#### Preliminary – Comments Welcome

# A Retrospective Look at the U.S. Productivity Growth Resurgence

Dale W. Jorgenson, Mun S. Ho, and Kevin J. Stiroh\*


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<sup>\*</sup>The views expressed here represent those of the author only and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.

#### **Outline**

- Evolving View of U.S. Productivity Growth
- Sources of Productivity Growth
- Productivity Projections

# Three Productivity Eras



4-quarter growth in nonfarm business labor productivity.

Dotted line represents averages for 1948:Q4-1973:Q4, 1973:Q4-1995:Q4 and 1995:Q4-2006:Q3. BLS (11/23/06).


# **Evolving View of U.S. Productivity Growth**

- Pessimism through the early-1990s
  - Computer Productivity Paradox (Solow, '87)
  - Age of Diminished Expectations (Krugman, '93)
- Neoclassical view in mid-1990s
  - Computers are still small (Oliner-Sichel, '94, Jorgenson-Stiroh, '95)
- Some optimists in mid-1990s
  - New economy adherents (Business Week)
  - Chairman Greenspan

"...rapid acceleration of computer and telecommunication technologies can reasonably be expected to appreciably raise our productivity and standards of living in the twenty first century certainly, and quite possibly in some of the remaining years of this century."

> Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan National Governors' Association February 1996


# Weak Productivity Growth through 1997



Note: Annual productivity growth for U.S. nonfarm business sector from BLS (2/11/1997) and BLS (2/2006).

# Evolving View of U.S. Productivity Growth

Release of new data and revision of old data proved the optimists correct




# **Evolving View of U.S. Productivity Growth**

Release of new data and revision of old data proved the optimists correct

#### Two effects

- Stimulated research on the role of IT
  - Macro, industry, firm, and case-study evidence that IT was important
- Growth and productivity outlook improved dramatically
  - Implications for fiscal and monetary policy

### **Growth Outlook Improved**



Note: CBO data are 10-year projections from January <u>Budget and Economic Outlook</u> of each year. BLS data are average growths for trailing 10 years for nonfarm business sector.


# Sources of Productivity Growth

Standard decomposition

$$\Delta \ln y = \overline{v}_{K_n} \Delta \ln k_n + \overline{v}_{K_{IT}} \Delta \ln k_{IT} + \overline{v}_{L} \Delta \ln L_Q + \overline{w}_{L} \Delta \ln A_n + \overline{w}_{IT} \Delta \ln A_{IT}$$


### Sources of U.S. Output and Productivity Growth

	1973-1995	1995-2000	2000-2005
Average Labor Productivity	1.49	2.70	3.09
IT Cap Deepening	0.40	1.01	0.63
Non-IT Cap Deepening	0.45	0.49	0.94
Labor Quality	0.25	0.19	0.36
IT TFP	0.25	0.58	0.40
Non-IT TFP	0.14	0.42	0.77
Share Attributed to IT	0.43	0.59	0.33



# **Productivity Outlook**

- Project productivity growth for next decade
  - Steady-state growth calibrations
    - Output and reproducible capital grow at same rate
    - Hours and labor supply grow at same rate
- Uncertainty about technological progress
  - Pessimistic, base-case, optimistic
  - Based on
    - Historical record
    - International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors



Average annual growth rate for U.S. private sector. Numbers do not sum due to rounding.

#### **Alternative Growth Projections**

	Date	Horizon	Productivity	+ Hours	= Output		
		Nonfarm Busin	ess				
Gordon	Sep '06	25-year	2.1				
Global Insight	Sep '06	30-year	2.3	0.8	3.1		
CBO	Aug '06	10-year	2.4	0.8	3.2		
Jorgenson, Ho, Stiroh	Oct '06	10-year	2.5	0.8	3.3		
Macroadvisors	Nov '06	3-year	2.5	0.9	3.4		
GDP							
Aaronson et al.	Sep '06	10-year		0.4			
Gordon	Oct '06	25-year	1.8	0.7	2.5		
SSA	Mar '06	10-year	1.9	0.7	2.6		
СВО	Aug '06	10-year	2.1	0.7	2.8		
Global Insight	Sep '06	30-year	2.1	0.7	2.8		
Macroadvisors	Nov '06	3-year			3.1		

#### **Conclusions**

- Productivity outlook evolved rapidly
  - Release of new data and revisions of old
- IT remains important, but less in 2000s than in 1990s
- Outlook remains solid, but edging down
  - Part of post-2000 gains appear transitory
  - JHS from 2.6% to 2.5%
    - Impact of BLS employment revisions about 2.4%
  - Little evidence that "productivity slowdown" will return

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
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# Reference Charts

Figure 2: Evolution of U.S. Productivity Data

Nonfarm Business Productivity



Note: Data are the annual growth rates of nonfarm business productivity for the trailing 10 years from February of each year, as reported in various BLS productivity releases.

Table 1: Sources of U.S. Output and Productivity Growth 1959-2005

Notes: Data are for the U.S. private economy. All figures are average annual growth rates. A contribution of an input reflects the share-weighted growth rate. Capital is broadly defined to include business capital and consumer durables. Information technology includes computer hardware, software, and communications equipment. Share Attributed to Information Technology is the average contribution of information technology total factor productivity divided by average labor productivity for each period.

Table 2: Changes in the Sources of Productivity Growth

Notes: All figures are average annual growth rates taken from Table 1. Share Attributed to Information Technology is the average contribution of information technology capital deepening plus the average contribution of information technology total factor productivity divided by average labor productivity for each comparison period.

Table 3: Output and Labor Productivity Projections

Notes: In all projections, hours growth and labor quality growth are from internal projections for 2005-2015, capital share and reproducible capital stock shares are 1959-2005 averages, and the IT output shares is the 1995-2005 average. The pessimistic case uses 1973-1995 average growth of IT-related TFP growth, non-IT TFP contribution, and capital quality growth. The base-case uses 1990-2005 averages, and the optimistic case uses 1995-2005 averages.

**Table 4: Alternative Growth Projections** 

Notes: All estimates are average annual growth rates. Jorgenson et al. estimates are for business sector including consumer durables. SSA estimate is imputed hours growth.