

# SECURING OUR CHILDREN'S FUTURE

*New Approaches to Juvenile Justice  
and Youth Violence*

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*Editor*

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## 7

JENNY BERRIEN  
CHRISTOPHER WINSHIP

*An Umbrella of Legitimacy:  
Boston's Police Department—  
Ten Point Coalition  
Collaboration*

AFTER A DECADE OF sharply increased homicide rates, a host of large cities in the United States have seen a dramatic drop in the number of homicides during the 1990s.<sup>1</sup> For example, Boston's homicide rate dropped from 26.5 per 100,000 to 6.6 per 100,000, a decline of 75.1 percent; New York's dropped from 30.7 to 8.7, a decline of 71.7 percent; Houston's rate dropped from 34.8 to 12.0, a decline of 65.5 percent; and Los Angeles's dropped from 28.2 to 14.8, a decline of 47.5 percent. Some cities, however, saw only minimal declines. For example, Phoenix's homicide rate fell from 13.0 to 11.7, a decline of 10.0 percent; and Baltimore's fell from 41.4 to 40.3, a drop of only 2.7 percent. (See table 7-1.) In most, if not all, of those cities, the reduction has been accompanied by an even sharper decline in youth violence. Why has youth violence fallen so significantly?

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Table 7-1. *Homicide Rates for Major U.S. Cities, 1990 and 2000*

	1990			2000		
	Homicides	Population	Homicides per 100,000	Homicides	Population	Homicides per 100,000
Boston	152	574,283	26.5	38	570,888	6.6
New York	2,245	7,322,564	30.7	673	7,746,511	8.7
Houston	568	1,630,553	34.8	230	1,920,350	12.0
Los Angeles	983	3,485,398	28.2	550	3,713,238	14.8
Washington, D.C.	472	606,900	77.8	239	572,959	41.7
Philadelphia	503	1,585,577	31.7	319	1,451,520	21.9
Phoenix	128	983,403	13.0	152	1,300,786	11.7
Baltimore	305	736,014	41.4	261	647,955	40.3
						Percent reduction
						75.1
						71.7
						65.5
						47.5
						46.4
						31.0
						10.0
						2.7

Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Crime in the United States 1990, 2000*.

Part of the decline in youth violence may be the result of the robust economy that the United States experienced during the 1990s, as well as the result of a drop nationwide in the number of youths aged fifteen to twenty-four, the most crime-prone age group. But those factors affect almost all cities and therefore cannot explain the discrepancy across cities. In addition, similar declines in homicide rates did not occur in the mid- and late 1980s, also a time when the U.S. economy was strong. Furthermore, the drop in the number of youths aged fifteen to twenty-four—7.7 percent from 1986 to 1996—is simply too small to account for much of the change.<sup>2</sup>

The story in Boston is similar to that of other cities, but it is unusual in two important respects. First, the drop in homicides has been marked by a strikingly low level of juvenile homicide victims and offenders. For the twenty-nine-month period ending in January 1998, Boston had no teenage homicide victims. There were sixteen juvenile homicides in 1993 but just one juvenile homicide during 1996, one in 1997, six in 1998, two in 1999, and two in 2000. The drop in the number of juvenile homicide offenders has also been dramatic, declining from seventeen in 1990 to zero in 1999 and one in 2000.<sup>3</sup>

Second, Boston is unusual in that a group of ministers, the Ten Point Coalition, is credited with playing a key role in reducing youth homicides

there.<sup>4</sup> As far as we are aware, ministers have not been singled out as playing an important role in any other city where there has been a similarly sharp decline in homicides. It is noteworthy that the core of the Ten Point Coalition consists of only three ministers, Reverends Eugene Rivers, Raymond Hammond, and Jeffrey Brown, each of whom has had substantial additional commitments. Reverends Hammond and Brown head churches with hundreds of members, and all three ministers, who are also involved in other programs not related to youth violence, have frequent local and national speaking engagements.

This chapter addresses the question of whether the Ten Point Coalition has in fact played a significant role in reducing youth violence in Boston. On the face of it, the answer would appear to be no. Crime rates have dropped dramatically in other cities without significant involvement of the clergy. In addition, only three ministers have been centrally involved and even they have not been able to devote themselves full-time to reducing youth violence. It would seem that the churches' activities have been too limited to have played a substantial part in bringing about the observed changes. Finally, David Kennedy and Ronald Corbett have documented in this volume and elsewhere how, in a broad-based move toward community policing, new Boston police and probation department policies and practices—and the new cooperative relationship between the two departments—have led to more effective procedures for dealing with youth violence.<sup>5</sup> Similar efforts have been undertaken in other cities as well. The assertion by many people that the Ten Point Coalition has been a significant facet of the effort would seem at best to be good politics and public relations.<sup>6</sup>

Our analysis has several goals. Most important, we want to establish that despite the above observations, the Ten Point Coalition *has* played a critical role in reducing youth violence in Boston. Second, we analyze why it has been difficult for police departments to effectively reduce violence. Certainly, racial antagonism is a problem that must be considered when assessing violence-reduction tactics in many cities. We argue more generally that any police action in the inner city is inherently problematic. The decision of whether to imprison a youth who is in serious trouble is a terrible choice for anyone to make: either the community is left vulnerable to potentially violent acts or the community loses another child. The lack of any intermediary institution in the inner city to ensure that such decisions are made in a fair and just way is an enormous problem. As a result, it has

been nearly impossible in many places to reach consensus on what constitutes legitimate and constructive police activity.

A further goal is to suggest types of policies that are likely to be effective in reducing youth violence in the inner city *over the long run*. Although many cities have successfully reduced youth violence, in some and perhaps in many cases they have done so through aggressive tactics that involve frisking and intimidating minority males on the streets. We predict that inner-city residents will find the resulting sacrifice of civil liberties simply too great to accept such tactics over the long term.

Our argument has multiple parts. Our key assertion is that a principal barrier to reducing youth violence in the inner city over the long run is the hostile and highly confrontational relationship that exists in many cities between the police (and other agents of the judicial system) and the inner-city community. That relationship has made it nearly impossible to devise legitimate and effective long-term solutions to youth violence.

The second component of our argument is that many cities (including Boston in the past) pursue an approach that is likely to succeed in the short run but not over the long term. Many inner-city residents have become so frustrated by the high levels of violence that they have had to live with that they are now willing to accept quite aggressive police tactics. Such tactics may produce immediate results, but eventually there is likely to be a community backlash, as there was in an earlier period in Boston.

A third component of our argument is that the key contribution of the Ten Point Coalition and the efforts of other church-based groups lies perhaps not so much in their work with at-risk youth as in how they have changed the ways in which the police (and other elements of the criminal justice system) and Boston's inner-city community relate to each other.<sup>7</sup> The coalition has done so by becoming an intermediary between the two parties. It has achieved a balance between the community's desire for safe streets and its reluctance to see its children put in jail, and in so doing it has created what we call an umbrella of legitimacy for police efforts to prevent and control crime. The coalition has served to legitimize police activities, first through a process of informal oversight and second by its willingness to go to the press when it believes that police actions have exceeded the limits of tolerance. To avoid painting an overly rosy picture, we acknowledge that the relationship in Boston between the police and the community, especially its youth, is far from completely harmonious. Much of the transformation that has taken place has involved special units of the police

department that are especially sensitive to community needs and sentiments. The typical beat cop, for the most part, has not been part of this reformation. In many cases street-level patrol officers are continuing to pursue the aggressive stop-and-frisk policies of the past. Only time will tell whether their behavior will change or whether it will instead undermine the legitimacy of the partnership that has been built between the police and the Ten Point Coalition.<sup>8</sup>

Later in the chapter we consider how we might test our argument. Boston's earlier history serves as a control case, and the success or failure of other cities in maintaining low levels of youth violence over the long run will provide future tests. We discuss an important case that occurred in Boston, the McLaughlin murder, the details of which we were unaware of until we first presented our theory. This case reinforces our interpretation of the Boston story.

### The Boston Story

Although Boston has never been considered a violence-plagued city to the extent that Los Angeles or New York has, in 1990 a record-breaking 152 homicides stunned Boston into realizing that it had a serious violence problem.<sup>9</sup> The roots of the problem took hold in the late 1980s, when crack cocaine was introduced in Boston's inner city, relatively late in comparison with other major U.S. cities. As the crack market developed, so did turf-based gangs. When they realized how much money they could acquire through crack sales, the gangs became increasingly protective of their turf. Gang colors and geographically based gang names, such as the "Corbett Street Posse," all showed evidence of gang identification and loyalty.

Rival gangs turned to firearms to protect and defend their turf and gang identity. One gang's show of disrespect or aggression toward another would inevitably be followed by retaliatory attacks. Gang ties and turf battles grew to such an extent that often individuals who formerly avoided gangs and the drug trade began to pursue membership for protection and camaraderie. With firearms as the primary means of aggression, the level of violence grew to a rate and severity never before seen in the Boston area.

Because Boston law enforcement agencies had little experience with turf-based violence and criminal gang activity, their initial response to the situation in the late 1980s and early 1990s was disorganized. Until 1990, police department policy directed officers and administrators to publicly deny the existence of a gang problem. Many current Boston police officers

vouched for the fact that the department had no policy for dealing with the problem of violence in certain Boston neighborhoods in the late 1980s. Rather than creating a plan of attack to address the specific characteristics of gang-related violence, the police fell back on aggressive tactics. In addition, because homicide traditionally has been handled on a case-by-case basis, the police department focused primarily on making the "big hit" and arresting the "big player," rather than addressing the significance of the group-based nature of gang violence.

In 1988, the City Wide Anti-Crime Unit (CWACU), which traditionally provided intense, targeted support across district boundaries, was permanently assigned to the most violent neighborhoods in Boston's inner city. In 1989, the police department adopted a policy stating that any individual involved in a gang would be prosecuted to the full extent of the law, thereby finally acknowledging the existence of a gang problem. According to one current police captain, the CWACU was expected to "go in, kick butts, and crack heads"; the unit adopted the mentality that "they could do anything to these kids" in order to put an end to violent activity. That attitude resulted in highly aggressive and reportedly indiscriminate policing tactics.

### *Community Backlash*

Two events in 1989, the murder of Carol Stuart and the stop-and-frisk scandal, focused community attention on the police department's initial approach to the violence crisis. Carol Stuart, a pregnant white woman, was murdered in the primarily African American neighborhood of Mission Hill. Her husband, Charles Stuart, who was with her at the time of her death, reported that a black male committed the crime. Relying on Stuart's account, the Boston police department "blanketed" the neighborhood looking for suspects. There were widespread reports of police abuse as well as coerced statements that implicated a suspect, William Bennet. Stuart himself was later alleged to be the perpetrator of the crime, but he committed suicide before an investigation could be completed. The Boston police department's unquestioning acceptance of Stuart's story about a black assailant and its subsequent mishandling of the murder investigation created extreme distrust of the department within Boston's African American community.

Community suspicion was further intensified and solidified when, in a public statement, a precinct commander labeled the then-current police approach to gang-related violence as a stop-and-frisk campaign.<sup>10</sup> There is

some disagreement within the police department about the extent to which police policy was to indiscriminately stop and frisk all black males within high-crime areas, a practice known as "tipping kids upside down." According to several officers, they targeted individuals who either were previously spotted performing some illegal activity or were known gang members. However, officers also acknowledged that because it often was difficult to "distinguish the good guys from the bad guys," the approach was critically flawed. In addition, current members of the police force agree that there were "bad cops" who acted far too aggressively and indiscriminately. Accusations of stop-and-frisk tactics led to a court case in the fall of 1989 in which a judge threw out evidence acquired in what he considered an instance of unconstitutional search and seizure.<sup>11</sup>

As a result of the Stuart case and the stop-and-frisk scandal, the CWACU was disbanded in 1990. However, the department began to see significant rewards from its aggressive street practices: Boston's homicides fell from 113 in 1991 to seventy-three in 1992, and the drop reinforced belief in the efficacy of the department's heavy-handed tactics.<sup>12</sup> The police continued to view their actions as simple compliance with department orders. Despite that success, however, most officers acknowledged that the department's aggressive actions during that time brought community mistrust to an extreme level.

These two scandals, combined with smaller-scale, less visible incidents, eventually led the Boston press to question the police department's capacity to handle even basic policing activities effectively. In 1991, the *Boston Globe* published a harshly critical seven-part series called "Bungling the Basics," which detailed a succession of foul-ups by the department during the previous few years and reported serious failings in the department's internal affairs division.<sup>13</sup> Misguided investigations, problematic policing, and bad press eventually led to the appointment of the St. Clair Commission to conduct a thorough review of the Boston police department and its policies.

After all the negative publicity, the Boston police department was in desperate need of an overhaul. Steps were taken to demonstrate a real change in law enforcement policy in Boston. "Bad cops" were weeded out. The disbanded CWACU was reorganized into a new unit, the anti-gang violence unit (AGVU), which took a "softer" approach. The effective but aggressive and indiscriminate street tactics of the past were sharply curtailed. Apparently as a result, the decrease in homicides during 1991 and 1992 were followed by a sharp increase in 1993.<sup>14</sup>

### *Innovation in Police Practices*

The St. Clair Commission report, released in January 1992 after a year-long investigation, cited major corruption within the department and recommended sweeping changes.<sup>15</sup> In 1993, Mayor Flynn resigned and Bill Bratton—who had previously been brought from New York City, where he was chief of the transit police, to be Boston's number-two cop—replaced police commissioner Mickey Roache. Bratton instilled a new philosophy and commitment to innovation to the Boston police department. Fundamental shifts occurred in overall operations. According to current police officers, the neighborhood policing tactics that formerly "just existed on paper" and had never been implemented under Roache were actively pursued under Bratton. Many officers also agreed that the new administration was simply more open-minded and willing to break away from embedded policing practices.

Street-level officers had learned from their constant exposure to the complexities of gang-related violence that innovative law enforcement strategies were needed to address the problem intelligently. The newly organized anti-gang violence unit looked for new ways to manage gang activities. First, realizing the need for community support, they were determined to follow "squeaky-clean" policing practices. Previous strategies had also failed to include collaboration with other agencies, so the AGVU began to pursue an increasingly multiagency approach to combating youth violence. In 1993, the AGVU was changed to the Youth Violence Strike Force, retaining the same key members.<sup>16</sup>

Other Boston law enforcement agencies were concurrently revamping their activities. Certain individuals within the probation department in particular had become quite disillusioned with the "paper-shuffling" nature of their job. Fearful of the extreme level of violence in certain Boston districts, probation officers had completely abandoned the practice of making home visits and maintaining a street presence. Consequently, there was no enforcement of probation terms such as curfew and area and activity restrictions. Without enforcement, probation became viewed as a slap on the wrist within the law enforcement community, and it was essentially ineffectual in combating youth violence.

A few probation officers began to respond to the crisis of ineffectiveness and took strong, proactive measures to readjust their approach. Informal conversations between probation officers and police officers who regularly attended hearings at Dorchester district court led to Operation Night

Light, an experimental effort in interagency collaboration that involved joint outings of probation and police officers. With police protection, probation officers were able to venture out after dark to enforce the conditions placed on probationers. Realizing that their P.O. might be out on the streets, at their house, or at their hangouts after curfew to check on them, youths began to understand that they could no longer blatantly disregard the terms of their probation. Violations would have repercussions, such as a lengthened probation sentence, stricter terms, or jail time. Operation Night Light eventually became an institutionalized practice of Boston law enforcement agencies, and it has been heavily praised by policy experts and the media across the country.<sup>17</sup>

Interagency collaboration to address the issue of youth violence has become standard practice in Boston. The participation of researchers (primarily David Kennedy and his associates at the John F. Kennedy School of Government) also served a vital role in bringing about a fundamental overhaul of Boston's policing strategies. The Boston Gun Project, which began in 1995, was a three-year effort to address youth violence that brought together a wide range of agencies, including the police department; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; the probation department; the Boston school police; the Suffolk County district attorney; and many others. The Boston Gun Project was innovative, not only because it involved collaboration but also because it used research-based information to address the problem of youth violence from a new angle. The Gun Project was able to attack the problem on the supply side by cracking down on dealers in illicit firearms and on the demand side by targeting 1,300 individuals who, although they represented less than 1 percent of their age group citywide, were identified by project research as responsible for at least 60 percent of the city's homicides.<sup>18</sup>

This type of interagency collaboration helped in implementing a variety of innovative strategies. In 1994, Operation Scrap Iron was initiated to target people who were illegally transporting firearms into Boston, and gun trafficking within certain areas of the city was shut down. "Area warrant sweeps," in which police would arrest all individuals with outstanding warrants within a particular housing project or neighborhood, also were used. Multiagency teams of youth workers then came in to provide follow-up services when the police presence subsided. As one police officer noted, these strategies made sure that "everyone was involved and brought something to the table. Everyone had a piece of the pie and, therefore, would get the benefits."<sup>19</sup> Even more impressive is that, according to the same police officer, not one civilian complaint was filed in response to the sweep tactic.

In May of 1996, this collaboration culminated in Operation Cease-Fire, which fully institutionalized interagency collaboration among Boston's crime-fighting agencies—the police and probation departments, the department of youth services, street workers, special agents from the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and others already mentioned in reference to the Boston Gun Project. Key community members, primarily from faith-based organizations, also became involved in the project. These groups worked together to identify gangs responsible for violence in specific hot spots around the city. They then developed and enforced a "zero tolerance" policy toward violence within a targeted area. The contribution of the ministers' involvement in Operation Cease-Fire needs to be evaluated in future research.

### *Community-Based Change*

Individuals within Boston's religious community were some of the most vocal and publicized critics of the police department's aggressive tactics during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Reverend Eugene Rivers, in particular, became a controversial media figure during those years because of his harsh criticism of both local law enforcement agencies and the city's black leaders. Remarkably, the same religious leaders later became active participants in law enforcement strategies such as Operation Cease-Fire. That turnaround suggests that the Boston police department has been effective in improving community relations; additionally, Boston's faith-based leaders experienced a shift in their own attitudes toward the police.

Boston's African American faith-based organizations did not begin working together as a group until 1992; until then, they had been following separate agendas, and their activities generally did not involve much street-oriented action to address youth violence within their community. Although Reverend Rivers was on the street, reaching out to gang members and other youth, his constant criticism of other clergy leaders made his effort a partnerless endeavor.

A tragic event in May 1992 finally spurred Boston's African American clergy to collaborative action.<sup>20</sup> Violence broke out among gang members attending the funeral at Morning Star Baptist Church of a youth murdered in a drive-by shooting, and the resulting shootout and multiple stabbing threw the congregation into chaos. The brazenness of the attack, which took place within the church sanctuary, inspired many of Boston's black clergy to take action. They realized that they could no longer hope to serve their community by remaining within the four walls of their church and ignoring the situation on the street. Instead, they needed to extend their

concept of congregation to include youth and others in the surrounding troubled neighborhoods.

That incident led to the founding of the Ten Point Coalition, which represented a major step toward active collaboration within Boston's African American religious community. The coalition—which included some forty churches, with Reverends Ray Hammond, Eugene Rivers, and Jeffrey Brown as key leaders<sup>21</sup>—drew up and published the “Ten-Point Proposal for Citywide Mobilization to Combat the Material and Spiritual Sources of Black-on-Black Violence,” a call to churches to participate in the effort to address the crisis of violence in their communities.<sup>22</sup> Jeffrey Brown defined the Ten Point Coalition as “an ecumenical group of Christian clergy and lay leaders working to mobilize the Christian community around issues affecting black and Latino youth—especially those at risk for violence, drug abuse, and other destructive behavior.”<sup>23</sup>

About forty churches in the Boston area are members of the coalition, including Eugene Rivers's Azusa Christian Community, Jeffrey Brown's Union Baptist Church, and Ray Hammond's Bethel AME Church. The coalition itself employs a staff of ten. It also has a board; Ray Hammond is chairman and members of each of the aforementioned churches participate. Efforts to import the Boston Ten Point Coalition model are being pursued in several areas around the country, including Indianapolis, Philadelphia, Louisville, and Providence.

Although the formation of the Boston Ten Point Coalition represented a dramatic shift in local faith-based collaboration, relations between African American community leaders and Boston's law enforcement agencies still were strained and often antagonistic. Reverend Rivers was constantly “in the face” of Boston law enforcement officials and was viewed as a “cop basher” in police circles. He was a constant presence on the troubled streets of Dorchester and maintained contact with the same kids that the anti-gang violence unit kept an eye on. As an aggressive advocate for local youth, both in and out of the courts, Rivers had many confrontations with the AGVU and other patrol officers.

A combination of events and the strong effort made by key law enforcement officials to show that the Boston police department had changed its attitude eventually resulted in a turnaround. The antagonism subsided, replaced with effective collaboration.<sup>24</sup> The turnaround resulted in part from an incident in 1991 in which shots were fired into Reverend Rivers's home in Four Corners, one of the most violent areas of Dorchester, making him painfully aware of the dangers of carrying out a solitary campaign

against youth violence. He acknowledged that seeing the lives of his wife and children placed in jeopardy caused a shift in his attitude, and he became more open to the possibility of allying with both other ministers and individuals in the law enforcement community.

When the Ten Point Coalition was formed in 1992, the public stature and media influence of Reverend Rivers and other key clergy members such as Ray Hammond and Jeffrey Brown increased, and they wielded their power effectively in an effort to maintain a check on police practices in Boston. In 1992, the coalition partnered with another community-based organization, the Police Practices Coalition, to establish an organized, community-based police monitoring group.

The Ten Point Coalition, especially Reverend Rivers, had habitually criticized the Boston police department. Increasingly positive interactions with individual officers, however, began to convince the group that the department could change its behavior. In 1993 the ministers acknowledged the department's progress through Youth Community Awards to publicly honor “good cops.” Such positive steps eventually led to collaborative efforts like the previously mentioned Operation Cease-Fire. Cooperation among law enforcement agencies and clergy leaders, as well as various community-based groups, has continued to evolve and expand during recent years.

### *Current Relations*

Since the mid-1990s there has been extensive interagency and community-based collaboration in Boston. A primary example is the Bloods and Crips Initiative, which was established in spring 1998 as an aggressive street-level mobilization of lay and pastoral workers to prevent youth involvement in the Bloods, the Crips, or any other gang.<sup>25</sup> By combining the efforts of a wide range of agency representatives, the initiative aims to approach the problem comprehensively. The Boston police and probation departments, the department of youth services, clergy members, city youth and street workers, transit authority police, the department of schools, and the school police meet weekly to share information on important developments on the street. For example, several disturbing incidents of sexual assault and harassment have occurred recently on the city's public transportation system. Transit police and city youth workers as well as clergy brought up the importance of addressing such incidents at the weekly Bloods and Crips Initiative meetings, and a task force on sexual harassment and assault was established. School presentations on the subject are planned in the future.

Another objective of the collaboration is to exhibit a strong, supportive, and unified image of authority to the targeted youth through the participation of multiple agencies and faith-based groups in all of the initiative's activities: school visits and presentations, home visits to youth suspected of gang involvement, regular street patrols, and visits to popular hang-outs during peak hours. The collaborative approach serves to notify youth of alternative options and brings them into contact with a network of resources designed to meet their specific needs.

More informal cooperation among the wide array of agencies and community groups participating in operations such as the Bloods and Crips Initiative plays an important role in achieving quick responses to tense situations and effective distribution of resources to hot spots in the city. In fall 1998, for example, a particular youth repeatedly engaged in dangerous behavior in Dorchester—holding a gun to another youth's head; firing shots in the air in the midst of young trick-or-treaters on Halloween night, shooting holes in parked cars—all within a period of a couple of weeks. Each incident had the potential to aggravate preexisting tensions among various neighborhood "crews" and to destroy any sense of community security. To avoid that risk, Reverend Rivers used his law enforcement connections to ensure the quick and effective handling of the situation.

In this case, "handling" the situation meant getting the individual off the street, for a long time.<sup>26</sup> At the weekly Bloods and Crips Initiative meeting, Reverend Rivers identified the youth and made law enforcement officials aware of his threat to peace in the neighborhood. Rivers and a youth worker also spoke with the youth personally to explain to him why he was being targeted. The youth was arrested and the "noise" he was causing in the community abated. Clergy leaders and law enforcement officials have thus achieved an uncommon level of collaborative action in Boston.

### The Judicial System and the Inner City

Why have police departments and judicial systems been unable to deal with past or current youth violence in so many cities? Observers have pointed out that inner-city communities in America's major cities often consider themselves to be at war with the local police and local government, and they frequently compare the police to an occupying military force. The reasons for that perception are well known. While the Rodney King beating in Los Angeles is the most publicized incident of the last decade, almost every major city has its own stories of police brutality. In Boston, the most recent case occurred in January 1995. Michael Cox, a

black undercover policeman, was brutally beaten by four uniformed policemen who mistook him for a suspect. In the previous year, police mistakenly broke into the home of Accelynne Williams, a retired black minister, during a drug bust. Williams died of a heart attack as a result of the forced entry. We have already discussed the Stuart case and the stop-and-frisk scandal, additional instances of allegations of racially biased and overly aggressive policing tactics.

As disturbing as such incidents are, the response of inner-city residents has at times been nearly as troubling. Although in most cities inner-city residents are disproportionately the victims of crime (crimes often committed by their fellow residents), they have become increasingly unwilling to cooperate with police or support police activities. In *Race, Crime, and the Law*, Randall Kennedy describes the growing alienation of black inner-city residents from the criminal justice system. Kennedy points to the lynchings of blacks in the South as a source of the problem, quoting from Gunnar Myrdal's 1944 book, *An American Dilemma*:

The Negroes are hurt in their trust that the law is impartial, that the court and the police are their protection, and indeed, that they belong to an orderly society which has set up this machinery for common security and welfare. They will not feel confidence in, and loyalty toward a legal order which is entirely out of their control and which they see to be inequitable and merely part of the system of caste oppression. Solidarity then develops easily in the Negro group, a solidarity against the law and the police. The arrested Negro often acquires the prestige of a victim, a martyr, or a hero, even when he is simply a criminal.

Kennedy then goes on to show the same dynamic at work today:

It largely explains why many blacks rallied around the gang of boys who raped a white jogger in New York's Central Park, around Marion Barry, the mayor of Washington, D.C., who was caught red-handed smoking cocaine, around Alcee Hastings, the federal district court judge who, based on allegations of corruption, was ousted from office by the U.S. Senate (only to be subsequently elected to the House of Representatives), around Damian Williams and the other hooligans who gained notoriety when they were filmed beating a hapless white truck driver (Reginald Denny) in the early hours of the Los Angeles riot of 1992, and around Mike Tyson, the boxing champion, when he was imprisoned for rape.

And the examples go on. Kennedy describes how the black criminal has been glorified in the movies and through gangster rap and records such as "Cop Killer." His point is that excesses of the criminal justice system, both past and present, have led inner-city minorities to see the system as totally lacking legitimacy and, at the extreme, to treat criminals as political dissidents and martyrs.<sup>27</sup>

In recent years the alienation of the inner-city community has led to a phenomenon known as jury nullification—decisions by minority juries to acquit defendants who are clearly guilty. The Marion Barry and Damian Williams cases noted above are examples. Kennedy discusses and critiques the arguments for jury nullification by Paul Butler, professor of law at George Washington University and a former federal prosecutor. Butler argues that jury nullification is justified for three reasons: there are cases when the acquittal of a guilty defendant is laudable; America has so grossly failed to keep its promises to blacks that there is no reason that blacks are obliged to uphold the law; white racism is the cause of most black criminality. Butler further argues that "the decision as to what kind of conduct by African-Americans ought to be punished is better made by African-Americans themselves based on the costs and benefits to their community than by the traditional criminal justice process."<sup>28</sup>

If Randall Kennedy's portrayal of minority attitudes toward police and the judicial system is even moderately accurate, as we believe it is, it should not be surprising that police have found it difficult to deal with youth violence in our inner cities. When police expect no cooperation from residents, they tend to choose aggressive broad-based tactics that only further alienate community residents. Moreover, the negative publicity they receive undermines their political support. By alienating inner-city residents, the police also lose their best potential source of community surveillance.

Randall Kennedy contends that although considerable improvements are needed in our justice system, much progress has been made. Certainly, the tense and often dangerous conditions that the police have to work in make it difficult for them to handle potentially explosive situations in a sensitive manner. We would like to suggest an additional reason. Inner-city residents have conflicting goals. On the one hand, they, like all Americans, want safe neighborhoods. On the other hand, they do not like seeing young men from their communities put in jail. As Glenn Loury has noted, "the young black men wreaking havoc in the ghetto are still 'our youngsters' in the eyes of many of the decent poor and working-class black people who are often their victims."<sup>29</sup> Given those conflicting desires, making

decisions about whether a particular youth should be arrested or jailed is difficult. Allow him to remain in the community and perhaps endanger other neighborhood residents? Or send him to jail, depriving him of his freedom and removing yet another young man from the community? Neither option is appealing. Parents, neighbors, and other residents are likely to disagree sharply, and a decisionmaking process that would be widely perceived as fair may be unattainable.

Most inner cities simply do not have institutions that are capable of dealing with these questions in a way that would be perceived as just by both residents and society at large. The police, in addition to their history of racism, are biased in favor of safe streets by any means necessary. Social workers, street workers, and community organizers typically are sympathetic to the kids. Residents themselves are likely to differ depending on who is in trouble and their relationship to them.

We argue that in Boston, the ministers of the Ten Point Coalition have become an intermediary institution through which decisions can be made that are perceived as fair. Through their involvement with at-risk youth, the ministers have gained the legitimacy needed to convince residents that they will demand justice. They will publicly attack indiscriminate or abusive police tactics; however, they will shelter the police from broad public criticism while the police are engaged in activities that the ministers deem to be in the interest of the community and its youth, giving the police what we call an umbrella of legitimacy to work under.

### An Umbrella of Legitimacy

The relationship between the Boston police and the Ten Point Coalition has progressed from hostility to stable cooperation. (Berrien provides a detailed exposition.)<sup>30</sup> The thesis of this chapter is that the cooperative relationship established between the Boston police and the coalition has been instrumental in reducing the level of youth violence, in two significant ways. First and more important, Ten Point has given increased legitimacy to appropriate police activities within the inner city. Second, the coalition's community surveillance may have increased police effectiveness.

If one were looking for legitimacy through a relationship, there could perhaps be no better way than through a partnership with a group of ministers. Throughout society ministers have unique moral standing. They are expected to be fair and to protect the interests of the less fortunate; because of that, they often are asked to be problem solvers and to adjudicate

between conflicting parties. In the inner city, the churches are among the last formal institutions committed to the welfare of their neighborhoods, and within the black community, ministers often have been looked to for leadership. In the case of the Ten Point Coalition, two of the three core ministers live in Boston's inner city and all three are well known for their extensive work with inner-city youth, factors that give the coalition considerable credibility in speaking for Boston's inner-city community. That is not to say that Ten Point is universally seen as the legitimate representative of the black community in Boston. There have been many conflicts between Ten Point, particularly Reverend Rivers, and other representatives of the black community. Nevertheless, the *Boston Globe* has printed numerous stories praising the coalition, which also has received considerable symbolic and financial support from Cardinal Law, head of the archdiocese of Boston, and the Jewish Community Relations Council, the agency principally concerned with social justice issues within Boston's Jewish Federation. All of this has contributed significantly to Ten Point's perceived legitimacy within Greater Boston.

The new relationship between the police and Ten Point is built on a number of assumptions, each of which can support legitimate police activity. We discuss six: youth violence needs to be dealt with as a criminal problem; some kids need to be jailed for both their own good and the good of the community; a small number of youth constitute most of the problem; the ministers will work with the police in identifying problem youth; the ministers will participate in the decisions about what happens to specific individuals; and if the police use indiscriminate and abusive methods in dealing with youths, the ministers will take the story to the media.

The first assumption is that although poverty, single-parent households, poor schools, and other conditions may be factors in youth violence, any effort to reduce violence in the short run must treat it as a criminal problem. In the presentations that ministers routinely give in schools, they make it clear to the kids that they have two choices. If they go straight, the ministers will help them succeed in school, find jobs, and deal with those kids who are trying to pressure them to stay with the gang. However, if they decide to participate in gang activities, the ministers will do their utmost to see them put in jail. The ministers emphasize that the last thing they want to do is to preside over a kid's funeral—that if a kid is going to be involved in a gang, it is safer for him to be in jail than on the street.

Implicit in the "choice" that the ministers offer is a second assumption—that some kids are so out of control that they should be put in jail.

It is not apparent that the ministers held that belief initially, and the police doubted the ministers' willingness to support the incarceration of some individuals. Interview after interview with both police and ministers indicates that cooperation became possible only after the ministers publicly acknowledged (Reverend Rivers most vocally) that some kids needed to be put in jail. There was no explicit agreement about what constituted a sufficiently "out of control" kid. Cooperation between law enforcement officers and the ministers emerged through negotiations over the particular circumstances under which certain kids should be committed. With improved communication and the acknowledgment of a common objective, both parties began working with the same definition of the problem. The primary issue that remained was agreeing on what should be done in particular circumstances.

A third assumption is that only a small number of youths are responsible for most of the violence. As noted above, David Kennedy places the estimate at 1 percent of their age group—1,300 youths.<sup>31</sup> That is why standard stop-and-frisk procedures can be so oppressive: for every hundred kids stopped, only one is truly part of the problem. It takes only a few kids shooting off guns to terrorize a whole neighborhood. A part of the agreement is that the ministers work with the police to identify those kids who truly are problems, thereby informally providing remote surveillance for the police.<sup>32</sup> The information they provide makes police efforts more effective; targeting also increases police legitimacy by ensuring that the police focus on the right youth, employing appropriate measures.

The fourth assumption is that the ministers will work with the police in identifying problem youth. This is not a matter of ascertaining who are the most dangerous individuals. These are generally known to the police, ministers, and the community at large. Rather, it is a process of ongoing assessment as to which youths have the potential to get into serious trouble in the future. This work is done in both formal meetings and informal conversations, as each party attempts to understand and evaluate the youth they are working with. Through these conversations the police and ministers come to a shared understanding of the youth that then forms a basis for deciding on when and for whom interventions will occur.

A fifth assumption is that the ministers will participate in determining how particular individuals are treated by the legal system. In some circumstances that means that the ministers contact the police and ask to have certain kids arrested; the ministers may also help the police locate them. An example was related above in which Reverend Rivers contributed to the

arrest of the young man responsible for repeated incidents of violence during Halloween 1998. In some cases, the ministers encourage judges to sentence troubled youths to alternative programs or regular "check-ins" at their churches, rather than time in jail; in others, the ministers appear in court to argue for a stiff sentence.

These understandings between police and the ministers are what has created what we term an umbrella of legitimacy for police activity. However, it is an umbrella that provides coverage only under specific conditions: when police focus on truly problematic youth; when they deal with these youth in what is perceived as a fair and just way; and when that is done in cooperation with the community through the ministers.

Activities that fall outside these boundaries will be publicly criticized in the media, which is the sixth assumption. The ministers' past criticism of the police in the *Globe* is well remembered. Furthermore, Reverend Rivers, the most outspoken of the ministers, is known for his willingness to criticize anyone, whether it is the police, the Urban League, or Harvard's Department of Afro-American Studies. The ministers are able to provide informal oversight of police actions in part because they are ministers, in part because they are community members and leaders, and in part because they exhibited a willingness in the past to be highly critical of the police.

How are we to understand the Ten Point Coalition's role within the inner city? In the discussion above, Myrdal and Butler argued that blacks need to have more control over the judicial process. The Ten Point Coalition has gone some if not all the way toward accomplishing that goal. Operating on the basis of these six assumptions, the coalition has created an umbrella of legitimacy for appropriate police activity. Activities carried out and decisions made under this umbrella are broadly seen by the community as being fair and just; those falling outside are brought to the attention of the media. Some youth have been sent to prison; others have been given second chances; and the vast majority are no longer being harassed on the street, or at least not as much as in the past. Because of the Ten Point Coalition's involvement, the differential treatment of individual youth is more likely to be seen by the community as legitimate. Hard decisions are being made, but they are being made in a manner that is typically viewed as fair and just.<sup>33</sup>

### Testing the Argument

We have claimed that the Ten Point Coalition played a critical role in reducing youth violence by helping to change the relationship between the

police and community from one of hostility to cooperation and thereby allowing the police to operate more effectively and with perceived legitimacy. How can our argument be tested?

Three observations are useful. First, the earlier history of Boston serves as a control case for the Ten Point story. The police, reacting to the influx of crack cocaine and guns, pursued a broad, aggressive stop-and-frisk policy that initially was successful. However, a community backlash occurred, and the police had to pull back substantially from those tactics. Without community support, they were not sustainable over the long run. Second, our theory makes important predictions about what will happen in other cities where police are pursuing heavy-handed policies to reduce youth violence. We have argued that this approach will work in the long run only if there is continued community support. We suspect that in many cities, as in Boston during the early 1990s, support will be short-lived. Most communities are unlikely to tolerate over the long term a police presence in their neighborhood that resembles an occupying military force.<sup>34</sup> Third, we found a practical test of our argument in a particular homicide case in Boston that illustrates how the relationship between police and the Ten Point Coalition allowed a potentially explosive situation to be handled without incident.

In May 1998, at a two-day meeting in Philadelphia to explore whether the lessons learned in Boston would be useful in Philadelphia, we made our first public presentation of our analysis of the Ten Point story. At the end of our presentation, Paul Joyce, one of the key police officers in Boston's Youth Violence Strike Force, spoke up. He said that he fully agreed with our analysis and wanted to tell us about a particular murder case that supported it.

On September 25, 1995, a white assistant attorney general, Paul McLaughlin, was shot and killed on his way home from work. The murder occurred at the commuter rail station in West Roxbury, a predominantly Irish middle-class neighborhood. McLaughlin was a well-respected prosecutor, dedicated to fighting crime, who had recently headed a task force on gang activities. The murder appeared to be a "hit" in retaliation for his gang work. His assailant was described as a "black male, about 14 or 15 years old, 5 foot 7, wearing a hooded sweat shirt and baggy jeans."<sup>35</sup>

Because the description could easily apply to many young black males, there was immediate concern. Reportedly, the police released the description "under intense pressure from the news media," but many feared that the public posting of such a vague description would only reinforce racial and "generational stereotypes" rather than aid the police investigation.<sup>36</sup>

Young black men feared being mistaken for the assailant due to their skin color, youth, and manner of dress.

Many also feared that the authority of Boston law enforcement officials could be severely damaged if the case was not handled firmly and effectively. The suspicion that McLaughlin was targeted because he prosecuted gang members left others in related professions feeling vulnerable. Calvin Wier, a criminal lawyer who lives on Dudley Street, said that he had held his head high as he walked past gang members in his neighborhood, assuming that his job sheltered him from attack. "I thought if I get killed in Roxbury, it'll be by accident. Now here's the possibility of a kid targeting someone because of his position."<sup>37</sup>

Due to the sensitive circumstances of the crime, Boston's African American leaders felt that they had to take immediate action. The day after it occurred, the executive committee of the Ten Point Coalition publicly condemned the murder of the assistant attorney general at a press conference, expressing concern for the McLaughlin family and strongly emphasizing the need to bring the city together to avoid the threat of polarization: "We ask the city as a whole to step back and not allow their conscious or unconscious fears to drive what happens," Reverend Hammond said. "This is a time for the city of Boston to come together and to make it clear that we will not be held hostage by either perpetrators of violence or by those who would exploit the fear of violence to promote more racial division."<sup>38</sup> Reverend Eugene Rivers considered the press conference critical to preventing what he termed an "open season on black youth," which he believes did occur after the Carol Stuart murder.<sup>39</sup> Ten Point Coalition ministers also forcefully advocated an aggressive, but fair, investigation of the murder: "Thus we wholeheartedly support all legal efforts to apprehend the perpetrators of this brutal crime."<sup>40</sup>

The strong stance immediately taken by leaders in the African American religious community accomplished several objectives. First, it emphasized that even a community with historically antagonistic feelings toward law enforcement officials would not tolerate retaliatory attacks against them and made it clear that the history of police abuse of African Americans in no way justified such a murder. The clergy sent the message to Boston's African American community as well as the primarily white law enforcement community that African American youth could not interpret the murder as some kind of justifiable defense of their neighborhood. At the same time, by pledging their support for a fair police effort, the clergy publicly clarified that police aggression or harassment was neither necessary or

acceptable. The press conference thereby removed cause or justification for aggression on both sides.

Another major accomplishment of the immediate response from the Ten Point Coalition was to prevent damage by the media. Many newspaper articles compared the McLaughlin murder with the Stuart case, and the media were poised to report another botched investigation. However, according to one police officer who witnessed both investigations first hand, media influence was much less in the McLaughlin case. The ministers' press conference made it possible for the gang unit to investigate the murder without their actions "being misconstrued as being other than what they were; we were not followed by TV cameras, as in the Charles Stuart murder."<sup>41</sup> By taking a stand supporting police action, the black clergy made the media less prone to exaggerate or aggravate the tense situation.

The ministers' stance also demonstrated that a group that had been highly critical of the Boston police department in the past now believed that the department had made significant improvements. According to one police source, by the time of the McLaughlin murder, the "clergy viewed them [the police] as a much different police force" and were confident that the department would carry out a "professional investigation."<sup>42</sup> The clergy were adamant that the press conference was not just a political maneuver designed to avoid racial conflict or keep inner-city neighborhoods safe from the threat of police aggression. They felt that there had been a fundamental change in police practices that enabled them to "back the case," according to law enforcement officials and ministers involved.

The investigative approach taken by Boston's law enforcement officials during this tense period was markedly different from their approach to the Stuart murder. Both clergy and police were very sensitive to the racial implications of the case. Police commissioner Paul F. Evans immediately made a statement to address community fears about a repeat of the chaos that surrounded the Stuart investigation: "I'm concerned about the potential for this limited description [of the assailant] to become divisive. We're not going to let that happen. This will be a professional investigation."<sup>43</sup> The commissioner spoke on a radio program with a largely black audience soon after the murder to emphasize the limited value of the vague description of the assailant and to say that an effective investigation depended on cooperation between the police and the community. The commissioner also joined the ministers at the Ten Point Coalition's press conference in an additional illustration of police cooperation with, rather than antagonism toward, the African American community.<sup>44</sup>

Those actions might have been interpreted as a political move to avoid public anger and disorder if street-level police officers had not demonstrated equally sensitive investigative tactics. Ten Point ministers serve as community advocates, often accompanying youthful offenders to court appearances, so the ministers' statement that "they have heard of no 'indiscriminate conduct' by police accosting black youths" during the McLaughlin investigation carried a lot of weight. The way that both the police and community leaders handled the McLaughlin case illustrates the dramatic shift that had occurred in the relationship between the two groups since the late 1980s and early 1990s. In May 1998, a special grand jury indicted Jeffrey "Black" Bly for the murder of Paul R. McLaughlin. Bly was a notorious "gang banger" whom McLaughlin had tried three times, and sources who know Bly claim that he was convinced that McLaughlin was on a "vendetta against him."<sup>45</sup> Bly made repeated attempts to intimidate the attorney at the courthouse, and his conviction that McLaughlin was after him most likely served as his rationale for executing the prosecutor. In 1999, Jeffrey Bly was convicted by a jury for the murder of Paul McLaughlin.<sup>46</sup>

## Conclusion

In this chapter we have argued that over the long run it is difficult if not impossible for police activity in the inner city to be successful unless it is viewed as legitimate and supported by local residents. Our argument goes further. Vigorous law enforcement initiatives and preventive tactics all have important roles in preventing and reducing youth violence.<sup>47</sup> We have argued also that police work dealing with youth violence is inherently problematic. Communities want safe streets, but they also want their kids to stay out of jail. Difficult choices need to be made that are likely to be seen as unjust by some residents. In this environment, it is difficult to establish legitimacy for police actions, no matter what those actions are.

We claim that in Boston the Ten Point Coalition has evolved into an institution that has at least partially ameliorated this dilemma. By supporting police activity that it believes to be beneficial to the community and criticizing activities that are not, it has created what we have called an umbrella of legitimacy for the police to work under. That in turn has allowed the police to effectively deal with youth violence by pursuing a strategy that targets the truly dangerous youth. We contend that this situation, which is far different from that in most major cities, has contributed significantly to the spectacular drop in homicide rates observed in Boston.

If our analysis is correct, it suggests that police need to create a strong community of partners who engage in a cooperative effort to deal with youth violence; there also must be a delineation of what constitutes legitimate police behavior. Police strategies can acquire true legitimacy within the inner city only if the community partner supports police tactics when they are appropriate as well as publicly criticizes activities that are not. In this role, churches and ministers are ideal partners.

The goal of our research was to establish the plausibility of the claim that the Ten Point Coalition had made a critical contribution to the dramatic reduction in homicides exhibited in Boston during the 1990s. We have argued that the coalition's primary contribution to Boston's success most likely has not been due to its street ministry, that is, its attempt to turn kids around through one-on-one counseling, but to its role in both controlling and legitimizing police activity.

While we believe that our research has established the plausibility of the Ten Point Coalition's importance, interesting questions remain. More research is needed to uncover what facets of the ministers' work have been most important. Furthermore, we do not know exactly how the three core ministers have come to obtain the power and standing they enjoy in the Boston community. If their charisma has been the critical factor, it may be difficult to replicate the Ten Point program in other cities. More generally, there is the question of why homicide rates and rate declines have varied among cities. Until we have a good understanding of what initiatives and factors have been important overall in reducing homicide rates in Boston and elsewhere, it will be impossible to determine precisely the full extent of the coalition's contribution in Boston.

As the Ten Point Coalition reaches its first decade, it does so against the backdrop of a rise in the number of homicides and juvenile homicides in Boston in 2001—to sixty-four and four, respectively—although the numbers are still below the 1992 levels.<sup>48</sup> The coalition remains a vigorous presence in Boston. As Reverend Ray Hammond and Reverend Wesley Roberts have observed, "in the past year alone member churches and staff of the Boston Ten Point Coalition have made more than 200 visits to the homes of high-risk youths, made presentations to more than 3,000 young people in the Boston public schools . . . worked with more than 500 high-risk youths in Department of Youth Services facilities, walked the streets (especially after several homicides), participated in crisis response teams at the funerals of several victims, and begun the mentoring and reintegration of some 20 recently released ex-offenders."<sup>49</sup> On behalf of a maturing coalition looking to the future, Reverend Rivers has warned of the need for a

retooled grassroots effort with greater police involvement.<sup>50</sup> The coalition has also cautioned that the present decade poses different challenges from those of the 1990s and that there will be a need for new initiatives that target an older, ex-offender population as well as continuing interventions for high-risk youths.

The possibility that Boston has found an effective strategy for reducing youth violence without severely and broadly compromising the civil liberties of its inner-city residents is exciting. But only the future can tell whether our interpretation of the Boston story is correct. Proof or disproof of our assertions will emerge as Boston's partnership-based strategy is put to the test across the nation and produces or fails to produce substantial long-term reductions in youth homicide rates.<sup>51</sup>

## Notes

1. Philip J. Cook and John H. Laub, "The Unprecedented Epidemic in Youth Violence," in Michael Tonry and Mark H. Moore, eds., *Youth Violence* (University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 27-64.

2. Many cities where there have been declines have implemented community policing programs, which typically try to be proactive rather than reactive in dealing with crime. Future research is needed to determine how important the programs might be in explaining differences across cities in the drop in homicide rates. See Alfred Blumstein and Joel Wallman, eds., *The Crime Drop in America* (Cambridge University Press, 2000).

3. See Ronald P. Corbett Jr., chapter 6 in this volume.

4. Charles Radin, "Reaching Up Against Crime: Partnerships, Awareness, Behind Boston's Success," *Boston Globe*, February 19, 1997, p. A1.

5. David Kennedy, chapter 8, and Corbett, chapter 6, in this volume. See also David Kennedy, "Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and a Theory of Prevention," *Valparaiso University Law Review*, vol. 31, no. 2 (Spring 1997), p. 449; David Kennedy, Anne M. Piehl, and Anthony A. Braga, "Kids, Guns, and Public Policy," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, vol. 59, no. 1 (Winter 1996), p. 147; and David Kennedy, "The (Un)known Universe: Mapping Gangs and Gang Violence in Boston," working paper (Cambridge, Mass.: Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1996).

6. The most significant publicity that the Ten Point Coalition has received was in *Newsweek*. In the June 1998 issue the coalition's work is the feature story and Reverend Eugene Rivers's picture is on the front cover. The Coalition also has been the focus of a PBS documentary and articles in *Time* (July 21, 1997), *Sojourners Magazine*, *Impact Magazine*, the *Weekly Standard*, and several national newspapers such as the *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, the *New York Times*, and, frequently, the *Boston Globe*.

7. Other Boston ministers, such as Reverends Bruce Wall and Michael Haynes, fellow members of the Boston Ten Point Coalition, also have engaged in intensive street ministry during the past decade. However, as we discuss later, Reverends Rivers, Hammond,

and Brown have been the key actors in establishing a partnership with the police and publicly establishing the legitimacy of their activities. As in other cities, there are many other groups in Boston involved in working with at-risk youth. Prominent examples are the Dorchester Youth Collaborative and the Boston Violence Prevention Program. Although these programs have almost certainly contributed to the dramatic reductions in crime we have seen in Boston, we believe that their direct impact on the overall homicide rate through one-on-one counseling of street youth, like that of the three Ten Point ministers, has been modest.

8. Interview with public defender.

9. The information in this section is primarily derived from interviews conducted by the authors during the fall of 1997 with members of the Boston police department, Boston probation department, employees of the city's street worker program, and David Kennedy. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's *Uniform Crime Reports* state that 143 homicides were committed in Boston in 1990; however, current Boston police statistics and current police officers report 152 homicides for that record-breaking year.

10. Interview with public defender.

11. "Events Leading to St. Clair Report," *Boston Globe*, January 15, 1992, p. 23.

12. Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Reports*, 1991-1992.

13. "Events Leading to St. Clair Report," p. 23.

14. The question of timing and causality here is complex. The most aggressive period of stop-and-frisk tactics ended in 1990, yet the homicide rate continued to fall in 1991 and 1992. If one believes that the causal connection is contemporaneous, then this is evidence of lack of a causal effect. However, if the causal effect of police enforcement is lagged, then this is evidence for a causal effect.

15. James D. St. Clair, *Report of the Boston Police Department Review Committee* (Boston: January 14, 1992).

16. David Kennedy, conversation, October 1997.

17. A more extensive discussion of Operation Night Light is provided by Corbett in chapter 6 of this volume.

18. Kennedy, "Pulling Levers," p. 449.

19. Jenny Berrien, "The Boston Miracle: The Emergence of New Institutional Structures in the Absence of Rational Planning," senior thesis, Department of Sociology, Harvard University, March 20, 1998.

20. Robert A. Jordan and *Globe* staff, "Clergy's Anger Can Bring Hope," *Boston Globe*, May 16, 1992, p. 13.

21. These pastors serve different types of congregations and have very personal styles. Reverend Rivers is the pastor of the Azusa Christian Community, which has a congregation of around forty members who live mostly within the Four Corners neighborhood of Dorchester. He is sometimes accused of running a store-front church because of the surprisingly small congregation. Rivers also tends to be the most politically outspoken and controversial of the three ministers. Reverend Hammond oversees the Bethel AME church in Dorchester, a much more populous church that attracts people from a variety of neighborhoods. Hammond is described as less controversial than Rivers but equally strong in his convictions and drive for social change. Jeffrey Brown is the pastor at the Union Baptist Church in Cambridge. Brown's congregation has several hundred congregants, but like Rivers, he remains very active in street-based outreach.

22. Jordan, "Clergy's Anger Can Bring Hope," p. 13. The Ten-Point Plan to Mobilize the Churches states: "1) To establish 4-5 church cluster-collaborations which sponsor 'Adopt-a-Gang' programs to organize and evangelize youth in gangs. Inner-city churches would serve as drop-in centers providing sanctuary for troubled youth. 2) To commission missionaries to serve as advocates and ombudsmen for black and Latino juveniles in the courts. Such missionaries would work closely with probation officers, law enforcement officials, and youth street workers to assist at-risk youth and their families. They would also convene summit meetings between school superintendents, principals of public middle and high schools, and black and Latino pastors to develop partnerships that will focus on the youth most at-risk. We propose to do pastoral work with the most violent and troubled young people and their families. In our judgement this is a rational alternative to ill-conceived proposals to substitute incarceration for education. 3) To commission youth evangelists to do street-level one-on-one evangelism with youth involved in drug trafficking. These evangelists would also work to prepare these youth for participation in the economic life of the nation. Such work might include preparation for college, the development of legal revenue-generating enterprises, and acquisition of trade skills and union membership. 4) To establish accountable, community-based economic development projects that go beyond 'market and state' visions of revenue generation. Such economic development initiatives will include community land trusts, micro-enterprise projects, worker cooperatives, and democratically run community development corporations. 5) To establish links between suburban and down-town churches and front-line ministries to provide spiritual, human resource, and material support. 6) To initiate and support neighborhood crime-watch programs within local church neighborhoods. If, for example, 200 churches covered the four corners surrounding their sites, 800 blocks would be safer. 7) To establish working relationships between local churches and community-based health centers to provide pastoral counseling for families during times of crisis. We also propose the initiation of drug abuse prevention programs and abstinence-oriented educational programs focusing on the prevention of AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases. 8) To convene a working summit meeting for Christian black and Latino men and women in order to discuss the development of Christian brotherhoods and sisterhoods that would provide rational alternatives to violent gang life. Such groups would also be charged with fostering responsibility to family and protecting houses of worship. 9) To establish rape crisis drop-in centers and services for battered women in churches. Counseling programs must be established for abusive men, particularly teenagers and young adults. 10) To develop an aggressive black and Latino curriculum, with an additional focus on the struggles of women and poor people. Such a curriculum could be taught in churches as a means of helping our youth understand that God of history has been and remains active in the lives of all people."

23. Prepared statement of Reverend Jeffrey L. Brown, "Bringing Worlds Together," serial no. J-105-6, before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, *Examining Efforts by Private Individuals, Community Organizations, and Religious Groups to Prevent Juvenile Crime*, 105th Cong., 1st sess., March 19, 1997.

24. Berrien, "The Boston Miracle."

25. The narrative information for this section is primarily derived from observation of weekly Bloods and Crips Initiative meetings that take place at the Ella J. Baker House (which also houses the Azusa Christian Community). A wide range of clergy and agency

partners attend these weekly meetings, including key members of the Boston police department (homicide, school police, Youth Violence Strike Force), Boston probation department (juvenile and adult probation), department of youth services, neighborhood health centers, the street worker program, and representatives from various churches in the Ten Point Coalition. The purpose of the meetings is to share information and encourage a collaborative approach to preventing and controlling gang violence in the city.

26. Information concerning this Halloween incident is based on a conversation that took place during the Bloods and Crips Initiative Wednesday meeting in November of 1998.

27. Randall Kennedy, *Race, Crime, and the Law* (Pantheon, 1997), pp. 24-25.

28. Paul Butler, "Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System," *Yale Law Journal*, vol. 105 (1995), pp. 724-25, n. 236, as cited in Kennedy, *Race, Crime, and the Law*.

29. Kennedy, *Race, Crime, and the Law*, p. 19.

30. Berrien, "The Boston Miracle."

31. David Kennedy, conversation, October 1997.

32. Some have been concerned that the ministers' role in identifying troublesome youth may allot them too much power, which is a legitimate fear. However, the Ten Point Coalition's own standing in Boston is quite fragile; it has its enemies and vocal critics. As a result, it would be difficult for the ministers to abuse their power without consequences. Moreover, the remote surveillance function, while important in terms of utilizing the coalition's presence in the community and providing a channel of communication to law enforcement, is also limited. The coalition does not have prior review power over the routine arrest and enforcement activities of the Boston Police Department.

33. An important piece of research that has not been carried out is to interview a broad section of community residents to see whether the activities and decisions that are made collaboratively by the police and the coalition are seen as just and fair. At this point, our claim is based only on the fact that there has not been any public outcry over these activities in the *Boston Globe* or the *Boston Herald* or in the local African American newspaper, the *Bay State Banner*.

34. For a discussion of recent community-police conflicts over heavy-handed policing and racism in New York City, see Andrea McArdle and Tanya Eren, *Zero Tolerance: Quality of Life and the New Police Brutality in New York City* (New York University Press, 2001).

35. Richard Chacon, "Profile of Gunman Fits Many, Youths Say," *Boston Globe*, September 27, 1995, p. 33.

36. Ibid.

37. Geeta Anand, "Stunned Community Copes with Outraged Fears," *Boston Globe*, September 27, 1995, p. 29.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Ten Point Coalition, "Black Leaders Speak Out on Slaying," *Boston Herald*, September 30, 1995, p. 12.

41. This information is from an interview by the author with a Boston police officer who was on the force during the Carol Stuart and the McLaughlin murder investigations.

42. Ibid.

43. Chacon, "Profiling of Gunman Fits Many, Youths Say."
44. Geeta Anand and Michael Grunwald, "Authorities Are Praised; Some Blacks Wary," *Boston Globe*, September 30, 1995, p. 80.
45. Sean Flynn, "Public Enemy," *Boston Magazine*, May 1998.
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