Institutionalizing Innovation in Municipal Police Departments

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I. Police Professionalism

For the last thirty years, the nation's police executives have sought to enhance the professionalism of the police. In their view, enhanced professionalism was the route not only to enhanced prestige for policing, but also to enhanced efficiency, effectiveness and accountability.

In the context of policing, enhanced professionalism meant specific things. It meant, for one thing, expanded use of new technological equipment such as computer aided dispatching, automated finger-print identification, non-lethal weapons, and computerized criminal history records.

It also included upgraded police capabilities to deal with more sophisticated offenders and complex law enforcement problems. SWAT teams gave them the capability to handle confrontations with heavily armed criminal groups. Special training prepared them to deal with riots and hostage situations. Intelligence systems guided sustained investigative efforts against organized criminal groups, and provided early warnings about civil disturbances.

Police professionalism also incorporated efforts to codify their policies and procedures and perfect their internal control mechanisms. Such efforts were particularly evident in sensitive areas such as the use of deadly force and the internal mechanisms to control police corruption. But the effort reached more broadly across the activities of the departments. Throughout the country, traditional practices, guided by informal lore, were gradually codified in bulky policy and procedures manuals. These manuals were drafted, published, and then amended as the police wrote down their procedures, and then found

themselves subject to review both through ordinary mechanisms of political oversight, and also through litigation.

To enhance professionalism, educational opportunities for police officers were widened, and educational standards for recruitment and promotion were elevated. Internal police training programs were expanded and upgraded. Public monies were spent to subsidize police training in the nation's universities and community colleges. Promotion to managerial positions came to depend on having advanced academic training as well as experience and performance on the job.

Above all, however, police professionalism meant seperating police departments from the potentially corrupting influence of local politics. This was accomplished by such means as weakening the power of local precinct commanders, centralizing the control of the departments in the office of the chief, and giving the chief of police special civil service status. It was also accomplished by critizing any mayor who sought to exercise any review of police operations for "improper political influence" - a stance that turned out to have substantial political force.

In its time, the drive to create professionalized police departments was a great innovation. It eliminated much of the lawlessness and incompetence that had previously handicapped the police in their struggles to achieve social status and gain the upper hand against crime. It also created room in police departments for the more particular technical and programmatic innovations described above. It even gave some impetus to critical empirical examinations of police operations.

More recently, however, the professionalized, crime-fighting strategy of policing seems to have come to the limits of its effectiveness as an overall strategy for policing, and as a concept that stimulated many useful smaller innovations. Indeed, to many in the field, the concept of professional policing now seems a strait-jacket that is preventing the emergence of newer strategies of policing, and also preventing the police from adapting their particular activities to the circumstances they confront in a way that would be most helpful to the citizens and the communities that they police.

To seize the newly perceived opportunities, however, police executives are now having to invent a new concept of policing. Even more importantly, the new conceptions of policing require organizations in which innovation is not an occasional event linked to new technologies and programs, but is instead a way of life. These new strategies of policing seem to pose significant threats to many of the values that animated the movement to create professional, crime-fighting policing - particularly, the values of accountability and fairness. To preserve these old values while creating a new strategy that makes more room for the effective use of police discretion is the administrative challenge facing police executives.

II. Challenges to Police Professionalism

The challenge to policing is coming from several different directions. The most important is the widespread sense that the professional crime-fighting strategy is failing in its own terms. It is simply not performing very well in controlling crime or

apprehending offenders. This is a surprise and a disappointment to the architects of this strategy.

A. Limited Efficacy

The current crime-fighting strategy is based on three cornerstones: first, motorized patrol operations designed to give the impression of police omnipresence to deter criminal offenses, and occasionally give the police a chance to thwart offenses in progress; second, rapid response to calls for service also designed to allow the police to reach crime scenes quickly enough to thwart the offense or apprehend the offender; third, retrospective investigations of crimes conducted by specially trained detectives and investigators. It seemed, thirty years ago, that if the police could develop and refine these techniques, they would succeed in controlling street crimes among strangers.

Empirical studies have cast doubt on the effectiveness of these primary tactics. The Kansas City Patrol Experiment indicated that varying the level of police patrol by a factor of two made no significant difference in levels of crime or fear. Indeed, citizens did not even notice the difference in levels of patrol.

Other experiments showed that even very rapid responses to calls for service did not necessarily increase the likelihood of the police thwarting a crime, or catching an offender. The reason was that while the police could get to the call in a hurry, often a lag occurred between the criminal incident and the call to the police. Witnesses did not call or did not notice the offense. During the offense, the victim was busy being victimized. After the offense, the first call was often to a friend rather than the police. As a result, the police

got there in time to hold the hand of the victim, but the offender was long gone.

Retrospective investigation also seemed to be singularly ineffective unless victims and witnesses to the crime could give the detectives detailed information about the offender. Then, and only then, could the crime be solved by detectives.

Taken together, these studies revealed the extent to which the police were dependent on citizens to help them control crime. Since many crimes took place behind closed doors or in dark corners rather than on public streets, the citizens remained the first line of defense. The police patrol cars could simply not get to most places. Unless the citizens called and mobilized the police, their rapid response capacity was useless. And unless they told the investigators who committed the offense, the detectives were not particularly valuable.

The obvious implication was that the police needed to develop a more effective crime-fighting partnership with the communities they policed. That, however, threatened their professional relationship with the community. It drew them into too close an operational link. And it seemed to diminish their sense of professional competence and autonomy.

B. Wider Uses of the Police

A second challenge to professional crime-fighting came from a certain mismatch between the objectives of the police, the way that they were organized and operated, and the way that the citizens wanted to use them. As noted above, the strategy of professional crime-fighting created an alert mobile force ready to be dispatched to deal

with serious crime calls 24 hours a day. The police and the citizens believed that such a capability was necessary to deal with serious crime. Once constructed, however, this capability was useful for a great many things other than crime control. Marital discord, a runaway child, noisy neighbors, medical emergencies, even cats in trees became incidents that stimulated calls to the police.

In a world in which the police were trying to retain their focus on serious crime, and protecting their capacity to respond, such calls seemed dangerously distracting nusiances. Under the strategy of professional crime-fighting, they were responded to as such. Dispatchers often lost the calls or gave them low priority. The police officers themselves responded slowly and perfunctorily to the calls. Indeed, in one of the more striking ironies of professional policing, when the police stepped out of their cars to deal with these calls for service, they reported to the dispatcher that they were "out of service". When they got back in their cars having dealt quickly with the problem as police procedures required, they reported that they were once again "in service".

In a world in which the police began to see the quality of their relationship to citizens as one of the key operational resources, however, the significance of these calls was a little different. They became the material out of which a confident relationship with citizens could be built so that it would be available for use when rarer crimes occurred. They also provided clues about where the real problems of the community lay.

C. Fear of Crime

A third challenge to professional crime-fighting came from the discovery that fear of crime was a distinct problem that bore an imperfect relationship to the problem of real criminal victimization. The police had always recognized that enhancing the citizens' sense of security was an important part of their mission. It was ultimately their most important purpose. The police had always assumed, however, that security would naturally come from success in controlling real criminal victimization. Indeed, the police thought it dangerous and irresponsible to seek to control fear without changing the underlying problem of criminal victimization, for fear was a rational citizen response to the threat of criminal victimization, and actually helped the police to control crime by minimizing citizen vulnerability.

Cumulative research gradually undermined this conception, however. It turned out that citizens' fears of crime were somewhat exaggerated - at least when compared to their fears of other risks in their environment. More importantly, the evidence revealed that fears were surprisingly un-correlated with real risks of victimization. They were much more closely associated with minor offenses and conditions that indicated a climate of lawlessness and social decay such as noisy youths, graffiti, littered parks, and broken streetlights.

It also became clear that while fear was doing some good in terms of mobilizing citizens to defend themselves, it was also a significant problem in its own right. It was keeping people off the streets, which made the streets seem even more dangerous. Fear was also encouraging citizens to buy dogs, locks, burglar alarms, and guns

which heightened the community's sense that they were in danger, and created new problems to which the police had to respond.

Finally, experiments revealed some police responses that could be effective in controlling fear even if they were not particularly effective in controlling criminal victimization. An experiment with foot patrol in Newark, New Jersey showed that foot patrols could reduce citizen fears even though they were unsuccessful in reducing criminal victimization. The finding was replicated in Flint, Michigan. In addition, the Flint experiment suggested that foot patrols could reduce calls for service to the central dispatching unit, and that citizens were willing to accept special taxation to fund foot patrol activities. All this identified fear as a separate problem for police executives to ponder.

D. Control versus Professional Discretion

A fourth challenge to professional crime-fighting came from a tension between the emphasis on tight discipline and written policies and procedures on the one hand, and the ideals of professionalism and the irreducible discretion of the police on the other. As noted above, one of the important thrusts of police professionalism was to codify policies and procedures. To a degree, this could be seen as an effort to refine and test the professional knowledge of policing. It is only when practices are written down and followed that they can be examined for their propriety and tested for their efficacy. In this view, policies and procedures could be seen as the field's current answer to the question of what constituted "best practice" in given areas of operations. In this view, the policies and procdures would also be open to challenge and change as the field accumulated experience.

But the codification of policies and procedures could also be seen as an instrument of central control designed to eliminate police officer discretion, and to change what had previously been craft work into routine production and clerical work. For the most part, it was this second thrust that was predominant in the minds of executives and police officers, for a major part of the impetus for police professionalism came from the desire to enhance control over the police, and insure their accountability. In this view, the policies and procedures became legal requirements on the police. They were absolutely binding and formed the basis of internal discipline, and the settlement of external complaints and suits. They could not be adapted by individual officers to fit a new circumstance. They cold not be changed without an elaborate process of central review in which the views of those at the top as to priority counted more than the views of those at the bottom as to efficacy and practicality.

Obviously, there was a certain tension between the effort to establish strong central control and eliminate officer discretion on the one hand, and the imagery of professionalism on the other. To many officers, the promise of professionalism was that their judgment and expertise would be honored and utilized, not replaced by standard operating procedures. Their irreducible discretion, created partly by the variety of the circumstances they encountered, and partly by the difficulty of close supervision, would be honored and celebrated as part of their emerging status rather than banished as a dangerous privilege that could not be granted to mere blue collar workers.

To a degree, these tensions could be reconciled through an analogy with military organizations and operations in which

professionalism was closely tied to hierarchy and discipline. But the analogy was a false one. The necessity for both close co-operation and initiative that were the essential ingredients of success in fighting large battles against a foe who was similarly organized simply did not apply to most policing. In policing, individual police officers generally operated alone, and confronted enormously varied circumstances. Initiative was certainly required, as was first rate technical training, but the arguments for discipline and hierarchy to assure that the organization all marched in the same direction seemed less compelling when one was dealing with varied, small circumstances on the street. To officers, the continuing reliance on hierarchy seemed much more oriented to control than an operational necessity in managing effective, large-scale operations.

The result of this tension was to create officers who felt betrayed by their organization. On the one hand, they were dispatched into the scary, uncertain world of policing the nation's cities, and told to do the job as best they could. On the other hand, they were made to feel extremely vulnerable to citizens and their superior officers to follow procedures.

This tension would not have been so great if the policies and procedures had been well designed. But they were often hastily established to placate some angry citizen group, or to deal with a particular incident that had occurred. As a result, they were often too general, too binding, and too inconsistent with other obligations to be valuable in guiding the activities of officers.

No wonder, then, that one of the principal causes of police stress is the organization and management style of the department

rather than the difficulty of the job. And no wonder that many police have established fraternal associations and unions to deal with their frustrations with the policies and procedures of the department.

E. Crime-Fighting versus Law Enforcement

A final pressure that tended to undermine the conception of professional crime-fighting as a strategy of policing is an inconsistency between the images of crime-fighting, on the one hand, and professional law enforcement on the other. The clearest way to see the difficulty is to note that professional crime-fighters are quite enthusiastic about enforcing the laws against burglary, rape, robbery and assault, and much less enthusiastic about enforcing the laws that are designed to protect citizens from attacks by the police. This assymetry undermines their claim to be a professional law enforcement agency, rather than a crime-fighting agency.

A professional law enforcement agency would see its responsibilities in terms of maintaining the rule of law - including the protection of minority interests, and the rights of those accused of a crime. Indeed, it might even see that what distinguished a public police force from private vengeance is precisely their commitment to the rule of law. It would see that this distinction was established every time they read the Miranda warnings to defendants, every time they used their expertise in the use of force to minimize its use in a particular situation, and every time they refused to use their powers on behalf of the particular interests of any citizen.

A crime-fighting agency, on the other hand, would see its responsibilities as effectively controlling crime. Anything that stood in the way of incapacitating or deterring criminal offenders would be

viewed as an outside constraint. They would also tend to see the difference between public and private crime control primarily in terms of technical competence - not values. The public agency would be able to deal with tougher, more sophisticated criminals. What would be celebrated in crime-fighting is getting the job done; protecting the good citizens from the bad.

In short, the image of professional law enforcement is the sheriff in the old west standing in the door of the jail house holding off a lynch mob. The image of crime fighter is Clint Eastwood as Dirty Harry. Somewhere in-between are the clean young men of the California Highway Patrol.

This tension exists in the basic conception of professional crime-fighting because it exists more generally in the society. It is almost as if the police make a deal with one segment of the society to be "the thin blue line" that keeps them safe from criminals and social decay by doing what has to be done. They then make a wholly different deal with a different segment of society that demands obedience to the rule of law. The words crime-fighting capture the content of the first deal. The words professional law enforcement reflect more of the second.

The inevitable result of this conflicting deal, however, is that the police end up lying about their operations. They feel authorized in the lie by the urgency of the crime problem, and the support they get from the good citizens. But that authorization can never really be formalized because it overturns much of what distinguishes America from other countries, and much of what distinguishes public justice from private vengeance.

The conflict also sets the police upt to fail. Insofar as they do the first job, they are branded as deviants and necessary evils that cannot be fully integrated into the rest of the society because they must do jobs that are too dirty for the rest of us to bear. Obviously, this position adds to the stress of the job, and to the tensions and vulnerabilities that police executives feel.

III. Police Responses: The Quiet Revolution

The police have responded to these challenges by experimenting with new approaches to policing. Some of the responses have stayed within the frame of professional crime-fighting.

To deal with the apparent limitations of their crime-fighting tactics they have experimented with such programs as: 1) "directed patrol" (in which patrol officers are committed to patrolling particular areas indicated by crime analysis as particularly vulnerable to crime); 2) "quality investigations" (in which patrol officers and investigators work collaboratively to improve the quality of evidence available in felony cases); 3) "anti-crime, decoy operations" (in which police officers simulate the behavior of a drunk hoping to attract a street mugger); and 4) "dangerous offender investigations" (in which the police give special investigative attention to those arrested for a crime who have past histories of criminal activity). While such programs can increase arrests and successful prosecutions of offenders, they have not yet been shown to be effective in reducing overall levels of crime in a community.

The police have also invested in sophisticated programs to help them manage the constantly escalating calls for service, and to insure

that police cars are available to respond to serious crime calls. The programs fall generally under the heading of "differential police responses." This category includes such things as prioritizing calls for service, informing citizens who call how long it will be before an officer can respond, asking citizens who are calling about non-urgent matters to bring their complaint to a police station or mail in a form, and so on.

These efforts to manage the demand for service calls are also joined with efforts to wring a little more response capability out of an existing patrol force. The police have invested in automatic vehicle locator systems that will keep the dispatcher informed about the exact location of any given car, and computer aided dispatch systems that will indicate which cars are nearest to the crime call, and least likely to be needed in the immediate future. These innovations have allowed the police to fall only slightly behind in their efforts to keep response times low in the face of escalating demand and limited resources.

Other police innovations, however, are beginning to break the frame of crime-fighting through motorized patrol, rapid response to calls for service and retrospective investigation of crimes. For example:

In Newark, New Jersey an experiment with foot patrol revealed that foot patrol was successful in reducing fear among citizens - an effect that motorized patrol and rapid response had never been able to produce.

In Flint, Michigan an experiment with foot patrol replicated the results of the Newark experiment. In addition, it

showed that foot patrol could reduce the calls for service coming in to central headquarters. Finally, the popularity of foot patrol was clearly demonstrated as the citizens voted a special tax to be earmarked for the continuation of the foot patrol program.

In Newport News, Virginia the department decidied to reduce their dependence on rapid response to calls for service, and instead devote time to the analysis and solution of problems that seemed to underlie the calls for service. Through the application of "problem-solving" methods, they were able to deal deal with problems such as prostitution related robberies, burglaries in a housing project, and thefts from cars parked in central city business areas.

In Houston, Texas the police established neighborhood police stations, and directed their officers to go door-to-door to meet the citizens, discover what problems concerned them, and build a partnership in dealing with crime and disorder.

In Philadelphia, Pa. the department created neighborhood consultative groups to help them decide what operational priorities should be within the department.

In Los Angeles, California the department authorized an experiment to use problem-solving techniques and community consultation to restore order and promote security in one of the city's most fearful and crime-ridden districts.

Innovations such as these are important because they step outside the frame of the existing strategy of policing. The goals of the police are widened from crime-fighting to include order maintenance, fear reduction, and problem solving. Police techniques shift from an exclusive focus on the application of the law to make an

arrest, to the possibilities of mediating a dispute, providing a service on an emergency basis, mobilizing other government agencies to help the community deal with a chronic problem, or mobilizing the community itself to deal with a problem. The basis of police legitimacy shifts from a claim that they are neutral enforcers of the law, to a claim that they are helping the community solve their problems using the law as an instrument. The relationship with the community changes from aloofness to greater intimacy.

Not only is the logic of these programs revolutionary, but also their operational impact. While all these innovations start as special projects or experiments using only a small fraction of the police department's resources, they bid to become a department wide operational philosophy - not simply a special project or experimental program.

IV. Infectious, Innovative Programs: COPE and RECAP

Two innovative programs that were finalists in the 1988 Ford Foundation Innovations Award Process are extremely important in the wave of changes now sweeping over policing. One such program is the Baltimore County Police Department's COPE Project. COPE is significan in the revolution for four reasons.

First, it is one of the first to focus on citizens' fears as a separate and solvable problem for policing to address. In the past, police departments had viewed fear reduction as an important objective, but had assumed that it would occur as a natural concommitant of reducing criminal victimization. Indeed, most departments thought it dangerous and cynical to seek to allay citizens

fears without reducing real levels of victimization. What the field gradually learned, however, was that fear was an important problem in its own right, that it was unexpectedly disconnected from actual levels of criminal victimization, and that the police could reduce fear through efforts that were different than those they relied on to reduce criminal victimization. The Baltimore County Police Department was one of the first departments to act on these findings and use fear reduction as an organizing concept behind a new program.

Second, the COPE program showed us the relationship between efforts to reduce fear on the one hand, and close community relationships on the other. If the task was to reduce fear, it was essential that the police get into close contact with communities so that they could discover and respond to whatever it was that frightened them.

Third, COPE revealed the close link between fear reduction and the need to rely on problem-solving methods rather than law enforcement methods to deal with peoples' fears. It turned out that fears were stimulated by things such as graffiti, litter, and disorderly youth. Against such problems, the police powers to arrest and prosecute had little impact. It was necessary for the police to reach out for other solutions. They helped to organize block groups, and used their influence with other county departments to get rid of graffiti and litter. They also mediated conflicts over the use of y radios. public spaces. These techniques rather than arrests turned out to solve the problems.

Fourth, COPE continues to be a laboratory for showing how these ideas of fear reduction, community relations, and problem-solving

begin to infect the rest of the department. At the outset, COPE was established as a separate unit within the police department. It was small and vulnerable. Gradually, the COPE unit grew. Now it is at a stage where further development of the concept will require the spread of the techniques into the general operations of the department and the dissolution of the special unit. Whether the COPE "culture" is now strong enough to stand on its own without the protection of a special structure, and powerful enough to dominate the traditional patrol culture is the critical issue that will determine whether COPE remains an interesting program, or becomes an important wedge in transforming the overall strategy of policing.

The second important innovative program is the Minneapolis Police Department's RECAP Program. RECAP is important for quite different reasons. A cornerstone of the current strategy of policing has been the development of a communication system linking citizens to police officers through telephones, centralized dispatching, and two-way radios. This has allowed the police to be available to citizens with unprecedented speed. In most cities, the police can respond to an urgent call for service coming from anywhere within the city in under five minutes. It is a great accomplishment.

Unfortunately, this network has also become one of the greatest obstacles to innovation and change in policing. The growth of the urban population and the successful marketing of 911 emergency telephone systems have led to a dramatic increase in the calls for service coming into police departments. The financial problems of the cities have prevented them from responding with increased manpower and equipment for police. Thus, the police find themselves now struggling

to meet very specific, well-defined objectives to keep response times low. The pressure exerted by this system has made it seem impossible to explore any alternative uses of police resources outside the objective of keeping response times low.

Within the objective of managing response times, the pressures have had stimulated innovation - much of it based on technology. The most common innovations include a variety of programs that go under the heading of "differential police response." The basic ideas include call prioritization, delaying police responses to non-urgent calls, sometimes responding to calls through means other than dispatching an patrol car. For example, in the case of minor break-ins that occurred long before the call was made, the police now sometimes as citizens to use the mail to make their complaints. Other responses include trying to wring additional efficiencies out of the available patrol force through automated vehicle locator systems, and improved dispatching algoriths that find the car closes to the scene.

The RECAP Program also seeks to respond to the crisis in calls for service, but in a wholly different way. RECAP is based on a finding that a large majority of calls for service come from a very limited number of addresses in the city. These addresses the police seem to visit over and over again. Perhaps the pressure to respond to calls for service could be reduced if the problem underlying the repeat calls for service could be resolved rather than left to fester. That is the basic concept.

What is significant about this approach to the problem of response times is that it requires the police to shift to a problem-solving ra;her than incident-handling approach. In the past, the

ideas of maintaining rapid response capabilities and doing problem solving were viewed by the police as inconsistent with one another. The only way to do problem-solving was to take officers off the line. Since that threatened to increase response times, and create greater burdens for those officers who remained in rapid response units, it always seemed too difficult and risky an experiment. The RECAP program links the objective of keeping response times low to problem-slving by suggesting that the solution to the response time pressure is to solve the problems that are producing repeat calls, rather than merely respond to the incidents. Thus, the most pressing problem faced by police executives is tied to a shift in focus from incidents to poblems.

It is hard to exaggerate the significance of the shift from responding to incidents (which they examine to see whether a law has been broken and whether an arrest is appropriate) to seeking the solution of problems that are stimulating calls for service. The second approach invites a wholly different investigative/analytic approach. One looks less for offenders, and more for other precipitating causes of crime such as frustrating relationships, or on-going disputes of one kind or another. One seeks the solutions less in arrests and more in other kinds of intervention to re-negotiate relationships. The solutions are less likely to rely solely on police resources, and more likely to rely on resources from outside the departments. Obviously, all this has important implications for the orientation and skills of the police officers, and even the role of the police department in city government.

Thus, RECAP, like COPE, is a simple idea that had radical implications for the overall strategy of policing. What is even more interesting is that they seem to push in similar general directions, even though their origins and purposes are quite different. They push the police towards a more sustained engagement with communities. The police are no longer allowed to stay at the surface of community life dealing only with criminal incidents through the instrumentalities of arrest and prosecution. They are instead drawn into the conflicts and frustrations that are frightening citizens and causing them to call the police. Once enmeshed in these problems, the police have to find different solutions than simply arresting someone. They also have to reach outside the department. That, in turn, forces the department into a more decentralized, entrepreneurial style, and draws the police into a much different relationship with the community.

V. Institutionalizing Innovation: Commissioning the Officers

If problem-solving and community policing are the wave of the future, then it is clear that much of our imagery of policing, and many of the administrative arrangements that now connect individual officers to the rest of the department will have to change. The imagery of policing has to change from images of routine application of policies and procedures, to an image of invention and improvisation as officers encounter new situations and problems. In short, we must see policing not as a production line, but as a job shop - perhaps even a fully professionalized, flat organization. The administrative relations must change from centralized control, to decentralized responsiveness. It is the officers themselves who must define the

problems to be solved, and the appropriate means for doing so. Their supervisors can be coaches in this activity, but not controllers or too much of the necessary initiative will be lost.

One way of viewing this set of changes is to see that the shift in strategy from professional policing to problem solving or community policing is itself an innovation that has the effect of creating an administrative framework within which the police are asked to engage in a continuing process of innovation. Obviously, the strategies of problem solving and community policing are innovations in the sense that they represent a fundamental change in the basic strategy of policing. Somewhat less obviously, these innovations commit police organizations to a continuing process of innovation. Instead of top-down experiments with new programs, individual officers, working with the community, are authorized to define problems and find solutions. Instead of applying known technologies for dealing with a problem now embedded in the policies and procedures of the department, police officers are expected to invent a response. Each problem that is identified and solved is, in some important sense, an innovation.

Thus, the new strategies of policing require administrative arrangements that institutionalize innovation. Table 1 presents a listing of the key changes in administrative relationships and style that must accompany a shift from professional crime-fighting to problem solving or community policing, and that are designed to institutionalize innovation in policing.

Obviously, there is danger in these changes. By giving greater initiative to officers, the organization and the community becomes much more dependent on their qualities. If they are skilled, the risk

TABLE 1

ADMINISTRATIVE STYLE OF POLICE DEPARTMENTS

Current Style	The Alternative
Bureaucratic Organization	Professional Organization
Centralized	Decentralized
Command and Control	Commissioned Officers
Control Through Rules	Control Through Values
Control Through Supervision	Control Through Accountability
City-Wide Accountability	Local Responsiveness
Management as Supervision	Management as Coaching
Functional Specialists	General Practitioners
Promotions Through Ranks	Promotions Through Pay Raises
Academy Training	Clinical Training

to the community will be less than if they are badly trained. Even more importantly, if they have the proper values, the community will be safer than if they are badly motivated. But all that that conclusion suggests is that in problem-solving and community policing, the society and the organization are asking the officers to be real professionals; that is, to have not only the skills of their trade, but also to reflect in their actions a commitment to society's values rather than their own. In short, the society must commission the officers to act on their behalf. Then, the potential of problem-solving and community policing can be realized without losing control of the officers. The control simply shifts to a different style than we have relied on in the past.