

## Editorial Policy

The aim of the *Journal of Public Economics* is to encourage original scientific contributions to the field with particular emphasis on the application of modern economic theory and methods of quantitative discussion of public sector policy, and bring together work which has in the past been scattered in journals.

## Editorial Board

### Editors

A.B. ATKINSON, London School of Economics, 10 Portugal Street, London WC2A 2HD, UK  
N.H. STERN, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK

### Co-Editors

M.S. FELDSTEIN, Littauer Center 119, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA  
C. HENRY, Laboratoire d'Économétrie de l'École Polytechnique, 5 rue Descartes, 75230 Paris, France  
A. SANDMO, Institute of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Helleveien 30, 5035 Bergen, Sandviken, Norway  
J.E. STIGLITZ, Department of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA

### Associate Editors

R. ARNOTT, Department of Economics, Queen's University, Kingston, Canada K7L 3N6  
A.J. AUERBACH, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA  
A.S. BLINDER, Department of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA  
P. BOHM, Department of Economics, University of Stockholm, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden  
D.F. BRADFORD, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA  
J.M. BUCHANAN, Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030, USA  
P.A. DIAMOND, Department of Economics, M.I.T., Cambridge, MA 02139, USA  
L. GEVERS, Faculté des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Facultés Universitaires N-D de la Paix, Rempart de la Vierge 8, 5000 Namur, Belgium  
R. GUESNERIE, Centre d'Économie Quantitative et Comparative, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 54 Blvd. Raspail, 75006 Paris, France  
K. HAMADA, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, Bunkyo-Ku, Tokyo 113, Japan  
J.A. HAUSMAN, Department of Economics, M.I.T., Cambridge, MA 02139, USA  
J.G. HEAD, Department of Economics, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada  
J.F. HELLIWELL, Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5  
M.A. KING, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK  
A.K. KLEVORICK, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520, USA  
S.Ch. KOLM, CEPREMAP, 140-142 rue du Chevaleret, Paris 13e, France  
P. MIESZKOWSKI, Department of Economics, Rice University, Houston, TX 77001, USA  
R.A. MUSGRAVE, Crown College, University of California, Santa Cruz, CA 95064, USA  
H.C. RECKTENWALD, Institut für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Lange Gasse 26, D-8500 Nürnberg 1, FRG  
K. ROBERTS, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK  
H.S. ROSEN, Department of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA  
J. SEADE, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK  
E. SHESHINSKI, The Eliezer Kaplan School of Economics and Social Sciences, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel  
J.B. SHOVEN, Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA  
S.J. TURNOVSKY, Department of Economics, University of Illinois, Champaign, IL 61820, USA  
B.A. WEISBROD, Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706, USA  
A. WILLIAMS, Department of Economics, University of York, Heslington, York YO1 5DD, UK

The *Journal of Public Economics* is published in volumes of approx. 400 pages; in 1984 three volumes will be published, each consisting of three issues of approx. 135 pages.

### Subscription: 1984 (3 volumes)

**Institutional subscriptions:** The subscription price is SF 555, including postage. *Personal subscription:* Private subscribers are entitled to a subscription at the reduced rate of SF 210, including postage. The following rules apply: (1) subscription must be prepaid; (2) the order must be sent direct to the Publisher; (3) the copies should not be made available to institutions. Subscriptions should be sent to the Publisher, Elsevier Sequoia, P.O. Box 851, Lausanne, Switzerland, or to any subscription-agent or bookseller. Claims for issues not received will be honored free of charge if made within three months of the publication date.

© 1984, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland)

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland), P.O. Box, 1991, 1000 BZ Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

Submission of a paper to this journal entails the author's irrevocable and exclusive authorization of the publisher to collect any sums or considerations for copying or reproduction payable by third parties (as mentioned in article 17 paragraph 2 of the Dutch Copyright Act of 1912 and in the Royal Decree of June 20, 1974 (S. 351) pursuant to article 16b of the Dutch Copyright Act of 1912) and/or to act in or out of Court in connection therewith.

**Special regulations for readers in the U.S.A. —** This journal has been registered with the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. Consent is given for copying of articles for personal or internal use, or for the personal use of specific clients. This consent is given on the condition that the copier pays through the Center the per-copy fee stated in the code on the first page of each article for copying beyond that permitted by Sections 107 or 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law. The appropriate fee should be forwarded with a copy of the first page of the article to the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 21 Congress Street, Salem, MA 01970, U.S.A. If no code appears in an article, the author has not given broad consent to copy and permission to copy must be obtained directly from the author. All articles published prior to 1981 may be copied for a per-copy fee of US \$2.25 also payable through the Center. (N.B. For review journals this fee is \$0.20 per copy per page.) Not for profit educational institutions and instructors attached thereto, subscribing to this journal, are permitted to photocopy isolated articles for not-for-profit classroom or library reserve use without fee. This consent does not extend to other kinds of copying, such as for general distribution, resale, advertising and promotion purposes, or for creating new collective works. Special written permission must be obtained from the publisher for such copying.

**Special regulations for authors —** Upon acceptance of an article by the journal, the author(s) will be asked to transfer copyright of the article to the publisher. This transfer will ensure the widest possible dissemination of information.

Printed in Great Britain by Bell and Bain Ltd., Glasgow

Journal of Public Economics 23 (1984), 245-278. North-Holland Publishing Company

## INFORMATION PROCESSING AND JURY DECISIONMAKING

Alvin K. KLEVORICK

Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520, USA

Michael ROTHCHILD

University of California at San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093, USA  
and National Bureau of Economic Research

Christopher WINSHIP\*

Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60201, USA  
and Economics Research Center, National Opinion Research Center

Received September 1982, revised version received July 1983

We develop a model to explore the information processing function that jury deliberation and its analogues perform. The central question we ask is: How much better could a jury possibly perform if it optimally used the collective information available to it than if it decides cases by a simple majority vote before any deliberation or information sharing occurs? It is shown how the answer depends on a number of considerations, including the correlation among jurors' observations, the jurors' assessments of the relative importance of type I and type II errors compared with society's assessment of those errors, and differences in jurors' abilities.

## 1. Introduction

The kinds of situations in which a group of people is called upon to make a decision are numerous. One common setting involves a group of individuals who all have access to the same data, or to the same informational input for the decision, and who are faced with a dichotomous choice. An example is a corporate investment committee to which a presentation is made concerning a particular capital project and whose task is to decide whether or not to proceed with the project. Another is a personnel committee (perhaps that of an academic department) which interviews a candidate for a position (or hears the candidate give a seminar) and must decide whether or not to hire the individual. There are many other similar decision settings. The prototype, however, is the criminal jury, and we

\*We are indebted to Gary Chamberlain, Arthur Goldberger, and Robert Lucas for perceptive comments, to Michael Stouffer for computational assistance, to the referees for helpful comments, and to the National Science Foundation for research support. Some of the work on this paper was done while Rothschild held the Oskar Morgenstern Distinguished Fellowship at Mathematica, Inc.

0047-2727/84/\$3.00 © 1984, Elsevier Science Publisher B.V. (North-Holland)

will analyze the kind of group decision just described in terms of the criminal jury's decision process.

At the end of a trial each juror has his/her own perspective on what has transpired. Each one could, on that basis, render a verdict in the case. But under the jury system, as we know it, the jury must deliberate before it — and not the members of the jury acting individually — renders a verdict. An important claim made in favor of the jury system (and similar decisionmaking procedures) is that during the deliberation process, jurors exchange points of view and assemble the evidence into a coherent picture that is more likely to be correct than is the view of any one juror. That is to say, one of the virtues claimed for a jury decision is that it is based on more complete and better processing of the information available than the verdict of any one juror deciding alone would be.

Given the central and valuable role attributed to the information processing that jury deliberation is supposed to achieve, it is striking that existing models of the jury decision process — including both abstract mathematical formulations and simulation models — are inattentive to this aspect of the jury's work. Although these models depict how a jury might move to a verdict from the initial views of its members, they do not provide any description or specification of how the jurors' views are combined or how their various observations and insights are assimilated. Indeed, some of the more sophisticated mathematical models imply that if a jury deliberates, it will be more likely to err — to convict an innocent defendant *and* to acquit a guilty defendant — than if it simply decides the case by a simple majority vote *before* any deliberation occurs!

The purpose of this paper is to explore, in the context of a formal model, the information processing function that jury deliberation and its analogues perform. In particular, we investigate when a jury that deliberates to a unanimous verdict can reach better decisions — ones with lower probabilities of error — than a jury that bases its decision on the view of the majority of its members immediately after the trial is concluded. What is the gap between the quality of decisions reached using a first-ballot, majority-rule procedure and the quality of those that would be generated by a jury making *optimal* use of the information provided at the trial?

It should be emphasized that we are not saying that juries that deliberate actually process what they have seen and heard in an optimal way. Indeed, in the complicated setting of an actual jury trial, it is not even clear how one would characterize optimal processing of information. Our strategy, instead, is to consider a simple model of juror observations, though one that is richer than characterizations in the literature, for which we can define precisely what an optimal jury decision rule would be. Of course, jurors do not read the books on statistical decision theory that discuss this optimal procedure nor do actual juries aggregate information according to this procedure.

Hence, our inquiry is not aimed at measuring the performance of actual juries against that of first-ballot, majority-rule juries. Rather, our concern is to gauge, within the context of a particular model, the maximum improvement that deliberation *could possibly* yield and to consider the circumstances that affect that possible gain. We will see that deliberation has the potential for generating substantial improvement in the quality of decisions, and we will see how that potential arises, especially the central role that heterogeneity among jurors — in terms of what they see and hear, what they believe about the costs of erroneous decisions, and what differences there are in their information processing capacities — plays in determining how much improvement is possible.

We begin, in the next section, with a discussion of the implications that existing models have for the value of jury deliberation. Then in section 3, we present the model of juror observation that is basic to our analysis. Section 4 contains our comparison of the jury that makes *optimal* use of trial information and the one that decides by first ballot majority vote. Central to the analysis in section 4 is the assumption that jurors may differ in what they see and hear at the trial. But that discussion assumes that the jurors share the same view of the relative cost of erroneous convictions and erroneous acquittals and that they have the same individual abilities to process information. Sections 5 and 6, respectively, consider models in which these assumptions are, each in turn, relaxed. The final section contains some concluding remarks.

The analysis in sections 3–6 is technical and detailed. We conclude this introduction with an informal discussion to convey a sense of the nature of the models we examine and the results we obtain. Formal justifications for the various rules mentioned here are, of course, deferred to the detailed development.

To fix ideas, it is best to have a concrete (if unrealistic) example in mind. Suppose that the jury in a particular trial knows that the defendant is guilty if he is more than 6' tall. The jury also knows that the defendant's height is either 6' or 6' 1". Thus, the inferential problem each juror faces is one of deciding whether the accused is 6' tall and innocent *or* 6' 1" tall and guilty. Imagine that the trial provides an opportunity for each juror to view the defendant and thus to try to guess his height. When the juror views the defendant, he/she forms an estimate of his height, which we denote as  $X_i$ . This estimate is a normal random variable with variance  $\sigma^2$ , and its mean is 6' if the defendant is innocent and 6' 1" if the defendant is guilty.

First consider the problem that a jury composed of a single individual will have in deciding the case on the basis of his/her information. The juror's optimal decision rule is a simple one: set a threshold  $Q$  and convict if the estimate  $X_i$  is greater than  $Q$ . Thus, the juror's problem is to set  $Q$ . It is straightforward to calculate that  $Q$  is a function of three things: the relative

cost of the two kinds of errors the juror can make (erroneous convictions, erroneous acquittals), the variance  $\sigma^2$ , and the average of the two alternative values of the mean. In fact:

$$Q = 6' \frac{1}{2}'' + \sigma^2 k, \quad (1)$$

where  $k$  is the log of the ratio of the cost of convicting the innocent to the cost of acquitting the guilty. Notice that if  $k=0$ , so that the costs of the two kinds of errors are the same, it is not necessary to know  $\sigma^2$ , while if  $k \neq 0$ , then it is necessary to know  $\sigma^2$ . Consequently, the case  $k=0$  is much simpler than the case  $k \neq 0$ .

Now suppose that the jury is composed of several individuals whose observations are independent. Each juror will make an estimate of the defendant's height and the jury's problem is to make a decision on the basis of the observations of all its members  $X = (X_1, \dots, X_n)$ . If the jury deliberates and uses this information to make an optimal decision, it will base its verdict on the sample mean  $\bar{X} = \sum_{i=1}^n X_i$ , a sufficient statistic for  $X$ . Once again the decision will be to convict if  $\bar{X}$  is greater than or equal to some threshold value  $Q_n$  and to acquit if  $\bar{X}$  is less than  $Q_n$ . Since  $\bar{X}$  is a normal random variable with variance  $\sigma^2(\bar{X}, n) = \sigma^2/n$ , the optimal choice will be to set

$$Q_n = 6' \frac{1}{2}'' + \sigma^2(\bar{X}, n)k. \quad (2)$$

Again, if  $k=0$  the decision is simpler because the threshold value is independent of  $\sigma^2$ , the variance of the individual observations.

Now consider a jury that decides the same case by voting without deliberating, a first-ballot jury. Each juror decides on the basis of his/her observation whether to vote to acquit or to convict. The simplest voting rule is majority voting and if jurors all apply the same standard,  $Q$ , then the value of the median juror's estimate will determine the defendant's fate. The problem then is what this standard should be. If the costs of the two kinds of errors are the same ( $k=0$ ), then considerations of symmetry make it clear that each juror should vote to convict if and only if his/her estimate is greater than  $6' \frac{1}{2}''$ , just as if he/she were the only juror. The decision of the first-ballot jury will be less efficient than that of the deliberating jury of the same size because the median contains less information than the mean — the median is not a sufficient statistic for  $X$ . But, when errors are equally costly, the decision will be reasonable in the sense that the *relative* sizes of the two error probabilities will be what the members of the jury would want them to be — namely, equal.

If  $k \neq 0$ , so that false convictions and false acquittals are weighed differently, it is very difficult to see how the first-ballot jury can achieve even this limited goal of desired *relative* error sizes. For if  $k \neq 0$ , then the

variability of the estimate must be taken into account when a threshold is set. If this is not done, the relative costs of the two kinds of errors cannot properly be balanced against one another. Whatever threshold or standard is used, it will clearly depend on  $\sigma^2$ . Hence, to apply a reasonable rule when  $k \neq 0$ , jurors must communicate what  $\sigma^2$  is. How they are to do this without deliberating is unclear.

To this point we have assumed, unrealistically, that jurors make independent observations. This seems thoroughly incompatible with the basic fact that they have all observed the same trial. It also has an obvious and implausible implication — a jury of infinite size will never err. An independent observations model essentially assumes that the trial generates enough information to settle the question of whether the accused is guilty or innocent. All that is necessary is that there be enough jurors to extract all the information. As we show in sections 3–6, the most obvious changes in the direction of realism make it even harder for the first-ballot jury, the one that does not deliberate, to reach a reasonable decision. When the amount of information that the trial generates is limited, the tasks of assessing the variability of the sample median and taking it into account when balancing the two kinds of errors become much more difficult.

Suppose, as we do in our analysis, that the information the trial generates is, at best, limited: an infinite number of jurors would only be able to discern the limited information the trial reveals. In the concrete example we have been discussing, imagine that all jurors view the defendant through a foggy one-way mirror. Each juror's observation consists of two parts: the commonly observed events in the trial, which are imperfectly observed by all jurors, and an idiosyncratic error of observation, which is due to independent variations in eyesight, quality of lighting, and the like. The individual errors, which have mean zero, are independent of each other and of the common information in the trial. Again, all random variables are normally distributed.

Consider the problem of the deliberating jury. We show, once again, that the optimal decision will be based on the sample mean of the jurors' observations and that the problem is where to set the threshold. If  $k=0$ , the problem is easy; in our example, the threshold is  $6' \frac{1}{2}''$ . If  $k \neq 0$ , since  $\bar{X}$  is again a normal random variable with a variance equal to  $\sigma^2(\bar{X}, n)$  and mean conditional on the innocence or guilt of the defendant, we can again use formula (2) to set the threshold  $Q_n$ . In this case, however,  $\sigma^2(\bar{X}, n)$  is a more complicated function than in the independent errors case discussed above. In particular, to compute  $\sigma^2(\bar{X}, n)$  in this case, each juror must partition the error in what he/she observes into two parts — an idiosyncratic error and a common error. This shows the potential value of deliberation. Unless jurors get together and talk, it is difficult to see how they can correctly make this partition. Deliberation allows jurors to compare observations so that they can correctly aggregate the information they have separately observed. In our

example, discussion could bring out the fact that all jurors' vision was distorted by the same foggy mirror. Thus, jurors would know that their errors of observations were not independent.

As for the first-ballot jury, if  $k=0$ , then the correct standard is the symmetric one: convict if the median observation is greater than  $6\frac{1}{2}$ . But if  $k \neq 0$ , the first-ballot jury's problem is very difficult because the median juror must somehow estimate the variance of the median. This is hard to do for a correct estimate depends on partitioning the error variance into common and independent components. We do not see how this can be done if jurors do not talk to one another. We note in section 3 that if jurors knew the model generating their observations, they could devise rules that would lead to decisions that were both asymptotically reasonable and as good as those that an optimally deliberating jury could reach. Those decision rules are complicated and depend on the parameters of the model, which will vary from case to case. We do not believe that juries or other groups in similar decision situations are likely to use them.

## 2. The implications of existing models

The implications that existing models have for the value of jury deliberation are best introduced by considering the most recent contribution of Gelfand and Solomon [Gelfand and Solomon (1977a, 1977b)], which is one of the most sophisticated efforts at modeling jury verdicts. The characteristic that determines the value of the deliberative process in their model is a common feature in the literature.

Gelfand and Solomon begin by partitioning a jury's decision process into two stages. First, they model the determination of the first-ballot distribution of jurors' votes using a mixed binomial formulation that they developed as an extension of Poisson's models for jury verdicts [Gelfand and Solomon (1973, 1974)]. To estimate the parameters of this model, Gelfand and Solomon use a unique data set gathered by Kalven and Zeisel as part of the Chicago Jury Project [Kalven and Zeisel (1966)]. These were data on 225 criminal cases in Brooklyn and Chicago for which Kalven and Zeisel were able to use post-trial interviews to reconstruct the juries' first-ballot votes. These were the data that had led Kalven and Zeisel to their 'majority persuasion' hypothesis that the final verdict of a jury is largely determined by the position that the majority of jurors take *before* any deliberation occurs.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>When Kalven and Zeisel compared the first-ballot votes of these 225 juries with their final verdicts, they found that 'in the instances where there is an initial majority either for conviction or for acquittal, the jury in roughly nine out of ten cases decides in the direction of the initial majority. Only with extreme infrequency does the minority succeed in persuading the majority to change its mind during the deliberation... [W]ith very few exceptions the first ballot decides the outcome of the verdict... The upshot is a radical hunch about the function of the deliberation process. Perhaps it does not so much decide the case as bring about the consensus, the outcome of which has been made highly likely by the distribution of first ballot votes' [Kalven and Zeisel (1966, pp. 488-489)].

In the second stage of the Gelfand-Solomon model, some social decision schemes, incorporating varying degrees of majority persuasion, are used to describe how the jury moves from its first-ballot position to its final verdict. A social decision scheme is simply a transition matrix that represents the jury's deliberation as a stochastic process moving the jury from a first ballot vote to a final position. [See Davis (1973) and Davis, Bray and Holt (1977)]. It is a comparative static, first-ballot/final-verdict model, which does not explicitly depict the jury's deliberation process. Gelfand and Solomon consider two alternative schemes involving different degrees of majority persuasion. First, they assume that the first-ballot majority always prevails and that if the jury is initially evenly split, then with probability  $\frac{1}{2}$  the final verdict will be innocent and with probability  $\frac{1}{2}$  it will be guilty. They apply this transition model to both twelve-member and six-member juries.

But Gelfand and Solomon regard this 'first-ballot majority decides the outcome' assumption as a crude approximation, and they go on to consider a more refined social decision scheme. Their refined scheme for the twelve-person jury is based on the one Davis (1973) suggested as a result of his experience with a large number of mock jury trials.<sup>2</sup> When they turn to the six-person jury, Gelfand and Solomon provide no elaborate justification for the social decision scheme they present. Rather, they simply assert that it is plausible to assume that the probability of a transition to a particular six-person jury verdict if  $h$  out of six people initially vote for conviction is the same as the transition probability to that verdict that Davis specifies for a twelve-person jury when  $2h$  out of twelve people initially vote for conviction.

Gelfand and Solomon use their two-stage model of jury decisionmaking to analyze the relative magnitudes of the errors six-person and twelve-person juries would make. They conclude that a twelve-member jury is to be preferred to a six-person jury. The basis for their conclusion is shown in table 1, the entries of which are calculated from the relevant parts of tables 4 and 7 in the Gelfand and Solomon article. Columns (1) and (3) are based on the model in which the transition from first-ballot vote to final verdict is determined entirely by the first-ballot majority, while columns (2) and (4) use as the transition probabilities from first ballot to final verdict the elements of Gelfand and Solomon's modification of Davis's social decision scheme. The major observations Gelfand and Solomon make are that a six-person jury is much more likely to convict an innocent person than is a twelve-person jury

<sup>2</sup>Gelfand and Solomon modify the Davis scheme for two reasons. First, they want the resulting social decision scheme to fit reasonably well the transitions from first-ballot vote to final verdict that were actually found by Kalven and Zeisel in the 225 cases mentioned earlier. Second, when the resulting social decision scheme is taken together with the estimated parameter values for their first-stage model, Gelfand and Solomon want it to yield an overall frequency distribution of convictions, acquittals, and hung juries that fits the empirical distribution found by Kalven and Zeisel in their overall study.

Table 1  
Error probabilities of jury decisions.<sup>a</sup>

	Conviction of an innocent defendant		Acquittal of a guilty defendant	
	(1) First-ballot majority	(2) Post-deliberation unanimous verdict	(3) First-ballot majority	(4) Post-deliberation unanimous verdict
6-person jury	0.0144	0.0688	0.0138	0.0639
12-person jury	0.0007	0.0469	0.0007	0.0266

<sup>a</sup>Calculated from Gelfand and Solomon (1977a, tables 4 and 7).

and that a six-person jury is much more likely to acquit a guilty person than is its twelve-person counterpart.<sup>3</sup>

There is, however, another very important point to observe about the numbers in table 1. Instead of comparing the two rows in the table, as Gelfand and Solomon do, consider each row separately and compare the entry in column (1) in the row with that in column (2) and compare the entry in column (3) in the row with that in column (4). The clear conclusion is that allowing a jury of *either size* to deliberate until it reaches a unanimous verdict results in a higher probability of convicting an innocent defendant *and* a higher probability of acquitting a guilty defendant than if the verdict were based instead on the outcome of a pre-deliberation, first-ballot majority vote. In fact, according to Gelfand and Solomon's results, a six-person jury deciding the case by a first-ballot majority vote would make much better decisions — lower error probabilities for both kinds of errors — than would a twelve-person jury deciding under a unanimity rule.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup>Although Gelfand and Solomon state their results in terms of the probability of convicting an innocent person and the probability of acquitting a guilty one, these are not the probabilities that they calculate and present in their paper. Instead, to measure jury errors, they compute, and their tables display, the conditional probability that a defendant is innocent given that he/she is convicted and the conditional probability that a defendant is guilty given that he/she is acquitted. Both sets of conditional probabilities — those which condition on the true state of nature (guilt or innocence) and those which condition on the jury's verdict — are of interest in a discussion of the accuracy of the jury decision process. But the error probabilities that condition on the true state of nature are the relevant ones for a decision-theoretic analysis of jury structure and jury decisions rules. It is this set of error probabilities that we display in table 1, and we indicate that they are calculated from information in the Gelfand and Solomon article because the latter did not directly provide these numbers. The qualitative comparisons that Gelfand and Solomon draw and the ones that we draw for their results are invariant with respect to which set of error probabilities one uses.

<sup>4</sup>This implication of the Gelfand and Solomon results was observed independently by Grofman (1979, pp. 24–25; 1980, pp. 298–299), though his discussion is based solely on the error probabilities that Gelfand and Solomon present. He uses the implication as part of his 'case for

This interpretation of the Gelfand and Solomon results summarized in table 1 suggests that there is a problem, and there is one. The fact that deliberation increases the probability of error is a consequence of an implicit assumption of the Gelfand and Solomon model. Specifically, they assume that the result of deliberation depends only on the first-ballot vote and a stochastic process, and not on the guilt or innocence of the accused. This means that all of the information about the defendant's guilt or innocence is contained in the first-ballot vote. Let  $q(h, N; G)$  denote the probability that a jury of  $N$  persons that begins with a pre-deliberation vote of  $h$  for conviction eventually convicts a guilty defendant, and let  $q(h, N; I)$  be the probability that a jury of  $N$  persons with  $h$  initial-ballot votes for conviction eventually convicts an innocent defendant. Then Gelfand and Solomon essentially assume that:

$$q(h, N; G) = q(h, N; I) = q(h, N).$$

But this implies that the deliberation process adds noise to the first-ballot vote, which by assumption in the Gelfand and Solomon model is an estimate of the guilt or innocence of the accused. Thus, the deliberative process can only produce decisions that are worse than those resulting from a pre-deliberation majority vote.

A rather simple formal argument illustrates this point. To facilitate the analysis, assume  $N$  is odd. (The same line of reasoning can be followed if  $N$  is even, but one must keep careful account of tied votes.) Then, under the first-ballot majority-rule standard, an initial vote of more than  $N/2$  for

majority verdicts', but he does not suggest any explanation of the observed phenomenon. In addition, he does not provide a formal argument about conditions, beyond those in the Gelfand and Solomon study, under which one could expect to observe pre-deliberation, first-ballot majority verdicts that are superior to full deliberation, unanimous verdicts.

Penrod and Hastie (1979, pp. 480–483) observe a similar phenomenon in their illustrative calculations comparing the performance of twelve-person juries operating under unanimous and non-unanimous (two-thirds majority rule) decision rules. In these calculations, they use an initial vote distribution that produces a good fit to the Chicago Jury Project data on the 225 criminal cases mentioned earlier, and they use a pair of social decision schemes that are roughly comparable to the ones Gelfand and Solomon use. Penrod and Hastie's calculations yield error rates for non-unanimous juries that are lower than those in the corresponding unanimous juries. They interpret this outcome by examining what happens when the jury's pre-deliberation vote would exactly meet the two-thirds majority requirement of the non-unanimous jury, though of course their interpretation applies as well when the pre-deliberation vote exceeds the non-unanimous decision criterion. Hence, the situations for which they interpret their result are exactly analogous to those in which (a) there is a majority on the first ballot and (b) one is comparing the simple majority decision rule with the unanimity requirement. The explanation that Penrod and Hastie offer is that the decision schemes they use 'do not assume that deliberation serves to correct the errors made in first ballot votes' but rather 'these decision schemes reflect relatively unfavorable views of the deliberation process insofar as they assume that both correct and errorful initial majorities are equally likely to be reversed during deliberation' (p. 481).

conviction will result in a conviction, while an initial vote of less than  $N/2$  for conviction will result in an acquittal. Let

$f(h, N; G)$  = probability that on the first ballot  $h$  of  $N$  jurors vote to convict a guilty defendant;

$f(h, N; I)$  = probability that on the first ballot  $h$  of  $N$  jurors vote to convict an innocent defendant.

Then, the probability that an  $N$ -person jury operating under the first-ballot majority-rule standard will convict an innocent defendant is:

$$\sum_{h > N/2} f(h, N; I).$$

The probability that the same error will be made by a jury that reaches a verdict only when the jurors are unanimous in their position is:

$$\sum_{h=0}^N f(h, N; I) q(h, N).$$

Hence, the result that the deliberative process increases the probability of an erroneous conviction — that is, the probability of a guilty verdict when the defendant is truly innocent — which appears in the Gelfand and Solomon estimates in table 1, can be expressed as:

$$\sum_{h=0}^N f(h, N; I) q(h, N) > \sum_{h > N/2} f(h, N; I). \quad (3)$$

We will now present two assumptions that, taken together, imply that (3) is true if the jury necessarily reaches a verdict — that is, if the stochastic process describing the jury's movement from its first-ballot position does not permit hung juries. The first is essentially a symmetry assumption:

$$q(h, N) + q(N - h, N) = 1. \quad (4)$$

This can be interpreted more easily if it is written as:

$$q(h, N) = 1 - q(N - h, N). \quad (4')$$

The left-hand side of (4') is the probability that an  $N$ -person unanimity-rule jury eventually convicts a defendant (whether he/she is innocent or guilty) when there are initially  $h$  votes for conviction. The right-hand side of (4') is

the probability that an  $N$ -person unanimity-rule jury eventually acquits a defendant when there are initially  $h$  votes for acquittal.

The second assumption, which is satisfied by the Gelfand and Solomon model, is that it is more likely that on the first ballot a majority of the jurors will vote correctly and a minority will err than it is that the predeliberation majority will be in error. In terms of our notation, the assumption is that:

$$\left. \begin{aligned} f(h, N; I) &> f(N - h, N; I) \quad \text{for } h < N/2 \\ \text{and} \\ f(h, N; I) &< f(N - h, N; I) \quad \text{for } h > N/2. \end{aligned} \right\} \quad (5)$$

To see that the conditions in (5) conform to the preceding verbal statement, consider the case of  $h < N/2$ . Then (5) says that the probability that on the first ballot  $h$  jurors vote to convict an innocent defendant is greater than the probability that  $N - h$  jurors vote to convict, where  $N - h > h$  since  $h < N/2$ . The second half of (5), for the case where  $h > N/2$ , can be similarly interpreted.

The proposition suggested by the Gelfand-Solomon result — that deliberation produces decisions that are worse than those yielded by a predeliberation majority-rule vote — can be proved as follows.

*Proposition.* Under conditions (4) and (5) above, it follows that:

$$\sum_{h=0}^N f(h, N; I) q(h, N) > \sum_{h > N/2} f(h, N; I). \quad (3)$$

*Proof.*

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{h=0}^N f(h, N; I) q(h, N) &= \sum_{h > N/2} [f(h, N; I) q(h, N) \\ &\quad + f(N - h, N; I) q(N - h, N)] \\ &> \sum_{h > N/2} f(h, N; I) [q(h, N) + q(N - h, N)], \quad \text{by (5).} \end{aligned}$$

But, by (4),  $q(h, N) + q(N - h, N) = 1$ , and we have:

$$\sum_{h=0}^N f(h, N; I) q(h, N) > \sum_{h > N/2} f(h, N; I). \quad \text{Q.E.D.}$$

This proposition concerns the probability of an erroneous conviction. But

it is also easily shown that under assumptions (4) and (5) the probability of an erroneous acquittal is higher if the jury deliberates subject to a unanimity rule than if it simply follows the dictates of its first-ballot majority.

The argument leading to the proposition above applies to a model in which there are no hung juries. Hence, it cannot directly explain the results in table 1 since the Gelfand and Solomon model of the jury deliberating subject to a unanimity rule includes the possibility that such a jury can fail to reach a verdict. For a discussion of conditions that yield results analogous to the proposition — namely, that deliberation reduces the quality of jury decisions — when hung juries are possible, see Klevorick, Rothschild and Winship (1982, pp. 18–20).

The critical assumption underlying the proposition, its analogues when hung juries are possible, and the manifestation of these results in table 1, with higher error probabilities for juries that deliberate than for those that do not, is that  $q(h, N; I) = q(h, N; G)$ . This assumption is quite common in the literature on juries, including in the reverse Ehrenfest model of the jury decision process, which two of us previously analyzed.<sup>5</sup> But the assumption is generally implicit rather than explicit and has obviously not been tested.

### 3. A model of juror observations

It is certainly no surprise that a first-ballot majority vote results in lower error probabilities than does a unanimous, post-deliberation verdict when deliberation is unrelated to the truth. Now consider the other extreme: How does the outcome of the first-ballot majority-rule procedure compare with the post-deliberation outcome when the jury's deliberation *optimally* uses the information provided at trial? How do the two decision procedures compare when the jury's discussion provides the *ideal* opportunity for the jurors to share the observations they have made during the trial, for the strength of different jurors' views to be considered, and for the jurors to discuss the standards to be applied in reaching a verdict? To answer these questions, we need to develop a characterization of juror observation and jury deliberation that is richer than those in existing models.

We assume that  $n$  jurors observe the trial. They may see different things in the same set of in-court proceedings, and they may process what they have seen in different ways. Each juror enters the jury room not only with a view about whether the defendant is innocent or guilty but also with an idea about how strongly he/she holds that view. The following model of correlated normal observations captures this structure.

Assume that the  $i$ th juror observes

$$X_i = \frac{\hat{Y}_i + a\hat{Y}_0}{[1 + a^2]^{\frac{1}{2}}}, \quad 0 \leq a \leq \infty, \quad (6)$$

<sup>5</sup>Klevorick and Rothschild (1979).

where  $\hat{Y}_0, \hat{Y}_1, \dots, \hat{Y}_n$  are independent normal observations with unit variance; and for  $i=0, \dots, n$ :

$$E\hat{Y}_i = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if guilty,} \\ -B & \text{if innocent.} \end{cases} \quad (7)$$

The observation  $\hat{Y}_0$  represents what all the jurors saw, while  $\hat{Y}_i$  is what only the  $i$ th juror observed. The parameter  $a$  indicates the common weight all the jurors place on the common 'signal' they extracted from the trial relative to the weight each attaches to his/her individual observation. Finally,  $B > 0$  measures the information content of the signal provided by each observation. If  $B$  is large, it is relatively easy to tell the innocent from the guilty. If  $B$  is small, it is very difficult to do so.

It is important, from both a conceptual and an analytical point of view, to recognize that this model of juror observation is equivalent to one in which each juror receives the same information from the trial but different jurors make independent errors of observation. In the latter model, the  $i$ th juror's observation is:

$$X_i = \frac{Y_i + aZ}{(1 + a^2)^{\frac{1}{2}}}, \quad (8)$$

where

$$Y_i \sim N(0, 1) \quad \text{for } i = 1, \dots, n; \quad (9)$$

$$\begin{aligned} Z &\sim N(0, 1) && \text{if guilty} \\ Z &\sim N(-D, 1) && \text{if innocent;} \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

the  $Y_i$ 's are independent ( $i=1, 2, \dots, n$ ) of each other and of  $Z$ ; and the parameter  $D$  is the bound on the ability of the jury to distinguish between the innocent and the guilty.<sup>6</sup>

In the formulation given by (8)–(10),  $Z$  is the information conveyed by the trial,  $Y_i$  is the observation error the  $i$ th juror makes, and  $X_i$  is a measure of the  $i$ th juror's perception of the defendant's guilt. The jurors' errors of observation are independent, identically distributed normal random variables. Letting

$$T = \frac{Da}{(1 + a^2)^{\frac{1}{2}}}, \quad (11)$$

<sup>6</sup>To see the equivalence between the model in (6) and (7) and that in (8)–(10), let  $Y_i = \hat{Y}_i - E\hat{Y}_i$  for  $i=1, \dots, n$ ;  $Z = \hat{Y}_0 + (E\hat{Y}_i/a)$ ; recall that  $E\hat{Y}_i$  is the same for all  $i$  so that  $Z$  does not depend on  $i$ ; and set  $D = [(1+a)/a]B$ .

$$\begin{aligned} X_i &\sim N(0, 1) && \text{if guilty,} \\ X_i &\sim N(-T, 1) && \text{if innocent.} \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

The correlation between the  $X_i$ 's, which we denote  $\rho$ , is:

$$\rho = \frac{a^2}{1+a^2}, \quad (13)$$

so that  $T = D\sqrt{\rho}$ . As (12) shows,  $T$  is a measure of the individual juror's ability to make a correct decision.

Before we examine the ways in which an  $n$ -person jury might use the observations it has — the values of the  $n$   $X_i$  variables — let us consider the way a decisionmaker would make optimal use of the information conveyed by the trial,  $Z$ , if he could in fact observe  $Z$ . Define the random variable  $W$  as follows:

$$W = \frac{aZ}{(1+a^2)^{1/2}}. \quad (14)$$

Its distribution is:

$$W \sim \begin{cases} N(0, \rho) & \text{if guilty,} \\ N(-T, \rho) & \text{if innocent,} \end{cases} \quad (15)$$

and it should be clear that  $W$ , as a transform of  $Z$ , contains all the information in the trial. Society would surely want the process that uses this trial information, in deciding the defendant's guilt or innocence, to reflect society's tradeoff between the two possible kinds of errors that can be made — namely, convicting an innocent defendant and acquitting a guilty defendant. Assume the terms of that tradeoff are given by

$$K = \frac{(1-\theta)\Gamma(G|I)}{\theta\Gamma(I|G)}, \quad (16)$$

where

$\theta$  = the prior probability that the defendant is guilty, and

$\Gamma(i|j)$  = the cost associated with declaring state  $i$  when state  $j$  is the true state.

Suppose that  $W$  is in fact observed. Then, given the distribution in (15) and the fact that  $K$  specifies the relative magnitudes of the a priori expected costs of errors of misclassification, the problem facing a decisionmaker who

wants to minimize the expected costs of such errors is a special case of the following standard problem in statistical hypothesis testing: a set of  $n$  independent observations has been drawn from a normal population with unknown mean  $\mu$  and known variance  $\sigma^2$ . We wish to test the hypothesis  $H_1: \mu=0$  versus the hypothesis  $H_2: \mu=-T$ , and the tradeoff between the expected cost of errors of misclassification is  $K$ . Letting  $V$  denote the sample mean of the  $n$  observations,  $\sigma_V^2$  denote the variance of  $V$  ( $=\sigma^2/n$ ), and  $k=\log K$ , the optimal test is:

$$\text{accept } H_1 \text{ if and only if } V \geq \frac{\sigma_V^2 k}{T} - \frac{1}{2}T. \quad (17)$$

[See, for example, Chernoff and Moses (1959, pp. 253–254, 335–336); Mood and Graybill (1963, pp. 281–290).]

The optimal decision rule in (17) should be noted carefully for it will reappear in various guises throughout our analysis. In particular, we can now apply the ideal decision rule in (17) to the problem of the social decisionmaker who observes  $W$  and must decide on the basis of that one observation whether the defendant is guilty or innocent. Note first that  $H_1$  corresponds to the larger value for  $\mu$  (namely  $\mu=0$ ) in the testing problem just as the defendant's being guilty corresponds to the larger value of  $\mu$  ( $\mu=0$ ) in the jury problem. Hence, setting  $V=W$  and  $\sigma_V^2=\rho$  in (17), the ideal rule for the social decisionmaker would be:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{convict if } W &\geq \frac{k\rho}{T} - \frac{1}{2}T, \\ \text{acquit if } W &< \frac{k\rho}{T} - \frac{1}{2}T. \end{aligned} \quad (18)$$

Contrast the ideal social decision rule in (18) with what the  $i$ th juror would do if he/she adopted the social tradeoff  $K$  as his/her own. Given the distribution of  $X_i$  in (12), the optimal decision for the  $i$ th juror acting alone is to follow the rule in (17) with  $V=X_i$  and  $\sigma_V^2=1$ . The  $i$ th juror would

$$\begin{aligned} \text{convict if } X_i &\geq \frac{k}{T} - \frac{1}{2}T, \\ \text{acquit if } X_i &< \frac{k}{T} - \frac{1}{2}T. \end{aligned} \quad (19)$$

The crucial difference between the optimal decision rule based on all the information in the trial and the optimal decision rule based solely on the  $i$ th juror's observation is that the former takes into account the correlation between the 'non-noisy' components of what the jurors see.



#### 4. The optimal use of trial information and the first-ballot majority vote

If the model of juror observations in section 3 applies to the members of an  $n$ -person jury, what is the *optimal* way for that jury to reach a verdict? How can the jury make the best use of the information available to it and, in particular, take account not only of the initial views of each of its members but also of the varying strength of those views? And, how does such ideal performance compare with the jury's performance if it follows the first-ballot majority rule?

The answer is that if the model presented in section 3 applies, the jury faces a problem in discriminant analysis. The jury must 'classify' the defendant as guilty or innocent on the basis of the 'measurements' — one per juror — it has on the defendant and the knowledge that the jury observes

$$X \sim N(0, \Sigma_n) \quad \text{if the defendant is guilty} \quad (20)$$

$$X \sim N(-Te, \Sigma_n) \quad \text{if the defendant is innocent,} \quad (21)$$

where  $X' = (X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n)$ ,  $e' = (1, 1, \dots, 1)$ , and  $\Sigma_n$  is the variance-covariance matrix of  $X$ . From (12) and (13), we know that each diagonal element of  $\Sigma_n$  is 1 and each off-diagonal element is  $\rho$ .

The solution to the problem of classifying an observation into one of two known multivariate normal populations with equal covariance matrices is given by Anderson (1958, pp. 133–137). Following Anderson's approach, the jury makes optimal use of the information it has by forming the statistic:

$$U_n = X' \Sigma_n^{-1} e T + \frac{1}{2} T^2 e' \Sigma_n^{-1} e. \quad (22)$$

It can be shown that:

$$U_n \sim \begin{cases} N(\frac{1}{2}\alpha, \alpha) & \text{if guilty,} \\ N(-\frac{1}{2}\alpha, \alpha) & \text{if innocent,} \end{cases} \quad (23)$$

where

$$\alpha = T^2 e' \Sigma_n^{-1} e = \frac{T^2 n(1 + a^2)}{na^2 + 1} = \frac{T^2 n}{(n-1)\rho + 1}. \quad (24)$$

Then, if  $K$  is, as defined in section 3, the ratio of the a priori expected cost of convicting an innocent defendant to the a priori expected cost of acquitting a guilty one, and  $k = \log K$ , the optimal rule for the  $n$ -person jury we have modelled is:

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{convict if } U_n \geq k, \\ &\text{acquit if } U_n < k. \end{aligned} \quad (25)$$

For the variance-covariance matrix  $\Sigma_n$  of the jury's observations as we have modelled them, the test in (25) reduces to:

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{convict if } \bar{X}_n \geq \frac{k}{T} \left[ \frac{(n-1)\rho + 1}{n} \right] - \frac{1}{2} T, \\ &\text{acquit if } \bar{X}_n < \frac{k}{T} \left[ \frac{(n-1)\rho + 1}{n} \right] - \frac{1}{2} T, \end{aligned} \quad (26)$$

where

$$\bar{X}_n = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n X_i$$

is the mean of the  $n$  jurors' observations.

Note that the optimal decision in (26) takes the form of the optimal test presented in (17) with  $V = \bar{X}_n$  and  $\sigma_V^2 = [(n-1)\rho + 1]/n$ . Since the jurors' observations are not independent, the derivation of the test in (17) does not strictly apply. But given the specific, symmetric structure of  $\Sigma_n$  in our case (with 1's on the diagonal and  $\rho$  everywhere else), the sample mean of the jurors' observations is a sufficient statistic for the common mean of the  $X_i$ 's, and one can demonstrate that (17) is, in fact, the optimal test in this case.

The error probabilities of the optimally deliberating jury, which are calculated using the distribution of  $U_n$  in (23) and the decision rule in (25), are:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(\text{acquit} | \text{guilty}) &= \phi \left[ \frac{k - \frac{1}{2}\alpha}{\sqrt{\alpha}} \right], \\ \Pr(\text{convict} | \text{innocent}) &= \phi \left[ -\frac{k + \frac{1}{2}\alpha}{\sqrt{\alpha}} \right], \end{aligned} \quad (27)$$

where  $\phi$  is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal variate  $S$ :

$$\phi(S) = \int_{-\infty}^S \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp(-\frac{1}{2}s^2) ds.$$

In our analysis, we shall be particularly interested in what happens to jury performance as the jury increases in size. Note first that, from (24):

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \alpha = T^2 / \rho. \quad (28)$$

Hence, there is a limit to the quality of the decisions that the optimally

deliberating jury — or any jury that uses the information generated by the trial — will make.

Second, and most important, as  $n \rightarrow \infty$  the decision rule in (26) approaches the ideal decision rule in (18), the decision rule that would optimally use all the information in the trial. To see this, observe that as  $n \rightarrow \infty$ , the term  $[(n-1)\rho + 1]/n$  in (26) approaches  $\rho$ , and the critical value on the right-hand side of (26) approaches  $k\rho/T - \frac{1}{2}T$ , which is the right-hand side of (18). Furthermore,

$$\bar{X}_n = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n X_i = \frac{\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n Y_i + aZ}{(1+a^2)^{\frac{1}{2}}} = \frac{\bar{Y}_n + aZ}{(1+a^2)^{\frac{1}{2}}},$$

where

$$\bar{Y}_n = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n Y_i.$$

But  $E(Y_i) = 0$  implies  $E(\bar{Y}_n) = 0$ ; and from the law of large numbers, it follows that  $\text{Var}(\bar{Y}_n) \rightarrow 0$  as  $n \rightarrow \infty$ . Hence, as  $n \rightarrow \infty$ ,  $\bar{X}_n \rightarrow aZ/(1+a^2)^{\frac{1}{2}} = W$ , as defined in (14). But then as the size of the jury increases,  $\bar{X}_n \rightarrow W$  so that a decision based on  $\bar{X}_n$  is based on all the information contained in the trial, and the left-hand side of (26) approaches the left-hand side of (18).

Finally, we can use (28) above to calculate the asymptotic error probabilities under optimal use of trial information. Denoted with an asterisk, they are:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr^*(\text{acquit}|\text{guilty}) &= \phi \left[ k \frac{\sqrt{\rho}}{T} - \frac{1}{2} \frac{T}{2\sqrt{\rho}} \right], \\ \Pr^*(\text{convict}|\text{innocent}) &= \phi \left[ -k \frac{\sqrt{\rho}}{T} - \frac{1}{2} \frac{T}{2\sqrt{\rho}} \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (29)$$

One special case of the jury that makes optimal use of the information at trial is worthy of note. It is the case in which the jury attaches equal weight to the a priori expected costs of the two kinds of errors it can make. For such a jury,  $K = 1$ , hence  $k = \log K = 0$ , and the jury optimizes by equating the probabilities of making the two kinds of errors. Setting  $k = 0$  in (26), (27), and (29), we see that such a jury follows the decision rule:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{convict if } \bar{X}_n &\geq -\frac{T}{2} \\ \text{acquit if } \bar{X}_n &< -\frac{T}{2}; \end{aligned} \quad (26')$$

the probability it errs is:

$$\Pr(\text{acquit}|\text{guilty}) = \Pr(\text{convict}|\text{innocent}) = \phi \left[ -\frac{1}{2} \sqrt{\alpha} \right]; \quad (27')$$

and the asymptotic value of this error probability is:

$$\Pr^*(\text{acquit}|\text{guilty}) = \Pr^*(\text{convict}|\text{innocent}) = \phi \left[ -\frac{1}{2} \frac{T}{\sqrt{\rho}} \right]. \quad (29')$$

We will return to this special case below.

Now consider the performance of a jury that renders a verdict based on a simple majority vote of the jurors before any deliberation has occurred. Each juror observes a normal random variable  $X_i$  with the distribution given by (12). Then, given the social tradeoff  $K$  between the two kinds of errors, the  $i$ th juror follows the decision rule in (19), which we repeat here:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{convict if } X_i &\geq \frac{k}{T} - \frac{1}{2}T \\ \text{acquit if } X_i &< \frac{k}{T} - \frac{1}{2}T. \end{aligned} \quad (30)$$

Under the first-ballot majority-rule procedure, the jury will convict the defendant if and only if the number of guilty votes is greater than  $n/2$ . Thus, the probability that the jury will render a guilty verdict is the probability that more than  $n/2$  of the  $X_i$ 's are greater than or equal to  $k/T - \frac{1}{2}T$  so that

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(\text{conviction}) &= \Pr \left[ X_{\text{med},n} \geq \frac{k}{T} - \frac{1}{2}T \right], \\ \Pr(\text{acquittal}) &= \Pr \left[ X_{\text{med},n} < \frac{k}{T} - \frac{1}{2}T \right], \end{aligned} \quad (31)$$

where  $X_{\text{med},n}$  is the median observation in a jury of size  $n$ .

Hence, as one would expect, the performance of the jury acting under the first-ballot majority-rule procedure depends on the median observation  $X_{\text{med},n}$  and how the juror who makes that observation decides on his/her vote. Let  $Y_{\text{med},n}$  be the median of the juror errors of observation  $Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_n$ . Then, from (8), we have:

$$X_{\text{med},n} = \frac{Y_{\text{med},n} + \alpha Z}{(1+a^2)^{\frac{1}{2}}}. \quad (32)$$

As  $n \rightarrow \infty$ , the variance of  $Y_{\text{med},n}$  approaches zero and since  $Y_i \sim N(0, 1)$  for all  $i$ ,  $Y_{\text{med},n}$  itself approaches zero. Hence, as  $n \rightarrow \infty$ ,

$$X_{\text{med},n} \rightarrow aZ/(1+a^2)^{1/2} = W.$$

But then, since  $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \bar{X}_n$  also equals  $W$ , tests based on the median *could* be asymptotically as good as tests based on the mean. That is to say, as the size of the jury increases, the *median* observation approaches  $W$ , which contains all the information in the trial, just as the *mean* of the observations approaches  $W$ .

Thus, a *large* jury that decides its verdict by a first-ballot majority vote has the information to perform as well as it would if it followed the rule for optimal deliberation. But if the median voter follows the decision rule in (30) above, applying society's error tradeoff  $K$  to his/her own observation, the large jury deciding by first-ballot majority rule will *not* — except for one special case — perform as well as it would under the optimal deliberation rule in (26). Following the decision rule in (30), the large jury's median voter will vote to convict if and only if  $X_{\text{med},n} \geq (k/T) - \frac{1}{2}T$  so that the large jury applying a first-ballot majority rule is essentially applying the criterion: convict if and only if  $W \geq (k/T) - \frac{1}{2}T$ . The optimal decision criterion, which we have seen the optimally deliberating jury approaches as it increases in size, indicates instead [see (18)] that a guilty verdict should be rendered if and only if  $W \geq (kp/T) - \frac{1}{2}T$ . Hence, the large jury deciding cases on the basis of first-ballot majority rule would achieve asymptotic optimality if its median voter applied the rule: convict if and only if  $X_{\text{med},n} \geq (kp/T) - \frac{1}{2}T$ , which differs from what the rule in (30) dictates.

It is conceptually clear why the first-ballot rule generally fails to produce an asymptotically optimal result. The median voter in the large jury makes an observation in which the noise factor approaches zero. He/she should take this into account and, when formulating his/her decision rule, recognize that his/her observation has a lower variance than an observation chosen at random. If the median juror does not take this into account, his/her vote will lead the jury to a non-optimal decision.<sup>7</sup> To make this more precise, recall that the criterion for the optimal decision rule in (17) is:

$$V \geq \frac{\sigma_v^2 k}{T} - \frac{1}{2}T. \quad (33)$$

<sup>7</sup>There is an analogy in the competitive bidding literature, more specifically, in the phenomenon referred to as 'the winner's curse'. Potential bidders with private information should recognize that they will win only if their observations are extreme. Hence, when evaluating the information in their observations, they should condition on the observations being extreme. See Milgrom and Weber (1982).

Hence, in the optimal decision criterion, the variance weights the term  $k/T$ , which reflects the decisionmaker's tradeoff between the two types of errors. Overestimating the variance has the same effect as using a larger absolute value of  $k$ .

Suppose, then, that a large jury decides the case on the basis of a first-ballot simple majority vote and that each juror — including the one with the median observation — follows the decision rule in (30). Then if the jury regards the expected cost of convicting the innocent as higher than that of acquitting the guilty, so that  $k > 0$ , it will tend to acquit too many truly guilty defendants. That is, if  $k > 0$ , then the asymptotic error probabilities satisfy the following inequalities:

$$\Pr_F^*(A|G) > \Pr_D^*(A|G) > \Pr_D^*(C|I) > \Pr_F^*(C|I), \quad (34)$$

where  $F$  denotes the first-ballot simple majority rule procedure,  $D$  ideal deliberation,  $A$  acquittal, and  $C$  conviction. If  $k < 0$ , then the inequalities in (34) are reversed.

The result in (34) is illustrated in fig. 1, which depicts the efficiency frontier for the jury's decision problem. For any given level of one of the error probabilities, the corresponding point on the frontier gives the minimum attainable level of the other error probability — that is, the level that an optimally deliberating jury would achieve. The frontier can be generated by varying  $k$  in the expressions for the error probabilities given in (29) above. It can be verified that the frontier is negatively sloped and, if each of the error probabilities is less than one-half, convex. In terms of the figure, the inequalities in (34) show that a large jury applying a first-ballot majority rule when, for example,  $k = k_1 > 0$  will, in fact, attain a point like  $k_2$  on the frontier where  $k_2 > k_1$ . The jury *will* reach a point on the efficiency frontier, but one where the probability of false acquittals is higher than desired.

How far from its target on the efficiency frontier does a jury stray when it reaches a verdict on the basis of a first-ballot, simple majority vote? Alternatively, if such a jury were to deliberate in an optimal way, by how much could it reduce the expected loss due to its misclassification of defendants? Of course, the answer depends on the values of the various parameters. But to get some sense of the disparity between the jury's desired combination of error probabilities and the combination it attains, consider a very special case of the social tradeoff between the two types of errors a jury can commit ( $K$ ). Specifically, suppose that  $\Gamma(G|I) = \Gamma(I|G)$ , so that the cost of a false conviction is equal to the cost of a false acquittal. In this case, minimizing the expected loss due to errors of misclassification is equivalent to minimizing the (unconditional) probability of an error:

$$(1 - \theta)\Pr(C|I) + \theta\Pr(A|G).$$




Fig. 1

The social tradeoff  $K$  then equals  $(1-\theta)/\theta$ , or the prior probability that the defendant is innocent divided by the prior probability that he/she is guilty, so that  $K$  equals the prior odds that the defendant is innocent.

For this specification of  $K$ , table 2 compares the unconditional error probability for infinitely large juries that decide on the basis of a first-ballot majority vote with the unconditional error probability for similarly sized, but optimally deliberating juries.<sup>8</sup> The comparison is made for different values of  $K$  and  $\rho$  for two cases, one in which the asymptotic error probability of an optimally deliberating jury with  $K=1$  is 0.3 and the other in which that probability is 0.1. We see that in both cases, when  $K=1$  (so that  $k=\ln K=0$ ), the asymptotic error probability of the first-ballot, majority-rule jury is the same as that of the optimally deliberating jury. As we shall

<sup>8</sup>An alternative interpretation of the entries in table 2 is that  $\theta=1-\theta=\frac{1}{2}$  so that  $K=I(G|I)/I(I|G)$ , the relative social costs of the two kinds of misclassification. In this case, the entries in table 2 equal the expected losses due to misclassification multiplied by  $2/(I_1+I_0)$ .

Table 2  
Asymptotic probability of error.

K		Case i			Case ii		
		1	2	4	1	2	4
$\rho=0.1$	D	0.3	0.262	0.165	0.1	0.089	0.058
	F	0.3	0.333	0.200	0.1	0.310	0.200
	A	0.0	0.071	0.036	0.0	0.221	0.142
$\rho=0.5$	D	0.3	0.262	0.165	0.1	0.089	0.058
	F	0.3	0.284	0.197	0.1	0.102	0.094
	A	0.0	0.022	0.033	0.0	0.013	0.036
$\rho=0.8$	D	0.3	0.262	0.165	0.1	0.089	0.058
	F	0.3	0.265	0.186	0.1	0.095	0.077
	A	0.0	0.003	0.021	0.0	0.006	0.019

D=asymptotic probability of error for optimally deliberating jury.  
F=asymptotic probability of error for first-ballot majority-rule jury.  
A=absolute difference between the asymptotic error probabilities of the two kinds of juries.

demonstrate below, this result is completely general. If  $K=1$ , a large jury will do equally well applying a first-ballot majority rule or engaging in optimal deliberation.

For  $K=2$  and  $K=4$ , however, the difference in performance due to optimal deliberation is considerable. As one would expect, the differences are greater for the smaller values of  $\rho$  because the smaller  $\rho$  is, the larger is the correction that the median juror should make in his/her decision rule. In the worst instance — case ii with  $K=2$ ,  $\rho=0.1$  — the absolute difference between the asymptotic error probabilities is 0.22 and the first-ballot, majority-rule jury is nearly 3.5 times more likely to err than is its optimally deliberating counterpart. Thus, if a jury chooses to decide on a verdict on the basis of the outcome of a first ballot majority vote, with each juror following the decision rule in (30) above, rather than to engage in optimal deliberation, then the jury can have a considerably higher chance of making an error.

The preceding discussion points us to the one special case in which the large jury performs as well under first-ballot simple majority rule as it does under the optimal deliberation rule in (26). It is the special case we considered earlier in which the jury attaches equal weight to the two kinds of errors it can make so that:  $K=1$  and  $k=0$ . In this case, the median voter applying the rule in (30) votes to convict if and only if  $X_{med,n} \geq -\frac{1}{2}T$ . We have observed that as  $n \rightarrow \infty$ ,  $X_{med,n} \rightarrow W$ . Hence, for large juries, the median voter's criterion and, consequently, the jury's decision rule, is equivalent to: convict if and only if  $W \geq -\frac{1}{2}T$ . As can be seen from (18), this is the optimal decision rule for the case in which  $k=0$ . Hence, when  $k=0$ , the decision criteria of the first-ballot simple majority jury and the optimally deliberating

jury converge asymptotically to the same rule. Consequently, for  $k=0$ , the asymptotic error probabilities of the two kinds of juries are the same, and they are given in (29'). In terms of fig. 1, this means that when  $k=0$ , the large jury that decides the case by a simple majority on the first ballot attains the frontier point,  $k_0$ , for which it aims.

For this special case in which the jury attaches equal weight to the two kinds of errors, there is a particularly simple relationship between the size of a large jury that decides by first-ballot majority rule and the size of the optimally deliberating jury that achieves the same degree of accuracy. Namely, if the large jury that deliberates optimally — that is, follows the rule in (26') — is of size  $n$ , then a first-ballot, majority-rule jury will have to be of size  $(\pi/2)n$ , or approximately 57 percent larger, if it is to achieve the same error probabilities, that is, the ones given in (27'). The reason for this is as follows. For large  $n$ , the median of a set of independent, identically distributed normal variables with mean (and median)  $\mu$  and variance  $\sigma^2$  will be approximately normally distributed with mean  $\mu$  and variance  $\pi\sigma^2/2n$ .<sup>9</sup> Applying this result to approximate the distribution of  $Y_{\text{med},n}$ , we can use (32) to calculate the variance of  $X_{\text{med},n}$ , which is  $\frac{1}{2}\pi[(1-\rho)/n] + \rho$ . But then the error probabilities of the large jury that decides the case by first-ballot majority rule can be computed using the expressions in (31). One finds that for large  $n$ , with  $k=0$ , the probability of error for a jury that uses the first-ballot majority-rule procedure is approximately equal to:

$$\Phi \left[ -\frac{1}{2}T / \sqrt{\frac{\pi}{2} \left( \frac{1-\rho}{n} \right) + \rho} \right]. \quad (35)$$

Equating the probability in (27') to that in (35) and solving for the  $n$  in (35) as a function of the jury size in (27'), it is straightforward to show that if the optimally deliberating jury is of size  $n$ , the first-ballot jury must be of size  $(\pi/2)n$  if the two are to be of equal efficiency.

Before leaving the special case in which  $k=0$ , let us consider some evidence about how quickly the error probabilities of the optimally deliberating and first-ballot majority-rule juries converge and how large the discrepancy between the errors is for small  $n$ . Table 3 contains a comparison of the error probabilities of the two kinds of juries as jury size varies. The illustrative comparisons are made for two values of the asymptotic error probabilities — 0.3 and 0.1 — and for a range of values of  $\rho$ , the correlation between the jurors' observations. (In table 3, we do not distinguish between the error probabilities for false convictions and those for false acquittals since the jury acts to equate those probabilities when  $k=0$ .)

<sup>9</sup>Kendall and Stuart (1958, p. 329).

Table 3  
Probability of error: Comparison of first-ballot and optimally deliberating juries when  $k=0$ .

$n=$		1	5	9	11	15	25	35	$\infty$
$\text{Pr}^*=0.3$									
$\rho=0.1$	D	0.434	0.377	0.355	0.349	0.339	0.327	0.320	0.3
	F	0.434	0.391	0.370	0.363	0.352	0.337	0.329	0.3
	A	0.000	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.013	0.011	0.009	0.0
$\rho=0.5$	D	0.355	0.316	0.309	0.308	0.306	0.304	0.303	0.3
	F	0.355	0.322	0.314	0.311	0.309	0.305	0.304	0.3
	A	0.000	0.006	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.0
$\rho=0.8$	D	0.320	0.304	0.303	0.302	0.302	0.301	0.301	0.3
	F	0.320	0.306	0.304	0.303	0.302	0.301	0.301	0.3
	A	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
$\text{Pr}^*=0.1$									
$\rho=0.1$	D	0.343	0.222	0.182	0.171	0.156	0.136	0.127	0.1
	F	0.343	0.249	0.208	0.196	0.177	0.152	0.139	0.1
	A	0.000	0.027	0.026	0.025	0.022	0.016	0.013	0.0
$\rho=0.5$	D	0.182	0.121	0.112	0.110	0.107	0.104	0.103	0.1
	F	0.182	0.129	0.118	0.115	0.111	0.107	0.105	0.1
	A	0.000	0.008	0.006	0.005	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.0
$\rho=0.8$	D	0.126	0.106	0.103	0.103	0.102	0.101	0.101	0.1
	F	0.126	0.108	0.105	0.104	0.103	0.102	0.101	0.1
	A	0.000	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0

D=probability of error for optimally deliberating jury.

F=probability of error for first-ballot majority-rule jury.

A=absolute difference between the error probabilities of the two kinds of juries.

Several features of the comparison are noteworthy. First, the differences between the error probabilities of the two kinds of juries are quite small, even for small  $n$ . The largest difference in the table is 0.027, and it occurs for  $\rho=0.1$ ,  $\text{Pr}^*=0.1$ ,  $n=5$ . Thus, when  $k=0$  and the jury's asymptotic error probability is 0.1 or 0.3, the first-ballot majority-rule jury does not seem to be at a great disadvantage relative to one that engages in optimal deliberation even when  $n$  is small. Second, the rate of convergence between the two juries' error probabilities is moderate. Third, convergence is not monotonic. For example, for  $\rho=0.1$ ,  $\text{Pr}^*=0.3$ , the largest absolute difference between the two error probabilities is for  $n=9$ . One's intuition might suggest that the smaller the jury, the greater the disadvantage of the first-ballot majority-rule procedure. The non-monotonicity of convergence shows that intuition is not correct, and another moment's thought suggests the flaw in that intuition. We know that the error probabilities under the two decision methods must be the same for a single-person jury ( $n=1$ ) since one person does not engage in deliberation. And we have also shown that the error

probabilities are equal for  $n \rightarrow \infty$ . Consequently, the convergence between the two error probabilities cannot be monotonic.

Finally, if a large jury attaches different expected costs to the two kinds of errors — so that  $K \neq 1$  and  $k \neq 0$  — but it still wants to decide on the basis of a predeliberation vote, there are two ways it can make an optimal decision. First, individual jurors can take account of the correlation between their observations and alter the cutoff in the individual decision rule in (30) to  $(k\rho/T) - \frac{1}{2}T$ . Then a decision based on a simple majority vote would converge to the optimal decision as  $n \rightarrow \infty$ . Alternatively, the individual jurors can be instructed to vote as if the two kinds of errors do have equal weight — that is, as if  $k=0$  — but the jury as a whole would agree to convict the defendant only if a fraction

$$\beta = \phi \left[ \frac{a^2}{(1+a^2)^{1/2}} \frac{k}{T} \right] \quad (36)$$

voted to convict. It is straightforward to show that as  $k$  varies, a first-ballot jury following this rule asymptotically traces out the same efficient tradeoffs between the two kinds of error probabilities as the optimally deliberating jury does.

### 5. The effects of differences in jurors' standards

To this point, we have implicitly assumed that the social tradeoff between the two types of errors that a jury can commit,  $K$ , is universally shared, or at least that each juror puts aside personal views and applies the social tradeoff in casting his/her vote. Suppose, on the contrary, that different jurors have different views about the appropriate tradeoff between the expected costs of erroneous convictions and erroneous acquittals, and suppose that they do not simply adopt the social tradeoff when they become jurors. In particular, assume that individual standards  $k_i = \log K_i$  are normally distributed among the population with mean  $k^*$  and variance  $v^2$ . We will also assume that the distribution of standards is independent of the distribution of observations made by jurors. What implications does the existence of this distribution have for the comparative performance of first-ballot, majority-rule juries and optimally deliberating juries?

To focus attention on the new issues introduced by the dispersion of standards in the population, let us assume that a jury adopting the first-ballot majority-rule procedure does so in a 'sophisticated' way. Specifically, assume that each individual juror takes account of the correlation between his/her observation and the others' and alters the cutoff in his/her decision rule to reflect that correlation. Hence, if juror  $i$  applies the standard  $k_i$ , that

juror's decision rule is:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{convict if } X_i &\geq \frac{k_i \rho}{T} - \frac{1}{2}T, \\ \text{acquit if } X_i &< \frac{k_i \rho}{T} - \frac{1}{2}T. \end{aligned} \quad (37)$$

As we observed at the end of section 4, a decision based on a simple majority vote of jurors who apply (37) to determine their individual positions will converge to the optimal decision as  $n \rightarrow \infty$  if each juror uses the social standard  $k$  for  $k_i$ .

Consider the decision process of a first-ballot, majority-rule jury in which juror  $i$  votes according to the decision rule in (37) with  $k_i$  representing that juror's *personal* view of the tradeoff between false convictions and false acquittals. The outcome for the defendant depends on which inequality in (37) holds for more than  $n/2$  jurors, that is, whether the median value of  $X_i - k_i \rho / T$  is greater than, equal to, or less than  $-\frac{1}{2}T$ .

Define

$$R_i = \frac{Y_i}{(1+a^2)^{1/2}} - \frac{k_i \rho}{T}$$

so that, from the definitions of  $X_i$  and  $W$  in section 3,  $X_i - (k_i \rho / T) = R_i + W$ . Then the jury's decision rule can be expressed as:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{convict if } W + R_{\text{med},n} &\geq -\frac{1}{2}T, \\ \text{acquit if } W + R_{\text{med},n} &< -\frac{1}{2}T, \end{aligned} \quad (38)$$

where  $R_{\text{med},n}$  is the median value of

$$\frac{Y_i}{(1+a^2)^{1/2}} - \frac{k_i \rho}{T}$$

in a jury of size  $n$ . From the definition of  $R_i$ , we can determine its distribution:

$$R_i \sim N \left( -\frac{k^* \rho}{T}, \frac{1}{1+a^2} + \frac{v^2 \rho^2}{T^2} \right). \quad (39)$$

It follows from the distribution of  $R_i$  in (39) that as  $n \rightarrow \infty$ ,  $R_{\text{med},n}$  approaches  $-k^* \rho / T$  and its variance goes to zero. Thus, asymptotically the defendant is convicted by a jury following the first-ballot, majority-rule procedure if and

only if  $W - (k^*\rho/T) \geq -\frac{1}{2}T$ . This large jury follows the decision rule:

$$\text{convict if and only if } W \geq \frac{k^*\rho}{T} - \frac{1}{2}T. \quad (40)$$

Comparing (40) with the optimal decision rule in (18), we see that the large first-ballot, majority-rule jury in which jurors correct for the correlation of their observations but apply their personal views of the error tradeoff will reach a point on the efficiency frontier. Whether it reaches the socially optimal point depends on the relationship between the social standard  $k$  and the mean  $k^*$  of the distribution of the  $k_i$ 's. If  $k = k^*$ , then as  $n \rightarrow \infty$ , the sophisticated first-ballot, majority-rule jury will approach the socially optimal decision rule. Otherwise, it reaches a point on the efficiency frontier, but not the socially optimal point.

It should be emphasized that in this section we have compared the verdicts of a 'sophisticated' first-ballot, majority-rule jury with the results of following a decision rule that makes use of all the information in the trial and applies society's tradeoff between the two kinds of erroneous verdicts. We have not identified the latter with the results of a particular way of processing the contributions of  $n$  jurors, an identification we were able to make in the previous section. There the optimal way to proceed was to apply discriminant analysis to the jurors' observations. The problem with making any such identification in the current setting is that there is no way to specify how the individual jurors'  $k_i$ 's ought to be aggregated to arrive at the social standard  $k$ .

It is also not possible to compare the performance of the first-ballot, majority-rule jury with that of a jury that first combines its members' standards and then applies discriminant analysis using that composite standard, unless one specifies how that aggregation occurs. As one example, it can be shown that given the specification in this section, a first-ballot, majority-rule jury that is 'sophisticated' in correcting for correlated observations will attain the same error probabilities as a large jury that first averages its members' standards and then applies discriminant analysis to their observations with that averaged standard.

One last observation can be made about the case in which  $k = k^*$ , that is, in which society's standard is equal to the mean of the distribution of individual standards. A possible interpretation of this situation is that all members of the population actually share the same standard  $k$ , but when a particular individual, say the  $i$ th, applies that standard, some 'noise' enters and he/she actually uses the individual standard  $k_i$ . An interesting question is whether a jury that decides by 'sophisticated' first ballot, majority rule should agree on a common standard, call it  $k^0$ , before casting individual votes or whether each juror should vote based only on his/her individual

standard  $k_i$ . For the case in which  $k = k^*$ , intuition suggests that if the aggregation procedure is unbiased, so that  $E(k^0) = k$ , then the jury should agree on a single standard before voting if the variance of the agreement procedure is less than the variance of the individual  $k_i$ 's, namely, less than  $v^2$ . It can be demonstrated that this is, in fact, a sufficient condition for pre-balloting aggregation of standards to be desirable. An example of an aggregation procedure that satisfies this sufficient condition is averaging the jurors'  $k_i$ -values. One that fails to meet the condition is adopting the view of the most extreme juror.

## 6. The effects of differences in jurors' abilities to decide

In the previous analysis we have assumed that all jurors were equally able to follow the testimony and arguments they saw and heard and the instructions they received at the trial. Of course, though, jurors are likely to differ in their abilities to process the information produced by a trial. In this section we examine the effect of one difference in jurors' abilities: differences in the variances of the jurors' measures of the defendant's guilt or innocence. To focus attention on these differences among jurors in the context of a tractable model, we simplify our earlier formulation by assuming that the jurors' observations are uncorrelated.

Specifically, we suppose that juror  $i$  observes  $X_i$  where

$$\begin{aligned} (a) \quad & X_i \sim N(0, \sigma_i^2) \quad \text{if the defendant is guilty,} \\ (b) \quad & X_i \sim N(-1, \sigma_i^2) \quad \text{if the defendant is innocent,} \end{aligned} \quad (41)$$

and the  $X_i$ 's are uncorrelated. The crucial difference between this specification and our previous one is that  $\sigma^2$ , the variance of the juror's measure of the defendant's guilt, can now vary across jurors. We will assume that the precision of a juror's observation,  $(\sigma_i^2)^{-1}$ , is the same no matter whether the defendant is innocent or guilty, and we will assume that this precision is distributed according to a gamma distribution with parameters  $m/2$  and  $(2\gamma)^{-1}$ . The mean and variance of the precision of the juror's observation are:

$$E\left[\frac{1}{\sigma_i^2}\right] = \gamma m \quad (42)$$

and

$$\text{Var}\left[\frac{1}{\sigma_i^2}\right] = 2\gamma^2 m. \quad (43)$$

The analysis that follows is facilitated by the observation that if  $H$  satisfies

$$1/\sigma_i^2 = \gamma H, \quad (44)$$

then  $H$  is distributed as chi-square with  $m$  degrees of freedom.

Suppose the  $i$ th juror considers the expected costs of the two kinds of errors he/she can make to be equal so that  $K=1$  and  $k=0$  for this juror. Consequently, he/she adopts a decision rule that equates the probabilities of making the two kinds of errors. Then, given the specification in (41), this juror will vote to convict if his/her observation exceeds  $-\frac{1}{2}$  and to acquit if that observation is less than  $-\frac{1}{2}$ . The probability that this juror votes incorrectly when the defendant is guilty is:

$$p = \Pr[X_i < -\frac{1}{2} | X_i \sim N(0, \sigma_i^2)]. \quad (45)$$

Since  $k=0$  for this juror, the probability in (45) is also the probability that he/she errs when the defendant is innocent.

This error probability is easily calculated. To evaluate it, we must remember that  $\sigma_i^2$  is a random variable with density  $g(\sigma_i^2)$ , calculate the probability of an incorrect decision conditional on a given value of  $\sigma_i^2$ , and then integrate over  $\sigma_i^2$ . The result is that the probability that the  $i$ th juror reaches an incorrect decision is:

$$\Pr\left[\frac{X_i}{\sigma_i} < -\frac{1}{2\sigma_i}\right],$$

where  $X_i \sim N(0, \sigma_i^2)$ . Letting  $S$  be a standard normal variate and using (44) we see that this probability is:

$$\begin{aligned} p(\gamma, m) &= \Pr[S < -\frac{1}{2}\sqrt{\gamma H}] = \Pr\left[\frac{S}{\sqrt{H}/\sqrt{m}} < -\frac{1}{2}\sqrt{\gamma m}\right] \\ &= \Pr[t_m < -\frac{1}{2}\sqrt{\gamma m}], \end{aligned} \quad (46)$$

where  $t_m$  is distributed as a  $t$  distribution with  $m$  degrees of freedom.

From (46) it is clear that the probability that an incorrect decision is made by a juror who attaches equal weight to the expected costs of the two kinds of errors is a function of the two parameters  $\gamma$  and  $m$ . In our analysis of the effects of differences in jurors' abilities, we will want this error probability to remain constant. This is achieved by defining  $\gamma$  as a function of  $m$ , which we will denote  $u(m)$ . The properties of  $u(m)$  are important because they establish  $m$  as a measure of the dispersion of jurors' abilities. Specifically, with the error probability  $p$  in (46) held constant, the parameter  $m$  measures,

inversely, the variability of individual jurors' abilities to process trial information.<sup>10</sup> If  $m=1$ , jurors' abilities are quite variable;<sup>11</sup> while as  $m \rightarrow \infty$ , the variability in ability of individual jurors vanishes, and the model converges to the model of section 4 where jurors did not vary in ability. (To see this rigorously, note that  $t_m \rightarrow S$  as  $m \rightarrow \infty$ .)

The fact that jurors vary in ability has no effect on the probability of error when the jury decides on the basis of first ballot votes. The errors made by the jury are simply determined by the probability that the individual juror errs, which is given by (46) above. The probability that an  $n$ -member jury errs in its decision is then:

$$\sum_{r > n/2} \binom{n}{r} p(\gamma, m)^r (1 - p(\gamma, m))^{n-r}. \quad (47)$$

Now consider an  $n$ -member deliberating jury that makes optimal use of its observations of the  $n$  random variables  $X = (X_1, \dots, X_n)$ , which are independently distributed with  $X_i \sim N(0, \sigma_i^2)$  if the defendant is guilty and  $X_i \sim N(-1, \sigma_i^2)$  if he/she is innocent. Here we will consider only the case where the jury treats the expected costs of the two kinds of errors as equal so that  $k=0$ . Hence, the jury will form the statistic  $U_n$  defined in (22) and the optimal decision rule is to convict if and only if  $U_n \geq 0$ . Given the structure of the jurors' observations in the present model, this is equivalent to convicting if and only if

$$\bar{X}_w \geq -\frac{1}{2}, \quad (48)$$

where  $\bar{X}_w$  is the weighted mean of the  $X_i$ 's:

$$\bar{X}_w = \frac{\sum_i X_i}{\sum_i \frac{1}{\sigma_i^2}}. \quad (49)$$

<sup>10</sup>To establish this relationship between  $m$  and  $\text{Var}[1/\sigma_i^2]$ , let  $t_{w,p}$  be defined by  $\Pr\{t_w < t_{w,p}\} = p$ ; that is,  $t_{w,p}$  is simply the critical value for tail probability  $p$  of a  $t$  distribution with  $w$  degrees of freedom. But from the properties of the  $t$  distribution, it follows that for  $p < \frac{1}{2}$ , as  $w$  increases,  $t_{w,p}$  increases — that is,  $|t_{w,p}|$  decreases. Hence, as  $m$  increases, if the probability in (46) is to remain constant, we must have  $\sqrt{\gamma m}$  decrease. But then it follows that for  $p$  to stay fixed,  $\gamma$  must decrease more than proportionately to the increase in  $m$  so that  $u'(m) < -u(m)/m$ . Substituting  $u(m)$  for  $\gamma$  in the expression for  $\text{Var}[1/\sigma_i^2]$  in (43), differentiating with respect to  $m$ , and using this result about  $u'(m)$ , yields the desired result: as  $m$  increases, the variance of the individual jurors' abilities decreases.

<sup>11</sup>The upper bound,  $m=1$ , is imposed only by our desire to have the probability computed in (46) be a  $t$  distribution. If  $1/\sigma_i^2$  is distributed as a gamma distribution with parameters  $v$  and  $\xi$ , then the same logic as was used to derive (46) shows that the probability that a juror decides incorrectly is just  $\Pr[y < \delta]$ , where  $y$  is a standardized normal variate divided by the square root of an independent gamma distribution and  $\delta$  is a function of  $v$  and  $\xi$ . This is, in principle, easy to calculate. It is not, as is the  $t$  distribution, extensively tabulated.



Now  $\bar{X}_w$  is distributed as:

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{X}_w &\sim N(0, 1/\alpha) && \text{if guilty,} \\ \bar{X}_w &\sim N(-1, 1/\alpha) && \text{if innocent,}\end{aligned}\quad (50)$$

where  $\alpha = \sum_i (1/\sigma_i^2)$ . For fixed  $(\sigma_1^2, \sigma_2^2, \dots, \sigma_n^2)$ , the probability that the jury errs is:

$$\Phi[-\frac{1}{2}\sqrt{\alpha}]. \quad (51)$$

Since  $\alpha = \sum_i (1/\sigma_i^2)$ , the assumptions about the distribution of  $\sigma_i^2$  imply  $\alpha \sim \Gamma[nm/2, (2\gamma)^{-1}]$ . If we let  $\alpha = \gamma L$ , then  $L \sim \chi_{nm}^2$ . We can then calculate the optimally deliberating jury's error probability by integrating over  $\alpha$ . Letting  $y(\alpha)$  denote the density of  $\alpha$  and using  $S$  as the standard normal variate, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{error probability} &= \int \{\Phi[-\frac{1}{2}\sqrt{\alpha}]\} y(\alpha) d\alpha = \Pr[S < -\frac{1}{2}\sqrt{\gamma L}] \\ &= \Pr[S/(\sqrt{L}/\sqrt{\gamma nm}) < -\frac{1}{2}\sqrt{\gamma nm}] \\ &= \Pr[t_{nm} < -\frac{1}{2}\sqrt{\gamma nm}],\end{aligned}\quad (52)$$

where  $t_{nm}$  is distributed as a  $t$  distribution with  $nm$  degrees of freedom.

How should we expect the error probability of the optimally deliberating jury to change with  $m$ ? Intuitively, one would think that the more variable the abilities of the jurors, the lower the probability of error. The optimal deliberation process pays the most attention to those individuals with high abilities (small  $\sigma_i^2$ ), and it discounts the views of those with low abilities (large  $\sigma_i^2$ ). The optimal jury will always do at least as well as the most able juror and usually considerably better. Thus, as the variance in ability increases, the jury would be more likely to get a very high ability juror and that would yield a low probability of error.

Although we do not have an analytic proof that this intuition is correct, we do have some numerical results that support the following conjecture for the jury whose members' observations were modelled in this section. If the probability of a single juror being in error is held constant, then the greater the variance in ability (the smaller is  $m$ ), the lower is the probability that the optimally deliberating jury will err. The numerical results appear in table 4, which presents the probability of error for optimally deliberating juries with different variances in ability and the probability of error for the first-ballot jury. As we noted above, differences in ability do not affect the first-ballot jury's performance. But, as table 4 does show, differences in ability do affect the probability of error of the optimally deliberating jury. A jury basing its

Table 4  
Probabilities of error when there are differences in ability.

$n =$	1	5	9	11	15	25	35
$m = 1$	0.400	0.250	0.178	0.152	0.114	0.058	0.031
$m = 2$	0.400	0.267	0.199	0.174	0.136	0.078	0.046
$m = 4$	0.400	0.276	0.211	0.187	0.149	0.089	0.056
$m = 10$	0.400	0.282	0.219	0.195	0.158	0.097	0.062
$m = \infty$	0.400	0.286	0.224	0.200	0.163	0.103	0.067
First ballot	0.400	0.317	0.267	0.247	0.213	0.154	0.114

$m = 1$ , high variance;  $m = \infty$ , no variance.

decision on a first-ballot majority vote will be at a greater disadvantage compared with one that uses information optimally the greater is the variance in abilities of the jurors.

## 7. Concluding remarks

In this paper we have focused attention on the processing of information by juries, an aspect of the jury system that is central to almost all policy discussions but that has been neglected in the development of models that are intended to inform such discussions. We have analyzed, in particular, the opportunity that jury deliberation offers for making decisions that are better than those produced by majority votes taken before any discussion among the jurors. Deliberation is important precisely because it enables differences in what jurors have seen, in the strengths of jurors' views, in their decision standards, and in their abilities all to be taken into account in reaching a verdict. These are factors that a first-ballot, majority-rule decision cannot weigh and that previous models of the jury decision process have not encompassed.

Do the benefits of jury deliberation outweigh its costs? To answer this question, one must consider the various elements we have discussed — both the implication of other jury decision models, like Gelfand and Solomon's, that deliberation creates noise, and the implications of our analysis about how deliberation enables a better approach to more complex problems. But one must also weigh a host of factors that we have not addressed: for example, the costs of jury deliberation and the process values served by having juries deliberate. And, finally, one must bear in mind that we have provided only an *upper bound* on the benefits of jury deliberation since we have compared the first-ballot outcome with that produced by *first-best* jury deliberation.

## References

- Anderson, T.W., 1958, *An introduction to multivariate statistical analysis* (John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York).
- Chernoff, Herman and Lincoln E. Moses, 1959, *Elementary decision theory* (John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York).
- Davis, James H., 1973, Group decision and social interaction: A theory of social decision schemes, *Psychological Review* 80, 97-125.
- Davis, James H., Robert M. Bray and Robert W. Holt, 1977, The empirical study of social decision processes in juries, in: June L. Tapp and Felice J. Levine, eds., *Law, justice, and the individual in society: Psychological and legal perspectives* (Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., New York) 326-361.
- Gelfand, Alan E. and Herbert Solomon, 1973, A study of Poisson's models for jury verdicts in criminal and civil trials, *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 68, 271-278.
- Gelfand, Alan E. and Herbert Solomon, 1974, Modeling jury verdicts in the American legal system, *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 69, 32-37.
- Gelfand, Alan E. and Herbert Solomon, 1975, Analyzing the decision-making process of the American jury, *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 70, 305-310.
- Gelfand, Alan E. and Herbert Solomon, 1977a, An argument in favor of 12-member juries, in: Stuart S. Nagel, ed., *Modelling the criminal justice system*, vol. 7 of *Justice systems analysis* (Sage Publications, Beverly Hills) 205-223.
- Gelfand, Alan E. and Herbert Solomon, 1977b, Considerations in building jury behavior models and in comparing jury schemes: An argument in favor of twelve-member juries, *Jurimetrics Journal* 17, 292-313.
- Grofman, Bernard, 1979, The case for majority verdicts, *TRIAL Magazine*, 23 December.
- Grofman, Bernard, 1980, The slippery slope: Jury size and jury verdict requirements — legal and social science approaches, *Law and Policy Quarterly* 2, 285-304.
- Kalven, Harry, Jr. and Hans Zeisel, 1966, *The American jury* (Little, Brown, and Co., Boston).
- Kendall, Maurice G. and Alan Stuart, 1958, *The advanced theory of statistics*, vol. 1 (Charles Griffin and Company, Ltd., London).
- Klevorick, Alvin K. and Michael Rothschild, 1979, A model of the jury decision process, *Journal of Legal Studies* 8, 141-164.
- Klevorick, Alvin K., Michael Rothschild and Christopher Winship, 1982, *Information processing and jury decisionmaking*, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 635.
- Milgrom, Paul R. and Robert J. Weber, 1982, A theory of auctions and competitive bidding, *Econometrica* 50, 1089-1122.
- Mood, Alexander M. and Franklin A. Graybill, 1963, *Introduction to the theory of statistics*, 2nd edn. (McGraw-Hill and Company, New York).
- Penrod, Steven and Reid Hastie, 1979, Models of jury decision making: A critical review, *Psychological Bulletin* 86, 462-492.

## THE EFFECTS OF GRANTS-IN-AID ON STATE AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES

### The case of AFDC

Robert A. MOFFITT\*

*University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706, USA*

Received November 1982, revised version received May 1983

This paper develops econometric methods to estimate the effect of the piecewise-linear budget constraints created by grant formulas in which the subsidy rate is not constant over expenditures (e.g. closed-end grants). The methods are applied to the AFDC program. The results show that, because of the kinked nature of the grant formula, (1) the present federal formula actually increases cross-state inequality in AFDC benefits, (2) several subsidy rates in the formula actually reduce benefits, and (3) the so-called 'flypaper' effect disappears.

### 1. Introduction

As economists who have studied the public sector are well aware, actual government programs often differ significantly from those outlined in undergraduate and graduate texts. This is especially true in the area of grants-in-aid, for grant programs as actually legislated and implemented administratively are frequently far different from the simple models of those programs with which economists generally work. The two most common models of the effect of grants-in-aid on state and local expenditures are those which depict either an open-end matching grant, under which expenditures by the receiving government are subsidized by the granting government at a constant rate, or a block grant, under which the receiving government is given a subsidy fixed in amount and independent of its own expenditures. These two models are simple to analyze because they alter the budget constraint of the receiving government in a simple fashion, by a change in slope in the first case and by a parallel outward shift in the second case, but they are far less common in practice than programs which alter the budget constraint in more complex ways. Closed-end grants, which outnumber all

\*The author would like to thank Howard Chernick, Ed Olsen, Tom Pogue, Daniel Rubinfeld, the participants of workshops at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and Milwaukee, and two anonymous referees for comments. The paper was also delivered at the NBER Conference on Incentive Effects of Government Spending, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 5-6 November, 1982. Research support from the University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty and the US Department of Health and Human Services is gratefully appreciated.