

Model V:
The Popular Politics Paradigm

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I. Introduction

The complex processes that initiate and structure government policy deliberations, force these deliberations to a decision, and transform a decision into actual changes in the "state-of-the-world" allow numerous¹ opportunities for influence to be exerted by non-governmental "groups" of all kinds. At each stage of the process, the behavior and attitudes of "ordinary citizens" may have some impact on all future stages. Sometimes clusters of public opinion or overt public agitation may stimulate government attention in a new policy area. Then, articulate non-governmental groups will cluster around policy deliberations seeking to persuade government officials to adopt their point of view. The success of these groups in enlisting allies among government officials and/or agitating and organizing public opinion may force the deliberations to end in a favorable decision. If the decision is unfavorable, the non-governmental groups may try to alter or subvert the decision by interfering with the implementation efforts of governmental organizations. Finally, for at least some governmental decisions (e.g., wage and price settlements in the Steel industry), the non-governmental groups become critical tools of government policy. Their voluntary activity becomes the cutting edge of government policy in shaping the world.

The numerous opportunities for influential appearances by non-governmental groups in governmental policy processes imply that some governmental outcomes can only be explained or predicted accurately when an analyst is sensitive to the behavior of non-governmental groups and their impact on the government machinery that produces governmental outcomes.² The presumption is that this impact is achieved through dependencies of the governmental

machinery on non-governmental groups and individuals. Thus, an analyst must be sensitive to the peculiar interdependencies that exist between parts of the governmental machinery and non-governmental groups. The objective of the Popular Politics Paradigm is to provide an explicit framework for analyzing the conditions within the government and among non-governmental groups that structure the character and eventual result of their interdependence.

II. Basic Unit of Analysis: Policy as the Result of Interdependencies Between Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations and Individuals

Governmental outcomes are often critically affected by the interests and behavior of non-governmental "groups" and individuals. The interests may be self-consciously and actively expressed, interpreted more or less accurately by other active groups, or nearly inarticulate. The behavior may be organized or unorganized, regular or intermittent. In all cases, the critical effect is achieved via functional interdependencies between government officials and organizations on the one hand, and "civic leaders," lobbying organizations, and unorganized public opinion and behavior on the other hand. The timing of governmental decisions, the options available to decisionmaking units, opportunities for necessary political coalitions within decisionmaking units, and the detailed character of organizational implementation may all be influenced by non-governmental groups through the dependencies.

Because the effect of non-governmental groups is achieved through interdependencies, the effect will be both distorted and intermittent. Non-governmental interests will be distorted since they will be compromised by the capacities of non-government groups to listen and effectively respond.

These capacities structure the possibilities for mutual dependence and constrain the clear implementation of non-governmental interests. Non-governmental interests will be intermittently effective because

1) opportunities for functional interdependence do not occur in all governmental actions, and 2) when they do occur, incapacities within the government or non-governmental group may not allow them to be exploited.

Thus, the "popular politics analyst" carries a few simple ideas in his head about the different kinds of interdependencies that frequently exist between governmental and non-governmental actors. He then asks himself 1) whether these interdependencies are likely to be important in the policy area or outcome he is analyzing and 2) if they are possibly important, do the internal characteristics of both government and non-governmental actors make it likely that they will be able to exploit the interdependence:

[Digression on the Relation of Model V to Model II and III:]

[This definition of the basic unit of analysis hints at significant overlaps between the popular politics paradigm and the other models of government behavior. Governmental officials and organizations appear as important actors in the popular politics paradigm, and Models II and III were written to provide a comprehensive view of their behavior. In addition, there is a strong presumption that the propositions of Models II and III describe the behavior of organizations and bargaining individuals in general ways. Thus, we would expect to be able to describe the behavior of organized lobbies and public leaders in nearly the same terms as we described the behavior of governmental organizations and bargaining among officials. Consequently, we do not need a new model to describe non-governmental organizations and individual leaders. In short, because many of the units and behavior critical to the popular politics paradigm appear to be explicitly considered by previous models,

it can be argued that we do not need a popular politics paradigm.

Despite these apparent overlaps with the other models, an argument can be made for distinguishing the popular politics paradigm from the other models. The argument for distinguishing a Model V from the other models as they are currently written rests on three observations.

First, at this stage we have no model that makes us sensitive in an explicit and discriminating way to the variety of interdependencies that can and do exist between governmental actors on one side and a variety of non-governmental actors on the other. A corollary is that we have no model that illustrates the "chancy" character of these interdependencies appearing and being effectively exploited by governmental and non-governmental actors. Thus, a Model II or III analyst might be confused by 1) the fact that governmental outcomes are sometimes distorted dramatically by non-governmental actors and 2) the fact that this influence is not achieved regularly. A Model V analyst would expect both.

Second, we have no model that directs our attention to people who do not have regular positions in the policy making process. Indeed, if one were to take the models currently available literally, we would be blind to people who did not have formal or legal positions in the policy making process. The popular politics paradigm shifts our attention at least partly to non-official actors in the policy making process, both regular and irregular. It sensitizes use to the fact that the regularized bargaining process of Model III and the mechanical application of SOPs and programs in Model II may on occasion be completely overwhelmed by an unexpected, effective mobilization of non-governmental leaders and groups.

Third, the behavior of non-governmental players and organizations differ in some degree from the behavior of governmental players and organizations.

For example, although Model II captures much of the behavior of "mature" large organizations, it does not seem immediately applicable to the small staffs, irregularly available resources, and large numbers of inactive "members" that are characteristic of non-governmental organizations that become involved in government policy making. Another example relevant to differences between governmental players and non-governmental players is that governmental players are concerned with a broader range of issues, and more "fixed" with respect to a policy area by previous commitments and relations than non-governmental players typically are. In effect, a non-governmental player has more "slack" he may draw on than a government player, although he is also less strategically "wired in" to other government officials.

It can obviously be argued that these differences are not important enough to warrant a new model. Indeed, one suspects that a careful, explicit analysis of differences between governmental and non-governmental organizations or players would employ the "parameters" of Models II and III. However, the typical differences in degree are essential in analyzing the possibilities and effects of interdependence. Models II and III, as currently written, do not make us sensitive enough to the differences in degree. In effect, the concerns of Model V force us to begin a process of further specification of Models II and III. Systematic differences that show up in this further specification of Models II and III allow us to set non-governmental groups and players off from governmental groups and players.

The conclusion of these arguments for the current writing of a new model, then, should be this: if an analyst looks closely only at the relations of governmental players and organizations to one another, and/or assumes that

all resources that are likely to become involved in a policy struggle are those controlled by regular players, and/or assumes that non-governmental organizations and players behave in ways identical to government organizations and players, then he will not adequately predict or explain many governmental outcomes. In short, the argument is that this paradigm captures another cluster of determinants of governmental outcomes. This cluster is not sufficient to explain all governmental outcomes and the relevance of the paradigm varies from case to case, but for some significant class of governmental outcomes, the factors identified here are likely to be important.

III. Organizing Constructs:

A. Governmental v. Non-Governmental

The critical distinction between governmental or non-governmental positions is whether or not one has the formal or legal authority to commit government resources (e.g., money, authority and sometimes prestige). It is commonly recognized that those with formal or legal authority are not always "influential" in policy outcomes. Often, government officials appear to passively reflect the interests of non-government personnel who participate regularly in the policy machinery. This abdication of formal or legal authority to regular influence from non-government personnel does not change our definition of governmental, however. It only points up the fact that governmental or non-governmental status is a function of position in formal or legal systems and not necessarily an indication of more or less influence over the commitment of government resources. It also suggests that public intervention in governmental machinery is often significant.

B. The Governmental Machinery: Responsibility without Resources

The Model V analyst's view of the governmental machinery is dominated by four observations. First, he notices that the power to commit governmental resources to a specific outcome is highly decentralized. Many individuals control necessary conditions for a particular outcome to occur. No one individual controls sufficient conditions for an outcome to occur. Efforts to aggregate control over necessary conditions to provide a coalition sufficient for an outcome to occur may be voided by a countervailing mobilization of conditions sufficient to block the governmental outcome. The process of coalition building may begin regularly, but expands elastically and irregularly. Because of the elastic and irregular coalition building process, there is enormous uncertainty about the feasibility of most outcomes.

Second, he notices that at any given moment the government officials must make an enormous number of decisions and set in motion many significant processes. Officials are pressured by their position within the government's vast undertakings to commit themselves to a decision or action when they cannot accurately foresee the consequences of their action. They are often uncertain about what groups, organized or unorganized, lurk in the wings to subvert or criticize their action. The uncertainty about the personal and social consequences of governmental action is pervasive among governmental officials.

Third, despite the large number of actors and decisions, a Model V analyst notices that the governmental machinery has only a limited capacity to affect "states of the world" important to ordinary citizens. Its capacity to provide jobs, health care, housing, etc. is limited by

constitutional or traditional restraints, its own incompetence, or the privileges of powerful non-governmental groups. Thus, on some occasions, powerful groups outside the government behaving in a self-conscious and co-ordinated way may be more important in determining relevant "states of the world" than is the government apparatus. On other occasions, the spasmodic, uncoordinated action of many individuals may drastically alter "states of the world" without the government being able to anticipate or control the spasmodic action. Thus, in some issues at some times, the governmental apparatus lacks important leverage in affecting states of the world. Consequently, to the degree that government officials are perceived to be responsible for states-of-the-world, they may be dependent on non-governmental personnel for a favorable image.

Fourth, a Model V analyst believes that there are more or less strong and regular tendencies to focus the responsibility for government action on individual public officials. Elections insure that elected officials regularly must accept responsibility for some of the government's actions. Some appointed officials who are dependent on elected officials also face the consequences of governmental action as individuals through the electoral process. Appointed and career officials in administrative agencies are forced to accept individual responsibility for governmental action in facing their clients in appropriations or investigative hearings. The far-ranging periodic inspections of the mass media also tend to focus individual responsibility for governmental action.

In addition to these formal procedures for focusing responsibility there are an infinite variety of informal mechanisms. Politicians' concerns about their public or historic images motivate and constrain a small, but important subset of government officials. A favorable image in a variety of professional reference groups may also motivate and constrain the

action of government officials. Finally, advancement in the government bureaucracies and the committee hierarchies also tend to force the government officials to accept responsibility for their actions.³ In sum, officials take responsibility for their actions in the government's name by facing a variety of publics in both formal and informal ways. This responsibility motivates work towards governmental outcomes, and also constrains the possible shape of governmental outcomes.

The process of government, then, is a crazy quilt of extensive responsibilities and inadequate resources. The responsibilities of individual public officials forced on them by having to face a variety of "publics" in a position to condemn them professionally or morally nearly always outstrip their capacities for informed and effective action. The gap between their responsibilities and capabilities leads them to search for auxiliary groups that may help them. This search is difficult to predict in detailed situations, but in general follows the lines of governmental dependence.

C. Governmental Dependencies

As we observed in section B, government officials typically find themselves short of resources they need to live up to their ambitions and responsibilities. They are often unable to guarantee either appropriate governmental outcomes or the continued tolerance of their clients and constituencies. More specifically, the shortages show up critically in:

1. Inadequate analysis of complex policy choices
2. Inadequate detailed and updated information about opportunities for strategic intervention by an official in a policy area in which he is interested, or for which he is responsible.

3. Inadequate access to and reliable influence over other government officials required for a coalition sufficient to produce a desired outcome.

4. Pervasive uncertainty about trends of public opinion in home constituencies, among attentive publics, among clients. Also uncertainty about whether the trends affect strategically located groups or not, and the likelihood that public opinion movement will be translated into important political conflicts, affect voting, or lead to public demonstrations.

5. Continuing dependence on: a) the tolerance of a constituency in accepting the strains of living in an imperfect world, and b) the voluntary help of non-governmental forces in shaping the "relevant world" for constituency or clients.

These shortages become fertile grounds for the intervention of non-governmental groups since these groups are sometimes in a position to provide resources needed by government officials. They are sometimes in a position to trade this aid for future governmental support, or shape their aid in such a way that the government official decides to act in a way consistent with their ambitions. Specifically, groups may be able to help government officials by:

1. Providing policy analysis of pending decisions that indicates to the official the consequences of deciding one way or the other for a restricted constituency.

2. Providing policy analysis that offers alternative policy directions that are more attractive and amenable to an individual or group of officials than anything currently being considered.

3. Updated information about and analysis of alternative strategies for intervening in the governmental machinery to gain a desired outcome.
4. Aid in establishing necessary coalitions through favored access to a variety of government officials or other non-governmental groups.
5. Providing more or less accurate and precise cues about trends in public opinion.
6. Providing aid in shaping, mobilizing, or placating public opinion among constituencies.
7. Undertaking organized or "disorganized" action that improves or damages "states of the world" important to constituencies.

Clearly not all groups can perform all these functions all the time in all policy areas. In fact, the opportunities for interaction by any group via these government dependencies are quite limited. The limitations are imposed partly by the policy area in which intervention is desired, and partly by the character of the officials and organizations that occupy strategic positions in the policy area. However, the internal organizational structure of the group and its position vis-a-vis a variety of constituencies are also critical constraints on the capacities of the groups to provide these services. The internal constraints of groups will be examined in the next section.

D. Typologies of Groups:

The enormous variety of non-governmental groups influential in governmental affairs has resisted comprehensive and systematic cataloguing. Analysts of the role of these groups in governmental processes have often been forced to accept a simple, but suggestive typology or simply describe some aspect of group behavior that seemed particularly important to them.

Like previous analysts, our interests in the groups are limited. We are concerned only with those aspects of groups that affect their capacities to fulfill governmental needs (and consequently to trade their usefulness for current or future influence). Unlike all previous analysts, we may build our insight on the attempts of other analysts of interest groups. Thus, we will look at three previous typologies of groups, take from them what is suggestive for our purposes, and outline a rough typology of our own.

In Governing New York, Sayre and Kaufman were forced to deal with the stakes, strategies and influence of non-governmental groups in New York. They arrayed the groups they observed along two dimensions; the scope of the group's expressed interest, and the frequency of the group's activity. The scope of the group's interests was a suggestive, but not clearly defined variable. Three possible definitions are: 1) the number of issues that the city considers each year that the group finds more or less interesting and suitable for their own action, 2) the number of potential beneficiaries of a certain outcome a group pursues, or 3) the number of political changes that have to occur in order for a group's desired outcome to be produced by the government. The frequency of activity variable was described (and presumably predicted) on the basis of past performance. No effort was made to examine the triggering mechanisms that galvanized the organization into action nor to describe the internal organizational structure that determined the likely shape and absolute limits on the character of the group's response. 4

The Governmental Process was a classic effort to analyze the role of all kinds of groups in the American governmental machinery. Besides cataloguing a vast amount of data on the role and character of interest

group's, the analysis adds two critical perspectives to group behavior that were not considered by Kaufman; the internal cohesion of the organization, and the organization's strategic position vis-a-vis other groups and the governmental machinery.

Truman observed that groups could be distinguished on the basis of their internal cohesion. At one extreme of groups were "latent interest groups," an odd collection of people who shared an attitude or interest, but didn't know it. At the other extreme, were groups that had frequent interactions, a complex division of labor, an explicit common value system, and an expectation of permanence. Within each group, members varied from "fellow travelers" who were not self-conscious members and did not actively participate, to the active minority that devoted substantial time to maintaining and furthering the purposes of the organization.

The degree of cohesion achieved by a group was a function of many variables. The age of the organization appeared to have a significant effect. At a young age, the entrepreneurial leadership was able to dominate the group with their ready and explicit expectations. They were also able to shift positions easily since there was no self-conscious constituency that demanded consistency of them. Later in the organization's life, the leadership's room to maneuver had been sharply limited. They were leaders by virtue of a compromise position they adopted. At either close side stood opponents ready to take over for them, should they deviate from the rigid expectations of the membership. The degree of cohesion was also a function of "leadership." Leaders used internal propaganda, sanctions provided by the threat of expulsion or loss of some membership privileges, or sanctions controlled by the active minority

to maintain organizational cohesion.

Cohesion was important in Truman's view because he believed that cohesion dramatically affected the likely influence of the group. A show of solidarity in a collective interest was critical to the prestige and persuasiveness of a group's appeal to government. Moreover, a stable and loyal membership guaranteed that resources would be available to support the active minority, and that a majority of the group's internally generated resources could be used by that minority in carrying on the "collective" purposes of the group rather than settling internecine fights. Thus, cohesion was a critical variable in describing a group and in predicting its degree of influence.

Truman also focused attention on the strategic position of the group among other groups and vis-a-vis governmental machinery. One important strategic element for a group is its social position. The higher a group's social status, the more likely it is that the group will be able to successfully persuade marginally concerned government officials and other groups that their position is the appropriate one, and consequently enlist the aid of the officials in their cause. Another strategic element is the group's position with respect to the numerous access points established by formal governmental structures. The U.S. governmental structure forces officials into positions that demand a wide variety of sensitivities. Senators, for example, often like to have national or regional constituencies. Consequently, they are sensitive to all who can affect constituencies on that scale. Officials in a given bureau depend on the satisfaction of their restricted set of clients. Consequently, they are in a position to be threatened by anyone who can adversely affect the small set of clients. The wide variety of governmental positions

insures a wide variety of sensitivities. A group's position vis-a-vis these sensitivities is a critical strategic element in its efforts to achieve a desired governmental outcome. A final strategic element Truman noted was the information gathering capacity of a group. Some groups were in a position to find out about impending government action earlier than others. Still other groups could get precise information about when, where and how the battle for a governmental outcome was shaping up. Such advantages were often a function of informal connections and experience in government and were critical in determining the relative influence of one group over another.

Truman's contribution to an understanding of the character of group life and the mechanisms that allowed groups to be influential, then, was enormous. In looking at group cohesion, he was forced to recognize that a fuzzy common interest was not adequate to hold a group together on all issues. Leadership wielding the persuasive influence of office or manipulating the individual benefits of membership was an important condition for group cohesion. In addition, in looking at the role of leadership in groups, he became aware of the distinction between active minorities and the rest of the membership. He noted that in formal organizations, leadership was often tightly constrained by rigid expectations of members. In less formal or new organizations, or old organizations where the leaders controlled much of the group's collective property and members did not interact frequently, the leaders were able to move more freely. No leader was ever free, however, to devote no attention to the maintenance of the group membership, for nearly all depended on a cohesive membership for a strategic public appearance and resources sufficient to field an active minority. He also focused on the strategic position of the group vis-a-vis governmental machinery, and

identified three critical elements in a group's efforts to influence that machinery; the possibility of persuading other groups and officials that they had an appropriate position by virtue of their social position and expertise, the possibility of influencing some government official who by virtue of the peculiar sensitivities of his position was likely to be sensitive to this group, and the possibility of getting early and precise information about the character of the governmental battle. Thus, he began a discussion of the internal capacities of an interest group and its relation to the constraints and opportunities provided by formal governmental structures.

Mancur Olson provided an economic critique of existing interest group theory that sharpened some of the concepts and problems raised by Truman and others. Basically, the argument focused explicitly on the need for interest groups to maintain selective sanctions to compel the participation of people who stood to benefit from the provision of some collective good. A rough paraphrase of the argument is this:

- 1) Interest groups have typically been defined as groups that are organized to fulfill a common need or objective of the membership. For example, the textile industry supports a lobby for import quotas on textiles because the individual firms will all be able to internalize higher profits if the quotas are legislated. Similarly, Blacks contribute to Black leaders because they hope the leaders will be able to persuade the government to provide programs that will benefit primarily Black people.
- 2) An economist would define these common objectives as a collective good for the individuals in the group. It is a collective good because each individual in the group stands to benefit from its provision, and no one in the group may be feasibly excluded from enjoying the benefits of the good if or when it is provided. Thus, when a textile quota is imposed, all textile firms will benefit from the restricted supply of foreign textiles. It is politically and economically impossible to keep any particular textile firm from charging the higher price the market will allow when the supply is restricted. Similarly, it is politically impossible to exclude some individual Blacks from participation in a new public school in ghetto areas.

- 3) Olson then argued that the fact that some group stood to benefit from the provision of some collective good was not a sufficient condition for the group to organize in a way that enabled them to supply the collective good. In fact, since an individual in the group could not be excluded from enjoying the good when it was provided, it was in his interest to wait until some other individual in the group paid the cost of providing the good. He would then enjoy the benefits of the good without having had to pay for its provision. Since all individuals would be motivated by self interest to play this waiting game, the group would never organize to share the costs of providing themselves with the good, even though all would be better off if the good was provided. (This would not be the result if one individual valued his share of the collective good more than the total cost of supplying it. If this were the case, the individual would be motivated to pay the full cost of supplying the good by himself. These cases are rare in most political situations, though not impossible. Some officials have positions so powerful that supplying a collective good is relatively cheap to them as individuals. Consequently, even a relatively small personal evaluation of their share of a collective good may be sufficient to guarantee the provision of the good. Thus, Senator Russell Long is often motivated to maintain the oil depletion allowance even though his share of the benefits is fairly small. Similarly, President Kennedy was able to make a national park on Cape Cod, even though his share of that good was rather small.)
- 4) A group needs "selective sanctions" (i.e., rewards and punishments that could be dealt out in a discriminating way to individuals in the group) that could compel active participation in the group, and guarantee the sharing of the cost of the collective good. Sometimes these selective incentives were provided by group control over the distribution of the collective good that was provided. For example, unions were in a position to set up discriminating prices of labor by their collective strike power, and then were able to control which individual members of the union advanced to higher paid classes of workers. Other times, the selective incentives were provided by resources external to the collective good that was being provided. For example, unions compelled membership in their collective movement through picket lines that kept all who were not members of the union out of the factory. The union's ability to use force was independent of their ability to provide and distribute a collective good. Similarly, unions now set up pension funds from members' contributions. They can use the pension fund to control members, even though the existence of the fund is not directly related to their provision of the collective good. Thus, whether the selective incentives are derived from organizational control over the distribution of the collective good provided or from sources independent of the collective good, the selective incentives are necessary to compel membership and the sharing of the costs of providing the collective good.

With this argument, Olson brought even stronger emphasis to bear on the role of sanctions and incentives in maintaining group cohesiveness. He also defined more carefully than previous analysts had done, the character of a group's collective interest, and the variations among a group's evaluation of the value of a collective good. All people who stood to benefit from the provision of a particular collective good were potential members of the group. Those who valued their share of the collective good more than others (because their share was larger or their preferences simply favored the particular good) were the most likely candidates for active participants in the group. Olson, however, failed to be explicit about the institutional character of groups that could be established to control rights to shares of the collective good, nor consider the problems in moving to those institutional forms.

Our own typology uses some of the variables identified and defined by these other characterizations of group behavior. The critical parameters of our typology are:

- 1) The costs of the political coalition necessary to secure a desired governmental outcome that is pursued by a group as a collective good.
- 2) The number of people who stand to benefit from the provision of the collective good.
- 3) The capacities and incentives of the "executive unit" of the interest group
- 4) The resources and incentives of the membership and potential membership

The first two parameters describe the potential or actual scale of government intervention. The second two define the expected value and limits of that intervention.

The costs of setting up a political coalition sounds like a more precise and quantifiable variable than it really is. Any estimate of the costs of setting up a political coalition must use vague language, and will not be objectively demonstrable to all observers. However, the idea should convey a fairly discriminating sense of the process required to move the governmental machinery. Imagine yourself in the position of an individual who has a desired outcome in mind. In order for you to secure a desired outcome you must absorb all of the following kinds of costs.

- 1) Gather information about all those who have rights and resources necessary to guarantee and sufficient to block a desired outcome.
- 2) Gain "legitimate" access to those people who are needed (i.e., acquire a variety of "hunting licenses")
- 3) Be able to impress each of those you need with the current salience and individual benefits for an official in committing himself to a particular action in your policy area.
- 4) Be able to influence each individual to accept the appropriateness of your preferred outcome without making crippling concessions.
- 5) Sustain the interest and approval of the various groups throughout the long process of gathering other groups to the movement and reaching some critical mass or deadline where effective action is possible.
- 6) Experience great uncertainties since it is almost always impossible to obtain enough resources to identify threats to and adequately cover your flanks.

These categories point to the most significant classes of costs associated with organizing for effective action. The costs may be greater or lesser depending on the policy area and your own position. For example, some policy areas have long been battlegrounds. Relevant players are well known and locked into positions by previous commitments. Consequently, gathering information about necessary players is relatively inexpensive, while persuading the players is relatively expensive. In new policy areas not yet crisscrossed with well known arguments and established coalitions, it

may be more expensive to identify necessary and sufficient resources for an outcome to occur, but easier to aggregate the resources once they are identified and a favorable start made. The costs also depend critically on your own position. For "insiders," information about players is relatively less expensive than for "outsiders." Thus, costs vary from policy area to policy area, and from individual to individual.

The number of people who stand to benefit from the provision of some collective good also has an inaccurate connotation of quantifiability. It is extremely difficult to predict who will benefit from some collective good and how much. Still, it is possible to define different kinds of collective goods to give us more precise estimates of who will benefit.

A pure collective good is a good that no one may be excluded from enjoying and all who enjoy it have an equal part of the good. Defense of the U.S. is often considered the clearest example of such a good. The fact that all enjoy an equal share does not imply that all value their share equally, nor that all pay for the collective good equally. There are often significant variations in the public valuation and expenditures for a collective good. However, it is to say that no accidents of nature nor institutional decision-making divides up the share of the collective good (as a consumption item) in a selective or discriminating way.

An unequal access collective good is a good that is collective in that any individual may enjoy it once it is provided, but is unequally accessible to individuals because of an "accident" of nature. Some must pay more to enjoy the good (not to provide it, but to consume it) than others. A national ski resort located in Vermont would be an example. Although all individuals may enjoy the use of the good at a subsidized price, those who live nearest will have a lower transactions cost necessary to consume or use the collective good. Thus, the critical difference between this good and

a pure collective good is that the transactions costs of consuming one's share of the good fell unequally on people entitled to enjoy the collective good.

An exclusive collective good is a good that is equally available to all members of some exclusive group. In order to enjoy the good, one must become a formal member of an institution that controls rights of access to the collective good.⁵ However, once one is a member, he enjoys an equal share of the collective good with all other members. An example considered by Olson is the member of a labor union. An ordinary individual does not get the benefit of the higher wage paid to union members. Once he is a member, he shares equally with his fellows the benefits of the higher wage.

A discriminating exclusive collective good is a collective good like the one above that is controlled and rationed by the institution that provides and controls the collective good. Thus, unions may control the advancement of workers through a hierarchy of wage levels, or tennis clubs may allot more playing time to charter subscribers than to new members.

These distinctions among different kinds of collective goods are useful because the different kinds of goods have different implications for 1) the number of potential "members" and "contributors", and 2) the value of the collective good as an individual incentive to be a loyal member of, or a large contributor to, the organization. As a first cut, all those with a positive valuation of some unit of a collective good are potential members or contributors. Thus, a pure collective good will have more potential contributors than an unequal access collective good, and an unequal access good often more than an exclusive collective good. How loyal or generous individuals will be to those trying to provide the collective good, however,

depends not only on the value of the units of the collective good to be provided and individuals' preferences for those units, but also on 1) the degree of uncertainty about whether the good will be supplied and 2) the strategic consideration of whether it will be impossible, difficult or easy to exclude individuals from enjoying the good once it is provided. The more uncertain the possibility of the good being provided, the lower the incentive for contributions or loyalty. The more difficult to exclude individuals, the lower the incentive for individuals to contribute. The distinctions among the collective goods focus on these different factors that determine the size and loyalty of members. The number of potential members, and their degree of support, in turn, has an enormous impact on the expected, effective size of any organization.

Thus, the costs of setting up a new political coalition sufficient to generate a desired outcome, and the peculiar collective good character of the desired outcome set the stage for interest group activity. They are the major structural variables in that they define ranges of resources required and resources available. Where within that range any particular interest group falls depends on the micro conditions of the interest group's activity.

A characterization of the incentives and capacities of the executive unit and membership is an effort to capture the critical elements of an interest group's micro-conditions. The membership is separated from the executive unit in response to Truman's identification of the active minority and Olson's failure to identify an entrepreneur in providing collective good. The executive unit is assumed to comprise both leadership and whatever staff he is able to maintain. "Membership" is defined broadly to include "fellow-members" and latent interest groups that may be galvanized into action under some conditions.

Thus, membership becomes a spectrum of more or less committed and loyal parts of an organization.

For our purposes, we may categorize the incentives of the executive units of interest groups within three different classes. One kind of incentive is the executive unit's expected share of the collective good for which they organize. For example, the executive unit of the Sierra Club may work for conservation causes primarily because they are active hunters, hikers and fishermen who expect to capture a large share in the collective good for which they lobby. Another class of incentives are those implicit in representing and/or controlling a large organization. Sometimes the interest in maintaining a large organization derives from the financial incentives and job security available to the executive unit of a stable, dues paying membership. Other times, the psychological gratifications of leadership or advocacy are enough to motivate executive units to work hard on maintaining and increasing the number of people they may claim to represent or lead. The third set of incentives available to interest group leaders is that set of professional opportunities that are possible when one is an advocate in government circles. "Hobnobbing" with important and powerful men is often likely to pay off in an enhanced sense of self-importance and numerous opportunities for more interesting or higher paying jobs and positions. Similarly, the government is often critically concerned with difficult legal or analytic problems. Working on such problems before attentive and important forums is often a desirable objective for young professionals and others. Both the exercise of skills and the expected job possibilities are important pleasures motivating some executive units. Thus, the three classes of incentives are: 1) expected share of a collective good 2) the financial or psychological rewards from representing or controlling

a group, and 3) the opportunities for making professional contacts and exercising professional skills with powerful people.

It is assumed that the incentives that motivate the work of the executive unit play a key role in structuring the capabilities of the executive unit. Those executive units marked by a primary interest in financial benefits from a loyal membership will be motivated to do all they can to maintain or increase the size of their group. Those who are interested primarily in a collective good may allow their membership to dwindle in order to devote more time to active lobbying. Those units who enjoy professional relations with Washington officials may ignore both membership and the collective good to help Washington officials as analysts or mediators. Obviously no executive unit is dominated by one set of incentives. All are important and all will attract some of the executive unit's time. However, the mix of the incentives will have an important impact on the mix of the executive unit's time, and consequently, an important impact on their capability.

The incentives of the membership may be classified for our purposes into two different categories. One set of incentives is each member's preference for an expected share of the collective good that the group will provide. Another set of incentives are those benefits that accrue to individuals who participate in group activities that are not related to the provision and distribution of the collective good for which they organized. In practice, it is difficult to maintain this distinction among the different kinds of incentives. The group's collective ownership of goods, property and services often becomes confused with their efforts to provide collective goods that may be used by members. In fact, once a good is supplied by the government, it often appears to be the collective property of the group. It will be

difficult, then, to define what is common property of a group and what is the collective good provided to the group. The difficulty will be greater the older the group because of the tendency of the group to organize and routinize control over the provision of collective goods and their tendency to acquire property and services with the regular membership contributions.

Still, the distinctions is important to our purposes. The assumption is that the more important the non-collective good incentives of membership, the more time the executive unit must spend in responding to particular needs and interests or in managing the internal funds and behaviors of the membership. Consequently, to know whether a group is primarily interested in a collective good or primarily concerned with selective incentives that are not related to a share of the desired collective good, one must look at how the executive unit spends their time and how much collective property (as opposed to what collective good the organization controls) the group owns. Common examples of non-collective good incentives are pension funds, annual dinners or weekly socials, an expectation of appearing on T.V., or the satisfaction of striking a morally correct posture. Common examples of collective goods are new social service programs, an import quota on commodity X or an unpolluted section of a river.

The "capacities" of the membership are only partly determined by the incentives. The incentives determine a degree of loyalty to the executive unit. The stronger the incentives (whether dependent on the collective good or the benefits supplied directly by the member oriented action of the executive unit), the more loyal the members. The degree of loyalty, in turn, determines the probability that the membership's "slack political resources" will be mobilized on cue from the executive unit. The slack political

resources include such things as money, social status, access to media, votes, or control over important economic institutions. Thus, the capacities of the membership are primarily determined by the position of the membership in ordinary social life -- not by their role or interest in the interest group. The interest group often has an important role in determining the expected value of those capacities to government officials by being in a stronger or weaker position to mobilize the membership's capacities.

Given this discussion of the parameters, what kind of typology have we built up? Consider first the parameters of the micro system. We defined three classes of incentives that marked the interest of the executives, and two classes that marked the interest of the membership. This gives us a two by three matrix illustrated in Chart #1.

Chart #1

Executive Unit motivated by:	Members Primarily Motivated by:	
	Selective Incentives	Share of Collective Good
Share of Collective Good	I	II Entrepreneurial Group
Leadership of Organization	III Stagnant Group	IV Advocates
Professional Opportunities	V	VI Expediting Group

Cells I and V describe groups that are not likely to arise. If the membership of a group is primarily motivated by selective incentives, they must have an executive unit greatly concerned with leading, organizing, and encouraging the membership. Thus, there is a presumption that only executive units, primarily motivated by such interests will be effective in holding a group together. Sometimes, as an executive unit achieves prominence as either

a provider of collective goods or as distinguished professionals, it may attract membership to bask in the reflected glow of their prominence. However, these incentives are not likely to be reliable or long lasting incentives. Members with professional ambitions may stay on to become part of the executive unit, but few members or contributors not interested primarily in a share of the collective good will stay on.

Cell #II describes an entrepreneurial group. As Olson pointed out, when there are a few individuals who stand to benefit a great deal from a collective good, a collective good may be supplied. The costs to these few individuals are sufficiently low relative to their expected share of the benefits and the negotiation and organizing sufficiently easy to have a few individuals go into a partnership in providing a good. As they increase the probability of supplying the good and also possibly erect the basic institutional structures that will allow exclusion, the discounting of the value of the collective good to other individuals due to uncertainty and strategic bargaining will decrease. As a result, they may attract others to their cause. The members they attract will be those who value relatively highly their expected share of the collective good.

Cell #III defines the parameters of a "stagnant" interest group. In this group, there is not incentive for the executive unit to spend time making political demands or aiding government officials in efforts to provide collective goods. The objectives of the executive unit are to maintain a large and loyal membership. The large and loyal membership is dependent on regular meetings, other group functions, or effective management of the group's membership dues or pension plan. Consequently, the time of the executive unit goes toward the internal management of the group. This situation will exist until the preferences of the executive unit change,

and/or the executive unit finds itself with more members and money than it needs to satisfy those interests. Should the preferences of the executive unit change, then the group may be used by the executive as a platform for satisfying other interests.

Cell #IV is a description of what many people expect when they think of an interest group. The membership is primarily interested in the maintenance or provision of some particular collective good. They hire or maintain a staff to provide them with that good. As long as the executive unit is successful in providing the desired collective good, its job is secure. Should the executive unit fail to provide the good, the membership will fall away and the job of the executive unit disappear.

Cell #VI describes groups that are interest groups nearly incidentally. The executive unit is primarily interested and active in professional roles in Washington. Their success in this role may sometimes depend on an appearance of organized interest behind them since access to officials may only be possible originally as a representative of a group. Consequently, some of their time will be attracted to these efforts. However, they are likely to depend primarily on the voluntary contributions of individuals to claim a membership and devote little time to actively courting members. By serving as useful resources to harried officials, they may increase the probability of a particular outcome. The increased probability of the collective good may be their greatest membership drawing card. Thus, as expeditors to government officials, they may attract some loyalty and contributions from those who stand to benefit from the provision of the collective good.

Thus, by dichotomizing the groups into an executive unit and the membership, and the incentives facing these different units into 5 different

categories, we may describe four "ideal types" of organizations. If we place these four ideal types in a matrix with the different kinds of collective goods, we may observe the effects of the interdependencies of the micro systems with the character of the collective good they seek as a governmental outcome. Chart #2 illustrates this new matrix.

Stagnant groups are only likely to exist with non-exclusive collective goods. If the collective good that is being sought is exclusive, then it is likely that an individual's share in the good is an important incentive for group membership. The importance of the collective good as an incentive to membership is inconsistent with our definition of a stagnant group. Thus, to remain consistent with our definition of stagnant groups, we must assume that the groups are interested only in collective goods that are not likely to serve as strong individual incentives. Pure and unequal access collective goods are both unlikely to offer strong individual incentives to a membership.

Chart #2 - Type of Collective Good

	Pure	Unequal Access	Exclusive	Exclusive Discrimination
Stagnant	Utopian Club	Utopian Club	---	---
Entrepreneurs	Crusader	Parochial Crusader	Catalytic Organizers	Empire Builders
Expeditors	Expediter	---	Expediter	Expediter
Advocates	----	----	Representatives	Bargaining Units

Differentiating among entrepreneurs with respect to the type of collective good they seek yields more interesting distinctions. Entrepreneurs interested in pure collective goods are not likely to be able to benefit from or maintain a regular organization. They must count on unsolicited support

from those who are sympathetic, but necessarily skeptical and unwilling to commit much of their resources. Both the character of the good that such entrepreneurs seek and the style they must adopt to maximize unsolicited contributions are consistent with the connotations of "crusader."

Entrepreneurs interested in exclusive groups, however, must have the beginnings of an organizational structure behind them. They have the opportunity to increase the size and loyalty of that organization as they 1) increase the probability of the good being supplied, and 2) demonstrate that the good can be excluded from those who do not help pay the cost of providing it. Hence, they become catalysts for increasing numbers to contribute the provision of the desired outcome.

Entrepreneurs interested in obtaining exclusive discriminating collective goods hold the potential for more systematic empire building. Membership in this case depends not on the relatively weak links of sympathetic contribution, or catalytic action, but rather on the discriminating distribution of shares of the collective good to members on the basis of their loyalty and contribution. Thus, the entrepreneurs show much different capacities for increasing and controlling their organization depending on the particular character of the collective good they are trying to obtain. The crusader hopes for unsolicited contributions for his public struggle, while the empire builder hoards expected shares of a collective good to be handed out on a quid pro quo basis to people eager and willing to pay for a share of the good.

Expeditors do not change their character in any noticeable way no matter what kind of collective good they seek. In all events, they try to remain closely linked to interesting professional opportunities. Their behavior is shaped by those professional opportunities rather than the ultimate result

of exploiting the opportunities.

Advocates are not likely to appear in search of pure or unequal access collective goods. Our definitions of advocate groups were ones where the membership was interested in a collective good, and the executive unit primarily interested the the membership. The interest of the executive unit in the membership guarantees an organization. Since there is a strong organization and the interests of the members are in a collective good, the presumption is that the organization will be one that can exclude non-members from enjoying the collective good, and include members in the benefits of the good. No executive unit interested in membership would lose the possibility of handing out shares of the collective good in ways that increased membership. Thus, no advocate will be in the business of providing anything but exclusive goods. Whether we provide exclusive or discriminating exclusive groups, however, is an important distinction. The distinction is in the strength of the member's loyalty to the executive unit. If the executive unit cannot control individual members' shares of the collective good, then there is no strong reason for them all to support the leadership faithfully. They simply expect the executive unit to supply the good at fairly low cost to them. The members hedge their payments because paying more will not increase their members' share appreciably. On the other hand, if the executive unit controls the distribution of shares of the collective good, there will be stronger incentives for individual members to pay for shares at their individual margins. This means that the executive unit may extract more loyalty or resources from membership. Because the exclusive good does not give the executive unit much authority, the executive unit merely represents the group. He cannot make binding agreements. Because the discriminating exclusion allows the executive unit to more strictly control and motivate members, the executive

unit achieves some reliable control over the membership. This reliable control implies opportunities for bargaining and making binding agreements in addition to representation.

Thus, our typology allows us to distinguish among essentially seven different kinds of groups. They are:

- 1) Stagnant groups (may become platform groups)
- 2) Expediting groups
- 3) Crusaders
- 4) Catalytic organizers.
- 5) Empire builders
- 6) Representative Advocates
- 7) Bargaining Advocates

} Entrepreneurs

This typology will be primarily useful to us if we can associate the different kinds of groups with the different governmental needs. The more closely the capacities of the groups meet governmental needs, the more the groups will be able to lower the costs of the government organizing for desired outcomes, and the more likely the desired outcome becomes. Chart #3 presents a rough first cut at how the different groups may be expected to fulfill governmental needs. The process of influence is described in a more detailed and dynamic way in the next section.

E. A Model of Interest Group Influence

The basic model of interest group influence is this: government officials occupy strategic positions vis-a-vis the exercise of governmental authority: they are motivated to produce governmental action because they must face a variety of publics who expect them to do so and who hold some sanctions over them; some of the relevant "publics" are comprised of

non-governmental personnel; sometimes these publics are in a position to lower the costs to a government officials of producing a desired governmental outcome; they lower the costs by providing auxiliary resources that fill gaps in the officials own resources, or by reducing the uncertainties about the consequences of an officials action; when a group can lower the costs to an official, it will do so in a way that makes the outcome approach their desired outcome or make clear the official's indebtedness to them; at a later date the indebtedness can be traded for a favor. In short, effective influence depends on how interest groups may lower the costs and raise the benefits of a particular governmental action. This is a complex function of the positions of many government officials and the capacities of the non-governmental groups. So far, we have skirted around the complexities. We have examined them on a piecemeal basis. The purpose of this section is to try to trace out the complexities and interdependencies in a systematic way. Much of what follows will be summaries of previous sections. Much of the remainder will also appear unduly complex and pedantic. I can only plead for tolerance until the next draft. Let's begin by trying to characterize the critical actors.

The public can be characterized as a shifting, fine-grained mosaic. Fine-grained because of the number of idiosyncratic individual positions and collections of attitudes that are the basic units of the public. The shifting quality derives from the fact that the salience of issues and positions change frequently and irregularly. The mosaic character implies that the fine grained issues and positions are clustered into larger schemes, both logically and socially. These larger patterns change slowly with respect to one another. But within each larger pattern, small changes occur rapidly.

This over-view of the public is slightly different than the perspective that is characteristic of this analysis. The analysis in this

paper has been primarily in terms of specific outcomes. Viewed from the perspective of a particular outcome, much of the public recedes into unimportance as an uninterested or inattentive or apolitical group. One is left with a narrowed view of an attentive public. However, even within that narrowed view of an attentive public, the shifting mosaic pattern still exists. Potential members of groups lurk behind the self-conscious ranks. Common perceptions and interests lie smoldering waiting to be kindled by a catalytic spark. Political entrepreneurs stand ready to articulate a demand that could alter the interests and mobilize the energies of previously inattentive individuals. Thus, the characterization of the public as a shifting kaleidoscope is as relevant when looking at a particular outcome as when scanning the publics embroiled in all the governmental issue areas.

Out of publics, members and contributors are formed. As we have seen members of groups or contributors to lobbying or political activity may be attracted to the role of member or contributor by a variety of incentives. Sometimes an individual is attracted to membership because he hopes to share in the value of a collective good provided by the lobbying activity. His willingness to contribute increases with the probability that the good will be supplied and the probability that he may be excluded to a greater or lesser degree from enjoying the collective good. Alternatively, an individual may be attracted to a group because of values other than an expected share of a collective good. He may be threatened into joining, or may join because of a desired moral position. He may enjoy affiliation with the other members, or simply desire to benefit in some "fringe benefits" of belonging to the group, such as participating in a pension plan supported by members' contributions. Thus, publics become members or contributors to organizations that may provide a collective good that they value, or to organizations that provide a variety of incentives not directly related to the success or failure of their lobbying

activity.

Executive units are groups or individuals in the business of articulating the interest of a more or less well-defined public. Note that it is not always necessary that the executive units be closely tied to their membership, contributors, or latent public. Many executive units do not have strong or regular ties to a well defined set of constituents. Newspapers, for example, often act as executive units for some badly defined, unself-conscious, and inactive public. Similarly, "crusaders" often begin strong, independent lobbying activities with only the public quality of their objective to lend credibility to their role as a "representative" of the public.

As also noted in earlier sections, executive units may be in the business of articulating interests for more than one reason. Sometimes they are public advocates because they value very highly their expected share of the public good for which they are lobbying. Other times, they enjoy the professional roles and opportunities they may exploit in governmental arenas. Finally, some enjoy the sense of authority and/or responsibility that accrues to those who "lead" large groups of people.


Government officials are people who by law or formal structure are able to commit some part of the governmental resources to a particular outcome. They are motivated to produce outcomes because they are evaluated by their colleagues and publics by their record of accomplishments. A favorable evaluation keeps them successfully employed. An unfavorable evaluation may leave them frustrated and unemployed. Despite their motivation, they are often unable to achieve outcomes because the governmental machinery is very difficult to move. Decentralized power imposes large costs and uncertainties on those who try to move it towards a desired outcome.

Their shortage of resources necessary to move the machinery leads government officials to seek the help of non-governmental groups. The outcome the official desires determines in part the capacities of the group to act. The capacities of the group to act in part determines the outcome that an official seeks and his chances of obtaining it.

Chart #3 outlines the various actors we have described and the various ways they work on one another. Although the chart appears complex, it is merely a summary of some of the major categories and hypotheses of the paper. This chart is the general model of non-governmental involvement in policy struggles.

Notice that any circle on the chart is potentially an equilibrium position. For example, it is possible sometimes to explain the work of government officials in producing governmental outcomes simply on the basis of their professional role within the governmental machinery. To some extent, Models II and III are primarily concerned with the small flows described by I and II in our flow diagram. Player's stakes and organizational health are often linked only to the evaluations of other parts of the governmental machinery. A cycle including flows I, III and IV is the traditional model of electoral, democratic politics. To a great extent these flows are like those of an advocate group with the government official playing the role of the executive unit. Officials are motivated to act for the good of their constituency in the expectation that they will be continually re-elected. The cycle with VIII and IX emphasized at the expense of flows III, V and VI define the expediting interest group. The cycle emphasizing VI and VII define the stagnant interest group. A cycle including I, III, IIIa, VI and VII defines the action of the advocate-type interest group. Each of these cycles has some stability and describes some part of our typology.

Chart #3



(One of the interesting potential uses of the chart is to trace the changes that occur in the way that interest groups relate to the government. As some flows increase in strength and others atrophy, the groups will dramatically change their nature and future potential.)

From the chart, it is also possible to define the conditions under which group influence is likely to be effective in furthering the governmental outcome. Flow I in fact represents a vector of different costs that must be absorbed by government officials in producing outcomes. The particular costs that cannot be covered by the government official must be covered by the resources provided by streams VIII, III, IIIa, or II. If, for example, a government official is trying to persuade a colleague that a current issue is salient, he must be able to demonstrate clearly a large magnitude in flows IIIa, or III. Unless he can do so, he will be unable to persuade his colleague that action is desirable. Alternatively, he may not be able to demonstrate through clear arguments that his position on a salient issue is the appropriate one. Unless he is aided by an appropriate element of flow VIII of sufficient magnitude, the government official will not be able to cover the costs necessary for political organization. Thus, the conditions for effective influence must be that $I - (IIIa + VIII) \leq II + III$, since $I - (IIIa + VIII)$ represents the costs to the individual official required to produce the outcome, and $II + III$ equals the benefits the government official anticipates from producing the outcome.

Two things about this solution should be noted. First, it is not always the case that interest groups are needed. When $I \leq II + III$, the collective good will be provided without the aid of the interest group. Second, these flows represent vectors with many varied and specific variables. Flow VIII, for example, includes a variety of connections with other professionals,

and analytic skills as general categories. The particular outcome may require a particular subset of both these general cases. Unless the group matches those needs at exactly a detailed level, the total cost vector will not be covered sufficiently. Thus, the success of groups in fulfilling the conditions for effective influence may be very irregular, and may be closely tied to a very restricted policy area and/or particular official.

III. Dominant Inference Pattern:

If a government performs an action, it was made possible at least partly by the activities of non-governmental groups. Without different cues from public representatives that reduced uncertainty, analytic help that guided the government official in policy choices, or help in creating and sustaining necessary coalitions, the particular governmental action would not have occurred. The particular kind of help offered by a particular non-governmental group had important effects on the ultimate character of the governmental outcome.

IV. General Propositions:

1. Government officials are interested in pleasing their clients or constituencies for a variety of reasons. Because they do not know what their clients' interests will be, they search for cheap clues about the expected response. Consequently, they are likely to be swayed by dominant voices. Dominant voices are those that speak from a well organized platform, or articulate an interest that has some potential for mobilizing important constituencies.

2. Because government officials must often consider more issues than they have time for, they are frequently confused. Despite their confusion, they must decide. Consequently, they may be radically influenced by expert opinion or partisan analysis. Consequently, groups that can provide them with their own partisan analysis or bring them into contact with people recognized as experts are likely to be influential.

3. Political entrepreneurship is both risky and expensive. Official time and resources are short. Consequently, there is little successful action until a coalition is nearly completely established. Consequently, groups that can rough out successful coalitions, or reduce the costs and uncertainty of political organization are likely to be influential.

4. The detailed character of governmental needs implies that the influence of groups is likely to be sharply restricted to some particular policy area, or control over some particular official. Both these restrictions may loosen as a result of experience in Washington or of increased capacity to mobilize and control a larger organization.

5. Crises and widely perceived evil in the society will increase the benefits and lower the risks of governmental action. Therefore, groups that can generate crises or crystallize widespread beliefs and anxieties are likely to be influential.

6. The needs of policy makers are often much different than those of policy implementers. Consequently, a group that was successful in policy making circles may be unsuccessful in efforts to affect policy implementation.

FOOTNOTES

1. At this stage "groups" are defined as any collection of individuals. It includes collections of people who share at least one common characteristic such as occupation (e.g., electricians), age (e.g., the youth), or some characteristic behavior (e.g., rioters, looters) etc. as well as collections of individuals who have self-conscious, formal ways of relating to one another. Later we will distinguish these different kinds of groups and illustrate their different capacities for intervening in governmental outcomes.
2. Note that a claim is not being made that the behavior of these non-governmental groups uniquely determine governmental outcomes. As is the case with the other paradigms, this one is explicated because it captures some part of governmental processes which, if ignored by an analyst, would lead the analyst to predict incorrectly or inadequately explain an outcome. As is also the case with the other paradigms, the popular politics paradigm is sometimes incorrectly used to explain all of a governmental outcome. For example, an analyst might conclude that the peculiar shape of the Rent Guidelines Commission in New York City was uniquely determined by the collision of unorganized tenant pressure and the articulate interests of an organized real estate industry. Though such an argument might capture much of the determinants of the Rent Guidelines Commission, it would fail to explain the particular people that were appointed to the commission and the impact of these appointments on the ultimate behavior of the commission.
3. Note that it is not being argued that these individual evaluations are accurate or fair. The fact that they rarely are either accurate or fair does not often diminish the motivation of government officials to act appropriately in the eyes of a variety of publics. In fact, many are made much more anxious to avoid the smallest hint of irresponsibility by the inaccuracy of most estimates.
4. In Model II terms, these mechanisms would be SOPs.
5. In effect, becoming a member of the group is a particular kind of transactions cost, i.e., an expenditure of resources to achieve a position where consumption is possible. As a transactions cost, membership is analytically no different than the travel costs required to reach Yellowstone National Park. However, it differs from the travel costs in that the costs are imposed by an institutional group legally empowered to control rights rather than by some accidents of nature.
6. Groups in a position of providing exclusive collective goods probably show characteristics that resemble "critical mass hypotheses." At the beginning, individuals discount heavily the value of the good because of uncertainty and the possibility that others will pay and they will still benefit. As an organization begins to form, the probability of the good being supplied in an exclusive and reliable way increases. Hence, those that were previously marginally interested, became actively interested. Each new surge of membership makes the next surge more likely until the value of the expected share of the collective good declines faster than the probability of it being supplied increases.