
URBAN PROBLEMS
and
COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT

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and
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editors

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CHAPTER SEVEN

Security and Community Development

Mark H. Moore

Security is vital to communities. Without it, everyday life is, as Thomas Hobbes wrote, "nasty, brutish and short."¹ Among the threats that people face, the threat of criminal attack seems particularly salient.² Those whose future is threatened have little incentive to invest: they buy merchandise rather than property and recreation rather than education.³ Instead of developing the trusting relationships that form the heart of strong communities, they become suspicious and exploitative.⁴ In these important ways crime could be said to cause poverty as well as the other way around.⁵

1. Thomas Hobbes, *The Leviathan*. For a contemporary account of a community that has far too little order and the security it can produce, see Kotlowitz (1991).

2. Garofalo (1981, pp. 839–57).

3. Edward C. Banfield thought that excessive "present-orientedness" among residents was one of the most important explanations for conditions in poor neighborhoods. See Banfield (1968, pp. 46–54). It is possible, of course, that this present-orientedness is not a trait that individuals have from the outset, but that it is influenced by the conditions in which they find themselves.

4. As John DiIulio (1989, p. 32) observes: "When underclass citizens do not bother to make that extra (or perhaps first) dollar, it is because they quite literally have reason to fear getting mugged for it. And when they display cavalier and callous attitudes toward their friends and relatives, it is because they live in an environment in which any display of 'normal' middle class sensibilities may make one a target of street level predators who truly do think and behave differently from the rest of us." Edward Banfield has also developed this theme in *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (1967) and *The Unheavenly City* (1968).

5. James B. Stewart (1986, pp. 6–10) first popularized this idea. Wesley Skogan (1990) offered some evidence suggesting this relationship might be true.

The kind of security that matters to people is individual and subjective. That may differ from the security measured by social scientists: the objective risks of harms. Of course, there is some relationship between the two because the risks that people feel are the ones that are present in their environment. Yet the relationship is often less close than one might imagine. Risks of crime, for example, seem somewhat exaggerated.⁶ And such fears are more often triggered by graffiti, broken street lights, abandoned cars, and noisy youth than by real risks of criminal attack.⁷

The security experienced by community residents may also differ from the security attributed to the community by outsiders. Indeed, an important common finding in crime victimization surveys is that people consider their own neighborhoods safer than surrounding areas even when the objective risks they face in their own neighborhoods are higher.⁸ This suggests that their reactions to the threat of crime are similar to those they have to environmental and health risks. They can tolerate a great deal of risk if the risks they face are familiar and seemingly controllable.⁹

The particular ways that individuals and communities produce security has important effects on both the overall *level* and the *distribution* of risk in the society. Some forms of security, such as more widespread gun ownership, might actually increase the level of risk.¹⁰ Others, such as the development of walled communities, may increase the security of some, but only at the expense of others. Indeed, increasing reliance on individually purchased private security at the expense of tax-financed public secu-

rity may result in wealthier communities enjoying much greater security than poor communities.¹¹

Over the long run some of the most important effects of producing security may be their impact on the character of social relationships they create both within threatened communities and between threatened communities and others. Within threatened communities, different relations are created when people buy locks, guns, and dogs to protect their own premises than when they band together to patrol their public places. Similarly, different relations are constructed between communities that patrol themselves and those that purchase security from Burns Security Guards or the Black Muslims. At stake in such choices is whether the threatened communities become more individualized or more collective and whether the collectives they construct are built on fellow feeling or commerce. Relations between communities can be affected by the choice of how security is provided. Security efforts may divide society into culturally homogeneous neighborhoods and allow the enforcement of very particular codes of conduct. Alternatively, the efforts may allow a diverse society to live together with no assurance that individuals can avoid cultural affront, only that they can avoid criminal victimization.

The ultimate goal, of course, is to produce not only a high level and fair overall distribution of security, but also to protect freedom. Life in a democratic society imposes two fundamental duties on citizens. The most obvious is the obligation not to give offense. Achieving that is the first goal of security arrangements. Equally important, however, is the duty not to *take* offense, at least not easily. After all, it is in the interstices created by individuals exercising self-restraint (associated with not *giving* offense) and in extending to other individuals wide freedoms (associated with not *taking* offense) that the maximum of freedom and security can be found. Thus building the capacity for tolerance should be as important a goal of security arrangements as discouraging people from offending. Those are the kinds of social relationships, the kind of justice, sought by a liberal democracy.¹²

6. Rosenbaum and Heath (1990, pp. 226-27).

7. Skogan (1990, pp. 76-77).

8. Merry (1981, p. 8). One of the most striking examples of this phenomenon is given in Carcaterra (1995), the more or less factual account of a child growing up in Hell's Kitchen in the 1950s. By all accounts this neighborhood was full of violence. Husbands beat and killed their wives. People committed suicide. Gangs murdered one another for various transgressions. Yet the children living in the midst of this violence experienced the neighborhood as quite safe and well understood. The thing that made them anxious (and for good reason) was when the outside criminal justice system showed up to try to order things.

9. One study reports that "increase in fear may be positive if it is accompanied by a sense that something is being done to address the situation. As community organizers work with local residents and convene meetings about crime and safety, residents may become more aware of the crime around them and more fearful but at the same time feel empowered and vigilant because something is being done," though "whether this is so in any given case needs to be demonstrated" (Briggs, Mueller, and Sullivan, 1996, p. 9). More generally, anthropologist Sally Merry (1981, p. 160) describes how fear declines as people become more familiar with their surroundings and gain a sense of control over them.

10. Cook and Moore (1995).

11. The recent growth in private security is described in Cunningham, Strauchs, and VanMeter (1990).

12. As the inscription over the entrance of the U.S. Department of Justice reminds us, "Justice in the life and conduct of the state is possible only as first it resides in the hearts and souls of the citizens." Assistant Attorney General Laurie Robinson reminded me of this. See Robinson (1996, p. 4).

These are the concerns I address in this chapter. I define security as a subjective state of mind and suggest why concerns about it often focus on crime. I also lay out what is known about the conditions that create community insecurity and their consequences for community life. Turning to efforts to increase security, I discuss what is known about how security issues can be used to organize communities, and whether, how, and in what circumstances communities can be successful in tackling crime by themselves. I then discuss the ways criminal justice agencies can improve security, particularly in partnerships with communities. Finally, I discuss the extent to which partnerships created between communities and criminal justice agencies can be used as a springboard for more comprehensive community development efforts.

Throughout, I lean against the notion that increased security can be gained only at the expense of freedom and tolerance. Instead, I focus on finding methods to increase security in ways that can expand freedom and promote tolerance. In the end that means learning a lot more than we now know—even with several centuries of experience—about how to build liberal, democratic communities.

Security, Crime, and the Criminal Justice System

Perhaps the reason that crime has a disproportionate effect on citizens' security is that crimes shatter confidence in the norms that can guarantee that social relationships will be reliably helpful rather than potentially threatening.

Norms, Social Capital, and the Criminal Justice System

Living in a network of reliably helpful social relations promotes security simply because such relations guard us from many real threats. If we can call on friends to tend us when disease fells us, to raise our barns after a fire strikes, or to get us jobs when layoffs hit, social relations provide the same kind of security that wealth can supply—a literal form, then, of social capital.¹³ As Blanche Dubois reminds us in *A Streetcar Named Desire*,

13. According to James S. Coleman (who has given the most thorough theoretical treatment of social capital), Glenn Loury developed this concept in the 1970s. But its recent popularity is associated mainly with the work of Robert Putnam. See Loury (1977); Coleman (1990); and Putnam (1993; 1995, pp. 65–78).

being able to “rely on the kindness of strangers” is sometimes the only thing that stands between us and disaster. Such social capital may be particularly important to those who have little of the other kinds.

Besides, it does not seem like asking too much from strangers to expect them to resist attacking us. Unlike other promises we could make to one another, counting on not being attacked does not depend on society as a whole becoming wealthy and charitable enough to care for everyone; it depends only on a commitment to refrain from attacking one another. Because these obligations seem so simple and morally compelling, failures to live up to them invite indignation as well as sadness. Both victims and witnesses will stew until action has been taken to restore the moral order, and with that a renewed sense of security.

If social relationships represent a kind of capital that provides insurance against important risks, and if these are particularly threatened by crime, it becomes more understandable why crime would be a particularly important threat to security. These observations also indicate why the criminal justice system might be important in producing security: it is important not only because it reduces the objective risks of criminal attack by deterring, incapacitating, and rehabilitating offenders, but also because it helps restore citizens' confidence in the presence of a reliable moral order that can allow them to insist on the harmlessness (if not the kindness) of strangers.

Threats to Security from Strangers, Acquaintances, and Intimates

Attacks by strangers are the most obvious threats to the security of individuals. They are also the threats that the agencies of the criminal justice system are best designed to reduce.¹⁴ And they are the threats that animate most private security initiatives.

Before limiting our interest in promoting security to criminal attacks by strangers, however, we should recognize that the gravest threats come not from strangers but from those close to us. Far more people are killed in acts of domestic violence than by serial killers or madmen with assault weapons.¹⁵ And surely some of the most heartbreaking and dispiriting

14. Moore (1983).

15. For example, in 1995, of reported homicides where the victim-offender relationship was known, only 25 percent were committed by strangers. The rest were committed by friends, lovers, acquaintances, or family members of the victim. See Federal Bureau of Investigation (1996, table 2.12).

crimes are those awful moments when parents, under significant emotional pressure, kill or maim their children.¹⁶ In the short run these crimes create disturbances that frighten and demoralize the community.¹⁷ In the long run they have a terrible impact on children who witness and suffer from violence in the home.¹⁸

The crimes that have had the most devastating recent effects on the nation's sense of security are far from random; they occur within social contexts that give them meaning. Much of the gang violence that has peppered our streets with gunfire comes from the competitive relationships among gangs for turf, for standing, for control of drug markets.¹⁹ Similarly, the hate crimes that terrorize families moving into hostile communities are also rooted in relations among citizens, not in the assaultive or acquisitive dispositions of individual criminal offenders.²⁰

Criminal Justice and the Resolution of Disputes

The fact that many crimes occur in the context of relationships that have become crucibles for violence helps emphasize a point made earlier: an important part of the work of the nation's legal system is to provide the means for resolving such disputes, or as Attorney General Janet Reno has often said, to "reweave the fabric of community."²¹ Among the important disputes to be resolved are those of special interest to the criminal justice system: the "dispute" that begins when one person attacks another in a crime. Sociologist Donald Black has observed that many things that appear to the world as crimes were understood by the offender and the victim to be an effort to achieve justice in a world where aggrieved individuals could not rely on the formal justice system to help them.²² This suggests that insofar as the legal system could more reliably provide justice, more reliably relieve the indignation that one person feels about his or her treatment at the hands of another, those particular crimes that emerge from an aggrieved sense of injustice could be prevented.

16. See U.S. Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect (1995).

17. Tracy Chapman sings powerfully on this subject in her song, "Behind the Wall."

18. Widom (1992).

19. Klein (1995).

20. Ellis (1990). See also the harrowing story told by Billy Johnson from the Boston Police Department's Community Disorders Unit, in Gaffighan and McDonald (1977, pp. 63-65).

21. Speech at meeting on Community Policing, Washington, D.C., January 1996.

22. Black and Baumgartner (1980).

Although the criminal justice system can help reduce violence and fear, it can and has become itself a source of violence and fear as well as a protector. In many of the nation's most desperate communities, agencies of the criminal justice system are hardly seen as important sources of security. They are instead considered either as irrelevant (because of their neglect and indifference to the people who live in these communities and the problems they face) or worse, as additional threats (that is, strangers who are as likely to victimize as to protect, and to do so without the victim's having any real recourse).²³

Disorder, Fear, and the High Price of Insecurity

Communities can be and are threatened by real harms from strangers, intimates, and (sometimes) even the actions of the criminal justice system itself. It has been an article of faith that the best way to promote security was for the police and the criminal justice system to act effectively to reduce the real, objective risks of these harms. Perhaps the single most important intellectual development in criminal justice in the past decade has been to undermine this particular assumption.

Disorder as a Threat to Security

The first blows were struck by findings that fears of crime were more closely tied to the prevalence of "incivilities" such as littered streets, graffiti-smearing walls, idle men holding bag-wrapped bottles, and teenagers jostling one another on street corners than to objective threats of robbery and burglary.²⁴ These discoveries were closely followed by findings that the police could do things such as engage in foot patrols that reduced fear but did not necessarily reduce objective risks of criminal attack.²⁵ Taken together, these findings created a troubling strategic issue for police departments: should they act to reduce fear even if their actions did not reduce criminal victimization? Some police chiefs were inclined to do so, but

23. City of New York, Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption of the Police Department (1994); and Geller and Toch (1995). It is not hard to understand why minorities, in particular, have historically been distrustful of the criminal justice system, given its role in supporting slavery. See Friedman (1993).

24. Skogan (1990, pp. 76-77 and throughout).

25. Trojanowicz (1982); Police Foundation (1981); and Pate and others (1986).

others worried that such efforts were nothing more than cynically motivated public relations gimmicks.²⁶

Their uneasiness was allayed by the publication of an article by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling titled "Broken Windows."²⁷ It contended that incivilities did more than simply increase fear: they also created conditions in which real crime could flourish. The hypothesized mechanism was a series of self-reinforcing processes. The fear engendered by the signs of disorder caused the community to relax its informal control. The relaxation in social control allowed visible signs of crime to emerge that marked that neighborhood as out of control and therefore vulnerable to crime. Because the area looked vulnerable, offenders would be attracted to it. Thus the neighborhood would, in fact, become more dangerous.

This article echoed some earlier ideas, including Jane Jacobs's trenchant observations about the importance of "eyes on the street" as important deterrents to crime, and Oscar Newman's belief that physical environments affected citizens' willingness and capacity to defend their dwelling spaces.²⁸ What seemed new in the "broken windows" argument, however, was that it identified a particular, vulnerable target for intervention: the signs of disorder. No one knew how to get more eyes on the street. And the physical costs of reconstructing residences to provide defensible space seemed prohibitive. But it seemed easy to imagine actions that could be effective against graffiti, trash, noisy teenagers, and drunken panhandlers. And once the link had been made between controlling these conditions and controlling real crime, the initial ambivalence about controlling these conditions could be set aside. To fight crime effectively, it was important to mobilize informal social control. And to do that, it was necessary to "fix the broken windows."²⁹

In 1982 when the article appeared, this prescription was little more than a theory based on social psychology experiments whose results had been cleverly extended to make a plausible link between controlling disorder, restoring informal social control, and reducing crime. But soon the speculations were confirmed. Wesley Skogan showed that there was in practice an important relationship among crime, fear of crime, and neigh-

borhood decline. He also found that the relationship was established through public concerns about incivilities and signs of disorder.³⁰

What Counts as Disorder?

Given that disorder can lead to fear, crime, and neighborhood decline, it is important to understand more precisely what is meant by disorder. Wesley Skogan lists the following specific conditions: corner gangs; street harassment; drugs; noisy neighbors; commercial sex; vandalism, dilapidation, and abandonment; and rubbish.³¹ It is worth noting that "disorderly youth" appear in this listing as "corner gangs." The concept of corner gangs is meant to be broader than the concept of organized gangs made visible and recognizable through distinctive dress and colors. But I wonder whether this concept goes far enough in describing the impact of apparently unruly and threatening teenagers on the quality of neighborhood life. Arguably, one of the worst consequences of the growth in teenage gangs, and the fact that many other teenagers adopted the dress and behavior of the gang members, was that from the point view of unsophisticated adults all male teenagers became somewhat menacing. A recent article by a prosecutor in New York City's family courts takes advantage of this common adult fear to inflame his audience's indignation:

The hardest part of my job as a prosecutor is facing victims or their relatives after the perpetrator has figuratively—and sometimes literally—gotten away with murder. Take what happened to John B., 28, . . . on the subway train. As the train rumbled south from 34th St. to 28th St., the door between the cars banged open and in swaggered every New Yorker's nightmare—four teen hoodlums in army-style parkas, stocking caps, baggy pants, and unlaced, steel-tipped boots.³²

In this instance the fears proved warranted: John B. was attacked and severely beaten. Although there are many times when the fourteen-year-olds are dressed as these "teen hoodlums" were and no attack occurs, the fear is profoundly experienced. Indeed, it has been reported that adult audiences shown images of teenagers dressed like gang mem-

26. Moore and Trojanowicz (1988a). See also Kennedy (1990); and Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy (1990).

27. Wilson and Kelling (1982, pp. 29–38).

28. Jacobs (1961); and Newman (1972).

29. Kelling and Coles (1997).

30. Skogan (1990, p. 84).

31. Skogan (1990, pp. 21–46).

32. Reinharz (1996, p. 43).

bers walking toward them will become so uncomfortable that they will get up from their seats and move away even though they know they are looking at photographs.

If gangs and their (deserved) reputations for careless violence have created a context in which many male teenagers have become effective vectors of fear, it might be worth giving special attention to the fear that they occasion. After all, there are lots of them, they move around a lot, and they occupy public spaces. All this makes them particularly important in spreading fears of crime. It also may help explain why curfews and school uniforms have emerged as important public policy initiatives.³³

How Does Disorder Undermine Security?

According to Skogan, these minor conditions have a profound impact on both a community's sense of security and its ability to band together to materially reduce crime, just as Wilson and Kelling supposed. The mechanism starts with the emotional responses of people to the disorder: anger, demoralization, and fear. This reaction produces three adverse effects: it "fosters social withdrawal, inhibits cooperation between neighbors, and discourages people from making efforts to protect themselves and their community. . . . [This] sparks concern about neighborhood safety, and perhaps even causes crime itself; [and] undermines the stability of the housing market."³⁴

Thus disorder, crime, and fear can have a devastating impact on communities and those who live in them. Individuals suffer directly from criminal victimization.³⁵ They suffer from the daily fear they experience as a result of the crime and disorder they feel around them and from the feeling of powerlessness to construct social relations that can protect them. They suffer the long-run consequences of losing control over the environments within which their children are being raised and the loss of economic

value in the places in which they live. The high cost is something to be avoided. The question is how?

Security through "Community-Based, Informal Social Control"

To many, the ideal way to strengthen community security is for communities to produce it themselves. They prefer the informal social control created by community action over the formal control applied by agencies of government, particularly the police, prosecutors, courts, and corrections departments.

The Appeal of Informal Social Control

It is not clear why, as a matter of public policy, informal, community-based social control should be preferred over formal, tax-supported, governmental social control. Yet the idea has enduring appeal across the political spectrum. The political left seems to support informal community controls because the mechanisms rely on voluntary agreements, not on the use of government authority. The arrangements also allow for cultural diversity. They celebrate the capacity of free individuals to act responsibly without external restraint. The political right seems to support informal social control because it relies less on government funding; it counts, instead, on voluntary action by individuals. That protects citizens from unreasonable tax burdens and celebrates the virtues of individual and community self-reliance.³⁶

Both the left and right have reasons to be concerned about relying too much on informal social control, however. What disturbs the left is the

33. For example, on curfews, see Fox Butterfield, "Successes Reported for Curfews, but Doubts Persist," *New York Times*, June 3, 1996, p. A1; "Curfews and Common Sense," *New York Times*, June 11, 1996, A24. On school uniforms, see Marylou Tounsignant, "Trying Uniforms on for Size: Policy Fad May Not Fix Schools, Some Warn," *Washington Post*, March 11, 1996, p. A1; and "Uniforms Aren't the Answer," *Washington Post*, March 16, 1996, p. A17.

34. Skogan (1990, p. 65).

35. Cohen, Miller, and Rossman. (1994).

36. Skogan seems to agree with these observations: "Earlier in the 1960s, 'more social programs' and 'more police' seemed the obvious answers to urban decay. [B]y the late 1970s, municipal and federal crises made those solutions less viable. . . . The emergence at about this time of community approaches to crime prevention presented a rationale for experimenting with *off-budget* approaches to local problem solving. The community approach emphasizes collaboration between government agencies and neighborhood organizations. It also assumes that voluntary local efforts must support official action if order is to be preserved within realistic budgetary limits and *without sacrificing our civil liberties*." Skogan (1990, p. 125). I have italicized *off-budget* to point to the right's interest in saving money and *without sacrificing our civil liberties* to point to the left's interests in reducing state authority.

prospect that the capacity for effective informal control may be unequally distributed in society, with the poor disadvantaged in this respect as in others. This leads the left to think that government might yet be important in producing an adequate level and fair distribution of security by providing resources to even out the imbalance in private capacities. The right is concerned that relying too much on informal social control might fail to establish important, minimal, and universal standards of conduct—that some conduct will be tolerated that should be punished. This leads the right to think that there might be an important government role in establishing and enforcing a universal law that applies to all the nation's diverse subcultures.

Mobilizing Communities to Improve Security

Whatever the theoretical appeal of these approaches, the important questions of whether informal social control can actually be mobilized and if so whether it can be effective in strengthening security, either by reducing crime and disorder or strengthening community solidarity, remains. On review, the practical appeal of informal social control seems less than its theoretical appeal, for effective efforts are both hard to initiate and sustain and uncertain in their effects.³⁷

At some level this should not be surprising. It is generally difficult to mobilize community action.³⁸ And finding effective methods to reduce crime and still fears has proven difficult even with paid professional employees. So the uncertain results are not unexpected. What is important is to determine just how much these mechanisms can be relied upon, and which are the most important kinds of efforts to support.

Efforts to organize community action to produce community security suffer from the general problems of organizing collective action.³⁹ In theory, we know how collective action problems can be overcome. If it matters a great deal to a single person (enough to make the costs of supplying the good himself worth doing in his own terms), the good will be supplied. If there are a relatively small number of people who can be organized through the creation of "solidary" and "purposive" incentives, the good will be produced.⁴⁰

37. Rosenbaum (1988, pp. 323–95); and Hope (1995).

38. Olson (1965).

39. Olson (1965).

40. Wilson (1995).

Moreover, there are lots of examples that fit these predictions. Langley Keyes identifies people whom he describes as "saints" who are willing to undertake the personal risks and enormous organizing effort it takes to build community-based groups without being able to offer any specific payments or benefits to those who participate.⁴¹ There is also a compelling story of Edward Johnson, who organized the Orange Hats of Fairlawn and eventually spread the organization across the neighborhoods of Washington, D.C.⁴² So there are examples of successful community organizing around security issues.

The crucial questions about such efforts, however, are not whether they exist but whether they can be created with enough scale and durability in any particular neighborhood, and across enough different neighborhoods in a city, to provide a satisfactory level and distribution of security for a city as a whole. This will determine whether informal social control can be a viable competitor with formal social control or only an intermittently useful complement to governmentally supported efforts. It is in answers to these questions that the evidence is more mixed.

There is a great deal of evidence showing that concerns about crime and disorder can be a potent organizing issue. Without much effort a Kennedy School of Government project looking for some neighborhood anticrime initiatives found dozens in Boston and scores across the country.⁴³ A project studying three community development corporations that sought to learn about the origins of these efforts, the factors that sustained them, and the effects that they had on communities found that concerns about crime had been important.⁴⁴

Yet despite the potency of crime and security as organizing issues, there remains the concern that the organizations spawned by such fears cannot be sustained.⁴⁵ There is also a concern that only some will develop into a broader platform for wider community development activities. Of course, this need not be a damning criticism. As long as society can count on organizations to form when and where they are needed and to last for as long

41. Keyes (1992).

42. Simon (1991).

43. Weingart, Hartmann, and Osborne (1994).

44. Briggs, Mueller, and Sullivan (1996, p. 13). These authors explain that "research also suggests that anticrime organizing can be sustained much more effectively in multipurpose community organizations, such as CDCs, than in single-purpose anticrime organizations. Such organizations tend to be very short-lived."

45. Lewis, Grant, and Rosenbaum (1988).

as they are needed, it need not worry too much about whether the organizations become permanent or extend their concerns to other domains of social action. Society can get the crime control it needs and that citizens are willing to provide.

But the deeper concern is that social control efforts do not get started in enough places and that they do not come up to the level needed to produce desirable results. Indeed, many have noted the fundamental paradox of relying heavily on informal social control to produce security: in neighborhoods that are already overwhelmed by disorder, crime, and fear, the issues are very prominent and important to citizens (and therefore potentially useful in organizing efforts); yet precisely because the community is threatened, afraid, and demoralized, it may be impossible to get organizing efforts going.⁴⁶ In some of the nation's most frightening communities, those who would resist criminals and drug dealers must face real prospects of being attacked or killed.⁴⁷

At a more abstract level, one can observe with Skogan that producing community security depends on having or creating some combination of shared understandings about acceptable behavior and a large number of people prepared not only to observe the conduct of others, but also to act to enforce the rules.⁴⁸ These conditions suggest the high threshold of involvement and effort that must be met if informal social control is to be effective. They also suggest that it may be impossible to create community organizations that are effective in communities that are divided as to what norms are appropriate or undermined by dominant norms that support the conditions that create crime and disorder.⁴⁹

The implication of these observations is that despite the apparent potency and generality of concerns about crime and disorder as an organizing issue, it is not easy to mobilize sustained efforts to promote security across the board in urban areas. In fact, what one observes is uneven patterns of private initiatives laid alongside public security efforts.

46. Rosenbaum (1988, pp. 323-95); and Skogan (1988, pp. 39-78).

47. For one tragic example, see Michael Hedges, "Death of Grocer Who Hated Drugs Reshapes a Town," *Washington Times*, May 22, 1989, p. A1. More generally, Langley Keyes explains that stress often becomes overwhelming among drug-fighters; see Keyes (1992), which also describes strategies for dealing with this problem.

48. Skogan (1990, p. 135).

49. Skogan (1990, p. 132). See also Briggs, Mueller, and Sullivan (1996, pp. 9-10).

Types of Informal Social Control

So far, I have been talking about the general problem of organizing social effort; I have not yet talked about the forms that such efforts take. Much of the initial work on informal social control focused on efforts to confront crime with effective citizen surveillance and action. Skogan describes the theory of community crime control that has been developed by researchers such as Dan Lewis, Jane Grant, and Dennis Rosenbaum, who have proposed broader aims: to empower citizens and community groups to regulate the conduct of one another and strangers by taking control of their streets.⁵⁰ As Skogan notes, devices used to accomplish this aim include "inspirational meetings, block-watch groups, neighborhood patrols, property marking, home security surveys, escort services for the elderly, educational programs, leafleting, and marches to 'take back the night.'"⁵¹ In short, the efforts are directed at building durable, effective social relationships, what Robert Putnam describes as "social capital."⁵²

Reasons to want to approach the problem of crime and insecurity through such methods are not hard to find. It is plausible to imagine that the kind of surveillance and action stimulated by such community organizing efforts could be effective in controlling crime.⁵³ Moreover, if such capabilities were created in a neighborhood, one can easily imagine that these relationships would be valuable in producing much in addition to reduced crime and greater security.⁵⁴ Yet evaluations of the impact of such methods have so far been disappointing. Skogan reports on two significant efforts to carry out this kind of strategy:

The Chicago and Minneapolis organizing experiments were two of the most carefully evaluated efforts to attack local disorder and crime by

50. Lewis, Grant, and Rosenbaum (1988).

51. Skogan (1990, p. 17).

52. Putnam (1993, 1995).

53. Skogan (1990, p. 68) explains that "surveillance entails both 'watching' and 'acting.' Acting is facilitated by personal recognition, hence the importance of knowing your neighbors. It is also facilitated by the sense that local standards about appropriate public behavior are widely shared; this legitimizes individual intervention. There is some evidence (summarized in Shotland and Goodstein, 1984; and Goodstein, 1980) that crime is encouraged by low levels of surveillance of public places and reduced by people's willingness to challenge strangers, supervise youths, and step forward as witnesses. However, in neighborhoods in decline, mutual distrust and hostility are rampant, and antipathy between newcomers and long-term residents prevails."

54. Putnam (1993, 1995).

organizing block-watch groups and encouraging household and community prevention efforts. Both had a great deal of visibility, and generated levels of participation that seemed substantial. However, both programs failed to affect the neighborhood problems and failed to affect the processes by which they were to have done so. These failures—especially in light of their success at gaining visibility and involvement—raise important questions about the viability of community approaches to disorder and crime control.⁵⁵

He then goes on to speculate what might be the reasons that these reasonably conceived and carefully implemented strategies might have failed.

The root solutions which the organizers pursued may have been wrong, or misdirected in terms of what they presumed could be accomplished with realistic levels of local organizing. Past research and the Chicago evaluation presented here both suggest that a focus on *social* solutions may be misguided. There was no evidence of area-level effects on the attitudes and behaviors they intended to improve, and they may in fact have spread concern and enhanced levels of fear. Fear of crime went *up* in virtually every area of Chicago after the programs had been at work. There is no good evidence that the effects of participation “rub off” on (more numerous) nonparticipants, and more that most people find it easier to be a free rider and reap any benefits of local activism without becoming involved themselves. To attempt to tackle neighborhood disorder by rekindling local friendship networks, seeking solidarity, and encouraging informal intervention is to define a solution that is difficult to implement effectively.⁵⁶

The alternative strategy for developing informal social control might be to focus less on developing wide, durable networks of people who watch and act to defend space from potential offenders, and instead to concentrate on mobilizing citizens for short-term projects designed to reduce disorder and signs of crime. Xavier Briggs and his colleagues suggest that this approach might be successful. “Citizen groups may find it too difficult and dangerous, not to mention illegal, to assume the roles of police, but such groups can and do organize to get windows fixed, graffiti re-

55. Skogan (1990, p. 149).

56. Skogan (1990, pp. 151–52).

moved, rowdy bars closed and the like.”⁵⁷ In effect, just as the police have found it easier to get leverage on crime, fear, and disorder by devoting some of their attention to disorder, so might those citizen groups that want to do something to restore security in their communities.

The Importance of Partnerships

Although the evidence on the effectiveness of informal social control directed at crime and fear is disappointing, it is important to understand that this is evidence about the impact that such efforts can have when they are undertaken alone. It is a somewhat different story when informal social control efforts directed either at crime, or fear, or the construction of social capital (as both an end and a means) *are undertaken in partnership with governmental organizations*. In these circumstances, informal social control efforts can have larger and more durable effects. As Briggs and colleagues observe,

The community crime prevention literature suggests that community-based efforts are no substitute for effective policing and are most likely to be effective *when undertaken in close cooperation with the police*. The blockwatch programs that last longest appear to be those that work closely with police (Garafolo and McLeod, 1986). Keyes (1990) also emphasizes the importance of police and goes so far as to question the usefulness of private security guards who are typically unarmed and have far less authority than the police.⁵⁸

Thus the next question to consider is how the criminal justice system, including the police, prosecutors, courts, and corrections might work to produce security of the type that interests citizens, and in particular how they might do so through partnerships with community organizations.

Partnerships with Criminal Justice System Agencies

In the past, achieving security in a community was seen very narrowly. The end was to reduce criminal victimization. The means were to rely on

57. Briggs, Mueller, and Sullivan (1996, p. 5).

58. Briggs, Mueller, and Sullivan (1996, p. 11). These authors also explain that “the few credibly successful CPTED (Crime Prevention through Environmental Design) efforts have all linked changes in physical design to social interventions such as improved relationships with police and improved informal social control.”

criminal justice agencies to deter criminal offenders through sustained vigilance that ensured arrest and prosecution if a crime were committed.

The Criminal Justice System and the Rediscovery of Community

Indeed, the conception of the importance of the criminal justice system in producing security was enshrined in the 1967 report of the President's Crime Commission, *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society*.⁵⁹ There was much that was exceedingly important and valuable in the report and its aftermath. Yet two of the results have proven less helpful as society now tries to confront the problems of crime, disorder, and insecurity.

First, the commission created an enduring image of a criminal justice system designed to deter, apprehend, and process criminal offenders that was separate from the communities for which it did its work. This image was the famous "funnel diagram" (figure 7-1). This diagram showed the relationships among criminal justice agencies, but it neglected the important role that private individuals, families and communities played in controlling crime and strengthening security. It showed no families exercising control over their children. Nor did it show any local merchants policing the streets or providing jobs to kids. Nor could one see the private security firms that sprang up to meet citizens' desires for guns, locks, and more effective control over who came and went from spaces they wanted to control. It was hard even to see the effects of victims and witnesses in activating and guiding the huge, blind apparatus of the criminal justice system toward individual offenses and offenders. In short, an important piece of the system that was actually producing security was missing and unaccounted for: the emphasis was on public, criminal justice agencies, not on their partners in the community.

Second, the President's Crime Commission recommended a sharp focus on "serious" crimes such as murder, rape, robbery, assault, and burglary. This recommendation was justified in part because of their obvious seriousness. But the commission had another reason to focus on these crimes. It observed that in enforcing the laws against less serious crimes such as public drunkenness and disorderly conduct police discretion was particularly important. It observed further that the "discretion" so used was often influenced by racial and class biases. Finally, it observed that

59. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (1967a).

enforcement of the laws against these minor offenses had bred police corruption and sometimes triggered urban riots. These observations supported the principled claim that many lesser offenses should never have been defined as crimes in the first place and that it was a waste of public resources to enforce laws against them. The net effect was to draw attention away from the important effects that minor offenses could have on neighborhood security.

Thus the conception of crime and security that emerged from the President's Crime Commission set the nation on a course that carried it away from the concerns that are now reemerging as central to its efforts to strengthen security. By focusing attention on the agencies of the criminal justice system, it ignored what informal social control could contribute to controlling crime and improving security. By directing attention away from disorder offenses, it ignored conduct that has turned out to be important in shaping a community's sense of security.

Fortunately, the discussion of crime and security is beginning to refocus on what private community institutions can do to reduce crime and the importance of disorder offenses in producing insecurity.⁶⁰ Fortunately, too, that discussion is beginning to influence the conduct of criminal justice agencies.

Community and Problem-Solving Policing

The police have been the first (and most aggressive) in adopting the idea that their efforts to reduce crime and improve security could be significantly strengthened through partnerships with the community. Indeed, it is precisely this idea that is embodied in the concept of "community policing."⁶¹


At some level the police have always understood that their success depended on strong partnerships with citizens. Indeed, before publicly supported police departments were established, security was established by a system that required all citizens to respond to the hue and cry raised by other citizens who were being victimized by crime.⁶² The earliest tasks of the police were simply to take custody of those whom the aroused citizens had caught. Much later, after the police had become large profession-

60. Robinson (1996).

61. Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy (1990). See also Moore (1992).

62. Blackstone (1966, pp. 249-70).

Figure 7-1. Sequence of Events in the Criminal Justice System



Source: Adapted from President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society*, 1967.
 a. This chart gives a simplified view of caseload through the criminal justice system. Procedures vary among jurisdictions. The weights of the lines are not intended to show actual size of caseloads.

alized public bureaucracies and had taken over most of the responsibility for patrolling communities and apprehending offenders, they still understood that they needed support from citizens. In the 1950s, at the height of what came to be called the era of "professional policing," the police urged citizens to "support their local police." And the President's Crime Commission report spent a great deal of time discussing the problem of "police-community relations" and made many recommendations to improve their quality, particularly with minority groups.⁶³ So there has never been a time when the police did not understand the importance of maintaining close connections to the communities they policed.

What is new about the concept of community policing, however, is how *much* importance is assigned to building strong connections. In community policing, building strong community partnerships is seen both as a means to reduce crime and increase security and as an end of policing.⁶⁴ Also important and novel are the ideas of how the operational procedures of the police must change to support the creation of these partnerships and who in the police department is to be responsible for doing so.⁶⁵ The unique features of community policing can best be seen in contrast with features of professional policing.⁶⁶

In the strategy of professional policing, the fundamental goal of the police is to reduce crime by enforcing criminal laws. The principal instrument for achieving this goal is arrests. If, the thinking went, the police could credibly threaten and succeed in arresting those who committed crimes (and if the other agencies of the criminal justice system met their obligations), crime would be reduced through deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.⁶⁷ To produce the required arrests, the police relied on three main operational tactics: patrol (both random and directed), rapid response to calls for service, and retrospective investigations. To ensure an efficient, effective, and consistent response to incidents that came to

63. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (1967b, pp. 221-28).

64. Moore and Trojanowicz (1988b).

65. For a description of how the community relations function shifts across levels of a department, see Kennedy (1987).

66. For a more detailed discussion of the changing strategies of policing, see Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy (1990); and Moore (1992).

67. For discussions of what the concepts of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation mean and whether they are effective in controlling crime, see Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin (1978); and Martinson (1975).

their attention, they organized themselves in highly centralized, paramilitary bureaucracies.

Organized in this way, the police benefited from the generalized support of the community, which believed that the police had a plausibly effective strategy for controlling crime, and which, in any case, thought it was important and just that offenders be called to account for their crimes. The police also enjoyed the legitimacy that came from promising a fair and impartial enforcement of the law, from making themselves available to all citizens for the price of a telephone call, and from relying on reactive tactics that kept them unobtrusively at the surface of the community until there was an important reason to intrude.

It should be apparent from this brief description how compelling the idea of professional policing is. It is a strategic concept that has, over a generation or so, carried the police from both corruption and amateurism to a high level of integrity and professional competence. It has been widely supported by citizens, their representatives, and expert opinion. Yet despite its strength, this strategy became vulnerable to some fundamental criticisms.

First, beginning in the 1960s the strategy seemed to be failing to reduce crime and fear. Of course, the police had their explanations for this. One was that the other institutions of the criminal justice system were not doing their job: the prosecutors were not winning the cases, the courts were too lenient, the corrections bureaucracy failed to incapacitate or rehabilitate. Another explanation went the other way: the criminal justice system alone could not deal with the "root causes" of crime such as poverty, racial discrimination, and joblessness. With either explanation, increases in crime could not be blamed on the police. They were doing their job perfectly well.

A second, more telling critique of the strategy of professional policing was that the particular tactics being used—patrol, rapid response, retrospective investigation—were failing to reduce crime, still fears, or reliably identify and apprehend offenders. Indeed, a series of important evaluations of the tactics found little impact on any of the important outcome variables.⁶⁸ These critiques cut close to the bone because they indicated that the police were not even doing very well in controlling crime.

68. Kelling and others (1974); Spelman and Brown (1984); and Greenwood, Chaiken, and Petersilia (1977).

The last important critique of the strategy of professional policing was the startling discovery that the police were "losing market share" in the security industry. For the most part they had not worried much about their need to compete. After all, if there was anything that was a public monopoly, it had to be policing. And if policing was a public monopoly, it followed that they did not have to be worried about competition. That analysis held up as long as they defined their industry in terms of public policing or law enforcement. But once they redefined policing as "the security industry," they found that they had considerable competition. Even worse, they learned that they were losing. There were suddenly more private police than public, and much more money being spent on private police than public.⁶⁹

These trends had very bad implications for the future of the public police. They could see that the gains they had made in the past generation could be wiped out if wealthy citizens turned to relatively low paid private security guards and left the police mostly to take care of the poor. The example of public education showed all too clearly what happened to a public institution when it became an institution for the poor rather than the middle class and wealthy. Moreover, insofar as the important virtues of public policing (as compared with private security) included stronger commitments to providing protection to all who needed it (as well as to those who could pay) and to protecting the civil rights of those arrested (rather than to satisfying those who paid the bills), the shift to private policing lessened society's ability to act on these values and threatened the careers of the public police.

Taken together, these observations provided strong reasons to reconsider the basic strategy of policing. But how should the strategy be changed? What new goals and methods would improve the performance of the police and position them more effectively to be of value to the citizens who both supported them and gave significance to their work? The answers began to emerge as innovative chiefs and departments responded to academic critiques of policing by experimenting with new philosophies and strategies of policing.⁷⁰ The new strategies of policing came to be called "community policing" or "problem-solving policing."⁷¹ Although much about these ideas remains vague and a great deal of innovation is continu-

69. Cunningham, Strauchs, and VanMeter (1990).

70. Sparrow, Moore, Kennedy (1990).

71. Moore (1992).

ing, they are influencing the development of police agencies. An effort to identify the ten most important innovations in policing in the past twenty years found that the concept of community policing placed very high in the rankings given by a random sample of police chiefs.⁷² And the spread of community policing has been enshrined as one of the important goals of the federally supported effort to "put 100,000 police on the streets."⁷³

The idea of community policing qualifies as a strategic concept because it seeks to redefine the ends as well as the means of policing and to restructure the most important internal and external working relationships that the police rely on to achieve their goals. With respect to the ends of policing, the concept retains the fundamental goal of reducing crime. But it also includes preventing crimes from occurring (rather than simply reacting to them after the fact), reducing fear as well as crime, and providing courteous, responsive service to citizens.⁷⁴

One of the important consequences of taking responsibility for these ends as well as the reduction of crime is to refocus the attention of the police on minor as well as serious offenses. After all, crime prevention might be served by responding early to calls about disorderly youth or family disturbances to keep these situations from developing into gang fights and domestic homicides.⁷⁵ Similarly, reducing fear can often be served by focusing on disorderly conduct and conditions. And providing high-quality service might be achieved by exploiting rather than resenting the fact that citizens call the police for many minor concerns simply because the police, unlike other government agencies, make house calls twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.

With respect to the means of policing, community policing retains the idea that enforcing criminal laws and making arrests for serious crimes is the distinctive competence of the police. Yet it seeks to develop other competencies. The most encompassing idea is that the police should engage in problem solving.⁷⁶ This deceptively simple idea turns out to have radical implications for how the police think and operate.⁷⁷ It encourages them to

72. Moore, Sparrow, and Spelman (forthcoming).

73. *Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994* (Public Law 103-322), September 13, 1994, sec. 10003.

74. Sparrow, Moore, Kennedy (1990).

75. For evidence that a focus on minor offenses results in reductions in serious crime, see Kelling and Coles (1997).

76. Goldstein (1979, pp. 236-58; 1990).

77. Sparrow (1994).

think about the results of what they do, not merely whether they have applied the law properly.⁷⁸ It encourages them to imagine steps other than arrests that could help achieve the results. In these respects the police are wooed away from an obsessive focus with producing arrests.

Similarly, the concept of problem solving changes the unit of work in a police department from an "incident" to a "problem."⁷⁹ Instead of responding to incidents and analyzing them to determine whether a crime has been committed and who is to blame, the police look past the incident (or bundle of incidents) to the problem that has caused it and analyze the problem in terms of what would make an effective response. Arrest is one important kind of intervention. But use of civil sanctions as well as criminal or mobilizing other government agencies to deal with conditions that are leading to the problem are also appropriate responses.⁸⁰

The concept of community problem-solving policing seeks to transform internal and external working relationships. Internally, the aim has been to move from centralized, hierarchical, and bureaucratic relationships (that locate all wisdom and initiative at the top of the organizations and conformity and consistency of values at the bottom) to more decentralized and collegial relations (in which the top seeks to support the initiative of those at the bottom, and the judgment of those at the bottom is valued because they are more in touch with the particular conditions that demand attention).⁸¹ Rules are transformed into guidelines. Accountability shifts from before-the-fact approval to after-the-fact review. In short, officers at the street level are "commissioned" to do their jobs, and the organization as a whole is guided by their initiative and judgment, a feature that has long been true but is now explicitly recognized.⁸²

Externally, the aim has been to make the boundaries of police organizations much more porous to the concerns of citizens and to strengthen relationships with other agencies of government. In the strategy of professional policing, the police made themselves accessible to citizens at two levels: at the bottom of the organization they were (literally) wired to individual citizens through the emergency 911 systems. At the top they were linked to citizens through the ordinary mechanisms of democratic ac-

countability: the need to produce annual plans and budgets, have their policies reviewed by elected officials, and remain open to press coverage of their day-to-day operations. Because they viewed themselves as the frontlines of the criminal justice system, their most important government partners were the supporting agencies of the criminal justice system—primarily the prosecutors.

In community policing the links to individual citizens at the bottom and to overseers at the top remains. Indeed, these are strengthened by the commitment to providing quality service to citizens and to making police operations even more transparent to oversight mechanisms. In addition, however, systematic efforts are made to expand contact with citizens and provide channels by which groups of citizens who represent interests larger than individual concerns but smaller than citywide concerns can have their voices heard.⁸³ Skogan describes these innovations:

Collectively known as "community policing," these strategies include foot patrol, team policing, administrative decentralization to storefront offices, and other efforts to build two-way communication into neighborhood police work. When they succeed, such programs function two ways: they open informal channels for the flow of information and demands for action from the people to the police, *and* they facilitate police action on that basis. These programs differ from traditional police community-relations units. . . . Community policing is a line rather than a staff responsibility.⁸⁴

Moreover, because community-oriented police departments regard themselves as community institutions committed to reducing fear and crime and improving the quality of life through means other than making arrests, they consider such agencies of city government as parks, sanitation, education, and recreation as partners very much as important as the criminal justice agencies.⁸⁵ They know that their ability to solve the problems that citizens bring to them depends as often on being able to call on other agencies as on being able to mobilize the criminal justice system to give their arrests a sustained, potent effect.

78. Goldstein (1979, 1990).

79. Sparrow (1994).

80. Goldstein (1990, chap. 8); and Finn and Hylton (1994).

81. Moore and Stephens (1991). See also, Moore, Sparrow, and Spelman (forthcoming); and Moore (1994).

82. Moore, Sparrow, and Spelman (forthcoming).

83. I am indebted to Malcolm Sparrow for emphasizing this point, and for a compelling diagram.

84. Skogan (1990), p. 15.

85. Moore (1997).

What is important about these new strategies is that they promise to make the police more reliable partners with community groups that want to have their efforts to achieve local security supported rather than treated as irrelevant or dangerous by the police. This is hardly of small significance. One study of eight community-based efforts to increase security by fighting local drug markets, efforts that had no connection with the police, found that all eight organizations had gone to the police to request help, and all eight were told that what they proposed to do was too dangerous and that the police would not be able to guarantee their safety if they confronted the drug dealers.⁸⁶ Whatever the truth of that claim, the response was discouraging to citizens who were willing to assume the risks and burdens of defending their own communities.

With increased police responsiveness and reliance on partnerships, the hope is that crime-fighting effectiveness will increase (because of the increased vigilance of the community) and that fears will be reduced (because of the elimination of conditions that frighten citizens and wider participation in efforts to control the risks). Equally important, as the police become more responsive and accountable to citizens (as individuals, interest groups, and overseers), the police might eliminate themselves as a source of fear to the community. And if the police are supported by chief executives of their cities and other agencies of government, they can become important allies of citizens in making other parts of government work well. This, at least, is the promise of community policing.

Unfortunately, the reality looks a little different, at least so far. It has proved difficult to carry out the concept of community policing.⁸⁷ There is mighty resistance to its precepts within police departments and often only weak political support for forcing the changes.⁸⁸ Even where departments have been able to make progress, the concept seems to work best in middle-class communities. Skogan reports, for example that there has been "disturbing evidence that the benefits of community policing were largely reserved for white and better-educated residents of the target communities."⁸⁹ Despite abstract enthusiasm for the new strategies of policing, it remains difficult for the police to cross the boundaries of class, race, and culture that now separate them from many of the communities they po-

86. Weingart, Hartmann, and Osborne (1994).

87. Rosenbaum (1994).

88. Moore (1990).

89. Skogan (1990, p. 16).

lice. And this remains true even in departments that have made significant strides to increase the representativeness of different social groups in the department.

The greatest successes of community policing have come from and depended on sustained governmentwide commitment to dealing with locally defined problems. This has been the story in Newport News, San Diego, and Chicago.⁹⁰ What allows these kinds of partnerships to flourish is a combination of conditions both inside and outside police departments. Things that are important inside police departments are commitment from police executives, decentralization of initiative, and training in problem solving, mediation, and leadership. Things that are important outside the departments are commitments from chief political executives of cities and preexisting networks of community organizations. If these conditions exist or can be produced, the police can become important partners with their communities in strengthening security through means that are consistent with America's most important values.

Comprehensive Approaches to Community Security and Development

What is known about initiatives undertaken from the outset with the goal of producing community social and economic development by incorporating concerns about security and criminal justice agencies? These efforts do not treat security alone as the end. Nor do those behind the initiatives think of the criminal justice agencies as either sufficient to the achievement of the goal nor obviously the best point from which to launch the intervention. They do, however, give security concerns and criminal justice agencies an important place in the overall strategy of community development, a step that is necessary if not sufficient for developing disparate communities, and often the first step if success is to be achieved.

Two interesting examples of such initiatives are described by David Kennedy: the Showcase Savannah Program begun in the late 1980s in Savannah, Georgia, and the Sandtown/Winchester Project begun in 1990 in Baltimore.⁹¹ What makes these projects similar to one another and different from other efforts I have discussed (that is, either community-based ef-

90. Chicago Community Policing Evaluation Consortium (1996).

91. Kennedy (1994).

forts to control crime and fear or police efforts to work in partnerships with communities to control crime and fear) is that from the outset these had ambitions that went well beyond improving community security. They sought to develop communities socially, economically, and politically as well as to make them more secure—objectively and subjectively. They also had resources that went beyond volunteer community efforts and the resources that hard-pressed criminal justice agencies could make available: they had mayoral leadership and outside financial resources to support the construction of new housing and encourage economic development.

In the breadth of objectives and means and the concentration of resources on selected areas of a city, these projects harkened back to the bold Model Cities projects of the late 1960s.⁹² The comparison was not particularly favorable, for most of the Model Cities initiatives had proved to be failures. Arguably, what made these new projects different is that instead of ignoring security as an issue and criminal justice agencies as important contributors to the social, political, and economic development of communities, these communities would respond to local neighborhoods and treat crime, fear, and disorder, and the role of the criminal justice system in dealing with them as a crucially important feature of the projects. In this, the philosophy of these initiatives reflected the views of the Mayors' Leadership Caucus on Crime and Neighborhood Revitalization: "At least in our most troubled communities, violence and fear, and community conditions, must be addressed together."⁹³

Indeed, these new projects tended to deal with crime, fear, and deteriorating physical conditions first in their sustained efforts to build communities. At least part of the reason was that these efforts were determined to include residents in rebuilding their communities, and concerns about security were the things that the residents focused on at the outset. In both Savannah and Baltimore the leaders of the community development efforts wanted to reach the causes of neighborhood decay rather than concentrate on the symptoms. Yet in both cases, meetings with residents revealed that what they wanted first was relief from drug dealing, broken streetlights, trash, abandoned cars and buildings, and dangerous parks and school yards.

92. Frieden and Kaplan (1975).

93. Schmoke and others (1993, p. 3).

The leaders of the initiatives reacted in different ways to these concerns. In Savannah, City Manager Arthur Mendonsa swallowed his concerns and embraced the neighborhood focus on crime, disorder, and physical decay. The initiative focused on capital improvements, particularly streetlights and sidewalk repairs; improved sanitation and code enforcement; and public safety.⁹⁴ In Baltimore the leaders continued to insist that all phases of the program move ahead simultaneously.⁹⁵ They not only developed improved partnerships with the police and eliminated troublesome hot spots such as a local liquor store, but also invested extensively in constructing new housing and creating new jobs in the neighborhood. Still, in both neighborhoods, efforts to control crime through partnership with the police and to control the appearance of disorder through increased efforts to eliminate trash, abandoned cars, and abandoned buildings were first steps in promoting neighborhood development. It was only after these efforts were made and the communities learned that the problems could only be dealt with permanently by developing themselves as communities that the projects could turn to address unemployment, poor housing, and inadequate education and recreational opportunities for children.

It was also significant that the police departments in these cities had done little to implement community policing.⁹⁶ However, as the community development projects proceeded, the police departments were dragged into community policing. The police who participated quickly became converts. They liked the experience of working with community residents and other government agencies to change the quality of neighborhood life.

Indeed, they were pleased to discover that by working in this particular way, they could have large effects on the problems they were particularly responsible for ameliorating. They could not eliminate crime, drug trafficking, and fear, but for the first time they thought they could reduce these problems and sustain that effect for a long time. In Savannah the community and the police and other city agencies reduced the number of active drug hot spots from fourteen to three.⁹⁷ A survey of residents indicated that they thought conditions had significantly improved.⁹⁸ In Balti-

94. Kennedy (1994, pp. 2-4).

95. Kennedy (1994), pp. 9-12.

96. Kennedy (1994, pp. 7, 17).

97. Kennedy (1994, p. 8).

98. Kennedy (1994, p. 8).

more, violent victimization in the Sandtown area fell 15.6 percent between 1992 and 1993 (although murders increased from ten to thirteen).⁹⁹ More recent figures show that violent crime continued to decline in 1994. Although it increased in 1995, it remained well below the levels that had characterized Sandtown in 1992.¹⁰⁰ The rate of decrease in violent crime was also much greater than the reduction in crime that occurred throughout the city (a 19.5 percent reduction in Sandtown compared with 1.1 percent in the city as a whole). According to David Kennedy, residents of Sandtown "point with pride to key victories like the reclamation of Parlene Fauntleroy Park, the neighborhood's only large open recreation space, from drug dealers."¹⁰¹

Important to the future success of these efforts is that, in the course of developing and carrying out the initiatives, a "network of capability" has been created that not only links community residents to government agencies, but also links government agencies to one another. In effect, what is emerging in these communities is an operational capacity to focus the combined resources of the community and various government agencies on the problems that concern and threaten the community. In the short run, that has been largely crime and disorder. But as these problems have been handled, the community and the government together have learned how to deal more successfully with the community's deeper problems. This builds not only a technical capacity to deal with situations more effectively, but also a social and political capacity to act collectively and individually. Social capital is being built and may be worth more over the long run both to the community's residents and their future lives together than any single initiative undertaken now.

Summary, Conclusions, and an Agenda for Research

In the past decade the nation has witnessed the collapse of some of its poorest communities. Undermined by the loss of jobs and the flight of the middle class, many urban neighborhoods have lost both their economic and social capital. City agencies, starved for funds and undermined by

mismanagement and corruption, have done little to fill the gaps. Cut off from the wider society, families and communities weakened.

In these communities the epidemic of crack cocaine hit like a bomb. Already weakened families were torn apart by addiction. Young men with relatively limited economic prospects were tempted into the glamorous, economically rewarding, but ultimately disastrous life of cocaine dealing. As social and physical conditions worsened, individuals and families that had once been strong wavered. They withdrew their vigilance and their care. With that, conditions grew still worse.

The deteriorating conditions had disastrous effects in other ways. Some people who had previously supported community development efforts from a safe suburban distance concluded that it was not possible to help. Others saw in the decline of these neighborhoods support for their racist views about the moral character of poor minorities. Despair among the first group and indignation and fear among the second further weakened the relationships between those struggling in the poor neighborhoods and those outside them.

Finding a way to turn the neighborhoods around is an urgent task for the society. It is urgent for the lives of the people who live there. It is urgent for the quality of social relations the society as a whole can enjoy in the future.

In the past, observers might have concluded that the only way to turn such neighborhoods around is through large government programs focusing on economic and social development. They might have seen concerns about fear and crime as barely disguised racism and the institutions of the criminal justice system as at least irrelevant and potentially hostile to the aim of developing these communities. This might still be true. But the evidence I have reviewed suggests that dealing with fear, crime, drug dealing, and other kinds of disorders is important in an overall strategy for turning these communities around.

The trick is to find ways to use the urgency that individual citizens feel about these matters to organize a collective capacity to deal not only with crime and fear, but also the conditions that make these such prominent concerns. That necessarily involves helping criminal justice agencies become more reliable partners for neighborhoods that want to reduce crime and fear and ensuring that the forms these partnerships take enlarge citizens' capacities for tolerance. It also means using the relationships created in reducing crime and fear to build relationships between community groups and government agencies and among government agencies to deal

99. Kennedy (1994, p. 18).

100. Personal communication from Pat Costigan, August 28, 1996.

101. Kennedy (1994, p. 18).

with the problems that remain once some semblance of order has been restored.

It is this path toward success in restoring communities that suggests the importance of answering the following important questions.

—How deep and widely distributed are the community-based organizations capable of producing greater security? Is the current pattern of limited and unevenly distributed capabilities an inevitable fact of life, or is there some hidden, unrealized capacity for action that can be mobilized?

—How powerful are the problems of crime and security in spurring the organization of community groups? What actions can be taken by community residents, with or without the help of community organizers, to mobilize whatever latent potential for action lies in concerns about these matters?

—What can and should police departments do to help communities develop their own capacities for self-defense? What should they do in communities that seem entirely passive? What in communities that are dominated by criminal gangs? What in communities that are badly divided? What should they do when the leaders that emerge in communities have criminal records or are hostile to police? What are the best practices in policing with respect to these problems?

—What could other agencies of the criminal justice system—prosecutors, defense attorneys, courts, correctional agencies—do to support the development of community capacities for self-defense, reintegrating offenders into the community, and preventing the development of future offenders?

—To what extent can community efforts organized to deal with crime and fear be sustained to deal with other community problems? Does focusing on security strengthen or weaken the capacity of a community group to promote broader social and economic development goals of the community?

—To what extent is success in dealing with security (with or without the help of community groups) a necessary condition for making progress on other matters facing the community? To what extent is it true that starting with these problems and with community organizations focused on them is a particularly effective way of initiating broader community development efforts?

Answers to these questions can lead the way toward more effective action, not only to restore security to the nation's communities, but also to build the kinds of working relations among community residents and

their government agencies that can allow both to deal with a great many other problems as well.

COMMENT BY

Wesley G. Skogan

As Mark Moore's chapter so clearly points out, the relationship between security and community development is reciprocal. Communities have the potential to spiral either down or up depending on which direction gets a nudge. The sources of the extra push may be internal or external to the community. They may be planned or spontaneous. Of course, policymakers have their preferences: they like planned (or at least predictable) and spiraling up. They would be ecstatic to find either internal or external levers capable of making these kinds of changes.

One important contribution of Moore's chapter is to highlight the many factors that go into calculating a community's level of security. Crime counts for a lot, to be sure. Drive-by shootings, gang wars, and house break-ins devastate community morale. Residents are also disturbed by close proxies for victimizing crime, including gang graffiti and the sound of young members of the drug trade standing at street corners, advertising what is available down the block with cries of "rocks and blows!" Insecurity is also generated by visible signs that no one is in charge or cares about what happens to the area. These include the "broken windows" made so famous by James Wilson and George Kelling.¹⁰² A decade and a half after the appearance of their article, scarcely a police officer in the country does not know the crux of the argument. The decline of informal community control can be read in violations of widely approved standards of public conduct that are not lawbreaking. These include noisy neighbors, congregations of idle men, and bands of youths dressed (apparently) in gang-related apparel. Their metaphor was extended by others to include physical decay: negligence, abandoned buildings, broken streetlights, trash-filled vacant lots, and alleys strewn with garbage and alive with rats. It also encompassed activities that police often do not take very seriously despite their unlawful status, including scrawling graffiti on walls, vandalism, loitering, and trespassing. Albert Reiss captured the flavor of this array of disorderly conditions and be-

102. Wilson and Kelling (1982).

haviors that lie near the edges of the law when he dubbed them "soft crimes."¹⁰³

The consequences for community development of community insecurity are manifest. There is an important economic core to the relationship. Residents of insecure communities often want to move out—this is especially true of families—while at the same time, outsiders do not want to move in. It is hard for the best-meaning landlords to make a profitable rate of return under these circumstances. Building maintenance and tenant screening, then tax and utility payments, often are jettisoned. Large apartments get cut up into smaller units that best provide for the unattached. Trash-filled vacant lots appear where buildings have been clawed down to make the neighborhood safer. Businesses that depend on attracting customers from a broad marketing area are the first to feel the influence of the area's reputation: the limited and carefully rationed purchases of those who live nearby narrow business opportunities. The businesses find it hard to attract and retain staff. Small businesses come and go under the best circumstances, but where the circumstances are not good, those that close are less frequently replaced by new entrants into the market and buildings fall vacant. Banks find that business and residential loans in the area are looking riskier.

The range of factors that go into determining a community's security level creates a puzzle when it comes to "what can be done about it?" The police still manage to arrive at professional speed when they are called, for a great deal of crime analysis typically goes into planning their activities. But residents are unhappy because they have always been told that visible motorized patrol is the best deterrent to crime, and they do not think they see police often enough, given their problems. When residents gather, they complain about the many problems that lie behind their fears, only to be informed that most "are not police business."

Community policing steps into this breach, and as Moore rightly notes, it promises (a carefully chosen word) to do something to close it. Community policing programs are characterized by the permanent assignment of officers to specific areas, significant decentralization of authority and responsibility in the organization, openness to the public when it comes to identifying and prioritizing issues for police to work on, willingness to form partnerships with civic associations and service agencies, and adoption of a problem-solving approach to the daily work of the department.

103. Reiss (1985).

All these elements are important, but a department cannot claim to be doing community policing without the problem-solving component. It cannot work. When officers meet with neighborhood residents to discuss and prioritize problems, they cannot dismiss important concerns because they are not police business. No one will come to the next meeting. They have to confront the vital problems facing the community, if only to identify how others can take—or help take—responsibility for addressing them.

Problem solving may also be the most radical component of the package. As Moore points out, it changes the unit of work within the department from individual incidents to problems. It calls for police to adopt tactics that lie outside their standard repertoire as well as their traditional core competence. Finally, it stresses results, not the process of policing. As Herman Goldstein and others have pointed out, most of the performance indicators that drive the operation of big-city police departments measure activities rather than accomplishments, and several decades of research have undermined confidence that many of these activities are closely linked with actual crime prevention.¹⁰⁴

However, it can be surprisingly difficult to get the community involved, either on behalf of the police or themselves. Although the number of people who now get involved in anticrime activities at the grassroots is significant (data collected by the National Crime Victimization Survey indicate that during the 1990s some 8 to 9 percent of the population, or between 18 and 19 million people, has been involved in a neighborhood group that does something about crime), civic participation is difficult to sustain in the worst-off places.¹⁰⁵ Crime and fear stimulate withdrawal rather than involvement in community life. Residents view each other with suspicion rather than neighborliness. Because they fear retaliation by neighborhood toughs, their participation in programs requiring public meetings or organized cooperation may be lowest in the most insecure areas. As a result, the organizational infrastructure needed to get people involved is not there. The organizations that do represent the interests of community members also may not have a record of cooperating with police. Because their constituents often fear the police too, organizations may be more interested in urging greater police accountability for misconduct to civilians than in becoming closely identified with them.

104. Goldstein (1990).

105. For the survey data see Friedman (1998).

To make community-oriented policing work, police need to mobilize the support of organizations that represent the community. Organizations can keep projects alive when leaders tire or turn to other affairs. They provide a locus for identification and commitment, and they provide important social benefits for participants. This commitment and solidarity can in turn sustain the membership during tough moments or in the face of extraordinary demands on their time. Organizations are needed to turn people out for meetings even when the weather is bad. They are also useful for confronting issues of racial diversity. In Chicago I have observed organizations working to extend their base to areas the police had ignored. I have seen citizens rise in community meetings to ask where the minority residents of their neighborhood are and how more could be encouraged to attend.

Community institutions are fewer in number, but when mobilized they often can bring more resources to bear on the problems that affect them. They include business and condominium associations and churches. Other important institutions are large organizations with significant place-based investments: hospitals, universities, manufacturing and warehousing concerns, and industrial parks. Telephone, gas, and electric companies also are significant investors and local employers, and they conduct their daily business in neighborhoods all over the city. Finally, varied forms of business improvement districts are springing up. They enable associations of merchants to formally tax themselves to provide services that benefit all of them. Many are willing to spend significant amounts to keep the areas that immediately affect them clean and safe. Increasingly, they have their own security personnel (there are now about three times as many private as public police in the United States) and extend an additional envelope of security around their operations.¹⁰⁶ They also have the resources occasionally to lend staff and provide funding for safety projects and even organizations representing the nearby community when they believe doing so will further their interests.

To make community policing work, police have to change themselves. This is a tall order. As individuals and organizations they have a remarkably ability to outlast those who try to change them. Important aspects of police culture militate against change. Police resist the intrusion of civilians (who "can't really understand") into their business. They do not like projects that civilians plan; they disapprove of civilians determining im-

106. Bayley (1995, p. 10).

portant aspects of their work or evaluating their performance. They fear that community loudmouths will take over or that people will seek to use the police for private purposes or personal revenge. They are quick to dismiss police policies influenced by outsiders as "politics" and suspect that they will wither away after the next election. If they do not like changes proposed from within, they snort that the top brass are "out of touch with the street." They scoff at tasks that smack of "social work" or the "wave and smile" policing they associate with community relations programs. At the same time, they constantly lament that the public misunderstands them and does not lend enough support.

Things are not always better among their bosses. The sergeants who immediately supervise them may have only a dim understanding of problem solving, which they themselves never practiced. Although the new stance of the organization may encourage them to coach or mentor their officers, the habits of the older, hierarchical management structure, in which the job of supervisors was to watch for violations of the department rule book and levy punishments when they surfaced, are hard to break. Some early surveys of Chicago police found that sergeants were somewhat more supportive of change than their officers, but the differences were small and their views were much closer to those of the troops in the streets than they were to those espoused by the top brass downtown. At least problem solving makes their job more important, albeit carrying with it a threat to increase their workload.

However, immediately above them is a management layer that recent changes in policing have threatened with extinction. Problem solving aims to shift authority and responsibility downward toward the bottom of the old hierarchy. Many police agencies find that they must shed layers of ranks to make this work and to short-circuit the labyrinthine reviews and re-reviews of decisions that give lieutenants and captains something to do and the ability to stop things from being done. Managers at these levels often resist surrendering their authority to frontline supervisors. There can also be resistance at the top, where labor-management issues loom large and senior executives can be loath to loosen the strings and empower their employees. They have good reason to fear that allowing increased discretion will facilitate abuse and corruption, which unlike crime rates or neighborhood deterioration are problems likely to get them fired. Many who have risen to the top under the old rules like a neat organization chart and find the fluidity of tasks and relationships required by problem solving to be evidence of its pop sociological character.

Finally, to make community policing work, other agencies need to get involved. Community policing throws the definition of what police business is up for grabs. The scope of the police mandate is widened to encompass the criminogenic as well as the criminal. The community's and officers' own common sense, guided by training, help identify what needs to be done and how to do it. It is the job of city hall and police headquarters to see that police and residents then have access to the resources required to carry out the plan. There are still public management problems to be resolved: police and residents may identify and prioritize garbage and rat infestation problems, but someone else is going to have to pick up trash and spread poison.

This kind of cooperation is far from automatic. Some observers are less sanguine than Moore about the ability of cities to form "networks of capability" that link police and community groups with municipal service agencies. They are divided by their bureaucracies and their bureaucratic routines. Every agency has its routine tasks and longer-term action plans, and both are built into their budgets. They have been developed on the basis of professional standards and local experience and in response to demands by powerful politicians, so officials are loath to bend them very far very often. Those who run the agencies tend to think that policing is the police department's business and not theirs. Police represent a potential wild card in the bureaucratic game if they are let into it. Letting them set the pace of work could upset plans. Police will have a different agenda, and the demands they will make will be, like much of the work that lands up in the bureaucrats' laps, somewhat unpredictable.

There can also be systemic divisions between the police and the various bureaus with which they have to cooperate. In Chicago these include state and county agencies as well as city departments. They report to politicians with different priorities, and they are responsible to taxpayers who mostly live somewhere else. Together, these state and county agencies provide the bulk of the welfare and human services available to city residents. But more so than with city departments, police come to these agencies as supplicants, hoping for attention and assistance. Moore rightly notes that it takes sustained commitment from the very top to make problem solving work. It is a public management problem.

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