

Recognizing and Realizing Value in Policing:

The Lessons of COMPSTAT

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
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## I. Introduction:

Tonight, I want to talk about policing. I want to talk about it by providing a detailed answer to a question that might seem excessively technical and boring: namely, how we as citizens of a democratic society might best measure the performance of the public police departments we support, and use those measurements to help reassure ourselves that the police are performing well, and to help ensure that result.

The reasons for addressing the general subject of policing through the particular question of how best to measure the performance of the police are essentially two. First, if we can agree upon and deploy an effective system for measuring police performance, I think we will have provided ourselves with a powerful instrument for giving guidance to, demanding accountability from, and improving the performance of public police departments. Second, in trying to reach an agreement about how best to measure police performance, I believe we will have to confront some deep normative and philosophical questions about the “public value” we want the police to produce for us, and the “public values” we want the police to express in their operations. My claim is that if we can align our largest normative aspirations for the police aligned with operationally powerful performance measures, we will have taken a major step towards increasing the value that public police departments can contribute to our individual and collective lives.

Of course, it is not an accident that I choose this site to talk about police performance measurement. The NYPD has become famous both nationally and internationally for the way it has used performance measurement to make itself more accountable to citizens, and more operationally successful in dealing with crime. Indeed, the COMPSTAT system has become something of an icon of the modern era of policing. Many police departments have made pilgrimages to NYC to see the system in operation, and have left inspired to create their own versions of the system, hoping to achieve the same results. Others who could not make the journey themselves have heard the glad tidings and tried to take some of the spirit of COMPSTAT into their operations. So, New York City is as close to a sacred shrine for police performance measurement as I can find, and if I want to find an audience for this discussion, this is where I have to come.

But speaking from a sacred shrine also creates difficulties. Any stranger who preaches from this particular pulpit about police performance measurement must speak as either a believer or an apostate of COMPSTAT.

Showing precisely the kind of conviction and courage that you can expect from an academic, I would prefer to be viewed as neither. I am more of an agnostic, I think.

On one hand, I am a devout enthusiast of COMPSTAT. I am delighted that it seems to have succeeded in helping the police department reduce crime. Further, I think it is very important for the future of policing that COMPSTAT has put before citizens and police managers a very specific, concrete challenge about how best to use performance measurement to improve the performance of policing. The challenging example will, inevitably, push the field forward.

Yet, to no small degree, I am also a critic of COMPSTAT (or at least what I understand COMPSTAT to be and how it works). I think that there are some important dimensions of police performance that are ignored in the COMPSTAT system. Specifically, I worry that the system does not give focus enough attention on how economically and fairly one crucial asset of the police is used: namely, the force and authority of the state. And it does not keep track of the extent to which its legitimacy with citizens is being supported or undermined by its operations. Further, I worry that precisely because these valued dimensions of performance are neglected while others are closely observed, the pursuit of these values will be sacrificed by those who are managing the system to the detriment of the current and long run performance of the Department.

I hasten to add, however, that I do not purport to be an expert how COMPSTAT actually works. (I'm not even sure what it is an acronym for, or whether it is spelled with or without a P!) It follows, then, that I am not offering my remarks tonight as a fully developed evaluation of the impact of COMPSTAT on the character and quality of policing in New York City.

Indeed, given the somewhat mythical status of COMPSTAT, it would be hard to offer an authoritative account of the how the system works and what impact it has had. As one listens to the accounts of those involved, it becomes immediately clear that COMPSTAT has been many different things to many different people.

Moreover, whatever it was in the beginning seems to have changed, and ~~that~~ COMPSTAT continues to change. Indeed, I was enormously heartened to read in the New York Times just several days ago that Police Commissioner Kerik had emphasized the importance of rebuilding relationships with local communities as an important dimension of police performance, and that he had committed himself to conducting surveys of citizens to learn about their experiences with the NYPD. The article did not say how this new measurement initiative was to be integrated into the COMPSTAT system, but to the extent that they will be, these adaptations to COMPSTAT would go a long way toward alleviating my deepest concerns. Indeed, such initiatives would, in my view, move COMPSTAT closer to becoming, in fact, an ideal system for police performance measurement.

The important point for tonight, however, is not to get bogged down in the concrete details of how COMPSTAT works, and whether it has had a good or bad effect on the nature of policing in New York. The point, instead, is to use the example of COMPSTAT, whether stereotyped or accurately understood, as an occasion for thinking hard about what values we want a public police department to achieve and express in its operations, and what we could do to construct an operational police performance measurement system that would allow us both to recognize and realize public value in policing. That is the assignment I would like to take on. We can learn in the discussion period about how the system really does operate, and how it is even better than the system I propose.

## II. Why Measure Police Performance?

In designing a police performance measurement one might usefully start by asking what important purposes are served by measuring police performance. While there are many answers one can give to this question, three seem particularly important to me.

### A. External Accountability to Citizens

First, accurate measurements of police performance would help to satisfy the strong citizen demand for public sector accountability in general, and police accountability more specifically. Citizens want to be able to look at something like the private sector's famed "bottom line" that could tell them whether the investments they had made in public policing were worthwhile or not.

We want external accountability partly as an end in itself. We think it is right and proper that those who are granted public resources to accomplish public purposes should have to account for their use. But we value accountability even more as a means of improving the performance of the police. We think that accountability will guard against theft or misuse of public resources. We also hope that such accountability will provide incentives for the organization to perform well on the various dimensions of performance we have indicated are important to us.

In these respects, we could think of the development of police performance measurements as being as important for public police departments as the development of a regular system of financial reports would be for private sector firms: as the means that protect investors from being defrauded in their investments, and as a device that gives those who manage the organization incentives to perform well with respect to the owners' aspirations.

It is important to understand that the police are now held accountable through many means other than through the routine publication of reports that purport to measure their overall performance. For example, the news media give intensive coverage to particular "incidents" of policing that seem either

particularly notorious or praiseworthy. This reporting serves some of the same functions that we might imagine regular performance measurement would, since it helps shape the overall reputation of the Department with citizens, and provides incentives for the police to perform well (or at least become adept in explaining why notorious incidents were exceptions to an otherwise exemplary record of performance). Similarly, citizens who are badly treated by the police can hold the police accountable by filing civil suits, with or without the aid of noisy politicians who want to make issues of the case. This, too, shapes public opinion about the police, and gives them incentives to avoid unnecessary or inappropriate uses of force. The City Council, too, can suddenly take an interest in policing, and hold hearings on the fairness with which police resources are distributed across the city, the adequacy of its operational procedures for dealing with civil disorder, or the emphasis it gives to crimes such as domestic violence or shoplifting. Such things send the kind of voltage through a police department that we all understand the experience of accountability to require.

Yet, one might say that this kind of accountability, useful as it is, is not quite as useful as an alternate system that focused more attention, and more significant rewards and penalties, on aggregate statistical measures of police performance – that is, on the kinds of information that could emerge from a fully developed, routinely reported, police performance measurement system. After all, one *does* have to worry that the notorious incidents fail to provide a reliable picture of what the police do on a day to day basis in less visible cases. More importantly, one also has to worry that reporting on notorious incidents fails to provide an accurate picture of whether the police are improving or going backward.

Moreover, one has to recognize that this kind of “incident reporting” doesn’t really provide the kind of incentives required to focus the sustained, careful attention of managers within the police department to examine the processes they are relying on to deliver police services. From the perspective of an internal police manager, being held accountable for particular incidents feels a lot like being struck by lightning. It hurt. It could happen to him. It could happen again. But, it is hard to know exactly what one should do to insulate him- or herself from this possibility. The best thing might be simply to stay indoors and hope for the best. This doesn’t always produce the kind of close attention to processes and morale that are likely to actually improve the average performance of the police on the street.

## B. Promoting Internal Accountability

These observations help to remind us that the second important function of a police performance measurement system is to generate some degree of *internal* accountability as well as support *external* accountability. As in the case of external accountability, internal accountability is both a valued end (employees should accept their fiduciary responsibilities to their employers and their employers' agents), and an important means for achieving the goals of improved performance (monitoring performance and making rewards and penalties contingent on performance will tend to motivate individuals to perform better on the tasks that are rewarded).

Now, there is an important, somewhat heated debate among those who study organizations about the extent to which demanding internal performance measurement systems do or do not seem to work to improve the performance of the organization. Part of the debate has to do with how much "voltage" one ought to try to run through the performance measurement system.

Different features of the performance measurement system can be adjusted to vary the amount of behavioral voltage the system will have. A measurement system that is closely aligned with a structure of responsibility, and is used in awarding bonuses or promotions will be a "hotter" system than one that fails to identify success or failure with individuals, or fails to use that identification to reward and punish. A measurement system that is used frequently – say weekly or monthly -- will have much more power than one that is used less frequently, say annually. A system that exposes one's performance publicly, to high level officials in the organization, will have more power than a system that relies on more informal, private communication among peers. And so on.

One might think that the best measurement systems are those that crank up the voltage to very high levels. But this turns out not to be the case. If the voltage in the system is too high, lots of pressure will accumulate to distort the measures used in the system. Moreover, if those subjected to a high voltage system cannot think of any ways to improve their performance or escape punishment, they tend to fall into a state of "learned helplessness." Instead of acting creatively to find ways to achieve the measured results, they simply give up and wait for the axe to fall. Finally, the more pressure that exists in the system, the more vulnerable it becomes to internal attacks that the system is measuring the wrong things, or is being used unfairly. In short, there are some systems that are simply too hard for organizations to bear.

Importantly related to the question of how much voltage runs through the system is the question of what particular things managers are held accountable for achieving. The current vogue in performance measurement is to seek to hold public managers accountable for "outcomes;" not outputs or activities. An

outcome is a socially valuable result that happens as a consequence of what an organization does: for example, a reduction in crime as a consequence of the police department threatening or actually making arrests. This makes sense because it is often the outcome that constitutes the true social value of the organization's activities.

The difficulty, however, is that the "outcome" usually emerges from a complex causal process over which the manager and the organization that are being evaluated have only limited control: the crime reduction effect of the police making an arrest occurs because the defendant is successfully prosecuted and taken off the streets, or diverted to drug treatment, and his place is not taken by any others because others hear about and are deterred by the prospect of arrest. From the point of view of the manager being evaluated, such a system feels like a "strict liability" system: he is accountable for the ultimate result even though he cannot reliably control all the factors that lead to the result. This often feels unfair. It may also lead to the feeling of learned helplessness if the manager cannot figure out what to do to get the desired results.

There is a further problem. If we do not devote some attention to monitoring what the organization actually does to try to produce the desired outcomes, it will be difficult for us to learn much about how the organization can improve. After all, in order to improve, we have to know what we did, and whether it worked. If we only know the outcomes, and not the activities and outputs that we produced that we thought were linked to the outcomes

For these reasons, desirable as it is to measure outcomes, the most effective internal accountability systems measure activities and outputs of organizations as well as outcomes. The reasons are: 1) these are things the managers can control; 2) they give the manager a way to show conscientious and thoughtful effort as well as results; and 3) encouraging managers to be self-conscious about the processes they are relying on to produce the desired results, and to experiment with new methods may help an organization improve its performance by learning new and better ways to operate, as well as by working harder and more conscientiously on the things it already knows how to do.

These points can be usefully summarized in the simple matrix that looks at how much voltage is being run through the system on one axis, and the focus of the system on inputs, activities, outputs, or outcomes along the other. (See Figure 1.) The common stereotype is that private sector performance measurement systems are typically high voltage systems focusing on outcomes. In principle, this gets people cranked up to work hard at creating valuable results, and allows them to experiment with the means for doing so. The public sector, in contrast, operates with either low voltage systems in which there is little reason to do anything, or high voltage systems that focus on activities and outputs rather than outcomes. Arguably, these are the worst systems of control because they do not provide much incentive for working, or for learning.



In practice, however, it seems pretty clear that the best systems in the private sector for producing internal accountability are those that focus a reasonable amount of pressure on both outcomes and processes. These are systems that are consistent with the culture of learning organizations. There is enough pressure to keep one's attention focused on performing, but not so much that it paralyzes people, or drives out the willingness to experiment with new ideas. There is enough clarity about what the ultimate point of the organization is to keep one's attention on producing those results rather than some other, but the organizations continues to gather and examine information about current operations and processes so that one can experiment with them to produce improved results.


If we imagine that the principle problem facing police departments is that people don't work hard enough, and fail to use the procedures that the organization has recommended (either because they are known to be efficacious, or because they are professionally recommended as the "best practice," or simply because the organization wants to deliver a consistent service), then one might want a high voltage system focusing on processes, activities and outputs rather than outcomes. This, I think, is mostly what we believe about policing and public sector organizations in general.

If, however, we imagine that the problem facing police departments is that they do not have very good responses to many situations they encounter (either because they are facing unusual and unique situations that require a "customized" response, or because they are facing a new class of problems that they haven't really seen before, or because their old responses to a broad class of problems has never been very good), then one might prefer an internal performance measurement system that is more similar to those used by learning organizations: namely, moderate voltage systems that focus attention both on outcomes and processes.

So, we need performance measurement to support both external and internal accountability. Both external and internal accountability are important as ends in themselves. They are even more important as means for improving the performance of the department over time. The improvements in performance could come from establishing incentives that encouraged people to work harder and use established procedures more consistently. Or, they could come from helping the organization learn and adapt its methods to meet heterogeneous, or changing demands, or to learn more effective means of dealing with the problems that have long been part of its core functions.

Figure 1. Alternative Performance Measurement Systems

Focus is on:

	Inputs	Activities/Processes	Outputs	Outcomes
Low "Voltage" Systems				
High "Voltage" Systems				

### C. Aligning External and Internal Demands for Accountability

The third important reason to be interested in measuring police performance is that constructing measures of police performances forces the public and the police to confront the question of how external demands for accountability will be aligned with internal accountability. Two different issues are at stake in aligning external and internal performance measures.

The most obvious and most frequently discussed is the issue of how “transparent” the operations of the organization should be to the external environment. On one hand, it seems that there is much to be said for high degrees of transparency. After all, citizens and their representatives should have the right to investigate how their police department operates. When a questionable incident arises, they ought to be able to investigate it in detail. If they have this power for individual cases, they ought to have it for the overall organization. Such transparency will help to build the crucial bonds of trust and legitimacy that will allow the police to perform well. It will create incentives for performing well. And so on.

On the other hand, there are some important reasons to be interested in shielding the organization from too much detailed observation. Transparency can lead to “micro-management.” Micro-management, in turn, can waste everyone’s time by demanding constant justification of and accounting for particular actions. It can also sap the initiative of an organization constantly subjecting it to “second-guessing.” Transparency could also lead to the “politicization” of the department. If every special interest group could look into the police department to see the extent to which the Department is achieving their own idiosyncratic values, the Department’s operations could be eaten up by outside demands. Transparency can also leave managers and officers feeling so exposed that they will be reluctant to take any action at all. Finally, there are some important operational secrets that have to be kept secret to ensure that the police can be effective in controlling crime and calling offenders to account.

Balancing these competing concerns leads to the usual systems we can observe. The police report externally about aggregate results with a few summary statistics. They are forced to go into more detail when someone has raised a question about a particular incident, but this is much resented as the kind of micro-management and political interference that reduces the initiative and morale of the department. Sometimes, the incidents come fast enough and frequently enough to cast real doubt on the capabilities of the organization. In such cases, the police are put into a kind of special receivership during which the police departments operations and administrative systems are reviewed by a special commission. In these periods, much police activity slows and initiative is blunted while people make up their minds about how the police will be governed and managed in the future.

These are important enough concerns. But the second important reason to be interested in the relationship between external and internal accountability focuses less on the question of how much detail the police should offer about their operations, and more on the crucially important question of *whether there are real differences between the public and the police about the substantive values to be pursued through police operations*. One possibility, for example, is that the police might believe that their most important purpose is to reduce crime by finding and arresting the people whom they judge to be guilty of the crime. They may think that the public agrees with them about this fundamental objective; and further, that the public is not very interested at all in other aspects of their performance such as acting in ways that inspire trust or reduce fears, or that provide emergency medical and social services of various kinds. They may also think that the public doesn't care much about the niceties of due process as long as they get the crooks off the streets.

If the citizens agree with the police about these matters, then we could say that the public and the police were substantively aligned in their ideas about what constituted the important public value of the police. In such circumstances, it would not be too difficult to construct performance measures that aligned external with internal expectations.

If, however, the public does not have these views about the important functions of policing, then a different kind of problem emerges. Suppose, for example, that the public would like to reduce crime, but would prefer that the police find ways to prevent crime through means other than threatening or making arrests. Or, suppose that the public was intensely interested in the economy and fairness with which force and authority was being used, and included the desire to have the police use force and authority both economically and fairly as an important aspect of police performance. Or, suppose that the citizens wanted the reassurance of having a familiar police presence to still their fears, and provide them with a courteous service when they had a problem. Then, they might want to develop measures of policing that would measure these contributions of policing, and the police themselves might view such performance measures as silly or illegitimate.

In such cases, we could see that the public and the police were not aligned substantively on their ideas of what the police should do. The public would want the police to produce something that the police were reluctant to supply. Presumably, in such cases it would be difficult to construct a set of performance measures that could align external and internal expectations. Indeed, one might expect the police to use arguments against both "micro-management" and "politicization" to create some space within the system of external accountability so that they could gain some relief from the wrong-headed desires of the public, and pursue the goals they judged to be the true and proper goals of policing.

The tensions that arise in trying to align public expectations of the police with the standards of accountability that the police are willing to impose on themselves are what make police performance measurement an important *political* problem as well as an important *operational* and *technical* problem. It is not just that police departments are afraid of being judged and held accountable by something as unreliable as a political community; it is also that they sometimes disagree with what the political community wants from their police force. One of the great virtues of having a discussion about how to measure the performance of policing is that these issues can be surfaced rather than buried in a more or less tacit understanding. Thus, focusing on the alignment of external and internal performance measures provides a way for citizens to communicate with the police about the values they think are important to produce, and to have reflected in current police operations.

### III. Creating a "Bottom Line" for Policing: Preliminary Considerations

Given that measuring performance is important, what are the important dimensions of police performance that citizens should demand to have measured as an accurate indication of the value produced by police departments? What particular measures should go into the construction of a useful "bottom line" for public police departments?

#### A. Reducing Crime as the "Profit" Generated by the NYPD

To many, (particularly those who are impatient with academic quibbles), the "bottom line" of policing is simple and straightforward: it is reduced crime. Period. Full Stop. Indeed that was Commissioner Bratton's view when he declared early in his tenure and early in the development of COMPSTAT that "reduced crime" is the "profit" that the NYPD produces for its owners – the citizens of New York.

While trying to avoid being tarred as an academic quibbler, I would like to respectfully submit that Commissioner Bratton's claim is wrong. It is wrong in two important respects.

#### ~~A~~ B. Crime Reduction as the *Gross* not the *Net* Value of Policing

First, as a technical matter, Bratton's claim that "reducing crime" is to a police department what "earning profits" is to a business enterprise is not, in a strict accounting sense, accurate. Strictly speaking, "crime reduction" is the functional equivalent of the revenues a private company earns by producing and selling particular products and services -- not its profit.

In the private sector, the (*gross*) *value* that an organization produces is measured by the amount that customers are willing to pay for the particular products and services the firm supplies. This amount registers in the private sector's accounting systems as the *revenues* earned by selling products and services. *Profit*, however, is calculated by subtracting from the *revenues* the firm earned by selling its products and services from the *costs* it incurred in producing them. *Revenues* are, thus, a measure of the (*gross*) *value* that customers attached to the output of the firm. *Profits*, on the other hand, are a measure of the (*net*) *value* produced by the firm. *Net value* is what both the firm and the society are after. After all, as companies like Sears and Roebuck and Harley-Davidson have painfully learned, they can produce valuable products and services and earn huge revenues and still run the risk of bankruptcy if those huge revenues fail to cover even larger costs.

By analogy, then, the value that citizens attach to success in reducing crime is the equivalent of the revenue earned by a police department. That is (at least part of) the value they attach to the products and services of the police. To calculate the profit earned by the police, however, one would have to subtract the *costs* incurred in producing that valuable result. That is the measure of the *net value* of the police, and that is what ought to interest us. As citizens, we should be interested not only in how much the police reduced crime, but how much it cost to produce that result.

But what costs should be recognized in calculating the net value created by a public police force? The most obvious costs are the direct costs of fielding the force: the dollars paid out in salaries and benefits to working officers, the costs of training the officers to do their jobs well, the purchase of gasoline and automobiles that allow the officers to patrol and respond to calls for service, and so on. By subtracting these costs from the benefits associated with reducing crime, we could approximate something like the private sector's financial "bottom line."

### C. Authority as a Resource and Its Use as a Cost

It is important to recognize, however, that tax dollars are not the only asset that police departments use in reducing crime. The other is state authority. As the Philadelphia Police Study Task Force observed:

"The police are entrusted with important public resources. The most obvious is money: \$230 million a year flows through the Philadelphia Police Department. Far more important, the public grants the police another resource -- the use of force and authority. These are deployed when a citizen is arrested or handcuffed, when an officer fires his weapon at a citizen, and when an officer claims exclusive use of the streets with his siren."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Philadelphia Police Study Task Force. 1987. *Philadelphia and its Police: Toward a New Partnership: A Report by the Philadelphia Police Study Task Force*. Philadelphia, Pa: Philadelphia Police Study Task Force. p.129

Just as the money that public police use comes from money that would otherwise be used for private consumption, so the extensive authority that the police use in their work comes from the stock of private liberty that we, as citizens, enjoy as a matter of right. We are as reluctant to part with our private liberty as we are to part with the money. Of course, we may be persuaded to part with our liberty in the interest of keeping us safe from the attacks of criminals, just as we might be persuaded to part with some of our money to accomplish the same goal.

But the point is that we part with these assets only grudgingly. All other things being equal, we would like the police to use the authority we grant them sparingly. That is why we train police officers extensively in methods that allow them to accomplish important law enforcement objectives with the minimum use of force. And that is why we pay individuals who can show that they have been the victims of inappropriate uses of police force and authority.<sup>2</sup> In an important accounting sense, we have to recognize the grant of authority to the police as an asset, and count its use in police operations as a cost to be weighed against the benefits of lowering crime.

#### D. Justice and Fairness as Important Values to Be Pursued in Public Policing

The fact that the police use public authority in their efforts to reduce crime means not only that we have to account for the use of that asset in calculating the net benefits produced. It also means that the criteria we use to value police department operations change in an important way. When we talk about money, we are primarily interested in a means/ends calculus: the cost of a means compared to the value of an end. The key words here are efficiency and effectiveness.

When we talk about the use of authority, however, the criteria shift to concerns about justice and fairness. When public authority is used, we citizens are interested not only in how much authority was used and to what important effect, but also in how justly and fairly it was deployed. After all, we support police departments not only to achieve the practical result of reducing crime, but also to achieve the principled result of "doing justice." Justice is produced when we succeed in calling offenders to account for their crimes. It is also achieved when we respect the rights of those suspected of crimes. And, a certain kind of justice and fairness is achieved when we equitably distribute the burdens and benefits of public policing across the general population.

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<sup>2</sup> Skolnick, Jerome H. and James J. Fyfe. 1993. *Above the Law: Police and the Excessive Use of Force*. New York: The Free Press.

Producing justice, fairness, and equity may seem like abstract values -- more important to academicians and idealists than to practical people like citizens, mayors and police chiefs. Yet, I suspect that more chiefs have lost their jobs due to failures to solve particularly horrendous crimes, or scandals surrounding the excessive use of force, or allegations of corruption in a police department than to public indignation about failures to be cost-effective in controlling crime. If true, this would imply that the public has at least some intermittent interest in the capacity of the police to produce justice and fairness as well as crime control effectiveness.

Moreover, there are many individual citizens who suffer daily from a reasonable, experience-based belief that they will be subjected to higher levels of police scrutiny and receive lower levels of police service than their fellow citizens.<sup>3</sup> The sense of unfairness must count as a loss in accounting for the value of public policing -- not just because it is a loss in itself, but also because it might undermine the willingness of those citizens to help the police in achieving the practical goal of controlling crime, and in doing so, increase the costs or reduce the effectiveness of the police in controlling crime.

#### E. Valuable Accomplishments beyond Crime Control

Bratton's second error in equating crime control with the profit produced by a police department is that it fails to fully specify all the different dimensions of value that a public police department could produce for its community. It is not just that Bratton's formulation fails to account for the *costs* of reducing crime control. It is also that crime control is not the only valued product or service of a public police department. For example, a local community could decide that it was very interested in reducing overall levels of crime with the least amount of public resources, but that it was reluctant to give up the value that comes from prompt, sustained, responsive and courteous responses to calls for service. Or, that same community could decide that what it really liked about a public police department was that it was capable of bringing the authority of the state to bear with precision and restraint on suspected offenders regardless of the effect of such actions on levels of crime. Or, that community could decide that it was really important that the police department distributed the burdens and benefits of public protection against criminal offending quite fairly across the citizens and taxpayers of that community. In short, it might be that reducing crime, and doing so with the smallest use of the money and authority of the state, is only one important, valued goal of the police.

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<sup>3</sup> Flanagan, Timothy J. and Michael S. Vaughn. 1996. "Public Opinion about Police Abuse of Force." In *Police Violence: Understanding and Controlling Police Abuse of Force*. Edited by William Geller and Hans Toch. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.



Below, I take up several different dimensions of police performance that could be considered important, valuable outputs or outcomes of policing which could, in principle be measured. Throughout this discussion, however, it is important to remember that these measures define the *gross* value of policing; not necessarily the *net* value. To do that, one has to reckon the costs of money and authority that were used to produce these results as well as the results themselves.

#### IV. Important Dimensions of Police Performance

##### A. Reducing Crime and Criminal Victimization

While Bratton may have been wrong in declaring that crime reduction was the functional equivalent of profit earned by the police, he was not wrong to assign it paramount importance as one of the valued results of policing. Without doubt, reducing crime and criminal victimization is the single most important contribution that police are expected to make to society's well being. In business parlance, reducing crime is "job #1."

It has this importance because society judges it to be very important to minimize the immediate physical and economic losses of criminal victimization. We want fewer stabs and bruises, fewer trips to the hospital, and fewer wallets and stereos stolen. These are the clear, objective, socially desired effects of reducing crime and criminal victimization.

Yet, in transforming the goal of reducing crime and criminal victimization into a measurable "bottom line" for policing, two important problems arise.

First, it is unexpectedly difficult to measure levels of crime and victimization. What the police can (and do) conveniently measure is the level of crime reported to them. Arguably, this is the right measure to use in gauging the level of crime. After all, if a crime doesn't matter enough to a citizen to report it to the police, one can argue that it probably wasn't a serious matter. Moreover, since it is both practically and legally difficult for the police to act on crimes not reported to them, perhaps the only crimes that police should be expected to handle are those that are reported.

The difficulty, however, is that there are many serious crimes that occur in the society which will go unreported but still take their toll on the welfare of society.<sup>4</sup> For example, both domestic violence and child abuse and neglect may go unreported because the victims of the crime are afraid of the unknown consequences of filing the report. Similarly, victims of rape may fail to report due

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<sup>4</sup> Moore, Mark H. 1983. "Invisible Offenses: A Challenge to Minimally Intrusive Law Enforcement." In *ABSCAM Ethics: Moral Issues and Deception in Law Enforcement*. Edited by G.M. Kaplan. Washington, DC: Police Foundation.

to embarrassment. And, those who live in housing projects dominated by the economic power and threats of drug dealing gangs may fail to report on the daily extortion that occurs in such places.

As importantly, whether or not citizens report crimes to the police depends a great deal on whether they think the police can or will do anything about their reports.<sup>5</sup> If they think the police are overwhelmed, or incompetent, or biased against them, they may decide it is not worth the trouble to report the offense. To the extent that one thought that important dimensions of police performance included such things as being open and responsive to the concerns of citizens, fair in responding to calls for service, and eager to provide a good enough service to citizens so that they would not be tempted to take the law into their own hands, then one might easily view the reluctance of citizens to report crimes to the police (which would result in reduced levels of reported crime) as a sign of poor rather than good police performance.

In measuring levels of crime, then, one must deal with the simple fact that between the level of reported crime and the real underlying rate of crime lies the "dark figure" of unreported crime.<sup>6</sup> Determining the level of unreported crime is important not only to get a more accurate measure of the real rate of criminal victimization in the society, but also to determine how much confidence citizens have in asking the police for help.

The only way to measure the underlying rate of victimization is to conduct a general survey of citizens asking about their victimization, and their reasons for failing to report crime to the police.<sup>7</sup> But these "victimization surveys" are expensive, and vulnerable to several different kinds of error in themselves.<sup>8</sup> Still, if one wants to get close to the real level of victimization in the society, and to learn about the extent to which the police have earned the confidence of citizens in responding to criminal offenses, then there is little choice but to complement information on reported crime with information gained from general surveys of local populations.

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<sup>5</sup> Black, Donald. 1970. "Production of Crime Rates." *American Sociological Review*. 35:736-748.

<sup>6</sup> Bidderman, Alfred and Albert J. Reiss. 1967. "On Exploring the 'Dark Figure' of Crime." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*. 374:1-15.

<sup>7</sup> See, e.g., Bureau of Justice Statistics. 2000. *Criminal Victimization in the United States, 1998*. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.

<sup>8</sup> The most common errors are under-reporting and over-reporting. For a full discussion of the problems and errors in victimization surveys, see James Garofalo. 1990. "The National Crime Survey, 1973-1986: Strengths and Limitations of a Very Large Data Set." In *Measuring Crime: Large Scale, Long-Range Efforts*, edited by Doris MacKenzie, Phyllis Baunach, and Roy Roberg. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Patrick Jackson. 1990. "Sources of Data." In *Measurement Issues in Criminology*, edited by Kimberly Kempf. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Second, some believe that measuring the performance of the police in terms of their impact on levels of crime is wrong because, in their view, the police have little ability to control crime. As David Bayley put it:

“Crime is not something the police can really control. Sad to say, crime is not determined by what the police do or by how many of them there are. Criminologists have shown again and again that the best predictors of crime...are economic and social factors, notably income, unemployment, education, prevalence of minorities, households headed by single women, household size, and home ownership... Police [themselves] often ruefully observe that law enforcement is little more than a Band-Aid on the cancer of crime.”<sup>9</sup>

In this view, crime reduction may be a desirable and valuable thing. The police may be able to contribute to this goal. But, in the end, there is so much else that contributes to overall levels of crime that it would be wrong, substantively and managerially, to hold the police accountable for controlling crime.

Of course, Bayley and his colleagues may be wrong. After all, the fact that the best predictors of levels of crime turn out to be social and economic variables not the level of policing does not necessarily mean that the police cannot produce crime reduction effects that are potentially valuable to the society – particularly if one is willing to accept some local and temporary reductions in crime as important results. And there are some encouraging signs that some approaches taken by police agencies can, in fact, reduce crime below previous or expected levels of crime given the social and economic conditions.<sup>10</sup>

Indeed, there is even some evidence that the police can reduce crime through interventions that do not depend on threatened or actual arrests. For example, they can prevent burglaries by encouraging citizens to harden their homes and businesses against the usual practices of burglars.<sup>11</sup> They can prevent racial conflicts among teenagers by re-arranging bus routes, and conducting educational programs in schools.<sup>12</sup> They can reduce the lethality of youthful disputes by regulating the availability of guns to kids.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Bayley, 1996. p.40.

<sup>10</sup> Moore, Mark H. 1992. "Community and Problem-Solving Policing." In *Modern Policing*. Edited by Michael Tonry and Norval Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

<sup>11</sup> Ronald V. Clarke (ed.). 1992. *Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies*. New York: Harrow and Heston.

<sup>12</sup> David M. Kennedy. 1990. "Fighting Fear in Baltimore County." Case number 938.0. Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government.

<sup>13</sup> David M. Kennedy, Anne M. Piehl, and Anthony A. Braga. 1996. "Youth Violence in Boston: Gun Markets, Serious Youth Offenders, and a Use-Reduction Strategy." *Law and Contemporary Problems* 59: 147 – 196.

These important preventive activities fit directly into the core mission of reducing crime. But they focus police attention on different kinds of activities than patrol, rapid response to calls for service, and retrospective investigations which constitute the standard police methods for controlling crime. They work through means other than making arrests.<sup>14</sup>

These *preventive* methods for controlling crime are, in principle, very high-value police activities -- particularly if we view authority as a resource whose use ought to be husbanded. The reason is simply that an arrest uses the authority of the police intensively. If we can achieve the same crime reduction result through means that use less state authority, and rely, instead, on the state using smaller bits of authority to alter the conditions that lead to crime, then, presumably the net value of a police department would increase. For example, it seems pretty clear that we ought to prefer to have the police eliminate street level drug dealing through the use of civil sanctions against landlords who have allowed their premises to become havens for drug dealers to mass arrests repeated over and over again. It is not just that the first saves money over the second. It is also that there is less state authority being invoked in the first than in the second.

But even if we concluded that the police *could* reduce crime, and should be held accountable for doing so, the problem of reckoning the value of policing only in terms of reduced crime is that the police make other equally (or conceivably more) valuable contributions to society beyond their contribution to reducing crime. Unless we focus attention on those results as well, we risk failing to recognize or to produce some of the social value that the police are capable of producing.

#### B. Holding Offenders to Account

Many who are skeptical of police capacity to control crime, for example, nonetheless applaud their efforts to "enforce the law" and "call offenders to account." In this view, identifying and making cases against criminal offenders is consistent with achieving the *principled* goal of doing justice not the instrumental goal of reducing crime. Achieving that goal, in turn, is valuable in itself even if it produced no or little impact on crime. Indeed, to some, doing justice is the *only* important goal of policing. Focusing on the goal of calling offenders to account has the further (apparent) advantage of focusing police attention on something that the police can control. They may not be able to influence overall levels of crime, but they ought to be able to identify and apprehend those who offend.

To many, of course, achieving the principled goal of holding offenders to account is tantamount to achieving the practical goal of effectively controlling crime. In this view, the mechanisms of deterrence and incapacitation are assumed to be powerful enough to ensure that if the police catch those who

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<sup>14</sup> Herman Goldstein. 1990. *Problem-Oriented Policing*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press; Clarke, 1992; Moore, 1992.

commit crimes, one can count on crime being reduced in the future. Indeed, for many, this connection is so close that the two different ideas cannot easily be separated.

Yet, there is a clear difference between the principled goal of ensuring justice and the instrumental goal of reducing crime. From some ethical perspectives, it is desirable to hold offenders to account even if that effort had no impact on future crimes.<sup>15</sup> In this view, meting out just punishment is something that is intrinsically good. A good and just society would seek that result and spend treasure to produce it even if the punishment had no practical effect on future criminal offending. As the philosopher, Emmanuel Kant argued, if a criminal offender has been justly sentenced to some form of punishment, it would be important to carry out that punishment even if the offender and the warden were the only people left on earth.<sup>16</sup>

### C. Reduced Fear/Enhanced Security

The goals of "reducing crime and victimization" and "calling offenders to account" are squarely at the center of the conventional view of the police mission. They are also dimensions of performance for which (more or less adequate) measurement systems have been constructed: reported crime rates on one hand, clearance rates on the other. There is a third goal of policing that is thought to be closely related to these others for which current measurement systems are less well developed: namely, reducing citizens fears of crime and enhancing their sense of security.

As in the case of the relationship between "reducing crime" on one hand and "calling offenders to account" on the other, there are many who consider the relationship between "reducing crime" on one hand and "reducing fear and enhancing security" on the other to be so close as to be not worth making the distinction. The reasons that these concepts seem packed so tightly together are essentially two. First, one of the principal reasons society should be interested in reducing crime and criminal victimization is to relieve the fears that beset victims and those who fear they might become victims of crime. Second, the best and only proper way of accomplishing that goal is to bring down the level of criminal victimization.

Those who hold these views are right to think that reducing fear is one of the important reasons to be interested in controlling crime. After all, the direct economic and financial losses to victims represent only a small part of the overall social costs of crime. The other costs are linked to the fear that victimization

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<sup>15</sup> This is called a deontological ethical theory. See William K. Frankena. 1973. *Ethics*. Second Edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

<sup>16</sup> Immanuel Kant. 1964. *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Translated by H.J. Paton. New York: Harper and Row.

induces.<sup>17</sup> Those frightened by crime absorb losses associated with curtailing their activities, and spending money and effort in efforts to defend themselves against crime. They stay closer to home, and shun public parks and transportation. At home, they surround themselves with locks, guns, dogs, and burglar alarms purchased from commercial private security concerns. Some hire private police to patrol their areas. Others ask their neighbors to watch their houses or join them in citizen patrols. All this takes time and energy away from other activities. Such efforts may relieve citizens of some of their anxieties, but some residual fear will remain to make the quality of life edgier than they would desire. There is also the problem that some of the self-defense methods may end up increasing fears, increasing tensions, and actually contributing to crimes in the future. This is the sense in which reducing fear becomes an important reason to reduce overall levels of crime.

But there are two reasons to detach the goal of "reducing fear and increasing citizen security" from the goal of "reducing criminal victimization." One is that the relationship between criminal victimization on one hand and fear on the other is much less direct than is commonly assumed. We know that fear is triggered by relatively minor instances of disorder, and responds more to changes in disorderly conditions than it does to underlying risks of criminal victimization.<sup>18</sup> The reason is that fear is a subjective phenomenon. The real risks of victimization establish a backdrop of concern. How concerned one feels on a daily basis seems to depend on "signs of crime" that have subjective rather than objective significance.

The second reason for taking fear seriously as a problem independently of reducing criminal victimization follows directly from this first. It has become clear that there are many things that the police can do to reduce fear that do not necessarily reduce crime. For example, by becoming more intimately known to citizens through foot patrol and stable beat assignments, and by dealing with instances of disorder as well as responding to serious crime, police can enhance a community's sense of security.<sup>19</sup> This effect occurs even if these tactics fail to reduce the objective risks of criminal victimization.

If fear is somewhat independent of criminal victimization, and can be operated on separately by the police, then the broader society and police executives could view "fear reduction" as a distinct "product line" -- related to but not the same as reducing crime and catching offenders. Whether the police should embrace this line of business is hotly argued.

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<sup>17</sup> Mark Warr. 1990. "Dangerous Situations: Social Context and the Fear of Victimization." *Social Forces* 68: 891-907. Kenneth Ferraro. 1995. *Fear of Crime: Interpreting Victimization Risk*. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.

<sup>18</sup> Wesley Skogan. 1990. *Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral Decay in American Neighborhoods*. New York: The Free Press.

<sup>19</sup> Police Foundation. 1981. *The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment*. Washington, DC: Police Foundation.

The arguments against focusing explicit attention on fear reduction are essentially three. First, it is argued that fear reduction secured through “feel-good tactics” such as foot patrol that have no real impact on levels of crime is nothing but a shallow and dangerous public relations victory. In this view, the only proper way to produce fear reduction is the old fashioned way: to earn it by reducing the real risks of criminal victimization. Anything less than this deludes citizens into thinking the world is safer than it is, and risks their safety by encouraging them to lower their guard.

Second, because fear is essentially a subjective phenomenon, it cannot be objectively measured. Therefore, no matter how valuable it might be for a police department to focus on reducing fear, because levels of fear cannot be reliably measured, reducing fear cannot become a practical goal of policing.

Third, like crime, fear is influenced by many things other than what the police do. Indeed, we know that the public’s view of crime is importantly influenced by what they see on T.V.; and further, that what they see on T.V. is often quite disconnected from local crime conditions. Since the police cannot control the factors that cause citizens to become afraid, it would be wrong to hold them accountable for reducing citizens’ fears.

On the other hand, the arguments for recognizing police contributions to reducing fear are also strong. Arguably, enhancing the subjective sense of security is ultimately what policing is all about. If we had a great police force that solved all crimes and captured offenders but left citizens afraid and anxious that they were vulnerable to crime, it is not at all clear that we would have accomplished what a police force is intended to achieve.

Besides we know now that reducing fear can make an important independent contribution to serious criminal victimization. When fear is reduced, informal social control is enabled. When informal social control is enabled and combined with police action, serious crime goes down.<sup>20</sup> Similarly, when the police focus on minor criminal offenses to reduce fear, it seems that they have a direct effect on serious criminal victimization as well.

Finally, it seems clear that police efforts to reduce fear by being present in certain ways, and by reducing minor disorder offenses as well as serious criminal victimization tends to increase the economic and social capital in particular neighborhoods. That is good in itself – it adds to the wealth and the overall quality of life of citizens. It is also instrumentally good since a stronger civil society tends to strengthen the overall performance of government.

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<sup>20</sup> Skogan, 1990.

Most people, faced with these arguments, will agree that the police should be concerned not only with reducing crime and victimization, but also with the larger issue of "enhancing security." That is what they were really after when they said that the goal was to reduce crime and criminal victimization, and to call offenders to account. They just thought that the most appropriate way of enhancing security was to reduce the real, underlying risk of criminal victimization and arrest offenders.

Once one agrees that the police should be interested in reducing fear as well as reducing crime, however, the problem becomes how to measure it. This is a very difficult problem. There has been some progress made in assessing levels of fear, however.<sup>21</sup> The principal instruments are surveys of the population that ask them about their levels of fear, and their investment in self-defense efforts. These questions are usually asked in the same surveys that ask about unreported criminal victimization, and the reasons the citizens failed to report their criminal victimization to the police.

#### D. The Regulation of Traffic Safety and Public Spaces

The discussion of reducing fear and structuring society's overall response to crime in ways that produce an "ordered liberty" within which citizens can enjoy both a high degree of both subjective freedom and security, focuses our attention on some additional activities of the police that could be considered extremely valuable, but do not fit neatly into the conventional image of the police as the organization whose principal goals are to reduce crime and call offenders to account. These are the role of the police in what Herman Goldstein describes as "managing the movement of vehicles and people in public locations;" or, more concretely, the role of the police in traffic enforcement and the maintenance of public order.<sup>22</sup>

Compared to the drama of crime and punishment, it would be easy to overlook and trivialize the (largely civil and regulatory) police role in traffic safety. Yet, there are at least three reasons to take traffic enforcement seriously as a value creating activity of the police.

First, it remains true that the safety of citizens is more threatened by careless driving than by murderers and rapists. To the extent that the police are properly concerned with protecting citizens from accidents as well as crimes, police contributions to traffic safety may be as important as their contributions to reducing homicide.

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<sup>21</sup> Ferraro, 1995.

<sup>22</sup> Herman Goldstein. 1977. *Policing a Free Society*. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.



Second, it is in traffic and parking enforcement that the police come into direct contact with the largest number of citizens. In all likelihood, to the extent that citizens form their views of the police from direct experience rather than from T.V., they do so on the basis of what they, and their families, friends, and neighbors, experience in traffic stops. If the police are courteous, respectful, and professional in these transactions, then they will have a favorable view of the police. If they are rude, openly contemptuous, and unprofessional, then the citizens will form another view. To the extent that the police should be interested in the views that citizens have of them, then, they might be interested in ensuring that these encounters are done well, or that they are used only when necessary, and then done as well as possible.

Third, whatever one's views about the social benefits of traffic enforcement, the police spend a great deal of time doing it. Because the costs of the effort are high (both as an absolute amount as well as a proportion of their budget), it is important that the police measure the results.

Fourth, it is possible that there is an important synergy between traffic enforcement on one hand, and success in reducing crime and catching offenders on the other. The link is made via the fact that it is traffic violations that often motivate the police to stop citizens who turn out to be offenders, or allow them to stop citizens whom they suspect of being offenders for other reasons. Just as the focus on disorder offenses brings the police into broader, closer contact with citizens with the effect of reducing serious crime, so might a focus on traffic offenses. Indeed, writing in 1978, Barbara Boland and James Q. Wilson found that the only police activity that seemed to predict lower crime rates in cities was a high level of traffic enforcement.<sup>23</sup>

Note that the principal reason the police are engaged in traffic enforcement and parking regulation is simply that streets and thoroughfares are public spaces. As public spaces, they are assets that ought to be available to all. But there are also competing uses for the space. A road, after all, can be used as: 1) a thoroughfare that helps citizens get quickly from one place to another; 2) as a staging area for deliveries and pick-ups to commercial enterprises located on the street; 3) as a place to park; 4) a pedestrian mall; or 5) a fairground, ball field, or fountain and wading pool when a fire hydrant is opened on a hot day. Unfortunately, it cannot be used simultaneously for these different purposes without serious danger. Thus, public policy decisions, encoded in street signs, are made as to how the streets are to be used for the benefit of all. Police authority is needed to ensure that the rules regulating the use of the spaces are followed.

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<sup>23</sup> James Q. Wilson and Barbara Boland. 1978. "The Effects of Police on Crime." *Law and Society Review* 12: 367-90.

What is true for public streets is also true for other common spaces such as public parks and schoolyards. It is also true for commercial activities that can affect the health and safety of the population such as the distribution, sale and use of alcohol and guns. And it is also true for political activities such as striking, demonstrating and voting. These places, commodities, and activities are all parts of our collective life together. To ensure that there is a reasonable degree of harmony in these collective activities, the police are charged with the responsibility to produce both fair access to and orderly conditions within these spaces. Indeed, it is in these domains that the role of the police as the architects of liberty rather than as crime fighters is most apparent. And that may be one of the most important reasons for keeping these activities salient in the minds of the police. These activities remind citizens and the police that they exist to promote fairness and liberty, not simply to ensure security.

#### E. Emergency Medical and Social Services

A fifth important service provided by the police is some forms of emergency social and medical services to vulnerable and desperate people. The police save intoxicated people from being mugged or freezing to death. They protect runaway children from the hazards and exploitation of street life. They help abused spouses through the terrible hours following a domestic assault.

Again, there is a tendency to disparage these activities of the police as “social work” rather than “crime fighting,” and to complain that such work is more properly the responsibility of other agencies. So it might be. But it is still true that the police end up doing a lot of this kind of work. The reason is primarily that they are the only government agency that is open 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and not only patrol the streets looking for problems but also makes house calls. The result is that the police inevitably end up being the “first responders” to emergencies regardless of their causes or their best future management.

We could, of course, treat this capacity and function of policing as unimportant; or as something that some other agency could do better or more inexpensively. But the alternative would be to view this function as something that is important and valuable to the citizens who are aided, and to the society as a whole which might will there to be some such emergency capability. After all, having such a service available is a kind of insurance policy that we could all learn to enjoy. In addition, we can easily imagine that providing such services would help build support and legitimacy for the police, and that such support, in turn, would be operationally valuable to the police when it came time to solve a crime or quell a disturbance. The more legitimacy the police have with citizens, the more operationally successful they can be.

Note that there is one kind of emergency medical and social service that is quite intimately connected with the police role as crime fighter; that is the emergency medical and social service that is provided to victims of crime in the

aftermath of a criminal attack. Such services (which could include first aid, some initial counseling, notification of family and employers of the attack, etc.) are valuable in at least two ways.

First, to the victim of the crime, they may ease the pain and reduce the shock of their victimization. To the extent that an important goal of policing is not only to prevent crime, but to lessen its consequences for those who suffer, these services would count as value producing activities.

Second, to the police and wider society, the connection created between the police and the victim by the provision of high quality services can help to increase the chance that the case will be solved and successfully prosecuted. Prosecutors long ago discovered that criminal cases could be sustained and strengthened by assigning people from their office to care for victims and families, and keep them involved in the case.<sup>24</sup> Presumably, the police, too, could benefit from cultivating stronger relationships to victims, even though the police may sometimes have to treat victims with some suspicion.

#### F. Summary: Towards a Larger View of the Public Value of Policing

The argument so far, then, is that while one can assert that the ultimate public value produced by policing is crime reduction secured through the threat of arrests, it is by no means obvious that this is true. There are many things that the police can produce that are plausibly valuable to society other than reducing crime. These other valued results include: 1) preventing crimes through means other than arrests; 2) holding offenders to account in the interests of justice; 3) reducing fear and promoting security; 4) reducing the burden and encouraging public spirited forms of self-defense against crime; 5) regulating traffic and the use of public spaces in the interests of safety, security, and equal access to public resources; and 6) providing various types of emergency medical and social services.

#### V. Framing a Set of Measures to Be Used In Recognizing and Realizing Value in Public Policing

This discussion of what products and services the police produce, and who values them suggests that our usual ways of talking about police performance are not fully satisfactory. To see the value only in terms of "reducing crime" misses some important contributions the police both can and do make to society. There is a different way to view public value in police departments that may be more satisfactory.

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<sup>24</sup> President's Task Force on Victims of Crime. 1982. *Final Report*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Gilbert Geis. 1983. "Victim and Witness Assistance Programs." In *Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice*, Vol. 4, edited by S. H. Kadish. New York: The Free Press.

## A. Distinguishing Utilitarian from Principled Values

The first step is to make a distinction between "practical" or "utilitarian" values on one hand, and "principled" or "deontological" values on the other. Practical values include goals like "reduced crime," "enhanced security," and "responsive and courteous service." They are things that are good to have and to enjoy because individuals value them. The more of them, the better.

Principled values, on the other hand, are things like "justice" and "fair treatment." These are things that are considered good in themselves, regardless of whether individuals or collectives really want them, and regardless of whether the production of these values produce any additional good. They are good in themselves.

Of course, individuals and collectives often do want and value these principled values as well as the practical ones. Indeed they particularly seem to want these things when they get together as collective to establish a public agency spending tax dollars and relying on the authority of the state to accomplish public purposes. It is also true that actions take to secure these principled values may also produce valuable practical results. Crime may be reduced through the deterrence and incapacitation that results from pursuing principled goal of holding offenders to account. Compliance with rules may be more reliably and inexpensively secured if citizens believe that the system that enforces compliance with the rules is just and legitimate. But the point is that these principled values can be distinguished from the utilitarian values, and viewed as important in judging the value of public policing as well as the practical values.

## B. Ordering the Importance of Stakeholders and Customers to be Satisfied

The second step is to distinguish among the people – or more accurately, the social positions – who do the valuing of police enterprises. For many reasons, it is useful to distinguish between the social positions of a "citizen" on one hand (who, in principle if not in practice, forms his views of how a police force should operate without knowing whether he is going to be rich or poor, black or white, an offender or a victim), and a "client" (who is particularly situated in the society and therefore has particular interests that are affected by specific transactions with the police department) on the other. Among "clients" of the police, it is also useful to distinguish between those clients who want and receive services from the police (those who call because they have been victimized by a crime, or because they need other kinds of emergency service), and those clients whom the police oblige to do things (those whom the police suspect or know to have violated some laws).

Arguably, it is important to satisfy the interests of all these different stakeholders of policing, but the reasons for being interested in satisfying them, and the relative importance of seeking to satisfy them differ a great deal. Some of the preferences deserve more standing than others.

The clients who receive services from the police look most like “customers” in the private sector, and therefore (in this era that celebrates business models) the individuals whose satisfaction seems most important to pursue. Of course, there are obvious prudential reasons why a police force would seek to satisfy these clients. Because there are many who call, because most of them are “law-abiding citizens,” and because most of them pay taxes, there are political advantages to police departments of providing quality services to those who call, or walk-in, or attend neighborhood meetings to request particular services. Yet, as noted above, sometimes it is the duty of a police department to say “no” to such customers. They cannot have more than their “fair share” of police resources. They cannot have the police operate illegally to advance their particular interests in having orderly streets and places. It is at this moment that the principled views held by citizens trump the desires of the particular customers, and that the relative importance of citizens is greater than that of clients.

The clients who receive obligations from the police—the criminal offenders, the suspects in an investigation, the negligent drivers-- look least like customers, and one can imagine that the police are under no obligations to try to satisfy them. Yet, the police have instrumental reasons for wanting to satisfy these clients. All other things being equal, they would like the offenders to come quietly, the suspects to co-operate in the investigation, and the negligent drivers to recognize the error of their ways. That makes them more effective and less costly in achieving their law enforcement mission. The police also have principled reasons for treating the “obligatees” well. Citizens, thinking that they might someday find themselves in these awkward positions, have given offenders, suspects, and reckless drivers rights, and the police are duty bound to respect those rights in their operations. So, even though the point of policing is not necessarily to satisfy the interests of offenders, there are important reasons for operating with some attention to the interests and rights of offenders.

The stakeholders who, at first glance, seem least important to satisfy are the citizens. After all, the whole notion of a “citizen” as defined above is too abstract to have much practical value. Yet, as we went through the analysis of what police departments owed to particular, concrete clients, it kept turning out that the particular ways in which police departments managed their encounters with service recipients and obligatees was largely dictated by rules that “citizens,” with their interests in fairness and aggregate efficiency and effectiveness wanted. We couldn’t say “yes” to every particular citizen demand, because we had to

protect the interests of all. We had to consider the well-being of offenders because we had practical and principled interests in doing so.

It turns out, then, that the most important stakeholders to satisfy in policing are the *citizens*. That conclusion becomes less surprising when we remember that it is citizens who provide the police the authority and money they use in operations. The authority comes from the precious stock of liberty we all enjoy. The money comes from private consumption via taxation. Since it is citizens who pay for policing with these precious assets, and since the police must act for all, is primarily citizens' desires that deserve to be honored in police operations.

### C. Distinguishing Aggregate Values from the Quality of Individual Transactions

The third step is to distinguish between values that are realized in the aggregate, and those that are realized in smaller, more individualized transactions. This distinction parallels to some degree the distinction between citizens on one hand and clients on the other. Arguably, citizens value the whole of policing, including questions about its aggregate fairness and efficiency and effectiveness. Clients, on the other hand, value the particular transactions in which they are involved either as service recipients or obligatees. An important part of their individual valuation includes the issue of whether they think they have been fairly and decently treated.,

It is worth noting that there are many levels of aggregation that lie between the entire political community in whose name a police department operates on one hand, and individual clients on the other. There are different geographic neighborhoods or communities of place. There are also different communities of interest such as businessmen, or women, or people of color who have interests that are larger than individual interests, but smaller than city-wide issues. All other things being equal, when individuals collect in mediating institutions such as neighborhood groups, churches, or other kinds of interest groups, they have more political power, and more legitimacy in demanding police services than they do as individuals. But their legitimacy and effective influence increases even more when their grouping includes many diverse interests, or when the substantive claims they wish to make can be rationalized as in the interests of the whole as well as their immediate, somewhat idiosyncratic interests.

### D. An Ordered List of Values to be Pursued Through Public Policing

Once we have made these distinctions, it becomes possible to produce an ordered list of values that the police might try to express in, or realize through their operations. Table 1 presents a first cut at such a list. This table is important to the subject of police performance measurement because each of the values in this table is an important candidate for measurement. We know that

organizations tend to produce what is measured. We also know, then, that if some important values go unmeasured, the police will produce less of that value than is desirable. Some urgency thus attaches to developing a suitable measure for a neglected and important value. Thus, Table 1 can be used as a template for assigning priority to the construction of measures that could allow citizens to more reliably recognize the value of policing, and managers to more reliably guide operations. Some discussion of the values presented in Table 1 may help clarify the meaning and increase the practical utility of the Table.

**Table 1:  
What Citizens Should Value  
Valuable Dimensions of Police Performance**

	<u>Principled Values</u>	<u>Instrumental Values</u>
Social Perspective	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Enforce Law Faithfully &amp; Impartially</b></p> <p>Call Offenders to Account Reduce Corruption Reduce Brutality, Excessive Use of Force Fair Allocation of Police Resources Fairly Distribute Burden of Protection     Between Private and Public</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Enhance Safety &amp; Security</b></p> <p>Reduce Crime &amp; Victimization Increase Traffic Safety Reduce Public Disorder Provide Emergency Medical/Social Services Increase Efficiency &amp; Cost Effectiveness</p>
Individual/ Group Perspective	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Sense of Fair Treatment</b></p> <p>Among those Obligated by Police Among Particularly Situated Groups</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>High Quality Customer Service</b></p> <p>Quality of Customer Service: Individual Evaluation Quality of Customer Service: Group Evaluation</p>

The upper left hand cell of Table 1 holds the aggregate, principled values that a police department is duty-bound to pursue. This includes the important idea that the police should enforce the law faithfully and impartially – and not just the laws that define felony crimes, but also those that define misdemeanors, the civil statutes that seek to promote order in public places, and the laws that regulate the conduct of the police themselves. In this cell, then, would be the value of calling offenders to account for their crimes. Also in this cell would be the recognition of patterns of corruption in the police force, or the unfair use of force and authority. And, this cell also includes the idea that the police should use force and authority not only fairly, but also economically. All other things being equal, as a matter of principle, we would like the police to achieve their principled and practical aims with the smallest use of public force and authority.

This cell also includes the idea that, as a public police force, the police should fairly distribute the protection and service they can provide across the

entire political community they serve. The allocation of police services should be to socially defined need rather than to political or economic power.

Perhaps most controversially, this cell also includes the idea that the police should operate in ways that keep the responsibilities for self-defense and the avoidance of criminal victimization properly distributed between private and public agencies. After all, the public police are not, cannot, and should not be the only social actor that takes responsibility for controlling crime. Citizens have to do their part in protecting themselves and their neighbors. The public police should operate to support private self-defense efforts when they are constructive, to discipline and regulate them when they are not, and (reluctantly) to fill in gaps when the gaps appear. This is important as a matter of the proper relationship between the state and individual citizens in a liberal society. As a principled value (that has important practical effects), it is important that the police take neither too much nor too little responsibility for defending citizens against attack. Much must be left to the citizens, who then must be aided and encouraged to support public-regarding forms of self-defense.

The upper right hand cell of Table 1 holds the aggregate, instrumental values that serve as the primary practical justification for having a police force. It is here that the familiar goals of the police such as reducing crime and victimization appear. It is also here that the wider goals and effects of policing occur, such as reducing traffic accidents, establishing order in public places so that they can be widely and comfortably used, providing emergency medical and social services, and helping other city government agencies to perform more effectively in improving the quality of urban life. Obviously, within this cell, the most important and urgent values are those associated with reducing crime, victimization, and fear. But the other effects, while less central to policing, are important results the police produce, and therefore important to recognize through measurement if we want them to continue. It is also within this cell that the public's interest in efficiency and cost effectiveness is held. They would like to know that their money is being spent wisely and prudently as well as their liberty.

The lower left hand cell of Table 1 holds the disaggregated (either individual or group) principled values. The important value here is the extent to which individuals who are obliged by the police – to be arrested, to aid in a criminal investigation, to pay a traffic or parking fine – feel that they have been fairly treated. Equally important is the extent to which groups of citizens – small businessmen, minority youth, women-- feel that they are treated fairly by the police.

The lower right hand cell of Table 1 holds the disaggregated (either individual or group) instrumental values. It is here that the idea of "customer service" holds sway. This cell focuses our attention on the extent to which individuals who call the police, and groups who make requests of the police feel that they receive a high quality, responsive service from the police.



## E. A Simpler Model

While Table 1 is a relatively comprehensive and tidy way of summarizing the extended discussion I have offered on what might be important values to be produced by a public police force, it is far too complex to have much use practical discussions. Consequently, I have taken the liberty of taking one step further and trying to condense the contents of Table 1 into an even simpler set of dimensions. In doing so, I have also tried to bring in the important concerns we have not only about achieving valuable results from policing, but also about the resources we expend in doing so. I have even tried to create a simple icon that can stand for the general idea that is contained in the particular dimension of performance. The six dimensions of performance are presented in Table 2. If forced to take a stand on the small number of variables that it would be worth monitoring in determining how well a police department was performing, these are the dimensions that I would go with. I also believe that it is possible to develop real empirical measures for each of these conceptual dimensions, often simply by extending the information systems we already have available.

## VI. Implications for the Development and Enrichment of COMPSTAT

Suppose that these six dimensions of performance could be agreed to by citizens and the police as important measures of police performance. What would such an agreement imply for the further development of COMPSTAT as a system of both external and internal accountability. In what particular ways does this set of ideas challenge the design and framework of COMPSTAT?

I think there are several important answers to this question.

First, this system reminds us that there are many more contributions that the police make to society than simply reducing crime, and calling offenders to account (though that remains one of their most important contributions). They are in a position to reduce fears, to maintain order in public spaces, and to provide high quality services to citizens who confront emergencies that they judge to be important enough to call the police. Effects that register in these dimensions are as important to the quality of life enjoyed by the community as the effects that register on reduced crime.

Second, the system reminds us that we must pay attention to the costs expended in producing the results as well as the results themselves. This includes money – where systems already exist for measuring how much is being spent. But it also includes the force and authority of the state, and the legitimacy that the police enjoy with citizens who judge them against their own sense of fairness. The challenge to the Department is to get better than they now are at measuring how force and authority is being used, and the impact that that is having on the legitimacy they enjoy with the general population.

*Table 2. Valuable Dimensions of Police Performance*



1. Level of Criminal Victimization



2. Calling Offenders to Account



3. Level of Fear & Disorder



4. Use of Resources: Efficiency & Fairness



5. Use of Authority: Fairness & Efficiency



6. Customer Satisfaction

Third, because the resources used by the police are publicly owned, we have to remember that the police are accountable for using money and authority fairly as well as efficiently and effectively. This means that we have to have ways of determining how police effort is distributed across the city.

None of this means that COMPSTAT should be scrapped. It should continue to be celebrated as an important contribution to the performance of the NYPD and (perhaps) to the quality of life as well. But it also means that COMPSTAT should be improved and enlarged by finding measures that can capture the performance of the police on dimensions of performance that are not now closely monitored: we need to add victimization surveys to reported crime numbers; we need to survey the population to determine levels of fear and their utilization of public spaces; we need to capture more systematically than we have whether and how the use of police force and authority has increased; we need to find out through surveys whether the repository of good will that a police force needs to work effectively is being eroded or enhanced over time; and we need to find out whether those who had contact with the police either as beneficiaries or obligatees thought that they were well and fairly treated. If we fail to take these measures, it is quite possible that we will drive the NYPD to produce the measured results (reduced crime) by sacrificing the unmeasured results (costs, use of authority, public legitimacy, public satisfaction).

Not so long ago in our history we saw what happens when a police department engages in aggressive, preventive patrolling to reduce crime without paying too much attention to the way the department was using its force and authority, and using up its legitimacy with those who were being policed. It wasn't pretty; and it ultimately wasn't good for the society. Indeed, it was precisely this historical legacy that the field of policing has tried to go beyond as it has experimented with the ideas of "community" and "problem-solving" policing.

The ideas of community and problem-solving policing embodied three important ideas. First, that it was important to pay attention to minor disorder offenses as well as serious felonies. Second, that it was important to work on the problems that were producing incidents through measures that included but were not limited to arrest as well as responding to criminal incidents. Third, that it was important for police departments to reach out for community partnerships by becoming more responsive and accountable to community groups.

Many police departments have taken up some of these challenges, but not all three. Predictably, I suppose, most police departments have embraced the idea of order maintenance policing, and forgotten about problem solving or community accountability. But as Commissioner Benjamin Ward once asserted at a meeting at Harvard on policing, "We have seen order maintenance policing, and we won't have it again." If New York City is not to have this kind of policing again, it will have to develop and use a police performance measurement system that rewards something other than this. I'm sure COMPSTAT can be adjusted to make this important contribution to New York's future.