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FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT, VISIONARY

James T. Kloppenberg

Elizabeth Borgwardt. *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005. 437 pp. Notes, bibliography, illustrations, and index. \$35.00.

Cass R. Sunstein. *The Second Bill of Rights: FDR's Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need It More than Ever*. New York: Basic Books, 2004. vii + 294 pp. Notes, bibliography, and index. \$25.00 (cloth); \$16.95 (paper).

Visitors to the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial in Washington D.C. find themselves face to face with FDR's boldest challenge to the American people. Carved in the granite walls of the Memorial are the Four Freedoms that FDR proclaimed in January 1941. Joined to the Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Worship guaranteed by the original Bill of Rights are two new freedoms to be secured by Americans then confronting new dangers, Freedom from Want and Freedom from Fear. The two books under review address the history and significance of those latter freedoms, which remain as elusive in 2006 as they were sixty-five years ago. Most Americans today, lulled into smug contentment with their role as consumers rather than citizens, and provoked by endless harangues into demonizing a shadowy and little understood enemy, seem as determined not to confront the reasons behind the problems of want and fear as FDR was determined to force the nation to face them. FDR's urgent calls for greater equality at home and for a multilateral approach to global affairs may seem as quaint as the cape he wears in sculptor Neil Estern's powerful portrayal of the president at the Memorial.

Cass Sunstein's and Elizabeth Borgwardt's books are particularly valuable now, when the distance separating American politics from the principles of FDR has rarely seemed greater. These books matter in part because they demonstrate so clearly something that has been in doubt for several decades now. As I've tried to signal with the title of this review, Sunstein and Borgwardt both show that Franklin Roosevelt did indeed have ideals both for domestic politics and foreign policy. Countless historians have shown that FDR was a deft politician, shrewd in maneuvering friends and foes, but awareness of that skill should not distract us from the evidence of his guiding principles

so forcefully presented by Sunstein and Borgwardt. No less an authority than Harry Hopkins testified that the Four Freedoms speech showed "the real Roosevelt," and these books confirm that judgment. At least from the mid-1930s until the end of his life, FDR was animated by ideals that provided the criteria by which he wanted the members of his administration to evaluate the success or failure of the multiple experiments he prodded them to try. Those principles were effective freedom and more equal opportunity at home and greater security achieved through international cooperation abroad. The first could not be achieved without sustained government intervention to prevent the unregulated market from rewarding some while shutting out others; the second required the United States to relinquish its cherished unilateralism and join other nations to prevent war and spread prosperity.

In *The Second Bill of Rights*, Sunstein characterizes FDR's January 11, 1944, State of the Union Address as "the greatest speech of the twentieth century" and laments that it is not better known today. At that moment, with the Allied invasion of Italy bogged down and great naval victories in the Pacific still months away, FDR was already thinking about America after the war and its place in the world. He reported on the recent negotiations with Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China that had set the allied powers on course toward international cooperation both during and after the war. He excoriated those Americans "with selfish and partisan interests" who had tried to profit from the war and those who had sought to avoid the "prodigious sacrifices" it required. "If there was ever a time to subordinate individual or group selfishness to the national good," FDR proclaimed, "that time is now." Looking forward, he envisioned an America in which the fruits of economic growth would be more widely shared. "We cannot be content, no matter how high that general standard of living may be, if some fraction of our people—whether it be one-third or one-fifth or one-tenth—is ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed, and insecure" (pp. 235–44).

In order to meet that goal, FDR proclaimed a second Bill of Rights made necessary by the expansion of America and the transformation of its economy from agricultural to industrial. "We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence." Certain "economic truths have become accepted as self-evident." According to FDR, Americans had learned that their political rights must be supplemented by economic rights "under which a new basis of security and prosperity can be established for all—regardless of station, race, or creed." Americans in 2006 might be surprised by the rights FDR believed their parents and grandparents had eagerly embraced. His "second bill" included the following rights:

1. "to a useful and remunerative job";
2. "to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation";
3. of farmers to sell their products at a price that would yield "a decent living";
4. of businesses to be protected from "domination by monopolies at home or abroad";
5. "of every family to a decent home";
6. "to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health";
7. "to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment"; and
8. "to a good education" (Sunstein, pp. 242–3).

Such ambitious plans were greeted with shrieks from conservatives who had resisted the New Deal from the beginning. Tough-minded historians such as Alan Brinkley and David M. Kennedy have agreed that since such ambitious plans had no chance of success in the political climate of 1944, FDR could not have been serious about this second Bill of Rights.

Sunstein disagrees, as do I. One of his generation's most learned and prolific scholars of constitutional law, Sunstein constructs a brief to establish his case, first for the solid legal and historical foundations on which FDR's argument rested, and second for its continuing significance in our own day. Although some readers might challenge his claim for its contemporary relevance, his sturdy arguments concerning the basis of the economic bill of rights merit attention from American historians.

Sunstein quotes Enlightenment figures from Locke and Montesquieu to Smith and Paine to the effect that extremes of wealth and poverty are inimical to popular government. Since so many American conservatives now treat the writings of Madison and Jefferson as sacred texts, it is worth quoting just a single passage from each to give a hint of the tune sung by the chorus Sunstein has assembled. One can combat the evil of parties, Madison wrote, first by "establishing a political equality among all" and then by "withholding unnecessary opportunities from a few, to increase the inequality of property, by an immoderate, and especially an unmerited, accumulation of riches." How should that be done? "By the silent operation of laws, which, without violating the rights of property, reduce extreme wealth to a state of mediocrity, and raise extreme indigence toward a state of comfort" (p. 116).

Madison's ally Jefferson identified the best mechanisms to achieve that end: "I am conscious that an equal division of property is impracticable. But the consequences of this enormous inequality producing so much misery to the bulk of mankind, legislatures cannot invest too many devices for subdividing property," which is why Jefferson sought to abolish entail and primogeniture. But he did not stop there. "Another means of silently lessening the inequality of property is to exempt all from taxation below a certain point, and to tax the higher proportions of property in geometrical progression as they rise.

Whenever there is in any country uncultivated lands and unemployed poor, it is clear that the laws of property have been so far extended as to violate natural right" (pp. 115–9). Madison and Jefferson have seldom been invoked as founders of graduated taxation or the earned income tax credit, but Sunstein makes a good case for the proposition that FDR saw himself completing the work of the first Bill of Rights.

The brief reign of *laissez faire* in America, Sunstein correctly points out, lasted only from the end of the nineteenth century until the New Deal, and even then it was subject to repeated challenges at the local, state, and federal level. The myth that the United States has been an Eden of unregulated economic activity is, Sunstein insists, bad political economy and even worse history. Economists from Adam Smith to Friedrich Hayek and Amartya Sen have agreed that all economic activity, indeed all preservation of property, requires the active intervention of government authority in the form of predictable and enforceable law. No one benefits as much from the institutions of the state as its wealthiest citizens, which renders the shrill denunciations of "government intrusion" into the marketplace incoherent as well as disingenuous. Dismissals of *laissez faire* as "a tangle of confusions," to use Sunstein's term, do indeed have a long lineage. Such critiques, in various forms, lay behind many reforms in the half-century preceding the New Deal. They inspired not only progressive reformers' insistence on government regulation on behalf of the public interest but also the rise of legal realism, which originated in the pragmatism of William James and John Dewey; emerged in the contrasting pragmatist jurisprudential styles of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Louis Brandeis; matured in the writings of Robert Hale and Morris Cohen; and manifested itself in the positions taken by justices such as Felix Frankfurter and Charles Evans Hughes. In Sunstein's view it was not the 1923 decision in *Adkins v. Children's Hospital*, which invalidated minimum wage legislation for women and children, but *West Coast Hotel v. Parrish*, which in 1937 reversed *Adkins* on the minimum wage, that expresses the dominant strand of American jurisprudence. The deep American commitment to private enterprise has only rarely prevented courts from recognizing that law must regulate the operations of the workplace and the marketplace. If anything less than socialism fails to meet the standard for appropriate government intervention, then it is true that America has been a haven of free enterprise. But from the operation of poor laws to the exercise of the police power to regulate economic activity in antebellum America to the ratification of the New Deal by the Supreme Court in *West Coast Hotel*, there is a long history of government intervention from which the few moments of genuine *laissez faire* are striking deviations (pp. 3, 18–33).

Sunstein contends that FDR's commitment to an economic Bill of Rights should be understood within those broader contexts of the legitimacy of progressive taxation and regulation and within the narrower framework of

FDR's progression as person and president. FDR's own experience of polio, most observers agree, gave him insight into a world of limitations unknown to the jaunty patricians of his set. His experience of the scope of the Depression, and his genuine desire to do something about it despite his (not uncommon) inability to understand the dynamics of macroeconomics and his genuine disgust for "the dole," bred in him a commitment to address the problem of poverty.

Sunstein traces the now clear evidence of that growing awareness. He begins with FDR's Commonwealth Club address in 1932, in which FDR acknowledged that industrialization narrowed opportunity for some while expanding it for others. In his fiery speech at the Democratic National Convention in 1936, FDR talked about completing the American Revolution by expanding freedom from the political to the economic sphere and securing a "right to work" for all Americans. Although Sunstein is careful to acknowledge the provisional, experimental, and ad hoc nature of the New Deal in all its stages, he also points out that as early as November 1937, FDR provided a clear statement of the objectives that he would seek for the remainder of his life, including most of the measures at the heart of his second Bill of Rights. When he endorsed, first almost haphazardly and after 1941 more formally, the Four Freedoms, he was committing himself—and eventually, Great Britain and the other Allied powers as well, through the Atlantic Charter—to a version of the program of social provision that every industrialized nation except the United States adopted in the wake of WWII.

Sunstein makes a convincing argument for the careful development of the ideas that FDR eventually sketched in 1944. The National Resources Planning Board (NRPB), headed by FDR's uncle Frederic Delano, survived conservative opposition from 1933 to 1943, and it provided the institutional locus for research into existing and possible government economic policies. The NRPB, staffed with lively and energetic social scientists attuned to Deweyan democratic theory and committed to a more ambitious version of the New Deal than FDR ever succeeded in getting through Congress, generated big books and nasty criticism. Because conservatives in Congress put it out of business in 1943, historians have judged it a failure.

Again Sunstein disagrees; again I agree with him.¹ He makes clear that the efforts of the NRPB bore fruit in FDR's economic Bill of Rights and in the most radical speech of his presidency, a campaign speech delivered on October 28, 1944, as the election approached. FDR noted, in words that call to mind the dismissive judgments of later historians, that some "have sneered at these ideals, characterizing them as the unattainable dreams of starry-eyed New Dealers." But he was not cowed. The American public, he insisted, "agrees with these principles," and to that end he promised a combination of jobs programs, tax incentives, and expanded foreign trade that would spread prosperity "to all our citizens, irrespective of race, or creed, or color" (p. 89).

Make no mistake: FDR was committed to capitalism rather than socialism. He believed that full employment and the achievement of purchasing power sufficient to secure a minimum living standard should be achieved as much as possible through the private sector. But he saw no incompatibility between a robust market economy and an active, interventionist state responsible for taking the steps necessary to address imbalances of income at both extremes, through minimum wages for those who work and steep tax rates on unearned income. He did not have to read John Rawls to understand the appeal and the mechanisms of distributive justice in a liberal culture that values individual rights. In words taken from FDR's 1932 Commonwealth Club speech that Sunstein invokes several times, the exercise of "property rights might so interfere with the rights of the individual that the government, without whose assistance the property rights could not exist, must intervene, not to destroy individualism but to protect it" (pp. 89, 3).

That logic, presented repeatedly in the writings of American and European progressives and social democrats from the 1890s through World War II, received perhaps its most elaborate philosophical formulation in the immediate pre-New Deal years in the writings of Dewey, particularly in his book *Individualism Old and New*. Published in 1930 and incorporating articles that first appeared in 1929, that book included both Dewey's uncanny early diagnosis of the Depression (a result of underconsumption caused by the skewed distribution of wealth, Dewey explained) and a clear statement of his persistent case for rethinking rights as the effective rather than formal freedom to develop one's capacities.² That was the case FDR made, first tentatively and then with increasing forcefulness, from 1932 until his death in 1945.

As Sunstein points out, precisely that logic undergirds the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and most of the constitutions written throughout the world since World War II. Although FDR committed the United States to those goals, almost immediately after his death Cold War calculations and domestic political deal making combined to snuff out the program he had in mind. Only in the GI Bill did the initiatives he outlined come to fruition, and their transformative effect on postwar America has been universally acknowledged. Soldiers had a chance, as a reward for their service (not to be confused with a "government hand-out," as Congressional conservatives were careful to specify), to attend college, start businesses, buy homes, and get health care, all of which enabled them to become productive members of the middle class and jump-start the postwar boom. They enjoyed, in other words, precisely the economic rights that FDR, "starry-eyed New Dealer" that he was, envisioned for all Americans, "irrespective of race, creed, or color." The nation did not lack then, nor does it lack now, the means to provide those benefits—any more than did defeated nations such as Germany or devastated nations such as Great Britain or the Netherlands that took such steps after the war. The United States merely lacked the will.³

Elizabeth Borgwardt, in *A New Deal for the World*, explains the emergence of multilateralism after WWII and traces its strange career in recent decades. Whereas Sunstein attempts to breathe life into FDR's now apparently moribund idea of economic regulation and social provision and to recapture its potential as an authentically American project, Borgwardt examines three different sets of developments. The Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 opened the door to postwar international agreements to facilitate stable currency exchanges, trade, and banking. The San Francisco Conference in June 1945 laid the foundation for the United Nations. The Nuremberg trials in August 1945 provided a set of standards for judging war crimes and genocide. Borgwardt reminds her readers that only twenty-five years earlier the United States had renounced just such a course and returned to its tradition of isolationism. Why were things so different at the end of WWII?

There is no easy answer, which explains why Borgwardt's book is intricate, difficult, and hard to summarize. In each case different players produced a different drama; in each case the interplay between diplomatic insiders and public opinion, and between American, British, and Soviet decision makers, led through twists and turns to unexpected results. Borgwardt shows a historian's sensitivity to the open-ended nature of these developments at the time, an international lawyer's alertness to the decisive shifts of argument and uses of evidence, a political theorist's interest in the precise delineation of concepts and categories, and an activist's eye for the resources the historical record might contain for our own time.

Borgwardt argues that in each domain a gap opened early between the high ideals boldly stated during and immediately after the war, during the moment she calls "the high tide of multilateralism" or "the *Zeitgeist* of 1945," and the decline into Cold War wrangling and colonial and post-colonial struggles. Rather than concluding, as self-styled realists have been inclined to do, that the eventual emergence of global power politics reveals the hypocrisy of those who proclaimed the ideals in the first place, or lamenting the perfidy of the villains who tarnished the dream of international cooperation, Borgwardt opts for a more nuanced approach. She urges readers to contextualize these events "historically and culturally, as part of Roosevelt's vision of a New Deal for the World" (p. 286). She argues that we should be sufficiently hard-headed to realize that ideas, no matter how attractive, can make a difference only within institutions that give them power, and sufficiently high-minded to realize that ideals can sometimes change the frameworks within which power operates, as they did, for example, in seventeenth-century England, in eighteenth-century America and France, and at the "high tide of multilateralism" in the mid-1940s.

Borgwardt begins by placing readers in the midst of the negotiations between Roosevelt and Churchill off the coast of Newfoundland in August 1941. She balances the careful orchestration of the event and the shrewd calculations of

the principal players, acutely sensitive to their critics and careful not to jeopardize their own national interests, against the grand rhetoric of international cooperation and national self-determination that eventually emerged in the Atlantic Charter. Although nobody apparently planned it, the proclamation soon took on a life of its own. Felix Frankfurter wrote to FDR: "We live by symbols and we can't too often recall them. And you two in that ocean," Frankfurter wrote, "in the setting of that Sunday service, gave meaning to the conflict between civilization and arrogant, brute challenge; and gave promise more powerful and binding than any formal treaty could, that any civilization has brains and resources that tyranny will not be able to overcome" (p. 36). Or as Churchill put it later, the Atlantic Charter was not a law but a star.

Having hung that star in the sky, however, the Allies found themselves both constrained and propelled in certain directions. Leaders of Britain's colonies, heartened by invocations of self-determination that made Churchill uneasy, found in the Atlantic Charter sources of inspiration as invigorating as those earlier insurgents outside the West had seen in Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points.⁴ Eager to avoid repeating Wilson's mistakes, FDR worked diligently to recruit Republican isolationists such as Arthur Vandenberg, thereby securing bipartisan support but assuring that postwar planning would include America-Firsters as well as those committed to a broader international vision.

The vision that Borgwardt designates as Roosevelt's New Deal for the world differs in important ways from the now-standard interpretation of the war as a struggle to secure prosperity for American consumers. Borgwardt emphasizes the gap between the privatized utopia of plenty portrayed in Norman Rockwell's rendition and Roosevelt's own more egalitarian conception of the Four Freedoms. She cites Sunstein's *Second Bill of Rights* and bolsters his case with further evidence of her own to demonstrate the expansive conception of citizenship and social provision bound up in the New Dealers' idea of economic rights. She shows convincingly that FDR stressed a reciprocal relation between the citizens (as well as soldiers) who were making sacrifices and the democratic government that would reward all of them with an expanded commitment to securing a second Bill of Rights, which involved membership in a body of citizens and entailed fulfilling duties instead of just buying more stuff (pp. 46–60). New Deal multilateralism proved sturdier than Wilson's because it was forged in the experience of poverty brought by the Depression, the experience of the New Deal's (limited) successes, and the transformative experience of a much more sustained immersion in the cruelties of war. Whereas the United States had escaped WWI relatively unscarred, WWII transformed American sensibilities by altering individuals' sense of their own lives, their awareness of cultural possibilities, and their darker sense of the realities of racism and genocide. The rosy glow of the prewar world beckoned Americans after Versailles; WWII shattered such nostalgia.

The Bretton Woods system and the United Nations both took shape in the space created by that disenchantment. Negotiators realized, Borgwardt contends, that replicating the economic chaos of the interwar years would be catastrophic. John Maynard Keynes was the dominant figure in the initial stages of British and American economic negotiations. His commitment to the vision that would manifest itself in the Beveridge Plan and FDR's second Bill of Rights is apparent in the early plans for the postwar world. An international monetary fund, stable currency exchanges, and a fund for borrowing were at first justified as ways to "shelter domestic programs aimed at full employment and expansive social programs" of the sort FDR laid out in 1944 and Atlee made a reality in 1945 (p. 122). Although they were later hijacked for different purposes, Borgwardt contends, it is a mistake to assume that the machinations of Cold Warriors were already in planners' minds in Bretton Woods.

So too the UN. The human rights provisions of the UN Charter, which would prove unenforceable in light of the provisions guaranteeing national sovereignty, nevertheless generated public support from 1941 to 1943, and from 1943 to 1945, even though critics left and right assailed the plans for opposite reasons. Conservatives feared "one worlders" would triumph. Radicals worried that the great powers would dominate and that, as W. E. B. Du Bois put it, the world's most difficult problems—such as forms of racial, ethnic, and economic inequality—lay "beyond the jurisdiction" of the UN anyway (p. 193). Even though the latter critics proved more prescient than the former, official adoption of the charter, with its lofty proclamation of universal human rights that at first joined economic to political freedom, placed the great powers on record and thereby made them vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy when their actions failed to measure up to their stated ideals. Such standards provided the disfranchised new leverage that they (and those who rallied to their cause) were quick to use.

The idea of trying Nazi leaders for war crimes and genocide incited controversy from the beginning, which Borgwardt examines with admirable, clear-headed detachment. The fact that we now take for granted the legitimacy of trying war criminals, and the fact that failing to take action in the face of genocide now generates righteous indication (if not results) testifies to the long-term consequences of Nuremberg and the *Zeitgeist* of 1945. As Borgwardt points out, U.S. planners might well have decided against judicial proceedings at the end of WWII. After all, several allied nations had not been signatories to the treaties the Nazis were accused of violating. The rubric "crimes against humanity" might be said to include the lynching of blacks in the American South. Holding subordinates guilty for following orders, Michigan Congressman George Dondero pointed out, "encourages mass disobedience to superior officers within our armed forces," a question with renewed urgency since the ill-fated American invasion of Iraq (p. 232). Overcoming such objections

required much persuasion and some chance. The massacre of seventy U.S. soldiers at Malmédy by a German regiment during the Battle of the Bulge inflamed American sensibilities; in the absence of atrocities involving American troops rather than European Jews, Borgwardt suggests, justice might never have been meted out at Nuremberg.

Yet the trial, contingent and controversial as it was, ended up serving at least two purposes. First, it exposed to the world the evidence of the Holocaust, itself an important cultural achievement with lasting consequences in Germany and throughout (almost) all the world. Second, it established a precedent for holding all regimes to common standards with respect to individual human rights. Although the precise meaning of that standard—and even its very plausibility—remains subject to intense debate, it has established that the existence of a gap between facts and norms raises questions that the international community has both the institutional and the moral resources to address. In the longer sweep of human history, that legacy of the high-water mark of multilateralism stands out as a significant achievement.

Borgwardt's concluding section, "America in the World," is an ambitious and challenging meditation on precisely the gap between the aspirations and results of the New Deal for the world. She shows how quickly the multilateral tide receded and how quickly Cold Warriors erected seawalls to keep it at bay. But she offers a "counter-narrative" in which not the *Zeitgeist* of 1945 but the Cold War is a historical aberration. In this reframing of recent history, the "rule-of-law revolutions" after 1989 show the persistent power of the New Deal ideal and the inadequacy of the realist account of international relations. Despite the efforts of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger to return the world to a Metternich-style balance of powers ungoverned by any laws beyond rulers' wills, the ideal of multilateralism that animated the UN has persisted as a counterweight and exerted a force of its own that stubbornly resists unilateral exercises of U.S. power. Despite George W. Bush's withdrawal from multilateral agreements on the environment, security, law, and disarmament—a tendency that has become more pronounced since the publication of Borgwardt's book—critiques of that effort to establish an American empire, both at home and abroad, have likewise become increasingly strident.⁵

Having identified the value of both Sunstein's and Borgwardt's books, I want to note briefly that neither book is flawless. *The Second Bill of Rights* is repetitive. Perhaps authors of law review articles do not expect readers to read an entire book: Sunstein states some version of his larger argument in almost every chapter. When he addresses the question of whether we should now have a Constitutional amendment to establish FDR's second Bill of Rights, and when he rehearses the multiple reasons why America has had neither a socialist party nor an elaborate welfare state, he writes less as a historian than as a constitutional lawyer or a social scientist. Those sections of *The Second*

Bill of Rights are less likely to engage or convince historians. Borgwardt's book lies more comfortably within the field of U.S. history, as the multiple prizes it has won illustrate. But the issues she addresses in each of her case studies are so complex, and the longer-term consequences of these first steps toward multilateralism are so intricate and important, that readers may find themselves wanting even more detailed analysis, even more evidence, and even more broadly ranging accounts of what happened next.

Any work that provokes such questions has already served its purpose, as both of these books do. Sunstein's and Borgwardt's studies are valuable as works of scholarship and perhaps even more important as reminders, at this moment in U.S. history that so many of us find so demoralizing, that it was once possible for a U.S. president to campaign on—and to be three times re-elected on—a program calling for Americans to pay taxes and make personal sacrifices for the sake of people less fortunate than they, and that it was possible to recommend an array of economic, military, and judicial programs and policies that were presented as being not only in the interest of wealthy Americans but, even more strikingly, in the interests of those in the United States and in other nations who were least able to provide for themselves.

Sunstein's story unfolds as a tragic betrayal, a narrative of a noble ideal born in America, brought to fulfillment elsewhere, and still treated as a stranger at home today. Borgwardt tells an ironic tale. Ideals first proclaimed in the United States were repudiated here only to be resurrected, repeatedly, in other nations. Those ideals have since been deployed against American policies, as others have invoked the ideas first advanced in the Atlantic Charter, in FDR's second Bill of Rights, in the founding documents of the United Nations, and in the Nuremberg war crimes trials, and as Americans and citizens of other nations have challenged the U.S. to live up to the standards it invited others to uphold.

Several decades ago it was easy—perhaps even irresistible—to dismiss Franklin Delano Roosevelt as an intellectual lightweight, as a Machiavellian improviser, as an apologist for capitalism who wanted to protect America's market economy and create the institutions that would make possible an open-door world for U.S. economic domination. The New Deal seemed only to have bolstered American capitalism, and the United Nations seemed only a front for the exercise of U.S. power. Times have changed. From the vantage point of 2006, FDR appears—relatively speaking, at least—as an egalitarian multilateralist, a visionary. As at least a few visitors to the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial ask themselves, when contemplating the Four Freedoms he proclaimed sixty years ago, shall we ever see his like again?

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1. I have discussed the relation between Dewey, the NRPB, FDR's second Bill of Rights, and the relation between American and European social policy in James T. Kloppenberg, *The Virtues of Liberalism* (1998), esp. pp. 100–23. For more extensive treatments of these issues, cf. Patrick D. Reagan, *Designing a New America: The Origins of New Deal Planning, 1890–1943* (1999), and, for a contrasting analysis, which traces the rise and fall of planning and contends that a consumption-oriented ethos emerged after WWII in place of an earlier reformist sensibility, see Kathleen G. Donahue, *Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Idea of the Consumer* (2003).

2. A version of Dewey's updated Aristotelian approach has recently been given new life through the efforts of Amartya Sen. See Sen, *Choice, Welfare, and Measurement* (1982), *On Ethics and Economics* (1987), *Inequality Reexamined* (1992), and *Development as Freedom* (2000).

3. For a timely and instructive meditation on the reasons why Great Britain took such steps under the Labour governments of David Lloyd-George and Clement Atlee in the first half of the twentieth century, and why recent Labour governments have been so different, an illuminating analysis in light of the standard accounts of the "fall of the New Deal order" in the United States, see W. G. Runciman, "What Happened to the Labour Party?" *The London Review of Books*, June 22, 2006, pp. 17–21.

4. On this fascinating and little understood dynamic, see Erez Manela, "Imagining Woodrow Wilson in Asia: Dreams of East-West Harmony and the Revolt against Empire in 1919," *American Historical Review* (Dec. 2006): XXX–XXX; and Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (forthcoming from Oxford University Press in 2007).

5. Has the US become an empire? The frequency with which that question is now being asked, by historians as well as by pundits, testifies to the importance of the historical framework provided by Borgwardt's book. Cf. the contrasting analyses and perspectives of Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* (2004); and Charles Maier, *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors* (2006).