

Appendix A: Supplementary Results

Figure A-1: Placebo Test Using Rivers



Notes: The red line shows the 1698 boundary of Dai Viet's administrative expansion and the thick blue lines show rivers that form part of this boundary. Thin blue lines show all rivers.

Figure A-2: Correlation Plots



Notes: Each point is an outcome averaged within a bin. The regression line is fit on the raw data.

Table A-1: Randomization Inference

Variable	p value	Variable	p value
Household Consumption	0.000	Health Workers Visit Regularly	0.000
Years Schooling (> 25)	0.000	Health Station in Village	0.013
Telegraph Density 1878	0.005	Maternity Clinic in Village	0.770
Telegraph Density 1901	0.026	Education LCA	0.068
Rail/Road Density 1878	0.441	Primary School Access	0.012
Motor Road Density 1910	0.043	Primary School Completion	0.028
Rail Density 1910	0.023	Secondary School in Village	0.180
Paved Road 1926	0.005	Secondary School Attendance	0.034
Rail Density 1926	0.246	Law Enforced Day/Night	0.000
Log Family Income	0.000	Police Regularly Present	0.000
Economic LCA	0.000	Government Provides Assistance	0.000
Non-Rice Food Available	0.000	Share Communes with Lower Secondary	0.009
Manufactured Goods Available	0.000	Government Responsive to Citizens	0.034
Surplus Goods Produced	0.002	Local Officials Successful	0.000
Households Require Assistance	0.006	Knows Village Administrative Structure	0.052
% Households Access Vehicle	0.000	LTT Fairly Administered	0.000
Land Unfarmed Due to Bad Security	0.878	National Govt. Performs Poorly	0.002
Population Growth	0.680	National Govt. Manages Economy Poorly	0.002
Civil Society LCA	0.000	Active in Interest Group	0.000
% Households Participate in Civic Orgs.	0.000	People Decide SDP	0.007
% Households Participate in Econ. Train.	0.000	Security LCA	0.876
% Households Active in PSDF	0.001	VC Forces Present	0.032
Self-Development Project Underway	0.000	VC Base Nearby	0.541
Council Convenes Meetings	0.704	Village Guerrilla Squad	0.292
Organized Youth Activities	0.457	VC Main Squad	0.092
% Households Attend Govt. Meetings	0.000	VC Infrastructure Activity	0.338
RD Cadre in Hamlet	0.704	VC Taxation	0.715
% Households Participate in RD Cadre	0.000	Friendly Forces Nearby	0.610
Civic Orgs. Provide Assistance	0.000	Air/Art. Strike Nearby	0.371
Contributes to Charity	0.000	U.S. Initiated Attack	0.513
Local Administration LCA	0.060	SVN Initiated Attack	0.000
Govt. Systematically Collects Taxes	0.230	Territorial Forces Present	0.473
Village Committee Filled	0.174	Agricultural Households	0.000
Village Chief Present	0.057	Agricultural Land Size	0.730
Hamlet Chief Present	0.115	Main Job in Industry	0.037
Chief Controls RD Cadre	0.017	Share Annual Land Certified	0.000
Lack Provincial Assistance	0.804	Share Perennial Land Certified	0.000
Technical Personnel Visit	0.955	Share Residential Land Certified	0.000
Provincial Land Affairs Visits	0.987	Household has Interest Expenses	0.000
Health Care LCA	0.000	Employed Informal Sector	0.000
Govt. Medical Services Available	0.000		

The p-values give the share of 1000 absolute placebo coefficients that are larger in magnitude than the absolute coefficient for the actual effect of being on the Dai Viet side of the boundary on the outcome under consideration.

Table A-2: Household Consumption: Placebo Boundaries

		Sample i	s:
	Pla	acebo Boun	daries
	River	Province	Expansion
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dai Viet	-0.090	0.092	-0.044
	(0.097)	(0.109)	(0.064)
Obs	1,603	1,534	$5,\!351$
Clusters	165	160	400

The unit of analysis is the household. All columns include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, household demographic controls, year fixed effects, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by village.

Table A-3: Human Capital: No HCM

	D	ependent	variable i	is:
		Years S	chooling	
		Col	nort	
	> 25	25 - 40	40-60	>60
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dai Viet	0.970	0.886	1.045	1.045
	(0.201)	(0.195)	(0.244)	(0.240)
Obs	33,001	$14,\!186$	$13,\!353$	$5,\!462$
Clusters	365	364	365	354
Mean	7.28	8.26	7.50	4.16

The unit of analysis is the individual. All outcomes measured between 2002-2012. All columns include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, boundary segment fixed effects, and survey year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

Table A-4: Economic Outcomes South Vietnamese Period: Controlling for Population

				De	Dependent var	riable is:			
	Log		Non-rice	Manuf.	Surplus	Households	HH %	Land	
	Family	Econ	Food	Goods	Goods	Require	Access	Unfarmed	Pop
	Income	Γ CA	Avail.	Avail.	$\mathbf{Produced}$	Assist.	Vehic.	Bad Sec.	Growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(2)	$(2) \qquad \qquad (9)$	(7)	(8)	(6)
Dai Viet	0.218	0.144	0.250	0.156	0.152	-0.058	0.129	0.018	-0.005
	(0.046)	(0.054)	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.050)	(0.039)	(0.019)	(0.047)	(0.006)
Obs	18,273	2,348	388	388	388	2,330	2,332	330	2,276
Clusters	220	399	388	388	388	397	396	330	396
Mean	9.93	0.83	0.71	0.63	0.44	0.61	0.34	0.26	0.01

ear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment The unit of analysis is the household (column 1), hamlet (columns 2, 6, 7 and 9), or village (columns 3-5 and 8). Outcomes measured between 1970-1972 (column 1) and 1969-1973 (columns 2-9). All regressions include a linfixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

Table A-5: Economic Outcomes South Vietnamese Period: No Ho Chi Minh City

				Ď	Dependent val	riable is:			
	Log		Non-rice		Surplus	Households	HH %	Land	
	Family	Econ	Food		Goods	Require	Access	Unfarmed	Pop
	Income	ΓCA	Avail.		Produced	Assist.	Vehic.	Bad Sec.	Growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(2)	(9)	(2)	(8)	(6)
Dai Viet	0.176	0.135	0.256		0.171	-0.132	0.118	0.009	-0.000
	(0.039)	(0.055)	(0.000)		(0.052)	(0.039)	(0.019)	(0.047)	(0.006)
Obs	8,491	1,568	327		327	1,551	1,553	324	1,532
Clusters	168	338	327		327	336	335	324	338
Mean	9.78	0.75	99.0		0.41	0.56	0.26	0.26	0.01

ear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment The unit of analysis is the household (column 1), hamlet (columns 2, 6, 7 and 9), or village (columns 3-5 and 8). Outcomes measured between 1970-1972 (column 1) and 1969-1973 (columns 2-9). All regressions include a linfixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

Table A-6: Civil Society: Controlling for Population

						Depen	\neg	is:				
	Civil	% Ho	% Households	HH %	Self-Dev.	Org.	Council	% HH	RD	% HH	_	Contrib.
	Society	Parti	Particpate in	Active	Project	Youth	Convenes	Attend	Cadre in	Part.		to Charity
	Γ CA	Civic Org	Econ. Train.	in $PSDF$	Underway	Activ.	Meetings	Govt. Mtgs.	Hamlet	RD Cadre		Fund
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(2)	(9)	(2)	(8)	(6)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Dai Viet	0.190	0.262	0.220	0.067	0.097	-0.053	-0.011	0.106	0.021	0.174		0.153
	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.036)		(0.037)
Obs	2,348	2,325	2,348	2,330	388	388	384	2,331	2,337	2,314		5,889
Clusters	399	397	399	397	388	388	384	397	397	396		450
Mean	0.79	0.37	0.22	0.62	0.83	0.78	0.93	0.37	0.76	0.52		0.65

(columns 1-11) or 2002-2012 (column 12). All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns 1-4 and 8-11), the village (columns 5-7) or the household (column 12). Outcomes measured between 1969-1973 boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

Table A-7: Civil Society: No Ho Chi Minh City

						•						
i	Civil	% Hc	% Households	НН %	Self-Dev.	Org.	Council	HH %	RD	НН %	Civ. Soc.	Contrib.
• 1	Society	Parti	Particpate in	Active	Project	Youth	Convenes	\mathbf{Attend}	Cadre in	Part.	Provides	to Charity
	Γ CA	Civic Org	Econ. Train.	in $PSDF$	Underway	Activ.	Meetings	Govt. Mtgs.	Hamlet	RD Cadre	Assist	Fund
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(2)	(9)	(7)	(8)	(6)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	0.153	0.224	0.198	0.037	0.090	-0.069	-0.006	0.075	-0.026	0.129	0.145	0.157
	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.037)
	1,568	1,546	1,568	1,551	327	327	323	1,552	1,558	1,535	1,467	4,689
	338	336	338	336	327	327	323	336	336	335	331	362
	0.72	0.26	0.19	0.58	0.82	0.74	0.93	0.30	0.69	0.43	0.18	0.62

(columns 1-11) or 2002-2012 (column 12). All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns 1-4 and 8-11), the village (columns 5-7) or the household (column 12). Outcomes measured between 1969-1973 boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

Table A-8: Local Administration: Controlling for Population

	Provincial Placebos	Tech. Prov. Land Pers. Affairs Visit. Visit.						
	Provin	Lack Prov. Tech. Assist.						
Dependent variable is:		Chief Controls RD Cadre	(9)	0.084	(0.020)	382	382	0.88
Depender		Vilg. Hamlet Chief Chief Present	(2)	0.024	(0.023)	2,317	396	0.92
		Vilg. Chief Pre	(4)	0.053	(0.033)	388	388	0.93
		Vilg. Comm. Filled	(3)	0.057	(0.028)	388	388	0.87
		Govt. Syst. Taxes	(2)	0.058	(0.036)	388	388	0.84
		Local Admin. LCA	(1)	0.027	(0.013)	2,348	399	0.98
				Dai Viet		Obs	Clusters	Mean

The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns 1 and 5) or the village (columns 2-4 and 6-9). All outcomes measured tance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village between 1969-1973. All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for dislevel, are reported in parentheses.

Table A-9: Local Administration: No Ho Chi Minh City

Provincial Placebos	Lack Tech. Prov. Land Prov. Tech. Pers. Affairs Assist. Visit Visit (7) (8) (9)	-0.020 (0.046)	327 327	0 K3
Dependent variable is:	Chief Li Controls Prov. RD Cadre As (6)			
Dependen	Vilg. Hamlet Chief Chief Present (4) (5)	0.021 (0.023)	$\overset{)}{1,538}$ 335	88 0
	Vilg. Chief Pre (4)	0.056 (0.033)	$\begin{bmatrix} 327 \\ 327 \end{bmatrix}$	000
	Vilg. Comm. Filled (3)	0.052 (0.028)	327 327	28.0
	Govt. Syst. Taxes (2)	0.075	, 327 327	о Д
	Local Admin. LCA (1)	0.026 (0.012)	$\stackrel{1,568}{1,338}$	0.07
		Dai Viet	Obs Clusters	Mean

The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns 1 and 5) or the village (columns 2-4 and 6-9). All outcomes measured tance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village between 1969-1973. All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for dislevel, are reported in parentheses.

Table A-10: Public Goods: Controlling for Population

	Share	Communes	Lower Sec.	(14)	0.292	(0.069)	124	124	0.78	
	Govt.	Provides	Assist.	(13)	0.143	(0.047)	2,221	390	0.30	
	Law	Enforced	Day/Night	(12)	0.201	(0.046)	2,333	397	0.79	
	Police	$\mathrm{Reg}.$	Present	(11)	0.131	(0.046)	2,339	397	0.56	
	y.		School		(10)					- 1
	Seco	Sc	In Vilg.	(6)	0.034	(0.053)	388	388	0.35	
Dependent variable is:	Primary	chool	Completion	(8)	0.076	(0.031)	388	388	0.61	
Dependent	Pri	Γ_{1}	Access.	(7)	0.048	(0.023)	2,336	396	0.90	
		Educ.	Γ CA	(9)	0.031	(0.041)	2,348	399	0.84	
	Mat.	nic	llage	(2)	-0.010	(0.066)	388	388	0.61	
	Health N Clinic		in Village	(4)	0.129	(0.050)	388	388	0.79	
	\mathbf{Health}	Wkrs. Visit	${ m Reg.}$	(3)	0.319	(0.042)	2,336	397	0.47	
	Govt.	Med. Serv.	Avail.	(2)	0.157	(0.033)	2,339	397	0.39	
	Health	Care	ΓCA	(1)	0.113	(0.039)	2,348	399	0.88	
				,	Dai Viet		Obs	Clusters	Mean	

The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns 1-3, 6-7 and 11-13), the village (columns 4-5 and 8-10) or the district (column 14). Outcomes measured between 1969-1973 (columns 1-13) or 1999-2004 (column 14). All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village (columns 1-13) or district (column 14) level, are reported in parentheses.

Table A-11: Public Goods: No Ho Chi Minh City

	Share	Communes	Lower Sec.	(14)	0.310	(0.076)	112	112	0.79
	Govt.	Provides	Assist.	(13)	0.123	(0.049)	1,482	333	0.30
	Law	$\operatorname{Enforced}$	Day/Night	(12)	0.175	(0.043)	1,554	336	0.69
	Police	${ m Reg.}$	Present	(11)	0.085	(0.039)	1,560	336	0.36
	Secondary	ool	Attend.	$(9) \qquad (10)$	0.021	(0.013)	327	327	0.17
	Secon	School	In Vilg.	(6)	0.053	(0.059)	327	327	0.28
Dependent variable is:	Primary	school	Completion	(8)	0.084	(0.031)	327	327	0.59
Depende	Pr	Š	Access.	(2)	0.070	(0.021)	1,557	335	0.90
Del		Educ.	Γ CA	(9)	0.015	(0.041)	1,568	338	0.78
	Mat.	nic	llage	(2)	0.006	(0.069)	327	327	0.56
	Health Mat.	Clinic	in Vi	$(4) \qquad (5)$	0.136	(0.050)	327	327	0.77
	Health	Wkrs. Visit	Reg.	(3)	0.313	(0.041)	1,557	336	0.40
	Govt.	Med. Serv.	Avail.	(2)	0.199	(0.038)	1,560	336	0.35
	Health	Care	Γ CA	(1)	0.099	(0.038)	1,568	338	0.83
					Dai Viet		Ops	Clusters	Mean

The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns 1-3, 6-7 and 11-13), the village (columns 4-5 and 8-10) or the district (column 14). Outcomes measured between 1969-1973 (columns 1-13) or 1999-2004 (column 14). All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village (columns 1-13) or district (column 14) level, are reported in parentheses.

Table A-12: Public Opinion: Controlling for Population

	agement	People	Decide	SDP	(8)	0.208	(0.055)	353	53	0.23
	Civic Eng	Active in	Interest	Group	(2)	0.338	(0.146)	243	35	0.18
	Vational Gov.	l. Gvt.	Man. Econ.	Poorly	$(2) \qquad (6)$	0.081	(0.040)	5,778	215	0.31
ariable is:	$Views \ of \ N$	Nat]	$\operatorname{Performs}$	Poorly	(2)	0.092	(0.038)	2,811	182	0.19
Dependent variable is:		LLI	Fairly	Administ.	(4)	0.317	(0.080)	666	101	0.57
	Views of Local Gov.						(0.056)	1,457	89	0.22
	Views of	Local	Officials	Successful	(2)	0.154	(0.074)	3,487	183	0.52
		Gvt.	Responsive	Citizens	(1)	0.113	(0.045)	2,779	190	0.37
		ı				Dai Viet		Obs	Clusters	Mean

ear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment The unit of analysis is the individual. All outcomes measured between 1970-1972. All regressions include a linfixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

Table A-13: Public Opinion: No Ho Chi Minh City

$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		in organization of or				
Gvt. Responsive Citizens (1) 0.110 (0.041)	iews of Local Gov.		Views of I	Views of National Gov.	Civic Eng	xgement
Responsive Citizens (1) 0.110 (0.041)	Knows Vilg	LTT	Nat	Natl. Gvt.	Active in	People
Citizens (1) (1) 0.110 (0.041)	Admin.	Fairly	$\operatorname{Performs}$	Man. Econ.	Interest	Decide
$ \begin{array}{c} (1) \\ 0.110 \\ (0.041) \\ (0) \end{array} $	Struct. Well	Administ.	Poorly	Poorly	Group	SDP
$ \begin{array}{ccc} 0.110 & 0 \\ (0.041) & (0 \\ \end{array} $	(3)	(4)	(2)	(9)	(7) (8)	(8)
0)	0.096	0.350	0.093	0.117	0.395	0.222
-	(0.046)	(0.075)	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.146)	(0.052)
	335	666	1,432	2,558	243	353
Clusters 141 132	43	101	131	160	35	53
Mean 0.32 0.45	0.16	0.57	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.23

ear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment The unit of analysis is the individual. All outcomes measured between 1970-1972. All regressions include a linfixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

Table A-14: The Vietnam War: Controlling for Population

Dependent variable is:	Vilg. VC VC Friendly Air/Art. U.S. SVN	Guerr. Main Infra VC Forces Strke Initiated	Squad Squad Activity Taxation Nearby Nearby Attack	(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)	0.073 -0.100 0.035 -0.012 -0.010 -0.037 -0.000 -0.095	(0.039) (0.040) (0.032) (0.016) (0.037) (0.032) (0.002) (0.023)	390 390 2,339 389 389 388 2,348 2,348	390 398 389 389 389 399	0.20 0.23 0.09 0.07 0.49 0.13 0.00 0.71
Depender	. VC	r. Main	d Squad ⊅	(2)	-0.100	(0.040)	390	390	0.23
		_	J 2	$(2) \qquad (3) \qquad (4)$	-0.009	(0.049)	390	390	0.49
	Λ	Security For	щ	$(1) \qquad (2)$			2,348		0.83

1969-1973 (columns 1-9), 1970-1973 (columns 10-11), or 1970-1974 (column 12). All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns 1-2, 6, and 10-12) or the village (columns 3-5 and 7-9). Outcomes measured between latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

Table A-15: The Vietnam War: No Ho Chi Minh City

						Dependent	nt variable is:	3:				
		ΛC	Λ C	Vilg.	ΛC	ΛC		Friendly	Air/Art.	U.S.	SVN	Territ.
	Security	Forces	Base	Guerr.	Main	Infra	$\Lambda_{\rm C}$	Forces	Strke	Initia	Initiated	Forces
	Γ CA	Present	Nearby	Squad	Squad	Activity	$\operatorname{Taxation}$	Nearby	Nearby	Att	ack	Present
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(8)	(6)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Dai Viet	-0.016	-0.024	0.009	0.074	-0.096	0.029	-0.011	-0.046	-0.039	-0.000	-0.065	0.032
	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.050)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.016)	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.001)	(0.018)	(0.023)
Obs	1,568	$1,\!556$	329	329	329	1,560	329	329	328	1,578	1,578	1,568
Clusters	338	337	329	329	329	337	329	329	328	339	339	338
Mean	0.76	0.21	0.57	0.24	0.27	0.11	0.08	0.47	0.15	0.00	0.78	0.35

1969-1973 (columns 1-9), 1970-1973 (columns 10-11), or 1970-1974 (column 12). All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns 1-2, 6, and 10-12) or the village (columns 3-5 and 7-9). Outcomes measured between latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

Table A-16: Land and Markets: No Ho Chi Minh City

				Deper	ndent variabl	e is:		
		Agric.	Main		Share		H.H.	Employed
	Agric.	Land	Job in	Annual	Perennial	Residential	Interest	Informal
	H.H.	Size	Industry		Land Certif	fied	Expenses	Sector
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Dai Viet	-0.184	-0.010	-0.020	-0.131	-0.149	-0.184	-0.113	-0.070
	(0.035)	(0.111)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.022)
Obs	13,205	4,471	16,518	462	449	445	3,590	16,504
Clusters	365	270	365	192	190	189	203	365

The unit of analysis is the household (columns 1, 2 and 7), individual (columns 3 and 8), or commune (columns 4-6). All outcomes measured between 2002-2012. All columns include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, year fixed effects, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

Appendix B: Data Appendix

Table B-1: Definitions and Codings (Table 6)

Column	Original question	Question responses	Coding
	·	Categorical HES economic questions	<u>-</u>
3	Is a variety of foodstuffs other than rice and nuoc nam (such as pork, vegetables, fresh fruit, fish, etc) for sale at the local market	0=no; 1=limited quantity; 2=ample quantity	0/1=0; 2=1
4	Are manufactured goods such as bicycle tires, kerosene, and aluminum pots for sale at the local markets	0=no; 1=limited quantity; 2=ample quantity	0/1=0; 2=1
5	Is there a surplus of goods or foodstuffs produced in this village for sale outside the village	0=no; 1=yes, small; 2=yes, large	0/1=0; 2=1
6	Are there households in this hamlet who require assistance from others to maintain themselves at a subsistence level (friends, relatives, government, etc)	0=none; 1=yes, a few; 2=10-40%; 3=41- 90%; 4=all or nearly all	0=0; 1/2/3/4=1
7	Do any households in this hamlet have access to motorized vehicles	0=none; 1=yes, a few; 2=10-40%; 3=>40%	midpoints of intervals, top interval coded at 0.5 (robust to alternative top codings)
8	Is there farm land which belongs to this village which is not presently cultivated	0=no; 1=yes, primarily because of bad security; 2=yes, primarily for reasons other than security	0/2=0; 1=1
	Other	r variables (not included in LCA)	
1	How much is the average monthly family income?	12 income bins	continuous variable coded at midpoints of ranges, top interval coded at 100,000
9	total hamlet population	Integer count	We compute quarterly hamlet population growth

Source for variable in column 1 is PAAS - National Archives Record Groups 330 and 472

Source for variables in columns 3-9 is Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) - National Archives Record Group 472

Table B-2: Definitions and Codings (Table 7)

Column	Original question	Question responses	Coding
	HES categorical of	civil society questions	
2	Do any households have a member(s) participating in non-VC civic or religious organizations (farmers associations, co-ops; boy scouts, etc)	0=none; 1=yes, a few; 2=10-40%; 3=41-90%; 4=all or nearly all	A continuous variable coded using the midpoints of the intervals
3	Did any hamlet households have member(s) participating in government sponsored economic improvement programs (ag, animal husbandry, fisheries, handicraft, etc) during the past quarter	0=none; 1=yes, a few; 2=10-40%; 3=41-90%; 4=all or nearly all	A continuous variable coded using the midpoints of the intervals
4	Do any households have a member(s) active in the PSDF	0=none; 1=<10%; 2=10%-40%; 3=41%-90%; 4=all or nearly all	A continuous variable coded using the midpoints of the intervals
5	Are self-development projects physically underway	0=no; 1=yes but none were selected at open public meetings; 2=yes, some were selected at open public meetings; 3=yes all were selected at open public meetings	0=0; 1/2/3=1
6	Are there any organized activities for the youth of this village	0=no; 1=yes	0=0; 1=1
7	How frequently does the village council convene open public meetings to discuss village development plans and projects, local grievances, aspirations, etc.	0=never; 1=< once per month; 2=once a month on average; 3=twice a month or more	0/1=0; 2/3=1
		a selected sample (not in LCA)	
8	Did any hamlet households have a member or members attending any GVN-sponsored public meetings, award ceremonies, etc in the hamlet or village during the past quarter?	0=none; 1=yes, a few; 2=10-40%; 3=41-90%; 4=all or nearly all	A continuous variable coded using the midpoints of the intervals
10	Do any of the hamlet households have a member participating in "people's groups" organized by members of an RD Cadre Team?	0=none; 1=yes, a few; 2=10-40%; 3=41-90%; 4=all or nearly all	A continuous variable coded using the midpoints of the intervals
11	Has any welfare assistance been provided by non- GVN voluntary agencies to needy or refugee households in this hamlet during the past quarter?	0=no, none needed; 1=no; 2=yes	0/1=0; 2=1
	Not determined by local	al civil society (not in LCA)	
9	Have RD Cadre worked in this hamlet during the past quarter?	0=no; 1=yes, but no cadre currently working; 2=yes, cadre currently working	0=0; 1/2=1
		from VHLSS	
12	Has the household made contributions to various funds (natural disaster funds, charity funds, poverty funds, study encouragement funds)	0=no; 1=yes	0=0; 1=1
		eported in main text	
	Did any hamlet household(s) have members who participated in self-development projects during the quarter	0=none; 1=yes, a few; 2=10-40%; 3=41-90%; 4=all or nearly all	

Source for variables in columns 2-11 is Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) - National Archives Record Group 472; source for variable in column 12 is Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS)

Table B-3: Definitions and Codings (Table 8)

Column	Original question	Question responses	Coding
	HES categorical local o	administration questions	
2	Does the GVN collect taxes in this village?	0=no; 1=no, tax amnesty granted; 2=yes, but unsystematically or sporadically; 3=yes, systematically	0/1/2=0; 3=1
3	Is there an active government village administrative committee	0=no; 1=yes, consists of village chief only; 2=yes but two or more positions vacant; 3=yes but one position vacant; 4=all positions filled	0/1/2/3=0; 4=1
4	Is the GVN village chief regularly present in this village?	0=no; 1=no, irregularly; 2=yes but only by day; 3=yes, day and night	0/1/2=0; 3=1
5	Is the GVN hamlet chief regularly present in this hamlet	0=no; 1=no, irregularly; 2=yes but only by day; 3=yes, day and night	0/1/2=0; 3=1
	Variables available only in a	selected sample (not in LCA)	
6	Does the village chief have operational control over RD Cadre personnel working in this village?	0=no, no RD Cadre; 1=no, no control; 2=yes, partial; 3=yes, complete	1/2=0; 3=1
	Policies under the control of province	al governments (not included in LCA)	
7	Have any self-development projects in this village been retarded because of absence of technical assistance from province or district level personnel?	0=no such projects; 1=no, no retardation; 2=yes, minor retardation; 3=yes, serious retardation; 4=yes, resulting in project abandonment	0/1=0; 2/3/4=1
8	Do GVN technical personnel visit this village in support of local development programs? E.g. agriculture technicians, animal husbandry specialists, fisheries specialists, etc.	0=no; 1=yes, but infrequently (less than once a month); 2=yes, periodically (1-3 times a month); 3=yes, regularly (once a week or more); 4=yes, resident in village	0/1=0; 2/3/4=1
9	Have officials in the Province Land Affairs Service visited this village to assist in implementing the Land to the Tiller program during the quarter?	0=no; 1=yes, once; 2=yes, 2 to 4 times; 3=yes, more than 4 times	0/1=0; 2/3=1
	Variables Not Rep	orted in Main Text	
	How often does the village chief visit this hamlet	0=never; 1=less than once a month; 2=1-4 times per month; 3=twice a week or more; 4=resident in the hamlet	
	Is there a functioning government village office located in this village where official business is regularly conducted or where village administrative records are maintained	0=no;1=yes	

Source for all variables is Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) - National Archives Record Group 472

Table B-4: Definitions and Codings (Table 9)

Column	Original question	Question responses	Coding
	Categorical HES he	alth care questions	
2	Are government sponsored medical services available to hamlet residents	0=none accessible; 1=yes but further than a nearby hamlet; 2=yes, in a nearby hamlet; 3=yes in this hamlet	0/1/2=0; 3=1
3	Do government health workers visit this hamlet	0=no; 1=< once per month; 2=1-3 times per month; 3=once a week or more; 4=resident in hamlet	0/1/2=0; 3/4=1
4	Is a government sponsored public health station (dispensary) accessible to residents of this village	0=none accessible; 1=yes but further than an adjacent village; 2=yes, in the adjacent village; 3=yes in the village	0/1/2=0; 3=1
5	Is a government sponsored maternity clinic accessible to the residents of this village	0=none accessible; 1=yes but further than an adjacent village; 2=yes, in the adjacent village; 3=yes in the village	0/1/2=0; 3=1
	Categorical HES ed	ducation questions	
7	Are the children of hamlet residents able to attend primary school classes (grades 1-5)?	0=no; 1=yes, but school located further than nearby hamlet; 2=yes, school located in nearby hamlet; 3=yes, school located in this hamlet	0/1=0; 2/3=1
8	Do any of the children of this village complete the five year primary education program	0=none; 1=yes, a few; 2=10-40%; 3=41-90%; 4=all or nearly all	A continuous variable coded using the midpoints of the intervals
9	Is a GVN-accredited secondary school (grades 6-12) accessible?	0=no; 1=yes, but further than adjacent village; 2=yes, in adjacent village; 3=yes, in this village	0/1/2=0; 3=1
10	Do any of the children of village residents attend secondary school	0=no; 1=<5%; 2=5-20%; 3=>20%	A continuous variable coded using the midpoints of the intervals
	Other public g	goods in HES	
11	How often are police or NPFF present in the hamlet?	0=never; 1= less than once a month; 2=1-3 times a month; 3=once a week or more; 4=regularly present by day; 5=regularly present, night and day	0/1/2/3/4=0; 5=1
12	During daylight hours, do GVN authorities enforce the laws in this hamlet?/During hours of darkness, do GVN authorities enforce the laws in this hamlet?	0=no; 1=yes, but marginal; 2=yes, adequate	2/2=1; otherwise=0
13	Has any welfare assistance been provided by GVN sources to needy households in this hamlet (excluding assistance provided to GVN-recognized refugees) during the past quarter?	0=no, none needed; 1=no; 2=yes	0/1=0; 2=1
	Variables from pro	vincial yearbooks	
14	Share of communes in district with a secondary school	Continuous variable between 0 and 1	
	Variables not repo	orted in main text	
	Is attendance at primary school restricted by lack of teachers?	0=no; 1=yes	
	Is attendance at primary school restricted by the absence or over-crowding of nearby facilities	0=no; 1=yes	
	Is attendance at primary classes restricted because of security conditions?	0=no; 1=yes	

Source for variables in columns 1-13 is Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) - National Archives Record Group 472; source for variable in column 14 are provincial yearbooks for the 1999-2004 period.

Table B-5: Definitions and Codings (Table 10)

Column	Original question	Question responses	Coding
1	How Responsive in Respondent's Opinion is the Government to an Individual's Problems/Necessary Paperwork	A=very responsive, problems are attended to immediately; B=very responsive under certain conditions; C=somewhat responsive under certain conditions; D=unresponsive, there are usually long delays; E=very unresponsive, interminable delays, unneccessary red tape, etc	C/D/E=0; A/B=1
2	What do the People of the Community Think of the Performance of Local Officials in their Role of Insuring Security?	A=actively work with the people and armed forced to keep the vc out with good success; B=strive to improve the security situation in the community, but not enitrely successful; C=have some degree of success in improving security situation; D=have little or no success in improving the security situation	B/C/D=0; A=1
3	How Well Does the Respondent Know the Village Administrative Organizational Structure?	A=knows it well; B=has some knowledge; C=has little knowledge	B/C=0; A=1
4	Do You Believe the Land to the Tiller Program is Being Administered Fairly in Your Village?	A=yes, very fairly; B=yes, usually fairly; C=no, somewhat unfairly; D=no, very unfairly	C/D=0; A/B=1
5	What do the People of the Community Think About the Performance of the National Government?	A=the gov't has performed as well as could be expected under the circumstances; B=with a few exceptions gov't has performed as well as could be expected given the circumstances; C=gov't has performed adequately; D=with a few exceptions, the gov't performance has been inadequate; E=gov't incapable of performing	A/B/C=0; D/E=1
6	How Does the Respondent Rate GVN Performance in Handling Economic Problems?	A=very poor, has aggravated problems of people; B=poor, has done nothing to solve problems; C=has strived to solve economic problems with some success; D=has strived to solve economic problems with great success	B/C/D=0; A=1
7	If the Respondent has or is Participating in a Self Dev Project, was or is the Respondent a Member of a Special Interest Group?	A=involved in self dev, member of group that is very active; B=involved in self dev, member of group ocassionally active; C=involved in self dev, member of group that is inactive; D=not involved in self dev but knows of people who are involved and are group members; E=not involved in self dev, not a group member and knows nothing of special interest groups	C/D/E=0; A/B=1
8	Who Decides What Self Development Projects will be Approved?	A=district chief; B=village chief; C=village council or management board; D=hamlet chief; E=RD Cadre; F=religious leaders; G=people of the hamlet; H=american advisors	A/B/C/D/E/F/H=0; G=1

Source for variables is PAAS - National Archives Record Groups 330 and 472

Table B-6: Definitions and Codings (Table 11)

Column	Original question	Question responses	Coding	Notes
	1	HES categorical variables on insurgency		
2	Were armed enemy military forces present in inhabited parts of the hamlet during the month	0=no; 1=yes once; 2=yes, sporadically; 3=yes frequently	0=0; 1/2/3=1	
3	Are there areas in or adjacent to this village which enemy forces use as assembly areas for operations against friendly activities in the general area	0=no; 1=yes, temporary havens; 2=yes, small base areas; 3=yes, major base areas	0=0; 1/2/3=1	
4	What is the estimated size of the largest village guerrilla unit regularly present in this village (do not include local or main force units)		0/1=0; 2/3/4=1	A squad consists
5	What is the estimated size of the largest enemy main or local force unit regularly present in this village or adjacent villages	0=none; 1=less than a squad; 2=about a squad; 3=about a platoon; 4=more than a platoon	0/1=0; 2/3/4=1	 of at least two individuals
	regularly present in this viriage of adjacent viriages	0=no known or suspected infrastructure; 1=sporadic covert activity, little or no		
6	Which of the following most closely reflects the activity of the VC Infrastructure	overt activity; 2=regular covert activity, sporadic overt activity; 3=regular overt activity but not firmly established; 4=unchallenged authority in the village	0/1=0; 2/3/4=1	
7	During this month, was the main surface route leading from this village to the	0=no; 1=yes but regular enemy harassment or taxation; 2=yes, sporadic enemy		
/	province capital open during daylight hours	harassment or taxation; 3=yes, no enemy harassment or taxation	3=0; 0/1/2=1	
	Questio	ons on U.S. and South Vietnamese Interventions		
	True City the second Course second in this siller during the second 2	0=no; 1=yes, no enemy contact; 2=yes, light contact with enemy; 3=yes,	0-0-1/2/2-1	
- 8	Have friendly external forces operated in this village during the month?	heavy contact with enemy	0=0; 1/2/3=1	
9	Were any friendly artillery fires or air strikes directed in or near the inhabited area of this village during the month?	0=no; 1=yes, once; 2=yes, sporadically; 3=yes, repeatedly	0=0; 1/2/3=1	
10	U.S. initiated attack indicator	The data record the coordinates and dates of all U.S. initiated attacks, undertake	en by both small and large	
11	SVN initiated attack indicator	The data record the coordinates and dates of all SVN initiated attacks, undertake	en by both small and large	
12	Regional Forces Indicator	Indicator for whether there was presence of regional forces in the ham	let in the month.	
		Variables not reported in main text		
	Did the enemy initiate action against local security forces in or near the hamlet during the past month	0=no; 1=yes once; 2=yes, sporadically; 3=yes frequently		
	Were any attempts at selective terrorism (kidnapping, assassination) directed at particular government officials, prominent residents, or local leaders of the hamlet during the month	0=no; 1=yes once; 2=yes, more than once		
	Were any acts of non-selective terrorism (mining, sabotage, harassing fire, bombing of a public place) directed against people of this hamlet	0=no; 1=yes once; 2=yes, more than once		
	Have incidents targeted against government non-military activities (projects, offices, police) occurred in this hamlet	0=no; 1=yes, minor; 2=yes, serious		
	Do any households have a member or members who participated, by coercion or otherwise, in enemy-organized non-military group activities	0=none; 1=<10%; 2=10%-40%; 3=41%-90%; 4=all or nearly all		
	Were any enemy propaganda meetings held or was printed propaganda distributed in this hamlet	0=no; 1=yes once; 2=yes, more than once		
	What was the estimated size of the largest enemy local or main force unit present in or near inhabited areas in this village during the month	0=none; 1=less than a platoon; 2= about a platoon; 3=about a company; 4=a battalion or more		
	P	0=none; 1=minor harassment (sniping, mining, etc); 2=attack by coordinated		
	What was the most serious level of enemy-initiated military activity directed	small arms or automatic weapons fire; 3=attack by heavy weapons fire		
	at local security forces	(mortar, rocket, rr, etc.); 4=ground assault, repelled; 5=ground assault,		
	·	friendly position overrun		
		0=no known or suspected infrastructure; 1=sporadic covert activity, little or no		
	Which of the following most closely reflects the status of the enemy	overt activity; 2=regular covert activity, sporadic overt activity mostly at		
	infrastructure	night; 3=the primary authority in the hamlet at night but most act covertly		
		during the day; 4=the primary authority present day and night		
	Do enemy forces tax goods and produce moving to or from this village	0=no; 1=yes, sporadically; 2=yes, regularly		·
	Does the enemy collect taxes from hamlet households	0=no; 1=yes sporadically; 2=yes regularly and systematically		
	Do any hamlet households have a member(s) in enemy service	0=none; 1=yes, a few; 2=10-40%; 3=41-90%; 4=all or nearly all	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
	During daylight hours, do government authorities enforce the laws	0=no; 1=yes but marginal; 2=yes adequate		
	During nighttime hours, do government authorities enforce the laws	0=no; 1=yes but marginal; 2=yes adequate		
	Civilian casualties caused by enemy military activities	0=no; 1=yes, none killed; 2=yes 0-5 killed; 3=yes, >5 killed		
	Property damage caused by enemy military activities	0=no; 1=yes minor, 1=yes serious but localized 3=yes widespread		
Source for	r variables in columns 2-9 is Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) - National Archiv	as Pacoud Group 472	·	

Source for variables in columns 2-9 is Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) - National Archives Record Group 472
Source for variables in columns 10-11 is Situation Report Army (SITRA) - National Archives Record Group 218
Source for variable in column 12 is Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) and the Territorial Forces Activity Reporting System (TFARS) - National Archives Record Groups 472 and 330, respectively.

Appendix C: Complete Analysis of HES Questions

This appendix examines questions contained in the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) that fall outside the main scope of the study. There are three reasons why we do not examine questions in the main text: 1) For many variables, we have no clear theoretical predictions about how the historical state would affect them. Hence they do little to elucidate the hypotheses that we are testing and are also not good candidates for placebo outcomes. 2) Some questions are only answered by hamlets meeting certain criteria - which may themselves be affected by treatment - complicating the interpretation of the coefficients. For example, a village would answer a question about how self-development projects were progressing only if some projects were underway. 3) Some questions were only collected for part of the sample period. Questions were removed if challenges to their interpretation came to light. Moreover, if the set of questions changes over time, the inputs to the latent class index also change, making the average of this index across the sample period more difficult to interpret. For completeness, Tables C-1-C-6 examine all these outcomes, and the online appendix list the question text and coding. The conclusions that emerge are highly consistent with those in the main text.

Additional Modules: Table C-1 begins by considering the 26 questions - covering a range of topics - that consider "friendly security" - i.e. U.S. security forces, South Vietnamese security forces, and other factors relevant for maintaining security during the Vietnam War. In a few cases the questions reflect features primarily under local control, and the effects are in the expected direction. For example, Dai Viet villages are more likely to have a village security plan (column 18), and they are more likely to have household members in government service (column 26). For most questions, however, we have no clear prior about the direction of the effects. For example, we do not have a theory on how the historical state would affect the time of day that different types of curfews are imposed, and indeed find no effects (columns 21-23). Outcomes like whether or not the village had an air or artillery strike (column 7), which external security force is primarily responsible for maintaining security (column 11), reaction times of nearby forces (columns 15-16), and the amount of fire support that external forces provide to local security forces (column 17) result from the interaction of external decisions and local security conditions, and hence are a less clear test of differences in local conditions or external decisions than the outcomes examined in the main text. With the exception of the question on the security force primarily responsible for maintaining security - which is more likely to be the Popular/Regional Forces (regional defense forces) in Dai Viet areas - the estimates are not statistically significant. Other outcomes, such as misconduct by security forces (columns 2 and 3) and casualties/damage caused by friendly security forces (columns 8 and 9), are interesting but beyond the scope of the hypotheses that we focus on.

Next, Table C-2 considers two additional HES modules not examined in the main text: psychological operations (psyops) and Land to Tiller. Psyops aimed to convince South Vietnamese citizens to support the U.S. backed South Vietnamese government rather than the Viet Cong insurgency. Some pysops programs, such as leaflet drops, were planned centrally using algorithms. Others, such as displaying posters, involved the local government. Dai Viet hamlets are more likely to have trained an information cadre to manage propaganda within the hamlet (column 2), although there is no impact on whether the village office also has an information cadre (column 5). They are also more likely to have mobile information cadre visit the village (column 7), perhaps as a result of having more local guerrilla activity, as seen in the main text. As expected given their higher income levels, Dai Viet households are more likely to own a television (column 4). They are also more likely to have new static visual displays (posters) posted regularly (column 3), plausibly as a result of the hamlet information cadre whose job is to maintain such displays.

Columns 8 to 13 of Table C-2 examine measures in the Land to Tiller module, which considers the South Vietnamese land reform conducted during the 1960s and 70s and implemented through cooperation between local and central authorities. There are not statistically or economically significant differences in the share of households that were tenants, landowners, squatters, and wage laborers (columns 9-12). Dai Viet villages are less likely to grant titles (column 13), a result that is highly consistent with the more recent effects on titling documented in the main text.

Conditional Questions: Next, we examine questions that are answered only if some other condition holds. Table C-3 considers outcomes that speak to the categories of variables that are examined in the main text. While some

¹Alternatives include the National Police Field Force, the Army of South Vietnam, and the U.S. Army.

caution is required in interpretation, to the extent that effects are statistically significant, they tend to go in the expected direction. The share of the village council that is elected - conditional on there being a council - is higher in Dai Viet villages (column 2). Moreover, self-development projects are more likely to be retarded by material shortages (column 4). The labor for self-development projects was provided through local organizing but materials were received from higher levels of government. To the extent that Dai Viet villages were better able to organize labor for projects, we would expect them to be more likely to hit a material constraint. There are not significant effects on whether self-development projects are progressing satisfactorily (conditional on being underway), on whether the chief corrects grievances raised in village meetings (conditional on those meetings occurring), and on whether the village school is sanctioned by the Vietnamese government (conditional on it existing).

Table C-4 examines the three outcome categories considered in the appendix: friendly security, psychological operations, and Land to Tiller. Effects that reflect outcomes under local control again tend to go in the expected direction: conditional on a police presence, police in Dai Viet villages are more likely to perform daytime (though not nighttime) security checks (columns 1 and 2), conditional on existing the People's Self Defense Force is more likely to be active (column 3), and allowances are more likely to be paid to refugees if they are present (column 10). If anything, outcomes in this table also suggest tenser relations between the village chief and various security and external forces, perhaps reflecting the greater local guerrilla presence documented in the main text: the village chief is less likely to control the popular forces (a regional defense force, column 4) and the national police (a police force operating locally and supported by the South Vietnamese central government, column 12). The RD cadre (the corps of South Vietnamese development aid workers) are less likely to have a positive impact on the hamlet government (as rated by the hamlet government, column 7) and are also less likely to sleep in the village (column 9), possibly reflecting the greater guerrilla presence or hostility towards outsiders more generally. There is no effect on whether the RD cadre cooperate with the local government in executing their duties (column 8), nor are there effects on whether the identities of the local VC infrastructure or guerrillas are known to friendly intelligence personnel (columns 5 and 6).

Questions Asked for Only Part of the Sample Period: Finally, we examine questions that were asked during only part of the sample period (1969-1973). Some were removed when it became apparent that they were not informative, whereas others were added later. To the extent that the questions are less informative, we would expect estimates to be at best noisier. For this reason - and also to ensure that the latent class index contains a consistent set of questions across the sample period - we do not focus on these questions in the main text.

Table C-5 considers outcomes that relate to questions examined in the main text. Most estimates are not statistically different from zero; those that are go in the expected direction given the results in the main text. There are not statistically significant effects on whether prices are publicized and controlled (to reduce inflation, column 1), on whether the hamlet is represented on the village council (most are, column 7), or on whether self-development projects are impacted by corruption (column 8). Households are more likely to have a rice surplus (column 4) but not a non-rice surplus (column 5) or a village labor surplus (column 3). There is less likely to be skills training offered (column 2). Village officials are more likely to settle disputes than traditional authorities or the Viet Cong, as we would expect given the centrality of historical village government (column 6). There is not a difference in whether village officials are sent to a training center subsidized by the central government (column 9). Conditional on there being a legally established budget, Dai Viet villages are more likely to fund the full budget locally (column 10).

Next, in Table C-6 we consider the additional outcomes: friendly security, psychological operations, and Land to Tiller. The effects for friendly security tend to be statistically insignificant. To the extent they are different from zero, they are consistent with the results documented above i.e. Dai Viet households are more likely to own a radio (column 7) and are less likely to have formal title to their land (column 8).

Table C-1: Friendly Security

Panel A				Dependent variable is:	ariable is:				
	Friendly	Local	External	Local Sec	PSDF	Friendly	Friendly	Friendly	Friendly
	Security	Security	Force	Contacted	Engages	$\operatorname{External}$	Air	Civilian	Property
	Γ CA	Misconduct	Misconduct	Enemy	Enemy	Forces	Strikes	Cas.	Damage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(7)	(8)	(6)
Dai Viet	0.143	0.008	0.015	0.014	0.010	-0.024	-0.040	-0.006	0.004
	(0.056)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Obs	2,348	2,326	2,333	2,326	2,301	389	388	2,331	2,331
Clusters	399	398	398	398	397	389	388	398	398
Mean	0.44	0.03	0.02	90.0	0.03	0.49	0.13	0.01	0.01
Panel B				Dependent variable is	ariable is:				
	Friendly	PF/RF	GVN	GVN	Military	Daylight	Darkness	Reasonable	Village
	Force	Primarily	No Go	No Go	Base	Reaction	Reaction	Fire	Security
	Defeat	Responsible	Darkness	Daylight	Nearby	Time	Time	Support	Plan
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Dai Viet	-0.011	-0.259	-0.019	-0.011	0.202	-0.008	-0.016	-0.009	0.103
	(0.011)	(0.053)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.048)	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.008)	(0.040)
Ops	2,341	2,339	2,337	2,329	390	389	389	389	388
Clusters	398	397	397	397	390	389	389	389	388
Mean	0.03	0.52	0.05	0.02	0.46	0.95	0.89	0.98	0.74
Panel C				Dependent variable is	ariable is:				
	NP	NP Reg	Inhabited	Surrounding	Road	NP Reg	NP	HH Member	Non-comm
	$\operatorname{Enforces}$	Present	Curfew	Curfew	Curfew	Present	Procedures	in Gvt	Political
	Law	Hamlet	9:30	9:30	9:30	Village	Up to Date	Service	Parties
	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)
Dai Viet	0.012	0.146	-0.052	0.040	0.015	0.023	0.049	0.099	0.197
	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.061)	(0.072)	(0.054)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.035)
Ops	2,338	2,339	2,339	2,339	389	388	388	2,333	388
Clusters	397	397	397	397	389	388	388	397	388
Mean	0.82	08.0	0.31	0.41	0.48	0.97	0.85	0.53	0.54

Notes: The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns 1-5, 8-13, 19-22, and 26) or the village (columns 6-7, 14-18, 23-25, and 27). Outcomes measured between 1969-1973. All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

Table C-2: Psychological Operations and Land to Tiller

	LTT	Titles	Granted	(13)	-0.096	(0.033)	326	326	0.48
	ж нн %	Wage	Laborers	(12)	0.016	(0.021)	329	329	0.14
	ж нн %	Land	Squatters	(11)	0.002	(0.008)	334	334	0.03
	ж нн	Land	Owners	(10)	0.025	(0.036)	330	330	0.53
				(6)		_			
iable is:	Land	Tiller	Γ CA	(8)	0.008	(0.040)	387	387	0.48
lent va				(-)	l	_			
Depend	Exposure	to GVN	Movies	(9)	0.057	(0.053)	388	388	0.49
	Village	$_{ m Info}$	Cadre	(2)	-0.049	(0.040)	387	387	0.74
	% нн	Own	ΛT	(4)	0.105	(0.023)	2,330	397	0.22
	Static	Visual	Displays	(3)	0.198	(0.044)	2,336	397	0.47
	Hamlet	$_{ m lu}$	Cadre	(2)	0.103	(0.037)	2,313	393	0.62
	Pysch	$_{\rm Obbs}$	Γ CA	(1)	0.177	(0.038)	2,348	399	0.36
					Dai Viet		Ops	Clusters	Mean

Notes: The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns 1-4) or the village (columns 5-13). Outcomes measured between 1969-1973. All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

Table C-3: Main Outcomes: Selected

		De	Dependent variable is:	ble is:	
	Self Dev	Share	Chief	Self Dev	School
	$\operatorname{Progress}$	Council	Corrects	Material	Sanctioned
	Satisfact.	Elected	Grievances	Shortage	GVN
	(1)	(5)	(3)	(4)	(2)
Oai Viet	-0.000	0.019	0.001	0.147	0.002
	(0.030)	(0.006)	(0.041)	(0.028)	(0.005)
SqC	2,277	321	385	382	2,322
Clusters	391	321	385	382	396
Mean	0.26	0.98	0.75	0.20	0.99

Notes: The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns 1 and 5) or the village (columns 2-4). Outcomes measured between 1969-1973. All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

Table C-4: Alternative Outcomes: Selected

	Chief	Controls	$^{ m NP}$	(12)	-0.076	(0.044)	386	386	0.59
	Combat	Related	Assistance	(11)	0.033	(0.075)	1,200	257	0.54
	Refugee	Allowances	Paid	(10)	0.234	(0.111)	1,072	186	09.0
	RD Cad.	Sleep in	Village	(6)	-0.068	(0.036)	382	382	0.83
e is:	RD	Cadre	Cooperate	(8)	0.003	(0.012)	382	382	0.95
Dependent variable is:	RD	Cadre	Positive	(2)	-0.045	(0.022)	2,295	396	0.95
Depend	Enemy	Guerilla	$_{ m Known}$	(9)	0.021	(0.035)	320	320	0.69
	Enemy	Infra.	Known	(2)	0.011	(0.026)	381	381	0.76
	Chief	Controls	PF	(4)	-0.086	(0.043)	328	328	0.61
	PSDF	$^{\mathrm{Is}}$	Active	(3)	0.166	(0.052)	2,293	395	0.71
	Security	Checks	Darkness	(2)	0.025	(0.043)	2,279	394	0.84
	Security	Checks	Daylight	(1)	0.064	(0.036)	2,247	393	0.92
					Dai Viet		Ops	Clusters	Mean

Notes: The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns 1-3, 7, and 10-11) or the village (columns 4-6, 8-9, and 12). Outcomes measured between 1969-1973. All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

Table C-5: Main Outcomes: Partial Sample Period

	Budget	Funded	Locally	(10)	0.136	(0.049)	331	331	0.23
	Vung	Tau	Training	(6)	0.067	(0.042)	382	382	09.0
	Projects	Affected by	Corruption	(8)	0.010	(0.024)	373	373	0.07
3:	Hamlet	Represented	Council	(7)	0.024	(0.031)	1,592	334	0.90
nt variable is	Officials	Settle	Disputes	(9)	0.052	(0.026)	2,234	386	0.97
Depender		Non-Rice	Surplus	(2)	-0.070	(0.055)	379	379	0.71
		Rice	Surplus	(4)	0.240	(0.057)	378	378	0.67
	Village	Labor	Surplus	(3)	-0.069	(0.065)	384	384	0.36
	Skills	Training	Offered	(2)	-0.164	(0.062)	382	382	0.57
	Prices	Publicized,	Controlled	(1)	-0.021	(0.042)	384	384	0.25
					Dai Viet		Ops	Clusters	Mean

Notes: The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns 6-7) or the village (columns 1-5 and 8-10). Outcomes measured between 1969-1973. All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.

Table C-6: Alternative Outcomes: Partial Sample Period

				I	Dependent vari	able is:				
	VC Targets		Local	Local	Police	Police	HH %	HH %	LTT	Effort
	Sleep in	Д	Security	Security	Present	In	Own	No	Land	Implement
	House		Adequate	Plan	Day/Night	Uniform	Radios	Title	Disputes	$_{ m LLL}$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(2)	(9)	(-)	(8)	(6)	(10)
Dai Viet	0.064		0.012	-0.041	-0.030	0.046	0.063	0.049	-0.015	-0.013
	(0.045)		(0.015)	(0.053)	(0.032)	(0.065)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.015)	(0.031)
Obs	2,280		2,288	384	384	382	2,290	300	305	301
Clusters	392		392	384	384	382	392	300	305	301
Mean	0.80		0.98	89.0	0.91	0.65	0.71	0.18	0.05	06.0

Notes: The unit of analysis is the hamlet (columns 1-3 and 7) or the village (columns 4-6 and 8-10). Outcomes measured between 1969-1973. All regressions include a linear RD polynomial in latitude and longitude, a control for distance to Ho Chi Minh City, and boundary segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level, are reported in parentheses.