De se ascription in PRO and logophoric pronouns

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Introduction

- (1) a. Marie expects PRO to leave.
 - b. Marie expects that she will leave.

It's long been noted in the literature, since at least Chierchia (1990), that in the first sentence, *Marie* is consciously self-ascribing the property of "leaving" to herself. On the other hand, in the second sentence, *Marie* does not need to consciously self-ascribe the property of "leaving" to herself. PRO itself is therefore an obligatory de se anaphor—at least when it can be read de se at all.

De re blocking effect

Anand (2006) notes a very interesting linguistic phenomenon:

(2) De re blocking effect No obligatory de se anaphor can be c-commanded by a de re counterpart.

Anand uses this to argue that there are two paths to de se in our semantics. One is de se binding in Chierchia (1990)'s sense: binding via an abstraction operator. And in another, de se is just a special kind of de re, this was first argued by, I believe, Lewis (1979). If the de re blocking effect is present, that means there is de se binding. If not, de se is a special kind of de re.

How is PRO read de se?

Landau (2015)'s two-tier theory of control sides with Lewis: he proposes that in cases of logophoric control, PRO is read de se as a special kind of de re. Landau claims that logophoric control complements are *propositional*, and not properties, contra Chierchia (1990). One way to determine whether Landau is right or not would be to use the de re blocking effect with PRO.

To my knowledge, the de re blocking effect has not been used in the context of PRO. In the first half of this presentation, I produce examples from different languages (English, Romanian and Ewe) which seem to have very robust judgments, at least in English. I argue that the presence of the de re blocking effect with PRO indicates the presence of de se binding.

Logophoricity

In the second half of the presentation, I introduce Ewe's logophoric pronoun, and its different distribution in realis and irrealis embedded clauses. Interestingly, as the subject of a realis embedded clause, it does not undergo the de re blocking effect, even though it does as the subject of an irrealis clause. I provide an account of the pronoun's distribution based on my prior work in Satık (2020). I propose an explanation of why for certain speakers of Ewe, the logophoric pronoun may be read de re.

Ewe

- Ewe is a Niger-Congo language spoken in southeastern Ghana and southern Togo.
- Ewe forms a dialect continuum with Mina, which is mostly mutually intelligible with Ewe.
- The dialects furthest apart, Mina and Ewe share a mutual intelligibility of 85%; distinct variations may even exist between towns that are miles away from each other (Goeh-Akué (2009)).

Ewe

- Given this, finding dialectical variation is not surprising; Anne Bimpeh (p.c.) does not agree with Pearson (2015)'s conclusion that yè can be read de re. But Anne herself has found interesting facts...
- But the fact that this variation exists has to be accounted for.
- The Ewe data obtained here was primarily obtained from 1 native speaker of Anlo Ewe from the town Atiavi, and the judgments were double-checked with two other speakers of the same dialect.
- Some of the findings in this paper from Ewe are corroborated by Grano & Lotven (2016) in the Gengbe dialect.


Background

- What are the two paths to de se?
- What is the de re blocking effect?

Background

In Chierchia (1990)'s account, de se ascription involves a unique LF configuration, where an operator in the left-periphery of the clause binds the pronoun. PRO is not directly bound by the subject:

(3) Gennaro_i wants [$_{CP}$ Op_i PRO_i to take time off.] $\forall < y,w'> \in Dox-Alt(Gennaro, w)$: y takes time off in w'



And the co-evaluation between PRO and the subject is due to the semantics of the control predicate.

Background

Lewis (1979), Schlenker (2005) etc. suggest, de se ascription could just be a kind of de re ascription with a special self-identity acquaintance relation, perhaps as a presupposition on the concept generator:

(5) Gennaro_i wants of himself_i, under self-identity, [CP he_i takes time off.]

This is what Landau assumes in the case of PRO. Anand proposes that one way of diagnosing whether we're dealing with one structure or the other is via the *de re blocking effect*, which states that no obligatorily de se anaphor can be c-commanded by a de re counterpart.

De re blocking effect

The pronouns that are directly bound by the operator are alleged to give rise to the blocking effect, because there is an intervening pronoun between the operator and an anaphor, and this results in a binding configuration that is local and prevents an anaphor from being licensed by its operator. One example of a de re blocking effect is found with dream report pronouns in English as Percus & Sauerland (2003) points out. For example, in the sentence below, the bodily counterpart kissing the mental counterpart is unacceptable:

- (6) I dreamt I was Brigitte Bardot and I kissed me.
 - a. Attested reading: In the dream, Brigitte kisses George.
 - b. Unattested reading: In the dream, George kisses Brigitte.

De re blocking effect in Yoruba

Anand notes that this bears resemblance to an interaction between logophoric and non-logophoric pronouns in Yoruba. Ordinary pronouns, the *o*-forms, cannot c-command the logophoric pronoun *òun* under coreference, which is an obligatory de se logophor. This is despite the fact that ordinary pronouns and logophoric pronouns may both co-occur in the same logophoric environment (subject of an attitudinal embedded clause).

(7) Olu_i so pe o_{*i/j} ri baba òun_i
 Olu say that o see father LOG
 'Olu said that he_{*i/i} had seen his father.'

Yoruba

Logophoric pronouns in languages such as Yoruba, Tangale and Wan require that the logophoric pronoun is read *de se*. The sentence in Yoruba below is false; if it could be read *de re* then it would be true (Nike S. Lawal, p.c.).

- (8) Scenario: Taiwo sees a portrait of a very fat person from behind at his grandfather's house. He thinks to himself "wow, that person is very fat." Taiwo doesn't realize that it was him in the portrait; Taiwo actually thinks that he is not fat.
 - a. Taiwo ro pe oun sanra (Taiwo thinks he is fat).

De re blocking effect with PRO

- (9) Context: Jack is a criminal who lost his memories years ago, is watching a security camera recording of himself and does not realize it was him trying to run from the police.
 - a. # Jack said that he_{de re} tried PRO_{de se} to run from the police.

No blocking with raising

- (10) Context: Jack is a criminal who lost his memories years ago, is watching a security camera recording of himself and does not realize it was him trying to run from the police.
 - a. Jack said that he seems to be running from the police.

De re blocking effect with finite control

- (11) Context: Jack is a criminal who lost his memories years ago, is watching a security camera recording of himself and does not realize it was him trying to run from the police.
 - a. # Jack a zis că el a încercat să fugă de poliție.
 Jack has said that he has tried PRT run.3SG the police
 'Jack said that he_{de re} tried PRO_{de se} to run from the police.'

 Romanian

De re blocking effect with finite control

- (12) Context: Kofi is a criminal who lost his memories years ago, is watching a security camera recording of himself and does not realize it was him trying to run from the police.
 - a. # Kofi be yè dzagbagba be yè-a sisim le kpovitor Kofi COMP yè try COMP yè-POT run ? police wo gbo
 PL from 'Kofi said that he_{de re} tried PRO_{de se} to run from the police.'

What's going on here? Pearson (2015) has shown that *yè* can be read de re. Yè isn't an obligatory de se anaphor!

No de re blocking effect in realis clauses

Given that $y\dot{e}$, at least in the subject position of realis clauses, is not obligatorily read de se, we would expect it to not undergo the de re blocking effect, and this prediction is borne out below, which is from Pearson (2013).

(13) John koudrin be yè nyi Obama koudo yè na yè John dream COMP LOG COP Obama CONJ LOG give LOG dokui cadeau REFL gift 'John dreamed he was Obama and Obama gave John a gift.' (second yè is de re)

Might it have something to do with the realis vs. irrealis nature of the embedded clause?

The potential mood

/a/ can mark two things. It can either mark the potential mood, or the subjunctive mood (both of which are irrealis).

(14) Kofi a dzo. Kofi POT leave

Potential meaning 1: 'Kofi can leave.'

Potential meaning 2: 'Kofi could have left.'

Potential meaning 3: 'Kofi could be leaving.'

Essegbey (2008) studies the potential variant of -a, arguing that because sentences like (14) can refer to possible states of affair in the past, present and future, it is merely a modal morpheme which marks potentiality. But it usually has a meaning in the future sense. I argue that *yè* is in fact controlled in the subject of irrealis clauses.

Multiple examples of *yèa* with predicates that would involve PRO and control in other languages such as English:

- (15) a. Agbe_i dzagbagba/ŋlobe/dzina/vovom/wosusu be
 Agbe try/forget/want/afraid/decide COMP
 yè_i-a dzo.
 YÈ-POT leave
 'Agbe_i tried/forgot/wanted/is afraid/decided/likes/intends
 PRO_i to leave.'
 - Kofi_i dzagbagba/dzina/vɔvəm/wosusu/dzi be
 Kofi try/want/afraid/decide/like COMP
 yè_i-a kpo dzidzə.
 YÈ-POT experience happiness
 'Kofi_i tried/wanted/is afraid/decided/likes PRO_i to be happy.'

It has to be read de se. This sentence is from Hornstein (1999) (p. 73) while the context is from Landau (1999) (p. 36), translated to Ewe:

- (16) Kofi is a war hero who suffers from amnesia and remembers nothing of his wartime experiences. Suppose this person sees a TV program describing his own exploits, and is impressed with the courage exhibited by that person, who he does not know is himself. Kofi comes to believe that the hero will win a medal.
 - a. # Kofi_i emo kpom be yè_i-a ho kplu. Kofi expect see COMP YÈ-POT COP medal '#Kofi_i expects PRO_i to get a medal.'

It's been well-known since Clements (1975) that realis $y\dot{e}$ can have long-distance antecedents. Pearson (2015)'s example is given in (17) below. This sentence is ambiguous: each $y\dot{e}$ may refer to Kofi or Marie.

(17) Marie_i be Kofi_k xuse be $y\grave{e}_{i/k}$ na $y\grave{e}_{i/k}$ cadeau Mary say Kofi believe COMP YÈ give YÈ gift 'Mary_i said that Kofi_k believed that he_k/she_i gave him_k/her_i a gift.'

Irrealis $y\dot{e}$, on the other hand, cannot usually have a long-distance antecedent—that is, referring to a DP that is not the nearest one. This contrasts with the logophoric pronoun, as PRO also cannot have long-distance antecedents:

(18) a. Agbe_j kadedzi be Kofi_i dzagbagba be yè_{i/*j}-a
Agbe believe COMP Kofi try COMP YÈ-POT
kpo dzidzɔ.
experience happiness
'Agbe_j believes that Kofi_i tried PRO_{j/*j} to be happy.'

Grano & Lotven (2016) reports this as well.

Promise

(19) Agbe $_i$ do enugble ne Fafa $_k$ be $y\grave{e}_{i/^*k}$ -a fo nutsu-a. Agbe make promise to Fafa COMP YÈ-POT beat man-DEF 'Agbe $_i$ promised Fafa $_k$ PRO $_i$ to beat the man.'

Animacy

(20) Ati-a_i dzegome/dzudzɔ/yidzi be yè_i-a ŋe. Tree-NOM begin/stop/resume COMP YÈ-POT break. 'The tree_i began/stopped/resumed PRO_i to break.'


If we follow Charnavel & Sportiche (2016) in using inanimacy as a test for non-logophoricity, this would mean that $y\dot{e}$ is not actually a logophoric pronoun. It would be unlikely for trees and other inanimate objects to be logophoric as they cannot possess attitudes, thoughts or report speech, unless we are dealing with a metaphorical context.

Summary

Properties	Realis yè	Irrealis yè	OC PRO
Must be c-commanded	?	✓	1
Must be read de se	×	✓	1
Long-distance antecedent	✓	×	X
Bound variable	✓	✓	1
Inanimate possible	X	✓	1
Sloppy reading only	X	✓	1
Partial possible	✓	✓	1
Split possible	✓	✓	1
Blocking?	Х	✓	1

Structures

Yè is not a true logophoric pronoun. It is just a phonetic form which instantiates control (see Charnavel (2019) for more on prolog):



Technical Details

The semantics for irrealis constructions is therefore simple: it's just a control complement. Both PRO and *yè* have the same semantics: they're bound variables.

$$(23) \quad \lambda P_{< e, st>} \colon [\lambda x \colon \forall < y, w'> \ \in \ Dox-Alt(x,w) \colon P(y)(w')]]$$

The semantics for realis complements is much more complex.


Back to the de re blocking effect

The presence of the de re blocking effect with irrealis $y\dot{e}$ is not surprising after all! It's just because it has to be controlled, and PRO is an obligatory de se anaphor.

How come realis $y \ge doesn't$ undergo the blocking effect? Here my answer is not so clear, but it seems that it must be embedded in a resP. $Y \ge does = does$

Semantics for realis yè

I adopt an analysis very similar to Landau (2015)'s:



(25) [believe] $^{c,g} = \lambda \Pi_{\text{<esee,st>}} \lambda w_s$. $\exists G$: G is suitable for x in w & $\forall w' \in Belief(x,w), \Pi(G)(w')$

Conclusion

- The de re blocking effect seems to provide a way of investigating how de se readings are ascribed to PRO.
- There's reason to believe that PRO's de se is not a special kind of de re.
- This presentation has tried to shed further light on the distribution, syntax and semantics of yè.
- There seems to be two paths to de se with yè, in line with Anand (2006) and Pearson (2018).
- Thank you!

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