

# The local vote effects of presidential candidate visits

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July, 2020

## Abstract

Given how candidates' scarce time is often devoted to visits aiming to stimulate local support, the limited causal evidence on these effects is surprising. Comparing outcomes between visited and non-visited places is likely to yield biased estimates. This paper studies the local electoral effects of Henrique Capriles' visits in 2012 as Presidential Candidate in Venezuela. Leveraging the panel structure of electoral data and unique detailed data on the determinants of other local campaign efforts, I estimate that Capriles' visits eroded Chavismo's vote shares by 0.6 percentage points. Turnout levels seem unaffected, suggesting a persuasive effect of visits. Effects concentrate in low priority States and States with a Chavista governor, suggesting that visits matter most in regions receiving less campaign resources and stronger rival presence. Effects are also driven by Capriles' later campaign visits, highlighting the relevance of the timing of candidate appearance. These results suggest that visits affected electoral outcomes by enhancing local information about HCR.

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\*I thank Horacio Larreguy for his persistent attention and thoughtful comments. I also thank Bárbara Lira, who provided key insights on Henrique Capriles' presidential campaign strategy in 2012. Luis Da Silva and the team at BigVene provided excellent research assistance. All errors are my own.

# 1 Introduction

A candidate's time is arguably the scarcest resource in any presidential campaign. Candidates often spend it visiting places under the assumption that such visits will yield further local support on election day. Identifying the causal effect of visits on local electoral outcomes is challenging, as the decision to visit is likely endogenous to a myriad of factors connected to the candidate's performance. Importantly, campaigns intervene in high-priority locations through means other than -but correlated with- the candidate's visit. Hence, adequately measuring the local effect of visits should consider their non-random assignment, and hold constant other local campaign interventions.

I explore this question in the context of the Venezuelan presidential elections of 2012 and 2013. In October 7 of 2012, Henrique Capriles-Radonski (HCR) faced Hugo Chávez, who was running for re-election while undergoing cancer treatment. President Chávez died in March 2013, and a new election was called for mid-April, when HCR faced Nicolás Maduro. Being massively out-funded by Chavismo, HCR's campaign decided to prioritize its assignment of resources and attention towards locations that had shown to have high numbers of swing voters. The campaign ranked all parishes (*"parroquias"*) in the country according to the estimated share of total swing voters they represented, and defined the top 284 parishes to be of high-priority. HCR's campaign prioritized these Focal Parishes (*"Parroquias Focales"*) in assigning resources and attention.

I assess the effect of HCR's campaign visits in 2012 on local electoral outcomes during the 2012 and 2013 elections. Identifying this effect requires controlling for the non-random assignment of visits, as well as for the correlation between visits and other local campaign efforts. I leverage from the panel structure of Venezuelan elections data to calculate difference-in-differences estimates that address the former concern. Furthermore, I use information on HCR's local campaign efforts - unique data on the priority level assigned to all parishes in Venezuela - to control for local campaign efforts other than HCR's visits.

I find that HCR's visits eroded Chavista vote shares by 0.6 percentage points in the 2012 and 2013 elections. This result is not found for placebo visits that have a much broader national coverage and are dictated by factors other than local electoral purposes.

These effects seem to be driven by persuasion and not by mobilization, as visits seem to have negligible effects on turnout levels. I validate the identification strategy by confirming parallel pre-2012 trends between visited and non-visited parishes. I also find that the effects seem to concentrate on the 2013 election, which suggests that visits were not effective in tilting preferences against the highly charismatic Hugo Chávez, but succeeded in undermining support for the much less popular Nicolás Maduro. I assess the heterogeneity of these effects along political characteristics of States, finding that HCR visits eroded Chavista support in lower-priority States and States with a Chavista Governor, suggesting that visits matter most for local outcomes in regions receiving less campaign resources and with a stronger rival presence. I also assess the relevance of the timing of HCR visits, and find that results are driven by his later visits.

Taken together, these results are more consistent with theories connecting candidate visits to local electoral outcomes through a local information channel than through a local organization channel, as enhanced local information should work by persuading regular voters when deciding between candidates they are relatively indifferent about, and when information about the candidate is relatively scarce. A number of studies in the developing world observe how enhanced local access to information about candidates can affect voting patterns. For example, Platas and Raffler (2019) find that random local screenings of candidate interviews close the knowledge gap between incumbents and challengers, yielding an electoral gain for the opposition<sup>1</sup>.

The observational and quasi-experimental literature on the local electoral effects of candidate campaign visits is inconclusive, with studies finding positive, null and even mixed effects<sup>2</sup>. The most notable effort to control for the non-random assignment of visits comes from Heersink & Peterson (2017), who study the effects of Truman's "Whistle-Stop" visits in the 1948 election. The authors fit synthetic counterfactuals for each visited county among the pool of non-visited counties, finding a +3pp effect on Truman's vote share. This study, however, does not control for other Truman campaign interventions

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<sup>1</sup>Other relevant recent studies are Bowles and Larreguy (2017) and Casey, Glennester and Bidwell (2019).

<sup>2</sup>See Devine (2018), Herr (2002), Hill et al (2010), Holbrock (2002), Holbrock and McClurg (2005), Jones (1998), Shaw (1999), and Wood (2016).

that may have correlated with the “Whistle-Stop” strategy. The only experimental analysis on the effect of visits comes from Shaw & Gimpel (2012), who randomize the visits of Governor Rick Perry in his 2006 re-election campaign, finding positive public opinion effects that lasted for at least a week. Their study, however, does not assess the effect of random visits on actual electoral results.

This paper contributes to the literature by expanding its scope and providing a methodological innovation. To my knowledge, there is no study on the effect of presidential candidate visits on local electoral outcomes in a developing or in an anocratic country. Furthermore, controlling for HCR’s local priority levels allows me to address concerns on the correlation of visits to other campaign efforts. Given the absence of such controls in the literature, this study invites the use of information on campaigns’ geographic strategies in assessing the effects of a particular kind of local intervention.

## **2 HCR’s Presidential Campaigns in 2012 and 2013**

Henrique Capriles-Radonski (HCR) won the opposition primaries in February 12, 2012, rallying the opposition against President Hugo Chávez. Chávez, a charismatic politician that had already won 3 presidential elections, ran for re-election despite battling cancer. High oil prices and access to foreign capital markets allowed the government to pursue a voracious public spending strategy during the campaign.

Knowing of Chavez’s popularity and the heavy resource imbalance between the campaigns, HCR decided not to pursue an aggressive political change strategy, but aimed at persuading swing voters by emphasizing on how he would further similar policy goals as Chávez with a more efficient and transparent administration. Message-wise, this meant not antagonizing Chavez’s personal figure, or being critical about him running despite his illness.

Geographically, this meant identifying swing voters. The campaign analyzed the variability in electoral outcomes at the parish level in previous elections, and determined a number of likely swing voters per parish. Given the campaign’s estimates of the number of

swing voters needed to win the election, HCR's campaign determined the top 284 parishes to be Focal Parishes ("*Parroquias Focales*"). These parishes became the central focus of the campaign, and received the bulk of the resources and attention. The campaign also assigned states that accounted for the bulk of these swing voters to be of high-priority, and leveraged opposition Governors for local interventions.

Knowing that mobility was his relative strength given Chávez's health limitations, HCR toured the country aggressively during his campaign. Between early March and late September of 2012, HCR made a total of 366 visits to different parishes throughout the country. 288 of these visits were "local", and implied close contact with the local population - town-hall like activities, such as knocking on doors, playing sports matches with kids, walking through neighborhoods, eating soup with neighbors, etc. 78 of the visits were "programmatic/religious", which accounted for platform speeches and appearances in large religious events which pursued a broader electoral reach beyond the location.

The 2012 election was won by Hugo Chávez by a 10pp margin. However, just two months after the elections, Chávez declared that he was to receive additional cancer treatment, and espoused Vice-President Nicolás Maduro as the Candidate of Chavismo for a future election if he could not return to office.

Chávez died on March 5 of 2013, and new elections were rushed for April 14 that year. HCR rallied the opposition again, competing against Maduro while the country continued to mourn Chavez's passing. The campaign's political message against Maduro was now much more aggressive than it had been against Chávez, but given time limitations, HCR's time was geared towards appearances with broad reach. Nicolás Maduro won the 2013 elections by 1.5pp.

### 3 Data

This paper builds on the following data sources:

- Parish priority level: Unique information from the HCR campaign on the share of estimated swing voters for each parish, and whether the parish was marked as one

of the 284 Focal parishes.

- Parish visits: Indicators for whether HCR visited a given parish during the 2012 campaign. The data differentiates by type (local vs. programmatic/religious) and timing (before July vs. July and later) of visits.
- Panel of electoral outcomes: Information on the vote share for Chavismo and on the turnout rate for each parish in all presidential and parliamentary elections between 1998 and 2018<sup>3</sup>. The source of this data is the National Electoral Council.
- Socio-economic covariates: There is parish-specific information on population, population density, poverty rate, average age and urban population. The source of this information is the 2011 Population Census by the National Statistics Institute.

Table [A1](#) in the appendix provides summary statistics for all these variables.

## 4 Empirical Strategy

I study the effects on both the local Chavista vote share and the local voter turnout. Visits could affect local voter outcomes by persuading swing or rival voters to vote for HCR, or by stimulating (eroding) the electoral turnout of supporters (rivals). Observing an effect on voting outcomes that is not accompanied by an effect on turnout would be evidence of visits playing a persuasive role on voters' decisions.

There are two main threats to identification of the causal effects of candidate visits. First, visits are not assigned randomly, so differences in electoral outcomes may be driven by baseline differences in confounders affecting visit decisions. Beyond controlling for observable covariates, I address this concern leveraging on the panel structure of the electoral data. Using a Difference-in-Differences approach, I capture the change in relative outcomes in HCR elections as the measure of the causal effect of visits. This method relies on an identifying assumption of parallel trends. I assess its plausibility providing event-study results with constant outcome differences between visited and non-visited

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<sup>3</sup>Presidential elections of 1998, 2000, 2006, 2012, 2013 and 2018. Legislative elections of 2010 and 2015. Missing information on the 2005 Legislative elections, which were boycotted by the opposition.

parishes across pre-2012 elections, also estimating independent effects for the 2012 and 2013 elections.

Second, other HCR campaign interventions may correlate spatially with visits. Even if the above approach addresses the non-randomness of visits along the baseline characteristics of parishes, it does not capture the fact that other relevant parallel interventions may confound the estimates. I address this concern by controlling for the available measures of local priority assigned to different parishes. Specifically, I control for the parish share of total swing voters identified by the HCR campaign, and for whether the campaign classified the parish as focal. While these characteristics predict visits, there is substantive residual variation. Controlling for these variables would allow for the identification of the causal effects of visits under the assumption that any correlation between visits and other (unobserved) campaign interventions is driven by the local priority assigned by the campaign. While this assumption cannot be tested for explicitly, observing independent effects associated to these priority variables would suggest that they are capturing the effect of other relevant factors.

Under the assumptions above, I claim that the joint use of a difference-in-differences approach that controls for observable baseline covariates and for local priority variables allows for the identification of the causal effects of visits. To further assess whether the effects are driven by activities aimed at stimulating local support, I compare estimates for places receiving "local visits" in contrast to places receiving "programmatic/religious" visits, expecting effects to concentrate or be larger for the former.

Difference-in-differences results come from estimating the following model:

$$R_{e,p} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 HCR_e * Visited_p + \beta_2 * HCR_e * Focal_p + \beta_3 HCR_e * Swing_p + \gamma HCR_e * C_p + \phi_e + \phi_p + \epsilon_{e,p} \quad (1)$$

Where  $R_{e,p}$  stands for the result (either Chavista share or turnout) in election  $e$  for parish  $p$ .  $HCR_e$  stands for an indicator of the HCR elections of 2012 and 2013.  $Visited_p$  marks whether parish  $p$  was visited by HCR in 2012.  $Focal_p$  marks whether parish  $p$  was prioritized as focal by the HCR campaign.  $Swing_p$  marks the share of total swing voters identified for

each parish  $p$ .  $C_p$  marks a fixed vector of covariates for parish  $p$ . These include the Chavista share in the 2010 election, population, population density, poverty rate, average age, urban population and State indicator variables.  $\phi_e$  and  $\phi_p$  mark parish and election fixed effects and  $\epsilon_{e,p}$  marks an error term.  $\beta_1$  is the coefficient of interest. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level. To further assess whether the observed estimates are driven by the local impact of visits aiming to stimulate local electoral support, I provide separate results for “local” visits and “programmatically/religious” visits.

I validate the parallel trends assumption and evaluate heterogeneity between the 2012 and 2013 by estimating the following event-study specification:

$$R_{e,p} = \beta_0 + \sum_{e=1998}^{2018} [\beta_1^e E^e * Visited_p + \beta_2^e * E^e * Focal_p + \beta_3^e E^e * Swing_p + \gamma^e E^e * C_p] + \phi_e + \phi_p + \epsilon_{e,p} \quad (2)$$

Where  $E^e$  is an indicator for election  $e$ . The coefficients of interest are  $\beta_1^e$ , which are expected to be negative for the HCR elections and about 0 for earlier and later elections. The base election for interaction terms is the 2010 Legislative election, which is the last national contest before the HCR campaigns. Standard errors are clustered at the parish level.

## 5 Results

### 5.1 Determinants of Visits

To assess the relevance of the two identification concerns described above, I first evaluate whether observable baseline covariates and local priority levels determine the probability of different locations receiving a visit. Table 1 shows beta coefficients of a linear probability model predicting visits as a function of baseline covariates, local priority variables and State fixed effects.

I find that focal parishes are 17pp more likely to be visited, while the share of swing voters seems not to play an independent role (regression 1). Visits are also more likely in less Chavista, larger, richer, younger and relatively rural parishes. While the link between focal parishes and “local” visits (regression 2) does not appear statistically different than the link to



VARIABLES	(1) Visited	(2) Local Visited	(3) Prog/Rel Visited
Focal Parish	0.166*** (3.386)	0.114** (2.242)	0.127* (1.925)
Share of Swing Votes	-0.109 (-1.117)	-0.151 (-1.440)	0.125 (0.848)
Baseline Chavismo (2010)	-0.116*** (-3.053)	-0.132*** (-3.472)	0.0125 (0.311)
Population	2.414*** (5.784)	1.836*** (3.924)	2.269*** (3.453)
Population Density	0.0239 (0.523)	0.0384 (0.808)	-0.0455 (-1.343)
Poverty Rate	-0.0708** (-2.064)	-0.0402 (-1.206)	-0.0339 (-0.959)
Average Age	-0.0947** (-2.230)	-0.0675 (-1.523)	-0.0422 (-1.174)
Urban Population	-2.104*** (-5.005)	-1.461*** (-3.119)	-2.253*** (-3.407)
Observations	1,131	1,131	1,131
R-squared	0.247	0.215	0.099
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust t-statistics in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 1: Determinants of Visits

“programmatic/religious” visits (regression 3), the latter link is much more imprecise.

## 5.2 Difference-in-Differences

Table 2 provides estimates for equation 1. Visiting a given parish had an average effect of -0.6pp on the Chavista vote share for the HCR elections of 2012 and 2013 (regression 1). This result is specific to “local” visits (regressions 2-4). Visits seem not to affect turnout levels, suggesting that results on voting outcomes are driven by persuasion and not by differential mobilization<sup>45</sup>.

<sup>4</sup>There seems to be a positive association of “programmatic/religious” visits on local turnout rates during the HCR campaigns. Given how these visits are often triggered by religious celebrations with potential political effects and enhanced presence by both campaigns, I do not interpret these effects on turnout as causal.

<sup>5</sup>I also find that focal parishes associate with an independent drop on Chavista vote shares of -1.7pp and a positive effect on turnout rates of 1.5pp. While only correlational, this result suggests that the aggregate of other campaign interventions may have an independent effect on local outcomes, and that it may partially operate by mobilizing new voters for the opposition

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Chavismo				Turnout			
HCR Election * Visited	-0.00579** (0.00281)				-0.00101 (0.00522)			
HCR Election * Local Visited		-0.00612** (0.00292)		-0.00611** (0.00293)		-0.00383 (0.00577)		-0.00351 (0.00579)
HCR Election * Prog/Rel Visited			0.000838 (0.00381)	0.000166 (0.00382)			0.00744** (0.00310)	0.00705** (0.00316)
HCR Election * Focal Parish	-0.0163*** (0.00364)	-0.0166*** (0.00363)	-0.0173*** (0.00360)	-0.0166*** (0.00363)	0.0149*** (0.00375)	0.0151*** (0.00371)	0.0142*** (0.00364)	0.0146*** (0.00371)
HCR Election * % Swing Voters	1.946 (2.018)	1.883 (2.032)	2.097 (2.073)	1.880 (2.040)	-7.831*** (2.386)	-7.946*** (2.426)	-7.940*** (2.326)	-8.065*** (2.425)
Observations	9,030	9,030	9,030	9,030	9,028	9,028	9,028	9,028
R-squared	0.704	0.704	0.704	0.704	0.418	0.418	0.418	0.418
Covariates	All	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parish FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Standard Errors clustered at the Parish level in parentheses.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 2: Difference-in-Differences

### 5.3 Event Study

Figures 1 and 2 show estimates from equation 2, capturing the effects on electoral results for parishes that received a visit, parishes that received a “local” visit and parishes that received a “programmatic/religious” visit.




Figure 1: Event Study - Effects of visits on Chavista vote share




Figure 2: Event Study - Effects of visits on turnout rate

Figure 1 confirms the plausibility of the parallel-trends assumption. Differences in Chavista vote shares between visited and non-visited parishes held constant across elections before the HCR campaigns. The coefficient for the 2012 election becomes negative but is small and

statistically insignificant, while the coefficient for the 2013 election is about -0.9pp. The coefficient converges back towards 0 for the 2015 and 2018 elections. Again, these effects are specific to local visits. Figure 2 confirms that there were no effects of visits on turnout rates<sup>67</sup>. The event study confirms the results and interpretations of the difference-in-differences specification, while highlighting that the bulk of the causal effect of visits occurred for the 2013 election. I interpret this result as suggesting that visits are not effective in tilting preferences against the highly charismatic candidate like Hugo Chávez, but can succeed in undermining support for less popular candidates like Nicolás Maduro<sup>8</sup>.

## 5.4 Heterogeneity along States' political characteristics

I now study how political characteristics of States alter the estimated effect of a campaign visit on local electoral outcomes. Table 3 shows difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of "local" visits on the Chavista vote share and turnout rates for high-priority States (regressions 1 and 5), low-priority States (regressions 2 and 6), States with an opposition governor (regressions 3 and 7) and States with a Chavista governor (regressions 4 and 8). The negative effect of "local" visits on Chavista vote shares appear stronger (0.8pp - 0.9pp) and are only statistically significant for low-priority States and for States with a Chavista governor. There seems to be no effect of "local" visits on turnout rates for any segment of the data.

VARIABLES	Chavismo				Turnout			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
HCR * Local Visited	-0.00540 (0.00405)	-0.00867** (0.00416)	-0.00160 (0.00492)	-0.00787** (0.00364)	0.00306 (0.00388)	-0.0137 (0.0116)	-0.00138 (0.00384)	-0.00519 (0.00880)
Observations	4,205	4,825	2,806	6,064	4,205	4,823	2,807	6,062
R-squared	0.734	0.702	0.750	0.696	0.474	0.389	0.620	0.366
Covariates	All	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parish FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Segment	High-Priority States	Low-Priority States	Opposition Governors	Chavista Governors	High-Priority States	Low-Priority States	Opposition Governors	Chavista Governors

Note: Clustered standard errors at the Parish level in parentheses.  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 3: Heterogeneity of over political characteristics of States

Table A3 and figures A1 and A2 in the appendix show event study estimates on the effect of "local" visits on the Chavista local vote share along the same political segments. Conclusions are consistent with the difference-in-difference results, the validity of the parallel-trends assumption

<sup>6</sup>With regards to the link between "programmatic/religious" visits on turnout rates, we observe that pre-visit coefficients are similar to the effects observed for the HCR elections, confirming that the difference-in-differences effects should not be interpreted as causal.

<sup>7</sup>Confidence intervals for the 2018 election become much wider in figure 2 because of the higher dispersion in turnout that year (see table A1). This is a consequence of the opposition's boycott of that election.

<sup>8</sup>See table A2 in the appendix for regression results of the event study specification.

is relatively tenuous for low-priority states. Effects of visits are also stronger for 2013 than for 2012. Taken together, these results suggest that the effect of candidate visits may be strongest in regions with higher rival presence and lower access to other campaign resources and interventions<sup>9</sup>.

## 5.5 Timing of visits

I now explore whether effects in parishes that received “local” visits by HCR early in the 2012 campaign (March to mid-June) are different from that of parishes visited later in the campaign (mid-June to September). Table 4 shows difference-in-differences estimates for parishes visited in both periods. Figure A3 in the appendix shows event-study estimates over the timing of visits. Results suggest that the effect of visits on electoral outcomes are driven by the erosion of Chavista support in places visited later in the campaign<sup>10</sup>.

VARIABLES	(1) Chavismo	(2)	(3) Turnout	(4)
HCR * Early Local Visited	-0.00221 (0.00462)		-0.0166 (0.0195)	
HCR * Late Local Visited		-0.00604** (0.00305)		0.000851 (0.00265)
Observations	9,030	9,030	9,028	9,028
R-squared	0.704	0.704	0.418	0.418
Covariates	All	All	All	All
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parish FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Clustered standard errors at the Parish level in parentheses.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

Table 4: Difference-in-differences estimates over the timing of visits

<sup>9</sup>Table A3 also shows results on turnout rates. There seem to be no effects for high-priority States and States with opposition governors, and pre-visit trends do not seem parallel for low-priority States and States with Chavista governors as coefficients for the 2006 presidential election are negative and statistically significant.

<sup>10</sup>See table A4 in the appendix for regression results of this event study specification. The table shows results on turnout rates, on which there are no observed effects of early or late visits.

## 6 Conclusion

This paper documents an effect of -0.6pp of being visited by HCR on Chavista support. Results are specific to “local” visits, as opposed to “programmatic/religious” visits that do not aim at stimulating local support. Absent effects on turnout rates suggest that visits make a difference through the persuasion of swing voters, and not by the relative mobilization of loyal voters. Effects are largest and statistically significant for the 2013 elections, hinting that visits may not be effective against very charismatic rivals. Results are contingent to low-priority States and States with Chavista governors, suggesting that visits may yield highest returns in regions with scarce access to campaign resources and with strong rival presence. Finally, these results are determined by locations visited by HCR late in the campaign. Taken all together, these results are consistent with theories connecting candidate visits to local electoral outcomes through enhanced local information about the candidate.

This paper expands the literature on the effects of candidate visits to developing and anocratic contexts. Moreover, it offers a methodological innovation in combining panel data strategies for causal inference with unique information about HCR’s campaign strategy. Data on the priority that the campaign assigned to different parishes in the country allows for the control in the distribution of unobserved campaign interventions which may correlate heavily with visit decisions. This strategy addresses the main identification concern in this literature under the assumption that visits and other interventions are independent conditional on priority levels. While this assumption is not testable, this study highlights the need to leverage from deeper knowledge about the reasoning behind specific campaign strategies in order to adequately assess the effects of their different interventions.

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# Appendix

Figure A1: Heterogeneity of event study estimates by State priority




Figure A2: Heterogeneity of event study estimates by affiliation of Governor




Figure A3: Heterogeneity of event study estimates by timing of visit






Table A1: Summary Statistics

VARIABLES	(1) N	(2) Mean	(3) S.D.	(4) Min	(5) Max
Visited	1,132	0.261	0.440	0	1
Local Visited	1,132	0.216	0.412	0	1
Prog/Rel Visited	1,132	0.0645	0.246	0	1
Late Visited	1,132	0.219	0.414	0	1
Late/Local Visited	1,132	0.175	0.380	0	1
Early Visited	1,132	0.0645	0.246	0	1
Early/Local Visited	1,132	0.0539	0.226	0	1
Focal Parish	1,132	0.250	0.433	0	1
Share of Swing Voters	1,132	0.000882	0.00166	-9.44e-06	0.0188
Average Age	1,132	28.91	2.831	20.88	41.88
Urban Population	1,132	21,330	38,704	0	372,470
Poverty Rate	1,132	0.322	0.164	0.0251	0.965
Population	1,132	24,062	38,343	61	372,616
Population Density	1,132	0.000859	0.00317	5.86e-08	0.0435
High-Priority State	1,132	0.466	0.499	0	1
Opposition Governor	1,112	0.317	0.465	0	1
Chavismo 1998	1,116	0.522	0.119	0.132	0.818
Turnout 1998	1,120	0.593	0.0876	0	0.794
Chavismo 2000	1,132	0.618	0.121	0.115	0.937
Turnout 2000	1,132	0.574	0.0893	0.0979	1.286
Chavismo 2006	1,131	0.684	0.134	0.110	0.998
Turnout 2006	1,132	0.715	0.0651	0	0.943
Chavismo 2010	1,131	0.578	0.144	0.0650	0.993
Turnout 2010	1,131	0.635	0.0758	0.245	0.927
Chavismo 2012	1,132	0.620	0.131	0.0760	0.950
Turnout 2012	1,132	0.784	0.0573	0.399	0.895
Chavismo 2013	1,132	0.583	0.137	0.0752	0.952
Turnout 2013	1,132	0.769	0.0622	0.364	0.888
Chavismo 2015	1,131	0.492	0.139	0.0520	0.994
Turnout 2015	1,131	0.705	0.0774	0.336	0.841
Chavismo 2018	1,132	0.669	0.108	0.206	1
Turnout 2018	1,124	0.568	0.332	0.0623	6.102

Table A2: Event Study - Regression results

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Chavismo				Turnout			
1998 * Visited	0.00458 (0.00643)				0.00509 (0.00506)			
2000 * Visited	0.000552 (0.00599)				0.00869 (0.00535)			
2006 * Visited	0.00206 (0.00412)				-0.00259 (0.00286)			
2012 * Visited	-0.00230 (0.00309)				0.00287 (0.00233)			
2013 * Visited	-0.00872*** (0.00319)				0.00266 (0.00219)			
2015 * Visited	-0.00585 (0.00364)				0.00547** (0.00270)			
2018 * Visited	0.00145 (0.00530)				0.00529 (0.0293)			
1998 * Local Visited		0.00173 (0.00671)		0.00203 (0.00673)		0.00113 (0.00548)		0.00149 (0.00555)
2000 * Local Visited		0.00116 (0.00626)		0.00118 (0.00629)		0.00744 (0.00598)		0.00780 (0.00595)
2006 * Local Visited		0.00257 (0.00418)		0.00262 (0.00419)		-0.00546* (0.00290)		-0.00522* (0.00292)
2012 * Local Visited		-0.00194 (0.00325)		-0.00188 (0.00325)		-0.00121 (0.00237)		-0.000693 (0.00238)
2013 * Local Visited		-0.00868*** (0.00332)		-0.00869*** (0.00332)		-0.00126 (0.00226)		-0.000773 (0.00226)
2015 * Local Visited		-0.00402 (0.00374)		-0.00405 (0.00375)		0.00266 (0.00277)		0.00306 (0.00278)
2018 * Local Visited		0.00414 (0.00542)		0.00397 (0.00543)		0.00923 (0.0325)		0.00896 (0.0326)
1998 * Prog/Rel Visited			0.00607 (0.00844)	0.00630 (0.00849)			0.00762 (0.00580)	0.00778 (0.00595)
2000 * Prog/Rel Visited			0.000367 (0.00853)	0.000496 (0.00856)			0.00707 (0.00593)	0.00792 (0.00588)
2006 * Prog/Rel Visited			0.000969 (0.00644)	0.00126 (0.00645)			0.00594 (0.00397)	0.00536 (0.00398)
2012 * Prog/Rel Visited			0.00153 (0.00454)	0.00133 (0.00454)			0.0116*** (0.00315)	0.0115*** (0.00318)
2013 * Prog/Rel Visited			0.000810 (0.00481)	-0.000145 (0.00483)			0.0110*** (0.00330)	0.0109*** (0.00332)
2015 * Prog/Rel Visited			-0.000274 (0.00538)	-0.000719 (0.00541)			0.00853** (0.00409)	0.00887** (0.00412)
2018 * Prog/Rel Visited			-0.00420 (0.00717)	-0.00376 (0.00717)			-0.00683 (0.0135)	-0.00584 (0.0136)
Observations	9,030	9,030	9,030	9,030	9,028	9,028	9,028	9,028
R-squared	0.869	0.869	0.869	0.869	0.540	0.540	0.540	0.540
Priority Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Covariates	All	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parish FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table A3: Event Study - Heterogeneity over State political characteristics

VARIABLES	Chavismo				Turnout			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1998 * Local Visited	0.00581 (0.00950)	-0.00564 (0.00944)	0.00580 (0.0114)	-0.00265 (0.00792)	0.000879 (0.00896)	-0.00174 (0.00623)	-0.00653 (0.0106)	0.00607 (0.00610)
2000 * Local Visited	0.00833 (0.00902)	-0.0120 (0.00835)	0.00561 (0.0115)	-0.00313 (0.00697)	0.00576 (0.00743)	0.00689 (0.00981)	0.0148* (0.00855)	0.00506 (0.00772)
2006 * Local Visited	0.00467 (0.00564)	-0.00513 (0.00609)	-0.00131 (0.00792)	0.00372 (0.00458)	-0.000229 (0.00413)	-0.0139*** (0.00412)	-0.000335 (0.00538)	-0.00837** (0.00325)
2012 * Local Visited	0.00403 (0.00446)	-0.0118** (0.00483)	0.00468 (0.00510)	-0.00574 (0.00387)	0.00351 (0.00280)	-0.0101** (0.00415)	-0.00275 (0.00349)	0.000991 (0.00284)
2013 * Local Visited	-0.00436 (0.00472)	-0.0166*** (0.00488)	-0.00193 (0.00558)	-0.0125*** (0.00396)	0.00267 (0.00288)	-0.00864** (0.00375)	-0.00414 (0.00377)	0.00135 (0.00250)
2015 * Local Visited	-0.00256 (0.00519)	-0.00491 (0.00567)	0.000848 (0.00637)	-0.00672 (0.00443)	0.00548 (0.00362)	-0.00303 (0.00428)	-0.00348 (0.00466)	0.00671** (0.00316)
2018 * Local Visited	0.0142* (0.00792)	-0.00122 (0.00765)	0.00784 (0.00934)	0.00121 (0.00669)	-0.0126 (0.0166)	0.0370 (0.0682)	-0.0176 (0.0128)	0.0280 (0.0508)
Observations	4,205	4,825	2,806	6,064	4,205	4,823	2,807	6,062
R-squared	0.873	0.861	0.885	0.858	0.608	0.474	0.803	0.452
Priority Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Covariates	All	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parish FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Segment	High-Priority States	Low-Priority States	Opposition Governors	Chavista Governors	High-Priority States	Low-Priority States	Opposition Governors	Chavista Governors

Note: Clustered Standard errors at the Parish level in parentheses.  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table A4: Event Study - Heterogeneity over timing of visits

VARIABLES	(1) Chavismo	(2)	(3) Turnout	(4)
1998 * Early Local Visited	0.0167* (0.00873)		0.00297 (0.00671)	
2000 * Early Local Visited	0.00711 (0.00912)		-0.0121* (0.00695)	
2006 * Early Local Visited	0.00767 (0.00667)		-0.00226 (0.00408)	
2012 * Early Local Visited	0.00656 (0.00436)		-0.00279 (0.00328)	
2013 * Early Local Visited	0.000854 (0.00508)		-0.000956 (0.00338)	
2015 * Early Local Visited	-0.00166 (0.00554)		0.00206 (0.00424)	
2018 * Early Local Visited	0.00443 (0.00904)		0.0977 (0.114)	
1998 * Late Local Visited		-0.00122 (0.00719)		0.000949 (0.00589)
2000 * Late Local Visited		0.00205 (0.00671)		0.0117* (0.00648)
2006 * Late Local Visited		0.00284 (0.00441)		-0.00573* (0.00306)
2012 * Late Local Visited		-0.00248 (0.00355)		-0.000566 (0.00254)
2013 * Late Local Visited		-0.00794** (0.00357)		-0.00101 (0.00239)
2015 * Late Local Visited		-0.00161 (0.00398)		0.00244 (0.00291)
2018 * Late Local Visited		0.00388 (0.00557)		-0.0197* (0.0112)
Observations	9,030	9,030	9,028	9,028
R-squared	0.869	0.869	0.541	0.540
Priority Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Covariates	All	All	All	All
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parish FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Clustered standard errors at the Parish level in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1