

Social-Psychological Approaches to the Study of International Relations

THE QUESTION OF RELEVANCE

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We are now ready to return to a question that was raised in the introductory chapter to this volume and repeated, in a variety of contexts, in some of the chapters that followed: What relevance, if any, do social-psychological approaches have to basic problems in international relations? Specifically, what is their potential relevance to the analysis of issues underlying policy formulation? And what is their potential relevance to the development of theory in international relations?

In Chapter 1, two different kinds of research were distinguished to which social-psychological approaches have made contributions: the study of the international behavior of individuals; and the study of international politics and foreign policy. The question of relevance has rather different implications

for these two types of research, and it will be easier, therefore, to examine them separately. It must be noted, however, that there is considerable overlap between these two types of research. They do not represent a sharp distinction along methodological lines; thus, the second type very definitely draws on analyses of the behavior of individuals, and the first type is by no means restricted to analyses at that level. Nor do they represent a systematic conceptual distinction. They are simply a convenient way of grouping two types of studies differing in general content and purpose. "The study of international politics and foreign policy" refers to research that is designed to understand and predict the behavior of nation states or other political units and of the individuals acting for these bodies.

"The study of the international behavior of individuals" refers to research on behavior in an international context that is not directly linked to the spheres of political decision-making or state-to-state interaction—although, as we shall see, it may have considerable bearing on these.

THE RELEVANCE OF RESEARCH ON THE INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR OF INDIVIDUALS

It is much easier to establish the relevance of social-psychological approaches insofar as they are concerned with studying the "international behavior" of individuals—that is, the ways in which individuals relate themselves to their own nation and other nations, to the international system as a whole, to foreign policy issues, and to the broader questions of war and peace; and the actual interactions between individuals of different nationalities. As was pointed out in Chapter 1, these problems are specifically and inherently of a social-psychological nature. Regardless of how relevant such research might be to problems of international politics, it represents a legitimate area of social-psychological investigation, meaningful and justified in its own right. In other words, it can be said to have "face relevance" for anyone who is interested in exploring the direct and indirect interactions of individuals with national and international objects.

At the same time, it can hardly be denied that studies, for example, of the structure of attitudes toward foreign policy issues or of individuals' conceptions of their national roles, can provide general background information useful in the analysis of foreign policy and international politics. The *specific* usefulness of such research depends on one's view of the role of public opinion

in the foreign policy process—a question to which we shall return later. But even those analysts who assign a minimal role to public opinion are likely to agree that public conceptions and reactions are part of the context within which foreign policy is carried out, and that an understanding of these factors, therefore, contributes to mapping out the background for international relations.

But does the study of the "human dimension" in international relations have any *direct* relevance to questions of foreign policy, and particularly to those fundamental aspects of foreign policy on which war and peace depend? I shall try to show, first, that there are certain specific aspects of foreign policy to which the study of individual attitudes and cross-national interactions does have direct relevance. As for its relevance to the broader questions of war and peace, this depends in part on our judgment of the significance of certain general attitudinal factors in creating the conditions for peace. I shall, therefore, proceed to examine whether (a) international cooperation and (b) changes in nationalist and internationalist ideology have some bearing on the conditions for peace, and hence whether research on these problems has potential political relevance.

Relevance to Specific Foreign Policy Goals

The foreign policy repertoire of national governments is not taken up entirely by the conduct of international conflict and activities directly related to it. Foreign policy also concerns itself with a wide range of international activities that constitute ends in themselves, or means toward certain specific goals that may have only a remote connection with the pursuit and resolution

of international conflict—activities such as foreign trade and foreign aid; participation in various international bodies of a largely nonpolitical nature, such as the specialized agencies of the United Nations; international communication and information services; educational and cultural exchanges; special cooperative international projects, for example of a scientific nature; and on-going cooperative international arrangements in such diverse areas as postal procedures, fishing rights, and weather prediction. Some of these activities are, of course, linked to broader foreign policy goals with potential implications for war and peace. Foreign aid, to take the prime example of this point, can be seen as a foreign policy tool designed to assure the stability of emerging nations, or to reward allies, or to attract neutrals or at least keep them from joining "the other side." Other activities, such as cultural and scientific exchanges, are often deliberately pursued as means of reducing international tensions. In the atmosphere of the Cold War it is particularly likely that almost any international activity will be converted into a tool for either pursuing or assuaging the dominant conflict, or at least that it will be presented in the rhetoric that characterizes this conflict. Nevertheless, these activities do have a life of their own, and their successful execution represents a foreign policy goal in its own right, regardless of their possible implications for the broader issues. To these more specific goals, social-psychological research on the international behavior of individuals has obvious relevance.

Enhancing the Effectiveness of International Activities. Such international activities as educational and cultural exchanges, technical assistance, international conferences, specialized

agencies and committees, and joint ventures in scientific and other domains involve interaction between individuals of different nationalities. If these activities are to be successful—in other words, if the specific foreign policy goals represented by these activities are to be achieved—the interacting individuals have to communicate effectively with each other, develop patterns of cooperation, and be prepared to accept some degree of change in their attitudes and habits. Activities of this sort are bound to create some difficulties, resistances, tensions, and misunderstandings among the participants even when they are all of the same nationality. One can readily think, for example, of the adjustment problems experienced by a student coming to a new community, the resistances engendered by attempts to introduce changes in farming methods, and the interpersonal difficulties that interfere with task attainment in conferences, committees, and work-groups.

Such difficulties are greatly magnified when the participants differ in nationality and cultural background (cf. Chapter 15). Thus, communication may be hampered and misunderstandings may arise because of cultural differences among the participants. For example, they may misinterpret one another's actions because these have different meanings in their respective cultures, or they may continue to interact at a polite superficial level because they lack shared signals for communicating readiness to enter on a genuine exchange. Sensitivities, particularly about one's national status relative to that of participants from other countries, are another source of difficulties that may limit the effectiveness of international activities. National status sensitivity has been found to be a major variable in shaping the experience of exchange students (cf. Lambert &

Bressler, 1956; Morris, 1960), and is especially likely to color reactions to foreign aid programs on the part of the aid recipients. Distrust of nationals of other countries is, of course, another barrier to effective interaction around specific tasks. Such distrust may be based on the specific relationship between the nations represented, such as the mutual distrust between Americans and Russians; or on generalizations from earlier experiences, such as the distrust of Africans for Europeans.

Social-psychological and related research have obvious relevance to problems of this sort. General studies of communication and group interaction, or of attitude change and adjustment to novel situations, can provide useful background for studies that specifically address themselves to these processes in an international context. To complement research on the nature of the processes involved, there is a need for understanding the values, customs, communication patterns, and social institutions that characterize the different countries represented in various international activities. Such understanding can be gained through a variety of techniques, such as anthropological field studies, cross-cultural surveys, or comparative institutional analyses. These two types of research—that is, research on the processes and problems of cross-national interaction, and research on the cultural characteristics of the various participants in such interaction—can jointly contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of international activities. The former would do so by identifying barriers to communication and cooperation that are likely to arise in such situations and suggesting ways for overcoming them; the latter, by providing the participants specific information about each other that would help to reduce misunder-

standing and to facilitate productive exchange. (On the last point, cf. Klineberg, 1964, Chapter 13.)

Studies of students who go abroad for training, of the nature of their experience, and of the types of adjustment problems they face while living in the foreign country and upon returning home (cf. Chapters 4 and 15), are an example of social-psychological research that has direct relevance to efforts to enhance the effectiveness of international exchanges of personnel. Equally relevant are studies that focus on individuals who go abroad primarily to serve in the country they are visiting rather than to be trained there, such as the Peace Corps Volunteers (for example, Smith *et al.*, 1963). The attitudes that these individuals bring to the experience abroad and the satisfactions that they derive from it can have an important bearing on the success of the entire venture. In this connection, research on the selection of personnel for assignments abroad or in international agencies (cf. Klineberg, 1964, Chapter 12) can contribute directly to increased effectiveness of international programs. Such research would provide a basis for assessing the characteristics of individuals who can perform effectively in specific types of international settings.

Another type of applied research that has direct relevance for improving international activities is evaluation research, involving systematic study of specific technical assistance projects, exchange-of-persons programs, information campaigns, international conferences, or cooperative ventures. On the basis of such research, it should be possible not only to conclude whether the program under study achieved its goals, but also to gain some insight into ways of enhancing the effectiveness of similar programs in the future. For ex-

ample, in an intensive evaluation study of a multi-national seminar for communications specialists (Kelman, with Steinitz, 1963), a partial analysis of interviews held with participants led us to identify seven general conditions that are likely to enhance a participant's satisfaction: (a) relevance of the experience to the participant's specific professional concerns; (b) the participant's opportunity for colleague-like relationships with his counterparts in the host country; (c) the participant's opportunity to make personal contributions; (d) availability to the participant of choice in activities and arrangements; (e) arrangement of the participant's schedule and facilities in line with his desired pattern of activities; (f) the participant's opportunity for informal social contacts with nationals of the host country; and (g) enhancement of the participant's national and personal status (pp. 104-114).

If sufficient cooperation on the part of operating agencies can be obtained, it is possible also to do more ambitious types of research, such as field experiments in which different program procedures (for example, two different ways of conducting an international conference) are developed and systematically compared; or action research projects, in which program participants join research personnel in successive evaluation and revision of the program as it proceeds. These types of research have been carried out in other settings and can certainly be applied to efforts to enhance the effectiveness of international activities.

So far, I have been speaking primarily about the contributions that basic and applied social research can make to the overcoming of barriers to communication and cooperation and thus, in turn, to the productivity of international activities and the satisfactions

they provide for their participants. Typically, the goals of international activities also include the production of change in the behavior and attitudes of participants, although the degree and kind of change involved will vary considerably.

There are certain kinds of international activity—of which technical assistance and aid to developing countries are the prime examples—whose success depends on producing fundamental changes in the action patterns, attitudes, and even values of individuals and communities. Such programs may presuppose, for example, changes in the work habits and group loyalties of the individuals involved, and changes in the power structures and reward systems of their communities. Given the existing cultural patterns, values, and institutional structures of the societies in question, it is understandable that innovations will often (a) represent a threat and thus arouse strong resistances, (b) be difficult to institute because of the absence of essential psychological and institutional preconditions, and (c) have disruptive consequences for the target community. These problems are likely to be exacerbated when the change agents come from other countries, are unfamiliar with the existing patterns and channels for instituting change, and arouse suspicion, resentment, and feelings of inferiority in the target population.

Clearly, the success of such programs can be aided by an understanding of resistances to attitude change (cf. Chapter 6) and of processes of change-induction in individuals, organizations, and communities; and by research that focuses specifically on the induction of change in this type of situation—that is, a situation in which the change agents represent other countries or

international organizations, and in which the nation itself is part of a larger process of national economic and political development in the context of an international system in which level of industrialization represents a major dividing principle. To facilitate social change in this kind of situation, it is necessary to combine knowledge about general principles of planned change with knowledge about the specific ideological systems and institutional structures of the societies in question. A mapping of the existing values and institutions must precede any attempt to induce change, if we are to (a) understand precisely what the change would involve, what readinesses for it exist, and what barriers would have to be overcome; (b) identify existing values and institutions that can be used to facilitate change; and (c) find ways of minimizing disruptive consequences. Such a mapping would require not only a study of traditional culture patterns and institutions, but also an exploration of emerging power relationships and belief systems, in recognition of the fact that we are dealing with societies in flux. It would be important to focus, among others, on those ideological dimensions that relate directly to the program itself—such as the target population's conceptions of economic development and social change, and of foreign aid and international cooperation.

Another type of change that is frequently desired by a government that initiates various kinds of international activities is a change in the images of the initiating country or the attitudes toward it held by other populations. Whatever other goals they may have, foreign aid projects, personnel exchanges, and information campaigns are partially designed to transform the hostile, suspicious, or indifferent attitudes of other peoples into favorable

ones, or at least to increase their understanding and correct their misconceptions of the initiating country. There are many barriers to change in these attitudes and images, similar to the ones that have already been discussed, and again social-psychological research has clear implications for understanding these barriers and finding ways of overcoming them. General principles of attitude change (as discussed in Chapter 6), combined with study of the specific situations involved, can thus contribute to the achievement of this particular set of goals. In a paper devoted to a more detailed analysis of this general problem (Kelman, 1962a), I tried to develop the proposition that favorable attitude change is most likely to result from various international activities if they make possible the joint occurrence of two conditions: (a) the provision of genuinely new information about the country and people in question, in the context of (b) a positive interaction with and friendly behavior toward representatives of that country. Any attempt to create these conditions must confront the special resistances to change that are likely to arise in a particular situation. For example, foreign aid projects may fail to provide conditions for favorable attitude change because "there are strong forces in the direction of hostility toward the donor country that are inherent in the very nature of the aid situation. The fact that nationals from the donor country have come to his country to give aid is concrete evidence, from the recipient's point of view, of his own inferior status. The situation has obvious implications of an unfavorable comparison, damaging to the recipient's self-esteem. The very fact that he finds himself in this situation with its negative implications for the evaluation of his country and himself may generate hostility. This hostility is most naturally directed at

the one who, by giving, underlines the recipient's inferiority" (Kelman, 1962a, p. 79). In this situation, therefore, meeting the conditions for attitude change will depend on the extent to which status-enhancing features are built into the project itself as well as into extra-project relationships.

Research on the selection of personnel, evaluation studies, and action research, which were discussed above, are equally applicable to questions of inducing change—whether this be the often fundamental changes in habits and values that constitute the goals of technical assistance programs, or the changes in images and attitudes held by other peoples that governments hope to produce through many of their international activities.

Assessing and Influencing Public Attitudes. Whatever we may assume about the role of public opinion in the determination of foreign policy—a question to which I shall return later—there is little doubt that governments are concerned with attaining public support for the policies they are pursuing. Even if we were to take the extreme position that governments can and do effectively ignore the preferences of the public at large in the *formulation* of foreign policy, we would have to grant that the *execution* of foreign policy is often affected by the nature of the public's reaction to the steps proposed or taken. An obvious example would be any foreign policy move that re-

quires a certain amount of sacrifice on the part of the population. If the public does not support the move with sufficient enthusiasm, then it cannot be carried out as effectively. Moreover, lack of public support reduces the credibility of the move and thus its effectiveness in influencing other nations.

It becomes important, therefore, for governments to assess public response toward foreign policy moves that they are contemplating or that they have carried out, and to exert influence on the public when support for these moves is insufficient. Studies of attitudes on foreign policy issues thus have direct relevance to certain specific foreign policy goals. Of similar relevance is knowledge about ways in which attitudes are influenced (cf. Chapter 6) and public support is mobilized (cf. Chapter 8). On the broader level, the study of people's general orientation toward foreign policy issues and of their relation to the nation state (cf. Chapter 10) can provide useful background for understanding their reactions to specific foreign policy moves and the conditions under which their loyalties can be aroused and their support elicited.¹

The concern of governments with assessing and influencing public attitudes also extends beyond their national boundaries. One of the foreign policy goals of most governments is to create a favorable image abroad. The emphasis on this goal may vary for different governments and at different times.

¹ In my judgment, the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy decisions involves a considerably more complex and reciprocal process than the above paragraphs imply. I would assume that governments do not merely assess public reactions to their policies and, if they find the level of acceptance to be insufficient, proceed to shape these reactions in the desired directions. To a large extent, the process may indeed take precisely this form, but the decision-makers are also influenced by public opinion. This influence is often indirect and is more likely to derive from the opinions of important elites than from those of the "man in the street," but it does suggest the existence of a two-way process. We shall examine this possibility in greater detail when we discuss the relevance of social-psychological research to the study of foreign policy.

Moreover, a government is by no means equally concerned with all foreign populations: it will be particularly anxious to produce a favorable image and acceptance of its policies among those nations whose support it deems crucial to the successful achievement of its foreign policy objectives. Research on the attitudes of foreign populations and on the effectiveness of various efforts designed to influence these attitudes thus also has direct relevance to certain specific foreign policy goals.

Relevance to Broader Questions of War and Peace

We have seen that social-psychological research on the international behavior of individuals—specifically, on their interactions in the context of various international programs, and on their attitudes toward foreign policy issues—has not only intrinsic interest for the social psychologist fascinated by these problems, but also direct relevance to certain specific, if limited, foreign policy goals. But does it have any relevance to the broader questions of war and peace? Certainly, the oft-quoted statement from the constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization implies such relevance: "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed." According to this view, research on motives, images, and beliefs of individuals, and on the modification of these in the direction of greater international understanding and cooperation would have the highest relevance to the basic issues of war and peace.

If, however, one regards war—as I do—as essentially a societal and inter-societal process, then the political relevance of what we are here calling the

study of the international behavior of individuals is not as obviously apparent. In an ultimate sense, I would subscribe to the "minds-of-men" formulation, because societies and institutions are, after all, created by men, controlled by men, and subject to change by the actions of men. Their effects "work in and through human beings; they are altered as the result of human relations" (Klineberg, 1964, p. 6). The actions of men in the international arena, however, take place with reference to organized political systems, and they can have an impact on matters of war and peace only insofar as they affect these systems and are mediated by them. Thus, it cannot be assumed that activities designed to promote international understanding and world-mindedness necessarily contribute to creating the conditions for peace. It is not enough that they alter the minds of men; we must also be able to show that they enter into those political processes whereby international conflicts are conducted and decisions for war or peace are made. Let us examine the effects of international cooperation from this point of view, taking international cooperation (broadly defined) as the prototype of activities designed "to construct the defenses of peace in the minds of men."

International Cooperation. There is considerable disagreement about the potential contributions of such activities as international exchanges, cooperative ventures, or the Peace Corps—whatever their intrinsic merits may be—to creating the conditions for peace. Proponents of such activities often argue that they increase international understanding and improve mutual attitudes. We have already seen in Chapters 4 and 15 that there is no clear-cut evidence that international travel

and exchange in fact produce more favorable attitudes. But even if they did, there is some reason to question how much bearing such favorable attitudes are likely to have on the prevention of war. Is it reasonable to suppose that favorable attitudes developed through personal contact can overcome the realities of a conflict of interests? If conflicts between nations are based primarily on incompatible goals rather than on lack of understanding, it is doubtful that increased understanding can contribute greatly to their resolution. Despite these limitations, it seems to me that international cooperation does have political relevance, though its contribution to creating the conditions for peace may be largely indirect and long-range.

One can distinguish four types of effects of international cooperation and exchange that may have an impact on the relations between two nations and may reduce the likelihood that conflicts between them will take violent forms: (1) an increased openness, among key individuals in each nation, in their attitudes toward the other nation; (2) a reduction in the level of tension between the two nations; (3) an increased commitment to an internationalist ideology; and (4) a development of a network of relationships cutting across national boundaries. What is the potential relevance that each of these four interrelated effects might have for international politics?

1. Participants in international exchanges and other forms of cooperation do not universally and necessarily come away from these experiences with wholly favorable attitudes toward the other nation or nations involved. Yet the indications are that such experiences can and usually do produce some very important attitude changes—provided the experiences themselves are

personally and professionally satisfying to the participants. These are not necessarily changes in general favorableness toward the host country, but rather changes in the cognitive structure—for example, in the complexity and differentiation—of images of the host country (cf. Kelman, 1965). Such changes are probably more meaningful in the long run than total approval of the country would be; they indicate a greater richness and refinement of images and a greater understanding of the other society in its own terms. Moreover, participants in such activities are likely to develop personal ties to the other country and to certain individuals within it, and thus a sense of personal involvement in its fate. As we have already noted, this increased understanding and involvement are not likely to overcome real conflicts of interests that exist between the nations. They are likely, however, to create a greater openness in individuals' attitudes toward the other nation.

If there is a continuing pattern of cooperation and exchange between two nations, involving many individuals who are in leading positions within their own societies, then there should be a greater *predisposition within each nation to trust the other nation, to perceive it as nonthreatening, and to be responsive to it* (cf. Chapter 11). Thus, while it would be naive to assume that a pattern of cooperation and exchange is a sufficient condition for peace between two nations, such a pattern should decrease the likelihood that the nations will resort to violence in resolving their conflicts. If conflicts arise between nations whose citizens have a history of close and friendly contact, there should be less of a tendency to perceive threatening intent in the other and to formulate the issue in black-and-white terms, and a greater readiness to

communicate with one another and to seek accommodation.

2. If two nations that are in conflict with each other are, at the same time, involved in exchanges and cooperative ventures, the level of tension that marks their over-all relationship is likely to be reduced. They are more likely to engage in at least some interactions that are free of hostility and mutual threat, and that provide opportunities for communication and for the discovery of common values and interests. Needless to say, these more positive interactions will not cause the basic conflict between the two nations to vanish and will not persuade them to abandon the pursuit of incompatible goals. They can, however, contribute to the creation of an *atmosphere in which these basic conflicts can be negotiated more effectively and political settlements can be achieved*.

It has been extremely difficult, for example, for the United States and the Soviet Union to negotiate disarmament agreements, even though such agreements would be beneficial to both sides, because of the absence of mutual trust, without which the disarmament process cannot be initiated. Negotiation of more basic settlements of Cold-War issues is even more difficult under these circumstances. Positive interactions between two nations in areas outside of those on which their conflict centers, by reducing the level of tension, may help to build up some degree of mutual trust and thus at least make it somewhat more likely that serious negotiations on the issues in conflict will get under way. Moreover, the establishment of cooperative relationships in some domains may help to counteract tendencies toward complete polarization of the conflicting nations and may thus make it easier to find ways of "fractionating" the conflicts be-

tween them. Fisher (1964) has argued very persuasively that fractionating conflict—"dividing up the issues and considering them separately in small units" (p. 109), rather than treating each as part of a total ideological confrontation—may reduce the risk of war and at the same time facilitate achievement of specific national goals.

3. International exchanges and cooperative ventures—provided they are intrinsically useful and satisfying—are likely to increase world-mindedness and commitment to an internationalist ideology among the participants. Wide adoption of this type of value framework would seem to be necessary to provide the ideological underpinnings to a peaceful world order. In the short run, peaceful settlement of conflicts is more likely where there is an acceptance of the legitimacy of supranational organizations and a willingness to surrender some degree of national sovereignty to them. In the long run, the stability and effectiveness of such supranational organizations depend on the acceptance—as fundamental values governing the relations between nations—of the concepts of international (in contrast to strictly national) security, nonviolence in the settlement of conflicts, and responsibility for human welfare on a world-wide basis. As the rate of international exchange and cooperation increases, it seems reasonable to suppose that ideological changes in these directions will become more widespread.

Such changes in the belief systems of individuals, in and of themselves, are not likely to produce major changes at the institutional level. New institutional arrangements are likely to be developed when their functional significance becomes apparent to important segments of the societies involved. Thus, for example, it can be argued that the

major impetus for the development of the European Economic Community came, not from an ideological commitment to the idea of a united Europe, but from the recognition that economic operations can be made more efficient and profitable if they can be planned and coordinated with reference to a wider geographical area. Nevertheless, it is probably true that the existence of supporting beliefs within the societies—such as, in the case of EEC, the belief in the idea of a united Europe, along with the postwar disenchantment with traditional nationalism—facilitates the establishment of new institutional arrangements by providing an ideological framework ready to incorporate them. In the same sense, then, international exchange and cooperation may contribute to the development and strengthening of international political institutions by increasing the *ideological readiness for them among influential segments of the participating nations*, even though the major force toward the development of such institutions is likely to come from functional requirements rather than from an abstract commitment to an internationalist ideology.

4. The most important source of the political relevance of international exchange and cooperation, in my opinion, is its contribution to the development of human networks that cut across national boundaries. Participation in such activities, if they are successful, is likely to lead to the establishment of ongoing relationships around common professional concerns among individuals representing different nationalities. These relationships have functional significance for the individuals in the sense that they are directly relevant to their professional interests and the effective performance of their professional roles. Thus, individuals and groups from different countries become

committed to international cooperation not as an abstract value, but as a concrete vehicle for carrying out personally important activities and pursuing their immediate and long-range goals. They become involved in a network of interdependent individuals and groups, without reference to national differences, and are likely to develop a sense of loyalty to it. What is crucial here is that this loyalty cut across national lines; it need not be antagonistic to or competitive with national loyalty, but simply independent of it.

Insofar as international exchange and cooperation contribute to the development of such cross-cutting loyalties, they help to create the conditions for peace. We have seen, in Chapter 2, that the existence of cross-cutting ties created by multiple overlapping loyalty groupings tends to promote integration and internal peace within preliterate societies. Coser (1956) points out that modern pluralistic societies are "sewn together" by the existence of multiple group affiliations of individuals, which "make for a multiplicity of conflicts crisscrossing society" (p. 79). Individuals are members of various groupings, involved in diverse conflicts along divergent lines. Thus, for example, individuals who are members of antagonistic groups in the economic sphere may, at the same time, be members of the same religious group and thus stand together in a conflict with other religious groups. Because the lines of conflict between these multiple groups do not converge, deep cleavages along a single axis are prevented. "The interdependence of conflicting groups and the multiplicity of noncumulative conflicts provide one, though not, of course, the only check against basic consensual breakdown in an open society" (p. 79). It is in this same sense that the development of *networks*,

based on professional and other interests, that cut across national boundaries can contribute to the stability and integration of the international system. It would do so, not by eliminating conflicts, but by counteracting tendencies toward complete polarization—toward subordinating all relationships to a single basic conflict along national lines.

To put it in other terms, the development of cross-cutting networks that have functional significance for many individuals in the enactment of their various roles should create a widespread vested interest in maintaining both the pluralism and the integrity of the international system. Insofar as groupings that cut across national lines are important to individuals in the enactment of their various roles—in other words, insofar as individuals have become tied into a pattern of genuine interdependency—they will resist a definition of the international system along strictly national lines, in which national affiliations supersede and subsume all other affiliations. Moreover, they will have something at stake in maintaining the integrity of the international system, since its breakdown would also mean the breakdown of the cross-national networks in which they are involved. Ultimately, the maintenance of a stable international system will probably require the development of political and even military institutions (cf. Kelman, 1962b) that cut across national lines and that make, not for an elimination of national loyalties, but for a diffusion of loyalties that would counteract total cleavages along national lines. International exchange and cooperation can, however, contribute to this process in a small but cumulative way. As more and more cross-cutting ties develop, the vested interest in a pluralistic and stable international

system is likely to increase and ever stronger barriers to the breakdown of the system are likely to arise.

Ideologies of National and International Systems. In discussing the political relevance of international cooperation, I suggested that it may produce certain ideological changes among influential segments of the participating nations. This raises the larger question of the role of ideological factors—particularly of nationalist ideology—in international politics. To the extent to which such ideological factors enter into the relations between nations, their study has obvious political relevance. In particular, an understanding of the conditions that facilitate change from a narrowly nationalist to an internationalist ideology would have important implications for the broader issue of war and peace. But do such ideological factors really have any significant impact on the relations between nations?

Before attempting to answer this question, let me indicate briefly what I mean by nationalism and the social-psychological study of it. (See Chapter 10 for a more detailed discussion of related issues.) One can describe nationalism as an ideology that views the nation as the unit in which paramount political power is vested. The nation state, being the embodiment of the nation, is placed at the pinnacle of power and entitled to override both smaller and larger political units. The modern nation state derives its legitimacy and cohesiveness from the fact that it is seen as representing the nation—in other words, from the correspondence of the political entity with an ethnic, cultural, and historical entity with which at least large portions of the population identify.

The social-psychological study of nationalist ideology focuses on the belief

systems of individuals. It is concerned with the ways in which individual nationals and subgroups within the population relate themselves to the nation state, their definitions of the role of national and of the expectations that go with it, their level of commitment to and degree of involvement in the nation, and the nature of the satisfactions with which their national identification provides them. The study of political ideology at the social-psychological level, however, must be closely linked to an analysis of this ideology at the system level. That is, in studying political ideology we are not simply dealing with the beliefs of individuals, but with a set of beliefs that is inherent in the political system itself, communicated to individual citizens in the course of socialization and throughout life, and adopted by them (with individual variations in nature and degree).

Nationalist ideology, at the system level, must be seen in terms of the functions of the nation state. The performance of these functions and the effective operation of the system presuppose consensus about national institutional arrangements, the relation of the nation state to other states, and the relationship of the individual to the nation state. This set of assumptions by which the system runs constitutes its ideology, which is built into its institutional structures and its constitution, and transmitted through its basic documents and elite communications. The ideology built into the national system and communicated by its leaders may take different forms, depending on the level of development of a particular state, on its international position, its power and success in the international

arena, and its internal political structure. These variables would determine the *particular* functions that a given nation state must perform at a given historical juncture (such as the unification of tribal elements or the maintenance of bloc leadership), in addition to the *generic* functions common to all nation states.

There are many variations in the way in which the system ideology is interpreted and incorporated into the belief-systems of individuals and subgroups within the population. Depending on their demographic and personality characteristics and on their positions within the social and political structure, individuals may vary in the components of the ideology that they emphasize or deemphasize, the intensity of their commitment to the nation state, their definition of the national role and the expectations that go with it, and the way in which they enact this role.² While there may be such variations, it is essential to the effective functioning of the nation state that the basic tenets of its ideology be widely accepted within the population. For example, the system cannot operate successfully unless the population accepts the authority of the state as legitimate and shares the assumption that, in times of national crisis, the national role becomes paramount in the citizen's hierarchy of roles. The wide acceptance of these assumptions depends, in turn, on the extent to which individuals and groups are—in one way or another—integrated into the national system (cf. Katz, Kelman, & Flacks, 1964; and Chapter 10 in this volume).

These ideological assumptions, pro-

² According to the present view, the chauvinistic, exclusive type of nationalism would be one variant of nationalist ideology, which for a given nation may be the dominant form of the ideology at certain times (at certain historical junctures or certain periods of national crisis), and a deviant form at other times.

vided they are widely accepted by the population, constitute the terms on which a nation state relates to other nation states and on which international institutions are established. When viewed in this way, then, ideological factors clearly have a significant impact on the relations between nations. We sometimes tend to forget this fact because these ideological assumptions are so solidly built into our national and international structures that we come to regard them as givens, as part of the structure of reality. The feeling that ideological factors are irrelevant may be due to a concentration on the modern Western nation state to such an extent that the ideological assumptions that define that particular type of political system are seen as universal and inevitable, rather than as representing one position on a range of possible ones. We need a more comparative perspective, which takes into account a wider range of historical periods and of societies. It would then become apparent that the nation state was not always and is not everywhere the basic political unit; that it may take different forms, associated with different ideological assumptions; that it does not always function adequately, in part because some of its basic assumptions may not be widely accepted by a population that is poorly integrated into the national system; and that the functions, structures, and ideological assumptions of even the Western nation state are now changing in significant ways.

A comparative perspective makes it quite apparent that ideologies different from those that govern the modern nation state are possible, and that they would have important implications for the relations between nations. Of particular relevance to questions of war and peace would be the possibility of developing a more internationalist ide-

ology, in which the nation state would not be regarded as the paramount political unit in all respects. Such an ideology would not presuppose the complete abandonment of the nation state and its ideology, but might represent a variant of nationalist ideology for which some precedents already exist. There is no inherent reason why loyalty to international institutions should be incompatible with loyalty to the nation state, provided the two "are furnishing compatible solutions to different needs" (Guetzkow, 1955, p. 39).

The key question, of course, is how changes in ideological assumptions can be brought about. I would assume, in general, that such changes are most likely to arise, not through a direct attack on underlying values, but as a consequence of the adoption of new institutional arrangements that incorporate new values and ideological assumptions. "A specific institutional structure may be accepted on pragmatic grounds without requiring, in the first instance, a radical reorganization of national and individual values (although such a reorganization may evolve from the institutional structure in action)" (Kelman, 1962h). As the nation state itself becomes committed to certain supranational arrangements and in fact becomes dependent on these arrangements for the performance of some of its basic functions, it can be expected that its ideology will change and that this will be reflected in the belief systems of the citizens. As a matter of fact, given the many changes in the functioning of nation states that have already taken place in the post-war period, what is involved here is probably not so much the development of an entirely new ideology, as the encouragement of an already existing variant of nationalist ideology.

The development of the United Na-

tions and its various affiliates, and of nonnational roles within these organizations (cf. Chapter 14), is contributing to this process of institutional change from which ideological changes are likely to flow. Similarly, international exchange and cooperation are contributing to this process insofar as they lead to the development of institutionalized networks cutting across national boundaries (as described above). To be sure, it may be a long time before these developments will lead to ideological changes sufficient to have a major impact on the relations between nations. They do suggest, however, an alternative set of assumptions by which nation states in their interaction with each other can operate. An exploration of such alternative assumptions, in comparison with the currently dominant ones, may thus have profound relevance to long-range questions of war and peace.

THE RELEVANCE OF RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY

When we turn to social-psychological research that deliberately addresses itself to issues of international politics and foreign policy, the question of relevance takes on a different character. It may be intrinsically interesting to study the patterning of public opinion on foreign policy issues, or the images that important decision-makers have of their own and other countries, or the interactions of college students who are simulating actors in an international system. No matter how interesting and worthwhile these studies may be in their own right, however, insofar as they are presented as contributions to the understanding of international politics and foreign policy, it is entirely fair

to apply more stringent criteria of relevance to them. It becomes important to ask whether they have any relevance to the actual conduct of international affairs and whether they tell us anything about the factors that enter into foreign policy decisions.

It is usually not very fruitful to pose the question in such absolute terms—that is, to debate whether these studies have any political relevance *at all*. It would be unreasonable to insist that public opinion plays no role at all in the foreign policy process, or that the images of decision-makers have no effect whatsoever on the actions they take in the name of the state, or that one can learn nothing about international processes from observing the simulation of these processes in a group of college students. The real question concerns the *kind* of relevance that such studies have for international politics and foreign policy and the *limits* of this relevance. What is it that one can and cannot learn from them, and how does the information they yield help to order and explain the phenomena with which the student of international politics is concerned? And here there is room for genuine disagreement about the kinds of conclusions that can legitimately be drawn from such studies and about the importance of these conclusions. These disagreements may be due to differences in evaluation of the importance of certain kinds of variables—such as public opinion or images of decision-makers—in determining international political processes, and of the validity of certain types of research methods—such as simulation or content analysis—as sources of information about international political processes.

One can distinguish four ways in which social-psychological approaches can contribute to the study of international politics and foreign policy:

(a) They can contribute directly to the study of one *substantive problem* that is in large part within the domain of competence of the social psychologist—the role of public opinion in the foreign policy process. (b) They can provide analytical tools for investigating the individual decision-maker as the *unit of analysis* in the study of state behavior. (c) They can provide concepts and methods for the detailed study of *processes* that are centrally involved in international relations, particularly foreign policy decision-making and international negotiation. (d) They can address themselves to some of the *assumptions* that are frequently made—explicitly or implicitly—in formulation of theory as well as policy in international relations.³

The relevance of these four types of contributions is a matter on which students of international relations disagree, depending on the substantive and methodological assumptions they make. In the pages that follow, I shall review each of these four types of contributions and the kinds of questions that can be raised about them, and attempt to show in what ways they are relevant to the study of international politics. My intention is not only to show that these contributions are indeed relevant, but also to point to the necessary limits of their relevance.

Public Opinion in the Foreign Policy Process

The role of public opinion in the foreign policy process is a substantive

problem to whose exploration social-psychological concepts and methods can make clear and direct contributions. The political relevance of such research, however, rests on the assumption that public opinion does indeed play an important role in the foreign policy process—an assumption that some observers would question. They point out that the general public has very little information about foreign policy matters and very little interest in them, and that opinions in this domain tend to be simple, undifferentiated, and poorly structured. (See Chapters 3 and 8 for discussions of the structure of opinions and images relating to foreign policy matters.) A public opinion so impoverished can hardly have a major impact on foreign policy decisions. Moreover, these observers point out, foreign policy issues do not enter significantly into the electorate's choice between candidates, nor do decision-makers lose public support as a consequence of their actions in the foreign policy arena. Decision-makers can, therefore, carry out foreign policy without fear of electoral punishment or decline in their popularity.

There is little question that foreign policy attitudes among the population at large are marked, to a great extent, by apathy, ignorance, and a general lack of structure and stability. It does not follow, however, that public opinion therefore plays no role in the foreign policy process. It would be a mistake to equate public opinion with the distribution of answers to questions about specific foreign policy issues

³ The first three ways in which social-psychological approaches can contribute correspond roughly to the three types of research relating to international politics and foreign policy that were described in Chapter 1 (pp. 13–17): public opinion in the foreign policy process; individual actors in the foreign policy process; and processes of interaction in international conflict and conflict resolution. The fourth kind of contribution is related to the development of theory and methodology in international relations and the formulation of policy recommendations, as discussed in Chapter 1 (pp. 17–20).

on the part of a cross-section of the general population. If we focus on public moods and broad orientations, rather than on specific policy issues, we can readily see that even the opinions of the general public may help to direct and constrain foreign policy decisions. Furthermore, if we think in terms of an *effective* public opinion, in which different segments of the population carry different weights, rather than in terms of cross-sectional opinion distributions, we can see more clearly the ways in which publics enter into the foreign policy process. Let me elaborate these two points and comment briefly on their implications for the study of public opinion along lines that would be maximally relevant to problems of foreign policy.

The Role of the General Public in the Foreign Policy Process. The moods of the general public and their broad orientations toward national and international affairs are an essential part of the climate within which foreign policy decision-making takes place (cf. Chapter 9; also Almond, 1950). Decision-makers are likely to be influenced by widespread sentiments within the population that may favor hostility or friendliness toward certain other nations, involvement in or withdrawal from international affairs, militancy or conciliation in response to external pressures, and expansionism or cooperation in the pursuit of national goals. They are also likely to take into account, in the formulation of policy, such underlying dispositions as "the population's mood of pessimism or optimism about their own institutions, their level of confidence in the government, [and]

their desire for peace or readiness for war" (Kelman, 1958, p. 2).

In part, these moods and orientations within the population exert a "positive" influence on the process of policy formulation, in the sense that they impel decision-makers toward perceptions and actions that reflect public sentiments. Often, decision-makers are not only influenced by these pervasive moods, but actually share them with the rest of the population. In fact, these moods may originate in the very elites from which the decision-makers are recruited and then spread among the rest of the population, so that it becomes difficult to specify who is influencing whom. To the extent to which the orientations of decision-makers and the public overlap, studies of public opinion can serve as a valuable source of information about the predispositions of the decision-maker himself.⁴ At the very least, however, studies of public opinion ought to reveal the kinds of actions that express popular moods and for which the public is ready; it can be assumed that these states of readiness constitute one of the inputs into the policy process to which decision-makers are not entirely unresponsive.

Moods and orientations within the population also exert a "negative" influence on the process of policy formulation, in the sense that they serve as constraints on the decision-maker (cf. Chapter 8). Even though the decision-maker may have a great deal of latitude (as far as public response is concerned) in foreign policy matters, there may be certain broad limits set by public opinion within which he must operate. There are many specific policies that

⁴ The degree of overlap varies, of course, in different societies, at different times, and for different issues. See Chapter 7 for a discussion of the question of how much one can generalize from public images to leader images with special reference to the Soviet Union.

he could adopt without losing public support, but he may well be in difficulty if he violates certain pervasive assumptions and dispositions. Thus, to be assured of support, he must assess the state of public opinion before formulating policy and take its underlying moods into account.

The loss of support may take the form of electoral punishment. Despite the fact that specific foreign policy issues do not seem to play an important role in American voting behavior, there is some indication that general concern with avoiding war has had some impact on recent presidential elections. In 1952 and 1956, the Republican Party apparently gained some votes because it was seen as better able than the Democratic Party to keep the United States out of war; in 1964, with Senator Goldwater's candidacy, the Republican Party clearly lost this advantage.⁵

But the risk of losing electoral support is not the only source of constraint on the decision-maker. The very execution of foreign policy often requires wide public support, particularly if it calls for extensive sacrifices on the part of the population. Such support contributes vitally to the success of foreign policy moves, not only by providing active and enthusiastic participation in them at home, but also by lending credibility to them abroad. Decision-makers will be reluctant, therefore, to initiate important actions if they are not assured of public support. The difference between democratic and totalitarian societies with respect to this type of constraint is only one of degree, for even the totalitarian decision-maker cannot carry out foreign policies without public support and cannot ignore,

therefore, pervasive moods in his population.

It is, of course, possible for decision-makers to mobilize public support for a policy that they consider to be desirable though unpopular. Undoubtedly, those observers who maintain that public opinion does not determine foreign policy, but is determined by it, are often correct. Decision-makers may very well manipulate public opinion in order to bring it into line with decisions that they have already made—and here again the difference between totalitarian and democratic systems may be only one of degree. The possibility of mobilizing and manipulating public opinion, however, may be available to the decision-maker only within certain broad limits. He may be unable to mobilize support for policies that go counter to the general moods and broad orientations that we have been discussing. Sometimes, ironically, these inhibiting moods and orientations may themselves be the products of earlier efforts to mobilize public opinion in a very different direction; once they have been created, however, they may offer powerful resistances to a reorientation of foreign policy. In any event, there are likely to be at least some limits to the manipulation of public opinion, and these too serve as constraints on the decision-maker: he will be reluctant to initiate actions for which it will be difficult to mobilize public support.

But even when decision-makers choose actions that go counter to the public's preferences, in the expectation that they will subsequently mobilize support for them, this does not mean that public opinion—in the sense of broad orientations—plays no role in the policy process. The ability to mobilize

⁵ Evidence for this conclusion comes from data obtained by the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, and subjected to the type of analysis reported in Stokes, Campbell, and Miller (1958).

support depends on the presence of certain general dispositions within the population on which decision-makers can draw. For example, decision-makers may choose a policy that involves a serious risk of war in the expectation that they will be able to mobilize public support for it. This expectation rests, however, on certain assumptions about public dispositions—such as the assumption that the public accepts the legitimacy of the government and of its authority to decide on questions of war and peace, or that nationalist sentiments will readily be aroused when a situation is defined as one of national crisis, or that there is a readiness for belligerency which can be touched off by informing the public of a slight to national honor or prestige. The existence of these dispositions is usually taken for granted in modern nation states, but there is no reason to assume that they will always be present and certainly not that they will always be present to the same degree. The variability becomes even greater when situations other than those defined as national crises are involved. In short, whenever decision-makers choose actions in the expectation that they will subsequently mobilize public support, they must assess (though this is often done implicitly) the degree to which the public is disposed to respond to such mobilization, and must know on what public moods, images, and other dispositions they can draw in order to attain support.

In many foreign policy actions, the decision-makers are not so much concerned about mobilizing active support, as they are about avoiding active opposition. They may often feel free, therefore, to make decisions on the assumption that the public is largely ignorant and apathetic about the issues involved, and thus quite readily manip-

ulable: when presented with a *fait accompli*, the public will accept the decision without protest. But even this situation involves an assessment of public opinion and its degree of manipulability. "... the fact that the population is poorly informed on foreign-policy issues, that its attitudes are poorly structured, and that it has little interest or commitment on these matters does not mean at all that public opinion is unimportant; for this state of apathy, or whatever else we wish to call it, is very clearly a state of public opinion, and one which has profound effects on the conduct of foreign affairs" (Kelman, 1958, p. 3).

In considering the effects of public opinion on decision-making, we must keep in mind not only the "objective" constraints imposed by public sentiments, but also the constraints as *perceived* by the decision-maker. There is good reason to believe that decision-makers often have an exaggerated view of the strength of public opposition to certain policy innovations. To be sure, such statements as "the public will never go along with this policy" or "the public insists on this response" are often techniques used by decision-makers to buttress the position that they themselves prefer. No doubt, however, there are times when decision-makers genuinely believe these statements and—rightly or wrongly—feel that their hands are tied.

Whether or not these statements are genuine, they may constitute a self-fulfilling prophecy: they may create the very public opinion that they predicted and thus introduce constraints that did not exist before. When this happens, the decision-maker in turn may exaggerate the strength and rigidity of the public's feelings. The victim of his own propaganda, he may be unaware of the extent to which his own

communications contributed to the state of public opinion that now ties his hands. Under these circumstances, he would be likely to underestimate his own ability to mobilize public support for innovative policies. For example, the indications are that the American public would be much more willing to go along with a policy of diplomatic recognition of Communist China than many decision-makers believe or claim. Thus, in a recent survey (Patehen, 1964), respondents were asked how they would feel if "the President suggested that we exchange ambassadors with Communist China the way we do with other countries." Fifty-one percent indicated that they would favor following his suggestion and 34 percent that they would oppose it. Even among those respondents who, earlier in the interview, had said that the United States should not deal with the Communist Chinese government at all, 28 percent favored exchanging ambassadors if the President suggested it. If the *hypothetical* introduction of a mere presidential *suggestion* can make so much difference, it seems reasonable to predict that an *actual* pronouncement by the President that changing circumstances *require* a new policy toward China would meet with widespread acceptance.

The study of public opinion can thus be useful as a check on the assumptions of decision-makers about the constraints under which they are operating. It can provide relevant information not only for the decision-maker himself in his choice of actions and his efforts at mobilizing public support, but also for groups concerned with influencing foreign policy. Public opinion data—such as those regarding Communist China—can potentially be brought into the foreign policy debate as evidence that certain policy innova-

tions are indeed feasible. When public opinion data are used for these purposes, however—either by decision-makers or citizen groups—it is important to keep in mind that the current distribution of opinions on an issue is generally a poor indicator of what policies the public would be prepared to accept if *their adoption were strongly urged by national leaders*. More often than not the general public favors the official policies of the moment, so that projections based on poll data may systematically underestimate the possibilities for change. If more valid conclusions are to be drawn from opinion surveys, it will be necessary to introduce methodological refinements that will help us assess the structure, stability, and motivational bases of public attitudes, and predict the effects of changing circumstances and authoritative communications on them (cf. Chapter 8; also Katz, 1960, and Kelman, 1961). Moreover, it will be necessary to assign different weights to the opinions of different segments of the population, depending on their roles in the total foreign policy process—the issue to which I shall turn next.

Effective Public Opinion and the Structure of National Leadership.

When decision-makers speak of public opinion, they generally think in terms of influential congressmen, or newspaper editors, or leaders in various nongovernmental organizations. Individuals who occupy these positions of national leadership can exert direct influence on the decision-maker in part because they control some of the means—such as financial or editorial support—that he needs for successful execution of his policies, in the short run or in the long run. Much of their power, however, stems from their relationship to public opinion. Rosenau (1963) uses

the term "national leaders" in this connection interchangeably with "opinion-makers," whom he defines as "those members of the society who *occupy positions which enable them to transmit, with some regularity, opinions about foreign policy issues to unknown persons*" (p. 6). By virtue of their positions, these national leaders can impede or facilitate the achievement of consensus. They perform, in Rosenau's terms, a "veto-support function": decision-makers are constrained by their opposition, and turn to them for help in the mobilization of public support.

It is clear that decision-makers are sensitive to public opinion, as personified by the national leaders, and that public opinion thus plays an important role in the policy process. It is equally clear, however, that *effective public opinion* in the sense that I have been speaking of it is not identical with the distribution of opinions on foreign policy issues among the population at large. What we are most interested in, when we wish to assess the impact of public opinion on foreign policy decisions, are the opinions of the leaders or opinion-makers. As Rosenau (1963) points out, "except perhaps when mass passivity diminishes in extreme emergencies or when votes are cast in elections, the views of national leaders *are* public opinion insofar as foreign policy issues are concerned" (p. 28). "They guide and mold mass opinion and they also reflect it, and in this dual capacity the flexibility, intensity, and depth of their opinions constitute the essential subsoil in which foreign policy alternatives must be rooted" (p. 17).

To study public opinion in the foreign policy process it is necessary to analyze the structure of national leadership in order to determine *whose* opinions count. Examination of the power structure within the society

would help to identify those positions from which influence on foreign policy decisions can be exerted, "and to determine the degree to which they are influential, the issues over which they have some control, and the way in which they exert their influence. . . . Study of the communication structure would reveal which groups have access to the information enabling them to play a role in foreign policy and to communication channels enabling them to exert influence" (Kelman, 1955, p. 48). In Rosenau's (1963) terms, we are concerned—when analyzing the structure of national leadership—with "the pattern of positions which are likely to generate opinion-making on various issues" (p. 10).

It is important to note that the composition of the leadership can be expected to differ from issue to issue. The likelihood that an opinion-maker will become activated by a given issue depends on the relevance of this issue to the concerns of the group that he represents and the degree to which it touches on his group's interests. Thus, for each issue "one could plot a set of positions in the society out of which opinion-making activity is likely to emanate irrespective of the identity of the particular persons who occupy them. It is hardly surprising, for example, that an embargo on the importation of Cuban tobacco produced opinion-making activity on the part of the president of the Tampa [Florida] Cigar Manufacturers Association" (Rosenau, 1963, p. 10).

Depending, then, on the issue, the leaders of different groups within the population are likely to make their influence felt and to become influential. "This is true for direct influence, as expressed for example in pressure groups: the Catholic Church may be more influential than military groups in

legislation regarding censorship, but will probably be considerably less influential in matters relating to war and peace. It should also be true for indirect influence in the sense of 'whose opinions have to be taken into account': the opinions of college administrators may be more important than those of industrial workers when it comes to decisions on military training, but considerably less important when it comes to decisions on defense production" (Kelman, 1954, p. 5). Decision-makers will be most responsive to those leaders who have a stake in a particular issue—provided they also have a base of power—since these are the individuals whose opposition they fear and whose support they need with respect to this issue.

In short, then, in studying the role of public opinion in the foreign policy process, we must first ask *whose* opinions count on *what* issues. Such an analysis would enable us to assign different weights to different segments of public opinion and thus provide a bridge between the opinions of the population and the actions of the decision-maker. We would then be able to view the distribution of opinions on various policy issues in the context of the opinion-policy relationship as a whole. On the one hand, we would be able to deal more effectively with the *dynamics of opinion formation* on foreign policy issues—the psychological and social processes by which opinions become crystallized and public sentiments mobilized. Here we would be concerned with "downward" communication from the opinion-makers, with the mechanisms and processes by which they reach attentive publics and thus in turn the mass public (cf. Roseman, 1961). On the other hand, we would be able to examine the ways in which public opinion enters into the

dynamics of decision-making on foreign policy issues—the effects that it has on the assumptions and constraints under which decision-makers operate, and on the types of actions they choose and the manner in which they present them to the public. Here we would be concerned with "upward" communication from the opinion-makers, with the mechanisms and processes by which they reach decision-makers, whether it be at their own initiative or at the initiative of the decision-maker himself. When the study of public opinion is embedded in these ways in the study of opinion-making and decision-making processes, its relevance to foreign policy becomes more readily apparent.

Individual Actors in the Foreign Policy Process

Students of international relations have been quite concerned with the question of what constitutes the proper unit of analysis for the study of international politics (see, for example, Wolfers, 1959). One approach to this problem is based on the "conviction that the analysis of international politics should be centered, in part, on the behavior of those whose action is the action of the state, namely, the decision-makers" (Snyder, Bruck, & Sapin, 1962, p. 173). According to this approach, the state is seen as the basic actor in international politics, but it is assumed that state actions can be analyzed most effectively by focusing on the behavior—specifically, the decision-making behavior—of those individuals whose responsibility it is to act for the state. Insofar as the study of international politics follows this kind of approach—taking the individual decision-maker as the unit of analysis and his behavior as the object of systematic

observation--social-psychological concepts and methods are clearly relevant.

Focusing on the individual decision-maker in the foreign policy process has several advantages: (a) It counteracts and corrects for the tendency to reify the state and treat it as if it were a human agent. Analyses of state behavior typically involve such notions as perceptions, expectations, and motivations, taken from the vocabulary of individual behavior. If such concepts are going to be used, then there would seem to be advantage in using them more precisely and systematically. This can be accomplished by focusing on the individuals who are the carriers of perceptions, expectations, and motivations. (b) When the individual decision-maker is used as the basic unit of analysis, it becomes possible to analyze in detail the processes that produce state behavior. By contrast, when the state is used as the basic unit of analysis, we are much more dependent on inference if we wish to understand the precise ways in which certain state actions come about. (c) Observations of individual decision-makers provide an empirical handle for the study of international relations. In the field of international relations it is much more difficult to develop indices of macro-level variables than it is in the field of economics. To the extent to which we are able, therefore, to conceptualize in terms of the behavior of individuals and their interaction, we are in a better position to develop suitable measurement procedures.⁶

Whatever its advantages may be, the study of individual decision-makers is politically relevant only if one accepts the assumption that the individual de-

cision-maker is a relevant unit of analysis for the study of international politics. This assumption has on occasion been challenged on one of two grounds. Some critics have argued that the study of individual decision-makers is inappropriate because these men do not operate as individuals in their decision-making positions. The outcomes of their decisions are not determined by their psychological characteristics or by the nature of their interactions with each other. It is, therefore, misleading--according to this argument--to focus on individuals as if they were independent actors in international politics and as if their preferences really made a difference. According to this type of criticism, then, observations of the decision-maker are entirely irrelevant. A second type of criticism, while accepting the *relevance* of the behavior of decision-makers in the determination of state action, is concerned about the *equating* of state action with the behavior of decision-makers. By focusing entirely on the decision-maker--according to this view--we tend to ignore the fact that he is part of a larger process. We may thus obscure the role of certain societal forces in the determination of state behavior, which would emerge more clearly if we took the state as the basic unit of analysis, or if we focused not only on the decision-makers, but on all elements within the society that contribute to the policy process.

In sum, questions can be raised about two assumptions that underlie--or may appear to underlie--the study of individual decision-makers: the assumption of the individual decision-maker as independent actor, and the assumption of the individual decision-maker

⁶ As a matter of fact, even when propositions stated in terms of macro-level variables are put to the test, the actual indices used to measure these variables may be based on observations of individual behavior. For example, one might use public opinion data to obtain an index of the stability of a regime or of the tension level that characterizes the international system.

as sole actor in international politics. Let us proceed to examine each of these two assumptions.

The Decision-Maker as Independent Actor. In questioning the relevance of studying individual decision-makers, some critics point out that the foreign policy decision-maker operates under very severe constraints. It is misleading, therefore, to treat him as an independent actor who contributes importantly to the choice between alternative state actions. It certainly cannot be denied that the behavior of the foreign policy decision-maker is severely constrained. It does not follow, however, that a social-psychological analysis focusing on the individual decision-maker is *ipso facto* irrelevant.

The relevance of psychological analysis is sometimes dismissed because of the mistaken notion that such an analysis is identical with the attempt to explain decision-making in terms of the idiosyncratic characteristics of the decision-maker. Before we examine, therefore, some of the ways in which a focus on the behavior of decision-makers may be politically relevant—despite the existence of powerful constraints—it is important to spell out exactly what such a focus entails. When we speak of images, motives, and values of decision-makers we refer to much more than their idiosyncratic characteristics (cf. Snyder, Bruck, & Sapin, 1962, pp. 153–173; and Chapter 12 in the present volume). One can distinguish at least four major sources of the images, motives, and values that a decision-maker brings to any given situation:

1. The role that he is enacting within his decisional unit and within the larger structure of which this unit is a part: This role carries with it certain expectations that will determine, to a

large extent, the incumbent's definition of the situation and the goals that he will pursue. As Snyder *et al.* (1962) point out, the behavior required by this role reflects in part the functions and objectives of the total foreign policy-making structure and of the particular unit to which the individual decision-maker belongs; and in part norms and values internal to the decisional unit—relating, for example, to the interest of this unit in maintaining its peculiar traditions and its structural position within the total organization. While different role incumbents are likely to differ in the way in which they interpret the requirements of their roles, the broad outlines of the role behavior will be similar regardless of the individual characteristics of the decision-maker.

2. Norms and values that he shares with most of the members of his society: The images and motives that determine the choices of the decision-maker are derived, in part, from the predispositions that he brings to any given situation as a member of his particular society and culture. These are in no sense idiosyncratic to him as an individual, but they may have a great deal to do with the way in which he defines the situation and the kinds of goals he tries to pursue. It can be assumed that, given the same "objective" circumstances, decision-makers with different sociocultural backgrounds would make different choices.

3. Norms and values that he shares with those subgroups within the population to which he belongs: Images and motives derived from this source are likely to be quite important since they are often held in common by the decision-making elite as a whole. The segment of the population from which decision-makers—particularly members of a given decisional unit—are recruited

tends to be somewhat restricted. Insofar as this is true, the same subgroup norms and values may affect the preconceptions and preferred strategies of the entire decisional unit, and may even be built into its definition of the decision-making role.

4. His personality: Images, motives, and values derived from this source are, of course, unique to the individual decision-maker. Even here, however, we are not only concerned with extraneous frustrations, hostilities, and so on, that the individual displaces from other areas of his life onto the decision-making situation. It is also possible to look at personality factors that play a direct role in the way in which the individual handles the problems inherent in the decision-making situation itself—for example, the way in which he interprets the role of decision-maker, the kind of problem-solving skills that he brings to it, and the kind of decision-making style that he displays. Snyder *et al.* (1962) distinguish, in this connection, between "organizationally relevant personality factors and . . . idiosyncratic factors (those stemming from ego-oriented needs and conditions)" (p. 173). No doubt, both types of factors operate; the former, however, can be applied more readily to a systematic analysis of the decision-making process. Insofar as we are dealing with personality factors relating to a specific type of situation we should be able to identify a limited number of patterns and develop propositions about their differential effects on the process.

A social-psychological analysis of the decision-maker is concerned, then, with the effects that his images, motives, and values, derived from all of these sources, have on his behavior. His behavior, in turn, is seen within the organizational context in which it occurs, and as part of a process of com-

munication and interaction among the various members of the unit that is responsible for the final decision. With this conception of the study of the individual decision-maker in mind, let us return to the question of the political relevance of this kind of approach. I shall attempt to show that focusing on the individual decision-maker has considerable relevance for international politics, despite the fact that the foreign policy decision-maker operates under powerful constraints.

I would like to propose, first of all, that, even though the constraints under which the decision-maker labors are very severe, they are not so severe that he is left with no latitude whatsoever. It seems unlikely that external realities force the hands of the decision-makers to such an extent that their reactions are completely determined by these realities and entirely unaffected by their own predispositions and the social processes within their decisional unit. The decision-maker's freedom of movement is likely to vary, of course, as a function of a number of different factors. An obvious one, for example, is his position in the political hierarchy: decision-makers at higher echelons have more opportunities to make their preferences felt, although even lower echelon officials may influence the process by the type of information they feed to their superiors and the way in which they carry out their assigned tasks. Another variable is the nature of the decision involved. Wolfers (1959) suggests, for example, that decision-makers experience strong "compulsion" on issues where national survival is at stake. "Where less than national survival is at stake, there is far less compulsion and therefore a less uniform reaction" (p. 96). Even in situations in which the broad directions of decisions are determined by external realities (as

these relate to what are deemed to be vital national interests), the decision-maker may have some latitude in the way in which he carries out these decisions and this, in turn, may have important long-run consequences. For example, even if one assumes that the general direction of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in the 1950s could not have been altered by decision-makers' preferences, Holsti's (1962) analysis suggests that Secretary Dulles' beliefs and images had an important effect on the form that this policy took—for example, on the intensity with which the Cold War was pursued and on the lack of openness of the U.S. government to possibilities of settling Cold-War issues.

In short, since constraints are not perfect, the perceptions and motivations of decision-makers contribute—in varying degrees—to the final outcome. These perceptions and motivations derive from the various sources that have already been discussed. The decision-maker's actions are determined, in part, by his personality characteristics. But these are by no means the only source of the predispositions that he brings to the decision situation nor are they the determinants of action with which a social-psychological analysis is most actively concerned. Of special interest are the determinants of the decision-maker's actions that derive from norms and values he shares with the rest of his society. Insofar as these include such conceptions as what represents the national interest and what constitutes a proper reaction to certain moves by other countries, they actually contribute to the decision-maker's sense of constraint and compulsion under certain circumstances. Of similar interest as determinants of action are the images and motives—the assumptions and role definitions—that are common

to the decision-making elite in general. Thus, the characteristics of the decision-making elite—and of the particular segment of the population from which it tends to be recruited—become key factors in the choice of national action. Finally, a social-psychological analysis is concerned with the characteristics of the particular decisional unit in which the decision is vested—the norms and values, the patterns of interaction, and the leadership structure that it has developed. These, of course, are partly a function of the particular combination of individuals that constitute the unit and partly a function of the structure and objectives of the unit and of its place within the larger foreign policy organization. How much these various factors contribute to the choice of action on the part of decision-makers—and thus reduce the role of constraints imposed upon them by external realities—would seem to be at least an open question.

I have been speaking of constraints as imposed by external realities, and of the images and motives of the decision-maker—deriving from the society, the subsegment of that society, and the decisional unit to which he belongs—as factors that reduce the effect of constraints. The relationship between these two sets of factors, however, may equally well be reversed. We have already seen in the last paragraph that societal norms may set constraints on the individual decision-maker by specifying the issues that involve vital national interests and the reactions that are appropriate in certain international situations. Thus, the decision-maker would feel constrained by his assessment of public expectations and of the range of reactions that would be “politically safe.” Similarly, the norms of the groups from which the decision-maker comes and of the unit to which he be-

longs may limit the range of actions that he can take—or even the possible range of alternatives that he can perceive. To the extent to which his reference groups consist of people like himself, he is subject to a normative environment that is far more homogeneous than the society at large, and may therefore perceive constraints to an exaggerated degree.

In other words, it may often be true that external realities would permit the decision-maker considerable freedom of movement, but the social norms and values by which he is guided impose constraints upon him. In decision situations of this sort, a social-psychological analysis—far from being irrelevant—is in fact imperative. An analysis of the objective realities alone would not be sufficient for an understanding of the vital national interests that the decision-maker feels compelled to take into account, for in large part these are vital national interests only because they are socially defined as such.

In general, it is evident that a sharp distinction between constraints based on external realities and constraints based on group norms is difficult to maintain. Thus, even in a situation in which the decision-maker feels that he has no freedom of action, we are dealing in part with a social-psychological problem. In the most extreme case, the definition of situations that involve the national interest and the proper reactions in such situations may be written into the decision-maker's role to such an extent that the particular individual enacting the role may be entirely unable to bring his personal preferences into play. Even under such extreme circumstances, however, a social-psychological analysis is not precluded. It would be continuous with the analysis of *role behavior* in other kinds of social situations.

It can be assumed that in any kind of social situation—even the most casual encounter between strangers or the most intimate relationship between personal friends—the participants are enacting socially defined roles and are responsive to the requirements of these roles. The degree to which role considerations govern a given situation of interaction will vary, of course. Foreign policy decision-making situations may often be extreme in that participants are subject to highly structured role requirements with little room for variability. They are still, however, within the total range of social situations, in all of which the analysis of role behavior is at the heart of the social psychologist's concern. In other words, the fact that foreign policy decision-makers function under special circumstances—that they operate as representatives, rather than as individuals, and that their behavior is often highly structured and circumscribed—does not mean that social-psychological considerations are irrelevant; it simply means that social-psychological analysis must focus on the special type of role behavior that occurs under these special circumstances.

An analysis meeting these requirements would start out with the attempt to define just what the crucial circumstances in this type of situation are. What are the demands to which the foreign policy decision-maker is subject? How are these built into the larger political system and its ideology? What are the organizational patterns that were set up to carry out foreign policy functions and what is the organizational context within which a given decision-maker enacts his particular role? Given the demands of the system and the organizational patterns set up to meet these demands, what is the nature of the processes by which de-

cisions are made? What forms do these processes take as a function of different situational factors, including domestic and international events? How does the individual decision-maker define his role and its requirements? What goals does he pursue within this role? How do decision-makers react and interact as they arrive at decisions in the face of different situations?

These questions refer not to the decision-maker as a person, but to the *role* of the decision-maker. In studying the general characteristics of this role—and whatever variants of it the situation permits—we ask questions about the motives and images of individuals. These questions are not concerned, however, with their personal goals or preferences, but with their conceptions of national objectives and the requirements for achieving them and of their own roles within this process. Thus, in order to predict, for example, how the decision-makers of Nation X would respond to a particular provocation from Nation Y, we would be more interested in learning their views of what constitutes a threat to the national interests of X and of the responses to various kinds of provocations that are prescribed by their roles, than we would be in assessing the level of hostility or the attitudes toward Y of individual decision-makers. In sum, the political relevance of focusing on individual actors in the decision-making process becomes apparent once we recognize that a social-psychological analysis is as much concerned with the behavior of roles—and attitudes within and about these roles—as it is with the behavior of persons.

The Decision-Maker as Sole Actor. The second type of criticism that may be raised against approaches that focus on individual decision-makers is that

they provide an incomplete picture of state action by equating it entirely with the behavior of individual decision-makers. An excessive concentration on the decision-maker may cause us to neglect the fact that, while he is the locus of state action, he is not the state; and while he has the final responsibility for state action, he is by no means the sole actor contributing to the process. There are many elements within any society that play more or less direct roles in determining the policies pursued by the state—in general or on certain specific issues—even though they have no formal responsibility for formulating or executing foreign policy. Moreover, there are certain societal processes (such as those discussed in Chapters 9 and 10), formed by the aggregation of social interactions among many individuals and groups throughout a national population, that serve to create a state of readiness for certain kinds of state action. To be sure, all these influences *culminate* in the actions taken by the responsible decision-makers, but they may be obscured if we *restrict* our analysis to the actions of the decision-makers.

In part, this criticism points to the need for a detailed analysis of the total policy process and all of the elements within the society that contribute to it, along the lines suggested in the earlier discussion of public opinion in the foreign policy process. This kind of analysis would supplement rather than supplant the analysis of decision-making behavior itself. There is a more fundamental implication, however, in the above critique of the decision-making approach. It may well be that the societal processes that culminate in state action would emerge more clearly if we took the state, rather than individual actors, as the basic unit of analysis and searched for relationships

between variables at that level. For example, it might be proposed that as bureaucratic elements within a society gain in political influence, foreign policy decision-making takes on a more pragmatic character. It is quite unlikely that a proposition of this kind would emerge out of a microanalysis of the decision-making process or that it would be capable of confirmation by such an analysis. To study the effects of such broad societal processes we would have to examine historical and comparative data (along with data about the power structure and the dominant ideology within the societies in which we are particularly interested). For quantitative analysis, we would have to develop indices of such societal variables as rate of bureaucratization and of such structural variables as the relative political influence of the bureaucratic segment of the population.

While it is evident that a microanalysis of the decision-making process would probably not reveal and might perhaps even obscure the operation of certain larger societal processes, it constitutes an important part of the total research strategy on such problems. The illustrative proposition about the role of bureaucratic elements is based on the assumption that, as these elements gain political influence, the decision-making process will take on a different form. Once the reasonableness of this proposition has been established, it would become important to check out whether—in a situation in which bureaucratic elements are politically influential—the decision-making process does indeed take the form that has been postulated. Here, then, a detailed examination of precisely how decisions come about becomes essential, and the results of such an examination may lead to some modification or refinement of the original proposition. In short, criti-

cism of the decision-making approach, insofar as this approach assumes the decision-maker to be the sole actor, is well taken. What it suggests, however, is certainly not an abandonment of this approach, but a combination of analyses at different levels (cf. Chapter 1, p. 34).

There is another type of criticism that is not directed at the decision-making approach *per se*, but at the dominant tradition in the study of international relations that views nation states as the sole actors in the international system. The decision-making approach, by focusing on national decision-makers who speak for the state, is part of that larger tradition even though it uses the individual rather than the state as its basic unit of analysis. The assumption of the state as the sole actor has been criticized because it does not allow for "corporate bodies other than nation-states [that] play a role on the international stage as co-actors with the nation-states" (Wolfers, 1959, p. 101). These include both subnational bodies—"parties, factions, and all sorts of other politically organized groups" within the state that "can take a hand in matters transcending national boundaries" (p. 102)—and various international and supranational bodies, such as "the United Nations and its agencies, the Coal and Steel Community, the Afro-Asian Bloc, the Arab League, the Vatican, the Arabian-American Oil Company, and a host of other non-state entities [that] are able on occasion to affect the course of international events" (p. 104). The importance of this criticism is particularly apparent if one regards the fully sovereign nation state as only one of a range of principles by which the international system can be organized, and is alert to the indications of change within the international system, including the possibility of "a

steady deterioration and even ultimate disappearance of the national state as a significant actor in the world political system" (Singer, 1961, p. 90).

This criticism, however, is not directed at the emphasis on individual actors as such. As a matter of fact, by focusing on individual actors, we may be able to achieve a different perspective on the international system, with less exclusive emphasis on the nation state. Alger (1963) proposes, in this connection, that we "look upon those persons, from whatever nation, who carry on international relations as a society of individuals. In this society there are groups—religious, professional, ethnic, national, etc. The importance of nation groups is a matter that must be empirically verified since it will vary in different parts of the society and change through time" (p. 408). And Wolfers (1959) stresses that attention to individual actors is essential as a check on the basic assumption of those who criticize the exclusive concern with the nation state. This type of criticism presupposes that men do not identify themselves and their interests "completely and exclusively with their respective nation-states," but with other corporate bodies as well. "But to discover how men in the contemporary world do in fact identify themselves . . . attention must be focused on the individual human beings for whom identification is a psychological event" (p. 105).

Processes of Interaction in International Relations

One way of investigating foreign policy decision-making is to study the individuals and organizations that participate in the process. In this way we can learn about key factors that shape the process—the assumptions and pre-

dispositions that decision-makers bring to it, and the organizational channels within which it is acted out. Of special significance, however—particularly in light of our emphasis on role factors in foreign policy decision-making—is the observation of these individuals and organizations as they are actually engaged in the process of arriving at decisions. Systematic observations of this sort are usually very difficult to obtain. Investigators have, therefore, attempted to reconstruct the process involved in past decisions through interviews with major participants in these decisions (cf. Snyder & Paige, 1958) or through content analysis of relevant documents (cf. North *et al.*, 1963).

Similar considerations arise in the study of negotiation and other processes of interaction between nations. The constraints under which the negotiator typically operates are even more severe than those of the decision-maker. How much latitude the negotiator has in a given situation and what impact his images and goals are likely to have on the proceedings depend on his status and on the nature of the negotiation in question. The negotiator functions primarily, however, as a representative of his government. Much of what we would want to know about his contribution to the process can only be gleaned from observing him in this role—from observing the process of negotiation as it unfolds. To the extent to which international negotiations are carried out publicly, such observations should be easier to obtain than those of intragovernmental decision-making, yet there are many aspects of international negotiation that are not readily accessible to observation.

The problem of inaccessibility is one (though by no means the only) reason for turning to general social-psychological research on such processes as de-

cision-making and negotiation. The assumption is that study of these processes in other settings, though removed from the context of international politics, can provide valuable insights to supplement those obtained from more direct observations. Thus, research on various aspects of intergroup relations within a society—particularly in the areas of race relations and labor-management relations—could be used for these purposes. Such studies could be based on systematic observations, intensive interviews with representatives of the interacting parties and onlookers, and perhaps, on occasion, even some degree of experimental manipulation. On the whole, these situations are likely to be somewhat more manageable than comparable situations in international relations. The number of actors is usually more limited, the relevant elements can be identified more readily and more comprehensively, and the key participants and situations are more likely to be available for observation. This is not to minimize the complexity of intergroup relations within a society but, compared to international relations, they do offer more opportunities to social scientists for detailed observation (particularly participant observation) of interaction processes and “unofficial” questioning of participants.

A second source of indirect data about the kinds of interaction processes that are involved in international relations are laboratory experiments on interpersonal and intergroup relations.⁷ Prime examples of such research are bargaining experiments of the Prisoner's Dilemma variety and studies of interaction in the small-group tradition.

(Many such studies are reviewed in Chapters 11 and 13.) A more recent development is the laboratory simulation of international relations (cf. Guetzkow *et al.*, 1963), which—though carried out in a setting far removed from international politics—attempts to reproduce in the laboratory some of the essential conditions of international relations. (See Chapters 12 and 13 for a discussion of some simulation research.) Experimental studies have the advantage, not only of making certain processes of interaction more accessible to the investigator, but also of providing types of information that are not available by any other means. It is possible to manipulate variables that are of interest to the investigator and to study their effects on the interaction, while keeping extraneous factors under experimental control. Such studies are capable, therefore, of yielding causal information and of testing theoretical propositions in a relatively controlled fashion. Simulation studies, in particular, can also provide some empirical bases for predicting the effects of certain changes in the international system—such as the introduction of new kinds of weapons, the use of new strategies, or the development of new institutional arrangements—on the course of international relations. By contrast, nonexperimental studies can only provide inferential information about causal relationships. Moreover, they can tell us very little about the effects of conditions that have occurred only rarely in real life, and nothing about the effects of conditions that have never occurred.

These advantages of experimental re-

⁷ Field experiments, combining some of the advantages of experimental control with a greater real-life flavor, are potentially also a very rich source of such data, but there has been relatively little work in this direction. An example of a study that is somewhere between a field experiment and a laboratory experiment is the Robbers Cave experiment (Sherif *et al.*, 1961).

search, however, must be weighed against its disadvantages, of which the most obvious is the problem of generalization. When we attempt to generalize, for example, from the two-person game that is so often used in bargaining experiments to international negotiation situations, we are immediately confronted with the wide gap between interpersonal relations and international relations, and between laboratory settings and real-life settings. The danger of personification is ever-present when we transfer findings from such studies to international relations: one must beware of thinking of the nation state as if it were an individual reacting, as an individual would, to promises and threats and various other tactics and strategies. Nor can one resolve this problem by generalizing from the behavior of the experimental subjects to individual negotiators or decision-makers, rather than to nation states. The subject in a bargaining experiment, who acts for himself, is in a very different situation from the national official, who acts as a representative of his government and is part of an elaborate structure involving many other elements of his society—including various governmental units, pressure groups, and public opinion. To understand the actions taken by such national officials, one must take into account the contributions of all of these elements, both in terms of their direct participation in the decision-making process and in terms of the constraints that they impose on the responsible actors. One can legitimately question to what extent it is possible to generalize to this situation from a situation like the two-man game, which is so differently structured.

Studies of intergroup relations—both field studies (such as those dealing with racial or industrial relations) and ex-

perimental analogues—are less vulnerable to this criticism, since the participants do act as representatives of groups rather than as individuals acting entirely for themselves. Even these studies, however, provide problems in generalization, because the composition of the responsible actors in intergroup relations at “lower” levels is far less complex than it is in international relations, and because much of the relevant interaction in intergroup relations—in contrast to international relations—is of a face-to-face nature.

The Inter-Nation Simulation (Guetzkow *et al.*, 1963) is designed to deal with this very problem by building into its structure some of the elements that would permit more ready generalization to the international situation. Specifically, the participants in this simulation do not act as individuals, but take the roles of responsible decision-makers representing their nations. Experimental procedures involve not only negotiations between participants representing different nations, but also negotiations among decision-makers *within* each nation; there is even an opposition leader in each nation who enters into the process. Thus, there is an attempt to simulate the intranational interactions that play such a crucial part in foreign policy decision-making. Feedback from the constituency of each decision-making unit also enters into the simulation through the programming of intranational reactions, such as electoral defeat or revolution, as consequences of various decisions.

These features of the simulation procedure meet some of the major criticisms of experimental analogues of international relations, but they do not by any means dispose of the problem of generalization. Critics of simulation point out that there are certain major differences between the simulated

world and the real world which make generalization difficult. Participants in simulation studies are usually students who do not have the experience or the responsibility of actual decision-makers; they are engaged in a make-believe situation, in which very little is at stake; the intensity of their involvement and the level of stress are considerably attenuated; and the interactions are highly simplified and the time period over which they extend is greatly compressed. (Cf. Verba, 1964, for a discussion of some of these criticisms.)

Certainly it cannot be denied that laboratory simulations are very different from the real world, and social-psychological experiments on interpersonal and intergroup relations even more so. The question of generalization, however, involves much subtler issues than the mere degree of similarity or difference between the artificial situation created in the laboratory and the real-life situation to which one hopes to generalize. An experimental study is designed to investigate the effects of one or more variables on a particular process or its outcome—let us say, for illustrative purposes, on the probability that negotiation between two conflicting parties will lead to a cooperative resolution, satisfactory to both. If such a study is to be relevant to international politics, it must test the effects of variables that actually play a significant role in international relations. Whether or not a particular variable plays a significant role may itself be a matter of controversy, but the investigator who wishes to make a relevant contribution must at least attempt to analyze the situation to which he hopes to generalize and select variables that appear to play a role in that situation. Thus, for example, a study of interpersonal bar-

gaining may show that cooperative solutions are more likely to emerge when the two parties have personal affection for each other. It is quite likely that this study has relatively little bearing on international negotiation because it focuses on a variable that does not play a significant role in that setting. On the other hand, an experiment that shows that cooperative solutions are less likely to emerge when the two parties make extensive use of threats ought to be relevant because it deals with a variable that—at least on the face of it—would appear to be significant in international relations. In short, then, a study conducted in a very different setting than that of international politics may still be highly relevant if it has isolated a variable that is crucial in international relations.

Assuming that a crucial variable has been identified, the question arises as to whether the experimental situation is so structured that it allows this variable to operate in the way in which it is likely to operate in the real world. Returning to the example in the last paragraph, it might be suggested that reactions to threat take a rather different form in a situation in which the negotiator acts as a representative of a group than they do in a situation in which he acts for himself. To the extent to which this is true, generalization from an experiment involving a two-person game to the international situation becomes questionable, even though the experimental variable itself is clearly relevant. In other words, it is necessary to incorporate into the laboratory situation the significant conditions of the international situation that affect the way the experimental variable under study is likely to function. Our ability to generalize, then, depends on the adequacy with which

we have identified and reproduced in the laboratory situation the relevant background conditions.

The mere fact that an experimental situation differs in obvious ways from the real world does not *ipso facto* make it irrelevant as a possible source of valid generalizations. As Verba (1964) points out, the experimental model does not need to "look like" the real world. "What is important is the question of whether it *operates like the real world in the respects that are relevant to the study at hand*" (p. 502). And there is no general a priori answer to this question. The relevant conditions that need to be built into the laboratory situation are likely to be quite different, depending on the particular variables under investigation. What these conditions are must be determined through a combination of analytic and empirical procedures. For example, if we want to evaluate the extent to which one can generalize from the reactions to threat on the part of student participants in a laboratory simulation to the reactions of experienced decision-makers, we would have to analyze the situation in detail and see whether there is any reason to believe that threats would have a differential effect on experienced versus inexperienced decision-makers. If there is reason to suspect that this factor might make a difference, it would probably be best to seek an empirical answer, by running two versions of the simulation—one with experienced and one with inexperienced participants—and observing the reactions of the two types of participants to variations in threat. In any event, the fact that there is a difference in degree of experience between decision-makers in the simulation and in the real world is not a sufficient basis for rejecting the relevance of the simulation, unless there is some

reason to believe that this difference makes a difference with respect to the variables under investigation.

I have tried to show that it would be unwarranted to dismiss a laboratory situation as irrelevant *in general*, without reference to the particular problem with which it is concerned. It would be equally unwarranted, however, to accept a particular laboratory procedure as relevant in general and suitable for all purposes. That is, it is impossible to establish the validity of a laboratory procedure in such a way as to allow us to generalize indiscriminately from it to the real world of international relations. A procedure that is valid for the study of some problems may be quite invalid for the study of others. This is true not only for the more simplified and stylized types of laboratory situations, such as those used in Prisoner's Dilemma studies, but also for the more elaborate attempts to simulate the international system. A procedure like the Inter-Nation Simulation has a great advantage in that it is based on a detailed analysis of foreign policy decision-making and international politics and is deliberately designed to incorporate many of their crucial features in the laboratory model. As a result, the Inter-Nation Simulation not only resembles the real world more closely than simpler experimental situations and thus has greater face validity, but also contains the crucial background conditions necessary for testing the effects of a wide range of variables. Nevertheless, one cannot assume that it would be relevant for all purposes.

It may very well be that, for certain purposes, the simulation procedure is *more* elaborate and complex than necessary. Simpler situations may be available that incorporate the crucial conditions necessary for testing the hypothesis in question, and that have the

advantage of being less costly, more flexible, and more capable of yielding unambiguous results (Pruitt, 1964). In other words, the simulation procedure may incorporate more background conditions than necessary for a given purpose. For other purposes, however—and this is most germane to our present discussion—it may fail to incorporate the crucial background conditions that would permit valid generalization. While many features of international relations are built into the Inter-Nation Simulation, others are of necessity excluded. Other types of laboratory procedures would therefore have to be devised to test the effects of those variables whose functioning in the real world depends on conditions that the current Inter-Nation Simulation does not incorporate.

The question of generalization from experimental studies to the real world, then, cannot be settled once and for all. There is no laboratory situation that can have universal validity. The conditions on which valid generalization depends have to be reexamined for each specific problem that an investigator is pursuing. By the very nature of experimental work in the social sciences, there must be some degree of tension between the laboratory and the real world. Concern about the possibilities and limits of generalization is therefore an inherent and ubiquitous part of the entire investigative process.

In view of these considerations, the political relevance of experimental studies depends very heavily on the way these studies are used—the way they fit into the total effort to gain systematic understanding of international relations. Two points become particularly important if we grant that our ability to generalize from laboratory studies is necessarily a matter of some continuing ambiguity: the need to use laboratory studies in conjunction with

other types of research, and the need to view these studies as contributions to systematic thinking about international relations rather than as final scientific verifications of propositions about international relations.

1. Experimental studies are most likely to be useful if they are part of a combined research strategy, attempting to close in on problems in international relations from different angles through the use of different methods. Data from experiments and simulations (as well as data from field studies of intergroup relations) must be taken in conjunction with data of all kinds obtained directly at the level of international relations. While experimental research can complement direct observations or historical reconstructions of international interactions, it cannot substitute for them. It must turn to such studies in order to identify significant variables that ought to be manipulated in the laboratory and crucial conditions that ought to be built into the laboratory situation if it is to produce generalizable findings. Furthermore, findings from experimental studies must be checked out by means of *in situ* research, in order to determine how well propositions established in the laboratory hold up in the real world. There is a need then, for continued movement, back and forth, from the one type of research to the other. Insofar as laboratory studies are integrated into such a larger research strategy, investigators can come to grips with the problem of generalization. They can maximize the unique contributions of experimental research while minimizing its major limitation.

2. Given the ambiguities inherent in any attempt to generalize from the laboratory to the real world of international relations, it would be much more appropriate to regard experimental techniques "as a flexible mode of dis-

covery and clarification rather than as a mode of rigorous test or validation" (Synder, 1963, p. 11). We are severely limited, at least at the present stage of development of the field, in our ability to obtain experimental verifications of propositions about international relations. If we recognize these limitations and view experimental work, instead, as a special type of contribution to the process of systematic thinking about international relations, then its potential relevance becomes more readily apparent.

In developing a suitable experimental situation, the investigator is forced to clarify his theoretical notions and is likely to become aware of some of their implications. In a discussion of experimental bargaining games, for example, Schelling (1961) notes that "To build a game of this sort, and especially to build into the game particular features that one wishes to represent, requires that one define his concepts operationally. A game of this sort imposes discipline on theoretical model-building; it can be a test of whether concepts and propositions are meaningful, and a means of demonstrating so when they are" (p. 57). Experimental situations, moreover, permit detailed observations of interactions and provide opportunities for discovering unexpected phenomena. Above all, relationships observed in experimental studies can cut into commonly held assumptions about international relations by demonstrating the *possibility of the impossible* and the *questionableness of the obvious*.

Even though an experiment or simulation cannot establish with any degree of certainty that a relationship observed in the laboratory holds true in the real world, it can establish that such a relationship is at least possible under certain circumstances. If the existence of this relationship has previously been deemed completely im-

possible, its demonstration in the laboratory may constitute an important new input into theoretical and sometimes strategic thinking. For example, if we have shown in a laboratory simulation of international relations that the use of Osgood's (1962) strategy of graduated reciprocation in tension-reduction (GRIT) produces a reversal in the arms race, we have certainly not proven the efficacy of this strategy in the real world. The laboratory demonstration does, however, suggest some new possibilities worthy of consideration when we theorize about international influence processes or examine policy alternatives. Experimental studies can thus contribute to theoretical and strategic innovations by forcing onto the agenda certain possibilities that might not otherwise have been considered.

Similarly—and, again, without proving anything—experimental studies can demonstrate that what is deemed obvious may not be obvious at all, at least under certain circumstances, and that results may be quite different from those that are commonly expected. If an "obvious" proposition is disconfirmed in the laboratory, its validity in the real world is not destroyed, but it is at least thrown into question. Again, then, experimental studies can contribute to systematic thinking about international relations by making it necessary to reexamine certain assumptions about the nature and functioning of the international system that were previously taken for granted.

Perspectives for the Formulation of Theory and Policy

In recent years, some international relations specialists have been turning to social psychology and related disciplines for propositions and interpretations relevant to theoretical and policy

questions in the field of international relations. Moreover, some social psychologists have themselves entered into the debate of these questions. Social-psychological contributions are based in part on the kinds of research that were discussed in the preceding three sections, and in part on extrapolations from general social-psychological principles and from research designed for other purposes. It is to be hoped, of course, that social-psychological inputs will increasingly come from research specifically designed to answer questions about international relations, but even extrapolations from other areas can provide a useful perspective on the assumptions that enter into the formulation of theory and policy.

These extrapolations refer to the behavior of nation states and thus involve the application to state behavior of principles and findings based on the behavior of individuals. When such extrapolations are made, therefore, one either assumes that more or less similar principles apply at these different levels of analysis; or that approximate, but still adequate, predictions of state behavior can be made from a knowledge of the reactions of those persons (decision-makers and to a lesser extent various members of the public) whose individual behaviors aggregate into state behavior.

Insofar as these assumptions are untested and controversial, the extrapolation from individual to state behavior is open to the charge of personifying the nation state. Thus, critics may point out, for example, that it would be misleading to suppose that B's perception of and reaction to a conciliatory move on the part of A would take the same form in the relations between two nations as it would in the relations between two individuals. The relations between nations, they would argue,

cannot be understood simply in terms of the motives and perceptions of individuals, but must be analyzed within their historical and political context. This may lead, then, to the related criticism that too often attempts at extrapolation from psychological data are not informed by the historical and political realities impinging on international behavior and do not take these adequately into account.

The temptation to personify the nation state, and the glossing over of historical and political factors that constitute the conditions within which state actions are carried out, represent real dangers to which we must always remain alert—as I have already indicated in several contexts, both in the present chapter and in Chapter 1. Yet the existence of these dangers is not a sufficient reason for the social psychologist to rule himself out of the debate on theory and policy in international relations. In exercising justifiable scientific caution, we must beware of becoming overcautious; it would be regrettable if we chose to make *no* contribution simply because we cannot make an *unambiguous* one. Given the limited development of international relations theory, the scarcity of measurable concepts at the macro-level of analysis, and the difficulty in devising investigative tools, it would be unwise to close off any avenues from which contributions to international relations thinking can potentially come. Social-psychological extrapolation, if carried out responsibly—with due regard for the dangers it entails and for the importance of placing it in its proper context—is one such avenue.

The value of extrapolations on the part of the social psychologist—despite the fact that he typically works with concepts rooted in the study of interpersonal relations, and has limited ex-

pertise in historical and political spheres—must be assessed, not simply in terms of the extrapolations themselves, but in relation to the other inputs into theoretical and policy thinking in international relations. When this is done, it becomes apparent that social-psychological analysis can actually perform a *corrective* function with respect to some of the thinking in the field: (a) it can address itself to the psychological assumptions—often unexamined or even unstated—that underlie many theoretical and policy formulations; and (b) it can counteract some of the special biases that seem to be built into the more traditional historical and structural analyses of international relations. Let us examine these two possibilities in turn.

Psychological Assumptions. The tendency to generalize from psychological principles, based on interpersonal relations, to matters of international relations did not originate with the professional psychologist. Personification of nation states seems to pervade much of the thinking about international relations, not only among average citizens, but also among practitioners and students of foreign affairs. Even as sophisticated a decision-maker as Secretary of State Rusk seems on occasion to use a street-fight as his model for the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, he was quoted as saying to the reporter John Scali, at the height of the Cuban crisis: "Remember, when you report this—that, eyeball to eyeball, they blinked first" (Hilsman, 1964, p. 20). And W. W. Rostow, Chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, wrote in the *New York Times* (1964): "Behind all the elaborate mechanisms of diplomacy, behind the in-

credible complexity and sophistication of the world of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, the cold war comes down to this test of whether we and the democratic world are fundamentally tougher and more purposeful in the defense of our vital interests than they are in the pursuit of their global ambitions" (p. 113).

Systematic efforts at conceptualizing international relations—whether these be at the level of theory construction, policy formulation, or choice of strategy—vary in the extent to which they personify the nation state and the extent to which they impute to it reactions based on some simplified model of interpersonal relations. Central to most of these conceptualizations, however, are certain assumptions about social-psychological processes—about the goals of nation states, about their perceptions of each other, and about their probable reactions to various types of influence attempts.

Thus, for example, Morgenthau (1954) is clearly making a psychological assumption when he states, as the basic proposition of his theory of international politics, "that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power" (p. 5). Power in this context refers to "man's control over the minds and actions of other men" (p. 26). Morgenthau makes additional psychological assumptions in explaining the readiness of the mass of citizens to support the foreign policies of their nation state. "Not being able to find full satisfaction of their desire for power within the national boundaries," he writes, "the people project those unsatisfied aspirations onto the international scene. There they find vicarious satisfaction in identification with the power drives of the nation" (p. 95).

The formulation of policy vis-à-vis

other nations, and in particular the choice of strategies in the execution of these policies, invariably involve a whole series of social-psychological assumptions. Assumptions are made, first of all, about the way in which other nations are likely to react to such influence attempts as threats or promises (cf. Singer, 1963). These predictions, in turn, are based on assumptions about the goals and perceptions of these other nations. At a more specific level, various psychological assumptions govern the procedures followed in international negotiations. For example, the importance of negotiating from strength, and the advantage of starting with a large demand and then allowing it to be whittled down, are often stressed. Clearly, these involve assumptions about the effects of various kinds of bargaining behavior on the reactions of one's partner.

These different assumptions underlying theory and policy can be tested—more or less readily and more or less directly—through social-psychological research. But even in the absence of specific empirical tests, the social psychologist should be able to contribute to the debate insofar as the validity of certain psychological assumptions is at issue. Through extrapolation from general principles and from research on other problems, he should be able to say whether a particular assumption seems reasonable, whether it is consistent with the accumulated knowledge of the field, whether it would require some modification or qualification, whether there are some prior conditions on which its validity rests, or whether an entirely different set of assumptions ought to be considered. Thus, by bringing his professional perspective and relevant *expertise* to bear on the issue, he can help to advance the process of thinking about it.

A good example of a problem area that could benefit from social-psychological inputs is the debate about deterrence strategies. Much of the thinking about deterrence is based on certain psychological assumptions that are seldom made explicit—for example, assumptions about probable reactions to threat, or about the rationality of decision-makers. These assumptions do not only represent—at least in part—generalizations from interpersonal relations whose applicability to international relations has not been tested, but they are based on conceptions of interpersonal relations that are themselves of doubtful validity. Clearly, social psychologists could contribute to the thinking about these strategies, at the very least by offering informed evaluations of the psychological soundness of certain commonly held propositions about human behavior.

It may be worth noting that much of our strategic thinking is open to question not only with respect to its psychological assumptions, but also with respect to its reading of the historical and political context. To be sure, strategies based on military force are backed up by historical precedent and are readily seen as politically “realistic.” There is good reason to believe, however, that—given their heavy emphasis on military and game considerations—they often overlook significant historical and political *realities*. Thus, for example, the “missile gap” episode of a few years ago provides some evidence that American deterrence strategies were based on estimates of Soviet intentions that were not supported by subsequent events; it would appear that intentions were assessed on the basis of information about Soviet capabilities, rather than on the basis of detailed analysis of Soviet purposes and the nature of Soviet leadership. Those aspects

of strategic thinking that are still based on the model of a bilateral game (particularly a two-person zero-sum game) are especially open to question for their failure to take into account the emergence of new historical forces and the transformation of political realities—as exemplified by the growing importance of the emerging nations, and the probable proliferation of nuclear weapons.

These last examples were designed to illustrate that a social-psychological perspective and a historical-political one are not necessarily opposed or alternative to each other. Some of our thinking about international relations suffers from the absence of both. Moreover, a combination of these two types of perspectives may actually enhance the value of each. Thus, for example, the calculation of Soviet intentions in any given situation must be based on what is known about the history of the Soviet Union and the structure of its political system, but it cannot be based entirely on these considerations. The social-psychological dimension must also be brought into the analysis, through an examination of such data as the current images, values, and expectations of Soviet leaders and citizens, despite the obvious methodological difficulties in the acquisition of these data.

Historical-Structural Assumptions. A social-psychological perspective may complement a historical and structural analysis, not only because it can introduce new dimensions and data relevant to these, but also because it represents a different analytic approach. It can thus help to counteract some of the difficulties that are inherent in a historical-structural approach.

Analyses based largely on historical and structural considerations are often characterized by a static emphasis—an

emphasis on how things are and, by implication, on how they therefore must be. This kind of analysis is very useful as long as the situation remains relatively stable, but it is less adequately equipped for dealing with changed situations requiring different kinds of responses. Thus, while American and Soviet societies have been undergoing major changes, scholars have tended to lag somewhat behind reality in their perceptions of the adversary. As Bauer (1961) points out, "the American student of the Soviet Union uses a model largely based on Stalin's reign, particularly during the periods of purges. The Soviet view of America . . . is based in part on the state of American society during the great depression of the 1930's" (p. 226). Similarly, foreign policy formulation has not quite caught up with the revolutionary changes in weapons systems and in the power relationships within the international system.

If policy thinking with a historical-structural emphasis is slow in responding to changing circumstances, it is even slower in the discovery of new approaches and the development of new strategic possibilities. There is a tendency for this kind of thinking to be caught in a closed circle, particularly when it involves policy formulation in a conflictual relationship between two nations. "Political realities" are defined, in large part, in terms of the existing relationship between the conflicting nations; it is not surprising, therefore, that political realities, so defined, require policies that perpetuate the existing relationship.

The special contribution of a social-psychological perspective is that it regards any particular historical-structural situation as only one of a range of possibilities, and that it is concerned with propositions about the conditions under which different kinds of effects

emerge. Let us say, for example, that we want to predict how Nation Y is likely to react to a particular policy move on the part of Nation X. Typically, such a prediction would be based largely on what is known about Nation Y's political structure and leadership, its past behavior, and its relationship to X. A social-psychological analysis, however, would attempt to identify the various conditions—such as those surrounding the projected policy move and those characterizing the general relationship between X and Y—on which the predicted outcome depends. Such an analysis—by focusing not on “what reactions can be expected,” but on “what reactions can be expected under what conditions”—can more readily suggest possible ways of changing outcomes by changing the underlying conditions. It goes without saying that a social-psychological analysis can never substitute for a political and historical one, but it can complement it in a unique way. In contrast to the more static historical-structural approaches, it is set to recognize hypothetical variants of the existing situation, to see possibilities for changing it, and to come up with new policy orientations.

A social-psychological perspective can, thus, help in the development of alternative policies and innovative strategies that fail to emerge as long as our thinking is bound by traditional assumptions about actions and reactions in the international arena. Moreover, a social-psychological perspective would regard the very set of assumptions on which our international system is currently built as only one of a number of possible sets of assumptions, and hence potentially open to change. Thus, such a perspective would help in the development of alternative institutional arrangements for the international system, characterized by new ideological orientations, new types of loyalties, and

new patterns of relationship among different societies. The importance of such contributions to systematic thinking about these problems is particularly apparent when we recognize that we find ourselves today in a novel world situation, for which there is no adequate historical precedent, and in which many traditional assumptions are no longer relevant.

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