


## Dignity and Dehumanization

### The Impact of the Holocaust on Central Themes of My Work

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#### Biographical Note

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*ing the International Studies Association, the International Society of Political Psychology, and the Interamerican Society of Psychology.*

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The Holocaust has been a constant presence and a pervasive influence in my life and work. In this chapter, I reflect on my personal experience in confronting the Holocaust as a social scientist—which is, of course, my particular way of confronting it as a human being. The Holocaust has had an impact—in both obvious and subtle ways—not only on what I chose to study as a social scientist but also on my very choice of this profession as my lifelong career.

### **Personal Background and Intellectual Choices**

I was born in Vienna in 1927 into a Jewish family of east European origin. My parents came to Vienna, separately, from the Tarnopol region in Eastern Galicia during World War I, as young adults. The area in which they were born (and which I visited, with my wife, for the first time in the summer of 1997) is now part of Ukraine. Before World War I it was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; between the two wars it was part of Poland; and after World War II it was part of the Soviet Union.

I grew up in a traditional Jewish home, in which I absorbed the religious and cultural values of Judaism. I had a thorough Hebrew and Jewish education, starting at age four and continuing to age twenty. (I received the degree of Bachelor of Hebrew Literature from the Seminary College of Jewish Studies in New York in 1947.) I also had extensive exposure in my childhood to the Yiddish language and the east European culture in which it flourished, through regular attendance at the Yiddish theater in Vienna (which was managed by a cousin) and later through a year spent in Antwerp in a largely Yiddish-speaking environment.

I was eleven years old at the time of the *Anschluss* and lived under Nazi rule for the next year. After the *Anschluss*, my family was evicted from the city housing project in which my father had managed a few years earlier to obtain an apartment (with the help of his status as an Austrian war veteran). My sister and I were expelled from our respective schools but were assigned places in the by then overcrowded Jewish Gymnasium. We experienced the pogrom of November 9–10, 1938—the so-called *Kristallnacht*—in its full force, living by that time in a Jewish neighborhood, around the corner from the Sephardic temple, which (along

with all but one of the city's synagogues) was blown up and destroyed on that day. My memories of the *Kristallnacht* are detailed and vivid; I had the opportunity to share them with various Viennese audiences in the fall of 1998, when I took part in the commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the event.

In the aftermath of the *Kristallnacht*, it was clear that we had to get out of the country as quickly as possible. The small store that my father owned, in partnership with my aunt and uncle, was closed on November 10, and he never set foot in it again. We had no income and hardly any savings. My sister and I stopped attending school because it was not safe to walk there. (We did, however, manage to find ways of going to meetings of the Zionist youth group that we had joined after the *Anschluss*. I know that my membership in this group, my commitment to Zionism, and my strong Jewish identification in general sustained me during this period and enabled me to hold on to my self-worth in the face of the calculated degradation of the Nazi onslaught.) In addition to being deprived of work, of income, and of schooling, we lived in constant danger. The treatment of Jews, at the hands of bureaucrats, uniformed Nazis, or ordinary citizens, was entirely arbitrary, subject to the whims of the moment. A Jew—of any age and either gender—could be beaten up or forced to wash the sidewalk at any time. My father ran the constant risk of being dragged off to a concentration camp. It was only luck that protected us from beatings or arrests on the two occasions (one of them on November 10, 1938) when storm troopers came to our apartment to search and interrogate us. There was no question, then, that we had to get out. The problem for Jews during that period was not in getting out of Germany but in finding a place that would let them in.

My parents had the foresight to apply for immigrant visas to the United States within a few weeks of the *Anschluss*. We had close relatives in the States who provided the necessary affidavits. Still, in the end, it took two years before our visas were issued, because of the existence of national quotas for immigration to the United States at the time. Although we were Austrian citizens, we were on the Polish quota, since my parents' birthplaces were part of Poland during that period. The Polish quota was relatively small, and it took time for places to become available. I learned later, from a letter written by the U.S. consul in Vienna that I found in my father's papers, that had he delayed applying for the visas by just two or three weeks, the process would have taken an additional year and we would not have been able to escape Nazi-occupied Europe before the Holocaust.

As it was, our problem was to find an interim haven while waiting for our U.S. visas to come through. With the help of a cousin who had escaped to Italy, we managed to obtain illegal visas to Belgium, and we made it to Antwerp in the spring of 1939. The Belgian policy at the time was to allow illegal Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany to register with the police and legalize their stay, provided they did not seek employment. We had no funds, since we were not permitted to take out money or valuables upon departure from Germany. (I remember a very thorough search at the German border.) We were able to subsist, however, with the help of local and U.S. Jewish relief organizations. We stayed in Belgium as refugees for a year—during which, incidentally, I received good schooling and was happily active in my Zionist youth group. At the end of March 1940, our U.S. visas finally came through, and we left Belgium for the United States just a few weeks before Belgium was invaded by German troops. I had my bar mitzvah on the French boat that took us from St. Nazaire to New York, where we arrived on April 8, 1940.

My immediate family was thus saved from the Holocaust. Like so many others, I lost numerous relatives and childhood friends to the Holocaust, and I have lived with the knowledge that it was only by extraordinary luck and by a very slim margin that I escaped the same fate. For many years, I did not think of myself as a Holocaust survivor, because I felt that this title can be claimed only by those who survived in the midst of the Holocaust: in the camps, in the ghettos, in the woods, in the monasteries, or hidden in the cellars and attics of righteous neighbors. I have since learned that the term does apply to me, as a Nazi victim who suffered persecution but managed to escape in time from Nazi-occupied Europe. Accordingly, I have entered my name in the Registry of Holocaust Survivors and submitted information about my family and myself to the database in the Holocaust Museum in Washington.

I do not feel that I have been obsessed by the Holocaust or experienced more than the inevitable and appropriate amount of survivor's guilt. But there is no doubt that the Holocaust has shaped my thinking and my concerns since the end of World War II when we all fully realized the dimensions of the horror that had taken place. There has been scarcely a day, in all of these years, that the Holocaust has not been on my mind in one or another way. And I know that the attempt to confront the Holocaust—to understand it and to contribute to the prevention of future Holocausts, whoever their victims might be—has profoundly affected the discipline I chose to pursue and the topics I have chosen to address within that discipline.

Having noted the pervasive and profound influence of the Holocaust on my life and work, I must enter an important qualification. Just as it is a mistake, in my view, to construct Jewish history and culture entirely around the Holocaust and the experience of persecution over the centuries, it would also be a mistake to construct my own intellectual history entirely around the Holocaust. The Holocaust, as I shall try to show, has had a direct influence on some of the questions I chose to address in my work and has helped to shape the way in which I have addressed some other questions. But there are many other influences—some of which I can articulate better than others—that have played an independent or interacting role in shaping my work. Some of these preceded my encounter with Nazism. Important among these is my early and extensive exposure to Jewish religion and culture, as well as to the Hebrew and Yiddish languages and the environments in which they were rooted. Moreover, at age ten, it seems, I was already heading in the direction of the social-issues-oriented social scientist that I ultimately became: One of my favorite books was a children's text on ethnology; my favorite author was Johann Nestroy, the nineteenth-century Austrian playwright noted for his social criticism; and I was already sensitive to the horrors of war and the irrationality of social prejudice. Other important influences reached me over the years. These included my membership in a religious Zionist youth group, which also introduced me to socialist ideas and kibbutz ideology, my experience with racial segregation in the United States and active involvement in the civil rights movement, my encounters with pacifism and philosophical anarchism, and my exposure to existential philosophy. In short, it would be a mistake to overinterpret the influence of the Holocaust on my work by assigning it a wholly deterministic role.

With these qualifications in mind, I propose that the attempt to confront the issues raised by the Holocaust helped to propel me toward a career in social—and ultimately political—psychology. Within that discipline, it played a significant, if not decisive, role in my choice of four major topics on which my work over the years has focused: conformity and obedience, nationalism and national identity, ethnic conflict and its resolution, and the ethics of social research. My budding interest in the first three of these topics, as I shall elaborate, goes back to the period immediately after the end of World War II, when I was an eighteen-to-nineteen-year-old undergraduate. My interest in the fourth topic emerged in my first year of graduate school, as I was beginning to be socialized into the discipline. A theme that runs through all four of these

topics is the concern with human dignity and the danger of dehumanization—of depriving those placed in the category of “other” of dignity by denying their identity and excluding them from one’s own moral community, in other words, from the community with whose members one shares a sense of mutual moral obligation. I shall touch on this theme as I discuss each of the four topics in turn.

### **Conformity and Obedience**

My work on conformity and obedience shows the most direct influence of the Holocaust on my research agenda, although it reflects various other influences as well. My earliest research was concerned with determinants of conformity (Kelman 1950). In my doctoral dissertation (Kelman 1953), carried out within the early tradition of persuasive communication research (see Hovland, Janis, and Kelley 1953), I explored the conditions conducive to mere public conformity versus genuine attitude change, that is, private acceptance of the message of the communication. The dissertation research soon led me to the distinction between three processes of social influence—compliance, identification, and internalization (Kelman 1958, 1961)—which has continued to serve as the theoretical foundation of much of my work over the years (see, e.g., Kelman and Hamilton 1989). The distinction among the three processes of influence reflects my abiding concern with the depth, quality, and durability of change and the degree to which externally derived changes are integrated with the person’s own value system and personal identity (Kelman 1998b). This focus on the depth and durability of change also characterizes my later work on international and intergroup conflict, which draws the distinction between settlement of the conflict, perhaps in the form of a signed agreement imposed by outside powers, and resolution of the conflict, characterized by responsiveness to the needs of both parties, by attitudinal and structural changes, and by transformation of the relationship between the parties (Kelman 1996).

The three processes of influence do not represent a strict hierarchy, moving from a lower to a higher stage, in a moral and developmental sense. Two or all of the three processes may well occur in the same situation or relationship. All of us, no matter how high our level of moral development, engage at times in compliance and identification. Indeed, compliance and identification are often necessary to the maintenance of personal well-being and social order. Nor is internalization always “good”; it is possible to internalize destructive attitudes, anchored in a

value system that denies dignity and equality to some categories of human beings. Still, the distinction does have value connotations. It points to the dangers of automatic compliance, without consideration of how self-interest impacts on the interests of others; and of identification without consideration of how a particular relationship impacts on the wider community in which it is embedded. Moreover, the concept of internalization posits the possibility of a process of independent, reflective assessment of external influences in terms of their fit with a personal value system and in terms of their likely human consequences.

My formulation of social influence processes was clearly driven by two interrelated moral concerns.

- Concern about a social order marked by excessive conformity and unwillingness to resist group and authority pressures and by widespread failure to take personal responsibility for national policies, to live up to one's values, and to stand up against evil; and
- Concern about encouraging within the society a process of thoughtful reflection on existing patterns of violence, injustice, and inequality and promoting changes in social attitudes, practices, and institutions in accord with humanistic values.

These concerns were linked to the particular form of social activism to which I had become committed in my late teens—an activism centering on issues of peace, racial equality, and nonviolence and employing conscientious objection and nonviolent direct action as the means of protest and resistance.

When I began my graduate work at Yale in the fall of 1947, I had no idea about the kind of career I wanted to pursue. But I chose social psychology as my field of intellectual endeavor, not only because it intrigued me from the moment I first encountered it but also because I saw it as an appropriate scholarly vehicle for pursuing my moral concerns and my form of social activism. In this connection, it is noteworthy that I joined the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI) in 1946, when I was still an undergraduate at Brooklyn College. I was introduced to SPSSI by Daniel Katz, who chaired the psychology department at Brooklyn College at that time and who represented the kind of social psychology that I found appealing: an empirically anchored discipline focusing on the relationship of individuals to larger social structures and historical processes.

Although the moral concerns and social activism that drove my work

on social influence were directly related to the dominant social issues of the post-World War II years in the United States, I have no doubt that they were anchored to a considerable degree in my experiences in Nazi-controlled Europe and my confrontation with the Holocaust. The Holocaust sensitized me to the dangers of conformity, to the failures in resisting evil, to the need for socialization patterns conducive to the development of humanistic values and to a readiness to act in accord with such values. The link to the Holocaust became more direct as my work on social influence moved to the study of legitimate authority and destructive obedience. At that point, I was back to the original questions that had haunted me and so many others ever since the full extent of the Holocaust became known: How are such things possible? How can people get to the point of instigating such horrendous crimes, participating in them, or allowing them to happen? And how can one prevent such crimes in the future and build the foundations for resistance to them?

My first attempt to grapple with these questions from a psychological point of view was a forty-page paper for an undergraduate course on the psychology of personality that I took at Brooklyn College in the fall of 1946. The paper, entitled "Towards an Explanation of Nazi Aggression," used the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Dollard et al. 1939) as its primary theoretical framework but also drew extensively on Hadley Cantril's *The Psychology of Social Movements* (1941) and Erich Fromm's *Escape from Freedom* (1941). More than a quarter of a century later, I returned to the same questions in my Kurt Lewin Memorial Address, "Violence without Moral Restraint: Reflections on the Dehumanization of Victims and Victimizers" (Kelman 1973). I argue in this paper that the major instigators for the violence perpetrated in genocide and other sanctioned massacres derive from the policy process and that the key question for psychological analysis is how the usual moral inhibitions against violence become weakened so that large numbers of people are prepared to formulate, participate in, and condone policies that call for the mass killing of defenseless victims. The core of the paper is a discussion of three social processes that help people overcome the moral restraints that would normally deter them from engaging in acts of mass murder, torture, massacre, and other horrendous crimes: authorization, routinization, and dehumanization.

In 1971, two years before I wrote my Lewin address, Lee Hamilton and I started a research project that eventually led to the publication of our book, *Crimes of Obedience: Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and Responsibility* (Kelman and Hamilton 1989). The research began as an



attempt to understand the reasons behind the U.S. public's massive outcry against the conviction of Lieutenant William Calley for the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War. A national survey that we conducted in the spring of 1971 showed that the majority's disapproval and the minority's approval of the trial and conviction of Lieutenant Calley were strongly related to their differing conceptions of personal responsibility for actions carried out under superior orders. In a subsequent survey, conducted in 1976, we explored individual differences in conceptions of responsibility. How people assign responsibility for actions taken under superior orders is related to their views about authority and their own relationship to authority. In particular, we were interested in the relationship of people's judgments of crimes of obedience to three political orientations—rule orientation, role orientation, and value orientation—that are conceptually linked to the processes of compliance, identification, and internalization.

Although the empirical data presented in *Crimes of Obedience* are derived from our two surveys, focusing primarily on the My Lai massacre and the Calley trial, the book deals with the general question of how people determine personal responsibility for actions ordered or authorized by their superiors in a hierarchical relationship. We discuss a variety of historical and contemporary examples of crimes of obedience in different domains. We conclude the book with a chapter entitled "Breaking the Habit of Unquestioning Obedience," which addresses, in particular, possible policies and strategies for promoting personal responsibility and independent judgment in authority situations. We cast a wide net in identifying crimes of obedience, but the defining case is clearly taken from the Holocaust, whose perpetrators—Adolf Eichmann among others—often took recourse in the defense of superior orders. For me, this work represented part of my continuing attempt to grapple with the questions that have preoccupied me since the Holocaust: How are such crimes possible, and how can they be prevented?

I am not able in this chapter to elaborate on our definition of crimes of obedience, but I do need to note that the term is not restricted to actions taken strictly out of a sense of obligation or out of fear of punishment. We also include in this category actions that may correspond to the actors' own preferences and are taken in pursuit of some personal or ideological agenda but that the actors *justify* (not just *ex post facto* but *ab initio*) by superior orders. These are still crimes of obedience, by our definition, on the presumption that the action would not have been taken without authorization—without the umbrella of superior orders.

Even with this broader definition in mind, I am not proposing that obedience to authority accounts for the Holocaust. To account for the Holocaust, one needs to examine a wide range of factors, including (among others) the historical conditions that provided the context for the rise of Nazism; the political processes that brought the Nazis to power; the sources and implications of the racist ideology and biomedical vision of the Nazi movement; the cultural conditions that made Germany at the time a receptive environment for the promulgation and acceptance of this ideology; the historical circumstances that made Jews a prime target of the Nazi genocidal project; the psychological forces that caused people to participate—passively or actively, with different degrees of enthusiasm—in a genocidal process; and the internal dynamics of the genocidal process once it is set into motion in a society—that is, what Ervin Staub (1989) has called the “steps along a continuum of destruction.” Our work on authority and responsibility, and on the processes of authorization, routinization, and dehumanization, provides a small but not insignificant piece of an explanatory framework that can provide an account of the Holocaust and other genocides.

Although I do not claim to be a Holocaust scholar *per se*, I believe that my work can contribute to how we understand the Holocaust and what we learn from it. In saying this, I am clearly taking a position in the debate about the uniqueness versus generalizability of the Holocaust. In my view, the Holocaust is both unique and a suitable basis for comparative analysis. Every historical event is unique, and the Holocaust clearly has a special place in Jewish history and Jewish theology. Moreover, the Holocaust was an extermination project extreme in its magnitude and unprecedented in its execution. At the same time, the Holocaust is, unfortunately, one of many historical and contemporary cases of genocide that—despite their many unique features—are susceptible to comparative study by social scientists and historians. Studies of different cases can bring us closer to understanding the causes of genocide and the dynamics of the genocidal process and to finding ways of preventing genocide. One of the ways in which my personal experience with the Holocaust influenced my work has been in motivating me to make my own small contribution to this learning process.

### **Nationalism and National Identity**

My work on nationalism and national identity also has old biographical roots. In my childhood, I experienced nationalism both as a destructive

and direct oppressive force, in the form of Nazism, and as a personally liberating force, in the form of Zionism. I have already mentioned in passing that my membership in the religious Zionist youth group that I joined at age eleven, shortly after the *Anschluss*, and my strong Jewish identification in general sustained me in the face of the onslaught of the Nazi experience. I credit my Jewish identity for the fact that my self-esteem apparently remained undiminished by the attacks against me and my people. I have no recollection of ever asking myself seriously whether Jews were in some way responsible for or deserving of the anti-Semitism directed at them.

The contrast between the destructive and the liberating sides of nationalism has been a central feature of my earliest thinking and my subsequent research on the subject. I knew from the beginning and had many reasons to confirm that nationalism is a cause or at least a driving force of war and genocide, but I was never prepared to reject it outright because of my awareness of its liberating potential for oppressed people. My very first article (Kelman 1945), written in Hebrew and published in a student magazine in New York, grappled with this issue. The article, entitled "In Defense of Nationalism," distinguishes between positive and negative varieties of nationalism. On the one hand, it describes nationalism as a contribution to the struggle for freedom and against oppression and also, at the psychological level, as a source of cultural identification, self-respect, and personal efficacy. On the other hand, it enumerates the potential evils of nationalism when it becomes chauvinistic, exclusive, and destructive. It is because of these evils, of course, that I felt the need to defend nationalism in the first place.

My subsequent work on nationalism, which began some twenty years after this first piece was published, has always been concerned with the different faces of nationalism. Thus, our empirical work in the 1960s was based on a distinction between different types of nationalism or, more precisely, different patterns of personal involvement in the national system (DeLamater, Katz, and Kelman 1969; Katz, Kelman, and Vassiliou 1969; Kelman 1969). My analysis of nationalism has focused, in particular, on the dualities of nationalist ideology and its object, the nation-state: nationalism both broadens and narrows group loyalties by drawing boundaries that are both inclusive and exclusive, that both unite and divide people; it seeks to build both a state around a nation and a nation around a state; it mobilizes people by both discovering and creating a sense of national identity; it elicits high levels of both selfless and selfish behavior in its followers; and it is both a vehi-

cle for and a barrier to the enhancement of human dignity (Kelman 1997a).

The last point was a central thesis of my presidential address for the International Studies Association (Kelman 1977a), which focused on the conditions, criteria, and dialectics of human dignity. The dialectics of human dignity are a consequence of the contradictory role played by the nation-state in the contemporary world. On the one hand, the nation-state is the primary provider of human dignity to its citizens by protecting their rights, advancing their interests, and giving expression to their group identity. On the other hand, the nation-state often undermines human dignity by erecting barriers to alternative ways of meeting human needs and protecting human rights, alternatives necessitated by the growing interdependence *between* states and the upsurge of ethnic divisions *within* states.

The contradictions of national identity have led me to argue that a group's right to national self-determination by establishing an independent state cannot be automatic (Kelman 1997b). Implementation of that right must be negotiated with those whose needs and interests are affected by the establishment of such a state, particularly minority populations. The central criterion for granting international legitimacy to a quest for an independent state is that it provides absolute guarantees for the protection of minority rights. Thus, even though a state may legitimately be established to fulfill the quest for national self-determination by the majority of the population, it must never claim or strive to be ethnically pure. Any such project, I argue, is automatically suspect as a threat to fundamental human rights and an invitation to ethnic cleansing.

I argue further that "even a group's national identity itself must be 'negotiated,' i.e., explored and discussed, with those who are affected by the group's self-definition" (Kelman 1997b, 331). This is *necessary* because the way a group defines itself often has significant consequences for others; it is *possible* because national identity is a social construction, which can be—and typically is—reconstructed. The negotiation of identity is critical to the resolution of protracted ethnic conflicts, such as the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, in which each group has seen the destruction of the other's identity as necessary for the fulfillment of its own identity (Kelman 1987, 1999). My own work in conflict resolution, which focuses particularly on the Israeli-Palestinian case, is partly designed to encourage the parties to move away from exclusivist and monolithic definitions of identity and to accommodate the other's identity in their own identity

(Kelman 1992, 1998a, 2001). This work will be discussed in the next section.

In concluding this section, let me stress that a theme that permeates my work on nationalism and national identity is the danger of exclusivism. An exclusivistic nationalism can easily slide into dehumanization of the other. When the line that marks off the in-group from the out-group becomes the boundary of one's moral community—the community whose members have a sense of moral obligation to one another—then massacre, torture, rape, ethnic cleansing, and genocide become thinkable and doable. Clearly, the Holocaust, starting with the exclusion of Jews from the moral community of so many Germans and Austrians, which I observed at first hand, sensitized me to this perilous feature of nationalist ideology.

### **Ethnic Conflict and Its Resolution**

My work for some thirty years on ethnic conflict and conflict resolution is directly continuous with my long-standing interest in the study of war and peace and of the social-psychological dimensions of international relations and, in particular, international conflict. I have already mentioned that I went into social psychology because I saw it as a scholarly vehicle for pursuing my moral concerns and my form of social activism. A central part of these concerns and hence of my activism was my attitude toward war and violence.

My interest in peace and nonviolent conflict resolution was propelled by many experiences during my childhood and adolescence. These probably included my father's accounts of his life as a soldier in World War I; the fact that my mother lost two brothers during that war—one on the Italian front and the other in an epidemic; the political unrest in Austria during the 1930s; and finally the horrors of World War II itself. I have no doubt, however, that the experience of Nazi rule and the Holocaust and the lessons I learned from these events played a major role in shaping my views about war and violence. War is a massive exercise in the dehumanization of others—of those defined as the enemy or even as obstacles to the achievement of victory. In war, as in racial persecution and genocide, the targets of aggression are deprived of human dignity by denial of their identity and by their exclusion from one's own moral community. War provides the context for genocide and other gross violations of human rights.

I tried to build the study of war and peace, of international conflict, into my professional agenda from the beginning of my career. In April 1951, when I was just completing my doctoral work at Yale University, Arthur Gladstone and I published a letter in the *American Psychologist* in which we called for the systematic testing of certain assumptions about human behavior that underlie U.S. foreign policy. We pointed out that these assumptions have been challenged by pacifists on the basis of generally accepted psychological principles and that it would be important for psychologists to address these challenges. Reactions to this letter eventually led to the formation of the Research Exchange on the Prevention of War, which was probably the first organizational venture in the peace research movement that began to emerge in the 1950s. The *Bulletin of the Research Exchange on the Prevention of War*, edited by Arthur Gladstone from 1952–56 (I was book review editor), was replaced in 1957 by the more ambitious *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, originally published out of the University of Michigan, which is now in its forty-fifth year of publication.

My own efforts to move my work more actively into the arena of international relations included a research program on the effects of international cultural and educational exchanges (see, e.g., Kelman and Ezekiel 1970), as well as the program on nationalism described in the preceding section, “Nationalism and National Identity.” I paid particular attention, in my thinking and writing, to the ways in which social-psychological concepts and methods can contribute to the study of war and peace and of international relations more generally. A major product of this effort was a book I edited for SPSSI, *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis* (Kelman 1965b). This book, in chapters contributed by social psychologists and political scientists (and one social anthropologist), pulled together the extant knowledge about national and international images and about processes of interaction in international relations. My own introduction and conclusion were particularly focused on the appropriate points of entry for social-psychological analysis—on those points, within a larger theory of international relations, at which social-psychological approaches can make a specifically relevant contribution to understanding and conceptualizing the phenomenon.

My work in this area took a significant new turn in 1966 when I met John Burton, a former senior Australian diplomat and then director of the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict at the University of London. Burton told me about his work in “controlled communication,” an unofficial, third-party approach to the resolution of international and

intercommunal conflicts that brought together politically influential representatives of parties in conflict for direct, nonbinding, and completely confidential interaction in an academic context (Burton 1969). I was excited about his work because I saw it as a way of putting into practice the social-psychological approach to international conflict that I was grappling with at the theoretical level. The meetings organized by Burton represented to me another point of entry for social-psychological approaches: a point in the larger diplomatic process where social-psychological methods—in the form of face-to-face interactions between selected individuals—can make a specific contribution. I gladly accepted Burton's invitation to an exercise on the Cyprus conflict that took place in London in November 1966.

After that London meeting, I began to think and write about the approach (Kelman 1972a) and eventually to apply it in what we came to call problem-solving workshops. I have worked in collaboration with many colleagues, notably Stephen Cohen in the early years (Cohen et al. 1977) and Nadim Rouhana in recent years (Rouhana and Kelman 1994). Our approach, *interactive problem solving* (Kelman forthcoming), derives directly from the work of John Burton, although it has evolved over the years in line with our practical experience and our social-psychological orientation. I now direct (with Donna Hicks as deputy director) the Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution (PICAR) at Harvard University's Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. The program is based on the scholar/practitioner model, which calls for a continuing interaction of practice with research, theory building, and training. PICAR members work on a variety of international and ethnic conflicts, such as those in Sri Lanka, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, and Bosnia. My own work has concentrated, for many years, on the Arab-Israeli conflict and particularly its Israeli-Palestinian component (Kelman 1998c). My personal history can readily account for the fact that my work on war and peace has ultimately gravitated toward the analysis and resolution of conflicts between identity groups and, in particular, the Israeli-Palestinian case.

I began to think about applying John Burton's approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict shortly after I became acquainted with it. The idea came to me in June 1967, as I was watching the news about what turned out to be the Six-Day War. My reaction to the events was one of profound anxiety. The war brought back to me, as it did to many other Jews, memories of the Holocaust and a renewed fear of the annihilation of the Jewish people. The first reaction for so many of us was the question: Is it about

to happen again? I felt that the Jewish people could not absorb another Holocaust. The course of the war soon made it clear that this war was not another Holocaust and that Israel and the Jewish people were going to survive. But it was the old concern about Jewish victimization that first impelled me to explore conflict resolution efforts in the Middle East.

At the same time, I had from the beginning been conscious of the fact that there was another people living in the land that the Jews claimed for their national homeland. My second published article—written in Hebrew, like the first, and published in another student magazine (Kelman 1945–46)—was called “On the Question of Jewish-Arab Cooperation,” cooperation that I considered both necessary and possible. In the years before the establishment of Israel, I favored the concept of a binational state promoted by minority segments of the Zionist movement. After the establishment of Israel, I was active in American Friends of Ichud, a group identified with the names of Martin Buber and Judah Magnes of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, which earlier had been among the proponents of a binational state and was now focused on improving Arab-Jewish relations.

The concerns aroused by the 1967 war, along with my commitment to Arab-Jewish cooperation, led me to pursue the feasibility of organizing an unofficial encounter of high-level Arabs and Israelis to explore ideas for resolving the conflict. My efforts, in collaboration with John Burton, did not succeed on this first try. I learned that a great deal of groundwork had to be done before one could successfully recruit participants for such an effort. In particular, it became clear to me that I would have to familiarize myself with the communities involved, especially the Arab world, which I had never visited, and that I would have to establish relationships and connect with relevant networks. Because of other commitments, I was not ready to give this project the kind of attention that it required, and so I put it on the back burner. I did not give up on the idea, however. On a visit to Israel, I discussed it with several colleagues—and received mixed reactions. I thought about the theoretical underpinnings of the approach and wrote my first paper on problem-solving workshops (Kelman 1972a). And, in 1971, Stephen Cohen and I conducted our first workshop with Israelis and Palestinians (Cohen et al. 1977).

It was not until 1973, however, that I committed myself to giving this work my highest priority. I was home recuperating from a heart attack when the October 1973 war broke out. It was a time when, in any event, I had to review my priorities, and this new war convinced me that the Arab-Israeli conflict was the arena in which I must now invest my ener-



gies. Increasingly, I immersed myself in the issues of the region. Over the following years, I read about the Middle East, attended numerous meetings and conferences, traveled frequently to Arab countries as well as to Israel, made contacts, built relationships, and became connected with various networks that were crucial to my work. I turned myself into a Middle East specialist. Since 1977 I have chaired the Middle East Seminar at Harvard, which is sponsored by the Center for International Affairs and the Center for Middle Eastern Studies. This kind of immersion in Middle East affairs would not have been possible without the full involvement of my wife, who joined me enthusiastically in workshop activities, in Middle East travels, in the personal relationships that we established through our work (and indeed as part of our work), and in making the Middle East the center of our lives. My only regret is that I decided that I was too old and too busy to learn Arabic when I began this immersion process more than a quarter of a century ago.

During the past quarter century, my colleagues and I have conducted dozens of workshops—mostly with Palestinians and Israelis. Between 1990 and 1993, Nadim Rouhana and I conducted a continuing workshop (Rouhana and Kelman 1994), and since 1994, we have cochaired the Joint Working Group on Israeli-Palestinian Relations, which has produced joint working papers on the final-status issues in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Well over one hundred politically influential Israelis and an equal number of Palestinians have by now participated in one or more of our projects. Although I have done some work with Israelis and Egyptians and have maintained close contacts in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, I have concentrated my work on the Israeli-Palestinian relationship for several reasons.

- It is the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and a stable peace between Israel and its neighbors cannot be achieved without resolution of the Palestinian issue;
- It is the aspect of the conflict about which I care most deeply; and
- It is the aspect of the conflict to which interactive problem solving and my particular social-psychological approach to the negotiation of national identity are uniquely relevant.

In addition to conducting workshops and arranging similar opportunities for interaction between the two sides, I have lectured about the substantive issues in the conflict and have published policy analyses (starting with Kelman 1978) focusing on the social-psychological dimensions of

the conflict and approaches to its resolution. These writings have drawn extensively on what I have learned from our workshops, and I have been careful in these writings to avoid compromising my role as a facilitative third party.

The central motivating factors in my work on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been my concerns about a secure future for Israel and about justice for the Palestinian people. Both of these concerns are directly linked to my experience with the Holocaust. I feel that I am able to work as a third party in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because of my deep empathy with both sides and the trust that this engenders in the people who work with me. (I should add here that I have always worked with an ethnically balanced third-party team that includes at least one Arab member; this contributes both to sensitizing the third party to the concerns and perspectives of each side and to assuring the two parties of the third party's evenhandedness.)

On the one hand, I share the Jewish experience of the Israeli members: their memories, their fears, their feeling of connection to the land, their sense of necessity of the Zionist project—particularly in the light of the Holocaust. I am deeply committed to the survival and well-being of Israel. I bring to my efforts at conflict resolution a vision of Israel that is broadly shared by the Israeli participants in our workshops: Israel as a democratic, pluralistic state, living at peace with its Palestinian neighbors without dominating them, enjoying normal relations with the surrounding Arab states, and fully accepted and integrated in the region.

On the other hand, I feel that my own early experiences help me to empathize with the Palestinian experience of displacement, homelessness, statelessness, humiliation, and arbitrary treatment by others who exclude them from their own moral community. Although, as noted earlier, it was my concern about Jewish victimization that impelled me to explore conflict resolution efforts in the Middle East, I was from the beginning and became increasingly concerned about the historical and continuing victimization of the Palestinian people. My own Holocaust experience has sensitized me to acts of exclusion, victimization, and potential dehumanization directed against any group, not only my own group. What makes the victimization of the Palestinians particularly poignant for me is the fact that my own people are the source of that victimization.

The most difficult moments in my Israeli-Palestinian work were those at which I had to confront—within or outside of the context of a workshop—Israeli policies, practices, or isolated acts that involved humilia-

tion, harassment, and arbitrary treatment of Palestinians, depriving them of their dignity and identity. Such moments painfully reminded me of what happened to my own people and what I personally observed in my childhood. I have never, until now, shared these reactions with anyone other than my wife, for fear of being misunderstood. I am not comparing the Palestinian experience to the Holocaust. I have strongly rejected any attempt to draw such an analogy, just as I have rejected the analogy between Palestinian terrorism and Nazi pogroms. But one of the central lessons that I have drawn from the Holocaust is the need to be supremely vigilant to any action that degrades others merely because of the category in which they are placed and excludes them from one's own moral community. Although such actions may be far removed from mass murder or ethnic cleansing, they establish an inexorable logic that readily points in that direction.

### **The Ethics of Social Research**

The fourth and final area of my work that I believe was clearly influenced by my experience and contemplation of the Holocaust was the ethics of social research. I have been concerned with ethical issues raised by social research from the very beginning of my graduate training, as I began to reflect on what I was doing and what kind of knowledge I was producing in the new role into which I was being socialized. Over the years, I have spoken and written extensively about two sets of ethical problems: those relating to the processes of social research and those relating to the products of social research (Kelman 1972b).

In the latter category, an issue that occupied me early on was the manipulation of human behavior. I was concerned that much of the knowledge that applied and basic social research was producing—including the work on persuasive communication and group dynamics that I was personally engaged in—could be used for manipulative purposes. I first spoke about these concerns at a departmental colloquium at Yale when I was still a graduate student; a considerably revised and updated version of that talk was eventually published some fifteen years later (Kelman 1965a). The issue of manipulation was one of a number of issues taken up in a volume on the ethics of social intervention that I coedited in the 1970s (Bermant, Kelman, and Warwick 1978). I have also written about the social uses of research findings in general and about the harmful and dehumanizing uses to which the products of social research can potentially be put in particular domains. In this vein, for

example, I have addressed research in developing countries used for counterinsurgency purposes, research on social deviance, research on racial differences in IQ, and research carried out for military or intelligence purposes (see Kelman 1968, 1972b).

As for the processes of social research, a major focus of my writing has been on the ethics of human experimentation. An early article, entitled "Human Use of Human Subjects" (Kelman 1967), dealt with the problems created by the extensive use of deception in social-psychological experiments. In another article (Kelman 1977b), I addressed the issue of invasion of privacy in social and psychological research, starting with an analysis of three different meanings of privacy and the psychological significance of preserving one's privacy in each of these senses. Elsewhere (Kelman 1982b), I reviewed the ethical issues that arise with the use of different social science methods. My analysis, based on a classification of three different types of ethical impact of social research, links up with the distinction between the processes of compliance, identification, and internalization. Finally, in a number of writings (e.g., Kelman 1982a), I have addressed the issue of exploitation of research participants, which arises particularly when Western researchers study populations in developing societies or in other situations in which there is a power differential between the investigators and their subjects. Many of the ethical problems that arise in research can, in fact, be attributed to the power deficiency of the research participants vis-à-vis the investigator and to illegitimate uses of the investigator's power advantage (Kelman 1972b).

In my writings on the ethical issues raised by the processes and the products of social research, a recurrent theme is my concern about their effect on the human dignity of those who are touched by the research. I repeatedly stress the danger that the way the research is carried out—that is, the way the participants are treated in the course of the research—and the way the findings are used may contribute to the deprivation of people's dignity and to the dehumanization that already marks modern life. In a proactive mode, I call for research efforts that contribute to the humanization of society, for the development of participatory research models, and for the democratization of the research community. It is not hard to detect the echoes of the Holocaust in the set of concerns that has prompted my work on the ethics of social research. I have no doubt that the Nazis' abuses in the experimentation with human subjects and their heavy reliance on racial theories propounded by social

and biological scientists at the time have contributed significantly to sensitizing me to the ethical issues that I have written about.

## **Conclusion**

I have decided to conclude this chapter with another biographical note. In the section that describes my work on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, "Ethnic Conflict and Its Resolution," I mentioned that an important turning point in that work occurred in October 1973, when I was home watching the news about the latest Middle East war while recuperating from a heart attack. That heart attack had occurred several weeks earlier, at the Montreal meetings of the American Psychological Association, while I was delivering my Kurt Lewin Memorial Address, "Violence without Moral Restraint: Reflections on the Dehumanization of Victims and Victimizers" (Kelman 1973). I had been working on this address for many months, and I tried to put the finishing touches on it late in the night before it was scheduled for delivery. Although this address dealt with a wide range of cases of sanctioned massacres carried out in the context of a genocidal policy, it clearly represented my attempt to grapple with the meaning of the Holocaust and the social conditions that made it possible. I suspect that the emotional stress associated with writing and delivering this address was a contributing factor to the heart attack. And as I reflect on my decision, in the wake of that heart attack, to dedicate myself to working on resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, I wonder whether my good fortune in surviving the heart attack came to symbolize, in my mind, my good fortune in surviving the Holocaust.

In my Lewin address, I began the discussion of dehumanization by first asking "what it means to perceive another person as fully human, in the sense of being included in the moral compact that governs human relationships" (48). I proposed that perceiving others as human means according them identity and community, that is, perceiving them as independent and distinct individuals, capable of making choices and entitled to live their own lives on the basis of their own goals and values, and perceiving them as part of one's own interconnected network of individuals who care for each other, recognize each other's individuality, and respect each other's rights. Together, identity and community make up human dignity, "the status of individuals as ends in themselves, rather than as means toward some extraneous ends. . . . The overarching indicator of human dignity in a society is the worth attached to an individ-

ual's life" (Kelman 1977a, 531–32). Genocide becomes possible to the extent that we deprive fellow beings of identity and community and thus dehumanize them.

As I have tried to show throughout this chapter, respect for human dignity and counteracting the dangers of dehumanization are the common threads that run through the different areas of my work as a social scientist. The dehumanization of others by depriving them of identity and community—indeed by placing them into the category of “the other”—is at the heart of genocide and crimes of obedience; it is a danger inherent in nationalist ideology; it is the obstacle that must be overcome in efforts toward peacemaking and reconciliation between identity groups; and it is a temptation that must be resisted in the way in which we, as social scientists, conduct our research and allow our findings to be used. The central lesson that I have learned from the Holocaust is that we must never allow any people, any human group, to be excluded from our moral community. I can only hope that, in my own work as a social scientist, I have made a small contribution to this goal by promoting new ways of thinking about individual and social responsibility, about national identity, about conflict resolution, and about the role of the social scientist in society.

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