

Gov 2473, Political Parties and Interest Groups

Fall 2011

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Course Time: Thursday, 2-4 pm

Location: CGIS N-108

Requirements: The grade for the course will be based on:

(1) Class Participation (40% of the grade). To facilitate discussion, each week each student will write a short memo based on the assigned reading. This memo should be no more than one paragraph, and it should address one or more of the following questions: (i) What was exceptionally good or bad about the readings? (ii) What issues do the readings raise but not adequately address? That is, what do the readings suggest about promising directions for further research? The memos will not be graded, but they will be circulated to all participants so everyone can read them before class. The memos will help guide the discussion each week.

(2) A Final Paper (60% of the grade). You will attempt to write a publishable-quality paper. The topic must involve political parties or interest groups, or both. The paper may be theoretical or empirical. The paper is due on or before December 2, 2011.

Readings: The readings consist mainly of journal articles, and a few book chapters. Most are available online from JSTOR or other Harvard Library E-Resources. Any readings that are unavailable online will be on the course web site.

Topics:

1. Theories of Political Parties

APSA's Committee on Political Parties. 1950. "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System." *American Political Science Review* 44: Supplement, September.

Ranney, Austin. 1951. "Toward A More Responsible Two-Party System: A Commentary." *American Political Science Review* 45: 488-499.

Turner, Julius. 1951. "Responsible Parties: A Dissent from the Floor." *American Political Science Review* 45: 143-152.

Aldrich, John. 1995. *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.

Cox, Gary W., and Matthew D. McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Berkeley CA: University of California Press.

Snyder, James M. Jr., and Michael M. Ting. 2002. "An Informational Rationale for Political Parties." *American Journal of Political Science* 46: 90-110.

Fiorina, Morris P. 1980. "Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Politics." *Daedalus* 109: 25-45.

Primo, David M., and James M. Snyder Jr. 2010. "Party Strength, the Personal Vote, and Government Spending." *American Journal of Political Science* 54: 354-370.

Alesina Alberto, and Stephen E. Spear. 1988. "An Overlapping Generations Model of Electoral Competition." *Journal of Public Economics* 37: 359-379.

Harrington, Joseph E. Jr. 1992. "The Role of Party Reputation in the Formation of Policy." *Journal of Public Economics* 49: 107-121.

Levy, Gilat. 2004. "A Model of Political Parties." *Journal of Economic Theory* 115: 250-277.

2. Parties as Informational Cues for Voters

Lodge, Milton, and Ruth Hamill. 1986. "A Partisan Schema for Political Information Processing." *American Political Science Review* 80: 505-20.

Conover, Pamela Johnston and Stanley Feldman. 1989. "Candidate Perception in an Ambiguous World: Campaigns, Cues, and Inference Processes." *American Journal of Political Science* 33:912-40.

Rahn, Wendy M. 1993. "The Role of Partisan Stereotypes in Information Processing about Political Candidates." *American Journal of Political Science* 37: 472-96.

Huckfeldt, Robert, Jeffrey Levine, William Morgan, and John Sprague. 1999. "Accessibility and the Political Utility of Partisan and Ideological Orientations." *American Journal of Political Science* 43: 888-911.

Koch, Jeffrey W. 2001. "When Parties and Candidates Collide: Citizen Perception of House Candidates Positions on Abortion." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 65: 1-21.

Lau, Richar R., and David P. Redlawsk. 2001. "Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making." *American Journal of Political Science* 45: 951-971.

Grynaviski, Jeffrey D. 2006. "A Bayesian Learning Model with Applications to Party Identification." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 18: 323-46.

Coan, Travis G., Jennifer L. Merolla, Laura B. Stephenson, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2008. "It's Not Easy Being Green: Minor Party Labels as Heuristic Aids." *Political Psychology* 29: 389-405.

Woon, Jonathan, and Jeremy C. Pope. 2008. "Made in Congress? Testing the Electoral Implications of Party Ideological Brand Names." *Journal of Politics* 70: 823-836.

3. Parties and Roll Call Voting

Levitt, Steven D. 1996. "How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senator Ideology." *American Economic Review* 86: 425-461.

Snyder, James M. Jr., and Tim Groseclose. 2000. "Estimating Party Influence on Congressional Roll-Call Voting." *American Journal of Political Science* 44: 187-205.

Ansola-behere, Stephen, James M. Snyder Jr., and Charles Stewart. 2001. "The Effects of Party and Preferences on Congressional Roll Call Voting." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 26: 533-572.

Snyder, James M. Jr., and Michael M. Ting. 2003. "Roll Calls, Party Labels, and Elections." *Political Analysis* 11: 419-444.

Lee, David, Enrico Moretti, and Matthew J. Butler. 2004. "Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U.S. House." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119: 807-859.

Ansola-behere, Stephen, Shigeo Hirano, and James M. Snyder Jr. 2005. "What Did the Direct Primary Do to Party Loyalty in Congress?" In *Process, Party and Policy Making: Further New Perspectives on the History of Congress*. David Brady and Mathew D. McCubbins

editors. Palo Alto CA: Stanford University Press.

4. Parties and Fiscal Policy Outcomes

Browning, Robert X. 1985. "Presidents, Congress, and Policy Outcomes: U.S. Social Welfare Expenditures, 1949-77." *American Journal of Political Science* 29: 197-216.

Erikson, Robert S., Gerald C. Wright, and John P. McIver. 1989. "Political Parties, Public Opinion and State Policy in the United States." *American Political Science Review* 83: 729-750.

Alesina, Alberto, John Londregan, and Howard Rosenthal. 1993. "A Model of the Political Economy of the United States." *American Political Science Review* 87: 12-33.

Blais, Andre, Donald Blake, and Stephane Dion. 1993. "Do Parties Make a Difference? Parties and the Size of Government in Liberal Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 37: 40-62.

Reed, W. Robert Reed. 2006. "Democrats, Republicans, and Taxes: Evidence that Political Parties Matter." *Journal of Public Economics* Volume 90: 725-750.

Leigh, Andrew. 2008. "Estimating the Impact of Gubernatorial Partisanship on Policy Settings and Economic Outcomes: A Regression Discontinuity Approach." *European Journal of Political Economy* 24: 256-268.

Pettersson-Lidbom, Per. 2008. "Do Parties Matter for Economic Outcomes? A Regression-Discontinuity Approach." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 6: 1037-1056.

Warren, Patrick. 2008. "State Parties and State Policies: A Double Regression Discontinuity Approach." Unpublished manuscript, Clemson University.

Ferreira, Fernando, and Joseph Gyourko. 2009. "Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence from U.S. Cities." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124: 349-397.

5. Parties and Distributive Politics

Inman, Robert P. and Michael A. Fitts. 1990. "Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the U.S. Historical Record." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 6: 79-132.

Levitt, Steven D. and James M. Snyder Jr. 1995. "Political Parties and the Distribution of

Federal Outlays.” *American Journal of Political Science* 39: 958-980.

Ansolabehere, Stephen and James M. Snyder Jr. 2006. “Party Control of State Government and the Distribution of Public Expenditures.” *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 108: 547-569.

Larcinese, Valentino, Leonzio Rizzo, and Cecilia Testa. 2006. “Allocating the US Federal Budget to the States: the Impact of the President.” *Journal of Politics* 68: 447-456.

Larcinese, Valentino, James M. Snyder Jr., and Cecilia Testa. 2009. “Testing Models of Distributive Politics Using Exit Polls to Measure Voter Preferences and Partisanship.” Unpublished manuscript, London School of Economics and Political Science.

Primo, David M., and James M. Snyder Jr. 2010. “Party Strength, the Personal Vote, and Government Spending.” *American Journal of Political Science* 54: 354-370.

Berry, Christopher R., Barry R. Burden, and William G. Howell. 2010. “The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending.” *American Political Science Review* 104: 783-799.

Hall, Andrew and Maxwell Palmer. 2011. “Evidence Against Partisan Presidential Influence in the Appropriations Process.” Unpublished manuscript, Harvard University.

6. Effects of Interparty Competition

Besley, Timothy, and Ian Preston. 2007. “Electoral Bias and Policy Choice: Theory and Evidence.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 122: 1473-1510.

Besley, Timothy, Torsten Persson, and Daniel M. Sturm. 2010. “Political Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the United States.” 77: 1329-1352.

Galasso, Vincenzo, and Tommaso Nannicini. 2011. “Competing on Good Politicians.” *American Political Science Review* 105: 79-99.

Poterba, James M. 1994. “State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics.” *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 102, no. 4, pages 799-821.

7. Theories of Interest Group Activity

Schattschneider, E.E. 1960. *The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press.

- Austen-Smith, David. 1993. "Information and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes." *American Journal of Political Science* 37: 799-833.
- Austen-Smith, David. 1995. "Campaign Contributions and Access." *American Political Science Review* 89: 566-581.
- Lohmann, Susanne. 1995. "Information, Access, and Contributions: A Signaling Model of Lobbying." *Public Choice* 85: 267-284.
- Austen-Smith, David and John R. Wright. 1996. "Theory and Evidence for Counteractive Lobbying." *American Journal of Political Science* 40: 543-564.
- Hall, Richard L., and Alan V. Deardorff. 2006. "Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy." *American Political Science Review* 100: 69-84.
- Lohmann, Susanne. 1998. "An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests." *American Political Science Review* 92: 809-827.
- Prat, Andrea. 2002. "Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare." *Review of Economic Studies* 69: 999-1017.
- Peltzman, Sam. 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation." *Journal of Law and Economics* 19: 211-248.
- Denzau, Arthur T., and Michael C. Munger. 1986. "Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests get Represented." *American Political Science Review* 80: 89-106.
- Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. 2001. *Special Interest Politics* Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
- Coate, Stephen, and Stephen Morris. 1995. "On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests." *Journal of Political Economy* 103: 1210-1235.
- Snyder, James M. Jr. and Michael M. Ting. 2008. "Interest Groups and the Electoral Control of Politicians." *Journal of Public Economics* 92: 482-500.
- Snyder, James M. Jr. 1991. "On Buying Legislatures." *Economics and Politics* 3: 93-109.
- Groseclose, Tim, and James M. Snyder Jr. 1996. "Buying Supermajorities." *American Political Science Review* 90: 303-315.
- Snyder, James M. Jr., and Michael Ting. 2005. "Why Roll-Calls? A Model of Position-

Taking in Legislative Voting and Elections.” *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 21: 153-78.

Dal Bo, Ernesto. 2007. “Bribing Voters.” *American Journal of Political Science* 51: 789-803.

8. Interest Groups and Policy Outcomes

Gardner, Bruce L. 1987. “Causes of U.S. Farm Commodity Program,” *Journal of Political Economy* 95: 290-310.

Ellison, Sara Fisher and Wallace P. Mullin. 1995. “Economics and Politics: The Case of Sugar Tariff Reform.” *Journal of Law and Economics* 38: 335-366.

Goldbert, Pinelopi Koujianou and Giovanni Maggi. 1999. “Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation.” *American Economic Review* 89: 1135-1155.

Gawande, Kishore and Usree Bandyopadhyay. 2000. “Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection.” *Review of Economics and Statistics* vol. 82: 139-152.

Ederington, Josh and Jenny Minier. 2008. “Reconsidering the Empirical Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Model of Endogenous Protection.” *Canadian Journal of Economics* 41: 501-516.

Eicher, Theo and Thomas Osang. 2002. “Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation: Comment.” *American Economic Review*, vol. 92, no. 5, pages 1702-1710.

9. The Value of Political Connections and Office

Roberts, Brian E. 1990. “A Dead Senator Tells No Lies: Seniority and the Distribution of Federal Benefits.” *American Journal of Political Science* 34: 31-58.

Fisman, Raymond. 2001. “Estimating the Value of Political Connections.” *American Economic Review* 91: 1095-1102.

Jayachandran, Seema. 2006. “The Jeffords Effect.” *Journal of Law and Economics* 49: 397-425.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder Jr., and Michiko Ueda. 2004. “Did Firms Profit from Soft Money?” *Election Law Journal* 3: 193-198.

Romer, Thomas and James M. Snyder Jr. 1994. "An Empirical Investigation of the Dynamics of PAC Contributions." *American Journal of Political Science* 38: 745-769.

Gary Cox and Eric Magar. 1999. "How Much is Majority Status in the House Worth?" *American Political Science Review* 93: 299-309.

Ansola-behere, Stephen and James M. Snyder Jr., 1999. "Money and Institutional Power." *Texas Law Review* 77 (7): 1673-1704.

Marianne Bertrand, Matilde Bombardini, and Francesco Trebbi. 2011. "Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process." Unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago.

Jordi Blanes i Vidal, Mirko Draca, and Christian Fons-Rosen. 2010. "Revolving Door Lobbyists." Unpublished manuscript, London School of Economics and Political Science.

Eggers, Andy, and Jens Hainmueller. 2009. "MPs for Sale: Estimating Returns to Office in Post-War British Politics." *American Political Science Review* 103: 513-533.

Querubin, Pablo and James M. Snyder Jr. 2011.

Diermeier, Daniel, Michael Keane, and Antonio Merlo. 2005. "A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers." *American Economic Review* 95: 347-373.

10. Interest Groups and Roll Call Voting

Chappell, Henry W. Jr. 1981. "Campaign Contributions and Voting on the Cargo Preference Bill: A Comparison of Simultaneous Models." *Public Choice* 36: 301-312.

Stratmann, Thomas. 1991. "What Do Campaign Contributions Buy? Deciphering Causal Effects of Money and Votes." *Southern Economic Journal* 57: 606-620.

Stratmann, Thomas. 1998. "The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?" *Journal of Law and Economics* 41: 85-113.

Ansola-behere, Stephen, John M. de Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder Jr. 2003. "Why Is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17: 105-130.