifically the three faces of political power: coercive power, agenda-setting power, and power over ideology. But this study also seeks to dig deeper than merely a descriptive study that states whether these two programs have power or not. It also into how this power plays out, and how it is shared with other political actors. It

explores the foundations of this potential power, design choices that sustain it, and where it is likely to go in the future. As such, the following codebook guided my analysis of the interviews I conducted, and my own assessment of my observations.

The codebook is broken into four columns. In the first column is the name of the code itself. These codes correspond to the topics listed in the previous paragraph. The second column describes what evidence would look like in support of the associated code. The third column gives interview examples of what fulfillment of the description would look like. The fourth column describes the various methods I used to validate claims in order to minimize inaccurate responses, motivated reasoning, or other intentional and unintentional obfuscation. These included cross-case corroboration, recalled examples, counterfactual examples, identification of a plausible causal mechanism, and corroboration from my own observational research. These validations will be reported in the results section along with the paraphrased and directly quoted interview responses.

As a method of data collection, observational and interview methods are also valuable for theory-building, and for generating and even conducting early testing of new hypotheses (Lynch, 2013). For example, as I observed the two different programs, one of the starkest differences I noticed between the two was how rigidly (CIR) or loosely (PB) the deliberative components were designed. This got me thinking about research concerning DD and how it might map on to the two different programs. In general, it seems as though research projects on the more rigidly structured deliberative programs (such as Deliberative Polling) were the ones that reported increases in participant knowledge (Luskin, Fishkin, & Jowell, 2002) and research projects on less structured deliberation (such as in the National Issues Forum and in research on *flipped classrooms*) were the ones that reported increases in sophistication (Gastil & Dillard, 1999; Smith, Wood, Krauter, & Knight, 2011). This somewhat mapped on to the goals of the CIR (a rigidly structured deliberative program designed for participants to acquire and share knowledge) and PB (a relatively unstructured deliberative program designed for delegates to creatively shape, combine, and discard ideas), and informed some hypothesis testing from the interviews.

Code	Description	Example	Validation
Implementation Conditions	Interviewee indicates necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the initial implementation of a deliberative program, allowing it to exercise potential efficacy.	"Some of the reasons why it doesn't work on other communities is that they just don't have the money. That's the number 1 reason. We've talked to [multiple cities] and it's really nice to talk through this, but some just can't, don't have the money and don't have the staff to support it."	Corroborated by multiple interviewees. Interviewee provides illustrative real-world examples. Interviewee is able to provide counterfactual examples. Interviewee describes an associated causal process with high face validity.
Design Features for Program Sustainment	Interviewee explains how design features of a deliberative program contribute to its maintenance, allowing it to sustain potential efficacy.	"I think there's one specific area that should probably be loosened up, and that is the, you know rather than imposing very strict sort of ground-rules there should be more buy-in and development of the ground-rules, they should spend just a little bit more time with the group developing their own customs, ground-rules"	Corroborated by multiple interviewees. Interviewee provides illustrative real-world examples. Interviewee is able to provide counterfactual examples. Personal observation confirms claim.
Sharing Strategies across Programs	Interviewee claims that part of a program's success is based on information sharing between similar programs.	"In Latin America, I lived in Rosario Argentina for 6 months, and that was the biggest inspiration for the process that we've used here, where there were delegates that were developing projects, there was a full public vote unlike in Porto Alegre where that wasn't a feature of the process. So those two elements of a subset of residents developing projects and everyone invited to vote were things that were carried over from Rosario"	Corroborated by multiple interviewees. Interviewee provides illustrative real-world examples.
Power Sharing	Interviewee reveals how a deliberative program is able to exert directive or coercive power (1st face), agenda-setting power (2nd face), or ideological control (3rd face) in the realm of government policymaking.	"I came across a couple people who said, 'I'm not going to vote for you because I'm republican,' and I'd actually say to them, 'right now, because you're a republican, you're not being represented at all in your government, because you're not getting a representative, but with participatory budgeting, at least you're getting some say because you participate in that process and get more choice than you're getting now if we're just living in a representative democracy.' And they seemed to actually like that"	Corroborated by multiple interviewees, especially interviewees with conflicting agendas. Interviewee provides illustrative real-world examples. Interviewee is able to provide counterfactual examples. Interviewee describes an associated causal process with high face validity. Personal observation confirms claim.

This article will proceed in 3 sections. In Section 1, *Implementation*, I will discuss the necessary conditions for a DD project to get off the ground in the first place. This section will discuss funding, staff, trust, and political entrepreneurs.

In section 2, *Sustainment*, I will discuss design elements and technique-sharing between various deliberative projects. This section will serve as a helpful guide to those considering their own deliberative projects.

In section 3, *Power Sharing*, I will discuss the political impact that these projects have had. This section will focus on politicking around these projects (i.e. do political leaders use them to get elected, or are they simply fulfilling an ideological goal) as well as power-sharing (when can deliberation be used to do the legwork of governance). Additionally, this section will reveal instances of deliberation supplementing government rather than simply replacing it. In other words, deliberation is often able to identify and recommend solutions to otherwise unknown or difficult-to fix problems.

Section 1: Implementation

In this section I will reveal and discuss the necessary conditions for a large-scale deliberative project like the CIR or PB to come to fruition. These revelations come from extensive interviews informed by my observation of the two projects. This section will be divided into 4 subsections: Overview, Entrepreneurs, Funding, and Buy-In.

1.1: Overview

The primary conditions for the success of large-scale deliberative programs are threefold: Political Entrepreneurs, Funding, and buy-in by the community and staff. Louis Hernandez, one of the earliest Americans responsible for bringing PB to the United States largely drove my expectations about implementation in an early interview:

> Most places there's a political entrepreneur whether that's an official, a staff member with some power, who makes it happen. That's one thing. And then, whether it does happen depends a lot on resources, so if there are resources available, especially…for the pot of money but also for the implementation of the process. So there have been some times when there's been a real champion of the process but they haven't had those resources so it hasn't moved forward. Another factors can play into that certainly; community support and pressure can make those resources available or can get someone a political entrepreneur interested in the first place.

Alex Rodriguez, a city finance director, mirroring the above sentiment also suggested the need for buy-in from city staff members; essentially, PB adds to the workload of extant city staff, and generally cities do not hire extra staff to take up the slack. In terms of validation, these responses are corroborated across cases (interviewees), provide examples (seen more in the following sections), and provide a plausible causal story. I have good reason to believe that these claims are accurate.

As the following three sections will make clear there is a three-step process for implementation of deliberative programs. First and foremost there needs to be a political will. This occasionally begins as a grassroots movement, but that movement needs a political leader to take on its cause or it likely won't go anywhere. In the projects I studied these leaders have come in the form of state representatives, mayors, and city councilors/alderpeople. In about half of these instances the political entrepreneurs brought them in as pet projects, and in the other half they were brought to the attention of political leaders by activists.

After the entrepreneur convinces their locality to take on the project, the next necessary condition is funding. This requirement varies dramatically by the type of project bring implemented. For example, a single instance of the CIR costs roughly between one-half and one-twentieth of the cost of a single instance of PB, or roughly $65,000 to $120,000 for the CIR versus $200,000 to $1,250,000 for PB (San Antonio is currently implementing an even larger PB budget, and many current cities practicing PB increase their budgets each year). It is possible to conduct smaller-scale PB projects, and some schools have with much smaller budgets ($20,000-$50,000), but the scale of the impact of these projects also decreases dramatically. Moreover, just from a cost perspective, the CIR is even more efficient in that it affects an entire state, whereas PB projects in the United States (at least for now), are limited to the city or borough level. That being said, funding isn't as straightforward as it seems. Acquiring funding has perhaps been the most difficult challenge for the CIR. They've so far relied on grants and individual invested donors. For a project like PB, funding is more of a "you have it or you don't" situation; for wealthier cities it doesn't seem to take much convincing to allocate the funds and for poorer cities it seems a PB is forever out of reach. For example, Cambridge, MA spends approximately .15% of its total budget on PB, and approximately 1% of its capital budget (Cambridge Budget Office, 2018).

Finally, success requires buy-in from the community and the political leadership otherwise it is unlikely to get off the ground. This also plays out differently depending on the type of project being implemented. The CIR doesn't really require community buy-in in the sense that it requires broad participation for its deliberative activities; the actual levels of community engagement are miniscule compared to the population of any state. But the CIR does need citizen support in justifying the projects to state legislators to guarantee the CIR is politically viable. Thus, the CIR relies on surveys about preferences for the CIR process to convince politicians to support it. On the other hand, the CIR requires a highly dedicated and motivated staff to run a deliberative marathon over the course of up to 5 days. The staff is constantly engaged with participants, and when the participants are querying advocates or experts, the staff is in the background conducting continual assessments of the day and making real-time modifications to the process. This program would not function if they gave lackluster effort. On the PB side, having a dedicated staff is equally important (and one PB program collapsed partly as a result of a disengaged staff, detailed later), but they also need direct community engagement. Citizen engagement is required along almost every part of the process. Residents of the PB's locality submit the ideas to be considered, they serve as delegates to refine the ideas to make them appropriate to the stipulations of their locality, the citizens vote, and also give assessments. The amount of people involved is still a small part of the overall locality, but in this instance it's actually usually a couple percentage points and as high as 6% in Cambridge, MA.

In addition to these common themes, there are also miscellaneous considerations that are often context-specific but nevertheless might serve as helpful guides to navigating the implementation of a

large-scale deliberative project. The following 5 subsections will detail these conditions at greater length.

1.2: Entrepreneurs

Interviewees explicitly and tacitly conveyed the need for entrepreneurs to implement these large-scale deliberative programs. I asked City Councilor Ivan Nelson if he knew why some cities that could afford to implement a PB program nevertheless declined to do so. He responded, "No, I don't know. They didn't have me to push it through. I'm serious though, I pushed it through, so…" But this was no idle boast. Pauline Mirabal, the PB program directory in the same city, stated "Councilor [above] is the one who brought it [PB] to Cambridge." The councilor went on to say "I built the political will amongst the city council, the city administration, to attempt something like participatory budgeting, and then the city council passed a vote to appropriate money to hire a consultant to tell us how to do it, and then the consultant came in and totally designed the program to actually go on and implement it." Asked to elaborate what methods were successful for persuading the city administrators, the councilor said, "I worked with my colleagues and sold them on the idea, I worked with the city administration to figure out how we could carve some money out of the budget to figure out how we could fund it, I looked at the likely projects. A bunch of the things proposed in PB are things we would probably spend money on anyway, it's just that we're breaking it up in time, and so thinking about that and how to get buy in from the city finance staff…" Jack McClean, an aide to a city councilor in another city stated PB "was the particular passion project for a councilmember at the time. It was his last year in office. And he…felt very strong about it being a youth-focused pilot…and youth projects and programs were just a passion of his through his entire time in the council. So he got really excited by that."

As mentioned above, there were also instances of grassroots efforts to move these projects forward. Two activists from different cities, Barbara Grant and Travis Brown, shared their efforts to push these projects forward as well. Both of them outline a similar trajectory as the city staff, starting with an extant movement that they began, then looking for better ways to engage the community. From both of their accounts, it was apparent that the will to implement a PB program was generated from a grassroots movement, but, as mentioned, the program eventually still had to find backing from city government leaders. Barbara made PB a central pillar of her campaign to run for Alderperson, and though she didn't win, her activism inspired the eventual winner of the election to take up the program, and to appoint Barbara as its director. Travis, on the other hand, was largely motivated by an ideological affinity toward participatory democracy, and PB specifically, and eventually planned to start a business that provided resources for other cities interested in hosting their own PB programs. When discussing his efforts, he boldly proclaimed "I sold the s--- out of it," but also summed up his story with an acknowledgement , "somebody's got to push it forward to make it happen, and that's also how to get people to sign into it, and to get the whole city to sign into that."

Entrepreneurial leadership was also a necessary component of the CIR. However, the CIR leaders who brought the program into fruition tended to be activists and other interested non-governmental parties. Jodie Cabrera, an ex-facilitator for the CIR who left partly due to ideological differences, suggested that while political entrepreneurs were responsible for creating the CIR, they also relied on requests from government representatives and staffs to bring the program to their state. Thus, even with a fully developed program ready for implementation, an entrepreneur on the demand-side was still required for the program to be implemented.

This isn't to discount the necessity of a political entrepreneur on the supply-side. Jimmy Lane, one of the founders of the CIR explained how they personally had a hand in bringing building the program from scratch. Echoing Travis, beyond merely designing the program, much of the work Jimmy had to put in concerned getting political leaders in Oregon and Washington State to take up the program initially and to sign it in to law. With the help of two other passionate entrepreneurs, Jimmy hired a lobbyist, got signatures for petitions, and hired a law firm to actually write up a bill. Despite this work nobody in Washington State was willing to take up this program, though Oregon was more amenable (the reasons for which will be explicated later in the Sharing Power section). This serves somewhat as a counterfactual to show that even with supply-side entrepreneurs, without demand-side entrepreneurs efforts to implement these types of programs will likely fail.

Jimmy was also able to implement this project nearly on his own because it was largely self-funded. This partly explains why the CIR wasn't in need of as much political support as PB; most of the legwork could be done without government assistance or funding. Yet funding still remains a crucial challenge for both the CIR and PB, as will be detailed in the next subsection.

1.3: Funding

Jimmy goes on to talk about another necessary condition of implementation: funding.

> 10: "Okay. Good, now I assume that you've understood one of the key things that enabled me to get going with the Citizen's Initiative Review, and it's something that a lot of people failed to do. And that was that when I was born, I selected wealthy grandparents……the only reason that we were able to go ahead with the Citizen's Initiative Review is the inheritance that I had. Otherwise we never would have made any headway whatsoever…in Australia, Citizens' Juries are being used rather widely, again because somebody…named Luca Belgiorno, has a fortune of some $200 million. He started something called the New Democracy in Australia and they are promoting Citizens' Juries in a number of different places… Have you ever heard of Everyday Democracy in the United States…there's another group where somebody with an inheritance has set up a foundation.

Jimmy's account is rife with examples suggesting that a motivated entrepreneur with a large and available bank account is a collectively sufficient condition for the implementation of programs like the CIR. But as Jimmy states, his wealth is not boundless, and while he was personally responsible for designing and getting state support for the CIR, the program itself relies on outside funding for each actual instance of the CIR, usually through grants. Healthy Democracy, the parent of the CIR, is pushing for state legislation to fund the program in Oregon, but no other state has agreed to enshrine the program in law, and even if Oregon does decide to fund it, the CIR will still be limited to a single state. However, states like California and Massachusetts are testing CIRs and I've personally observed interest from a state representative outside of Oregon pushing to implement the CIR in their state.

PB, on the other hand, has very different funding requirements. Not only do PB programs require staff comparable to the CIR, they also require an often sizable chuck of a city budget to fund the programs that the citizens vote on. Additionally, many cities also pay consulting fees to either the Participatory Budgeting Project out of New York (which brought this process to the United States), or to other

consultants. Cities also correspond with each other for design features, but that will be covered in the Sustainment section.

City manager Darrell Krause explains that funding for PB will always be at the expense of something else. It would be unlikely for a city without wiggle-room in their budget to take on this kind of project. Darrell recalled talking to staff members from other cities who exclaimed that they would have liked to implement PB, but that other priorities prevented them from doing so. This was confirmed by Alex Rodriguez, stating that PB programs should never come at the cost of sacrificing other programs which address a city need.

But even wealthier cities would like to see a bigger budget for PB. Pauline Mirabal said, "Well I definitely think we need more money for the projects, at least a million. I think as that goes up it will continue to grow because then you'll see the scope of the projects will get bigger. I really want more people to vote." Another advantage some wealthy cities may have is that their need to tax the citizens is relatively low, and so they can more easily justify a program like PB, according to Darrell. A sizable portion of Darrell's city capital budget comes from bonds, and only about 3-4% percent comes from property taxes. Still, not every city is as easily able to allocate the necessary funds. Some cities struggle to find the funds to pay for these projects, and others simply aren't in a position to allocate funds away from other city operations. Pauline spoke with interested city staff members from at least 8 different cities, and only one, San Antonio (with a city budget of nearly $3 billion), was able to fund the program.

Two other themes emerged from discussions of funding. First, one consideration a city needs to take into account for a project like PB is how much money the residents of a city actually get to control. While this isn't directly comparable to the CIR, similarities can be found if this is posed in terms of impact; how much political power are the citizens actually being allocated? Pauline received a lot of feedback from citizens complaining that the amount of money available for PB was actually a tiny fraction of the city's overall budget, and this is common across cities. But she also warns against this type of thinking as the reason for most of the city's capital budget is for very important public utilizes, such as sewage, which she thinks would be less likely to win a PB election over other projects. Darrell confirmed that there was a tight balance between offering a meaningful portion of the budget, but still preventing other sacrifices by drawing away too much of the budget for PB.

A second theme was the nature of the allocated money. For example, a city could set aside money for a PB project, but they might only allow the money to go to parks. I ran into several instances of this having an effect, both on whether government employees thought the program was successful, and whether the deliberative components were able to function optimally. Both Pauline and Jack McClean recognized this limitation. Pauline's PB budget was much less restricted however, limited only to capital projects (projects that could essentially only incur a one-time expense). Jack's PB funding source actually changed from one year to the next, and as a result the restrictions changed as well, and as a result, what had previously been a PB project where the majority of winning proposals addressed human services and homelessness, the following year they were completely unable to do so, and instead were solely limited to parks and transportation projects. Jack concludes by stating, "Having the most flexibility with your funding goes a long way and I think is truer to the spirit of what PB is. That's my number one thing."

Thus funding seems a necessary, but not necessarily sufficient condition for implementing a PB project. The final subsection of implementation looks at a another dimension of PB and CIR that isn't quite necessary of sufficient for a program's implementation, but can certainly affect the ease of the process.

1.4: Buy-In

This subsection will be divided into 3 parts. *First*, it will discuss staff in terms of their buy-in. *Second*, it will discuss the buy-in of the volunteer deliberators. And *finally*, it will discuss the buy-in of the community at large.

Staff

Darrell Krause mentioned the importance of staff buy-in, or in other words, their emotional investment in their PB program, but was quick to also state that the city probably could have done it anyway. As a city manager, it was telling that Darrell felt he needed to indicate *his* personal buy-in to the staff in order to demonstrate to them that this program was going to receive the support it needed so that they themselves could more confidently invest in it. Alex Rodriguez shares a similar logic regarding department heads. He pointed out that in much the same way that department heads look to the city budget staff to inspire confidence that the program will receive the support it needs, individual budget delegates (volunteer deliberators) look to the department heads for the same assurances. Regina Sanders, a budget director, confirmed this, stating, "I think you need buy-in from the top. You need an advocate in the department." Louis Hernandez also spoke directly about the value of an engaged, but also tacitly confirming the idea that it is still possible to implement a PB program without staff buy-in, but, "when it's missing, it's a lot harder." Darrell also suggests some contributing factors to staff buy-in, such as living in the community, a general political culture of seeking citizen engagement, and by perceiving a program like PB better enabling city staff to serve their constituents.

On the other side of the coin, when buy-in by the staff is missing, the program can be a lot less successful. Barbara Grant, a PB advocate and advocate and eventual candidate for Alderperson, shared just such an experience. In her city, officials and staff were only willing to implement PB if Barbara and her partner ran the program as volunteers. City staff engagement was mostly limited to a single Alderperson for vague direction, but beyond that the city didn't really want much to do with the program. As a result, the program was sluggish, department heads often missed meetings, and the lack of buy-in from the top trickled all the way down to the volunteer delegates, who stopped putting in the required effort, and eventually they decided to end PB that cycle so as not to tarnish the name of the program for potential future iterations.

A lack of buy-in from the top also threatens the success of a CIR. Jodie Cabrera relayed an example where a hosting institution didn't actually believe in the value of the process of the CIR, they merely wanted to piggyback on its legitimacy to supplement their own claims, and as a result they attempted to tweak the review to suit their own needs, which negatively affected the willingness of the CIR personnel to work with them again.

Volunteers

Much like staff, volunteers are also heavily burdened in both programs. This section will discuss some of these challenges and will point to some conditions when volunteer buy-in is more and less successful.

Every person interviewed for PB suggested that the amount and the complexity of the work was a challenge for the budget delegates. Ivan Nelson gave examples of volunteers experiencing "burnout" as a result of the demands of PB. Alex Rodriguez puts it simply: "it's work!" He explains that much of his city's efforts around PB are in outreach and community engagement. His observation comports well with my own PB experience, meeting for 2 hours every week for up to 12 weeks, not to mention other volunteer activities associated with the program. PB is almost completely dependent on the labor of community volunteers, and without their buy-in, they will not do the necessary research, site-visits, and will occasionally even drop out of the program altogether. Regina Sanders also echoes this point.

One major theme in the interviews was making the process as simple as possible for volunteers. This is addressed further in the Design section. However, when talking about challenges for volunteers directly, Louis Hernandez stated, "one lesson for me over the past few years is that we needed to provide better support for participants, that this work is still too hard for them…they weren't able to sustain the level of deliberation that was originally put forward…people that want to get involved but then drop out because it's not made easy enough for them." However, Barbara also claimed that with buy-in, volunteers didn't mind the workload as much, stating "the delegates were so involved they didn't mind door-knocking because they were excited about it. They'd been working on these projects…they got really into it creating that proposal. So then they wanted to go out and tell people."

Community

Another major factor in implementation was the level of extant community involvement in a locality. This section also primarily concerns PB.

When asked why they thought they could successfully implement PB in their city, Ivan Nelson suggested, "I just thought it would work here, given the amount of community involvement they have on everything, community engagement we have on most things, that it would be a welcome project, a welcome idea to residents." Louis Hernandez confirmed this idea, stating, "I think it's easier for them to be successful if there's a culture of participation." He gave the example of PB functioning well in Latin America because of this culture, and being less successful in Easter Europe because of a lack of a culture of engagement. But as with staff buy in, Louis also didn't think a lack of community buy-in was an insurmountable problem. Regina Sanders also recognized that in her city "There's also a zeal for public service here….they're really invested in seeing what happens here…they're volunteering on committees and going to panels, and so I think that helps…"

Jack McClean suggested that it is not just a culture of engagement, but also a history of successful community *programs* that can lead to community buy-in. This makes intuitive sense, as it can lead to generalized trust in new programs, mimicking the top-down buy-in model. But Jack also suggested that the very fact of having past successful programs meant that engaged community members could more effectively get involved and increase the success of new ones. When asked if these were members of neighborhood associations or individual community members, Jack said "I mean, both. I think to be engaged in a neighborhood organization you gotta be really motivated. But it was some real passionate people from our neighborhood district council organizations."

Another major theme in the discussions about community was that of trust. Several interviewees from both projects had a wealth of insights about trust. The first major theme is that in order for a project to

be successful, a locality has to trust its residents to make good decisions. If that is the case, a locality will be more likely to implement. Both Pauline considering a PB program and Jodie discussing the CIR suggested that top-down trust in the deliberators was essential to getting these programs considered in the first place. Louis wasn't willing to go that far, but he did ultimately conclude that having high levels of trust makes implementation easier. But he also suggests that a program like PB, when successful, can actually increase trust in a city where trust was previously low, and gives the example PB in Vallejo, CA.

On the other hand, as the idiom states, "trust goes both ways." Interviewees also suggested that the public needs to support the government in order for a large-scale deliberative program to be successful. Darrell suggests that trust needs to be maintained by implementing what the program promises otherwise it will fail, the community will lose buy-in, and the bottom will drop out. Echoing both Darrell and Jack McClean, Alex Rodriguez also states that when a city has shown that that it has lived up to its promises in the past, the community will be more likely to invest their time and energy in new programs.

Darrell highlighted one strategy for increasing trust: actually going to the outreach meetings himself, as city manager, to demonstrate his support of the program. Regina also highlights the importance of transparency and broad outreach, suggesting that an open process is easier to trust than an obscure one, and that a city reaching out to *all* of its residents can alleviate fears that this program can only serve the needs of select groups.

Finally, Darrell also noted that there also needs to be interdepartmental trust within the government. The budget office, for example, needed to trust the department heads to manage the delegates and to make sure proposals stayed within bounds of the city's requirements.

Section 2: Design and Sharing

In this section I will discuss various design choices different deliberative projects made, and what the outcomes of those different choices were. These choices affect engagement, outreach, quality of deliberation, and accessibility. Additionally I will share some instances of when and how different deliberative efforts were shared across localities. This section will be divided into six subsections: Level of Structure, Document Design, Feedback, Outreach, Sharing Techniques, and Miscellaneous.

4.1 Level of Structure

Based on my personal observations of both programs, I asked interviewees related to both PB and the CIR about how much formal structure was ideal for each program. Should meetings have clear and strict minutes, pre-defined activities, and rigid processes, or should the structure be more flexible, open and forgiving. Surprisingly, most interviewees didn't give much thought to this issue, but those that did comported with my observations. Jack McClean felt that PB most benefited from a program with a balance of structure and openness. He described the process as successful because it was "open within bounds." Angela Carrico and Jodie Cabrera both suggested that the CIR needed more structure. When Angela expressed concern that the program was too strict, her director suggested, "Just tell them we're running a tight ship here." Jodie specifically mentioned that the CIR *was not interested in creative solutions*. The CIR was too task-oriented and served a specific function, and too much openness was a

detriment to the process. This claim comported with my hypothesis about strictly structured deliberative programs being better suited to knowledge gains, but there was simply not enough corroboration from the rest of the interviewees to support this claim, and I later addressed it in another project.

4.2 Document Design

Jodie Cabrera recommended that the deliberative aspect of the project should be more up front on the (CIR) documentation. As she stated previously, Jodie recognized that the deliberative component of the program conferred a degree of legitimacy upon it, and she felt that if the relevant community knew what went into the program, it would elicit more critical engagement with the output of the program (in this case the actual initiative review).

Additionally, interviewees related to both CIR and PB programs highlighted a need to make their documentation easier to understand. For example, Pauline Mirabal described creating (PB) documentation using pictures for community members with lower levels of literacy. And Jodie recommends getting a consultant to make documentation more user friendly.

4.3 Feedback

Regina Sanders suggests after-action meetings are a great time to get feedback. People having just completed the process likely still have it fresh in their minds, and are also in a position of 20/20 hindsight. Jack McClean provided a helpful list of feedback methods. He recommends collecting feedback at *every* event. He also recommends a formal debrief, similar to Regina's recommendation, but he elaborates by recommending both group debriefings and one-on-one meetings for feedback collection. He also ran a workshop involving participants, delegates, facilitators, steering committee members and department staff, lasting 3 hours, to go through the feedback such that it wasn't merely collected then ignored.

4.4 Outreach

Interviewees had a lot to say about outreach. Mirroring concerns highlighted in the Document Design section, Louis Hernandez stressed the importance of clear communication. He worried that small disagreements over unclear communication often blew out of proportion and turned into large conflicts that could disrupt the entire process. Once documents and messages are well designed, one generally agreed upon approach to outreach is to "go where the people are." This means housing authorities, business associations, libraries, shopping centers, etc. Pauline Mirabal notes that electronic communication is vital for mass outreach, and that she's been quite effective with internet tools. However, Eleanor Cook, a fellow researcher of PB, warns that too much focus on technological forms of communication can quickly leave citizens of lower means behind.

Once engaged, Pauline suggests keeping an eye out for citizens who want to expand their engagement, and gives examples of past participants applying to volunteer for other city committees. Pauline also

notes that framing the program in such a way that highlights personal benefits (i.e. from the PB projects' effects on the community) can increase people's level of engagement.

Commensurate with the section on Buy-In, Regina Sanders claimed that engagement is also important for governmental staff. If they're not engaged, if they don't appreciate the process or think it is valuable they won't put in the time to help it meet its potential.

This subsection will conclude with a brief discussion about the ability of these programs to engage the public. Broadly speaking, PB turnout is low. That being said, at least in some locations PB is able to elicit engagement from potential voting groups that simply cannot engage otherwise. For example, Cambridge does not limit the vote to US citizens, and it opens up the vote to 12-18 year olds. But even within eligible voting groups, some cities did see engagement from groups that don't normally participate at higher levels than groups that do

The CIR is a different story. Participation in the CIR is extremely intensive and applicable for a tiny percent of a state's population, whereas in PB voter engagement is much broader and less demanding. Engagement or the delegates it is roughly as demanding for those in the CIR, though on average PB programs have twice as many delegates as CIRs have citizen deliberators.

4.5 Sharing Techniques

One of the primary ways that PB design is shared is through the national Participatory Budgeting Project (PBP) based in New York, NY. This is the organization that brought PB to the United States initially. They currently serve as a consulting group where they go to various cities to help them set up their own PB programs. The founder of this organization is very active in sharing the program's techniques, as well as getting feedback from those collaborating cities. This is confirmed by several different PB projects. However, Barbara Grant had trouble raising the necessary funds to fully receive the services provided by PBP, and Travis Brown outright balked at the price. Still, Louis Hernandez suggests that the value of something like PBP is that there's a central repository of best practices to help new programs counter common obstacles, and that it's an improvement even on the Brazilian model, which doesn't have a centralized body. Both Travis Brown and Louis Hernandez directly observed international iterations of PB and used those observations to design their own versions of PB, and Travis intends to use those designs to create a competing central repository to the PBP

Another common theme is that as programs mature, they are more likely to collaborate with other cities. For example, having been successful for a few years, the Cambridge PB program saw an increase in other cities reaching out to share best practices.

The CIR, on the other hand, was almost wholly lifted from the Citizens Juries model created by the Jefferson Center. At the same time, Angela Cabrera admits of the CIR that "once we started in on CIRs, every one was an experiment." Because of its unique function, the idea that the CIR cannot rely on advice from similar programs has face validity. However, Renee Jones did point out that the CIR took inspiration from America Speaks!, the Citizen Juries, Deliberative Polling (though Renee also noted that Fishkin wasn't very collaborative at the time), the Citizen's Assembly, and Everyday Democracy.

Ultimately, across the board for both PB and the CIR sharing technologies and techniques has been useful to the successful sustainment of the programs.

4.6 Miscellaneous

One helpful design feature of a PB program is to use PB as part of an existing program. One of the cities that implemented PB also uses it in one of their community learning centers as a way to teach language and civics. This leads to a helpful complementarity in that the process helps the students in the center, but the center also helps the process by facilitating participation in PB and increasing turnout. Moreover, these students have some of the most considered votes in the process because they engage with the ballot for extended periods of time. During the voting phase of PB, I got to see something similar play out first-hand. This comported with my first-hand observations as a "get-out-the-vote" volunteer.

Section 3: Politics, Sharing Power and, Legitimacy

In this section I will discuss the ways that politics affect the implementation and success of large-scale deliberative projects, the political usefulness and value of these projects, both as they might foster goodwill but also as they solve political problems, how power is shared between government and deliberative bodies, and whether deliberative events confer legitimacy on other government activities.

5.1 Politics/Power Sharing

This section will discuss some disparate political considerations regarding large-scale deliberative projects. First, it is possible that these projects can actually help to empower residents of a locality that otherwise have little to no political power. But Barbara Grant also suggests a way in which a deliberative program like PB can empower people who are otherwise disenfranchised. Barbara was both advocating for PB and running an election for alderperson in her city. Barbara was affiliated with a political party that was essentially guaranteed to win the alderperson position every year. However, when engaging with people of the opposite political party, Barbara suggested that by supporting PB, voting for her was at least likely to give the out-party members at least some political power whereas without it, they wouldn't be represented at all. In other words, Barbara is claiming that a program like PB confers direct coercive political power over government decisions. However, Eleanor Cook questions the values of these types of claims as dependent on just how much power is given, who it goes to, and whether a city ultimately has veto power. Usually, she says, those conditions don't tend to favor meaningful empowerment.

Reflexively, this type of program can help political leaders whose partisanship is mismatched to their constituency. PB and similar projects can also help such a leader with networking and engagement. Travis Brown suggested that the mayor of his city was actually mismatched to the dominant political party, but that he got elected anyway because he was able to offer a program that (at least seemed) was universally empowering.

Finally, one thing that's important to consider is that a project like PB or CIR, especially if and/or when they become public projects, can get in the way or even overshadow of a political leader's normal operations. If that happens, it's unlikely the leaders will continue to support the project. Darrell Krause hinted at this potential problem but, commensurate with earlier claims that a program must not sacrifice other city needs to succeed, Darrell related that his extensive city budget meant that this wasn't a problem for him.

Collaborative Power Sharing

This section will discuss the ways that deliberative groups collaboratively share power with political leaders in the CIR and PB settings. This section will largely focus on instances of deliberative groups doing work for government bodies. In other words, how can deliberation be directly useful for governing bodies to increase their efficiency of efficacy? It's important to keep in mind the section on staff from earlier however; PB is unanimously described as creating extra work for a city. Instead, what PB is capable of is *complementing* government work. And that's where PB's efficacy shines. Perhaps surprisingly, the CIR is also useful to government workers in some situations. Darrell echoed a sentiment that was broadly shared by nearly every interviewee in PB:

> If you had said to me there would have been so many projects we would have funded that we weren't funding I would have said I'm not sure we could do that, but they have found projects that were not on our radar that have been good for the city, so I think it's been a win for everybody where the city has benefitted from this, the residents have benefitted from this.

Darrell goes on to say that:

> [PB has] also put us in the position where there may be something that didn't get funded from PB that we think's a good initiative that we can look at in our capital process. We take a look at that as well if it's something we should be adding. That's how we've looked at it.

In other words, PB is locating projects *for* city government that, even when PB voters do not prioritize them, the city will decide to fund.

PB unquestionably increases the workload for government employees. However, considering a counterfactual world where a city wants to implement a participatory budgeting project for whatever reason, it is here that PB in its current conception can save time and money. In the Entrepreneur section I relayed multiple responses about political leaders wanting to increase engagement. Any effort to do that will be costly. In that sense, PB can actually lower the cost by making use of citizen-deliberators instead of using city-staff to fully vet the submitted ideas. In such a scenario, a lot of government work is completed by PB projects. As Alex Rodriguez put it, PB "really is a delegate-driven process." Travis Brown's ultimate goal of creating his own PB consultancy firm is also in the spirit of lowering costs and effort by city officials.

Jack McClean also gives several examples of delegates doing the work of city workers, and in some instances, doing it better. He relays an anecdote where citizens are better able to identify a need for curb ramps than city officials because they bring unique and often community-based experiences. Across the board, PB interviewees lament the actual increase in work PB programs add, and all extoll the value of the volunteers to do most of that work. On the CIR side, Jimmy Lane indicated that the CIR was useful to state officials because it did something that legislative powers could not: put some form of control on the initiative process. Jimmy suggested that state officials are actually often fed up with the initiative process because it takes power out of the hands of state representatives and puts it directly in the hands of the demos. Jimmy explains that initiatives are extremely popular, and efforts to dismantle them are political suicide. However, because of its legitimacy and popularity, the CIR is able to put at least some form of control over the initiative process that the public supports. Here is a causal process

identified with face validity, and is also corroborated by Jodie Cabrera. Though she previously worked for the CIR, Jodie parted ways due in part to ideological differences, so her corroboration along with the plausible description by Jimmy suggest that this is a valuable program for state legislators to gain a measure of control that they previously lost. These accounts of the initiative process comport with literature on the subject, such as David Broder's *Democracy Derailed* (2001). What this suggests is that deliberative projects are most likely to be successful when they can complement the work that governing bodies already do, and that in well-designed programs such as PB and the CIR, they do. Here, it is important to note, however, that it is ideological control (the third dimension of power) that the CIR exerts.

Contentious

On the other hand, when power is shared, there's always the potential for struggle. This section suggests that sharing power isn't always mutually beneficial. A first example comes from Barbara Grant discussing how the public *moved* a politician to support PB because they saw it practiced in another ward. Obviously, as far as contentious politics goes this is fairly mundane, but it is important to remember that these programs are fragile, and in fact this is one of the cities where PB became unsuccessful. Perhaps more problematic is the struggle outlined by Angela Carrico. She shared a CIR anecdote where political activists were getting visually frustrated with deliberators because the deliberators weren't falling for their soundbites. She related instances of the CIR both leading to participants to ask questions beyond what the activists were trying to limit the conversation to (agenda-setting power) and also rejecting the framing of the activists (ideological power). Jimmy Lane corroborates this idea of the CIR holding ideological power. He gives the example of a group of powerful liberal lobbyists called "Our Oregon" that vehemently opposed the CIR because they wanted sole power to frame messaging on ballots and were threatened by the CIR, the sole purpose of which is to reframe ballot initiative language.

Louis Hernandez and Ramon Fagan also expressed concern that activists would end up competing with PB programs, and in Ramon's case, his borough's PB program was completely subverted by a PTA group that was too well-organized and won all the PB votes, excluding everyone else from the process and ultimately destroying buy-in from the bottom-up.

Miscellaneous

This subsection has several idiosyncratic contributions. An unintended benefit of a program like PB is increased communication. Pauline Mirabal said, "I also think [PB] works as a giant communications device for the city…so even if your idea doesn't get chosen, even if you're not a delegate working on it, all 608 ideas are circulated to the various departments…" Ivan Nelson echoed these sentiments as well. When asked about the projects proposed by PB delegates, revealed that many PB projects that didn't garner enough votes to be implemented by the program were nevertheless implemented by the city because the process communicated good ideas.

Collaboration is also a useful outcome, especially when deliberative bodies are complementing extant government work. Each party can learn and assist the other and form a solid complementarity. Pauline

stated that the delegates and the city departments were equal contributors to the process, and each learned and benefited from the other. Regina Sanders gives an example of the decision on where to place a bicycle washing station as more of a discussion between delegated and city officials more than a struggle for power.

Concluding Remarks

Thought my interviews, it was very clear to me that large-scale deliberative projects do have some coercive power, and a fair amount of agenda-setting and ideological power as well. The latter are possible because these types of programs have perceived legitimacy, and because they are designed with outreach in mind. These are not theoretical improvements to democracy, they are actual programs driven by engaged leaders and their constituencies, consisting of abundant deliberation, and are powerful political entities.

Section 6: Projections and Conclusions

So where are these deliberative projects likely to head in the future? Are these flukes, destined to crumble, or do they have some staying power? According to Pauline Mirabal:

> PB is definitely spreading. It started in Brazil forever ago, but I think 2009ish was when it came up to the US, but yeah, there's so many other communities that are getting involved and launching their own processes, I think that will continue to grow. But also not just municipalities, some schools are trying to do it, I think Universities should, we give them enough money...

Jokes aside, this seems correct. PB has initially spread rapidly, and while the number of cities that can afford to do this is limited, that limit is nowhere near being approached yet. Louis Hernandez agrees:

> I think there's increasing demand, or at least increasing interest because people increasingly feel they don't have a voice in government. Partly because they're able to have a voice in so many other spheres more effectively, because of new technology or communications, that division is starker. 50 years ago it was hard to influence corporations or your government or organizations. There's other ways that you can engage with and feel like you have a voice in, you know, what flavor of cereal is made. People are seeing that comparison more, they're seeing that they have a voice here, but not in government, and I think that's partly why there's more interest and demand now of government...

This can also be seen in the number of new cities reaching out to learn more about the process. Pauline and Regina Sanders also relayed several anecdotes about other cities reaching out to them for more information on PB, and as mentioned earlier, both California and Massachusetts were exploring adopting the CIR at the time of this writing.

My impression is that there was less optimism for the success of the CIR. Which is unfortunate but understandable. As this chapter discussed, the CIR is much more likely to have political opponents. It is somewhat abstract in a way that something like PB is not, so it can be hard to garner general voter

enthusiasm about the process. The CIR also requires a completely dedicated staff; it is not something that can be done in some spare hours by already employed officials. Additionally, that staff needs to be highly trained, much more so than was outlined by Pauline concerning PB facilitators. Still, Oregon does have a CIR commission as a state law, which in a sense is more durable than any city policy, and the process itself may be funded soon from state coffers, which would almost guarantee that it remains a permanent institution. It is hard to understand why the state hasn't funded it already, given the estimated cost is roughly $65,000 per initiative – chump change for a state budget – unless one considers the potential power that something like the CIR can wield.

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Appendix A: Interview Schedule

Do you know what projects [**PB/CIR**] was modeled after, or what theories its design was based off of?

[**PB**] Do all city models look the same across the country, or are there different models, and if so, which model did you decide to pursue? Why?

[**PB/CIR**] only [**operates in some cities/only receives support from some states**]. What do you think accounts for these regional differences? Do demographics, political climate, prevalence of major cities or similar factors seem to make a difference?

Do you think that deliberative projects like this one are on the rise in society? If so, what do you think has contributed to this change? If not, why do you think this project was successful despite no favorable changes?

What motivated you to get involved in this project?

My research interests are in deliberative democracy. [**PB/CIR**] is largely deliberative in nature, and the choices made are largely consequential. Why do you think this project was designed to make use of (a) deliberative group(s), and not some other form of coordination, communication and decision-making?

Do you think the deliberative component is successfully achieving what it was originally designed for? Do you think any other strategy could fulfill the same role? Why or why not?

What other purposes do you think deliberation might be fulfilling?

Are there elements of deliberation that make the goals of your project more difficult to obtain than other procedures, i.e. recruitment, coordination, etc.?

Throughout your experience with the deliberative process, what lessons have you learned that have motivated a change in procedures? For example, did you change guidance for facilitators, the formatting of written materials, or anything else?

Do you know of any other projects that have used [**PB/CIR**] as a roadmap for implementing their own deliberative processes? Have you thought about how else it might be used to increase political participation?

When you think about the people who deliberate in [**PB/CIR**], why do you think they volunteer?

Do you think that those who deliberate in [**PB/CIR**] are enriched by the process? Are there any problems? For example, do group-members get into heated arguments? How have you addressed these potential issues?

Where do you see [**PB/CIR**] heading in the future? What changes would you make to the project now? What changes would you make if you had substantially increased resources?

Do you think that [**PB/CIR**] will be even more deliberative, about the same, or less deliberative in the future? What factors do you think will contribute to that outcome?