

# Can't We All Just Get Along? How Women MPs Can Ameliorate Affective Polarization in Western Publics\*

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Concern over partisan resentment and hostility has increased across Western democracies. Despite growing attention to affective polarization, existing research fails to ask whether *who* serves in office affects mass-level inter-party hostility. Drawing on scholarship on women's behavior as elected representatives and citizens' beliefs about women politicians, we posit the women MPs affective bonus hypothesis: all else equal, partisans display warmer affect towards out-parties with higher proportions of women MPs. We evaluate this claim with an original dataset on women's presence in 125 political parties in 20 Western democracies from 1996-2017, combined with survey data on partisans' affective ratings of political opponents. We show that women's representation is associated with lower levels of partisan hostility, and that both men and women partisans react positively to out-party women MPs. Increasing women's parliamentary presence could thus mitigate cross-party hostility.

**Keywords:** gender and politics; descriptive representation; political parties; comparative political behavior; partisan hostility

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Many Western polities display intense distrust and hostility across party lines. This affective polarization can prompt animosity towards partisan opponents as neighbors, co-workers, or family members (Iyengar et al. 2019), economic discrimination against partisan opponents (McConnell et al. 2018), and willingness to violate democratic norms in pursuit of political objectives (Kalmoe and Mason 2018). Indeed, the January 6 U.S. Capitol insurrection, the attempted storming of the German Bundestag in August 2020, and the murder of British legislator Jo Cox during the 2016 Brexit campaign chillingly illustrate the violent consequences that may ensue from heightened political hostility. In response, scholars analyze the causes of affective polarization including policy disputes, economic conditions, levels of corruption, and electoral systems (e.g., Gidron et al., 2020; Reiljan 2020; Wagner 2021).

No research to date asks whether *who* serves in office affects mass-level inter-party hostility. Drawing on scholarship on both women elected representatives' behavior and citizens' beliefs about women politicians, we posit that partisans more warmly evaluate out-parties with higher proportions of women members of parliament (MPs). To test our claim, we analyze an original dataset on women's presence in the parliamentary delegations of 125 political parties in 20 Western democracies between 1996 and 2017, combined with Comparative Study of Electoral Systems survey data on partisans' affective party ratings. We show that women's presence in parties' parliamentary delegations is associated with lower levels of partisan hostility, and that both men and women partisans react positively to out-party women MPs. Our findings thus suggest that increasing women's parliamentary presence could mitigate cross-party hostility.

## AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION AND WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION

Scholars often emphasize the negative consequences of affective polarization, including its role in democratic backsliding (Orhan 2021; though see Broockman et al. 2020). There is less consensus about its causes. One strand of research links mass-level partisan resentment to elite-level policy polarization (Lelkes 2021; Orr and Huber 2020). Others see affective polarization as rooted in emotional attachments to social identities that are “sorted” along partisan lines (Harteveld 2021; Mason 2018), or emphasize structural features like economic conditions (Stewart et al. 2020).

Though still in its early stages (see Wagner 2021 for a discussion), comparative research highlights the role of parties and electoral systems. This work documents the intense hostility between mainstream and radical right parties (Harteveld et al. 2021; Helbling and Junkunz 2020; Reiljan and Ryan 2021). Democratic dissatisfaction and affective polarization are also more pronounced in majoritarian systems, which solidify “us versus them” political dynamics, compared to proportional systems which incentivize elite cooperation in the form of coalition governments (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Gidron et al. 2019; Somer and McCoy 2019). Multiparty governments, for example, alleviate tensions between co-governing parties (Bassan-Nygate and Weiss 2021).

Building on this scholarship, we argue that not only do electoral rules matter, but *who* is elected to office also influences out-party hostility. We posit that women's descriptive representation in parties' parliamentary delegations can potentially defuse affective polarization, for at least two reasons. First, women may employ more consensual and participatory leadership styles. Studies of the U.K. (Childs 2004; Sones, Moran, and Lovenduski 2005) and New Zealand (Grey 2002), for example, find that women representatives are less adversarial than men. Women's legislative speech in Austria (Haselmayer et al. 2021) and the U.K. (Hargrave and Langengen, 2020) is also less

negative. Work from the U.S. (Holman and Mahoney 2018; Kanthak and Krause 2012) and abroad (Barnes 2016) shows that women representatives engage in more collaboration and co-sponsorship. This cooperative behavior likely reflects gendered socialization processes and/or women's strategic efforts to overcome marginalization within political institutions. Regardless of their motivation, if women employ more cooperative, consensual leadership styles, citizens may feel more warmly towards rival parties with more women MPs.

Second, independently of whether women representatives behave differently than men, women's descriptive representation affects both citizens' and journalists' political perceptions. U.S.-based studies show that respondents hold gender-trait stereotypes, seeing women politicians as more caring and compassionate (Bauer 2019), more likely to compromise and build legislative consensus (Bauer et al. 2017), and having better interpersonal skills (Cassese and Holman 2017; Holman and Mahoney 2018). Citizens in Norway (Matland 1994), Belgium (Devroe and Wauters 2018), the U.K. (Johns and Shepard 2007), and Israel (Ben-Shitrit et al. 2021) likewise apply gender stereotypes to politicians. These stereotypes also influence media coverage of both candidates and parties. Analyzing newspapers from Australia, Canada, and the U.S., Kittilson and Fridkin (2008) find that women candidates are disproportionately linked to "feminized" issues and traits—including honesty, compassion, and non-competitiveness. In European Parliament elections, the media connects parties with more women MPs to compassion issues, independently of the issue content of parties' platforms (Greene and Lüthiste 2018).

Perhaps unsurprisingly in light of these studies, related work shows that citizens prefer institutions with more women, and report greater trust and satisfaction in institutions with higher levels of women's representation (Ben-Shitrit et al. 2021; Verge et al. 2020). Political parties have even sought to capitalize on these beliefs. Weeks et al. (2021), for example, argue that radical right

parties strategically increase their proportion of women MPs in order to defuse their extremist image and expand their support beyond their base. We thus posit:

**The Women MPs Affective Bonus Hypothesis:** *All else equal, partisans display warmer affect towards out-parties with higher proportions of women MPs.*

## DATA AND ANALYSIS

To test our hypothesis, we combine an original dataset on women’s descriptive representation at the party level with survey data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) for 20 Western publics and 81 election-years between 1996 and 2017. Section S1 in the appendix lists the countries, elections, and parties in our dataset. The CSES surveys include a 0-10 feeling thermometer asking respondents to rate the parties in their country, where zero denotes maximum dislike and 10 denotes maximum liking.<sup>1</sup> The feeling thermometer is the most common measure of out-party dislike in affective polarization research (Iyengar et al. 2019), and correlates with other affective measures including social distance and partisans’ economic discrimination against out-partisans (Druckman and Levendusky 2019). The survey also includes a question about party identification, which we use to classify party supporters.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The question is: “I’d like to know what you think about each of our political parties. After I read the name of a political party, please rate it on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you strongly dislike that party and 10 means that you strongly like that party.”

<sup>2</sup> Respondents were asked “Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular party? If so, which one?” Respondents who said no were asked “Do you feel yourself a little closer to one of the political parties

Our dependent variable, [*party  $i$ 's supporters' evaluations of out-party  $j(t)$* ], is the mean thermometer score that party  $i$ 's partisans assigned to out-party  $j$  in the CSES election survey administered in the year  $t$ . We analyze party dyads because studies find that out-party evaluations respond to ideological distances between the parties and also to their governing relationships: leftist party supporters evaluate left-wing out-parties more warmly than right-wing out-parties, for example, and governing parties' supporters award a large "affective bonus" to co-governing out-parties, independent of ideological distance (Horne et al. 2021).

We analyze out-party evaluations at the party dyad level – i.e., each partisan constituency  $i$ 's mean evaluation of each out-party  $j$  in the election year  $t$  – to account for these factors. Note that each party pair  $i, j$  in each election survey enters our data set twice, since we analyze the mean thermometer rating that party  $i$ 's partisans assign to party  $j$ , and the mean rating  $j$ 's partisans assign to party  $i$ . We analyze all dyads of parties  $i, j$  with at least four MPs each in the year before the current election survey, since smaller parties are arguably less consequential for affective polarization and also pose measurement problems because few survey respondents identify with these parties. In the appendix we show that our substantive conclusions also hold in analyses that include these smaller parties (see Section S2), and when using a stacked individual level data set (see Section S11) where each observation is an individual's evaluation of a given out-party, such that each individual enters the data as many times as they evaluate a party.


Our key independent variable, [*out-party  $j$ 's proportion of women MPs ( $t - 1$ )*], is the out-party  $j$ 's parliamentary gender composition lagged one year prior to the current CSES survey, scaled from

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than the others?" We code as party supporters both those who feel close and those who feel a little closer to the relevant party.

zero (all of  $j$ 's MPs were men) to one (all were women). For example, for the 2013 German parliamentary election, data on the gender composition of political parties is taken from 2012. Figure 1 displays the distribution of the proportions of women MPs across all of the party parliamentary delegations in our study, segmented into deciles (0.0 to 0.1, 0.1 to 0.2, etc.). Between 1996 and 2017, women MPs were significantly under-represented in Western parties' parliamentary delegations. The mean proportion of women representatives was only 0.29 (the standard deviation was 0.16), and roughly one in three party delegations featured fewer than 20% women. Fewer than 10% were majority-women.

**Figure 1. Proportion of Women MPs in Party Parliamentary Delegations Across 20 Western Democracies, 1996-2017**



We expect the coefficient on the [*out-party j's proportion of women MPs* ( $t - 1$ )] variable to be positive, denoting that partisans evaluate out-parties with higher proportions of women MPs more warmly. We control for governing coalition arrangements and for the ideological distance between the in-party  $i$  and the out-party  $j$ . The [*i, j are coalition partners* ( $t$ )] dummy variable equals 1 if parties  $i, j$  were governing coalition partners at the time  $t$  of the election survey, and we also include the dummy variable [*i, j are opposition partners* ( $t$ )] since research shows that opposition party supporters grant an affective bonus to co-opposition parties (Horne et al. 2021). The variable [*elite right-left distance i, j* ( $t$ )] denotes the absolute right-left distance between parties  $i$  and  $j$  in the current election, based on the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) coding of the Left-Right tones of the parties' election manifestos. We standardize this variable so that the coefficient predicts the variation in out-party evaluations associated with one standard deviation changes in the independent variable values.<sup>3</sup>

Since error terms plausibly correlate within elections, we use OLS with robust standard errors clustered by election. Our models include country-year fixed effects to capture unmeasured factors associated with specific countries and time periods such as economic conditions, electoral laws, media systems, and so on. Thus, our parameter estimates reflect within-country and within-election differences in partisans' ratings of different out-parties. Section S10 in the appendix displays models with alternative fixed effects specifications. We show that our results hold in models with country—rather than country-year—fixed effects, which leverage variation across elections within

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<sup>3</sup> The original CMP scale runs from -100 (most left-wing coded manifesto tone) to +100 (most right-wing tone). The mean value of the [*elite right-left distance i, j* ( $t$ )] variable computed over the cases in our data set is 22.4 units, and the standard deviation is 17.6 units.



the same country as well as within-year variation (Section S9). The results likewise hold when including individual fixed-effects in models that use individual level data (Section S11).

## RESULTS

We estimated our model parameters on the 1,842 directed party dyads in our data set. This represents every pair of parties with at least four MPs each in the 20 Western party systems we study, with most pairs observed at multiple years  $t$  across the 81 CSES election studies we analyze.<sup>4</sup> Table 1 reports the parameter estimates for our multivariate model (column 2), along with the estimate on a reduced-form model without controls (column 1). The estimates support our women MPs affective bonus hypothesis: the estimate on the [*out-party j's proportion of women MPs ( $t - 1$ )*] variable is positive and statistically significant ( $p < .01$ ) in both models. The estimate for the full model, +1.73 in column 2, denotes that moving from zero women MPs to all women MPs in a party's parliamentary delegation improves predicted out-party evaluations by 1.73 units on the 0-10 thermometer scale, when controlling for coalition arrangements and Left-Right distance. And, moving from one standard deviation below to one SD above the mean value of the [*out-party j's proportion of women MPs ( $t - 1$ )*] variable, i.e., from a proportion of 0.13 to 0.45 out-party women MPs,

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<sup>4</sup> Note that we infer the consequences of changes in parties' gender balance based on analyses of within country, same year, comparisons. That is, our model combines statistical power from multiple years but does not directly compare party evaluations across years. Our approach is dictated by the limited number of election surveys for each country in the CSES. At the same time in S10 – S11 we show that our results are not sensitive to this decision as compared to models using country or individual fixed effects.

improves predicted out-party evaluations by 0.55 thermometer units, about one third of the out-party dislike variable's standard deviation (which is 1.54 units). All else equal, partisans evaluate out-parties with higher proportions of women MPs more warmly.

**Table 1: The Predictors of Out-Party Thermometer Evaluations (N=1842)**

	Bivariate Model (1)	Full Model (2)	Women Partisans (3)	Men Partisans (4)
<b>[<i>out-party j's proportion of women MPs (t-1)</i>]</b>	<b>1.89** (0.43)</b>	<b>1.73** (0.52)</b>	<b>2.10** (0.53)</b>	<b>1.13* (0.50)</b>
[ <i>elite right-left distance i,j (t)</i> ]		-0.60** (0.09)	-0.62** (0.09)	-0.66** (0.09)
[ <i>i,j are coalition partners (t)</i> ]		0.94** (0.25)	0.94** (0.23)	0.96** (0.25)
[ <i>i,j are opposition partners (t)</i> ]		0.37** (0.11)	0.36** (0.09)	0.35** (0.11)
Country and year fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES
Adjusted R2	0.15	0.31	0.31	0.30

\*\*  $p \leq .01$  ; \*  $p \leq .05$  : two-tailed tests.

Notes. The dependent variable, [*party i's supporters' evaluations of out-party j (t)*], is the average thermometer rating on a 0-10 scale that party *i*'s partisans assigned to the out-party *j* in the CSES election survey administered at time *t*. The OLS regression models were estimated with standard errors clustered on elections. Section S1 in the appendix lists the countries, elections, and parties in our study.

The estimates on our control variables confirm that ideology and governing coalition arrangements also drive out-party evaluations. The negative coefficient on the [*elite right-left distance i,j (t)*] variable ( $p < .01$ ) indicates that out-party evaluations cool as the Left-Right distance between the parties increases. The positive coefficients on the [*i,j are coalition partners (t)*] and [*i,j are opposition partners (t)*] variables ( $p < .01$ ) denote that partisans award an affective bonus to out-parties from the same side of the aisle, compared to the baseline category of a party pair consisting of one governing and one

opposition party. In particular, co-governing parties' partisans grant their coalition partners a large affective bonus of nearly one thermometer unit on the 0-10 scale, all else equal.

## EXTENSIONS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

We conducted additional analyses to assess the robustness of our results. First, we examined whether our findings hold for both men and women survey respondents. Because existing literature yields competing expectations on this front (see Klar 2018; Ondercin and Lizotte 2021; Stauffer 2021), we re-estimated our models separately on all self-identified women survey respondents, and then on men. These estimates, reported in columns 3-4 of Table 1 above, show that both women and men partisans reward out-parties with higher proportions of women MPs.

Next, we estimated models controlling for the out-party's family, to assess whether partisans dislike some out-parties for reasons beyond policy disputes and coalition arrangements. These analyses continue to support our substantive conclusions (see Section S3 in the appendix). We also considered whether these effects are related to the country's electoral system proportionality, finding that the women MPs affective bonus is not mediated by—and continues to hold when accounting for—proportionality (see Section S6). Finally, our results hold across both the earlier and later parts of the 1996-2017 time span of our study, despite the shift across this period to greater reliance on online campaigning, where partisan hostility can be mobilized by racist and sexist memes (see Section S4).

We also analyzed whether the women MPs affective bonus is related to the representation of women MPs in the in-party, and whether partisans' tendencies to reward out-parties for representing women in parliament diminishes as the out-party's share of women passes parity. Sections S5 and S7 of the appendix report these analyses, which again support our conclusions. Finally, we assessed

whether the women MPs affective bonus differed for out-parties with women leaders, versus out-parties led by men. As reported in appendix Section S8, our analyses of out-parties led by men – which constitute nearly 75% of the cases in our study – strongly support our conclusions, and imply an even larger affective bonus than the estimates reported in Table 1 above. Our estimates on out-parties led by women suggest a smaller – but still detectible – women MPs affective bonus effect.

## DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Affective polarization is associated with social distancing, economic discrimination against out-partisans, and even partisans’ willingness to condone violence against political opponents. Yet while scholars link affective polarization to systemic factors including elite-level policy disputes, economic conditions, and electoral laws, existing work has not considered a potentially more malleable predictor: the gender composition of political parties’ elected officials. In analyses across 20 Western democracies, we find that partisans more warmly evaluate out-parties with higher proportions of women MPs.

Our findings are important for gender and politics scholars. There is increasing interest in the “symbolic effects” of women’s collective representation, including citizens’ feelings of efficacy and trust. We demonstrate that variation in women’s collective representation is also linked to out-party hostility, and we add to a small but growing literature on gender and affective polarization (Klar 2018; Ondercin and Lizotte 2021). Future work should examine the mechanisms driving our empirical findings, in particular whether the women MPs affective bonus stems primarily from substantive differences in women’s versus men’s leadership styles, from partisans’ gender stereotypes or preferences for descriptive representation, or from differences in how the media depicts women versus men MPs. Whereas some of these causal pathways require citizens to

recognize the gender compositions of different parties' parliamentary delegations, others do not. And, though existing work suggests that citizens are broadly aware of the gender composition of political institutions (Dolan 2010; Stauffer 2021) and respond to the makeup of political parties (O'Brien 2019), more research is needed to identify the individual-, party-, and system-level factors that predict knowledge of party gender composition.

Our results also extend the nascent comparative affective polarization literature. Most affective polarization research analyzes the U.S., and no study has asked whether *who* represents us influences out-party hostility. Future studies should examine whether the inclusion/exclusion of other marginalized groups is related to affective polarization. This work should also address the consequences of affective polarization for representatives, as high-profile women politicians are disproportionately targeted for violence (Håkansson 2021) and uncivil messages on social media (Rheault, Rayment, and Musulan 2019). Though women MPs may provide an affective bonus to their parties, we must acknowledge the costs these legislators bear.

We likewise note that although women's parliamentary representation has increased over the past two decades, there has been no corresponding diminution in affective polarization across Western publics (e.g., Boxell et al. 2020; Gidron et al. 2020). Yet, this does not suggest that women's representation is irrelevant to out-party hostility. Rather, the 1996-2017 period featured other developments that intensified cross-party hostility, including the rise of radical right parties, the growing salience of cultural issues relating to multiculturalism and national identity, and economic shocks including a global recession (see Gidron et al. 2020). In the absence of women representatives, we may have observed even higher levels of affective polarization.

Finally, we acknowledge the mixed normative implications of our findings. On the one hand, our results are promising for practitioners seeking to ameliorate affective polarization, since they

suggest that parties can “do well by doing good”: by nominating and electing more women MPs, parties can broaden their electoral appeal and defuse affective polarization while also providing better descriptive gender representation. On the other hand, some parties may use this effect strategically; for instance, populist radical right parties—who are strongly disliked by mainstream partisans (Harteveld et al. 2021; Helbling and Junkunz 2020; Reiljan and Ryan 2021)—may use women’s representation to enhance their affective standing in the general public (see Weeks et al. 2021). Given that opposition to extremist parties—particularly those that promote illiberal, anti-democratic stances—is arguably justified, it is troubling if these parties can defuse this hostility simply by promoting women. These normative implications of the women MPs affective bonus – both negative and positive – suggest that this is an important area for future research.

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## **Supplementary Appendix for “Can’t We All Just Get Along? How Women MPs Can Ameliorate Affective Polarization in Western Publics”**

This appendix presents the supplementary information and statistical analyses we describe in the main text of our paper. These include the following:

- Section S1 lists the countries, election years, and parties that we include in our empirical analyses (Tables S1A-S1B below).
- Section S2 summarizes analyses that included smaller parliamentary parties, i.e., those with three or fewer MPs, which were omitted in the analyses reported in the main text of the paper (Table S2 below).
- Section S3 summarizes analyses that account for the out-party’s family. First, we accounted for the possibility of “radical right exceptionalism,” i.e., that partisans dislike radical right out-parties – and are reciprocally disliked by radical right partisans – beyond what we can account for based on our main variables (Table S3A). Next, to control for unobserved differences between left- and right-wing parties, we controlled for whether the out-party was classified as a member of a left-wing party family (Table S3B ).
- Section S4 summarizes analyses that assessed whether the effects we identify have changed over time in response to changes in the political environment, such as the shift to greater reliance on online campaigning where partisan hostility may be mobilized by racist and sexist memes (Table S4 below).
- Section S5 analyzes the possibility that partisans’ tendencies to reward out-parties for their representation of women MPs is mediated by the in-party’s parliamentary representation of women (Table S5 below).
- Section S6 analyzes whether the effects we identify are mediated by the proportionality of the country’s electoral system (Table S6 below).
- Section S7 analyzes the possibility that partisans’ tendencies to reward out-parties for their representation of women MPs diminishes as the out-party’s share of women increases (Table S7 below).
- Section S8 analyzes whether the MP gender effects we posit differ for out-parties with women leaders versus those led by men (Tables S8A-S8B below).
- Section S9 reports models with standard errors clustered at the party dyad level (Table S9 below).
- Section S10 analyzes results where we leverage over-time variation within a country by using country fixed effects rather than country year fixed effects (Table S10 below).
- Section S11 reports models using stacked individual level data, where each respondent enters the data as many times as they evaluate a unique out-party. We present models with individual, party-dyad and country-year standard errors, as well as fixed effects at the individual and election level. (Tables S11A-B below).

## ***Section S1. Countries, Elections, and Parties Included in Our Analyses***

Table S1A lists the countries and years of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) election surveys included in our analyses of affective polarization, across the 20 western democracies in our study.

Table S1B lists all of the parties included in our analyses, and also highlights – with a superscripted cross – those parties that featured three or fewer members of parliament during at least one of the elections covered in our data set. As discussed in the main text of the paper, the statistical analyses we report there omit these smaller parties. However we included these parties in the robustness checks reported in Section S2 below. Table S1B also highlights – with an asterisk – those parties that were classified as members of the radical right family by the Comparative Manifesto Project. We relied on these classifications for the robustness checks pertaining to the possibility of radical right exceptionalism, reported in Section S3 below.

Table S1A: Countries and Election-Year Surveys Included in the Analyses

<b>Country</b>	<b>Elections included</b>
Australia	1996, 2004, 2007, 2013
Austria	2008, 2013, 2017
Canada	1997, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015
Denmark	1998, 2001, 2007
Finland	2003, 2007, 2011
France	2002, 2007, 2012
Germany	1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017
Great Britain	1997, 2005, 2015
Greece	2009, 2012, 2015
Iceland	1999, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2013
Ireland	2002, 2007, 2011, 2016
Israel	1996, 2003, 2006, 2013
Netherlands	1998, 2002, 2006, 2010
New Zealand	1996, 2002, 2008, 2011, 2014
Norway	1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013
Portugal	2002, 2005, 2009, 2015
Spain	1996, 2000, 2004, 2008
Sweden	1998, 2002, 2006, 2014
Switzerland	1999, 2003, 2007, 2011
United States	1996, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016

Notes. The table lists the election-year surveys from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems that we analyzed in our study.

Table S1B: Countries, Parties, and Elections included in the Study

<b><u>Britain (1997, 2001, 2005, 2015)</u></b>	<b><u>Ireland (2002, 2007, 2011, 2016)</u></b>
LAB Labour Party	SF Sinn Fein <sup>†</sup>
LibDem Liberal Democrats	FG Fine Gael
CON Conservative Party	GP Green Party <sup>†</sup>
PC Plaid Cymru <sup>†</sup>	LP Labour Party
SNP Scottish National Party <sup>†</sup>	FF Fianna Fail
UKIP United Kingdom Independence Party* <sup>†</sup>	SD Social Democrats <sup>†</sup>
GP Green Party <sup>†</sup>	
	<b><u>Netherlands (1998, 2002, 2006, 2010)</u></b>
	CDA Christian Democratic Appeal
<b><u>Denmark (1998, 2001, 2007)</u></b>	SGP Political Reformed Party <sup>†</sup>
CD Centre Democrats	D66 Democrats 66 <sup>†</sup>
KF Conservatives People's Party	GL Green Left <sup>†</sup>
SD Social Democratic Party	PvdA Labour Party
SF Socialist People's Party	SP Socialist Party <sup>†</sup>
V Liberal Party	VVD People's Party for Freedom & Dem <sup>†</sup>
EL Red-Green Unity List	CU Christian Union <sup>†</sup>
RV Danish People's Party*	LPF List Pim Fortuyn* <sup>†</sup>
KrF Christian People's Party	PVV Party of Freedom*
<b><u>Finland (2003, 2007, 2011)</u></b>	<b><u>Spain (1996, 2000, 2004, 2008)</u></b>
KD Christian Democratic Party	PP People's Party
KESK Centre Party	IU United Left
KOK National Coalition Party	PSOE Socialist Workers' Party
RKP/SFP Swedish People's Party	CiU Convergence and Union
SSDP Social Democratic Party	PNV/EAJ Basque Nationalist Party
VAS Left Alliance	ERC Republican Left of Catalonia
VIHR Green League	EA Basque Solidarity
PS True Finns* <sup>†</sup>	CDS Centre Democrats
	CC Canarian Coalition <sup>†</sup>
	BNG Galician Nationalist Bloc <sup>†</sup>
<b><u>Germany (1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017)</u></b>	
CDU Christian Democrats	<b><u>Portugal (2002, 2005, 2009, 2015)</u></b>
FDP Free Democratic Party <sup>†</sup>	CDS-PP Dem. & Soc Centre+People's Party
GRUNEN Green Party	PSP Socialist Party

PDS/LINKE Party of Dem Socialism <sup>†</sup>	PSD Social Democratic Party
SPD Social Democratic Party	BE Left Bloc <sup>†</sup>
AfD Alternative for Germany <sup>*†</sup>	
Pirates <sup>†</sup>	
	<b><u>Sweden (1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014)</u></b>
<b><u>France (2002, 2007, 2012)</u></b>	V Left Party
EELV Green Party	SAP Social Democrats
UDF Union for French Democracy	FP People's Party
PS Socialist Party	MP Green Party
FN National Front <sup>*†</sup>	M Moderate Party
RPR Rally for the Republic	SD Sweden Democrats*
MoDem Movement for Democracy <sup>†</sup>	KD Christian Democrats
UMP Union for a Popular Movement	C Centre Party
PG Left Party	
FDP Liberal Democrats	<b><u>Norway (1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013)</u></b>
GP Green Party <sup>†</sup>	SV Left Socialists
SP Social Democrats	DNA Labour Party
	V Liberal Party <sup>†</sup>
<b><u>Canada (1997, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015)</u></b>	KrF Christian People's Party
BQ Bloc Quebecois	H Conservative Party
CP Conservative Party	SP Centre Party
LP Liberal Party	Red Electoral Alliance
PC Progressive Conservatives <sup>†</sup>	FrP Progress Party*
ND New Democratic Party	GP Green Party <sup>†</sup>
GP Green Party <sup>†</sup>	
	<b><u>New Zealand (1996, 2002, 2008, 2011, 2014)</u></b>
	ACT New Zealand <sup>†</sup>
<b><u>Australia (1996, 2004, 2007, 2013)</u></b>	GP Green Party
ALP Australian Labor Party	LP Labour Party
AG Australian Greens <sup>†</sup>	MP Maori Party <sup>†</sup>
LPA Liberal Party of Australia	NP National Party
NPA National Party of Australia	NP National Party
AD Australian Democrats <sup>†</sup>	NZFP New Zealand First Party
PP Palmer Party	UFNZ United Future New Zealand <sup>†</sup>
	Progressive Party <sup>†</sup>
<b><u>United States (1996, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016)</u></b>	<b><u>Iceland (1999, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2013)</u></b>
Democratic Party	VGB Left Green Movement <sup>†</sup>
Republican Party	FF Liberal party <sup>†</sup>
	Sj Independence Party

<b><u>Austria (2008, 2013, 2017)</u></b>	F Progressive Party
GA Green Alternative	<b><u>Israel (1996, 2003, 2006, 2013)</u></b>
SPO Austrian Social Democratic Party	HaAvoda Labour Party
OVP Austrian People's Party	MERETZ Mapam-Ratz
KPO Communist Party of Austria	Shinui Change
VdU League of Independents	MAFDAL National Religious Party
FPO Austrian Freedom Party*	SHAS Sephardi Torah Guardians
BZO Alliance for the Future of Austria*	
NEOS New Austria and Liberal Forum <sup>†</sup>	Likud Union
TS Team Stronach for Austria <sup>†</sup>	National Union
JETZT Pilz List <sup>†</sup>	The Jewish Home* <sup>†</sup>
	Movement for Civil Rights and Peace <sup>†</sup>
<b><u>Greece (2009, 2012, 2015)</u></b>	There is a Future <sup>†</sup>
KKE Communist Party of Greece	
SYRIZA Coalition of the Radical Left	<b><u>Switzerland (1999, 2003, 2007, 2011)</u></b>
PASOK Panhellenic Socialist Movement	CVP Christian Democrats
ND New Democracy	FDP Liberal Democrats
ANEL Independent Greeks* <sup>†</sup>	GP Green Party <sup>†</sup>
LS-XA Golden Dawn* <sup>†</sup>	SP Social Democrats
DIMAR Democratic Left <sup>†</sup>	SVP Swiss People's Party*
KINAL The River <sup>†</sup>	EVP Evangelical People's Party <sup>†</sup>
P Pirate Party <sup>†</sup>	GLP Green Liberal Party <sup>†</sup>
So United Socialist Party	LT Ticino League <sup>†</sup>
Citizens' Movement <sup>†</sup>	

Notes. The table lists the countries, parties, and election years that were included in our empirical analyses of partisans' out-party evaluations that we report in the main text of the paper. The parties marked with an asterisk are those that were classified as members of the radical right party family, according to the Comparative Manifesto Project classification system. We used these classifications for the supplementary analyses on the possibility of 'radical right exceptionalism' reported in Section S3 in this memo. The parties marked with a super-scripted cross are those that featured three or fewer members of parliament during at least one of the elections covered in our data set. These party-years were excluded from the statistical analyses reported in the main text of the paper, but were included in the analyses reported in Section S2 of this memo.

## Section S2. Analyses Including Parties with Small Parliamentary Delegations

We re-estimated our main models from Table 1 in the paper while including parties with small parliamentary delegations, i.e., those with three or fewer MPs, which accounted for a disproportionate share of the all-men and all-women delegations in our data set. (These parties are marked with a superscript in the list of parties given in Table S1 above.) In these analyses the number of cases increased from N=1842 to N=2019. Table S2 reports the parameter estimates on this full set of cases, which continue to support our substantive conclusions.

Table S2: Predictors of Out-Party Evaluations, Including Small Parties (N=2019)

	Bivariate Model (1)	Full Model (2)	Women Partisans (3)	Men Partisans (4)
<b>[out-party <i>j</i>'s proportion of women MPs (<i>t</i> – 1)]</b>	<b>1.60** (0.30)</b>	<b>1.47** (0.35)</b>	<b>1.69** (0.38)</b>	<b>1.19** (0.33)</b>
[elite right-left distance <i>i, j</i> ( <i>t</i> )]		-0.58** (0.09)	-0.60** (0.09)	-0.64** (0.10)
[ <i>i, j</i> are coalition partners ( <i>t</i> )]		0.93** (0.25)	0.93** (0.23)	0.96** (0.25)
[ <i>i, j</i> are opposition partners ( <i>t</i> )]		0.35** (0.10)	0.32** (0.09)	0.34** (0.11)
Country and year fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES
Adjusted R2	0.15	0.30	0.32	0.28

\*\*  $p \leq .01$  ; \*  $p \leq .05$  : two-tailed tests.

Notes. The dependent variable, [party *i*'s supporters' evaluations of out-party *j* (*t*)], is the average thermometer rating on a 0-10 scale that party *i*'s partisans assigned to the out-party *j* in the CSES election survey administered at time *t*. The OLS regression models were estimated with standard errors clustered on elections. The set of election-year surveys included in these analyses, along with the parties we analyzed, are listed in Table S1B in this memo.



### Section 3. Analyses Accounting for Unobserved Effects Relating to Party Families

#### *The possibility of radical right exceptionalism*

Previous research suggests that partisans may dislike radical right out-parties – and that radical right partisans reciprocally dislike other parties – beyond what we can account for based on Left-Right disputes, coalition arrangements, and MP gender effects.<sup>1</sup> To evaluate whether such effects might change our substantive conclusions, we re-estimated our models while excluding radical right parties. (This reduced the number of cases in our analyses to N=1590.) Table S3A reports the parameter estimate for this model. The estimate on our key variable, [*out-party j's proportion of women MPs (t – 1)*], continues to support our substantive conclusions about the effects of women out-party MPs on partisans' affective evaluations.

**Table S3A. The Predictors of Out-Party Thermometer Evaluations: Analyses that Omit Radical Right Parties (N=1590)**

	(1)
[ <i>out-party j's proportion of women MPs (t – 1)</i> ]	<b>0.89**</b> (0.26)
[ <i>elite right-left distance i, j (t)</i> ]	-0.58** (0.0)
[ <i>i, j are coalition partners (t)</i> ]	0.95** (0.21)
[ <i>i, j are opposition partners (t)</i> ]	0.47** (0.09)
Country and year fixed effects	YES
Adjusted R2	0.30

\*\*  $p \leq .01$  ; \*  $p \leq .05$  : two-tailed tests.

Notes. The dependent variable, [*party i's supporters' evaluations of out-party j (t)*], is the average thermometer rating on a 0-10 scale that party *i*'s partisans assigned to the out-party *j* in the election survey administered at time *t*. The OLS regression models were estimated with standard errors clustered on elections. All models include country and year fixed effects. The set of election-year surveys included in these analyses, and the parties we analyzed, are listed in Table S1B in this memo. That table also identifies the parties classified as radical right.

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<sup>1</sup> Mudde, Cas. (2019). *The Far Right Today*. Cambridge: John Wiley & Sons.

### *Accounting for the distinction between left- and right-wing out-parties*

We estimated models that included a dummy variable for whether the out-party belonged to a leftist party family, in order to control for the possibility of effects pertaining to left- versus right-wing parties. For these analyses left-wing parties were defined as those belonging to the communist, green, and social democratic families, as classified by the Comparative Manifesto Research codings. Table S3B reports the parameter estimates for this model.

We estimate statistically significant tendencies for in-partisans to assign modestly warmer thermometer ratings to leftist out-parties, beyond what we would predict based on Left-Right differences, coalition arrangements, and MP gender effects: the coefficient estimate on the [*out-party j is leftist*] variable is +0.22 ( $p < .05$ ) in the full model (column 2 in Table S3B), denoting that in-partisans award a modest ‘affective bonus’ of about 0.2 points on the 0-10 thermometer scale in their ratings of leftist out-parties, in analyses that control for Left-Right distance, coalition arrangements, and the out-party’s representation of women. Most important, the parameter estimates on our key variable, [*out-party j’s proportion of women MPs ( $t - 1$ )*], continue to support our substantive conclusions about the effects of women out-party MPs on partisans’ affective evaluations.

**Table S3B. Controlling for Left- versus Right-Wing Out-Parties (N=1842)**

	Bivariate Model (1)	Full Model (2)
<i>[out-party j's proportion of women MPs (t – 1)]</i>	<b>1.89** (0.43)</b>	<b>1.30* (0.62)</b>
<i>[elite right-left distance i,j (t)]</i>		-0.60** (0.09)
<i>[i, j are coalition partners (t)]</i>		0.96** (0.25)
<i>[i, j are opposition partners (t)]</i>		0.37** (0.11)
<i>[out-party j is a leftist party (t)]</i>		0.22* (0.11)
Country and year fixed effects	YES	YES
Adjusted R2	0.15	0.31

\*\*  $p \leq .01$  ; \*  $p \leq .05$  : two-tailed tests.

Notes. The dependent variable, *[party i's supporters' evaluations of out-party j (t)]*, is the average thermometer rating on a 0-10 scale that party *i*'s partisans assigned to the out-party *j* in the election survey administered at time *t*. The OLS regression models were estimated with standard errors clustered on elections. All models include country and year fixed effects. The set of election-year surveys included in these analyses, along with the parties we analyzed, are listed in Table S1B in this memo.

#### Section 4. Analyses Accounting for Time-Period Effects

The period of our study (1996-2017) encompasses a time span that saw the rise of the internet and social media, along with parties' increasing reliance on online campaigning. Given that online platforms may contribute to an environment where partisan hostility can be mobilized by racist and sexist memes, we conducted analyses to assess whether the magnitude of the effects that interest us changed over the period of our study. Table S4 below reports analyses where we re-estimated our main model on the set of CSES election surveys in our data set from 1996-2006 (column 1) and then on the set of election surveys from 2007-2017 (column 2). We see that the parameter estimates on our key variable, *[out-party  $j$ 's proportion of women MPs ( $t - 1$ )]*, remain positive and significant in the analyses of both time periods, substantiating our substantive conclusions about the effects of women out-party MPs on partisans' affective evaluations.

**Table S4. Accounting for Time Period Effects**

	1996- 2006 (1)	2007- 2017 (2)
<i>[out-party <math>j</math>'s proportion of women MPs (<math>t - 1</math>)]</i>	<b>1.13*</b> <b>(0.55)</b>	<b>2.06**</b> <b>(0.69)</b>
<i>[elite right-left distance <math>i, j</math> (<math>t</math>)]</i>	-0.70** (0.11)	-0.51** (0.13)
<i>[<math>i, j</math> are coalition partners (<math>t</math>)]</i>	0.88** (0.28)	0.97** (0.29)
<i>[<math>i, j</math> are opposition partners (<math>t</math>)]</i>	0.37* (0.17)	0.37* (0.19)
Country and year fixed effects	YES	YES
$N$	848	994
Adjusted R2	0.33	0.30

\*\*  $p \leq .01$  ; \*  $p \leq .05$  : two-tailed tests.

Notes. The dependent variable, *[party  $i$ 's supporters' evaluations of out-party  $j$  ( $t$ )]*, is the average thermometer rating on a 0-10 scale that party  $i$ 's partisans assigned to the out-party  $j$  in the election survey administered at time  $t$ . The OLS regression models were estimated with standard errors clustered on elections. All models include country and year fixed effects. The set of election-year surveys included in these analyses, along with the parties we analyzed, are listed in Table S1B in this memo.

## Section S5. Analyzing the Effects of the In-Party's Proportion of Women MPs

Our theoretical arguments and empirical analyses emphasize partisan reactions to out-party women MPs. It is also possible that partisans' tendency to reward out-parties for women's representation is mediated by the in-party's representation of women. In particular, partisans may reward out-parties whose representation of women more closely matches their own party's representation of women.

To evaluate the possibility of this “birds of a feather” effect, we created a new variable, [*in-party i's proportion of women MPs ( $t - 1$ )*], that denoted the proportion of the in-party *i*'s parliamentary delegation composed of women, along with an additional variable [*absolute value of the difference between the proportion of women MPs in parties  $i, j$  ( $t - 1$ )*], denoting the absolute difference in the parliamentary representation of women between the in-party and the out-party. We then estimated the parameters of a model that included both variables, in addition to the variables included in our main model. For these analyses the coefficient on the [*absolute value of the difference between the proportion of women MPs in parties  $i, j$  ( $t - 1$ )*] provides an estimate of partisans' tendencies to reward out-parties whose parliamentary gender balance matches that of their own party, while the estimate on the [*in-party i's proportion of women MPs ( $t - 1$ )*] variable denotes whether partisans of parties with a greater parliamentary representation of women tended to award warmer (colder) evaluations towards out-parties, independently of the out-party's representation of women MPs.

Table S5 reports the parameter estimates for this model. We see that the estimate on our key variable, [*out-party j's proportion of women MPs ( $t - 1$ )*], remains large and positive ( $p < .01$ ), which continues to support our substantive conclusion that partisans reward out-parties for their representation of women MPs. The estimate on the [*absolute value of the difference between the proportion of women MPs in parties  $i, j$  ( $t - 1$ )*] variable is significantly negative ( $p < .05$  in the full model in column 2), which implies that partisans also reward out-parties whose parliamentary gender balances matches that of the in-party. However the magnitudes of the coefficient estimate on the [*out-party j's proportion of women MPs ( $t - 1$ )*] variable is larger than that on this difference variable, denoting that the former effect is stronger than the latter, i.e., that partisans continue to reward out-parties as the out-party's representation of women MPs exceeds that of the in-party. Finally, the estimate on the [*in-party i's proportion of women MPs ( $t - 1$ )*] is small and positive ( $p < .01$ ), denoting that partisans of parties with more women MPs tend to assign modestly warmer ratings to out-parties, all else equal.

**Table S5. Accounting for the In-Party's Representation of Women**

	Basic Model (1)	Full Model (2)
<b>[out-party <math>j</math>'s proportion of women MPs (<math>t - 1</math>)]</b>	<b>1.88** (0.37)</b>	<b>1.84** (0.55)</b>
<b>[in-party <math>i</math>'s proportion of women MPs (<math>t - 1</math>)]</b>	<b>0.76** (0.25)</b>	<b>0.57** (0.22)</b>
<b>[absolute value of the difference between the proportion of women MPs in parties <math>i, j</math> (<math>t - 1</math>)]</b>	<b>-1.42** (0.58)</b>	<b>-1.03* (0.52)</b>
[elite right-left distance $i, j$ ( $t$ )]		-0.60** (0.08)
[ $i, j$ are coalition partners ( $t$ )]		0.89** (0.26)
[ $i, j$ are opposition partners ( $t$ )]		0.38* (0.10)
Country and year fixed effects	YES	YES
Adjusted R2	0.16	0.32

\*\*  $p \leq .01$  ; \*  $p \leq .05$  : two-tailed tests.


Notes. The dependent variable, [*party  $i$ 's supporters' evaluations of out-party  $j$  ( $t$ )*], is the average thermometer rating on a 0-10 scale that party  $i$ 's partisans assigned to the out-party  $j$  in the election survey administered at time  $t$ . The OLS regression models were estimated with standard errors clustered on elections. All models include country and year fixed effects. The set of election-year surveys included in these analyses, along with the parties we analyzed, are listed in Table S1B in this memo.

Based on the estimates for the full version of the model reported in column 2 of Table S5 above, Figure S1 displays the in-party  $i$ 's partisans' predicted thermometer ratings of out-party  $j$  (the vertical axis) as a function of the proportion of women MPs in out-party  $j$ 's parliamentary delegation (the horizontal axis), for two different scenarios. The first scenario, represented by the top, solid line, is where the proportion of women MPs in the in-party  $i$  is 0.45, which is one standard deviation above the mean proportion of women MPs in our data set. The second

scenario, represented by the bottom, dotted line, is where the proportion of women MPs in the in-party  $i$  is only 0.13, which is 1 SD below the mean in our data set.<sup>2</sup>

The figure displays patterns consistent with our women MPs affective bonus hypothesis: predicted out-party evaluations improve (i.e., become warmer) with higher proportions of out-party women MPs, over all values of the *[out-party  $j$ 's proportion of women MPs ( $t - 1$ )]* variable. However, consistent with the conclusion that partisans also consider whether out-parties' representation of women matches that of their in-party, note that these predicted effects are much stronger when the out-party  $j$ 's representation of women MPs increases and also moves towards that of the in-party, since in this scenario partisans reward the out-party for increasing their descriptive representation of women and for more closely matching the in-party's representation of women MPs. As the out-party's representation of women exceeds that of the in-party, in-partisans continue to reward the out-party for increasing their representation of women, but at a diminishing rate.

**Figure S1. Relationship between the In-Party's Representation of Women, the Out-Party's Representation of Women, and Affective Evaluations**



<sup>2</sup> Because we are using country-year fixed effects models, it was necessary to specify a country-election year to generate the intercept for this plot. This choice determines the intercept but not the slope of the line. For a country we used France, and for a year we used 2002. The computations are for the scenario where the in-party and out-party are from different sides of the aisle (i.e., one is in government and the other in opposition), with the Left-Right distance between the parties set at the mean value in our data set.

## *Section S6. Accounting for the Possibility that Effects Are Mediated by Electoral System Proportionality*

There are reasons to evaluate whether the effects we analyze are mediated by a country's institutions, in particular the proportionality of the electoral system. Research by Andersen and Guillory (1997), for example, finds that the gap between democratic satisfaction expressed by partisans of governing parties versus opposition parties' partisans is greater in countries with majoritarian institutions, which are more likely to concentrate executive power in the hands of a single party or a governing coalition that commanded minority support in the popular vote. Moreover, Gidron et al. (2020, Tables 6-7) find that, all else equal, levels of mass-level affective polarization – and also of out-party dislike – are lower in countries with more proportional systems.

To account for possible effects related to the country's electoral system we conducted three supplementary analyses, reported in Table S6 below. Following Gidron et al. (2020), these analyses include the variable [*Logged District Magnitude*], which represents the log of the average district magnitude for the first tier, based on the data set compiled by Bormann and Golder.<sup>3</sup> The values of this variable range from zero for the single-member district systems in our study—the U.S., U.K., France, Canada, and Australia—to slightly above 5 for the most proportional systems in our study (e.g., the Netherlands). We note that because these analyses controlled for electoral system proportionality, we controlled for election but not country fixed effects in these models.

Column 1 in Table S6 reports analyses that include all of the variables in our main model plus the [*Logged District Magnitude*] variable. This model can be used to assess whether there is a direct relationship between electoral system proportionality and out-party evaluations, while controlling for Left-Right distance, coalition arrangements, and the out-party's representation of women. We see that the estimate on the [*Logged District Magnitude*] variable is small and insignificant while the estimate on our key variable, [*out-party j's proportion of women MPs ( $t - 1$ )*], remains positive and significant, substantiating our conclusion that partisans reward out-parties for greater representation of women MPs.

Column 2 in the table reports analyses for a model that is identical to that in column 1, except that it includes the additional interacted variable [*Logged District Magnitude*  $\times$  *out-party j's proportion of women MPs ( $t - 1$ )*], to assess whether partisans' tendencies to reward out-parties for their parliamentary representation of women is mediated by electoral system proportionality. Finally, column 3 reports analyses in which we interacted the [*Logged District Magnitude*] variable with all other independent variables (coalition arrangements, Left-Right distance, the out-party's representation of women), in order to assess whether these effects are mediated by electoral system proportionality. We find no evidence of such mediating effects, although in

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<sup>3</sup> Bormann, Nils-Christian, and Matt Golder. 2013. "Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946-2011." *Electoral Studies* 32(2): 360-69.



column 3 the estimated direct effect of electoral system proportionality is significant. Most important, for each model we continue to estimate positive and significant coefficients on the [out-party  $j$ 's proportion of women MPs ( $t - 1$ )], variable, which continues to support our key hypothesis.

**Table S6. Accounting for Electoral System Proportionality (N=1842)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
[out-party $j$ 's proportion of women MPs ( $t - 1$ )]	1.75** (0.42)	2.12** (0.42)	2.14** (0.82)
[Log of District Magnitude]	0.07 (0.04)	0.10 (0.06)	0.13** (0.05)
[out-party $j$ 's prop. of women MPs ( $t - 1$ )] $\times$ [Log District Magnitude]		-0.13 (0.23)	-0.15 (0.23)
[elite right-left distance $i, j$ ( $t$ )]	-0.53** (0.08)	-0.53** (0.08)	0.43** (0.15)
[ $i, j$ are coalition partners ( $t$ )]	1.06** (0.20)	1.06** (0.20)	1.21** (0.48)
[ $i, j$ are opposition partners ( $t$ )]	0.34** (0.12)	0.34** (0.11)	0.45* (0.23)
[elite right-left distance $i, j$ ( $t$ )] $\times$ [Log of District Magnitude]			-0.04 (0.06)
[ $i, j$ are coalition partners ( $t$ )] $\times$ [Log of District Magnitude]			-0.05 (0.12)
[ $i, j$ are opposition partners ( $t$ )] $\times$ [Log of District Magnitude]			-0.04 (0.06)
Year fixed effects	YES	YES	YES
Adjusted R2	0.26	0.25	0.25

\*\*  $p \leq .01$ ; \*  $p \leq .05$  : two-tailed tests.

Notes. The dependent variable, [party  $i$ 's supporters' evaluations of out-party  $j$  ( $t$ )], is the average thermometer rating on a 0-10 scale that party  $i$ 's partisans assigned to the out-party  $j$  in the election survey administered at time  $t$ . The OLS regression models were estimated with standard errors clustered on elections. All models include year fixed effects. The election-year surveys included in these analyses, and the parties we analyzed, are listed in Table S1B in this memo.

## *Section 7. Analyses Accounting for the Possibility of Diminishing Marginal Returns from Out-Parties Adding More Women MPs*

Our women MPs affective bonus hypothesis posits that partisans evaluate out-parties more warmly as their representation of women increases. Because political parties, like most political institutions, tend to be male-dominated (see Figure 1 in the main paper), we expect that in most cases citizens will evaluate out-party delegations more warmly as women's descriptive representation increases. However, as parties pass 50% women in their parliamentary delegations, citizens' warm evaluations of out-parties might diminish with additional increases in women's representation. Specifically, citizens may prefer institutions that reflect gender parity and are descriptively representative of the gender distribution in the general population (e.g., Barnes and Taylor-Robinson 2018; for related experimental research see Clayton et al. 2019).<sup>4</sup>

To evaluate the possibility that out-parties' affective gains from adding additional women MPs diminish at higher levels of women's parliamentary representation, we estimated the parameters of *diminishing gender effects* specifications, which were identical to the specifications in the main paper except that they also included the squared term [*out-party j's proportion of women MPs* ( $t - 1$ )]<sup>2</sup>. If out-parties' marginal affective gains from adding additional women MPs diminish for out-parties with significant women's parliamentary representation, we expect the coefficient on the squared term [*out-party j's proportion of women MPs* ( $t - 1$ )]<sup>2</sup> to be negative, denoting that out-parties' affective gains from adding additional women MPs diminish when the party has higher levels of women's representation to begin with.

Table S7 reports the parameter estimates on models that include the squared term. The estimate on the [*out-party j's proportion of women MPs* ( $t - 1$ )] variable is once again significantly positive ( $p < .01$ ) in both the reduced and full models (columns 1 and 2 in Table S7, respectively), while the estimate on the squared term is negative and significant in both models ( $p < .01$ ). This suggests that out-parties' marginal affective gains from adding additional women MPs diminish when the out-party has greater women's representation to begin with.

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<sup>4</sup> Barnes, Tiffany D., and Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson. "Women cabinet ministers in highly visible posts and empowerment of women: Are the two related?." *Measuring women's political empowerment across the globe*. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2018. 229-255.

Clayton, Amanda, Jennifer M. Piscopo, and Diana Z. O'Brien. "All Male Panels? Representation and Democratic Legitimacy." *American Journal of Political Science*, 63.1: (2019): 113–29.

**Table S7. Controlling for the Possibility of Diminishing Marginal Returns from Adding More Out-Party Women MPs (N=1842)**

	(1)	(2)
<b>[out-party <i>j</i>'s proportion of women MPs (<i>t</i>)]</b>	<b>4.40**</b> <b>(1.24)</b>	<b>4.51**</b> <b>(1.38)</b>
<b>[out-party <i>j</i>'s proportion of women MPs (<i>t</i>)]<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>-3.71**</b> <b>(1.42)</b>	<b>-4.11**</b> <b>(1.51)</b>
[elite right-left distance <i>i, j</i> ( <i>t</i> )]		-0.60** (0.09)
[ <i>i, j</i> are coalition partners ( <i>t</i> )]		0.93** (0.25)
[ <i>i, j</i> are opposition partners ( <i>t</i> )]		0.39** (0.10)
Country and year fixed effects	YES	YES
Adjusted R2	0.16	0.32

\*\*  $p \leq .01$  ; \*  $p \leq .05$  : two-tailed tests.


Notes. The dependent variable, [*party i*'s supporters' evaluations of out-party *j* (*t*)], is the average thermometer rating on a 0-10 scale that party *i*'s partisans assigned to the out-party *j* in the election survey administered at time *t*. The OLS regression models were estimated with standard errors clustered on elections. All models include country and year fixed effects. The set of election-year surveys included in these analyses, along with the parties we analyzed, are listed in Table S1B above.

Figure S2 displays the predicted relationship between the out-party's parliamentary gender balance and out-party evaluations, based on the estimates for the full version of the diminishing marginal gender effects model (column 2 in Table S7). Specifically, the figure displays party *i*'s partisans' predicted thermometer ratings of out-party *j* (the vertical axis) as a function of the proportion of women MPs in party *j*'s parliamentary delegation (the horizontal axis), for a party pair consisting of one governing and one opposition party, with the parties' Left-Right distance set at 22 RILE units, the mean value in the study.<sup>5</sup> The figure displays a pattern that is consistent with our women MPs affective bonus hypothesis: predicted out-party evaluations improve (i.e.,

<sup>5</sup> Because we are using country-year fixed effects models, it was necessary to specify a country-election year to generate the intercept for this plot. This choice determines the intercept but not the slope of the line. For a country we used France, and for a year we used 2002.

become warmer) with higher proportions of women MPs, over most observed values of the [*out-party j's proportion of women MPs* ( $t - 1$ )] variable.

**Figure S2. Predicted Out-Party Evaluations as Function of the Proportion of Women MPs: Diminishing Marginal Effects for Women-Majority Out-Parties**



Notes. The figure displays the mean predicted thermometer rating that members of a partisan constituency assign to an out-party (the vertical axis), as a function of the out-party's proportion of women MPs (the horizontal axis). The computations are based on the parameter estimates reported in column 2 of Table S7. The dotted lines display 90% confidence intervals.

However consistent with the expectation of diminishing marginal gender effects, out-parties' predicted gains from increasing their proportion of women MPs diminish at higher levels of women's representation: as the out-party  $j$ 's proportion of women MPs increases from 0.0 to 0.20, for instance, predicted out-party ratings improve by 0.74 thermometer units, an affective bonus that is comparable to the predicted effects of a one standard deviation decrease in the Left-Right distance between the parties (which is estimated at 0.60 thermometer units). When  $j$ 's

women MP proportion increases from 0.3 to 0.5, however, predicted out-party ratings increase by only 0.25 thermometer units.

Finally, when  $j$ 's women MP proportion passes 0.6, predicted out-party ratings begin to decline. This would be consistent with citizens preferring parity between men and women, rather than always preferring more women representatives (because, for example, women politicians are stereotyped as more consensual, collegial representatives). We caution, however, against over-interpreting these results. Very few parties have crossed beyond the 50% gender parity threshold. While there are theoretical reasons to expect a decline in party affect at very high levels of women's representation, we are limited in pinpointing the precise dynamics of this tradeoff because women remain significantly under-represented in parliamentary politics.

### *Section S8. Analyses of Different Reactions to Out-Parties led by Women versus Those Led by Men*

We analyzed whether the MP gender effects we posit differed for out-parties with women leaders versus those led by men. As displayed in Table S8B, our analyses of out-parties led by men – which constituted over 70% of the cases in our study – continued to support our substantive conclusions, and in fact these parties were estimated to realize even larger affective gains from increasing their representation of women MPs than our estimates over the full set of cases. As displayed in Table S8A, we could not reliably estimate effects for women-led out-parties due to the smaller number of cases (N=479), although our point estimates on such parties imply somewhat more modest affective gains from adding women MPs. However, these estimates on women-led parties did not differ at statistically significant levels from the estimates on parties led by men.

**Table S8A: The Predictors of Out-Party Thermometer Evaluations of Parties with Women Leaders (N=479)**

	(1)	(2)
<i>[out-party j's proportion of women MPs (t – 1)]</i>	<b>0.92</b> <b>(0.85)</b>	<b>0.93</b> <b>(0.80)</b>
<i>[elite right-left distance i, j (t)]</i>		-0.82** (0.15)
<i>[i, j are coalition partners (t)]</i>		0.82** (0.24)
<i>[i, j are opposition partners (t)]</i>		0.40 (0.23)
Country and year fixed effects	YES	YES
Adjusted R2	0.13	0.39

**Table S8B: The Predictors of Out-Party Thermometer Evaluations for Parties with Male Leaders (N=1,357)**

	(1)	(2)
<i>[out-party j's proportion of women MPs (t – 1)]</i>	<b>2.91**</b> <b>(0.57)</b>	<b>2.93**</b> <b>(0.67)</b>
<i>[elite right-left distance i, j (t)]</i>		-0.55** (0.09)
<i>[i, j are coalition partners (t)]</i>		0.98** (0.26)
<i>[i, j are opposition partners (t)]</i>		0.41** (0.12)
Country and year fixed effects	YES	YES
Adjusted R2	0.18	0.32

\*\*  $p \leq .01$  ; \*  $p \leq .05$  : two-tailed tests.

Notes. The dependent variable, *[party i's supporters' evaluations of out-party j (t)]*, is the average thermometer rating on a 0-10 scale that party *i*'s partisans assigned to the out-party *j* in the election survey administered at time *t*. The OLS regression models were estimated with standard errors clustered on elections. All models include country-year fixed effects. The election-year surveys included in these analyses, along with the parties we analyzed, are listed in Table S1B in this memo.

### Section S9. Alternative Approaches to Clustering the Standard Errors in the Statistical Models

We analyzed models with clustered errors at the party-dyad level, as determining the correct level to cluster observational research can be tricky, and to ensure that different clustering of the errors does not affect the substantive results. We find the results unchanged using the party-dyad level of clustered standard errors (see Table S9).

**Table S9: Clustering Standard Errors at the Party Dyad Level (N=1842)**

	(1)
[ <i>out-party j's proportion of women MPs (t – 1)</i> ]	1.47** (0.22)
[ <i>elite right-left distance i, j (t)</i> ]	-0.58** (0.04)
[ <i>i, j are coalition partners (t)</i> ]	0.93** (0.12)
[ <i>i, j are opposition partners (t)</i> ]	0.34** (0.07)
Country and year fixed effects	YES
Adjusted R2	0.30

\*\*  $p \leq .01$  ; \*  $p \leq .05$  : two-tailed tests.

Notes. The dependent variable, [*party i's supporters' evaluations of out-party j (t)*], is the average thermometer rating on a 0-10 scale that party *i*'s partisans assigned to the out-party *j* in the election survey administered at time *t*. The OLS regression models were estimated with standard errors clustered at the party-dyad level. The election-year surveys included in these analyses, along with the parties we analyzed, are listed in Table S1B in this memo.



## Section S10: Country Fixed Effects

We next analyzed models with country fixed effects. Our main models leverage within election variation in women's representation, while including fixed effects to control for any election specific effects. Here we instead leverage variation across elections within the same country, while including country fixed-effects to control for any country-specific effects (see Table S10).

**Table S10: Models with Country Fixed Effects (N= 1842)**

	(1)	(2)
<b>[out-party <i>j</i>'s proportion of women MPs (<math>t - 1</math>)]</b>	<b>1.83**</b> (0.36)	<b>1.66**</b> (0.43)
[elite right-left distance $i, j$ ( $t$ )]		-0.55** (0.09)
[ $i, j$ are coalition partners ( $t$ )]		0.93** (0.25)
[ $i, j$ are opposition partners ( $t$ )]		0.38** (0.11)
Country fixed effects	YES	YES
Adjusted R2		0.27

\*\*  $p \leq .01$  ; \*  $p \leq .05$  : two-tailed tests.

Notes. The dependent variable, [*party  $i$ 's supporters' evaluations of out-party  $j$  ( $t$ )*], is the average thermometer rating on a 0-10 scale that party  $i$ 's partisans assigned to the out-party  $j$  in the election survey administered at time  $t$ . The OLS regression models were estimated with standard errors clustered at the country-level. The election-year surveys included in these analyses, along with the parties we analyzed, are listed in Table S1B in this memo.

### Section S11: Stacked Individual Level Models

Finally, we present models with an individual level stacked dataset, in which each respondent is entered into the data as many times as they evaluated a unique out-party. We include individual fixed effects in Table S11A to test if, within individuals, parties that have more women MPs are evaluated more highly than parties with fewer women MPs. Then Table S11B includes a model that instead includes election-level fixed effects. We specify three clusterings of fixed effects, individual, party-dyad and country-year, as determining the correct level to cluster observational research can be tricky. Thus, below each coefficient, in order, are listed the size of standard errors when clustered at the country-year, then party-dyad, then individual level. Importantly, the choice of clustering does not impact the substantive results.

**Table S11A: Individual Level Models, Individual Fixed Effects, Various Standard Errors (N= 316,454)**

	(1)	(2)
<i>[out-party j's proportion of women MPs (t – 1)]</i>	<b>1.39***</b> (0.30, 0.39, 0.03)	<b>1.27**</b> (0.31, 0.29, 0.03)
<i>[elite right-left distance i, j (t)]</i>		-0.70** (0.07, 0.07, 0.01)
<i>[i, j are coalition partners (t)]</i>		1.00** (0.16, 0.17, 0.02)
<i>[i, j are opposition partners (t)]</i>		0.47** (0.15, 0.13, 0.01)
Individual fixed effects	YES	YES
Adjusted R2	0.13	0.21

\*\*  $p \leq .01$  ; \*  $p \leq .05$  : two-tailed tests.

Notes. The dependent variable, *[party i's supporters' evaluations of out-party j (t)]*, is the average thermometer rating on a 0-10 scale that party i's partisans assigned to the out-party j in the election survey administered at time t. The numbers in parentheses below each coefficient represent, in order, the sizes of standard errors when clustered at the country-year, then party-dyad, then individual level. The election-year surveys included in these analyses, along with the parties we analyzed, are listed in Table S1B in this memo.

**Table S11B: Individual Level Models, Country-Year  
Fixed Effects, Various Fixed Effects (N= 316,454)**

	(1)	(2)
<i>[out-party j's proportion of women MPs (t – 1)]</i>	<b>1.29***</b> (0.30, 0.33, 0.03)	<b>1.24**</b> <b>(0.20,</b> <b>0.25,</b> <b>0.03)</b>
<i>[elite right-left distance i, j (t)]</i>		-0.61** (0.06,. 0.05, 0.01)
<i>[i, j are coalition partners (t)]</i>		0.97** (0.15, 0.14, 0.02)
<i>[i, j are opposition partners (t)]</i>		0.44** (0.11, 0.09, 0.01)
Country Year fixed effects	YES	YES
Adjusted R2	0.06	0.11

\*\*  $p \leq .01$  ; \*  $p \leq .05$  : two-tailed tests.

Notes. The dependent variable, *[party i's supporters' evaluations of out-party j (t)]*, is the average thermometer rating on a 0-10 scale that party i's partisans assigned to the out-party j in the election survey administered at time *t*. The numbers in parentheses below each coefficient represent, in order, the sizes of standard errors when clustered at the country-year, then party-dyad, then individual level. The election-year surveys included in these analyses, along with the parties we analyzed, are listed in Table S1B in this memo.