

Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation in Counterinsurgency

Patrick B. Johnston
Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs
Harvard Kennedy School

11th Annual TISS New Faces Conference
October 1, 2010, Chapel Hill, NC

Preliminaries

Preview of the Presentation

- Research Question and Results
 - Key question: Is leadership decapitation an effective COIN tactic?
 - (Preliminary) Answer: Yes, but with caveats

Preliminaries

Defining Key Concepts

Key Concepts and Definitions

- Insurgency and COIN
- Leaders and decapitation

Preliminaries

Policy Significance

Policy Relevance

- U.S. UAV attacks in Pakistan
- Capture/kill missions in Afghanistan
- HVT operations in Somalia
- Military assistance to Yemen

Preliminaries

Academic Significance

Academic Significance

- Literature
- Data
- Identification

Is Leadership Decapitation Effective?

No

- Havens et al 1970; Ford 1985; Pape 1996; 2003; Hosmer 2001; David 2002; Hoffman 2006; Jordan 2009

Maybe/Sometimes

- Langdon et al 2004; Kurth Cronin 2006; Mannes 2008; Freeman n.d.

Yes

- Pryce 2009

Limitations of Existing Studies

Literature Gap

- No social science research on COIN/decapitation
 - Exclusive focus on interstate war and counterterrorism

Limitations of Existing Studies

Research Design

- Insufficient data/unsystematic analysis
- Silver bullets rather than average effects
- Selection bias
 - Negative cases
 - Endogeneity
- Counterfactuals

Identifying Causal Effects of Leadership Decapitation

Appropriate Counterfactual

- *“What would’ve happened if the leader hadn’t been removed?”*
- *“What would’ve happened if he had?”*

The Challenge: Non-random assignment of decapitation attempts (the “treatment”)

- Leaders targeted systematically
- Targeting at key moments
- No “field experiments” (unless you count the drones)!


Empirical Strategy

Exploit Randomness in Success and Failure of Decapitation Attempts

- If success is exogenous, *causal* effects can be estimated (conditional on attempts)
- Failed attempts as controls for successes—exogenous?
 - Guns jam/shooters misfire
 - Bombs don't detonate/detonate at wrong time
 - Sweeps fail to detect leaders in hiding

Rates of Successful and Failed Attempts

Figure: Attempted and Successful Decapitation Strikes, 1975-2005



Attempt Type

Decapitation Attempts: Summary Statistics

Type	Obs.	Percentage	Pr. Leader Removed
Shooting	34	29%	44%
Bombing	17	14%	29%
Raid/Sweep	25	21%	64%
Combat	41	34%	32%
Unknown	3	3%	0%
Total Attempts	119	n/a	40%

Are Successful and Failed Attempts Similar?

Pairwise t-tests

DV: Success of Attempt	Success	Failure	Difference	p-Value
Democracy	0.59 (0.05)	0.53 (0.04)	0.05 (0.07)	0.42
GDPPC	7.69 (0.13)	7.70 (0.15)	-0.01 (0.2)	0.95
Population	11.13 (0.32)	10.36 (0.27)	0.77 (0.42)	0.07
Elevation	5.87 (0.24)	6.09 (0.14)	-0.23 (0.27)	0.41
Distance	5.15 (0.38)	5.35 (0.34)	-0.19 (0.51)	0.71
Observations	45	58		

Are Successful and Failed Attempts Similar? Multivariate Regressions

DV: Success	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democracy	-0.101 (0.260)	0.002 (0.254)	-0.351 (0.294)	-0.186 (0.328)
GDPPC	-0.026 (0.086)	0.079 (0.089)	0.082 (0.107)	0.114 (0.114)
Population	0.132** (0.052)	0.068 (0.054)	0.008 (0.072)	0.043 (0.081)
Elevation	-0.014 (0.041)	-0.020 (0.043)	0.051 (0.061)	-0.034 (0.065)
Distance	-0.055 (0.037)	-0.022 (0.035)	-0.104** (0.046)	-0.029 (0.051)
Type FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Region FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	72	72	71	71

Data on COIN Campaigns

- New dataset on 91 COIN campaign campaigns since 1974
- Unit of analysis is the attempt ($N=119$) or the campaign-year ($N = 932$)
- Guerrilla campaigns drawn from Fearon and Laitin 2003; Lyall and Wilson 2009; UCDP/PRIO ACD; COW

Data on Leadership Decapitation

Independent Variable

- List of insurgent leaders
 - Compiled from START Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPS) database
 - Clodfelter 2002
- Data on decapitation attempts
 - Lexis-Nexis keyword searches of English language news sources
 - Standard key words used for each case

Data on Campaign Outcomes and Insurgent Violence

Dependent Variables

- War Outcomes
 - Lyall & Wilson 2009
 - UCDP/PRIO
 - COW
- Conflict Intensity and Insurgent Attacks
 - START Global Terrorism Database (GTD)

Data on Control Variables

Controls

- Military personnel (COW)
- Regime type/Level of democracy (Polity IV)
- GDP per capita (Fearon & Laitin 2003)
- Ethnic fractionalization (Fearon & Laitin 2003)
- Elevation (Lyall & Wilson 2009)
- Distance (Lyall & Wilson 2009)

Leadership Decapitation and Campaign Termination

DV: Termination	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Success	0.273*** (0.079)	0.290*** (0.081)	0.249*** (0.088)	0.260*** (0.091)
Constant	-0.140** (0.068)	-0.319** (0.126)	-0.259** (0.112)	-0.427** (0.179)
Type FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Region FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.154	0.202	0.211	0.265
Observations	103	103	103	103

Leadership Decapitation and COIN Success

DV: Victory	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Success	0.321*** (0.073)	0.338*** (0.075)	0.287*** (0.080)	0.310*** (0.084)
Constant	-0.173** (0.075)	-0.416*** (0.129)	-0.255** (0.110)	-0.505*** (0.171)
Type FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Region FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.210	0.318	0.261	0.384
Observations	103	103	103	103

Decapitation and Conflict Intensity

DV: Intensity	(1)	(3)	(5)	(7)
Success	-0.774 (0.494)	-1.994*** (0.426)	-0.898** (0.432)	-1.637*** (0.420)
Constant	-1.677* (0.890)	-1.640* (0.868)	-1.328 (0.899)	-1.308 (0.950)
Type FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Region FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	102	102	90	90

Decapitation and Insurgent Attacks

DV: Attacks	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Success	0.212 (0.480)	-0.728** (0.328)	-0.092 (0.325)	-1.685*** (0.444)
Constant	-0.925* (0.552)	-1.420* (0.860)	-0.514 (0.399)	-1.392* (0.811)
Type FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Region FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	102	102	90	90

Separating the Effects of Success and Failure

What Predicts Attempts?

DV: Attempt	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democracy	0.031 (0.041)					0.022 (0.046)
GDPPC		0.049*** (0.017)				0.039** (0.019)
Population			-0.002 (0.007)			-0.008 (0.010)
Elevation				-0.001 (0.007)		0.000 (0.006)
Distance					-0.001 (0.004)	0.000 (0.005)
Observations	833	790	747	926	926	741

Assessing the Impact of Success versus Failure

DV	Termination			Victory		
OLS	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Success	0.282*** (0.072)	0.284*** (0.073)	0.284*** (0.074)	0.296*** (0.069)	0.289*** (0.070)	0.288*** (0.070)
Failure	-0.010 (0.037)	-0.022 (0.037)	-0.030 (0.033)	-0.016 (0.027)	-0.022 (0.028)	-0.021 (0.028)
Constant	0.039 (0.032)	0.155 (0.112)	0.028 (0.250)	0.020 (0.027)	0.012 (0.070)	-0.220 (0.193)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Matching	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Parm p-Success	0.000175	0.000186	0.000210	4.80e-05	7.97e-05	8.71e-05
Parm p-Failure	0.788	0.560	0.356	0.555	0.424	0.450
Observations	932	932	932	932	932	932

Conclusions and Implications

The Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation

- 1 No evidence that leadership decapitation is ineffective or counterproductive
- 2 Decapitation is a cause, not an effect, of COIN effectiveness

Implications

COIN and CT Policy

- Network-centric war
 - Are hearts and minds really that important?
- Investing in IW capabilities: SOF or Conventional?

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Limitations of the Empirical Strategy

- Limited ability to answer questions of leadership removals that didn't happen
- Results consequently have limited implication for the effectiveness of decapitation *strategies*
- *Can* tell us whether leaders matter