# Econ 2148, fall 2017 Statistical decision theory

Maximilian Kasy

Department of Economics, Harvard University

# Takeaways for this part of class

- A general framework to think about what makes a "good" estimator, test, etc.
- 2. How the foundations of statistics relate to those of microeconomic theory.
- 3. In what sense the set of Bayesian estimators contains most "reasonable" estimators.

# Examples of decision problems

- Decide whether or not the hypothesis of no racial discrimination in job interviews is true
- Provide a forecast of the unemployment rate next month
- Provide an estimate of the returns to schooling
- Pick a portfolio of assets to invest in
- Decide whether to reduce class sizes for poor students
- Recommend a level for the top income tax rate

## Agenda

- Basic definitions
- Optimality criteria
- Relationships between optimality criteria
- Analogies to microeconomics
- Two justifications of the Bayesian approach

# Components of a general statistical decision problem


- Observed data X
- A statistical decision a
- $\blacktriangleright$  A state of the world  $\theta$
- ▶ A loss function  $L(a, \theta)$  (the negative of utility)
- ▶ A statistical model  $f(X|\theta)$
- A decision function  $a = \delta(X)$

## How they relate

- underlying state of the world θ
   ⇒ distribution of the observation X.
- decision maker: observes  $X \Rightarrow$  picks a decision a
- her goal: pick a decision that minimizes loss  $L(a, \theta)$  ( $\theta$  unknown state of the world)
- ▶ X is useful  $\Leftrightarrow$  reveals some information about  $\theta$   $\Leftrightarrow f(X|\theta)$  does depend on  $\theta$ .
- problem of statistical decision theory:
   find decision functions δ which "make loss small."

## Graphical illustration

Figure: A general decision problem



## Examples

- investing in a portfolio of assets:
  - X: past asset prices
  - a: amount of each asset to hold
  - $\bullet$ : joint distribution of past and future asset prices
  - L: minus expected utility of future income
- decide whether or not to reduce class size:
  - X: data from project STAR experiment
  - a: class size
  - $\triangleright$   $\theta$ : distribution of student outcomes for different class sizes
  - L: average of suitably scaled student outcomes, net of cost

### Practice problem

For each of the examples on slide 2, what are

- $\blacktriangleright$  the data X,
- ▶ the possible actions a,
- $\blacktriangleright$  the relevant states of the world  $\theta$ , and
- reasonable choices of loss function L?

### Loss functions in estimation

- ▶ goal: find an a
- which is close to some function  $\mu$  of  $\theta$ .
- for instance:  $\mu(\theta) = E[X]$
- loss is larger if the difference between our estimate and the true value is larger

#### Some possible loss functions:

1. squared error loss,

$$L(a,\theta) = (a - \mu(\theta))^2$$

absolute error loss,

$$L(a, \theta) = |a - \mu(\theta)|$$

## Loss functions in testing

- ▶ goal: decide whether  $H_0$ :  $\theta \in \Theta_0$  is true
- ▶ decision  $a \in \{0, 1\}$  (accept / reject)

#### Possible loss function:

$$L(a,\theta) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } a = 1, \ \theta \in \Theta_0 \\ c & \text{if } a = 0, \ \theta \notin \Theta_0 \\ 0 & \text{else.} \end{cases}$$

	truth	
decision a	$ heta\in\Theta_0$	$ heta  otin \Theta_0$
0	0	С
1	1	0

### Risk function

$$R(\delta, \theta) = E_{\theta}[L(\delta(X), \theta)].$$

- ightharpoonup expected loss of a decision function  $\delta$
- R is a function of the true state of the world θ.
- crucial intermediate object in evaluating a decision function
- ▶ small  $R \Leftrightarrow \mathsf{good}\ \delta$
- $\triangleright$   $\delta$  might be good for some  $\theta$ , bad for other  $\theta$ .
- Decision theory deals with this trade-off.

# Example: estimation of mean

- ▶ observe  $X \sim N(\mu, 1)$
- want to estimate  $\mu$
- $L(a,\theta) = (a \mu(\theta))^2$
- $\delta(X) = \alpha + \beta \cdot X$

### Practice problem (Estimation of means)

Find the risk function for this decision problem.

### Variance / Bias trade-off

#### Solution:

$$R(\delta, \mu) = E[(\delta(X) - \mu)^{2}]$$

$$= Var(\delta(X)) + Bias(\delta(X))^{2}$$

$$= \beta^{2} Var(X) + (\alpha + \beta E[X] - E[X])^{2}$$

$$= \beta^{2} + (\alpha + (\beta - 1)\mu)^{2}.$$


- equality 1 and 2: always true for squared error loss
- Choosing b (and a) involves a trade-off of bias and variance,
- $\blacktriangleright$  this trade-off depends on  $\mu$ .

# Optimality criteria

- Ranking provided by the risk function is multidimensional:
- lacktriangle a ranking of performance between decision functions for every heta
- ➤ To get a global comparison of their performance, have to aggregate this ranking into a global ranking.
- preference relationship on space of risk functions
  - ⇒ preference relationship on space of decision functions

### Illustrations for intuition

- Suppose  $\theta$  can only take two values,
- ▶ ⇒ risk functions are points in a 2D-graph,
- each axis corresponds to  $R(\delta, \theta)$  for  $\theta = \theta_0, \theta_1$ .



# Three approaches to get a global ranking

- 1. partial ordering:
  - a decision function is better relative to another if it is better for every  $\theta$
- 2. complete ordering, **weighted average**: a decision function is better relative to another if a weighted average of risk across  $\theta$  is lower weights  $\sim$  prior distribution
- complete ordering, worst case:
   a decision function is better relative to another
   if it is better under its worst-case scenario.

## Approach 1: Admissibility

#### Dominance:

 $\delta$  is said to dominate another function  $\delta'$  if

$$R(\delta, \theta) \leq R(\delta', \theta)$$

for all  $\theta$ , and


$$R(\delta, \theta) < R(\delta', \theta)$$

for at least one  $\theta$ .

### Admissibility:

decisions functions which are not dominated are called admissible, all other decision functions are inadmissible.

Figure: Feasible and admissible risk functions



- ▶ admissibility ~ "Pareto frontier"
- Dominance only generates a partial ordering of decision functions.
- ▶ in general: many different admissible decision functions.

#### Practice problem

- ▶ you observe  $X_i \sim^{iid} N(\mu, 1)$ , i = 1, ..., n for n > 1
- $\triangleright$  your goal is to estimate  $\mu$ , with squared error loss
- consider the estimators

1. 
$$\delta(X) = X_1$$
  
2.  $\delta(X) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i} X_i$ 

can you show that one of them is inadmissible?

# Approach 2: Bayes optimality

- natural approach for economists:
- trade off risk across different θ
- by assigning weights  $\pi(\theta)$  to each  $\theta$

### Integrated risk:

$$R(\delta,\pi) = \int R(\delta, heta)\pi( heta)d heta.$$


### **Bayes decision function:**

minimizes integrated risk,

$$\delta^* = \operatorname*{argmin}_{\delta} \, R(\delta,\pi).$$

- Integrated risk  $\sim$  linear indifference planes in space of risk functions
- lacktriangle prior  $\sim$  normal vector for indifference planes

Figure: Bayes optimality



# Decision weights as prior probabilities

- ▶ suppose  $0 < \int \pi(\theta) d\theta < \infty$
- ▶ then wlog  $\int \pi(\theta)d\theta = 1$  (normalize)
- if additionally  $\pi \geq 0$
- then  $\pi$  is called a prior distribution

### **Posterior**

- suppose  $\pi$  is a prior distribution
- posterior distribution:

$$\pi(\theta|X) = \frac{f(X|\theta)\pi(\theta)}{m(X)}$$

normalizing constant = prior likelihood of X

$$m(X) = \int f(X|\theta)\pi(\theta)d\theta$$

### Practice problem

- ▶ you observe  $X \sim N(\theta, 1)$
- consider the prior

$$heta \sim N(0, au^2)$$

- calculate
  - 1. m(X)
  - 2.  $\pi(\theta|X)$

## Posterior expected loss

$$R(\delta,\pi|X) := \int L(\delta(X),\theta)\pi(\theta|X)d\theta$$

### **Proposition**

Any Bayes decision function  $\delta^*$  can be obtained by minimizing  $R(\delta, \pi|X)$  through choice of  $\delta(X)$  for every X.

#### Practice problem

Show that this is true.

Hint: show first that

$$R(\delta,\pi) = \int R(\delta(X),\pi|X)m(X)dX.$$

## Bayes estimator with quadratic loss

- ▶ assume quadratic loss,  $L(a, \theta) = (a \mu(\theta))^2$
- posterior expected loss:

$$\begin{split} R(\delta, \pi | X) &= E_{\theta | X} [L(\delta(X), \theta) | X] \\ &= E_{\theta | X} [(\delta(X) - \mu(\theta))^2 | X] \\ &= \text{Var}(\mu(\theta) | X) + (\delta(X) - E[\mu(\theta) | X])^2 \end{split}$$

▶ Bayes estimator minimizes posterior expected loss ⇒

$$\delta^*(X) = E[\mu(\theta)|X].$$

### Practice problem

- ▶ you observe  $X \sim N(\theta, 1)$
- ightharpoonup your goal is to estimate  $\theta$ , with squared error loss
- consider the prior

$$heta \sim N(0, au^2)$$

- for any  $\delta$ , calculate
  - 1.  $R(\delta(X), \pi|X)$
  - 2.  $R(\delta,\pi)$
  - 3. the Bayes optimal estimator  $\delta^*$

### Practice problem

- ▶ you observe  $X_i$  iid.,  $X_i \in \{1, 2, ..., k\}$ ,  $P(X_i = j) = \theta_i$
- ▶ consider the so called Dirichlet prior, for  $\alpha_i > 0$ :

$$\pi( heta) = const. \cdot \prod_{j=1}^k heta_j^{lpha_j - 1}$$

- ▶ calculate  $\pi(\theta|X)$
- look up the Dirichlet distribution on Wikipedia
- ▶ calculate  $E[\theta|X]$

# Approach 3: Minimaxity

- Don't want to pick a prior?
- Can instead always assume the worst.
- worst =  $\theta$  which maximizes risk

#### worst-case risk:


$$\overline{R}(\delta) = \sup_{\theta} R(\delta, \theta).$$

#### minimax decision function:

$$\delta^* = \mathop{\mathrm{argmin}}_{\delta} \, \overline{R}(\delta) = \mathop{\mathrm{argmin}}_{\delta} \, \mathop{\sup}_{\theta} R(\delta, \theta).$$

(does not always exist!)

Figure: Minimaxity ("Leontieff" indifference curves)



## Some relationships between these optimality criteria

### Proposition (Minimax decision functions)

If  $\delta^*$  is admissible with constant risk, then it is a minimax decision function.

#### **Proof:**

- picture!
- lacktriangle Suppose that  $\delta'$  had smaller worst-case risk than  $\delta^*$
- Then

$$R(\delta', \theta') \leq \sup_{\theta} R(\delta', \theta) < \sup_{\theta} R(\delta^*, \theta) = R(\delta^*, \theta'),$$

- used constant risk in the last equality
- This contradicts admissibility.

- despite this result,
   minimax decision functions are very hard to find
- Example:
  - if  $X \sim N(\mu, I)$ , dim $(X) \ge 3$ , then
  - lacktriangleq X has constant risk (mean squared error) as estimator for  $\mu$
  - but: X is not an admissible estimator for μ therefore not minimax
  - We will discuss dominating estimator in the next part of class.

### Proposition (Bayes decisions are admissible)

#### Suppose:

- lacktriangleright  $\delta^*$  is the Bayes decision function
- $\pi(\theta) > 0$  for all  $\theta$ ,  $R(\delta^*, \pi) < \infty$
- $ightharpoonup R(\delta^*, \theta)$  is continuous in  $\theta$

Then  $\delta^*$  is admissible.

(We will prove the reverse of this statement in the next section.)

#### Sketch of proof:

- picture!
- Suppose  $\delta^*$  is not admissible
- ▶ ⇒ dominated by some  $\delta'$ i.e.  $R(\delta', \theta) \le R(\delta^*, \theta)$  for all  $\theta$  with strict inequality for some  $\theta$
- Therefore

$$R(\delta',\pi) = \int R(\delta',\theta)\pi(\theta)d\theta < \int R(\delta^*,\theta)\pi(\theta)d\theta = R(\delta^*,\pi)$$

▶ This contradicts  $\delta^*$  being a Bayes decision function.

## Proposition (Bayes risk and minimax risk)

The Bayes risk

$$R(\pi) := \inf_{\delta} R(\delta, \pi)$$

is never larger than the minimax risk

$$\overline{R} := \inf_{\delta} \sup_{\theta} R(\delta, \theta).$$

#### Proof:

$$\begin{split} R(\pi) &= \inf_{\delta} R(\delta, \pi) \\ &\leq \sup_{\pi} \inf_{\delta} R(\delta, \pi) \\ &\leq \inf_{\delta} \sup_{\pi} R(\delta, \pi) \\ &\leq \inf_{\delta} \sup_{\theta} R(\delta, \theta) = \overline{R}. \end{split}$$

If there exists a prior  $\pi^*$  such that  $R(\pi) = \overline{R}$ , it is called the least favorable distribution.

# Analogies to microeconomics

#### 1) Welfare economics

statistical decision theory	social welfare analysis
different parameter values $ heta$	different people i
risk $R(., heta)$	individuals' utility $u_i(.)$
dominance	Pareto dominance
admissibility	Pareto efficiency
Bayes risk	social welfare function
prior	welfare weights (distributional preferences)
minimaxity	Rawlsian inequality aversion

### 2) choice under uncertainty / choice in strategic interactions

statistical decision theory	strategic interactions
dominance of decision functions	dominance of strategies
Bayes risk	expected utility
Bayes optimality	expected utility maximization
minimaxity	(extreme) ambiguity aversion

# Two justifications of the Bayesian approach justification 1 – the complete class theorem

- last section: every Bayes decision function is admissible (under some conditions)
- the reverse also holds true (under some conditions): every admissible decision function is Bayes, or the limit of Bayes decision functions
- can interpret this as: all reasonable estimators are Bayes estimators
- will state a simple version of this result

# **Preliminaries**

ightharpoonup set of risk functions that correspond to some  $\delta$  is the **risk set**,

$$\mathcal{R} := \{ r(.) = R(., \delta) \text{ for some } \delta \}$$

- will assume convexity of R
   no big restriction, since we can always randomly "mix" decision functions
- a class of decision functions  $\delta$  is a **complete class** if it contains every admissible decision function  $\delta^*$


#### Theorem (Complete class theorem)

#### Suppose

- ▶ the set  $\Theta$  of possible values for  $\theta$  is compact
- ▶ the risk set R is convex
- all decision functions have continuous risk

Then the Bayes decision functions constitute a complete class: For every admissible decision function  $\delta^*$ , there exists a prior distribution  $\pi$  such that  $\delta^*$  is a Bayes decision function for  $\pi$ .

Figure: Complete class theorem



# Intuition for the complete class theorem

- ightharpoonup any choice of decision procedure has to trade off risk across heta
- slope of feasible risk set
  - = relative "marginal cost" of decreasing risk at different  $\theta$
- pick a risk function on the admissible frontier
- can rationalize it with a prior
  - = "marginal benefit" of decreasing risk at different  $\theta$
- for example, minimax decision rule: rationalizable by least favorable prior slope of feasible set at constant risk admissible point
- analogy to social welfare: any policy choice or allocation corresponds to distributional preferences / welfare weights

#### Proof of complete class theorem:

 application of the separating hyperplane theorem, to the space of functions of θ, with the inner product

$$\langle f,g\rangle=\int f(\theta)g(\theta)d\theta.$$

- ▶ for intuition: focus on binary  $\theta$ ,  $\theta \in \{0,1\}$ , and  $\langle f,g \rangle = \sum_{\theta} f(\theta)g(\theta)$
- Let  $\delta^*$  be admissible. Then  $R(.,\delta^*)$  belongs to the lower boundary of  $\mathscr{R}$ .
- convexity of  $\mathcal{R}$ , separating hyperplane theorem separating  $\mathcal{R}$  from (infeasible) risk functions dominating  $\delta^*$

ightharpoonup  $\Rightarrow$  there exists a function  $ilde{\pi}$  (with finite integral) such that for all  $\delta$ 

$$\langle R(.,\delta^*), \tilde{\pi} \rangle \leq \langle R(.,\delta), \tilde{\pi} \rangle.$$

- by construction  $\tilde{\pi} \geq 0$
- thus  $\pi := \tilde{\pi} / \int \tilde{\pi}$  defines a prior distribution.
- $\triangleright$   $\delta^*$  minimizes

$$\langle R(.,\delta^*),\pi\rangle = R(\delta^*,\pi)$$

among the set of feasible decision functions

ightharpoonup and is therefore the optimal Bayesian decision function for the prior  $\pi$ .

# justification 2 - subjective probability theory

- going back to Savage (1954) and Anscombe and Aumann (1963).
- discussed in chapter 6 of
   Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M., and Green, J. (1995),
   Microeconomic theory, Oxford University Press
- and maybe in Econ 2010 / Econ 2059.

- ▶ Suppose a decision maker ranks risk functions  $R(.,\delta)$  by a preference relationship  $\succeq$
- ▶ properties \( \sum \) might have:
  - 1. completeness: any pair of risk functions can be ranked
  - 2. **monotonicity**: if the risk function R is (weakly) lower than R' for all  $\theta$ , than R is (weakly) preferred
  - 3. independence:

$$R^1 \succeq R^2 \Leftrightarrow \alpha R^1 + (1-\alpha)R^3 \succeq \alpha R^2 + (1-\alpha)R^3$$

for all  $\mathit{R}^{1},\mathit{R}^{2},\mathit{R}^{3}$  and  $\alpha\in[0,1]$ 

Important: this independence has nothing to do with statistical independence

#### **Theorem**

If  $\succeq$  is complete, monotonic, and satisfies independence, then there exists a prior  $\pi$  such that

$$R(.,\delta^1) \succeq R(.,\delta^2) \Leftrightarrow R(\pi,\delta^1) \leq R(\pi,\delta^2).$$

#### Intuition of proof:

- Independence and completeness imply linear, parallel indifference sets
- monotonicity makes sure prior is non-negative

#### Sketch of proof:

Using independence repeatedly, we can show that for all  $R^1$ ,  $R^2$ ,  $R^3 \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{X}}$ , and all  $\alpha > 0$ ,

- 1.  $R^1 \succeq R^2$  iff  $\alpha R^1 \succeq \alpha R^2$ ,
- 2.  $R^1 \succeq R^2$  iff  $R^1 + R^3 \succeq R^2 + R^3$ ,
- 3.  ${R: R \succeq R^1} = {R: R \succeq 0} + R^1$ ,
- 4.  $\{R: R \succeq 0\}$  is a convex cone.
- 5.  $\{R: R \succeq 0\}$  is a half space.

The last claim requires completeness. It immediately implies the existence of  $\pi$ . Monotonicity implies that  $\pi$  is not negative.

#### Remark

- personally, I'm more convinced by the complete class theorem than by normative subjective utility theory
- admissibility seems a very sensible requirement
- whereas "independence" of the preference relationship seems more up for debate

Two justifications of the Bayesian approach

## References

- Robert, C. (2007). The Bayesian choice: from decision-theoretic foundations to computational implementation. Springer Verlag, chapter 2.
- Casella, G. and Berger, R. (2001). Statistical inference. Duxbury Press, chapter 7.3.4.