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in vain (as when the city of Baltimore is extinguished in *The Sum of All Fears*), there is enough skullduggery on the part of the agency (or of former CIA clandestine operators) to blur the lines between good and evil. Moreover, the authors' criticism of U.S. foreign policy is based on evidence, even if taken from press accounts and other published sources, that generally validates charges of CIA perfidy, misjudgment, mendacity, and incompetence.

Indeed the most valuable feature of this book is not the mechanistic coding of the decade-by-decade images of CIA agents (who often go rogue in these movies) but the links the authors make to reported clandestine activities. The CIA and the presidents it has served have at times defied the designs of sensible statecraft and demeaned other countries' sovereignty, something the United States so insistently invokes for itself. Buried in the authors' summaries of the preposterous plots is a biting indictment of how dangerously and ineptly the CIA has operated abroad. The resemblances between films and history that the authors present, almost in passing, suggest a disturbing enough pattern. Had the authors deepened those connections, *Hollywood and the CIA* would have been a more gripping and important book in tracing the way the United States has played what Rudyard Kipling called the "Great Game" of espionage.

Michael E. Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011. 256 pp.

Reviewed by Erez Manela, Harvard University

The last decade has seen an outpouring of groundbreaking studies on the themes of modernization and development in the history of U.S. foreign relations. One can date the beginning of this wave to two publications that came out in the year 2000. The first was Nick Cullather's influential essay "Development? It's History," published in *Diplomatic History* (Vol. 24, No. 4). The other was Michael E. Latham's first seminal work on the history of modernization in U.S. foreign policy, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Caroline Press, 2000).

Latham's book, which convincingly placed modernization theory at the center of American social science and U.S. foreign policy in the early 1960s, heralded a remarkable outpouring of studies centered on the themes of modernization and development in the history of U.S. foreign relations, including important contributions by David Engerman, Nils Gilman, Bradley Simpson, David Ekbladh, and others. A pioneering work published in 1998 by Amy L. S. Staples, *The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945–1965,* which looked at international organizations dealing with global health issues, broadened the scope of the literature. Matthew Connelly's

Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population (2007), on the history of the movement to control global population growth, showed how transnational networks of non-state actors worked to reshape government policies around the globe. Nick Cullather's *The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia* (2011) showed how agricultural science, theories of development, and Cold War pressures combined to revolutionize global food production.

Now Latham has returned to the field he helped launch more than a decade ago, this time to provide an authoritative, indeed magisterial, synthesis of what we have learned to date. He offers a wide-ranging narrative of how the theory of modernization evolved in the United States and how the pursuit of development abroad profoundly shaped U.S. foreign relations for much of the last century. His illuminating analysis combines temporal, geographic, and thematic breadth with an in-depth examination of carefully chosen case studies.

Latham lays out the ideological origins of modernization and development in Progressive and New Deal thinking and, no less importantly, in the rise of the social sciences in U.S. academia, from the foundational theories of Franz Boas and Talcott Parsons to the iconic exposition of modernization theory in the work of W. W. Rostow. Latham then analyzes several case studies. One chapter, focusing on India, Egypt, and Ghana, considers how U.S. efforts to guide the development of emerging states failed to sway postcolonial leaders, who zealously guarded their independence and found in the Soviet Union a more inspiring and relevant model for growth. Another chapter focuses on a set of cases—Iran, Guatemala, and Vietnam—in which development was overshadowed in U.S. policy by perceived military and strategic imperatives that justified U.S. support for oppressive regimes. Another chapter—based heavily on Connelly and Cullather's recent work—deals with efforts to control global population and food supplies in the context of apocalyptic fears of global famine and environmental calamities.

Latham's account is compelling, and his judgments are balanced. U.S. advocates of modernization, he tells us, sincerely sought to transcend racism and imperialism even as they replicated some of their sensibilities and offered policy prescriptions that were deeply flawed in both theory and practice. In addition, Latham is not content to present the developing world as a mere arena for U.S. action but rather emphasizes the agency of postcolonial leaders in accepting or (more often) resisting U.S. cajolements and pressures. Finally, among the book's most original and illuminating sections is the discussion in the final chapters of the decline of modernization theory as part of the "crisis of liberalism" in the 1970s and the rise in the 1980s of an alternative, "neoliberal" prescription for development that sidelined governments and emphasized the role of free markets and, especially, of the unimpeded flow of capital across borders. The book ends with explorations of the role of development in the post–Cold War world, whether as part of humanitarian interventions (Somalia, Haiti, East Timor) or, after September 2001, of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

If there are a few blind spots in the book, they reflect the larger literature on which it is based. First, Latham does not consider a possibility that arises from his own narrative, namely that in most of the cases he covers modernization theory was never

really implemented in any consistent fashion, either because postcolonial leaders rejected it (as they did in India, Egypt, and Ghana) or because Washington had other priorities (as in Guatemala, Vietnam, and Iran). If so, then the common critiques leveled at the theory—that it was rigid, paternalistic, insensitive to the diversity of cultural, economic, and political contexts—may well be correct but beside the point. Did Rostow's "non-communist manifesto" ever actually serve as a blueprint for a U.S. development program that was consistently applied on the ground? If so, such cases are not readily apparent in this book.

Economists have long pointed to Taiwan and South Korea as examples in which state-managed, non-Communist development programs led to economic prosperity and, eventually, democratic transitions. Latham, however, mentions those two cases only as refutations of the neoliberal rejection of state-led development, and he rightly notes that their characterization as examples of market-led development have little basis in history. But this implies that it was precisely in those cases that a Rostow-type program, if perhaps a more authoritarian version of it than Rostow foresaw, came closest to actual implementation. Would a fuller consideration of these cases have required Latham to reconsider some of his arguments? Or are these simply exceptions that prove the rule? It remains to future historians to work this out.

Such quibbles, however, do not detract from Latham's achievement. This book will serve as an excellent introduction to the topic for students at both the undergraduate and graduate levels and will also repay careful reading by more advanced scholars. But the topic is far from exhausted. We still need a more fully global history of modernization and development, not least a more sustained consideration of the role of the Soviet Union, both for its own foreign aid and nation-building programs and also, most especially, for its role as a model of state-led economic development. At least until the 1970s, that model was arguably far more influential than Washington's in the developing world, Rostow's best efforts notwithstanding.

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Daniel F. Harrington, *Berlin on the Brink: The Blockade, the Airlift, and the Early Cold War.* Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2012. 414 pp. $90.00.

Reviewed by Bruce Kuklick, University of Pennsylvania

This book is extensively researched in Anglophone sources and offers a more nuanced account of the Berlin emergency of 1948 and 1949 than has previously been available. Daniel Harrington argues that the Soviet Union did not plan out the blockade of the western parts of Berlin. Similarly, the U.S. and British airlift was an ad-hoc effort that turned into a heroic and successful defense of Western rights only in hindsight.

The view that President Harry Truman was a decisive and courageous leader and that the USSR was to blame for all the troubles in postwar Germany is part of a conventional set of beliefs, and few historians now accept them. Yet Harrington skillfully