MUNICIPAL POLICING

A Note on the Industry and Strategic Managerial Issues

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Table of Contents

LIST OF EXHIBITS

I. INTRODUCTION

The purposes of this note are three: first, to place the urban police function and the management of large metropolitan police forces in the context of other economic and governmental activities to facilitate comparison between the tasks of police executives and others; second, to highlight the nature of the strategic choices currently facing police executives; and third, to locate and analyze the important institutional relationships that become the focus of managerial attention and effort. Of necessity, the presentation will be brief and stark. A broad overview of this type cannot properly qualify each general statement about the history, current practices, and performance of urban policing. Nor can it reliably reflect the subtle but crucial differences among the local political settings within which actual decisions about organizational mission and strategy are made.

What the note can do, however, is to focus attention on a key managerial issue: how a police executive should think about and describe the mission of his organization. This might appear to be an irrelevant or academic question. One could argue for example, that the mission of urban police forces is already well known and established; or that the police executive has little role to play in defining the organizational mission; or that mere thought and talk about organizational mission has little effect on actual operations. An alternative view, however, is that the question of organizational mission ought to be the dominant concern of police executives. One could defend this view by insisting that important substantive issues about policing remain to be resolved, that the police executive can (and inevitably does) play an influential role in resolving those issues, and that the articulation of a coherent conception of an urban police strategy helps to implement it by shaping expectations and capturing support from the institutional environment, and by allowing police executives to sift the issues and tasks that come before them for their strategic significance and resolve them in a consistent way. It is not necessary to decide these issues now. But we would argue that it is valuable to entertain the view that it is worth thinking hard about the organizational mission of urban police forces, at least for the duration of the Management Institute.

Note that an organizational mission or strategy is not chosen in the abstract. What a given police force can be supported and organized to do depends crucially on the existing institutional setting. If the external political environment will not support or the existing organization cannot be made toperform a given mission. it does little good to conceive of it. To be useful, a concept of the organization's mission must be sustainable in a given institutional setting. This principle may seem to imply that the continuation of the status quo is usually the right strategy. Reflection suggests, however, that this need not be the case. The institutional setting may have changed enough to have made the old organizational mission inappropriate. Or, there may be enough slack in the institutional setting to accommodate several different concepts of organizational mission. Alternatively, it might even turn out that deft and determined managerial action could alter the institutional setting to allow a new concept to emerge that would not have been sustainable before. In any case, the intellectual problem for a strategically minded police executive is to have some alternative conception of an organizational mission, to consider how these might be fitted into a given political and institutional setting, and to see what managerial tasks and problems would be created by adopting one mission rather than another.

This note seeks to provide grist for this particular intellectual mill. We will look first at the context of urban policing in the U.S.: the size and scale of the industry, the history of its development, and its current traditions and ambiguities. Then, we will look at the internal operations of police departments: their diverse tasks, organizational structures, operating procedures and potential for productivity gains. Next we will examine the external political environment of police departments: mayors, public opinion, press, unions, and other elements of the criminal justice system. Finally, we will focus explicitly on the job of police executives: its terms and conditions, the sources of managerial influence, and the personal and strategic choices that police executives must make.

II. THE CONTEXT OF URBAN POLICING IN THE U.S.

Scale and Significance of Urban Policing

Viewed in strictly economic terms urban policing is an unexpectedly large industry. More than 13,000 municipal police departments now exist in the U.S. Approximately $11 billion are expended each year to support their activities. And about 500,000 people are employed. These facts make urban policing one of the top industries in the U.S.

When viewed as a fundamental governmental function, the importance of urban policing is even more apparent. Indeed, it is somewhat ironic that the economic importance of policing tends to pale when placed in the context of all governmental expenditures. Metropolitan policing accounts for only about 10% of all municipal expenditures (see Exhibit 1). Expenditures for public utilities and education both loom larger in municipal budgets than policing, and expenditures for sanitation, public welfare, roads, fire protection, and hospitals are each only slightly less than expenditures for policing. In fact, on a per capita basis policing costs urban residents $50 to $100 per year—less than the cost of a daily newspaper, insuring an automobile, or, indeed, less than the average costs of crime insurance premiums.

What makes policing so important to municipalities is not its economic impact, then, but the simple fact that policemen come to be the most familiar and important representatives of government. The police achieve this prominence as a result of three characteristics. First, no government agency is more accessible to individual citizens than the police: they are open 24 hours per day, and on the street in visible cars and uniforms. If they are not within view, a free phone call can command a police officer's presence quickly. Second, partly as a result of their accessibility (some would say vulnerability) to citizens, the police have tended to develop a wide range of skills to accommodate diverse citizen demands. As individual patrol officers, they are capable of surprising burglars, chasing robbers, resolving family disputes, dispersing unruly groups that are frightening other residents, administering first aid, transporting injured or lost people, finding suspected gas leaks and opening locked houses. As departments, they not only field these generalized patrol officers, but also maintain

specialized capacities to control traffic, keep the peace in public meetings and demonstrations, confront and control rioters, and monitor the activities of organized crime. Ready availability and broad capabilities alone would make the police a very important municipal agency. But when we add to these observations the third characteristic--that the police are armed and empowered to arrest and charge people with crimes--their claim to primacy among municipal functions seems assured. As convenient handymen and as agents who wield government's most coercive powers against citizens, the police inevitably become the most significant representatives of urban government.

Historical Development

Of course, the police function has not always been this central to urban governmental activities. In fact, policing as we now know it is a relatively new institution. Its growth and development have been retarded by our traditional distrust of governmental power. In both England and the U.S., the mandate to create large, specialized urban police forces was given reluctantly and only after other methods of keeping the peace and protecting lives and property from attacks by others had completely failed.

In England, the earlier systems had relied almost exclusively on the moral, persuasive and punitive qualities of the law to dissuade citizens from illegal behavior and to maintain order. No specialized, governmentally sponsored institution existed to prevent crime, apprehend offenders, or quell disorder. The only existing institutional models for such forces were large paramilitary units brought in to control widespread disorder, and networks of informants and agent-provocateurs that were common in France. Since both these models threatened valued political freedoms, such forces were only occasionally deployed. The result was that the tasks of watching and arresting were left almost entirely to the voluntary efforts of private citizens. Occasionally, reward money would be offered and some specialized enforcement efforts beyond those supplied by private citizens would be spawned. But this activity was inevitably small and often manipulated by one criminal against another. To compensate for the weak efforts to detect offenses and apprehend offenders, the laws of the time established truly Draconian punishments. Many petty offenses were subject to capital punishment.

As cities in England became more unruly, and as the demands for public order increased, it became apparent that private efforts supported by a very small constabulary were simply not strong enough to maintain civil and political order. The traditional reluctance to deploy a specialized force to maintain order was breached in England in 1829 when persistent lobbying by Sir Robert Peel secured the passage of the Metropolitan Police Act. Shortly thereafter, "peelers," "bobbies," or "Peel's bloody gang" began patrolling the streets of London in force.

The first commissioners, Rowan and Mayne, were acutely aware of the antagonism of the citizenry to police. Their response was to instruct the constables to be civil and neutral at all times in their dealings with citizens. They were to be uniformed but unarmed except for a concealed truncheon. Even that was to be used only under great duress. Yet even that caution did not immediately dispel the suspicion with which police were viewed. Police were regularly assaulted. Members of the upper classes whipped police as they passed them in their carriages. The press was laudatory when the first police officer was killed by a crowd. Eventually, however, the principles of Peel and the effective administration of Rowan and Mayne created a police force that earned the respect (even admiration) of English citizens.

In the U.S., the parish constable system was exported to the American colonies and seemed to work to the satisfaction of citizens until the early 1800's. Except in the South where cities like Charlestown, Savannah and Richmond had regular mounted and foot patrols to deal with slaves and challenges to the slavery system, the colonies (later the states) relied on night watches and unpaid police. But by the 1830's, cities such as New York, Boston and Philadelphia were having many of the same difficulties as London. Immigration was increasing rapidly. Political, racial, economic, religious and moral cleavages developed in cities and resulted in widespread disorder during the 1830's and 1840's. Finally, in 1845, New York City established a municipal police force based on the English model. Boston and Philadelphia followed shortly thereafter. By 1855 cities as far west as Milwaukee had established police departments.

Although modeled after the Metropolitan Police, there were at least two significant differences between the English and American police. First, the English police received and still maintain, their mandate from the Crown, a

central authority with a strong traditional claim on legitimate authority. In the United States police receive their mandate from local governmental units whose legitimacy is created more by political processes than traditional authority. Thus, the American police context is one of political pluralism, decentralization, and local control. Second, while rigid class distinctions divided England, English society is relatively homogeneous when compared to the ethnic, religious, and moral diversity that overlay the class structure of the United States. From the beginnings of policing in the United States these issues, decentralized authority, sharply limited powers and legitimacy, and cultural diversity, have peculiarly affected American policing and distinguished its style from the British. The "bobbie" was to be civil, but impersonal, distant, and remote. His aloofness was to insure his impartiality. In America, policing was to be more democratic. The police officer was to be a part of his beat and relate more personally to his charges.

While this democratic orientation was congruent with American decentralized political institutions of the time, it became the source of enduring problems with which police administrators and reformers have struggled since the earliest days of publicly sponsored policing. First, local, or even district accountability, led to struggles over control of police agencies, police districts and even beats. Individual officers, district commanders, chiefs, were all vulnerable to political control and manipulation for partisan or illegal purposes. Second, local control resulted in fragmentation of police services. Each city, jurisdiction, etc. had its own police agency, coordination was minimal and lateral entry forbidden. Thus, early policing in the U.S. both lacked a unifying mandate and an occupational culture.

The problem of political control of policing became a major issue in the last decades of the nineteenth century. At this time political machines were being constructed and operated in the major cities of the country. A natural result was that, in Robert Fogelson's phrase, police departments became "adjuncts to the machine." As adjuncts to the political machine, the police departments were managed as a source of jobs and upward mobility, and their enforcement efforts bent to accommodate the cultural diversity and decentralized power that characterized local cities. In many ways, they were more a "central cog" than a mere "adjunct" of the machine.

To the reformers in the progressive movement who despised the disorder in the cities almost as much as the growing power of the machines, the "corruption" of the police forces became a central problem. In many cities throughout the country they waged reform campaigns which left the following institutional results: a commitment to crime control as the primary objective of municipal police departments; a paramilitary form of organization; an organizational structure that centralized command at top levels of the organization and created functional rather than geographic specialists beneath this top level; rigid civil service systems; and specialized methods for appointing and terminating police chiefs that guaranteed some independence from the chief political executives of the cities. In short, the legacy of the reform movement was the development of a strategic conception of policing as a professionalized crime fighting force.

The first wave of reform did not succeed everywhere. In fact, it suffered serious setbacks during the era of Prohibition. But in the late 1940's-1960, the movement to create professionalized crime fighting police forces continued to advance. Starting in the 40's, the police began to make increasing use of transportation and communication technology. With cars, telephones and radios, it suddenly became possible to think of instantaneous responses to alarms as well as coordinated patrol operations. This meshed neatly with the paramilitary tradition and centralized authority of police departments. In addition, the Unified Crime Report came into existence and tied overall police department performance perhaps irrevocably to managing levels of Part I offenses (i.e., homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft). This accounting scheme meshed neatly with the crime control orientation of the reformers. Finally, in 1967, the President's Crime Commission issued its report and, as one of its major thrusts, recommended a substantial upgrading of police personnel standards. Each of these historical developments lent support to the original conception of an independent, professional crime fighting police force.

In the sixties, however, a challenge to this conception of policing developed. Several scholars began to voice concerns about the increasing distance between the police forces and the communities they policed. They began to talk about

the need for close relationships with the community and emphasized the dangers of independence rather than the benefits. This view gained credibility in the late sixties as the civil rights movement confronted the police.

The challenge posed by the civil rights movement was simply enormous. The movement embraced legitimate political groups that engaged in civil disobedience, disorderly riots that were sometimes characterized as political actions but seemed more often to be expressive collective outbursts, and the emergence of terrorist groups. Coping with each aspect of the movement alone placed enormous demands on the police. But the real problem was sorting out which events were which. The riots posed a stark trade-off between the law enforcement and order maintenance functions of the police. Aggressive enforcement seemed to both spawn and spread the disorder. Similarly, coping with political groups that appeared to be capable of generating riots, sniping and terrorism created enormous tension between commitments to protect first amendment political liberties, and at the same time protect cities from the violence of riots and terrorism. Thus, profesional crime fighting came into conflict with order maintenance and the protection of important political rights.

At the same time that the police were struggling to accomodate a concern for political rights in their operations, the courts were expanding individual rights in criminal cases and substantially restricting police investigative procedures. Constitutional protections against electronic surveillance were extended to apply in all states. The exclusionary rule made illegally gathered evidence useless in prosecutions. And Miranda required the police to inform defendants of their rights during police investigations. These actions may or may not have "handcuffed" the police. But what the fuss about these actions did accomplish was to create a widespread perception that there was an important conflict between effective crime fighting and individual freedoms, and that the police had been willing to sacrifice important personal freedoms to control crime. This inevitably tarnished the image of crime fighting--at least among some segments of the population, most notably judges.

A third factor chipping away at the commitment to professional crime control was the emergence of militant police unionism in the 1970's. That rank and file patrolmen would band together for protection and reassurance in these last two

decades cannot be considered surprising. After all they were poorly paid despite the fact that many people thought they should have professional status, and the cities at the time seemed able to provide for higher salaries. Moreover, they were under enormous stress. They were being shot at and spat upon. Concepts of how they should do their job were constantly changing. There were major efforts to place their professional careers in the hands of amateurs through civilian review boards. Recruitment, selection and training patterns were all changing so that social tensions were reflected in the locker rooms of the precinct stations. And if all this weren't enough, eventually affluence gave way to austerity in the cities and the police were threatened with layoffs, restricted promotional opportunities and threats to their pensions. No wonder they would seek protection and solace in tight fraternities.

The only problem was that the trend towards unionism struck at the idea of police professionalism in at least two ways. First, by organizing as a union, the police tended to undercut both the paramilitary tradition of a unified chain of command, and the emergent concept of independent profesionals who possessed unique skills and had an internal commitment to quality performance. Neither image was consistent with the formation of a union. Second, the unions became involved in substantive political debates that were broader than issues of pay and performance for patrolmen. They became advocates of political causes which further weakened the concept of a neutral bureaucratic or professional force.

A fourth factor eroding confidence in the new orthodoxy of policies was the emergence of a substantial body of research on police procedures and crime. Reflection, research and experimentation all indicated that the police were probably less able to control street crime than was commonly supposed. Moreover, the standard methods of crime fighting that had developed during the reform eras all came in for criticism. Both random patrol and standard investigative procedures among detectives were revealed to be less effective than their proponents had assumed. Where the police appeared to be able to apprehend offenders, it appeared to be largely due to the efforts of victims and witnesses who assisted the police in "solving" the crime. In effect, a century of experimentation with specialized police forces left the police still dependent on the voluntary efforts of private citizens to help them solve crimes.

Basic Traditions and Continuing Tensions

Urban police forces have emerged from this period of historical development with strong commitments to a few basic traditions. These traditions help to define the culture of policing. And, to a degree, they reflect more or less stable resolutions of the continuing dilemmas of policing a free society. At the same time, however, there are some important factors which are tending to erode and transform these basic traditions.

The basic traditions appear to be the following:

- Local Control of Police: Police forces in the U.S. will continue to be created and operated as agencies of local governmental units. This reflects our fundamental distrust of central authority, takes advantage of our federal governmental structure, and celebrates the potential for cultural diversity. It also makes difficult the emergence of a strong occupational structure since the tasks and styles of policing are apt to show substantial variation—more so probably than, say, the tasks of teaching or fire protection.

- Paramilitary Organization and Style: Police forces in the U.S. also seem firmly committed to a paramilitary organization and style. They wear uniforms, are organized in a strict chain of command, march in formation on ceremonial occasions, etc. This style is consistent with many of the functions they have to perform: it reflects their desire to be impartial, and to use force if necessary. It also suggests their readiness to be deployed in larger units as the situation demands. The fact that this concept of strict supervision is at odds with the actual conditions of police work creates some confusion in the internal management of police forces. Finally, a keen interest in technology--particularly command and control systems—seems to go along with this paramilitary style.

- Increasingly Bureaucratized Personnel Systems: The civil service system left behind by the reform movement is almost certainly here to stay. This means that appointments, pay, and promotions will largely be decided by agencies somewhat beyond the control of police executives. In addition,

promotions will be based largely on "objective" tests rather than evaluations of performance by supervisors. These systems will be affected by various affirmative action requirements, but they will not be fundamentally changed. The existence of police unions and the establishment of work rules negotiated in collective bargaining will also tend to make the personnel system increasingly rigid and bureaucratic. Police officers will be viewed as cogs in a machine whose procedures are all well defined and set out in advance. The fact that this conception is fundamentally at odds with the realities of their actual working conditions will create tensions, but no substantial change in the trend towards bureaucratized personnel systems.

- Strong Emphasis on the Law Enforcement/Crime Control Objective:
  The current strong commitment to effective crime control—particularly street crime—is likely to continue. That is the conception of the police officers and the political environment that supports and legitimates police operations.

While these basic traditions are currently defining and lending stability to the urban police function, some old unresolved (and probably unresolvable) issues may once again surface as a result of new pressures, and some new information may encourage changes. Some of these volatile areas are the following:

- Ambivalence About the Police Role in Local Politics:
  The police are now separated to some degree from local political control. While this allows them to get on with the job of being fair and efficient enforcers of the law, it tends to deny them the legitimacy and support that could come from closer collaboration with local political systems. Similarly, although the police in the past seemed committed to the idea of staying out of local politics as an organizaed body, the emergence of police associations which comment on the selection of police executives, help elect state and local political figures, and develop ideological positions on political questions beyond bread and butter issues of pay, work and promotion suggests that they may now be slipping on this commitment. How responsive police should be to local political forces and what kind of

local political forces they might themselves become are both difficult and unresolved issues.

- Grudging Committment to the Protection of Individual Civil Rights: The police have been forced by the courts to pay more attention to the civil rights of individuals and groups that become the object of their investigations. While they now do so, it is not clear that they are in a stable position on this issue. The commitment to protecting civil liberties has not been internalized as a goal by most police departments and officers. Their reluctance to do so is a constant source of tension with prosecutors, judges and the parts of the community that value civil rights very highly. How this issue will be resolved is unclear.

- Continuing Tension Among Enforcement, Order Maintenance and Service Functions: Despite the fact that the police are largely committed to narrowing their objective to effective crime control at least at the level of articulated purposes, they find it impossible to shed their other functions. In fact, with the movement to de-institutionalize disabled populations (such as the mentally ill) and with the aging of the urban population, the service function is likely to intrude even more deeply into police operations. Obviously, the responsibility for order maintenance and the tension between that objective and law enforcement will also not go away. The only way this tension might be resolved is if other agencies such as health, welfare, and mental health bureaucracies got on the streets 24 hours a day--an unlikely prospect.

- Continued Experimentation with New Modes of Organization and New Operating Procedures: The inevitable result of learning more about police activities (and, in particular, learning that old methods are not succeeding) is that police executives will innovate and experiment with new methods. In fact, fiscal austerity will give continued impetus for productivity oriented research. Within the admittedly tight limitations imposed by strong organizational commitments to traditional concepts of policing, then, we should expect to see the police innovating and experimenting with new organizational arrangements and new operating procedures.

- Great Pressures on Individual Patrolmen: For the man in the trenches, the future will be like the past: he will be expected to be all things to all people and will bear the brunt of the criticism when a problem arises. This will inevitably continue to create stress and tensions among the officers.

III. TASKS, ORGANIZATION AND OPPERATIONS OF URBAN POLICE FORCES

The Functions and Tasks of Urban Policing

In discussing the functions and tasks of urban policing, it is useful to distinguish between what police emphasize as their most important or distinctive function and what they actually do. This distinction is not particularly important as a device for criticizing police. Although it is often assumed that congruence should exist between the functions emphasized by police executives and those performed by their force to promote democratic accountability or to harmonize expectations and reduce tensions, there may be important managerial reasons to leave the two quite divergent. For example, a police executive might judge that service functions will be performed in satisfactory ways at satisfactory aggregate levels simply because citizens will demand such services, and that his job is to make sure that the police are willing to undertake the more difficult tasks of crime control by emphasizing the importance of this function. In emphasizing this function, then, he is not trying to shift all the activities of the police force in this direciton. Instead he is using one of his few managerial levers to move the police force marginally in this direction by talking about its importance. Alternatively, a police executive might emphasize one mission (say community services) to secure sufficient political support to allow him room to manage a police force in a slightly different direction (say order maintenance). Surely there are prices to be paid for these incongruities. But in a world where people disagree about the appropriate purposes of police, where the tasks necessarily performed by the police are extremely heterogeneous, and where talk about "central mission" and "distinctive competence" is only one of the ways that police executives can influence the operations of their department, the police executive is often in a situation where his job is more to minimize the incongruities, or choose the incongruities that are most useful to him, rather than eliminate them. Thus, the mere discovery of incongruities between articulated mission and actual performance need not lead to criticism.

The real utility of distinguishing between articulated functions and tasks and actual functions and tasks is analytic. The only way to understand the actual determinants of police behavior is to focus on what they do and ask what

combination of factors are causing them to behave in that way. For this purpose, articulated functions and tasks enter the analysis as part of the explanation of what police actually do, but must be rejected (or at least viewed with skepticism) as an accurate description of what police actually do. Since our purpose in this section of the note is to try to understand the range of police tasks and how managerial decisions about organizational structures, procedures, technology and staffing shape the aggregate pattern of organizational activity with respect to those tasks, we must begin with a factual description of what police do with what effect. While undisputed facts are hard to come by in this area, we will present what is currently believed or argued.

One thing we do know about urban policing is that the functions and tasks are very heterogeneous. It has become customary to describe three broad functions of the police: law enforcement/crime control; order maintenance; and services. Within each of these categories there is an astonishing variety of tasks. Crime control includes preventive patrol, stake-outs, undercover activity and detective work. Order maintenance includes handling domestic disputes, keeping people free from various forms of harassment on the streets, keeping political demonstrations within the bounds of civilized discourse, and coping with riots. Services include giving first aid to injured people, transporting sick or disabled people to places where they can receive help, helping people get into locked houses and cars when they have lost their keys, and even giving directions or advice to people who are lost or confused.

An important thing we don't know about policing is whether these functions are complementary (in the sense that performing well in one function will often aid in performing others) or antagonistic (in the sense that good performance with respect to one function will detract from performance with respect to others). It is often asserted, for example, that aggressive crime control efforts will lead to more disorder rather than less. In the background of such assertions are the images of policemen "causing" a riot by wading into a crowd to make arrests, or escalating a domestic quarrel into violence by arresting one of the parties, or antagonizing youths on the streets by subjecting them to close surveillance and supervision. While this assertion seems plausible, it could also be true that a known police capacity and willingness to arrest will aid the police in performing order maintenance functions: the exercise of state authority and force may in

some cases stabilize rather than inflame situations. Of course, knowing the right amount of force and authority to use in a given situation is part of the art of being a policeman or a superviser. But it is not obvious at the outset that order maintenance is always or even often antagonistic to enforcement. Similarly, police are fond of insisting that the service function detracts from crime fighting partly by diverting effort from preventive patrol and partly by encouraging personal characteristics such as trust, sympathy and patience that may be hindrances when they deal with hardened, determined criminals. Given the fundamental reliance of the police on cooperation from citizens in locating offenses, identifying offenders, and securing convictions, however, it may be that the service function dramatically improves the department's crime fighting capacities by creating what amounts to eager citizen auxiliaries.

Thus, while it is clear that large metropolitan police forces have diverse functions and tasks, the extent to which a police executive must choose among these functions is not clear. It is conceivable that the functions are quite complementary, that effective police departments are organized to do all of these things well, that the only way we can distinguish enforcement oriented departments from service oriented departments is by looking at the margins of a few dimensions of performance (e.g., elevated rates of weapons arrests in enforcement oriented departments versus slightly more courteous treatment of citizens requesting services in service oriented departments), and that these marginal differences mean little in terms of the overall effectiveness of police measured in terms of citizen security, satisfaction and rates of public violence. On the other hand, it may be that police forces differ dramatically, that these differences matter a great deal, and that the choice of orientation is quite a delicate one for police executives. We simply do not know. What seems likely is that the current fuss over these issues is largely symbolic: since we don't have the facts about how these diverse functions interact, the debate could hardly be anything but symbolic. The symbolism may matter, of course, but it would be nice if we knew what the real trade-offs were.

In any event, what functions and tasks the police actually end up performing will be based partly on what police executives say they ought to be doing, but probably more importantly on how their job is defined, what aspects of it are monitored and rewarded and punished, and what kinds of orientation they bring

to the job at the beginning. These things, in turn, are partly determined by administration systems which can sometimes be altered by police executives. How organizational structures, procedures, technologies and personnel systems shape aggregate and individual police performance is the next subject. To the extent police executives have a conception of which tasks they wish to emphasize, they will end up operating on their departments through these administrative systems.

Organizational Structure, Resource Allocation, and Deployment

A key decision that police executives make implicitly or explicitly is how to allocate their resources to given activities. One can usefully think of this as two different sets of decisions. One set of decisions is concerned with structural issues concerning the operational capacities to be developed and maintained within the organization. Should there be a special unit devoted to youth, to narcotics, to organized crime? How large should the Detective Bureau be and how should it be meshed with ordinary precinct patrol operations? Should special anti-crime units involving decoys and stake-out teams be developed? If so, should they be centrally directed or controlled at precinct levels? Since these decisions about whether to create specialized units and where to place them in an organization always have important implications for the future allocation of resources, one can also think of these structural decisions as profoundly influencing, if not precisely determining, the allocation of resources among these functions. The second set of decisions is concerned with how the operational capacities (created and fixed in resource terms by the first set of decisions) will be targeted in the world. Which geographic areas, situations or suspects will be given high priority?

When we view the resource allocating and deployment decisions of police executives from this perspective, it becomes clear that a key decision the executive makes is how much of his force to commit to generalized patrol operations. The reason that this decision seems so interesting is that once resources are allocated to generalized patrol, the police executive loses most of his control over what his men do. To be sure, within the constraints of union agreements and the preferences of his commanders he can allocate the patrol force across time periods and geographic areas. But once he has done that, the

patrol force largely does what the citizens request it to do via the dispatcher and on-view requests. Patrolmen may take some initiative in ferreting out potential crimes, and they may be motivated to do this by first line supervision. But still, what the patrolmen do is largely decided by people who call the police. In effect, the allocation of police effort is directly under the ad hoc control of individual citizens.

In contrast to patrol operations, however, the police executive maintains the discretion not only to establish, but also to deploy units such as detectives, narcotics, organized crime, anti-crime squads, and youth service bureaus. The reason is simply that these units are more insulated from ad hoc citizen requests for service. Obviously, the size and deployment of these units depends to some degree on requests for services or the frequency with which circumstances occur that could require the special capabilities. But still, the day to day management of these units is much more under the discretionary control of police managers than the patrol force is.

The implication of these observations is that the police executive can profoundly influence the aggregate pattern of activities carried out by his department by deciding how many of his resources will be sequestered in special units that are insulated from citizen calls and dispatchers, and what the special units will be. If much of the force is left as a generalized patrol force vulnerable to citizen calls for service, the police executive may inevitably be running a department that supplies a lot of services even if it isn't "service-oreinted." If the executive fields large detective units, anti-crime units, and narcotics units, he may produce a lot of enforcement activity even if his patrol force is being trained and motivated to be enthusiastic about responding to calls for service.

In fact, structural decisions about the character and size of functional units within the police department have significance beyond their direct influence on the allocation of police effort to given tasks. Structural decisions intersect with personnel systems and career tracks in important ways, offering greater variety in working conditions throughout the police force and raising the question of whether managers of the functional units should be specialists in that function or generalists. To the extent that the functional specialties have different pay and promotion opportunities, assignments to the different units will become potential

rewards and punishments that police management can use to motivate performance. Decisions about whether to create functional specialties also provide police managers with one way of responding to collectively expressed demands for changes in police operations. As will be discussed below in Part IV, this is one of the major ways that police can mobilize support. Finally, the creation of specialized units can allow the police executive to experiment with new capabilities in the police department that might eventually be absorbed into the repertoire of the patrol officers, or might be set aside as a specialized unit to be deployed by management when and where it is needed.

Given that the creation of specialized units could provide police executives with much greater control over the activities of their force, it is surprising to see how monolithic and undifferentiated most urban police forces are. Exhibit 2 reveals that many large city departments allocate more than half of their resources to generalized patrol operations, and another 10%-15% to Detective Bureaus. Vice is also commonly singled out for specialized attention, but receives relatively few resources. Some departments seem to make some use of "tactical" patrols and "other specialized operational bureaus," but what these units actually do is unclear. In short, for the most part, the urban police function is determined by what patrol forces and detectives do since all the rest of the operational units add up to relatively little. What these units do in fact is the subject of the next section.

Basic Operations of Municipal Police Forces

In principle, it would be possible and desirable to discuss the operations of all the separate functional units of police departments. It would be interesting to know, for example, what Youth Service Bureaus do and what effects they have. It would also be interesting to know how organized crime and traffic bureaus operate and with what effect. One can even imagine being very interested in how the records room and evidence control functions operate. And it has always puzzled us how police departments respond to people who jump bail. The sad fact, however, is that careful research into police operations has not probed into these areas. The research that has been done focuses on what have traditionally

been the main operating bureaus or the departments: the patrol bureau and the detective bureau. Thus, we will report what is known or believed about these activities and leave the rest for the future.

The Patrol Function:

Patrol is the backbone of urban police forces. It consumes most of the resources, occupies the attention of most mid-level managers, and is the searing, commonly shared occupational experience that binds the police department together. No wonder, then, that it dominates our conceptions of policing and captures most of our research attention.

The current patrol practices developed over the period 1930-1960. It was during this period that use of the automobile as the basic means of patrol expanded from occasional to almost universal. At first, the automobile was seen as a means to extend foot patrol. Police officers were to patrol a beat on foot, use the car to go to another beat, and again patrol by foot. Slowly, however, O.W. Wilson and others developed the notion that it would be possible to create the feeling of police presence through use of the automobile. They hypothesized that if the police were to patrol city streets unpredictably, a feeling of police omnipresence would be created. Citizens would feel safe and be highly satisfied with police services. Criminals would be fearful of apprehension, deterred from their activities, or apprehended during the commission of a crime.

At first police were deployed on the basis of variations of O.W. Wilson's hazard model. Later, as operations researchers turned their attention from military to domestic issues, complex computer based allocation models were developed. All were based on the assumption that the movement of cars rapidly through city streets would create feelings of police omnipresence and that citizens would be able to, and would, call police after the commission of a crime.

Out of these theories police patrol as it is known today developed; one or two police officers patrolling city streets in an automobile, observing citizens, moving unpredictably, monitoring hazards, and rapidly responding to calls for

service. Essentially contacts with citizens are brief, generally only occurring after a call for service. The central tendency for patrolling officers is to get back "in service," to resume observing and driving as soon as possible.

This basic operation has been the most thoroughly evaluated activity of police departments. Evaluation studies began in the 1960's and continue to the present day. Without going into detail about the studies, the general thrust of the findings is that random patrol has not been effective in performing the crime control function of policing. No significant study has found that it has much, if any, effect on crime, citizen satisfaction, or fear. The most conservative conclusion which emerges from the research is that patrol can be removed from geographical areas for long periods of time without being missed or with any measurable consequence. This conclusion need not vitiate the current police commitment to patrol activities. Random patrol might be important for order maintenance or service functions of the police even if it is not terribly effective as a crime control strategy. But the conclusion does give a police executive a license to experiment. He can consider alternative ways of controlling crime, and he can think of ways of using his patrol force to achieve purposes other than crime control— all because he no longer has to be committed to the notion that a patrolling, fast-reacting mobile force is necessarily the best way to control crime to say nothing of achieving other police purposes.

This point is particularly interesting because some recent research has suggested ways in which the patrol force might be released from the pressures created by telephones, dispatches and radios. Research conducted in St. Louis, Kansas City, and New Haven, for example, has found alternatives to routinely dispatching a patrol car in response to all calls for service. Departments can assign priorities to calls, delay response, send civilian report takers, take reports by mail or over the telephone, have citizens come to the police station, refer callers to other agencies, make appointments for later times, or, when calls are not relevant to police service, decline to respond at all. More recent research indicates that citizens are willing to accept such alternatives. Further support for adopting such alternative approaches is supported by several studies which conclude that citizens are willing to accept longer response times if they are given realistic

expectations. Similarly, other research indicates that once a call is responded to, a department can substantially reduce its investigative workload by using criteria such as "seriousness" and "solvability" to give priority to different cases.

Although these studies point the way towards freeing up police time in patrol and responding to calls for service, how that time should be used to accomplish police purposes is less clear. Although experiments are now being conducted with such things as "anti-crime" efforts, "team policing," and foot patrol, exactly how much these alternative uses of patrolmen might contribute to various police functions is quite uncertain. Thus, the field is wide open for some experimental changes in patrol operations.

Criminal Investigation and Detectives:

The Detective Bureau is typically the second largest operating unit of a police force--comprising 10% to 15% of the available personnel. The activities and operations of these investigative units are not well understood either by the general public or students of police. Formally, criminal investigation deals with the task of gathering information regarding crimes already committed for the purpose of solving cases and presenting evidence. In practice, the detective function appears somewhat broader and different than this definition. Often detectives may be involved in thwarting crimes that have not yet happened as well as in solving crimes that have already occurred. Moreover, in coping with crimes that have already occurred, their tasks are often simply to reassure the victim that something is being done and giving advice and to perform a variety of nearly clerical tasks in completing police records. And lurking in the background is the uncertain reliance of detectives on informants, and the uncertain price that is paid for informant contributions to crime solving.

Detective units from the beginning have been controversial and have presented special problems for police executives. They appeared in Anglo-American policing as the natural development of two separate traditions: a French tradition that emphasized the importance of using crooks to catch other crooks; and an English tradition of entrepreneurial crime solving. (In England, even after the detectives became part of the Metropolitan Police, they still contracted with private citizens to conduct investigation.) Thus, from the beginning, detectives

operated independently in close collaboration with "underworld elements." Since this made them suspect in the eyes of both administrators and citizens, their early role in policing was marginal and perilous.

Yet in both England and France and later in the U.S. their success in several particularly notorious cases caught the fancy of journalists and novelists. In this incarnation, however, the detectives were seen as elite crime solvers whose successes depended more on their clever wits than their sources of information. From the combination of these traditions emerged the current conception of detectives. They are still considered elite and their operations are still shrouded in secrecy. Their work with informants, the secrecy of their operations, their close association with criminals and their broad discretion in developing cases, all made them appear to be vulnerable to corruption. Their stock in trade is information, and while they demand it from other operating units of the police department, they tend to jealously guard what they themselves know.

The basic nature of their operations would be cause for concern among police executives alone. What makes them even more difficult for managers, however, is their substantial political power. Since they are prestige units, they tend to be supported by other police officers who would like to curry favor with the detectives. Often, they dominate police associations and unions and use their position to advance the interests of detectives and detective units. They also seem to enjoy special relationships with the press—especially the reporters whose regular beat is the police department. All this makes it hard for police executives to subject detective bureaus to close supervision and control.

Still, the critical issue for the police executive is how to use detectives and detective units to advance police department objectives. Here, research has not been particularly helpful. The studies that have focused on the activities of detectives have been exploratory—useful for generating hypotheses and puzzles, but too superficial to permit definitive conclusions. Other studies have focused on improving the efficiency of investigative units through administrative reforms such as case screening. While these studies have indicated real possibilities for saving time by gauging the seriousness and solvability of cases and using that judgment to guide the allocation of resources, they have not answered the basic issue of how investigators solve crimes, nor whether less fancy personnel could

do as well in solving the crimes. Thus, detective units remain a "black box": resources go in and clearances comes out, but no one knows what happens in the "black box" or how much the activity of detectives determines the result.

Police Use of Technology and Equipment

It should be clear by this stage that along with organizational structure and community elements, police operations have been profoundly influenced by technology and equipment police departments have created, or borrowed and adopted for two purposes. Beginning with call boxes and handcuffs, technology has gone on to provide the patrol car, one- and two-way radios, helicopters, computers, computer aided dispatch, and, finally, the automatic vehicle locater system. Each new advance in technology has been heralded by an enthusiastic belief that it would revolutionize the effectiveness of the police. And it has not just been the police that have had high expectations of the effect of technology on policing. Every commission from the Wickersham Commission in 1931 through the President's Commission of 1967 to the Standards and Goals Commission in 1973 has called for the adoption of additional and improved technology. Exhibit 3 shows the operating units that use different kinds of equipment.

Despite the enthusiasm for and prevalence of fancy equipment in police departments, the role of technology in improving policy has generally been disappointing and plausibly even counter productive. A variety of explanations have been offered for these disappointments:

- Since equipment and information system designers do not fully understand the nature of police work, these innovations turn out to be poorly suited to police operations.

- Instruments like the radio and automatic vehicle locator system are used for both strategic and supervisory purposes. Because staff at the operational level resist the supervisory uses, the strategic purposes are frustrated.

- New information systems could not improve the quality and relevance of available information in police departments, nor could it alter traditional patterns of information sharing. Since these are the fundamental problems in police efforts to use information systematically, the computers added little to police performance.

Regardless of whether some, or all, of these explanations are correct, some police and scholars have argued that the failure to adapt technology to policing represents more than just a waste of funds. Some, for example, argue that the use of automobiles, first without radios, and then automobiles with oneand two-way radios, then heated and air conditioned, then cars with computer terminals, has substantially changed how police relate to citizens, to each other, adn to the police organization itself. They argue that at each stage of this progression, the police have become increasingly isolated and remote from the citizens and communities they serve, less responsible to those communities, and more self-contained and impervious to the attempts of citizens and communities to affect their behavior. While no evidence exists to validate these claims, the seem plausible.

Police Productivity and Personnel Systems

Ultimately the police executive must be interested in increasing police "productivity", i.e., getting the police to do more valuable things within his current budget constraints, or maintaining a given level of useful activity while cutting costs. This will be particularly true in the immediate future as cities face financial difficulties. But it is also true that a police manager has a general responsibility to wring as much useful activity out of his stock of resources as he can that continues despite the financial condition of the cities.

A serious problem arises when one begins to discuss police productivity, however. Because the concept of productivity sounds technical and quantitative, people immediately begin thinking in terms of hard numbers that might be used to measure levels of police performance and their impact on the environment. Because we think of the police as being primarily or exclusively in the crime

control business, (and because the numbers are more or less conveniently available), we look first at crime rates and arrest or clearance rates to measure police performance.

There are at least two problems with this approach. On one hand, the police may be intentionally trying to do many more things than make arrests, solve crimes, and keep the crime rate down. To the extent that they are doing other valuable and useful things such as resolving disputes that could flair into violence, assisting disabled people to get help, providing recreational opportunities for youth, managing the flow of traffic, and providing first aid to injured people, measures of productivity tied directly to crime control objectives and a single device for coping with crime will under-estimate current levels of police performance and conceivably lead to inappropriate distortions in the way they operate. Second, these measures do not really capture the nature of police anti-crime efforts or their impact on levels of crime. Obviously, some kinds of crime are more deterrable than others: street muggings by a few inexperienced kids may be easier to control than burglaries; domestic assaults may be harder for police to control than fights in bars; and so forth. Unfortunately, the categories in which crimes are reported are too crude to allow police executives to determine whether changes in aggregate crime rates are occurring in components where it is conceivable that they could have an impact, or in categories that aremore fairly independent of police efforts. Moreover, as noted above, arrests and clearance rates fail to capture the full array of police efforts to prevent and control crime. So, the natural way to think about police productivity is somewhat misleading.

The only reason to make these well known points about the limitation of our current conception of police productivity is to emphasize a broader point that is less well understood. The definition of police productivity depends in the first instance on the definition of the goals and objectives of the police force. And this is not an objective or technical issue. The question of what the police should be trying to accomplish is an important issue for police managers to face in the context of local political and legal systems. It is fundamentally a <u>normative</u> question. The technical part of the problem comes in giving operational definition to the goals that police executives adopt and in accurately measuring levels of activity or accomplishments with respect to the objectives. Moreover,

the technical aspects of measuring performance with respect to some goals may be very difficult—even impossible. But the difficulty of measuring performance in a given area does not eliminate the importance of the objective or its role in defining what we mean by police productivity. No technical imperative requires that all police objectives be quantifiable. In fact, to the extent that there is a technical imperative, it runs the other way: in defining productivity, make sure one first has all the relevant goals in mind, and then worry about measurement. Obviously, measurement will allow police executives to exert more direct control over these operations and exert more pressure on subordinate managers. And for this reason, it is worth working hard to develop quantifiable measures for police activities and results. But if some important objectives or constraints on police performance might be sacrificed under the pressure to respond to performance measures which can be easily measured, it is a reasonable choice for police executives to back off from their commitment to the quantifiable parts of this definition of productivity. In sum, "productivity" must be defined in terms of the full set of goals and objectives of policing, not just those that are conveniently or traditionally measured.

If it useful to pause for a minute and think of how one might structure a set of goals for a police department. The simple idea of crime control is probably too narrow to properly direct or credit police activity. The three functions of policing—law enforcement, order maintenance, and personal services-- are a little too vague for our purposes. Perhaps the idea that comes closest to structuring a set of goals or objectives for the police is the list of eight objectives presented in the American Bar Association's report on the urban police function:

1. To prevent and control conduct widely recognized as threatening to life and property (serious crime).

2. To aid individuals who are in danger of physical harm, such as the victim of a criminal attack.

3. To protect constitutional guarantees, such as the right to free speech and assembly.

4. To facilitate the movement of people and vehicles.

5. To assist those who cannot care for themselves: the intoxicated, the addicted, the mentally ill, the physically disabled, the old, and the young.

6. To resolve conflict, whether it be between individuals, groups of individuals, or individuals and their government.

7. To identify problems that have the potential for becoming more serious problems for the individual citizen, for the police, or for government.

8. To create and maintain a feeling of security in the community.

In principle it seems to me that quantitative measures could be developed for many if not all of these objectives; that activities carried out by different parts of a police department could be considered as contributing to one or another of these objectives; and that costs could be assigned to the various activities. This would be the beginning of a control structure that would allow police executives to manage their departments into directions they wanted to go, and enable them to find out something about the relationship between costs, activities, and accomplishments. The specific structure presented here is less important than the general notion that to have a productivity program, police executives must begin with a structural view of the objectives.

Once a police executive has a clear sense of his objectives, and has given them operational definitions where possible, he then faces the problem of deploying the resources of his department and motivating his managers, first-line supervisers, and operational officers to perform well with respect to the objectives. Note that one can think of "productivity" as applying to the department as a whole, to subordinate functions and operational units, or to individual officers. Because of the dominance of the patrol function in most police departments, and because the patrol function depends crucially on the motivation and capabilities of individual patrol officers, we again tend to narrow our conception of how we might achieve greater productivity and focus on the problem of motivating and controlling patrol officers. Given the current organization and deployment of police forces, this emphasis on increasing the

effectiveness of patrol by concentrating on the performance of indivdiual patrol officers makes emminent sense. But before focusing our attention on this area, it is worth noting that aggregate productivity across the full range of police department functions could conceivably involve substantial re-deployments of the police force among operational units. This is the area where our current lack of knowledge of the activities and accomplishments of activities other than patrol hurts us a great deal. We simply do not know whether different allocations to different specialized functions would increase or decrease aggregate productivity.

Given the current structure and deployment of urban police departments, the key resource to be managed effectively is the conduct of individual patrol officers as they patrol their territory and respond to disatched calls for service. Thus, if we ignore the potential for cost reductions or improvements in performance that might result from aggregate deployments among functions or the replacement of expensive labor with cheaper labor in areas where the tasks would allow this, police productivity resolves itself into two deceptively simple questions: how do we want individual patrolmen to behave, and how can we get them to behave that way. The reasons that these questions are deceptively simple are obvious but worth restating since whatever effort we make to promote police productivity must be capable of handling the difficulties that make these issues deceptively simple.

The first issue—deciding how we want the police to behave—is difficult for at least three reasons. First, the general tasks and specific situations that the police encounter are sufficiently numerous and heterogeneous that it is hard to imagine that we could anticipate them all and have in mind an appropriate response. In fact, if we considered the unpredictability and variety of tasks and the inventiveness that had to be displayed in responding to the tasks as the defining characteristic of professional rather than operative or clerical positions, it would be difficult to imagine any job competing with the job of the patrolman in terms of its claim for professional status. Dentists, teachers, maybe even M.D.s and social workers all face environments that are fairly well structured and routinized when compared with the job of the patrolman. From a control point of view, the variety makes it difficult to imagine establishing a set of procedures to guide patrolmen's activities.

Second, even if we could somehow capture and codify the variety of situations which the police encountered, we might very well be at a loss in defining the appropriate response. It is difficult to gather information about the results of different kinds of police conduct in given situations at a level of detail that would allow us to develop a strong basis for recommending specific kinds of interventions. While this seems to have been done successfullly in the area of domestic disputes, we have been less successful in developing clinical methods for handling noisy kids, public demonstrations, riots, and so forth. But even if we did the research into effective modes of intervention, chances are that we would discover that the recommended actions worked only most of the time. Often, completely faithful execution of the recommended procedure would produce an unsuccessful result. This is true in medicine and other areas as well as policing. So while we might be able to improve interventions on average, we could not guarantee attractive results, and the response selected on an ad hoc basis by a talented patrolman could often be superior to the presented procedure.

Third, there are important value issues embedded in the concept of a successful or unsuccessful intervention. It is likely, for example, that some modes of intervention by police might lead (on a probabilistic basis) to a satisfying resolution of a conflict, but only at the price of increasing (again on a probabilistic basis) the risk of injury to the patrolman or innocent bystanders. This kind of trade-off is often what is at stake in discussion of police use of force, and it is only partly an empirical issue of how often a given level of force will protect the patrolman from a real danger rather than antagonize the citizen. It is also a value question involving trade-offs between risks to patrolmen and risks to citizens. This adds a layer of complexity to the design of appropriate police interventions.

The discussion of the difficulty of designing appropriate police responses suggests several reasons why it would be difficult to get the police to behave in accord with the procedures even if we could decide what they should be. In the first place, the procedures would probably be too complicated to keep easily in mind. This is an inevitable consequence of the varied situations that the police encounter, adn the variety we can imagine in their responses.

A second difficulty is that the individual interests of the patrolman will often be at odds with the prescribed response. Moreover, since patrolmen operate largely alone (or in the company of people who are in some degree compromised because they have also experienced the dilemmas of "going by the book" and running what appear to be foolish personal risks on one hand versus ignoring the book and protecting themselves on the other and resolved it in favor of ignoring the book), they are relatively free to pursue their own interests. In short, the conduct of patrolmen cannot be reliably supervised. And, while one might rely on citizens who are encountered by police to provide some supervision of patrolmen by complaining that they are badly treated, it is not always clear that the citizens filing complaints are unbiased.

Finally, even if patrolmen could be reliably supervised, it is not clear that anything important to them depends on their performance. Promotions and salary increases are typically determined by civil service examinations or length of service rather than favorable performance ratings. Dismissals and suspensions are painful, but can only be accomplished through elaborate procedures. The most important rewards and punishments that can be made contingent on performance are probably assignments and the willingness of one's peers to provide support when one gets in trouble. Typically these incentives are controlled by sergeants and peers who may or may not be inclined to use that power to support current procedures.

Thus, it is hard to specify appropriate responses in advance and hard to insure compliance with the procedures even if they could be designed. Given this situation, it is important to see that some aspects of our current systems for managing patrolmen are counter-productive. In particular, the concept of a paramilitary force regulated by narrowly drawn procedures and supervised through a tight chain of command creates a dangerous illusion about how the police force is actually controlled, and prohibits the development of alternative mechanisms that might be more successful in shaping police conduct.

It is easy to see the appeal of this concept of organizational control for policing. It appears to offer the greatest potential for neutrality and predictability in responses, and for absolute accountability of individual patrolmen and their supervisors. And the police have taken advantage of this concept to legitimate

their activities. And in principle, there is nothing wrong with the concept. If the structure of responses this system supported was mostly tailored to the tasks of policing and moved police conduct in appropriate directions, it would be hard to argue against.

The worry, however, is that this system doesn't work, and may be counter-productive. It may not work for at least three reasons. First, the current procedures may give inappropriate or incomplete guidance to police. Reading any random section of a police manual tends to give credence to this notion since they are often full of useless advice about unimportant parts of the policeman's job and silent or unrealistically pious on the crucial issues. Second, the strict accountability and close supervision is an obvious fiction. It is hard to monitor the patrolman's behavior, and hard to make things contingent on his performance. Those who <u>can</u> monitor his performance and make things of value contingent on this performance may well wield that power in opposition to the dictator of the apparent command structure. Third, the lack of congruence between the real requirements of the job and the apparent requirements of the formal control system tends to make patrolmen cynical about the control system and feel little commitment to it. Even worse, since substantial punishments can in principle and occasionally are in fact administered for small violations of procedures, and since the higher levels of the department profess continuing commitment to these procedures, the patrolmen are reluctant to talk about the areas in which the procedure seems useless or counter-productive. In effect, potentially useful information about appropriate and realistic responses to given situations is suppressed. Instead, it becomes embedded in the informal craft knowledge of policing which is understood to be partly in opposition to the formal control system. Thus, the formal control system fails to reliably guide and control police officers in their daily work, focus conversations about how they might perform more effectively in limited sub-terranean channels, and creates antagonism between the formal hierarachy and the patrolmen.

It is all well and good to complain about alleged deficiencies in current methods of controlling police conduct and motivating successful performance. The crucial operational question, however, is what system would be superior. After all, to say that controlling police conduct is difficult cannot mean that we should abandon the effort. Citizens acting through the political and legal system will

demand to know how the police are being told to behave, and the nature of the sytems that exist to insure compliance with the instructions. The police cannot and should not be given a blank check to exercise their discretion in any way that seems appropriate to them. Any control system that allowed this would almost certainly be rejected by the political system.

What is needed is a system that provides a more realistic and flexible kind of control over police operations. While it is not clear what such a system would look like, it is likely that the key to it would be to try to capture, and elevate by status of the informal conversations and operation now going on among patrolmen, and sergeants about how the police should behave. Since that is the nexus of advice, help and control that is now effectively controlling police conduct, and since a vast amount of experience and information is also lodged at this level of the organization, any effective solution to the problem of guiding police conduct must operate through these channels of information and control. Continued efforts to recruit better people, select more reliably, train more effectively, may also be desirable. But if police executives are to affect and control police behavior they must enter into a conversation with those who have the expertise and capacity to accomplish this purpose.

In entering that conversation, they are duty bound to insist on the legitimacy of the department's overall objectives, to promote predictability and consistency in the department's responses to specific situations, and to write down the things for which the department will be accountable. But they should be prepared to fit their conceptions to some degree to the experience and best practice of their men. They should in any case abandon the naive idea that their departments are now being run by the elaborate structure of rules and supervisor characteristics of the paramilitary style, or the cynical idea that they can pretend to be accountable by writing new rules and occasionally firing a patrolman who is caught operating outside the procedures.

IV. THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

The Question of Legitimacy and the Role of Politics

In most current discussion of policing, the local political system is considered an evil to be warded off. In fact, one of the current rituals of urban politics is for police executives to demand and political leaders to solemnly promise independence from "political interference." This commitment to an "independent" police force is a legacy of the era when police departments in metropolitan areas operated as adjuncts of the political machines and when traditional political elites, threatened by the emergent power of the political machines, waged a war of reform that successfullly wrested control of police departments from the political bosses.

The reform movement which centralized control of the police at the municipal level and established civil service systems was an appropriate response to some important abuses of police power. After all, when local political bosses primarily interested in maintaining their capacity to win elections can control the personnel and operations of a police force it is very likely that policemen will be selected more for their vote getting than their crook catching abilities, and that the police will operate more aggressively against their opponents than against their political supporters. In the worst cases, of course, when local political figures make alliances with criminals who can deliver votes, police power drifts into criminal hands and the police will be tempted to operate in ways that deny potential political opposition basic political rights such as freedom of assembly and even the right to vote. Clearly it was wrong for municipal police to operate as adjuncts of political machines, and it was right for the reformers to make structural changes that struck directly at the machines' levers of control —decentralization of power and authority to the precincts, and the vesting of broad appointing and promoting powers among local politicians.

But still, it seems a dangerous illusion to think that these reforms took the politics out of policing. After all the central question of who should control the police force and for what purposes remains. In fact, the reformers' motivation in proposing the reforms was partly political: they wanted not only to reduce the influence of the political bosses, but also to increase the responsiveness of the

police to their concerns. They wanted more effective city-wide enforcement of laws designed to insure public order and suitable public decorum. To a degree, they achieved that purpose with their reforms. Thus, the reforms didn't take politics out of policing, it simply shifted the location of the politcal power that influenced the police from precinct commanders strongly influenced by local political bosses to city-wide chiefs moderately influenced by the progressive, professional ideals of the reformers.

The police are inevitably and necessarily involved in politics for the simple reason that they wield state power. How such power is wielded will always be of substantial concern to the citizenry and their leaders. In fact, the willingness of a heterogeneous citizenry to accept the legitimacy of police operations is both a key indicator and a key ingredient of a successful police force. Thus, police executives must be concerned about legitimizing their operations in the eyes of the citizenry, and this will inevitably involve them in politics both in the broad and narrow sense. As much as police executives must fear the influence of local politicians, they need political activity to help them do their job because they must establish the legitimacy of their activities.

It is important to understand that in seeking to establish their legitimacy, the police have a more difficult time than many other public agencies. Herman Goldstein makes the point nicely:

> "The police by the very nature of their function are an anomaly in a free society. They are invested with a great deal of authority under a system of government in which authority is reluctantly granted and, when granted, sharply curtailed. The specific form of their authority—to arrest, to search, to detain and to use force—is awesome in the degree to which it can be disruptive of freedom, invasive of privacy, and sudden and direct in its impact upon the individual. And this awesome authority, of necessity, is delegated to individuals at the lowest levels of the bureaucracy, to be exercised in most instances without prior review and control."

In effect, the whole idea of policing runs counter to all our instincts and traditions about government. It is too much power, and it is not controllable by

elaborate procedures or codes. Hence, its operations seem prima facie illegitimate.

To the extent that the police have had a strategy for legitimizing their activity it has tended to be based on two ideas. First, they have emphasized their impartiality in enforcing current laws. This not only shields them from accusations of favoritism and corruption, but also cloaks them in whatever legitimacy is contained in the existing structure of laws. Second, they emphasize their professional capacities to control crime--primarily street crime. Since large segments of the community support the objective of reducing crime, the police legitimate their activities by aligning them with this objective.

Both of these concepts have become a bit tattered with age and usage. The concept of impartiality in enforcing laws remains central to urban policing, and to a great degree, the police are now widely perceived to enforce some laws (notably those concerned with interpersonal violence) with diligence and fairness. The problem with impartiality as the overarching goal for the police is that when we look across the full range of laws for which the police are responsible it is impossible to prove that enforcement is in fact impartial. A major reason for this is that enforcement is much less than full, and it is not clear how the police decide which laws to enforce, and which offenders to arrest. Some offenses seem so trivial that it is simply not worth the effort to mount systematic enforcement campaigns. Still, some people will occasionally be arrested, and because of the rarity of the event, they will feel entitled to claim that they were victims of discriminating and arbitrary enforcement. For other offenses such as vagrancy, drunk and disorderly conduct, weapons carrying, drug dealing, etc., the police play an important role in defining and locating the offense as well as investigating it. Without the concrete reality of an attack and a victim to focus police attention, the question of exactly why the police looked in a given area and decided to define some behavior as a crime becomes quite important. Finally, for some groups in the society, the impartial enforcement of all current laws would not be appropriate because the laws themselves are unjust: they attack some conduct and some parts of the population in an allegedly discriminatory way. While none of these observations taken alone seem sufficient to destroy police claims of impartiality, the combination of the observations cumulatively asserted has taken its toll--despite the fact that in all

likelihood the police have become more impartial rather than less in the last 15-20 years.

The concept of professional crime control has also been eroded. Part of the problem is that we are no longer confident that police can do much to control crime. Too many criminal acts take place in areas protected from police scrutiny by combinations of physical and constitutional restrictions. Moreover, when the police are successful in coping with crime, we often find that crucial forms of assistance were provided by private citizens. So police are less capable of coping with crime by themselves than we used to suppose. But another part of the problem is that as we conceive of more effective crime control tactics, we often find that we come up against painful trade-offs between guarding individual rights to privacy and increasing police opportunities to observe and control crime. Going beyond uniformed patrol of public areas by staking out individuals or areas, disguising police as victims or potential collaborators in a crime, or recruiting informants to help extend the scope of police surveillance may yield handsome dividends in terms of reduced crime, but they do so only at the price of profoundly altering customary forms of official surveillance. To the extent that effective crime control <u>does</u> require sacrifice in personal privacy and individual freedom from government surveillance, the crime control objective begins to conflict with a commitment to faithfully uphold the laws of the republic. After all, individual protections against unwarranted governmental intrusion are among our oldest and most fundamental laws. Moreover, the deployment of these investigative tactics often create charges of discrimination and bias in official surveillance. Thus, somewhat ironically, to the extent that the police determinedly pursue crime reduction objectives, they may cast doubt on their commitment to the full and impartial enforcement of the laws.

How the police might describe their purposes to capture widespread support and legitimacy remains an acute problem for police executives to solve. But beyond the question of objectives is the question of how police executives should interact with the political environment that surrounds them. They need the political environment to support them not only so that they can stay in office and see their personal and organizational goals accomplished, but also so that the community will help the police do their job rather than resist them. Attracting such support requires police executives to interact effectively with at least five

different features of their political environment: the chief political executives of their city; current public opinion towards the police; the media--both print and T.V.--; community groups and their political representatives; police unions; and other elements of the criminal justice system. Aspects of the relationships between these actors and the police will be discussed below.

Relationships with Elected Representatives and City-Wide Executives

Despite the rhetoric of police independence, police officials are creatures of local governments and ultimately responsible to those who man positions in the local governmental structures. Thus, police executives are often drawn into webs of complex relationships with the elected officials who wield governmental power at the local level.

Which officials turn out to be important to police executives depends at least in part on the formal structure of the city government. While on close examination, local governments reveal as much diversity in their forms as any genus of beetles, for our purposes we can safely sort all this complexity into three major forms -- one with two variants. The three major forms of local governments are mayor-council forms, council-manager forms, and commissioner forms. Moreover, within the mayor-council forms one can distinguish between "strong-mayor" and "weak-mayor" forms. Since the designations "strong" and "weak" refer only to the formal powers vis-a-vis the council and administrative agencies that are separately granted to the mayor and not to the political base or personal characteristics of the mayor, this designation may sometimes be deceptive and fail to locate the real power in the government. Still, in general, police chiefs will look for approval and support from the council in "weak mayor-council" forms, from the mayor in "strong mayor-council" forms, from the city manager (and the council) in council-manager forms, and from the commissioner who is responsible for the police department in the "commission form."

Exhibit 4 shows the prevalence of these different forms of government in cities of varying sizes. It is noteworthy that the overwhelming majority of large cities are governed by mayor-council forms, and most of these are the "strong-mayor" variant. Thus, for most big city police executives, the mayor will be the most important political official with whom they deal. Council members (as

individuals or factions) will be more or less important depending on how much the mayor can control the council, how many council members take a special interest in the police, or how much the police executive might need help from the council in his dealings with the mayor.

The influence of these local government bodies over the police stems from several kinds of formal administrative powers. In the first place, these bodies often have broad legal powers to direct police operations. To be sure, they cannot lawfully order the police to violate laws or constitutional principles. But within these broad constraints, they can do what they want. They can create or dissolve organizational units within the police department; they can establish goals and priorities for the department; they can specify patrol deployments and place limitations on investigation procedures; they can even specify armament policies for the department. To be sure, the current commitment to "police professionalism" and the desire to avoid the slightest suggestion of inappropriate political influence over department operations make most political bodies reluctant to intervene too directly in police affairs. But still, as a formal matter, they have both the authority and ultimate responsibility for police operations.

In addition to broad authority to direct police operations, mayors and elected representatives usually have control over police budgets and expenditures. There are no special revenue sources for the police. They must compete for city funds with garbage collection, fire protection, parks, libraries, consumer protection, hospitals, well-baby clinics and all the other diverse services provided by a modern city. The people who ultimately decide the winners and losers in this competition for funds are the mayors and councils assisted by specialized budget agencies. This budgetary control not only gives mayors and councils the wherewithal to implement specific policy directives, but also makes them generally important to police executives who know that their ability to maintain morale and develop new operational capacities depends on a reliable flow of resources to the police.

The final power typically granted to political executives is the power to hire and fire the head of the agency. But it is in this area that the movement to reduce political influence on police forces has had the most effect. Many cities have

adopted rather special procedures for appointing and removing police chiefs lest the chiefs become too responsive to the political leaders of the city. Exhibit 5 shows the distribution of different modes for selecting heads of enforcement agencies for different kinds of agencies and different parts of the country. It is significant that only about 30% of city and county enforcement executives are selected by political appointment. Moreover, police chiefs often have protection beyond these specialized selection methods. Often they cannot be fired except for cause and are entitled to a public hearing on the merits of the charges against them. In addition, in some cities, the terms of office for the police executive is not coterminous with that of the chief elected executives. Thus, in formal terms police executives are often less beholden to political executives than the heads of other administrative agencies: they owe them their appointment less often, and while they can be fired, the political executive usually faces much tougher administrative and political battles to do so than he does with other administrators. Because the hiring and firing power has been weakened by the reform movement, police chiefs may operate with somewhat greater independence than the executives of other city agencies. Whether this slightly greater independence is commensurate to the much greater hazards of running a police force is of course a matter of dispute. But, the fact of the matter is that police chiefs enjoy greater formal security than many other public executives.

These formal structures and relationships tell only part of the story, however. Much of the behavior of political executives and elected representatives towards the police force will be animated by their understandings of what the public at large and specific constituencies want and expect form the police. The constituencies may be more or less organized, more or less articulate, and more or less adamant on given isses. It is to these constituencies that we next turn.

Public Opinion, Community Groups, Special Interest Groups, and Political Parties

The public at large have general attitudes towards the police. Police executives have a strong interest in insuring that these attitudes are favorable: that the public is confident of their ability to achieve a given purpose and supportive of their efforts. Their interest runs well beyond the usual interests of public managers in creating a constituency that will support their organization in the

competition for public funds and give the manager some independent power and influence in confronting chief political executives. The fact of the matter is that the attitudes of citizens towards the police play a decisive role in determining how successful the police can be in achieving crime control objectives. If the streets are crowded because citizens believe they are safe, many crimes may be deterred. If witnesses and victims believe that the police can and will help right a wrong, many criminals will be apprehended. In effect, a favorable general public attitude towards the police not only insures that the police will have adequate resources and authority to do their job, but also dramatically increases their operational capacities to deter crime and apprehend criminals.

The public also makes demands on the police. The specific requests of individual citizens constitute one kind of demand. These have been described above in part III. Another kind of demand is collectively expressed proposals for large changes in the operating policies of the police: a demand to allocate more police to school security; or a request by local businessmen to "crack down" on street vendors; or an angry response to stepped up traffic enforcement in a given area; etc. Such proposals emerge from groups that vary in terms of size, representativeness, and social position; and are pressed with varying degrees of determination, intensity, technical skill, and political force.

It is reasonable to suppose that there is some relationship between general public attitudes towards the police and police responsiveness to the varied demands placed on them. But it is also important to understand that the relationship between responsiveness to citizen demands and general attitudes is far from direct and certain. While police are probably the most ubiquitous government agency, relatively few citizens will have had significant personal contact with the police: they will only occasionally have requested services as individuals, and even more rarely will they have been involved in expressing a collective demand for a change in operating policy. Thus, their knowledge of police responsiveness to community interests is apt to depend largely on hearsay.

There is an additional problem as well. Not all individual and collective demands could or should be satisfied. Collective demands which call for unjustifiable special dispensations, or which would divert resources from other important

activities must be rejected as illegal, unfair, or inconsistent with priorities established at "higher" government levels. In rejecting such demands, however, citizens must feel they have been treated fairly. Ordinarily this means giving them opportunities to press their claim with the appropriate officials, and giving reasons and justifications for turning them down.

Thus, police executives have a strong interest in maintaining a general climate of confidence and support. To some degree they can do this by responding to citizen demands. But since only an imperfect connection exists between being "responsive" and generating favorable public attitudes, and since many collectively expressed demands on the police should be rejected as inappropriate special pleadings by one part of the community at the expense of others, there are real limits to what can be accomplished by being "responsive." To build a climate of support, police executives must seek to build on current public attitudes, and must develop opportunities for citizens to express demands in appropriate channels where the demands can be heard, evaluated, responded to or not, and the police action explained.

The current evidence on public attitudes towards policing contains some good news and some bad news. The good news is that the public's attitudes towards policing are generally favorable and have held constant over the past decade while every other agency involved with criminal justice has lost support, that the public generally regards the police as honest and decent people, and that the public seems to have sensible views about the police use of force and violence. Harris polls conducted in 1964, 1966, and 1970 reveal that two-thirds of the population rated the police favorably. Surveys conducted in 1972 and 1975 show 75% to 80% of the population rating police performance as good or average and only 10% rating police performance as low. Similarly, more than a third of the population rates the police as having "very high" or "high" standards of honesty and ethical behavior. Only about a tenth rate the police as "low" or "very low." This contrasts favorably with lawyers who are rated "very high" or "high" by only about a quarter of the population and "low" or "very low" by more than a quarter. With respect to the use of force, the public draws a very distinct line. They are overwhelmingly against police use of force in interrogating a suspect in a murder case and in responding to someone who says vulgar and obscene things to a policeman, but they overwhelmingly support the use of force to prevent a

suspect from escaping and in defending themselves against a man who was attacking them with fists.

The only bad news is that what dissatisfaction exists about police performance is not evenly distributed over the population. Minority populations are twice as likely to say that the police are doing a poor job than whites are. (See Exhibit 6.) Additional evidence about minority views of the police reveals that they feel discriminated against in all their encounters with the police: when they request services as well as when they are the subjects of police investigations. When asked how the police might improve their performance they are much more likely than whites to suggest that the police should be more prompt, that they should be more courteous and concerned, and that they should patrol or investigate more. (See Exhibit 7.) In fact, about two-thirds of the minority respondents feel that blacks are discriminated against in the amount of protection against crime they receive, in the way they are treated by the police in casual encounters, and in the way they are treated if arrested for a crime. (See Exhibit 8,) As mentioned above, it is not clear how much their attitudes are based on personal experience, on the testimony of close friends and relatives who have had personal experience, or on general hearsay not reliably connected to the actual conduct of the police. But the strong sense of discrimination among minority groups is troubling--particularly when one notes the rising proportion of minority residents in urban areas.

The strong sense of community disatisfaction has led to some important efforts to create new channels of communication between community groups that had collective grievances and demands. The first ideas in the area were nearly disastrous. One idea, for example, was to create Civilian Review Boards that would allow the community to participate in hearing and adjudicating complaints against individual police officers. Upon reflection, this seems like a singularly inappropriate way to involve the community in police operations. It invites the community into areas that are extremely sensitive and anxiety provoking to the police, and draws neither on the competence nor the real interests of the communities. While isolated instances of alleged police misconduct are extremely upsetting, and while the community might reasonably have doubts about the determination of the police force to prevent misconduct by its members, community interests might be better served (and police acceptance of

their role more easily secured) if their influence over police operations could be focused on broader questions of operational policy and procedures. Administrative boards and courts inevitably looked like superior methods for adjudicating complaints against individual police officers.

A second idea was to establish "community relations" officers. Typically, though, these positions were conceived of as devices to "sell" the police to the community, or to "catch flak." The officers had little power or influence over police operations and thus functioned as ambassadors to the community rather than effective channels for capturing, organizing, and responding to collectively expressed demands.

More recent innovations in police organizations look more promising in terms of their capacity to admit citizen influence into police departments without the police department becoming either subordinated to special interests in a community, or hopelessly tossed and torned by shifting, amateurish conception of how the police should do their job. These devices include special citizen boards established at precinct or nieghborhood levels, and to some degree, the concept of neighborhood police teams. The concept of citizens advisory boards to police commanders operating at various different levels in the organization is apparently a simple concept: collective demands on the police from the community could be expressed by a representative group of citizens directly to the man who has operating responsibilities. In practice, however, it has proved difficult to make the boards work well. Exactly which citizens should be selected to serve on the boards, how much influence the boards would have in what areas of police operations, and how much freedom the local commander would have to negotiate with the citizen boards without clearing operational decisions with police headquarters were often left ambiguous. The ambiguity, in turn, led to misunderstandings and mutual suspicions. Still, the concept seems a useful one if the basic framework for the relationship is clearly established at the outset.

The concept of "neighborhood police teams" or "team policing" is not ordinarily considered a structural device for facilitating and encouraging community involvement in police decisions. Instead, it is conceived as an innovation that will enhance patrol effectiveness by allowing the police to increase their

familiarity with a given area, and to tailor their schedules, deployment, and methods to the specific needs of their area. It is even hoped that morale and accountability might improve as the teams begin to feel responsible for the areas they patrol. It is important to see, however, that this change in the internal organization of the police permits (indeed, invites) a change in the way that collective external demands are expressed. The sergeant in charge of a neighborhood police team has powers similar to those of the precinct commander: he can make discretionary choices about deployment and priorities. Because he has this authority, he becomes an attractive target of community influence. Moreover, because he is responsible for a smaller area than a precinct, it is easier for an external group to develop to a size where it can claim representativeness and exercise strong influence on the sergeant. To be sure, the sergeant may deny that he has the authority to do what the community groups want, and claim that the ultimate authority lies with the precinct commander—and others higher up in the chain of command. But there is also some opportunity for him to begin to respond to and feel accountable to representatives of his neighborhood as well as the precinct commander.

Thus, police executives must look for a balance in creating channels that could accommodate and respond effectively to collectively expressed demands for changes in police operations. They would like to acquire the support and legitimacy that comes from being responsive to collectively expressed needs, but must protect the force from manipulation by special interest groups in the community, or from frivolous innovations that weaken police operating capacity. In setting up such channels, some clear dangers can be avoided. It probably makes sense, for example, to make it clear in advance the areas in which the police might be willing to take advice, how the advice might be communicated, and how binding the police will regard it. Moreover, in setting these guidelines, it is probably desirable to leave all personnel powers outside the reach of the advisory groups. We have already seen and rejected what can happen to a police force when local political groups can exercise substantial influence over police personnel divisions. Finally, it may make sense to locate discretionary command authority at levels and places in the organization where there is <u>not</u> a very powerful local political group already in position to interact with the person who has discretionary authority. If there are powerful precinct level political organizations, a police executive might want to delegate the powers of precinct

commanders to neighborhood police teams at lower levels, or to district commanders at higher levels to prevent manipulation of police operations. This will not cut off all community influence, since anytime discretionary authority is created in an executive agency some external groups will begin forming to influence the use of the discretionary authority. It simply avoids situations where substantial local political power can penetrate police operations quickly and powerfully. In short, police executives must be shrewd politicians to protect the independence of their organizations without cutting them off from broad community support.

Relations with the Media

A key instrument that police executives must use to create a favorable climate for themselves, their programs, and their departments is the media—both print and visual. If police executives can generate favorable coverage in the press, they can guarantee resource availability in the future, enhance the morale of their employees, make their employees more responsive to their leadership, increase the chance that independent organizations that can contribute to police objections will be responsive to police concerns, and perhaps even increase citizen satisfaction. In effect, a favorable image creates real increases in operating capacity and citizen satisfaction as well as the perception of these things.

Unfortunately, the press is anything but a passive instrument waiting to be wielded by enthusiastic police executives. For one thing, the press is fully aware of their importance to public officials. Consequently, they expect public officials to try to manipulate them. And it is a central part of their professional ethic that they resist such manipulation. Their devices for resisting include relentless skepticism that borders on cynicism about public officials and agencies, and a more or less determined effort to dig for unreported facts or unrepresented sides of a story. For another thing, the police are not the only agency that would like to use the press to accomplish their purposes. Consequently, the police will face competition in gaining favorable in-depth coverage of their operations and initiatives. Finally, the press has imperatives associated with its own operations. It must capture the attention of people as

well as inform them. As a result, many complex events and problems are simplified until they can be fitted into an attention-grabbing (and not obviously false) headline and lead paragraph in a newspaper, or a 30-second slot in a half-hour newscast. Moreover, it must meet production deadlines so that papers can be delivered in the morning and T.V. newscasts presented in the evening. And it must do so with a fixed number of reporters and cameras in a given deployment. Thus, what appears in the news depends a great deal on what can be fitted into their production schedules: if a news conference is scheduled after 4:00 in the afternoon, it will not make the evening news; if a news release is given out early on a slow day, a reporter will have lots of time to check the facts and solicit additional comments, etc.

The necessary implication of these observations is that the police executive will only rarely get the story he wants when he wants it. A complex message will be "distorted" by the inevitable simplification. The official position will be "weakened" and "confused" by the addition of "balancing" comments and positions. The in-depth story of a new program or a significant accomplishment will appear on the inside pages next to a story on an obscure political party in a new African country, while a police scandal will appear on the front page accompanied by a vivid photo. All this will add up to frustration, a sense of betrayal, and a new resolve to cut the press off from information.

So far, the relationships described are typical of all public managers and the press. But several unique characteristics of the police-media relationship are likely to make matters worse than the usual hostility. Reporters on big city newspapers are very likely to have liberal values. This makes them generally suspicious of government agencies' efforts to control information, but it also makes them particularly hostile to police agencies. These values will be reflected in their coverage of the police. More important than this fact, however, is the fact that the press will occasionally be directly involved in police operations. They will have information that the police want to help them in their investigations, or will want to release information they have that could frustrate or endanger a police operation which depends on secrecy. In such situations, the police will see their operational objectives as paramount, and the press will see their obligations to protect sources and to publish what facts they know as over-riding principles. At this stage a genuine constitutional issue is

joined. However it is resolved, the hostility that is generated will sharpen the tension between the agencies.

In sum, police executives are likely to find relationships with the press ridden with conflict, frustration, tension and mutual suspicion. They may be tempted to try to escape from the relationship, but there is no escape. The press will cover and report on police activities. Thus, police executives must learn to manage this relationship as best they can. Three principles might form the basis of a management strategy towards the press.

The first principle is to understand that a police executive cannot "win" all the time in press relations. He will inevitably take bad stories. If the press found that they were reporting favorably on a police executive all or even most of the time, they would feel duty bound to publish a bad story to "balance" their coverage. Thus, a bad story cannot be taken as a betrayal or a sign of perpetual press antagonism, nor can it be taken as an excuse for trying to cut off relationships.

The second principle is that one should never lie to the press or seek too aggressively to cut off access of the press to people within the organization. The reasons are quite simple. Such actions play right into the prejudices of the press about public officials and guarantee that the police executive will face very close scrutiny in the future. In addition, it is professionally embarassing to a reporter to print what turns out to be a lie; it suggests negligence and a lack of zeal on his part. Finally, it makes the reporter's work more difficult.

The third principle is that a police executive should make it as easy as possible for the press to do their job by blending his dissemination of information in with the production imperatives of the press. Information should become available at a time that is convenient for the press to receive it. The information should be presented with the headlines, leads and summaries all quite apparent in the text. Such courtesy and assistance combined with a full disclosure policy will do as much as is possible to make reporters favorably inclined. After that, the police executive will at least have a chance to have the facts speak for themselves, but it must be the facts that do the talking.

Police Unions

The tradition of local control and autonomy which has characterized police agencies is also characteristic of the police union movement. Although loosely affiliated with national organizations (The International Union of Police Associations -- IUPA, The Fraternal Order of Police--FOP, and the International Brotherhood of Police Officers--IBPO, are the three largest) the support of local unions for national organizations has been relatively limited. The IUPA recently was formed from the now defunct International Conference of Police Associations (ICPA) and has affiliated with the AFL-CIO. That occurred only after a bitter internal struggle at a loss of 60,000 of its members, primarily from the northeast. (The IUPA now claims 100,000 members, the FOP 100,000, and the IBPO 8,000.) One of the primary reasons for this split was the substantial increase in dues which the local organizations would have to pay to the IUPA. It remains to be seen whether this affiliation will have much impact on the traditions of local autonomy.

The local unions themselves vary widely in the extent to which they are trade unions rather than fraternal associations. Some like New York, Milwaukee, Cincinnati, Phoenix, etc. are extremely sophisticated unions with equally sophisticated leadership. Others are purely fraternal associations. Many range between those two poles, but clearly most are moving toward union status. In many departments, competition is acute among groups identified with the FOP, IUPA, and/or the IBPO.

Aside from traditional concerns about salaries and working conditions the three issues now preoccupying police unions are:

1. avoiding participation in social security;

2. the passage of the National Public Employees Relations Act which would establish the right to collective bargaining on a national level and would be similar to the National Labor Relations Act;

3. the passage, on a national and state level primarily, of the police Bill of Rights which is primarily concerned with establishing due process in matters of internal discipline.

Locally, besides salaries and working conditions police unions are now primarily concerned with proper funding of pensions and with the right to off-duty political activity, including leaves of absence to run for political office.

The growth of the police union movement has been frought with controversy since its inception. Unfortunately most of the debate has been heavily tainted by ideology. The union accuses management of union busting, unwillingness to bargain in good faith, and frequent violation of collective bargaining agreements. They also complain about antiquated and arbitrary personnel procedures. Management accuses unions of illegal strikes, and complains that unions are usurping important management prerogatives.

What seems clear in all the sound and fury is that we are witnessing the initiation of new labor relations procedures. The unions are not likely to go away. In fact, they are becoming more sophisticated and aggressive. Police executives will have to adjust. A particular danger police executives should be aware of is that the negotiations might be handled by city-wide labor relation units without adequate participation by police executives. In this setting, it is always tempting for the city negotiators to give away management prerogatives in exchange for pension and wage concessions. This could create substantial problems for police executives.

Other Elements of the Criminal Justice System and "Expert" Opinion

The organization of the criminal justice system follows the traditional American penchant for dividing power wherever it exists: rigid distinctions are created and maintained between those who do the arresting and investigating, those who do the prosecuting, those who do the defending, those who preside over courts and decide on sentences, and those who supervise persons convicted of crimes. Despite the interdependent aspects of their work, no formal system requires them to be responsive to the concerns and interests of the other parts of the system, and separate traditions of recruiting, training and staffing tend to

exaggerate differences among the parts that would have been large in any event due to the differences in their jobs and settings. Consequently, the criminal justice system is less a well coordinated system than it is a loose collection of organizations bound together by their interdependent tasks (e.g., handling the same people), but institutionally committed to warring with one another about the appropriate way to handle their "clients"--not only in individual cases, but in general.

Two important implications for police executives emerge from this simple fact. The first is obvious: just as police executives must work to build a climate of support among the citizenry to help them accomplish their operational objectives, so they must work to build support among other elements of the criminal justice system. The prosecutors are the most attractive target since they are within reach and inclined to be sympathetic to police concerns. Indeed, the potential for an effective collaboration between police and prosecutors is seen in the success of the "career criminal" projects that have been introduced throughout the country. Probably the key to an effective relationship with prosecutors is to insure high quality case preparation so that their work becomes easier and chances of professional embarrassment are minimized.

In addition, it may be desirable for the police to seek to align their enforcement priorities with those of the prosecutor. Of course, the police cannot control the volume and character of the arrests they make very precisely since they often act in response to citizen demands or to those clear obligations under the law. But still, to the extent that the police do have discretion in terms of the volume and type of cases they make in a given area, they may wish to reach agreements with prosecutors about enforcement priorities and use their discretion in accord with those agreements. If prosecutors are supportive of police efforts, the police executive will benefit not only from the aggregate results of having more arrests lead to successful prosecution, but also from the fact that the morale of the officers will improve as their work is enthusiastically accepted by prosecutors rather than rejected or grudgingly accepted with substantial criticism.

The possibilities for having other units of the criminal justice system become responsive to police concerns are much less. Defense counsel should be understood in their role as institutionalized opponents of the police and no further time wasted in seeking their support though a great deal of their sting can be drawn off by effective case preparation. In recent years, judges have been effectively criticized for disparities in sentencing and excessive leniency. In fact, the number of people who think judges are too lenient has been steadily rising. (See Exhibit 9.) And, to a degree, police criticism of judges has contributed to this change in public attitudes. Similarly, confidence in the correctional system has also been eroded, and again police criticism has played some role in weakening the commitment to "rehabilitation" as the dominant objective in "corrections" policy. It is important to see, however, that as we move further away from the crucially important link between the police and prosecutors, the police capacity to influence the operations of the criminal justice system diminishes and becomes more indirect. In effect, the police become a kind of lobby with a commitment to a particular view of how a criminal justice policy should be designed. And this leads to the second important implication of the fragmented, institutionally warring criminal justice system.

In many areas of social policy where a large administrative agency takes much of the responsibility for implementing given policies, that agency gradually comes to be considered relatively expert in the policy area. Consequently, it can anticipate some deference and expect to exercise substantial influence in the formulation and execution of policy. An important implication of the fragmented criminal justice system is that the police never emerge in a similar position. They are not identified as dominant experts in the field of criminal justice policy. They end up sharing that role with the other agencies in the criminal justice system, and, to a surprising degree, with academic experts — largely sociologists and criminologists—as well. In fact, they are not even identified as expert in the narrower area of policing! Thus, their influence over criminal justice policy has been weaker than they might reasonably expect it to have been; they are simply a more or less predictable part of the general conversation rather than a dominant and decisive voice.

The fact that the police have been less influential in structuring the debate and shaping criminal justice policy has been characterized as the result of the fragmented criminal justice system. One could add to this explanation the fact that lawyers, judges and academics are more effectively connected with the journals, newspapers, and policy studies which support and structure the debates, and more inclined and able to participate in the conversations. But beyond the competition is the simple fact that until recently the police have not been inclined to produce the facts and the arguments that would get them into this game. They have let other people study them, but they have not studied themselves and their operations. Nor have they been willing to think about the operations of the other parts of the system in any terms other than a desire to shift the blame for a failure to control crime to incompetent or idle prosecutors and "bleeding heart" judges. Thus, their views have been narrow, weakly supported, predictable, and all too easily dismissed.

The question of whether the police should get into the larger game of formulating criminal justice policy is a nice question. One can argue that they should avoid it because it embroils them in politics and detracts from their professional role as police officers. On the other hand, one can argue that we need to create some consensus about criminal justice policy and the police are in a better position than many others to see what should be done (assuming that they incorporate some of the values now reflected in other parts of the criminal justice system). Thus, they should step out in front with consensus proposals supported by powerful arguments and evidence. What seems clear is that the police are now in the worst possible world on this issue: they are perceived as people who have a view of criminal justice policy and lobby for it (so they take the heat of being involved in politics); but their contribution is seen as narrow, unpersuasive and divisive (so they get few benefits of being involved in the larger policy debate).

V. POLICE EXECUTIVES AS MANAGERS

The Terms and Conditions of the Job

The commitment to local control of police agencies has had a profound impact on the characteristics of the jobs available to police executives. It has, for example, tied the number and size of jobs for police executives to the number and size of communities that field independent police forces. This means that while there are many independent police agencies each needing a chief executive there are only a limited number that have substantial forces and budgets. Fewer than 100 police departments exist with more than 500 employees; only about 50 have more than 1,000 employees; and fewer than 20 have more than 2,000 employees. Thus, the number of top level police executive jobs is quite small.

A second important implication of local control of policing is that selection procedures tend to be astonishingly varied and that "internal" (or at least "local") candidates tend to be preferred for the positions. Analytically, one can describe selection procedures in terms of who has the appointing authority, the breadth of the search for candidates, and the kinds of information that are developed about the candidates by the process. To some degree formal rules for appointment shape the actual process. The trend in formal rules has been to take appointing authority away from political executives, and to control the information to be developed about candidates through formal specifications of qualifications and attributes that must be taken into account in making the decision. But beyond the formal rules, local units have embellished or altered their formal procedures to meet the tasks of local political context. The variety in formal procedures and informal embellishments confront aspiring police executives with great uncertainty about how they might be evaluated for a job.

Despite this variety, however, there is a certain boring regularity about the terms in which the appointments are ultimately discussed and evaluted. Candidates are evaluated in terms of wheher they are more or less hard-nosed in their approach to law enforcement, more or less inclined to be aggressive and confrontational in their management style, more or less well connected to local political figures and police representatives, and more or less "open" and

"progressive" in their approach to police administration. The decision is usually made in terms of what the local political context requires: if crime is a problem and the local force considered ineffective, a tough confrontational police executive is likely to be appointed; if a progressive reform administration is elected, they will probably choose a person who seems to bring this approach to the police. Since the police themselves are often an important constituency (unless they have been discredited for some reason), and since a local force is likely to contain mid-level executives who vary on the dimensions described above, it will often be tempting for local appointing authorities to draw their candidates from (and ultimately choose) local officials. These observations of boring regularity do not alter the basic uncertainty about what is required to become a police executive; they simply compound the problem because the uncertainty about what balance of characteristics the local political context requires is added to the variety in the formal and informal mechanics of the appointing process.

Once appointed, the situation hardly becomes more predictable. As noted above, in formal terms police executives typically have more protection than other public managers. They cannot be fired except for cause and are sometimes granted the right of a formal public hearing. The problem is that they are exceedingly vulnerable to a variety of informal pressures that can be brought to bear by their subordinates, or their political superiors, or in the worst case, by both together.

Subordinates have two important kinds of power: they can refuse to be led by a police executive, or they can screw up in their jobs. In either case, the police executive's professional reputation may be seriously damaged so that he risks unemployability as well as unemployment. In fact, in most police organizations (as in most organizations of all types) there are "dirty secrets": situations where improper procedures were used to accomplish a purpose that was not quite legitimate. Such deviance is not rare. A certain amount may even be necessary for organizations to accomplish their purposes. But when this occurs in a public agency and particularly a police agency, it becomes the stuff of a major scandal. Since there may be several such incidents lying around unexposed in the recent history of an organization (as well as new events occurring), and since it takes

little to expose such incidents with consequences for police executives that range from troublesome and preoccupying to disastrous, police executives must always fear the resentment of their subordinates and trust that either self-interest or support for the executive and the department will discourage them from causing public scandals.

Political superiors also have important sources of informal power. They can simply stop dealing with the police executive. They can reach around him and deal directly with subordinate officers. They can undercut an executive's position by leaking rumors of a "rift" between the chief political executive and the police executive, or by stimulating a variety of "oversight" investigations and evaluations. They can slow up budgetary, personnel and contracting operations of the department. They can impose burdensome duties and restrictions. And so forth. Such actions not only make it difficult for police executives to operate, but they also signal that the police executive can be opposed and criticized by others without fearing retaliation by the chief political executive.

Thus, police executives are vulnerable on a daily basis to actions by superiors and subordinates that in the short run make their lives anxiety laden and unhappy, in the slightly longer run detract from their ability to manage their departments, and could ultimately lead to unemployment and permanent damage to their professional reputation. It is not surprising, then, that police executives could be persuaded to resign long before their formal term expires. In fact, the current data suggests that the average tenure of a police executive in major cities is quite short—about three years for executives responsible for agencies with more than 1,000 employees. (See Exhibit 10). This makes their average tenure only a little longer than the average tenure of managers of other public agencies.

The fact that the life of a police executive in a given job tends to be like Thomas Hobbes' description of man in the state of nature—"nasty, brutish and short" — is partly the result of our determination to keep the governmental apparatus firmly under citizen control through periodic elections. This will inevitably create instability in the environment of police executives and lead to frequent changes and short tenures. But another part of the problem is that we have pushed major unresolved issues about the police function onto the shoulders of the police executive. As a society we are quite confused and uncertain about what the

police should be doing. We want the police to enforce laws and maintain order, but we are indignant when they create some disorder by trying to enforce laws. We want them to prevent traffic jams and promote safety on the roads, but are a little annoyed when they give us traffic citations and wonder why they aren't catching crooks rather than harassing us. We want them to be kindly, patient, and helpful in dealing with drunks or other people who seem no longer to be able to fend for themselves, but we want the same people to be relentless—even ruthless—in pursuing armed robbers. We want them to enforce all laws fully and impartially, fail to provide them with resources to come anywhere near this ideal, and are astonished when they announce that the enforcement of some laws will be given low priority. In short, we expect police executives to accomplish an inchoate, inherently contradictory, and expensive purpose with very limited resources. And since everyone feels entitled to their own view of what the police should do, they feel entitled to criticize whenever the police fail on one or more of their functions and obligations. This also leads to short, uncomfortable tenures for police executives--particularly when we examine the resources they can bring to bear to manage their internal and external environment.

The Instruments of Managerial Influence

To succeed, police executives must somehow bring expectations about the performance of their organization into alignment with the actual operating capacities. Typically this requires managerial work in both directions. Police executives must work with the political environment to construct a coherent, legitimated concept of the mission of the police. And they must seek to build operating capabilities within the police force which will be able to accomplish the agreed upon mission. The question is what sources of managerial influence and control can a police executive draw on in trying to shape his external environment and internal operating capacities.

In confronting the external environment, the police executive is in a very weak position. He has a conventional symbol and goal to apply in the concepts of crime control and law enforcement, but as we have seen, the power of this concept has weakened a bit. He has a small amount of professional status and experience, but he falls far short of monopolizing expertise in the various areas for which he might be responsible. With the exception of his own troops, he

typically has no independent political base and it would be considered somewhat suspect not only by political executives but also the general citizenry if he were to try to develop one. Finally, the organizational functions that other public managers use to help them manage the external environment are often weak and neglected in police organizations. Press relations, liaison with political executives and elected representatives, policy planning and analysis, and legal counsel are all relatively weak functions in police organizations partly because they tend to be staffed by civilians without street experience, and partly because they all seem to draw the police departments into relationships with parts of the world that are extremely suspect in police eyes. The inevitable result, however, is that police executives confront the external environment with little capacity to construct agreements on purposes, create reasonable expectations, and explain and justify police actions.

In confronting the internal operating environment, police executives are in a much stronger position. As part of the paramilitary tradition, police executives have substantial power to deploy their forces. To be sure they may be constrained by police unions who have vested interests in current work rules and by community groups that have a vested interest in a given geographical deployment. But still within these limits, police executives can alter the overall operating characteristics of their organizations by reorganizing the department, creating specialized units, mandating new investigative and operating procedures, and shifting men onto new deployment schedules in new geographic areas. This power to structure, deploy and assign officers to jobs is the police executive's greatest power in creating operational capacities.

The police executive also has the power to structure his budget for submission to the political authorities. While in principle budgetary authority grants a great deal of influence to the police executive, in practice it gives him little to work with. The total amount is usually determined by others with an eye to staying within a revenue constraint rather than a sure sense of the marginal benefits of allocating additional resources to given city services. Moreover, the operating budget of a police force is largely wages and salaries--something that the police executive has little discretion to alter. So the budgetary power amounts to relatively little.

The police executive also has the power (buttressed by the paramilitary tradition again) to request information and reports from his subordinates, and to monitor their activities through the use of a variety of information systems that could be installed in a police department. Again, while this power is potentially important, in practice it has not typically been effectively utilized by police executives. A rather astonishing centralized capacity to control subordinates is created by the centralized dispatching system which monitors the availability of patrol cars, keeps track of what jobs they have been assigned and how long it took to be back in service, and even keeps track of coffee breaks and meal time. The problems with this system are: (1) that it tends to make the police too responsive to citizen calls for service that come over the telephone and not responsive enough to information about problems that could come from other sources; (2) that it records very little about how successfully the patrolman handled a given call—only that he responded and came back "into service" within some standard time; and (3) that it keeps track only of the patrol function of the police department and not any of the other services. Efforts to extend control systems to capture quality aspects of patrolman performance by having sergeants respond to a certain number of calls with patrolmen and fill out periodic evaluations of patrolman performance, and to create systems for monitoring the performance of other specialized units have been spotty and largely unsuccessful. So police executives know relatively little about the activity of their subordinates.

But they know even less about the ultimate impact of their operations. As noted above, the UCR provides a limited and not wholly accurate picture of police performance, and efforts to create different measures of police productivity have foundered on the ambiguity of the police mission as well as the difficulty of measuring performance with respect to some things that are clearly part of the police mission (e.g., services, facilitating the movement of traffic, deterring and controlling riots and organized crime, etc.). So, it is hard to create a "bottom line" for policing, and hard to direct, motivate and legitimate policing activity without this.

The real weakness of police executives in confronting their internal operating systems, however, is their imperfect control over their personnel systems. What

we usually have in mind when we think of a personnel system is the piece of the department's operations that monitors the performance of individual members of the organization, establishes their rates of compensation, and creates career tracks within the department. And when we look at this for most central city police departments, we discover that for most employees these functions are under the control of local civil service systems rather than the police executive. To be sure, he may be able to control assignments, transfers, and appointments to detective bureaus, and this gives him and his mid-level managers some control over the lives and futures of individual officers. But still, much of the apparatus that determines pay, promotions and discipline is defined by rigid civil service positions.

When we look outside this part of the personnel system and consider how officers are recruited, selected and trained (as well as motivated while on the force), we again find that police executives are to a degree hostages to the civil service system (particularly in the appointment process). But a close analysis of how recruitment and training worked would reveal that civil service was less of a problem for them than the informal traditions and culture of policing. The real recruiting systems for police are the information systems made up of current police who attract their relatives and T.V. shows which portray certain images of policing. The real training system is the first partner a rookie cop acquires when he goes out on a beat and to a lesser degree the informal advice he gets from his peers and his sergeant. The operative reward system (given that pay and promotions are largely predetermined) is the assignments he receives from his sergeant and the operational support he receives from his partners. Thus, an informal personnel system operates powerfully beneath the surface of the formal recruitment, training and motivational system.

Looking at the personnel system as a whole, then, we find that the police executive is hemmed in on one side by civil service rules and on the other by a powerful, informal system that operates in a way that is invisible and hard to control from the center. Moreover, the parts of the system that are ostensibly under the control of the police executive (e.g., assignments to precincts and bureaus, departmental rewards and internal discipline, training, the design of formal evaluation systems), turn out in fact to be run by specialized support units in the police department (e.g., personnel, training, and internal affairs.)

Typically, these are weak bureaus vis-a-vis the field units and are unresponsive to the interests of the police executives. They conceive of themselves as separate professionalized units, but they fail to deliver what the police executive wants—namely more effective control and influence over the conduct of his employees. It is the inability to control his own personnel that is the police executive's Achilles' heel as he confronts his own organization.

Personal and Strategic Choices for Police Executives

Given the perilous nature of the job, and the weakness of the position vis-a-vis the external and internal environment, it is not clear that it is all that desirable to become a police executive—particularly when one considers that average maximum salaries range from about $28,000 to $50,000. (There are a few higher salaries.) Still, whenever a job becomes vacant, several people offer to fill it, and one is appointed. Once appointed, the official faces important personal and strategic choices.

The important personal choice is whether he will choose to operate well within current concepts of policing and the role of police executives, at the edges of the concepts, or boldly outside the current conception. In facing this choice, it is tempting for police executives to assume that safety and long tenure lies in being cautious and traditional. But it is important to understand that there is little empirical basis for this view. In the current situation, <u>all</u> police chiefs face short, risky tenures. The traditional concepts of policing are no longer providing security to police executives. They are being buffeted by powerful new forces. To be sure, a departure from traditional concepts of policing always risks the enmity of the policemen, and they are a key constituency to be accommodated by police executives. But it is just possible that the patrolmen would trade their current concepts of policing for some concept that led to fewer tensions and more harmonious expectations of their job. In a world that is as difficult as the world of the police executive this possibility is not something to be ignored.

Regardless of how this personal choice is resolved, the police executive will face the problem of creating an image of what the police force stands for under his administration. He needs such a concept to help him communicate with his

internal and external environment and to focus his own attention on the key managerial tasks he must accomplish. Moreover, he must bring this concept to bear on and condition the variety of specific decisions he must make. Hermann Goldstein presents a challenging list of specific operational questions:

- Whether police officers should seek to make mass arrests of illegally assembled demonstrators.

- Whether patrolling police officers should be routinely armed with shotguns.

- Whether police officers should shoot at individuals looting stores in a riotous situation.

- What the response of the police should be to social gambling.

- The kinds of requests for assistance to which the police will not respond.

- The extent to which arrest records maintained by the police should be made available to others.

- The amount of police resources to be devoted to investigating organized crime.

- Whether police officers should seek to prosecute a known assailant when the victim refuses to cooperate in the prosecution.

- The extent to which police pay informants for information.

- The content of police training curricula.

- The procedures for investigating complaints against police officers.

- Whether an intoxicated person should be taken home, to jail, or to a detoxification facility.

- Whether a speeding motorist should be warned, issued a summons, or taken into physical custody.

The strategic challenge for a police executive is to develop an integrated concept of policing that somehow lends coherence to the resolution of these specific issues. The current strategic concept seems to be primarily law enforcement with an emphasis on the control of "street crime." Goldstein suggests a concept of "urban governmental services" which suggests the central involvement of the police in many of the government's most important functions: not only crime control, but the regulation of traffic and some commercial relationships, assistance to disabled people, even the protection of individual and political freedoms and the maintenance of the civic order. There are undoubtedly others. The real challenges to police executives are first to use their knowledge, experience and imagination to develop concepts of the mission of policing that are sustainable (i.e., that can attract durable, broad based political support, and that are consistent with the operating capacities of police agencies); and second, to make their concepts real by using their limited sources of managerial influence to create appropriate expectations in the external environment and appropriate capacities and orientations in the internal environment.

Exhibit 1

Municipal Expenditures by Function, 1977-78*

Function	Amount (millions of dollars)	Percent	Per capita amount (dollars)
Total general expenditure	60,964	100.0	439.99
Education	7,973	13.1	57.54
Police protection	6,991	11.5	50.46
Public welfare	4,357	7.1	31.45
Highways	4,740	7.8	34.20
Sewerage	4,054	6.6	29.26
Fire protection	3,855	6.3	27.82
Interest on general debt	2,869	4.7	20.71
Parks and recreation	2,798	4.6	20.19
Hospitals	2,591	4.3	18.70
Sanitation other than sewerage	2,197	3.6	15.86
General control	1,738	2.9	12.54
Housing and urban renewal	2,084	3.4	15.04
Financial administration	1,399	2.3	10.10
General public buildings	914	1.5	6.59
All other functions	12,404	20.3	89.52

*Source: City Government Finances in 1977-78, U.S. Bureau of the Census

Note: The $6.991 billion figure for police protection in the above table includes only expenditures by municipalities. It does not include expenditures by counties, nor direct state and federal expenditures in support of local police.

Exhibit 2

The Percentage Allocation of Police Personnel Among Specialized Operating Units*

	Crime Fighting				Other Functions			
	Patrol Bureau	Detective Bureau	Tactical Units	Vice Squads	Traffic Units	Youth Services	Other Operating Units	Support Bureaus
Boston	82	—	1	1	—	—	—	16
Detroit	47	10	4	4	1	3	2	29
Hartford	60	9	—	3	—	—	5	22
Kansas City	36	10	0	2	7	1	5	38
Miami	39	15	—	4	8	4	6	24
Newark	56	11	7	4	5	2	1	14
Oakland	38	14	—	2	6	4	2	34
San Diego	40	10	0	2	12	2	11	22
San Francisco	58	9	6	3	8	3	—	10

* In some cases, totals may not add to 100% due to rounding.

Exhibit 3

Police Uses of Equipment and Technology*

Area	Activity	Resources	
		Hardware	Software
Patrol	Apprehension Deterrence Intelligence	Radios, automobiles, computers, weapons, helicopters	Officers, non-sworn personnel, files, records, dispatch tapes
Traffic	Monitoring and facilitating apprehension	See patrol	See patrol
Juvenile	Liaison Deterrence Apprehension	See patrol	School records, court records, officers and staff, files, personnel, case, informant
Vice-Narcotics	Apprehension Intelligence Seizure-regulation	Computer Radios Cameras, video equipment, body mikes,transmitters, transponders,weapons, radio equipment	Files Officers Non-sworn personnel Informants
Detective Work	Investigation Clearance Case Preparation	Weapons Automobiles (covert) Tape recorders Cameras	Files
Internal Affairs	Supervision Intelligence	See Vice-Narcotics	Case records Data files
Administration	Policy-setting Command Control-supervision Budgeting-Allocation	Information storage, processing and retrieval systems	Programming Record keeping Files
Research and Planning	Intelligence Evaluation Planning	Information storage, processing and retrieval systems	Programmers Staff Data files

*Adapted from an unpublished paper by Peter Manning

Exhibit 4

Forms of City Government in the U.S. by Size of City

Population	Total Number of U.S. Cities	Total Number of Cities in Table	Mayor-Council		Commission		Council-Manager	
			No.	%[a]	No.	%[a]	No.	%[a]
Over 500,000	20	20	16	80.0	0	0	4	20.0
250,000–500,000	30	30	13	43.3	5	16.7	12	40.0
100,000–250,000	80	80	30	37.5	11	13.8	39	48.8
50,000–100,000	192	190	67	35.3	27	14.2	96	50.5
25,000–50,000	405	388	132	34.0	51	13.1	205	52.8
10,000–25,000	1,030	1,005	499	49.7	101	10.0	405	40.3
5,000–10,000	1,290	1,257	838	66.7	66	5.2	353	28.1
All cities over 5,000	3,047	2,970[b]	1,595	53.7	261	8.8	1,114	37.5

[a] Percentage of total number of cities in this table in each population class.
[b] Does not include Washington, D.C., 15 cities with town meeting government, 19 cities with representative town meeting government, and 43 cities for which no information was obtained.
Source: International City Managers' Association, *The Municipal Year Book, 1961* (Chicago, 1961), p. 76.

Source: Herbert Kaufman, Politics and Policies in State & Local Government, p. 51.

Exhibit 5

Prevalence of Different Modes of Selectiong

Police Chief Executives, by Region and Type of Agency

Table 1.34 *Estimated percent of police chief executives, by method of selection and region, United States, 1975*

NOTE: These data were based on a survey conducted by the Police Chief Executive Committee of the International Association of the Chiefs of Police. The survey included (1) the heads of the 49 State police and highway patrol agencies (Hawaii does not have a State police or highway patrol agency), (2) all chiefs of police and sheriffs who head police agencies with 100 or more sworn personnel, and (3) a 20 percent random sample of heads of police agencies with fewer than 100 sworn personnel that report crime statistics to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reporting section. Questionnaires were mailed to 2,546 police chiefs, who represent 14.6 percent of the police agencies listed in the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration's 1975 Report on Criminal Justice Agencies in the United States *(Source, p. 141). A total of 1,701 (66.8 percent) agencies responded.*

Police chief executives are those who have administrative and leadership responsibilities for the policies and performance of municipal, county, or State police or public safety agencies. The title may vary—chief of police, sheriff, superintendent, colonel, director, or commissioner (Source, p. 3).

[Percent]

Region	Method of selection		
	Political appointment	Civil service	Other
New England	22	41	37
Middle Atlantic	20	42	38
East North Central	30	18	52
West North Central	19	11	70
South Atlantic	25	8	67
East South Central	35	12	53
West South Central	24	10	66
Mountain	32	5	63
Pacific	19	22	59
Total	24	20	56

Source: International Association of Chiefs of Police, Police Chief Executive Committee, *The Police Chief Executive Report* **(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 47, 49. Table adapted by SOURCEBOOK staff.**

Table 1.35 *Estimated percent of police chief executives, by method of selection and type of agency, 1975*

NOTE: See NOTE, Table 1.34.

[Percent[a]]

Method of selection	Type of agency			Total
	State	Sheriff	City/county	
Civil service	10.0	0.0	25.7	19.9
Election	0.0	96.9	2.2	22.2
Political appointment	64.3	2.8	29.0	24.4
Examination	0.0	0.0	5.0	3.7
Seniority	0.0	[b]	8.3	6.2
Appointment by a group	4.8	[c]	10.9	10.5
Appointment by an individual	19.0	0.0	7.1	7.6
Other	2.4	0.0	7.1	5.5

[a] Percents may not add to 100 because of rounding.
[b] Too few agencies to report findings.
[c] Inadequate number of responses.

Source: International Association of Chiefs of Police, Police Chief Executive Committee, *The Police Chief Executive Report* **(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 168.**

Source: Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1978, p. 91

Exhibit 6

Ratings of Local Police by Demographic Characteristics, 13 Selected American Cities, 1975

Question: "Would you say, in general, that your local police are doing a good job, an average job, or a poor job?"

[Percent]

	Good	Average	Poor	Don't know	No answer	Number of respondents [a]
Thirteen city total	40	41	12	7	0	15,386,699
Sex:						
Male	40	41	13	5	0	6,882,142
Female	40	40	11	8	0	8,504,193
Race:						
White	47	37	9	7	0	10,872,109
Black and other	24	50	19	7	0	4,514,226
Education:						
Less than 9 years	46	33	11	11	0	2,959,807
Some high school	37	43	14	6	0	3,039,822
High school graduate	39	42	12	6	0	5,093,778
Some college	38	43	13	6	0	2,250,349
Four years of college and more	39	43	10	7	1	2,026,193
Not ascertained	32	50	10	8	0	8,230
Income:						
Under $3,000	40	36	14	10	0	1,304,699
$3,000 to $4,999	41	36	13	9	0	1,593,365
$5,000 to $7,499	38	40	14	7	1	2,016,131
$7,500 to $9,999	38	43	13	6	0	1,587,500
$10,000 to $11,999	39	43	12	5	0	1,570,004
$12,000 to $14,999	41	42	12	5	0	1,839,205
$15,000 to $19,999	42	42	11	4	0	1,799,727
$20,000 to $24,999	42	43	9	5	0	940,702
$25,000 or more	45	41	9	6	0	1,074,675
Not ascertained	36	40	13	11	1	1,660,690
Age:						
16 to 19 years	25	52	18	5	0	1,477,445
20 to 24 years	29	48	16	6	1	1,857,174
25 to 34 years	34	45	15	6	0	2,975,189
35 to 49 years	40	42	13	6	0	3,288,509
50 to 64 years	48	36	9	7	0	3,397,629
65 years or older	53	28	6	11	0	2,390,388

[a] Base on which percents were computed.

Source: Table constructed by SOURCEBOOK staff from data provided by the National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

Exhibit 7

Suggested Ways in Which Local Police Could Improve, by Race and Sex of Respondent, 13 Selected American Cities, 1975

Question: "In what ways could they (your local police) improve?"

[Percent]

	White		Black and other	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
No improvement needed	16	16	9	9
Need more policemen	25	23	24	22
Patrol or investigate more	13	9	17	14
Be more prompt	12	13	22	26
Improve training, raise qualifications or pay	7	5	8	6
Be more courteous, concerned	10	8	19	16
Don't discriminate	3	2	9	6
Need more traffic control	1	1	1	1
Need more policemen in certain areas or at certain times	25	23	27	26
Other improvement	8	6	6	5
Don't know	13	16	11	14
Total number of respondents [a]	4,970,660	5,001,450	1,911,492	2,602,743

[a] Base on which percents were computed.

Source: Table constructed by SOURCEBOOK staff from data provided by the National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

Note: Because some respondents have suggested more than one improvement, the sums of the columns exceed 100 percent.

Exhibit 8

Attitudes Toward Discrimination Against Blacks in Protection Against Crime, the Way Treated by Police, and the Way Treated if Arrested for a Crime, by Race, U.S., 1977

NOTE: The information presented here is part of a larger survey in which respondents were asked about 13 areas in which blacks may be discriminated against. Those areas that relate to criminal justice issues are presented below. For a discussion of public opinion of survey sampling procedures, see Appendix 8.

Question: "Let me ask you about some specific areas of life in America. For each, tell me if you think blacks are discriminated against in that area or not: . . . the protection they have against crime; the way treated by police; the way treated if arrested for a crime."

[Percent]

	Blacks discriminated against	Blacks not discriminated against	Not sure
Protection against crime:			
Black respondents	61	31	8
White respondents	23	67	10
The way treated by police:			
Black respondents	71	23	6
White respondents	28	60	12
The way treated if arrested for a crime:			
Black respondents	69	23	8
White respondents	28	61	11

Source: Louis Harris, *The Harris Survey* (Chicago: The Chicago Tribune, Sept. 12, 1977), p. 3. Reprinted by permission.

Exhibit 9

Respondents Agreeing That Courts Do Not Deal Harshly Enough with Criminals, U.S., 1972-77

Question: "In general, do you think the courts in this area deal too harshly or not harshly enough with criminals?"



Source: Figure constructed by SOURCEBOOK staff from data provided by the National Opinion Research Center; data were made available through the Roper Public Opinion Research Center.