



The Economic Outlook: Downshift

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The global outlook: lower growth in 2019



Real GDP Growth (Y/Y)	2018	2019	2020
Global Output Growth (PPP weights)	3.7	3.4	3.6
US: heading back to trend	2.9	2.2	1.8
Euro Area: near-term soft patch	1.8	1.2	1.4
Japan: growth holding up	0.8	1.0	0.8
UK: will depend on Brexit outcome	1.4	1.4	1.3
China: credit-driven slowdown this year	6.6	6.1	6.1
India: brisk growth	7.2	7.3	7.7
Russia: sanctions a drag	2.3	1.5	1.8
Brazil: recovery still slow	1.1	1.3	1.7

Source: Consensus Forecasts for 2018, PIIE for 2019-2020. Annual-average-over-annual-average growth rates.

Behind the global forecast




Some special factors (e.g. bottlenecks for German automakers) are weighing on growth, but **the slowing of growth is largely a return to trend** amid:

- Financial conditions that are tighter on net than in 2018 despite some easing in recent months
- Waning fiscal stimulus in the United States

Since the October 2018 GEP, a **downward revision to growth**, **especially in 2019**, on weaker-than-expected incoming data for Europe, China, Brazil, and the United States

The US contour is shaped by fiscal effects






Note: Average of estimates based on CEA (2009) multipliers and CBO multipliers as reported in CEA (2014).

Source: Congressional Budget Office (2017; 2018); Joint Committee on Taxation (2017); Council of Economic Advisers (2009, 2014); Jason Furman's calculations.





Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Haver Analytics; author's calculations.


	Unemployment	PCE Price Inflation (Q4/Q4)		
	Rate (Q4)	Headline	Core	
2016	4.8	1.6	1.8	
2017	4.1	1.8	1.6	
2018	3.8	1.9	1.9	
2019	3.7	2.0	2.0	
2020	3.8	2.2	2.2	

Note: Values in shaded cells are forecasts.

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Bureau of Labor Statistics; Haver Analytics; author's calculations.



What to make of the sharp deceleration in US real GDP in recent quarters?




The slowing toward the end of 2018 is consistent with estimates that fiscal effects on growth peaked mid-year

2019:Q1 not really so weak as the government shutdown and residual seasonality are holding back growth by ½ to ¾ percentage point

Soft recent readings on consumption but strong household fundamentals





Note: Core retail sales excludes building materials and supplies, auto sales and sales at auto dealers, and sales at gas stations. Source: Census Bureau; author's calculations.


	2008:Q4	2013:Q4	2018:Q4
Personal saving rate	6.1	6.3	6.8
Wealth to income ratio	5.3	6.4	6.6
Debt service ratio	12.8	10.1	9.9
Credit card delinquency rate	10.2	9.5	7.8


Note: 90+ day delinquency rate for credit cards.

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Consumer Credit Panel; Equifax; Haver Analytics.



With indicators of household confidence holding up, it's most likely just a breather






Source: University of Michigan; Haver Analytics.

2019


Prospects for a pick-up in home construction depend on how fast Millennials leave nest (best guess is only gradually given low affordability)



Source: Census Bureau; Haver Analytics.

Source: Census Bureau.

Business investment picked up in 2018 even outside oil and mining, but orders have flattened of late



Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; Jason Furman; author's calculations.

Source: Census Bureau; Haver Analytics.

With the dollar likely to remain strong, net exports should continue to be a modest drag





Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors; Haver Analytics.


Contributions of Net Exports to Q4/Q4 Real GDP Growth

2017	-0.3
2018	-0.2
2019	-0.2
2020	-0.2

Note: Values in shaded cells are forecasts.

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Haver Analytics; author's calculations.


Expect payroll gains to at last moderate with slowing growth (and not much slack left in participation)



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Haver Analytics; author's calculations.

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
Resulting in a bottoming out of unemployment in coming quarters



Unemployment Rate

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Haver Analytics; author's calculations.


Wages are rising but the still-high profit share level suggests room for wages to do so without pressure on prices



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta; Haver Analytics; author's calculations.

Note: Includes inventory valuation adjustment and capital consumption adjustment. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Haver Analytics; author's calculations.

Very modest overshoot of inflation target expected





Consumer Price Inflation

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Haver Analytics; author's calculations.



With just one more increase in the fed funds rate over next two years





Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors; Haver Analytics; author's calculations.

Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors; Haver Analytics; author's calculations.

Shifting downside risks to the outlook



Less likely:

Inflation rising more sharply than expected resulting in a sharp Fed move toward higher rates

More likely:

- Hard Brexit
- Trend growth turning out to be weaker than we think now
- (Relatedly) slower growth leading to more resistance to needed structural reforms and more support for populist policies like protectionism