Fairness and Support for Populist Parties

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Abstract

On the premise that issues of fairness are important to voting behavior but often unrecognized, we explore how feelings of unfairness increase support for populist parties. We distinguish personal unfairness, the view that one's own economic situation is unfair, from social unfairness, the view that the economic situation of others in society is unfair. Based on findings in psychology, we argue that uncertainties associated with the transition to a globalized knowledge economy heighten people's feelings of personal unfairness and find empirical support for that contention. We develop arguments about why feelings of *personal* unfairness should increase support for the populist right and feelings about *social* unfairness should increase support for the populist left and find empirical support for them. Our results contribute to explanations for why people vote for the populist right rather than the left and underline the roles that uncertainty and issues of fairness play in electoral politics.

A large body of research indicates that people whose livelihoods are threatened by regional economic decline or automation are more likely than others to vote for candidates of the populist right (Kriesi et al. 2008; Autor et al. 2020; Colantone and Stanig 2018; Anelli et al. 2021; Im et al. 2019; Rodrik 2021). But why do they vote for the populist right rather than parties of the left? In some respects, this outcome is puzzling. Although some populist right parties defend income maintenance programs, in many developed democracies the policies of radical left parties, and even some center-left parties, speak more directly to the material needs of people facing threats of unemployment or economic deprivation (Fenger 2018; Enggist and Pingerra 2022). The principal appeal of populist right candidates often lies in their stances against immigration, even though most studies find that the economic benefits of limiting immigration would be small (Ivarsflaten 2008; Rooduijn et al. 2017; Ottaviano and Peri 2012). Some candidates of the populist right seek trade protection, but its appeal may also be cultural in nature (Hays et al. 2019; Mutz 2021).

This puzzle directs our attention to the extent to which electoral politics is not simply a contest for material resources. Although democratic politics may ultimately be about 'who gets what, when, how' (Lasswell 1936), it also has other dimensions, visible in the longstanding power of nationalist appeals and the prominent roles of ethnic or racial conflict in many polities (Bonikowski 2016; Jardina 2019). Scholars seeking to understand the contemporary resurgence of support for right populism from these more cultural perspectives have generally

emphasized the extent to which that resurgence represents a backlash against the growing prominence of post-material values or the status anxieties aroused by recent efforts to promote gender equality, racial equality and multiculturalism (Norris and Inglehart 2019; Gest et al. 2018; Gidron and Hall 2017). There is much in these perspectives, but it is still puzzling why people suffering from the effects of economic dislocation or susceptible to the threat of automation should be especially likely to support parties of the populist right. Arguments focused on the psychological effects of threats to status get us only some distance toward resolving this problem (Mutz 2019; Gidron and Hall 2020).

To these issues, we bring an approach that emphasizes how central considerations about fairness are to political behavior and electoral politics. In some respects, that claim may seem obvious. Social democratic parties have long campaigned on appeals to social justice (Moschonas 2001) and liberal political theorists have portrayed fairness as the bedrock of social justice (Rawls 1971). Sandel (2018) notes that moral claims such as these may motivate voters just as strongly as material concerns do (see also Rodrik 2018; Cavaillé 2023). Many analyses in social psychology also point to the importance that people attach to issues of fairness (Lind and Tyler 1988). But scholars of voting behavior have tended to draw a sharp distinction between moral issues, seen as ones engaging human values, from issues associated with the distribution of economic resources (cf. Ryan 2014); and many studies of the relationship between economic developments and votes for populist parties tend to emphasize the material interests

engaged by those developments rather than concerns of the sort associated with issues of fairness (eg. Autor et al. 2020; Colantone and Stanig 2018; Broz et al. 2021; Anelli et al. 2021).

There is special warrant for approaching support for populist parties from the perspective of fairness. Several seminal ethnographic studies reveal that perceptions of unfairness are central to the grievances motivating support for populist right movements (Cramer 2016; Hochschild 2018); and, inspired by Runciman's (1966) research, other studies find that positional deprivation, based on changes in a person's income relative to the incomes of others, or nostalgic deprivation, defined as decline from an imagined level of prior social, political or economic standing, are associated with support for populist politicians (Burgoon et al. 2019; Kurer 2020; Gest et al. 2018). However, it has not yet been established whether the concerns about unfairness highlighted in this ethnographic research generalize to wider populations; and it remains unclear whether the political effects of positional deprivation follow from relative material losses or from feelings of unfairness associated with them.

The purpose of this paper is to pursue these issues by considering how beliefs about unfairness might condition support for radical parties. Building on research in social psychology, we develop a theoretical argument to explain why individuals who believe that their personal economic situation is unfair are inclined toward anti-immigrant attitudes and support for populist right parties, and we explain why those feelings of personal unfairness can be intensified by the

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subjective uncertainty that accompanies contemporary economic developments. Based on the literature about 'beliefs in a just world', we develop a parallel argument to explain why perceptions about unfairness in the economic situation of other people is also conducive to support for radical parties, but in this case for populist left parties.[1]

We then test these arguments empirically. Using economic data, we show how regional economic shocks and threats of automation amplify feelings of personal unfairness. With individual-level data from the European Social Survey for thirteen Western European countries, we examine the association between different types of feelings of unfairness and attitudes toward immigration or redistribution as well as levels of support for parties of the populist right and left. We find that people who think that their *personal* economic situation is unfair are more likely to embrace anti-immigrant attitudes and support the populist right, while those who believe that the distribution of income or jobs in their *society* is unfair are more likely to favor redistribution and the radical left.

Since the votes for any political party are multiply determined, our objective is to supplement, rather than supplant, alternative explanations for the political support secured by populist parties (Damhuis 2020; Harteveld et al. 2022). But our analysis points to the important contribution that feelings about fairness make to contemporary support for such parties, and it suggests that more attention should be devoted to issues of fairness in electoral politics.

2. Fairness and support for radical parties

i. Developments in the literature

Many analyses show that support for populist right parties is likely to be higher in regions that are in economic decline or suffering job losses associated with trade in manufactured goods (Colantone and Stanig 2018; Ballard-Rosa et al. 2021; Broz et al. 2021). However, there is debate about why this should be so. Some studies posit mechanisms that turn largely on material interest, on the premise that voters believe that the protectionist policies advocated by populist right parties will restore the jobs lost to more open trade or that anti-immigrant policies will preserve jobs for natives (Colantone and Stanig 2018). There is likely some truth in these accounts. But there is scant evidence that such policies would have the expected effects and, as Margalit (2019) notes, this approach does not explain why there is widespread support for populist right parties beyond the affected regions or why that support is also elevated among occupational groups threatened by automation – a problem for which these parties have yet to devise a coherent solution. Similarly, although support for populist parties among people with poor economic prospects may reflect a diffuse protest vote against mainstream parties, it is not clear why so much of that vote goes to the populist right rather than the radical left (cf. Betz 1993; Berger 2017).

To address these issues, other scholars argue that adverse economic experiences give rise to reactions that are broadly cultural, such as the hostility to

immigrants on which populist right parties base much of their appeal. Ballard-Rosa et al. (2021) argue, for instance, that, by frustrating people's aspirations, local economic shocks incline them toward authoritarian values. Others emphasize the threats to social status that economic adversity poses and reference psychological theories about inter-group behavior, which suggest that individuals whose status is under threat adopt more hostile attitudes to out-groups, such as immigrants, whom right populist politicians often portray in threatening terms (Tajfel 1978; Sidanius and Pratto 2001; Mutz 2018). American studies sometimes link such status anxieties to efforts to defend traditional racial hierarchies (Jardina 2019).

We build on these perspectives but extend them in new directions. Our core contention is that support for populist parties is often animated by concerns about fairness. The Manichean claims of populist parties to be speaking for the 'people' against an 'elite' that neglects them exploit the types of resentments that are aroused by feelings of unfairness (Canovan 1999; Mudde 2004; Spruyt et al. 2016). Rising support for populist parties, therefore, calls for renewed attention to the role that issues of fairness play in voting behavior.

Several emerging literatures point to the importance of such issues for populist voting, but each has some limitations. First, as we have noted, influential ethnographic studies observe that perceptions of unfairness are central to the grievances motivating support for populist right politicians or movements (Eribon 2013; Cramer 2016; Hochschild 2018). However, it is not yet clear how well those observations generalize to other cases.

Inspired by Runciman's (1966) seminal work, a second set of studies find that positional deprivation can promote support for populist parties. Burgoon et al. (2019) find that declines in people's incomes relative to the incomes of the rich incline them toward radical left parties, while declines in their income relative to the poor increase their support for radical right parties. Kurer (2020) finds that occupational trajectories, combined with changes in the relative status of those occupations, push people toward or away from radical parties, in line with the observation of Gidron and Hall (2017, 2020) that declines in subjective social status are likely to lead people to support radical parties. Protzer (2021) finds that support for populist politicians is higher in regions marked by relatively low levels of social mobility (see also Kurer and Van Staalduinen 2022; Protzer and Summerville 2022), while Gest et al. (2018) asked people in the US and Britain to assess their social, economic and political standing relative to people in their position thirty years ago and find that those who suffered from 'nostalgic deprivation' were more likely to support the radical right. The premise behind all these studies is that relative deprivation renders people susceptible to populist appeals because it gives rise to feelings of resentment rooted in a sense of unfairness. But none of these studies directly assess their respondents' feelings about unfairness.

Finally, some scholars have examined the relationship between group-oriented feelings of unfairness and populist attitudes. In pioneering research on a sample of Dutch citizens, Elchardus and Spruyt (2014) find that people who believe that the group they belong to has been unjustly disadvantaged on a variety of

dimensions are more likely to hold attitudes associated with populism (see also Spruyt et al. 2016). In a cross-national sample, Filsinger (2022) finds a relationship between 'subjective group deprivation' and populist attitudes. These are important studies, but they assess feelings of collective disadvantage rather than how individuals feel about their own situation, construe that disadvantage in highly general terms, and attempt to explain populist attitudes rather than how people vote.

ii. Two conceptions of unfairness

To extend these lines of inquiry, we consider how people feel about the distribution of resources and draw a distinction between two types of feelings of unfairness. We call the first set feelings about *social unfairness*. These refer to people's views about the fairness of the distribution of resources across their society, namely whether people think that the economic situation of others in their country is fair. The second set are feelings of *personal unfairness*. These are the beliefs that individuals have about their personal situation – whether what *they* are receiving is fair. If social unfairness is about whether 'I feel that *people* in my society get what *they* deserve,' personal unfairness is about whether '*I* feel that *I* get what *I* deserve'. Psychologists have found that beliefs about social and personal unfairness are quite distinct from one another. Measures for them are only modestly correlated at the individual level, and they have a different relationship to other attitudes (Lipkusa et al. 1996; Dalbert 2001). Although there are many dimensions on which a person can feel unfairness, in this analysis we focus on the beliefs of individuals about fairness in the distribution of income and job opportunities.

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iii. Social unfairness and its importance for voting behavior

Issues of *social unfairness* have long figured in partisan political appeals, including those mounted by mainstream parties. Social democratic parties often promise, not only to provide the working class with material benefits, but also to deliver a more just distribution of resources or fairer society (Moschinos 2001). Conservative politicians also use principles of fairness to justify their policies by claiming, for instance, that those policies tie rewards to effort (Hoggett et al. 2013; Sandel 2020). In short, politicians of all hues know that voters can be moved, not only by promises of material benefits, but also by moral visions and, in modern societies, social fairness is a central pillar of such visions.[2]

There is also evidence that considerations of social fairness condition the political attitudes of voters in multiple ways. Psychological research on system justification finds that people who regard the existing system as fair are more willing to defend the status quo (Hafer and Choma 2009; Jost et al. 2004). A variety of corollaries follow from this observation. People who believe that most people are getting what they deserve are more likely to underestimate social inequality, to believe that opportunities are distributed equitably, and to oppose social welfare programs (Begue and Bastounis 2003). A parallel literature on 'beliefs in a just world' shows that the preferences of individuals over redistribution are likely to be conditioned by concerns about fairness (Alesina and Angelotos 2005; Benabou and Tirole 2006). Many studies find that people who regard poverty as unfair because it results from factors beyond an individual's control rather than from a lack of

effort are more likely to support redistribution (Fong 2001; Alesina and Angeletos 2005). In keeping with this, people who regard the world around them as fair tend to be political conservatives, while those who see it as unfair are more likely to support the political left (Graham et al. 2009; Hafer and Sutton 2016).

From these literatures, we extract three propositions about feelings of social unfairness that we will examine empirically. First, they suggest that people who regard the current distribution of income or jobs as unfair are more likely than others to support redistribution. Second, since populist left parties typically call for the redistribution of income and efforts to expand employment, we expect concerns about social unfairness to increase support for those parties. However, since mainstream center-left and center-right parties also take positions on redistribution and employment, we expect concerns about social unfairness to be associated with support for them as well. That yields three hypotheses:

> H1: Perceptions that the existing distribution of income or jobs is socially unfair are likely to increase support for redistribution.

> H2: Perceptions that the existing distribution of income or jobs is socially unfair are likely to increase the propensity of individuals to vote for parties of the radical left.

> H3: Perceptions that the existing distribution of income or jobs is socially unfair are likely to increase the propensity of some individuals to vote for parties of the center-left and against parties of the center-right.

iv. Personal unfairness and its importance for voting behavior

Psychological research suggests that feelings of *personal unfairness* will condition people's political attitudes and voting behavior in ways that are quite different from those associated with feelings of social unfairness. Three findings are especially apposite. First, this research shows that perceptions of personal injustice evoke much stronger emotional responses than perceptions of social injustice (Lipkusa et al. 1996; Dalbert 1999, 2001, Begue and Bastounis 2003, Sutton and Douglas 2005). Second, feelings of personal unfairness often induce defensive responses marked by tendencies to view one's in-group as superior to other groups, to feel more distant from other groups, and to view existing authorities as illegitimate (Doosje et al. 2012). Third, while beliefs in the fairness of one's own situation are associated with increased feelings of self-control and competence, positive outlooks for the future, and trust in other people, when people perceive their own situation as unfair, they are likely to experience higher levels of subjective uncertainty and to view the world as a more unpredictable or threatening place (Lerner 1980). (Dalbert 1999, 2001).

Given these findings, people who feel that their personal situation is unfair are likely to be attracted to populist right parties because various facets of the appeals of those parties play directly into such concerns. The discourse of their leaders is frequently built around claims about unfairness (Goethals 2018; Mob and Jellen 2015).[3] Even more important is the overtly emotional character of their appeals. As Betz and Oswald (2017: 117) observe, "What sets radical right-wing

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populist parties apart is their deliberate citation of a panoply of emotions such as anxiety, anger, and nostalgia" (see also Demertzis 2006; Salmela and von Scheve 2017; Pappas 2019).   Most radical right parties also speak to the concerns about out-groups exhibited by people who feel they have been treated unfairly via overt expressions of hostility to immigrants (Ivarsflaten 2008; Spruyt et al. 2016). These features are distinctive to the appeals of right populist parties. They are much less prominent in the discourse of mainstream parties; and, for that reason, we expect feelings of personal unfairness to be associated with support for radical right parties and unrelated to support for mainstream center-left or center-right parties.

At this point, issues of uncertainty also become relevant. Psychological research has shown that, when people experience heightened uncertainty in their lives, issues of fairness become more salient to them, and they become more likely to perceive their own situation as unfair. In laboratory experiments, when people are primed about uncertainty in their lives, they respond more strongly to issues of fairness and express stronger negative reactions when they perceive unfairness (Van den Bos and Lind 2002; Van den Bos 2009a). Feelings of subjective uncertainty also increase the likelihood that people will describe a given situation as unfair (De Cremer and Seikides 2005; Sedikides et al. 2013).

We think that these processes help to explain why especially high levels of support for radical right parties are found among people whose livelihoods are threatened by automation or the loss of manufacturing jobs (Im et al 2019; Autor et al 2020; Kurer 2020; Ballard-Rosa et al. 2021). Globalization and technological

change have created serious uncertainties for many workers, and the literature in social psychology about uncertainty management suggests that experiences of uncertainty may heighten people's concerns about unfairness and increase the likelihood that they will see their own situation as unfair – thereby rendering them more susceptible to the appeals of right populist parties. The results of in-depth interviews with 279 European workers reported in Flecker (2007) document such reactions.

The types of defensive responses that uncertainty generates are also likely to render people more open to the claims of right populist parties to be defending national culture in the face of putative threats from immigrants and other outsiders. In experimental settings, Van den Bos et al. (2005) show that participants who were primed to think about the uncertainties in their lives were more likely than others to defend their worldviews and to react strongly to negative information about their in-group. Hogg (2007) finds that people cope with uncertainty by intensifying group identification, using the clear ideas about how to behave associated with group identification to make their world more predictable, while Hogg and Adelman (2013) show that people facing heightened uncertainty also prefer to identify with groups characterized by clear boundaries, high internal homogeneity, and common goals. As a result, they are attracted to groups with radical rather than moderate ideologies.

In short, perceptions of uncertainty and feelings of personal unfairness are mutually-reinforcing: feeling that they have been treated unfairly increases

people's sense of subjective uncertainty and feeling subjectively uncertain inclines people to regard their situation as unfair. This observation helps to explain why workers who live in regions that have experienced manufacturing job losses or who have routine jobs that are vulnerable to automation might be especially likely to vote for the populist right. It also speaks to the important finding that people can be drawn to the populist right by threats to their future wellbeing, of the sort posed by technological change, even if their current economic situation is not adverse (Im et al. 2019; Kurer 2020)).

This analysis carries several implications that we explore empirically. It suggests that people exposed to heightened uncertainty about the loss of their jobs in the wake of globalization or skill-biased technological change should be more inclined to see their own economic situation as unfair. We expect those who believe that their own economic situation is unfair to evince heightened hostility to immigrants. And people who regard their own situation as unfair should be attracted by the appeals of right populist parties. Although center-right parties adopting anti-immigrant stances could conceivably also attract those people, we expect the strong feelings of resentment associated with perceptions of personal unfairness to limit the appeal of mainstream parties for them. These are the corresponding hypotheses:

> H4: When individuals are more exposed to the uncertainties of potential job loss linked to globalization or skill-biased technological change, they should be more likely to see their personal situation as unfair.

> H5: Feelings of personal unfairness should be associated with anti-immigrant sentiments.

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H6: Feelings of personal unfairness should be associated with voting for populist right parties.

H7: Feelings of personal unfairness should not be associated with voting for center-right parties.

3. Empirical analysis

i. Data and measures

To investigate these issues, we draw data from Round 9 of the European Social Survey fielded in 2018-19, the only dataset that includes comparable measures for views about personal and social fairness along with measures for vote choice in the last election and attitudes to redistribution and immigration. To maximize cultural comparability, we focus on the thirteen West European countries with radical left or radical right parties: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Germany, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. We do not include East European countries because the dynamics of partisan competition there are different: leftwing parties are often tainted by a Communist legacy; and in many of those countries populist right parties have been in government so long that they no longer have an anti-establishment appeal but rely instead on the distribution of social benefits for much of their support (Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009; Rovny 2014; Enyedi and Deegan-Krause 2018). In keeping with this, Cena et al. (2022) find that relative deprivation is relevant to right populist voting only in wealthier European countries. As a result, we do not expect our conjectures to apply consistently in East European settings.[4]

We measure *personal unfairness*, namely, how fair individuals perceive their own economic situation to be, with a question that asks how fair they think their own income is, and we measure *social unfairness*, namely, whether respondents think the economic situation of others in their country is fair, with two questions that ask how fair they think the pre-tax incomes are of people in the top 10 percent and the bottom 10 percent of the income distribution. We consider views about both the rich and the poor because studies find that people's opinions about 'redistribution from' the rich and 'redistribution to' the poor can diverge (Cavaillé and Trump 2015). We do not have *ex ante* views about whether attitudes to the rich or poor should matter more to political attitudes and partisan choice. Respondents answer these questions on a nine-point scale running from 'low, extremely unfair' (-4), 'low, very unfair' (-3), 'low, somewhat unfair', (-2), 'low, slightly unfair' (-1) 'fair' (0) through 'high, slightly unfair (+1), 'high, somewhat unfair (+2), 'high, very unfair (+3) to 'high, extremely unfair' (+4).[5]

As additional checks, we also employ questions about whether, compared to others, individuals think they would have a fair chance of getting a job they seek, and about whether they think everyone in the country has a fair chance of getting the jobs they seek.[6] Respondents answer these questions on an 11-point scale ranging from 'does not apply at all' to 'applies completely'. In the following estimations, we change the order of values on these variables so that higher values indicate how strongly the respondents feel that their own income, the incomes of

Figure 1: How fair people perceive their own income to be, by income decile

Note: Each panel reports results for an income decile (1 lowest, 10 highest), showing the numbers of people who describe their own income as more or less fair, where 0 on the X axis indicates 'fair', increasing positive numbers indicate views that their income is unfairly low and decreasing negative numbers indicate views that their income is unfairly high.

people in the bottom decile, their own job prospects and the job prospects of others are unfairly low, or that the incomes of people in the top decile are unfairly high.

One might be concerned that individuals' views about the fairness of their own income is simply a reflection of how high their current incomes is. To allay such concerns, Figure 1 shows how perceptions about the unfairness of the respondent's own income are distributed across people within the income deciles in the pooled sample. As expected, less than 5% of respondents regard their incomes as unfairly high, and people with lower incomes are more likely to regard their income as unfair, but the relationship between the respondent's income decile and how fair they regard their income is very modest (correlation = 0.19). At all income levels, significant numbers of people regard their own income as unfairly

low. We find similar results when comparing the views of people at different income levels about whether the incomes of the highest and lowest income-earners are unfair. Beliefs about the fairness of incomes in the top decile are only weakly correlated with the income level of the respondent (correlation = 0.12), and beliefs about the fairness of incomes in the bottom decile are almost independent of the respondent's own level of income (correlation = 0.03). Figures for these distributions on income and job opportunities are in the online appendix.

ii. Exposure to uncertainty and views about fairness

Based on laboratory experiments which find that heightened uncertainty increases people's concerns about the fairness of their own situation, we have argued that uncertainty about the potential loss of income or jobs associated with contemporary economic developments may increase people's tendencies to see their personal situation as unfair (H4). We assess this in two ways. First, to capture the uncertainty associated with industrial restructuring in a context of globalization, we identify the European region at the NUTS2 level in which the respondent lives and draw on data from the European Restructuring Monitor (ERM) database of Eurofound to capture regional economic shocks.[7] This database provides regional data on large-scale restructuring events, such as plant closures and new job creations reported in local and national media. From it, we compute net changes in manufacturing jobs in the three years preceding the survey (2015-2017) in the relevant region. Second, to capture the uncertainty associated with skill-biased

technological change, we link the occupational data for respondents (at the ISCO 88 2-digit level) to scores for the routine task intensity (RTI) of their occupations computed by Goos et al. (2014) on the conventional premise that jobs with a higher RTI score are more vulnerable to automation.

We estimate the relationship between exposure to these two sources of economic uncertainty and the views of individuals about whether their own income or the job opportunities available to them are unfairly low, as well as their views about whether the incomes or job opportunities available to others are unfair. For this purpose, we use OLS regressions in which these views about unfairness are the dependent variables, and condition the estimations on a range of other individual-level variables that might affect such views about unfairness, including education, income, age, gender, union membership, employment status, religiosity and urban residency, as well as the variables for regional socioeconomic conditions used in an analogous study by Baccini and Weymouth (2021): net losses of non-manufacturing jobs, regional unemployment rate, share of college graduates, share of males, and share of immigrants. However, the results are robust when those regional controls are not included (see Table E1. in the online appendix). We also include country fixed effects, so that the net change in local manufacturing jobs captures only the within-country variation. We cluster standard errors at the NUTS level and use listwise deletion of missing values.[8]

Table 1 reports the results. They suggest that susceptibility to the economic developments currently threatening people's livelihoods does not alter their views

about overall social unfairness but does increase the likelihood that people will regard their own income or the job opportunities available to them as unfairly low. The first row of the Table indicates that the more exposed people are to the threat that their jobs will be automated (via a higher RTI score) the more likely they are to feel that the set of job opportunities available to them is unfair, although exposure to technological change does not affect their views about the fairness of job opportunities open to others. The second row of the Table suggests that, as manufacturing jobs within a region decline, people are more likely to regard both their own level of income and the job opportunities available to them as unfairly low – again without any apparent effect on how fair they regard the situation of others. The negative relationship between RTI and people's feelings about their income in the first row of the Table is unanticipated, but it may reflect the fact that, although people in routine occupations can reasonably expect technological change to affect their job opportunities, it is unlikely to have immediate implications for their income. By contrast, the loss of manufacturing jobs affects both job opportunities and incomes in the regions where it occurs (Autor et al. 2015).

Figure 2 reports the estimated marginal effects for the three most important coefficients in Table 1 when the values of other variables are held at their means, namely, between changes in local manufacturing jobs and how unfair people consider their income and their job opportunities to be, and between the

| | Unfairness of Income | | | Unfairness of Job Opportunities | |
| | Self | Top 10% | Bottom 10% | Self | Others |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
RTI	−0.032**	−0.009	−0.023	0.146***	0.021
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.023)
Net Losses of Manufacturing Jobs	0.032**	0.004	0.021	0.062**	0.007
	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.029)	(0.024)
Net Losses of Non-manufacturing Jobs	−0.001	−0.001	0.024	−0.038	−0.047*
	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.025)
College	−0.171***	−0.161***	−0.067**	−0.744***	0.00003
	(0.032)	(0.041)	(0.033)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Female	0.183***	0.103***	0.228***	0.277***	0.332***
	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.062)	(0.042)
Age	−0.002**	−0.001	0.0001	0.033***	0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Income	−0.074***	−0.063***	−0.005	−0.172***	−0.039***
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Union	0.018	0.120***	0.243***	−0.130*	0.058
	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.053)	(0.070)	(0.068)
Unemployed	0.331***	0.149	0.061	1.185***	0.645***
	(0.092)	(0.099)	(0.093)	(0.154)	(0.130)
Citizen	−0.086*	0.296***	0.169**	−0.527***	0.590***
	(0.049)	(0.099)	(0.080)	(0.190)	(0.143)
Religious	−0.004	−0.008	−0.010*	−0.017	−0.040***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Urban	−0.055	−0.014	−0.016	0.148**	0.157**
	(0.038)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.071)	(0.070)
Share of College Graduates	0.523	−0.284	0.555	−1.631	0.789
	(0.778)	(1.154)	(0.825)	(1.366)	(0.929)
Share of Male	−1.384	1.153	7.100	6.759	−6.162
	(3.134)	(6.038)	(4.500)	(5.492)	(4.691)
Unemployment Rate	0.021***	−0.005	−0.017	0.009	0.013
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Share of Immigrants	−0.863	−4.357***	−1.319	−0.909	1.856*
	(0.780)	(1.161)	(1.247)	(1.509)	(1.051)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.078	0.081	0.084	0.193	0.123
Adjusted R^2	0.076	0.078	0.082	0.191	0.121
Observations	10,940	11,092	11,375	11,411	11,611

Table 1: The relationships between economic uncertainty and views about unfairness

Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance levels reported as: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.

Figure 2: Relationships between regional manufacturing job losses or routine task intensity and respondents' views about the unfairness of their own income and job opportunities.

Note: These plots show the marginal relationship between net losses in local manufacturing jobs per 1000 employed people and the RTI score of the respondent's occupation and respondents' views about the fairness of their own income or the fairness of the job opportunities available to them, with all other variables fixed at their mean values. 95% confidence intervals.

susceptibility of their jobs to automation and how unfair they think their job opportunities are. The associations are substantial: when the routine task intensity of a person's occupation increases by one standard deviation, for instance, their tendency to see the job opportunities available to them as unfair increases by about the same amount as it would if that person's income were to fall by a decile. These findings are congruent with hypothesis H4 that the uncertainties engendered by globalization and skill biased technological change increase the likelihood that people will regard their own economic situation as unfair.

iii. Views about fairness and attitudes toward immigration and redistribution

Before considering the relationship between feelings of unfairness and support for populist parties, we consider the association between those feelings and attitudes

toward redistribution and immigrants, widely seen as drivers of support for populist left and right parties (Rooduijn et al. 2017; Gidron and Hall 2020). Based on the literature about 'beliefs in a just world', we have conjectured that people who think that the incomes or job opportunities available to others are unfair are more likely to support redistribution (H1). Conversely, based on findings in social psychology, we expect individuals who believe that their own income or the job opportunities available to them are unfairly low to become stronger defenders of their cultural boundaries, which implies that they should become more hostile to immigrants (H5).

To assess support for redistribution we use a conventional measure eliciting responses to the statement 'The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels' to which respondents express their level of agreement on a 10-point scale. We measure attitudes to immigration with the question 'Would you say that [country's] cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?' with responses on an 11-point scale. We focus on people's views about the cultural impact of immigrants since the mechanisms we have cited linking views about unfairness to views about immigration operate via concerns about cultural threat. Once again, we employ linear regressions in which support for redistribution and support for immigration are the dependent variables and condition on the same set of individual-level variables as in previous estimations, with country fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the country level. Table 2 reports the full estimation, while Figures 3

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	Support for Redistribution		Support for Immigration	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Income Unfair for Self	0.016*		−0.163***	
	(0.010)		(0.021)	
Income Unfair for Top 10%	0.053***		−0.030	
	(0.008)		(0.023)	
Income Unfair for Bottom 10%	0.098***		0.073***	
	(0.007)		(0.014)	
Job Chance Unfair for Self		0.004		−0.098***
		(0.004)		(0.010)
Job Chance Unfair for Others		0.056***		−0.025*
		(0.006)		(0.014)
College	−0.071**	−0.067**	1.118***	1.038***
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.067)	(0.065)
Female	0.128***	0.136***	0.242***	0.259***
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Age	0.003**	0.002*	−0.008***	−0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Income	−0.046***	−0.048***	0.039***	0.032***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Union	0.162***	0.195***	0.143***	0.093*
	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.052)	(0.056)
Unemployed	0.087*	0.081*	−0.060	0.004
	(0.048)	(0.043)	(0.115)	(0.055)
Citizen	−0.021	0.013	−0.717***	−0.718***
	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.149)	(0.146)
Religious	−0.016***	−0.015***	−0.001	−0.005
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Urban	0.005	−0.026	0.316***	0.354***
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.106	0.083	0.151	0.150
Adjusted R^2	0.105	0.082	0.150	0.149
Observations	17,362	19,595	17,272	19,525

Table 2: The relationship between views about unfairness and support for redistribution and immigration

Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance levels reported as: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.

Figure 3: The relationship between views about the unfairness of incomes and support for redistribution

Note: Each panel shows the marginal effects on support for redistribution of respondents' views about the fairness of (i) their own income, (ii) top 10% incomes, and (iii) bottom 10% incomes, when other variables are held at their means. 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 4: The relationship between views about the unfairness of income and support for immigration

Note: Each panel shows the marginal effects on support for immigration of respondents' views about the fairness of (i) their own income, (ii) top 10% incomes, and (iii) bottom 10% incomes, when other variables are held at their means. 95% confidence intervals.

and 4 display the marginal effects associated with attitudes to redistribution and immigration when the values of other variables are held at their means.

As might be expected, people who believe that their own level of income is unfairly low are more likely to support redistribution but, as Figure 3 indicates, that association is barely significant and much smaller in magnitude than the association between support for redistribution and people's views about the unfairness of the incomes going to others in the top and bottom deciles of the income distribution. As H1 posits, support for income redistribution appears to be driven primarily by perceptions of social unfairness.

By contrast, attitudes to immigration are more strongly associated with whether individuals regard their own economic situation as unfair. The coefficients in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 indicate that people who feel that their own income is unfairly low or that they do not have a fair chance of getting the jobs they seek are much more likely than others to express hostility to immigrants (see also Figure 4). However, feelings about social unfairness are not closely associated with hostility to immigrants. Indeed, people who believe that incomes at the bottom of the income distribution are unfair are slightly more likely to have positive views of immigrants. The relevant associations are notably large. Many studies have observed that people with low incomes are generally more hostile to immigrants, and, in our sample, dropping one standard deviation in income is associated with an increase of 0.11 on the scale of hostility to immigrants. But the effect associated

with feeling that one's level of income is *unfair* is twice as large (a 0.22 increase). In sum, these results are broadly supportive of H1 and H5.

iv. Views about fairness and voting for radical parties

We turn now to the ultimate object of this inquiry – to ask how people's feelings about unfairness might affect support for populist parties of the political left and right. Both types of parties play upon generalized discontent with the experiences people have had under the established parties of government. Hence, it is plausible to think that feelings of unfairness of either kind, whether personal or social, might increase support for populist challengers on either the left or right.

However, we have argued that beliefs about social unfairness and feelings of personal unfairness condition political attitudes in quite different ways. The literature on 'beliefs in a just world' suggests that views about the social unfairness of the distribution of income or jobs are generally grounded in a deeper set of beliefs about whether luck or effort determines such outcomes. Those worldviews may or may not have much emotional content. By contrast, the literature in social psychology suggests that believing one's own situation is unfair usually elicits a stronger emotional response, inclines people to see the world as an unpredictable place, and inspires a variety of defensive responses, including a desire to reinforce the boundaries around one's own cultural values. Accordingly, we expect perceptions of social unfairness and of personal unfairness to inspire different forms of political behavior congruent with our findings about their effects on political

attitudes. We expect feelings about social unfairness to promote voting for the populist left and feelings of personal unfairness to prompt voting for the populist right (H2 and H6).

To assess these propositions, we specify a set of estimations conditioned on the same set of variables used in our prior estimations and often found to influence voting behavior, with country fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the country level. The dependent variables are whether the individual voted in the last election for a populist left or populist right party rather than any other party. To classify the parties, we use the PopuList of Rooduijn et al. (2019) (as listed in the online appendix) and the estimations cover only those countries classified as having a populist left party (Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Netherlands) or a populist right party (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom). We report the results of these logistic regressions in Table 3. Figures 5 and 6 display the marginal effects of different types of feelings about fairness on the likelihood of voting for populist parties of the left or right. The coefficients on the variables on which we condition these estimations conform to standard expectations, increasing our confidence in the results.

Different types of feelings about unfairness yield starkly different political results. Beliefs about *social* unfairness are associated with voting for a populist left party. People who believe that the incomes of people at the bottom of the income distribution or the job opportunities available to others are unfair are more likely to

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	Vote for Populist Left		Vote for Populist Right	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Income Unfair for Self	0.012		0.117***	
	(0.043)		(0.040)	
Income Unfair for Top 10%	0.056		0.006	
	(0.056)		(0.023)	
Income Unfair for Bottom 10%	0.078*		−0.005	
	(0.042)		(0.019)	
Job Chance Unfair for Self		0.013		0.042***
		(0.017)		(0.012)
Job Chance Unfair for Others		0.109***		0.004
		(0.027)		(0.013)
College	−0.383	−0.418	−1.181***	−1.133***
	(0.284)	(0.269)	(0.148)	(0.144)
Female	−0.155	−0.097	−0.444***	−0.440***
	(0.194)	(0.179)	(0.143)	(0.132)
Age	−0.018***	−0.018***	−0.009***	−0.009***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Income	−0.128***	−0.109***	−0.035*	−0.034*
	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Union	0.468***	0.427**	−0.123	−0.081
	(0.144)	(0.170)	(0.087)	(0.077)
Unemployed	0.386**	0.515***	−0.208	−0.148
	(0.162)	(0.120)	(0.266)	(0.175)
Citizen	0.597**	0.602***	0.115	0.160
	(0.300)	(0.223)	(0.496)	(0.454)
Religious	−0.127***	−0.142***	−0.016	−0.013
	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Urban	0.453**	0.422*	−0.039	−0.086
	(0.207)	(0.219)	(0.138)	(0.118)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,571	5,141	11,373	12,509

Table 3: The relationship between views about unfairness and voting for populist left and right parties

Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance levels reported as: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.

Figure 5: The relationship between views about unfairness and voting for populist left parties

Note: Each panel shows the marginal effects on the likelihood of voting for a populist left party of views about the fairness of (i) one's own income, (ii) top 10% incomes, and (iii) bottom 10% incomes, when other variables are held at their means. 95% confidence intervals.


Figure 6: The relationship between views about unfairness and voting for populist right parties

Note: Each panel shows the marginal effects on the likelihood of voting for a populist right party of views about the fairness of (i) one's own income, (ii) top 10% incomes, and (iii) bottom 10% incomes, when other variables are held at their means. 95% confidence intervals.

vote for the populist left. But beliefs about *personal* unfairness are associated with voting for the populist right. When people believe that their own incomes or their chances of getting a job they want are unfair, they are more likely to vote for the populist right. Conversely, views about the fairness of a person's own situation are unrelated to support for the populist left, and views about social unfairness are unrelated to support for the radical right.

To put these results into context, when a person's views about the unfairness of their own income moves from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above it, the likelihood that they will vote for a populist right party increases by 2.7 percentage points – a notable shift given that the average vote share for populist right parties in this sample is 11 percent. This relationship is substantially larger, for instance, than the one Burgoon et al. (2019: 73) find between changes in a person's 'mean positional deprivation' (based on lower growth in their income decile relative to growth in mean incomes) and voting for the radical right.

Note too that the beliefs about social unfairness most closely associated with voting for the radical left are beliefs about how unfair job opportunities are in society as a whole. Beliefs about the unfairness of low incomes are weakly related to support for the radical left, but views about the unfairness of top incomes are unrelated to it. This suggests that supporters of the radical left are especially concerned about employment and about people on low incomes – in contrast as we will see to supporters of the center-left. However, the political effects associated

with concerns about job opportunities are substantial. When people's views about the unfairness of job opportunities move from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above it, the likelihood that they will vote for a populist left party increases by 2.4 percentage points in a context where the average vote for populist left parties is about 10 percent. These results are congruent with hypotheses H2 and H6. Feeling that one's own economic situation is unfair increases support for the populist right, while beliefs about social unfairness increase support for the populist left.

We took several steps to assess the robustness of these findings with results reported in the online appendix. As Table E.1 in that appendix indicates, the relationships between economic uncertainty and feelings of unfairness remain substantively the same when we omit the regional controls applied in Table 1. Very few respondents reported that their personal income was unfairly high, but to ensure that they were not distorting our results, we replicated our estimations for the relationship between feelings of unfairness and attitudes and voting behavior excluding this group. The results parallel those we have reported (Table E.3). Similarly, when feelings about the unfairness of incomes or job opportunities are coded as binary variables (fair/unfair), the estimation results remain substantively the same (Tables E.2.a and E.2.b). Since the appeals of populist parties also vary to some extent cross-nationally, we have replicated the estimations for fairness and voting reported in Table 3 on the national samples for each country with a pertinent populist party. Given the small size of the national samples, the relevant

coefficients are not always statistically significant, but the signs on those coefficients are generally consistent with those in Table 3 (see Table G.2 in the online appendix).

v. The distinctive appeal of the populist right

The most striking feature of these results is how strongly people who believe that their own economic situation is unfair are attracted to parties of the populist right. We have argued that this follows from the types of emotional reactions that feelings of personal unfairness evoke – including anger or resentment about their situation and a heightened desire to defend cultural in-groups from out-groups such as migrants – in tandem with how the appeals of right populist politicians play upon those emotions. By contrast, beliefs about social unfairness have a much lower emotional valence. For this reason, although feelings of personal unfairness should attract people primarily to populist right parties, we expect beliefs about social unfairness to condition support for mainstream parties as well as radical left parties.

We assess this line of reasoning in Table 4 which reports estimations for the association between feelings of social and personal unfairness and voting for mainstream center-left and center-right parties as well as the relationship with non-voting. These estimations are conditioned on the same set of variables used when we considered voting for radical parties. As expected, beliefs about social unfairness are associated with support for mainstream parties. In line with hypothesis H3, people who regard top and bottom incomes or the availability of

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	Vote for Center-Left		Vote for Center-Right		Voted	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Income Unfair for Self	−0.019		−0.007		−0.074***	
	(0.042)		(0.021)		(0.013)	
Income Unfair for Top 10%	0.044***		−0.034**		−0.011	
	(0.017)		(0.013)		(0.015)	
Income Unfair for Bottom 10%	0.058***		−0.079***		0.025	
	(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.017)	
Job Chance Unfair for Self		0.021*		−0.019		−0.095***
		(0.012)		(0.015)		(0.007)
Job Chance Unfair for Others		0.047***		−0.098***		0.010
		(0.017)		(0.013)		(0.013)
College	−0.091	−0.036	−0.071	−0.096	0.874***	0.803***
	(0.140)	(0.132)	(0.127)	(0.121)	(0.095)	(0.090)
Female	0.119	0.095	−0.023	−0.039	−0.039	−0.003
	(0.077)	(0.073)	(0.060)	(0.056)	(0.080)	(0.072)
Age	0.010	0.008	0.009**	0.011***	0.032***	0.036***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Income	−0.036***	−0.036***	0.091***	0.082***	0.124***	0.111***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Union	0.483***	0.474***	−0.368***	−0.375***	0.414***	0.406***
	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.094)	(0.087)	(0.067)	(0.078)
Unemployed	0.201	−0.010	−0.355*	−0.210	−0.410***	−0.199
	(0.182)	(0.150)	(0.185)	(0.136)	(0.133)	(0.148)
Citizen	−0.655***	−0.698***	0.864*	0.912	3.266***	3.256***
	(0.245)	(0.230)	(0.508)	(0.586)	(0.359)	(0.339)
Religious	−0.039***	−0.029**	0.131***	0.123***	0.025**	0.014
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.012)	(0.009)
Urban	0.162	0.162*	−0.288**	−0.266**	−0.024	−0.002
	(0.101)	(0.092)	(0.118)	(0.117)	(0.079)	(0.079)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	12,333	13,567	12,333	13,567	16,324	18,141

Table 4: The relationship between views about unfairness and voting for center-left and center-right parties, and electoral turnout

Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance levels reported as: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.

jobs as unfair are more likely than others to support center-left parties, which usually favor redistribution, and less likely to support center-right parties, which generally oppose redistribution. For people concerned about social unfairness, center-left parties are a viable alternative to radical left parties. But a comparison of the coefficients in Tables 3 and 4 suggests that, compared to voters for the center-left, voters for the radical left are more likely to be younger, unemployed, on lower incomes, and more concerned about people on low incomes than those on high incomes (for similar results, see Rooduijn et al. 2017).

By contrast, feelings of personal unfairness do not draw people to mainstream parties on either side of the political spectrum (H7). But those feelings are strongly associated with not voting – a notable finding since non-voting is often a sign of political alienation and non-voters are a reservoir from which populist right parties recruit many of their supporters (Abou-Chadi et al. 2021; Koch et al. 2021; Schulte-Cloos and Leininger 2022). These observations suggest that people who believe that their personal situation is unfair may turn away from mainstream parties because those feelings of unfairness also inspire political alienation; and they may be drawn toward populist right parties because the anti-establishment rhetoric of those parties exploits this alienation (see also Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2018).

To explore this issue further, we estimate the relationship between feelings of unfairness and two standard indicators of political alienation – trust in politicians and satisfaction with democracy. Our indicator for trust in politicians is an average

Figure 7: The relationship between views about unfairness and trust in politicians and satisfaction with democracy

Note: Panels show the marginal effects of (i) views about the fairness of one's own income and bottom 10% incomes on trust in politicians (ii) views about the fairness of one's own income and bottom 10% incomes on satisfaction with democracy, and (iii) views about the fairness of job opportunities for others and for oneself on trust in politicians, when other variables are held at their means. 95% confidence intervals.

of answers on a ten-point scale to two questions asking how much trust the respondents have in their country's politicians and parliament. The full results are in Table F.1 in the online appendix and Figure 7 reports the relevant relationships when the other variables are held at their means. We find a small association between beliefs about the unfairness of low incomes and trust in politicians. But believing that one's own income is unfair is associated with a sharp decline in trust in politicians – indicative of political alienation. The pattern is similar for satisfaction with democracy. But people who regard the job opportunities facing everyone else as unfair also lose trust in politicians. Taken together, these results suggest that feelings of unfairness, especially about one's own income or general job opportunities, may draw people away from mainstream parties and toward

populist parties because those feelings engender levels of political alienation that populist parties effectively exploit.

Of course, we are not arguing that feelings of unfairness are the only factor translating the economic effects of globalization and technological change into electoral support for populist parties. As we have noted, populist parties depend on diverse and multiply motivated electoral coalitions. But our results suggest that beliefs about unfairness play an important role in this process. To assess the relative importance of that role, we conduct a final estimation on vote for populist parties in which we include indicators for two other factors widely believed to foster support for populist parties alongside measures for those feelings. The first is a standard indicator for economic deprivation, based on responses to a question asking how well people are coping on their current income. The second is a measure for authoritarian attitudes.[9] The results are in Table 5 where the coefficients are standardized so that their magnitudes can be compared. Voting for a populist right party is associated with experiences of economic deprivation but it is just as closely associated with feeling that one's income is unfair; and support for the populist left is much more closely related to beliefs about social unfairness than to economic deprivation.

As expected, authoritarian attitudes are closely associated with support for the populist right (and inversely related to support for the populist left). But, even when this variable is included in the estimations, the key coefficients on feelings of unfairness remain statistically significant, and the relationships between feelings of

	Vote for Populist Left		Vote for Populist Right	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Income Unfair for Self	0.010		0.117**	
	(0.067)		(0.051)	
Income Unfair for Top 10%	0.072		0.015	
	(0.088)		(0.034)	
Income Unfair for Bottom 10%	0.132**		−0.015	
	(0.061)		(0.032)	
Job Chance Unfair for Self		0.042		0.104***
		(0.056)		(0.033)
Job Chance Unfair for Others		0.224***		0.002
		(0.071)		(0.031)
Economic Deprivation	0.075	0.053	0.109**	0.126**
	(0.112)	(0.129)	(0.052)	(0.053)
Authoritarian Attitudes	−0.215***	−0.210***	0.245***	0.253***
	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.051)
College	−0.439*	−0.482**	−1.113***	−1.069***
	(0.251)	(0.234)	(0.150)	(0.147)
Female	−0.120	−0.070	−0.448***	−0.447***
	(0.211)	(0.195)	(0.139)	(0.130)
Age	−0.019***	−0.019***	−0.009***	−0.009***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Income	−0.119***	−0.105***	−0.020	−0.014
	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Union	0.465***	0.459***	−0.128	−0.096
	(0.137)	(0.175)	(0.089)	(0.075)
Unemployed	0.349*	0.470***	−0.243	−0.177
	(0.210)	(0.162)	(0.255)	(0.165)
Citizen	0.588**	0.606***	0.170	0.148
	(0.277)	(0.217)	(0.501)	(0.484)
Religious	−0.116***	−0.132***	−0.026	−0.023
	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Urban	0.474**	0.433*	−0.037	−0.078
	(0.217)	(0.226)	(0.140)	(0.120)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,528	5,086	11,293	12,401
Note:			$^*p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$	

Table 5: The relationship between voting for populist left and populist right parties and views about unfairness, economic deprivation and authoritarian attitudes

Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance levels reported as: $*p<0.1$; $**p<0.05$; $***p<0.01$.

personal unfairness and voting for the radical right emerge as about half as strong as the relationship with authoritarian attitudes. Because authoritarian attitudes are widely seen as strong predictors of support for the populist right, this is a notable finding (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Donovan 2019; Ballard-Rosa et al. 2021; cf. Dunn 2015). These results suggest that feeling of unfairness are not the only relevant factor explaining electoral support for populist parties but deserve a prominent place in our efforts to understand the roots of that support.

Conclusion

In this article, we have examined how feelings of personal and social unfairness affect political attitudes and behavior. We find that believing one's own economic situation is unfair, in terms of income or available job opportunities, is associated with greater hostility to immigrants and support for populist right parties, while feeling that the economic situation of others in society is unfair is associated with support for redistribution and parties of the populist left. Feelings of both personal and social unfairness appear to be relevant to political attitudes but in quite different ways. Of course, the relationships we find are not causally identified, but the associations are strong enough to suggest that feelings of unfairness play a role in contemporary politics.

This analysis helps to explain why people who are threatened with the loss of income or employment often turn to the populist right rather than the populist left. Building on findings in social psychology, we have argued that the

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uncertainties engendered by the loss of local manufacturing jobs or exposure to automation can increase individuals' tendencies to feel that they are being treated unfairly, thereby promoting a defensive attachment to traditional cultural values, which increases the appeal to these individuals of the populist right parties that defend those values. Our empirics support this argument. One important implication is that support for parties of the populist right can be inspired, not simply by material deprivation, but by generalized uncertainties about the future associated with the transition to a globalized knowledge economy. Through these mechanisms, uncertainty about the future may increase support for populist right politicians even when it is not accompanied by immediate losses of material well-being.

This observation carries significant implications for policy. If uncertainty about the future is central to these electoral outcomes, providing social benefits or compensation for job losses may not be enough to reduce support for populist right politicians. Our findings also point to the need for more research into the political effects of subjective uncertainty, an issue that has not yet attracted much attention in political science. It may be that support for the populist right is inspired not simply by nostalgia for the past but by fears about the future, as an emerging literature on automation implies (Im et al. 2019; Anelli et al. 2021; Häusermann et al. 2021; Im et al. 2023).

This article can also be read as a study in the politics of resentment. Of course, radical right politics has long been understood as a matter of resentment

(Betz 1993). The relevant resentments are often portrayed as ones rooted in social identities, and sometimes they are (cf. Fukuyama 2018). Our analysis indicates, however, that economic conditions can also be potent sources of resentment, and we identify several mechanisms through which feelings of unfairness about economic conditions can inspire resentments that spill over into cultural conflicts focused on identity. In that respect, we contribute to a growing body of knowledge about how economic experiences can give rise to the cultural conflicts so prominent in contemporary politics.

In the most general terms, our results point to the significance of issues of fairness for electoral politics. They suggest that people's political behavior is motivated, not simply by the material benefits they expect politicians to provide, but also by whether they believe that they or others are being treated fairly. One implication is that voters can be moved by appeals to fairness. Adept politicians understand this: hence their frequent references to social justice. But issues of fairness do not figure prominently in contemporary studies of electoral politics. We need to know more about how feelings of unfairness and political appeals to fairness condition various types of electoral behavior, and we hope that this study will encourage more research into such questions.

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Notes

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[1] We will sometimes describe these as radical left parties, but most of these parties also deploy populist discourse (Rooduijn and Akkerman 2017).

[2] In responses to a 2011 survey asking British voters what values they most want a political party to reflect, for instance, 'fairness' was often mentioned, preceded in frequency only by 'economic responsibility.' It ranked more highly than 'equality', 'liberty', 'patriotism' or 'family values' (O'Brien 2011).

[3] Anyone who doubts this might try searching Google for "Donald Trump" and "so unfair".

[4] Table G.1 in the online appendix provides some evidence for the distinctiveness of East European politics. It suggests that support for the radical right in Poland and Hungary is conditioned by beliefs about social unfairness rather than personal unfairness.

[5] The statement eliciting a response about personal fairness reads "Your net [pay/pensions/social benefits] is unfairly low, fair, or unfairly high". To elicit views about social fairness, respondents are shown how much people at the top (bottom) decile of the income distribution earn and are asked how fair they think those people's incomes are. "And now please think about the top (bottom) 10% of employees working full-time in [country], earning more (less) than [amount per month or per year]. In your opinion, are these incomes unfairly low, fair, or unfairly high? Please think generally about people earning this level of income."

[6] The question wordings are "Imagine you were looking for a job today. To what extent do you think this statement would apply to you? Compared to other people in [country], I would have a fair chance of getting the job I was seeking." and "Overall, everyone in [country] has a fair chance of getting the jobs they seek."

[7] Since ESS data provides only NUTS1 regional information for Germany, Italy, and the UK, we aggregated restructuring events at the NUTS1 level for these countries. ERM data at https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/emcc/european-restructuring-monitor

[8] There are 11 countries in this estimation. Switzerland and Ireland are dropped because of limited data available for them on the regional variables. Replication materials and code can be found at Kim and Hall 2023.

[9] We assess economic deprivation with a measure asking respondents to indicate how they feel about their household's income, indicating whether they are 'living comfortably on present income', 'coping on present income', 'finding it difficult on present income', or 'finding it very difficult on present income' (scored 1 through 4). As a measure of authoritarian attitudes, we use a question asking respondents whether they are like someone for whom it is important that the government ensures their safety against all threats and wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens –

on a 6-point scale running from 'very much like me' to 'not like me at all'. This is a relatively crude measure but the best available in this survey.

<center>

Online Appendix
Fairness and Support for Populist Parties

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A   Data Sources

1. **European Social Survey 9** [1]

2. **Regional variables**: Eurostat (all retrieved June 7, 2022)[2]

   - **regional population** (in 2014): Population on 1 January by age, sex and NUTS 2 region (demo_r_d2jan).

   - **regional employment** (in 2014): Employment by sex, age, economic activity and NUTS 2 regions (NACE Rev. 2) (1 000) (lfst_r_lfe2en2)

   - **regional unemployment rate** (2015-2017): Unemployment rates by sex, age, educational attainment level and NUTS 2 regions (%) (lfst_r_lfu3rt)

   - **share of college educated** (in 2014): Population by sex, age, educational attainment level and NUTS 2 regions (1,000) (lfst_r_lfsd2pop) divided by regional population

   - **share of male** (in 2014): Population by sex, age, educational attainment level and NUTS 2 regions (1,000) (lfst_r_lfsd2pop) divided by regional population

   - **share of non-citizens** (in 2014): Population by sex, age, citizenship, labour status and NUTS 2 regions (lfst_r_lfsd2pwn) divided by regional population

3. **Net reduction in manufacturing jobs** (2015-2017): ERM Restructuring events database. [3] See Section C for more details.

4. **RTI**: Goos et al. (2014)

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[1]https://ess-search.nsd.no/en/all/query/
[2]https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/regions/data/database
[3]https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/emcc/erm/factsheets

<center>

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B Distribution of Personal and Social Unfairness

Figure B.1: How fair people perceive bottom 10% income to be, by their income decile.

Note: Each panel reports results for an income decile (1 lowest, 10 highest), showing the numbers of people who describe pre-tax income of the bottom 10% as more or less fair, where 0 on the X axis indicates 'fair', increasing positive numbers indicate views that their income is even more unfairly low and decreasing negative numbers indicate views that their income is even more unfairly high.

Figure B.2: How fair people perceive top 10% income to be, by their income decile.

Note: Each panel reports results for an income decile (1 lowest, 10 highest), showing the numbers of people who describe pre-tax income of the top 10% as more or less fair, where 0 on the X axis indicates 'fair', increasing positive numbers indicate views that their income is even more unfairly low and decreasing negative numbers indicate views that their income is even more unfairly high.

Figure B.3: How fair people perceive their own job opportunities to be, by their income decile.
Note: Each panel reports results for an income decile (1 lowest, 10 highest), showing the numbers of people who describe their job opportunities as more or less fair, where 0 on the X axis indicates fair, increasing positive numbers indicate views that their job opportunities are more unfair.

Figure B.4: How fair people perceive the job opportunities of others to be, by their own income decile.
Note: Each panel reports results for an income decile (1 lowest, 10 highest), showing the numbers of people who describe the job opportunities of other people as more or less fair, where 0 on the X axis indicates fair, increasing positive numbers indicate views that others' job opportunities are more unfair.

Country	Income Unfair for Self	Job Chance Unfair for Self	Income Unfair for Top 10%	Income Unfair for Bttm 10%
Austria	0.45	0.20	0.67	0.88
Belgium	0.50	0.22	0.55	0.82
Finland	0.56	0.18	0.45	0.81
France	0.63	0.33	0.39	0.84
Germany	0.53	0.18	0.41	0.84
Ireland	0.42	0.19	0.37	0.77
Italy	0.67	0.45	0.69	0.91
Netherlands	0.33	0.16	0.53	0.76
Norway	0.36	0.18	0.43	0.86
Spain	0.65	0.39	0.46	0.92
Sweden	0.44	0.18	0.34	0.66
Switzerland	0.42	0.17	0.53	0.87
United Kingdom	0.41	0.17	0.37	0.80
Pooled Sample	0.49	0.24	0.48	0.83

Table B.5: The share of respondents reporting personal and social unfairness of income and job opportunities by country

Note: The first, third and fourth columns represent the percentage of people who said their own/bottom 10% /top 10% income is slightly/ somewhat/ very/ extremely unfair. The question we use to measure the unfairness of job opportunities reads "Overall, everyone in [country] has a fair chance of getting the jobs they seek" and respondents choose from Does not apply at all = 0 to Applies completely = 10. The second column is the percentage of people who chose a number greater than 5.

C Net Loss of Local Manufacturing Jobs

Note that ESS provides regional information at the NUTS 1 level for Germany, Italy, and United Kingdom. For the other countries, we have regional information at the NUTS 2 level. The ERM database does not collect data on restructuring events in Switzerland, thus excluded in the regressions. Also, due to NUTS correspondence issues, Ireland is excluded. Eleven countries are included in the final analysis: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. (See Figure C.1 for the geographic distribution.)

The ERM database provides NUTS 2003 codes while ESS provides NUTS 2016 codes. While many of the codes didn't change (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Netherlands, United Kingdom), some changed (especially France and Sweden as well as parts of Italy, Finland, and Ireland). Using R package `regions`, we recoded NUTS 2013 to NUTS 2003.[4] ITH, ITI, and FI1D (NUTS 2016) are dropped because of boundary changes. Since FI1B and FI1C (NUTS 2016) are both mapped into FI18 (NUTS 2003), we manually changed them.

Figure C.1: Net manufacturing job losses per 1000 employees across Western Europe

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[4]For correspondence tables from Eurostat: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/history

D List of Radical Parties

Country	Party Name	Populist	Far-right	Far-left
Austria	FPÖ	1	1	0
Belgium	Vlaams Belang	1	1	0
Germany	The Left (Die Linke)	1	0	1
Germany	Alternative for Germany (AFD)	1	1	0
Spain	VOX	1	1	0
Spain	Unidas Podemos	1	0	1
Spain	En Comú Podem	1	0	1
Finland	True Finns	1	1	0
France	FN (Front National)	1	1	0
France	FI (LA FRANCE INSOUMISE)	1	0	1
France	DEBOUT LA FRANCE	1	1	0
United Kingdom	UK Independence Party (UKIP)	1	1	0
Ireland	Sinn Féin	1	0	1
Italy	Lega Nord	1	1	0
Italy	Fratelli d'Italia	1	1	0
Netherlands	Socialist Party	1	0	1
Netherlands	Party for Freedom	1	1	0
Netherlands	Forum for Democracy	1	1	0
Norway	Fremskrittspartiet	1	1	0
Sweden	Sverigedemokraterna	1	1	0
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party	1	1	0
Switzerland	Ticino League	1	1	0

Table D.1: List of Populist, Far-right, and Far-left Parties.
Source: The PopuList (Rooduijn et al., 2019)
Note that our analysis focuses on parties that are classified both as populist and as far-right or far-left.

E Robustness Checks

E.1 Table 1 without regional controls

| | Unfairness of Income | | | Unfairness of Job Opportunities | |
| | Self | Top 10% | Bottom 10% | Self | Others |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
RTI	−0.036***	−0.015	−0.026	0.144***	0.009
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.022)
Net Losses of	0.038***	−0.005	0.003	0.073**	0.029
Local Manufacturing Jobs	(0.013)	(0.025)	(0.011)	(0.030)	(0.023)
College	−0.175***	−0.173***	−0.055*	−0.760***	0.012
	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.031)	(0.062)	(0.058)
Female	0.183***	0.110***	0.224***	0.288***	0.333***
	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.058)	(0.040)
Age	−0.002**	−0.001	−0.0001	0.033***	0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Income	−0.076***	−0.062***	−0.003	−0.172***	−0.040***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Union	0.019	0.102**	0.224***	−0.118*	0.050
	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.050)	(0.065)	(0.063)
Unemployed	0.311***	0.131	0.033	1.179***	0.648***
	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.091)	(0.147)	(0.133)
Citizen	−0.062	0.347***	0.147*	−0.488***	0.529***
	(0.049)	(0.088)	(0.077)	(0.176)	(0.142)
Religious	−0.005	−0.008	−0.010*	−0.018*	−0.040***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Urban	−0.041	−0.089	−0.013	0.120*	0.205***
	(0.035)	(0.060)	(0.042)	(0.065)	(0.071)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.077	0.073	0.085	0.189	0.123
Adjusted R^2	0.076	0.071	0.083	0.188	0.122
Observations	11,940	12,104	12,418	12,456	12,669

Table E.1: The relationships between economic uncertainty and views about fairness. *Note:* Standard errors are clustered at the NUTS level and reported in parentheses. Significance levels are reported in the following way: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

E.2 Tables 2 and 3 with Binary Unfairness

In the estimations in this section, responses to the questions about the fairness of own income and the income going to the bottom decile of the population are recoded as 'unfair' (1) if the responses to the original question were below 0 and recoded as 'fair' (0) if the responses to the original question were at or above 0. Responses to the question about the fairness of the income going to the top decile of the population were recoded as 'unfair' (1) if the responses to the original question were above 0 and recoded as 'fair' (0) if those responses were at 0 or below. Responses to the questions about job opportunities were coded as 'unfair' (1) if they were below 5 on the 11 point scale and otherwise coded as 'fair' (0).

	Support for Redistribution		Support for Immigration	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Income Unfair for Self (=1)	0.047**		−0.344***	
	(0.021)		(0.043)	
Income Unfair for Top 10% (=1)	0.259***		−0.070	
	(0.025)		(0.064)	
Income Unfair for Bottom 10% (=1)	0.323***		0.236***	
	(0.026)		(0.075)	
Job Chance Unfair for Self (=1)		0.028		−0.433***
		(0.026)		(0.049)
Job Chance Unfair for Others (=1)		0.183***		−0.103*
		(0.022)		(0.059)
College	−0.064**	−0.066***	1.122***	1.092***
	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.067)	(0.070)
Female	0.135***	0.146***	0.242***	0.252***
	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.057)	(0.059)
Age	0.003**	0.002**	−0.008***	−0.008***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Income Decile	−0.044***	−0.049***	0.043***	0.040***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Union	0.164***	0.197***	0.153***	0.098*
	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.053)	(0.059)
Unemployed	0.100**	0.101**	−0.080	−0.039
	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.109)	(0.055)
Citizen	−0.024	0.022	−0.710***	−0.695***
	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.149)	(0.149)
Religious	−0.017***	−0.016***	−0.001	−0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Urban	0.008	−0.021	0.319***	0.349***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.106	0.076	0.148	0.076
Adjusted R^2	0.105	0.075	0.147	0.075
Observations	17,427	19,663	17,337	19,663

Table E.2.a: The relationship between views about unfairness and attitudes to redistribution and immigrants. *Note*: Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance levels are reported in the following way: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

	Vote for Populist Left		Vote for Populist Right	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Income Unfair for Self (=1)	0.175		0.274***	
	(0.190)		(0.090)	
Income Unfair for Top 10% (=1)	0.334*		−0.049	
	(0.184)		(0.071)	
Income Unfair for Bottom 10% (=1)	−0.047		−0.124	
	(0.126)		(0.092)	
Job Chance Unfair for Self (=1)		0.117*		0.180**
		(0.061)		(0.082)
Job Chance Unfair for Others (=1)		0.413***		0.056
		(0.144)		(0.100)
College	−0.354	−0.412	−1.194***	−1.160***
	(0.272)	(0.276)	(0.145)	(0.141)
Female	−0.144	−0.084	−0.436***	−0.441***
	(0.200)	(0.181)	(0.139)	(0.136)
Age	−0.017***	−0.018***	−0.009***	−0.009***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Income	−0.121***	−0.111***	−0.040**	−0.037**
	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Union	0.481***	0.436**	−0.129	−0.090
	(0.156)	(0.175)	(0.083)	(0.077)
Unemployed	0.365**	0.506***	−0.178	−0.135
	(0.174)	(0.099)	(0.257)	(0.166)
Citizen	0.609**	0.618***	0.119	0.167
	(0.291)	(0.233)	(0.488)	(0.454)
Religious	−0.131***	−0.144***	−0.016	−0.012
	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Urban	0.473**	0.428**	−0.041	−0.086
	(0.206)	(0.215)	(0.136)	(0.115)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,592	5,162	11,421	12,558
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table E.2.b: Views of Unfairness and Voting for Radical Left and Radical Right Parties. *Note:* Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance levels reported as: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

E.3   Excluding Respondents with Personal Income Unfairly High

	Redistribution	Immigration	Radical Left	Radical Right
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Income Unfair for Self	0.026***	−0.216***	0.017	0.162***
	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.067)	(0.050)
Income Unfair for Top 10%	0.053***	−0.024	0.068	0.007
	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.055)	(0.020)
Income Unfair for Bottom 10%	0.099***	0.065***	0.113**	−0.008
	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.047)	(0.021)
College	−0.076***	1.088***	−0.354	−1.171***
	(0.029)	(0.070)	(0.296)	(0.155)
Female	0.136***	0.265***	−0.165	−0.453***
	(0.020)	(0.062)	(0.213)	(0.144)
Age	0.003**	−0.008***	−0.018***	−0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Income	−0.045***	0.035***	−0.115***	−0.029
	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.020)
Union	0.158***	0.148***	0.358**	−0.144
	(0.027)	(0.051)	(0.148)	(0.088)
Unemployed	0.072	−0.005	0.401***	−0.224
	(0.046)	(0.095)	(0.142)	(0.275)
Citizen	−0.026	−0.724***	0.370*	0.367
	(0.044)	(0.155)	(0.196)	(0.534)
Religious	−0.016***	0.002	−0.130***	−0.019
	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.034)	(0.024)
Urban	0.008	0.309***	0.437**	−0.030
	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.205)	(0.133)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	16,539	16,451	4,305	10,820

Table E.3: Views of Unfairness of Income, Attitudes to Redistribution and Immigration, and Voting for Radical Parties. *Note:* Standard errors are clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses. Significance levels reported as: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

F   Trust in Politics

	Trust in Politics		Satisfaction with Democracy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Income Unfair for Self	−0.184***		−0.204***	
	(0.017)		(0.013)	
Income Unfair for Top 10%	−0.024		−0.036	
	(0.021)		(0.029)	
Income Unfair for Bottom 10%	−0.043***		−0.048***	
	(0.016)		(0.019)	
Job Chance Unfair for Self		−0.041***		−0.065***
		(0.009)		(0.009)
Job Chance Unfair for Others		−0.180***		−0.214***
		(0.012)		(0.015)
College	0.476***	0.430***	0.471***	0.422***
	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.062)	(0.068)
Female	−0.126***	−0.099**	−0.169***	−0.108**
	(0.031)	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Age	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Income	0.036***	0.032***	0.074***	0.063***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Union	0.056	−0.012	0.044	−0.013
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.037)	(0.050)
Unemployed	−0.023	0.077	−0.198	−0.126
	(0.086)	(0.058)	(0.153)	(0.077)
Citizen	−0.326***	−0.258***	−0.583***	−0.496***
	(0.088)	(0.065)	(0.128)	(0.084)
Religious	0.077***	0.065***	0.070***	0.061***
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Urban	0.129**	0.177***	0.100	0.172*
	(0.053)	(0.047)	(0.112)	(0.094)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	15,336	17,289	16,752	18,887
R^2	0.162	0.180	0.186	0.217
Adjusted R^2	0.160	0.179	0.185	0.216

Table F.1: Views of Unfairness of Income and Trust in Politics/Satisfaction with Democracy
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses. Significance levels reported as: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

G National-level Results

| | Vote for Populist Right | | | |
| | Hungary | | Poland | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Income Unfair for Self	−0.031		−0.043	
	(0.096)		(0.083)	
Income Unfair for Top 10%	0.050		0.143**	
	(0.046)		(0.057)	
Income Unfair for Bottom 10%	−0.207**		0.010	
	(0.095)		(0.081)	
Job Chance Unfair for Self		−0.002		−0.007
		(0.047)		(0.042)
Job Chance Unfair for Others		−0.130***		−0.036
		(0.048)		(0.045)
College	−0.281	−0.437	−0.376	−0.524**
	(0.309)	(0.296)	(0.255)	(0.239)
Female	−0.154	−0.112	−0.476**	−0.414**
	(0.214)	(0.204)	(0.215)	(0.201)
Age	−0.020***	−0.017**	−0.019***	−0.011
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Income	−0.034	−0.052	−0.066	−0.038
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.043)
Union	−0.261	−0.199	−0.095	−0.063
	(0.379)	(0.377)	(0.340)	(0.336)
Unemployed	14.567***	0.226	13.882***	1.042
	(0.656)	(0.654)	(0.660)	(0.765)
Religious	0.159***	0.155***	0.363***	0.322***
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.046)	(0.043)
Urban	−0.609***	−0.601***	−0.185	−0.210
Observations	514	559	494	535

Table G.1: Views of Unfairness and Voting for Radical Right Parties in Hungary and Poland. *Note:* Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance levels reported as: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

	Vote for Populist Right			Vote for Populist Left		
	Income for self unfair	Job chances for self unfair		Income unfair for top 10%	Income unfair for bottom 10%	Job Chances for others unfair
Austria	+	+				
Belgium	-	+				
Finland	+	+				
France	+*	+		+*	+	+
Germany	+*	+*		+	+	+*
Ireland				-	-	+
Italy	-	+				
Netherlands	+*	+		+*	+	+
Norway	+*	+				
Spain	+	+		-	+	+*
Sweden	+*	+				
Switzerland	+	-				
UK	+	+				

Table G.2 Signs and significance of the coefficients on unfairness at the country level

Notes: This table reports the signs and statistical significance of the coefficients for the variables reflecting personal unfairness in estimations on vote for populist right parties and social unfairness in estimations on vote for populist left parties. These estimations are conditioned on the same set of variables as those in Table 3 in the article but conducted at the country level. Our theoretical expectation is that these coefficients will be positive. The marker + indicates that the coefficient on the relevant variable was positive and the marker – indicates that the coefficient was negative. The marker * indicates that the coefficient was statistically significant at the 0.05 or 0.01 level. Shading indicates the absence of the relevant type of party.

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