

THE FULL SERVICE MODEL OF POLICING

Over the last decade, as "law and order" has become a major political issue, the police have come under increasingly sharp and effective criticism. Casual observation and scholarly research have combined to alter our view of police functions in fundamental ways. Shortcomings have been noted in four major areas.

First, the police seem to be surprisingly ineffective in performing their basic law enforcement functions; i.e., deterring crimes and apprehending criminals. Steadily increasing crime rates (and the discovery that official crime rates understate actual crime rates by a factor of three or four) testify to the relative impotence of the police in controlling crime. Indeed, several experiments have indicated that even large changes in the number of policemen on the streets have very little impact on crime rates. Low clearance rates for crimes like robbery and burglary suggest that the police are as ineffective in apprehending criminal offenders as they are in deterring crime. Thus, there is significant uncertainty about whether the police can effectively perform their basic law enforcement functions.

Second, in several key areas, it appears that police action not only fails to prevent crime, but actually augments it. In 1967, police efforts to arrest people on minor charges touched off disastrous riots in Newark, Watts, and Detroit. Police intervention in family quarrels has often triggered violent attacks against police officers and resulted in more serious charges than might have occurred with a different kind of intervention. Police intervention against the casually deviant behavior of adolescents has resulted in the life-long stigma--and consequent behavior problems--that goes with a serious arrest history.

Third, the police frequently fail to exploit numerous opportunities open to them to provide valuable services to citizens in their community. As James Q. Wilson noted in his definitive study of police behavior:

In addition to catching criminals and preventing crime, he (the patrolman) recovers stolen property, directs traffic, provides emergency medical aid, gets cats out of trees, checks on the homes of families on vacation, and helps little old ladies who have locked themselves out of their apartments.

It is not hard to see why the police are asked to perform these services. They are the only government agency that is open twenty-four hours a day, that has a telephone number which is easy to remember, and that cruises the streets in easily identifiable vehicles. However, despite the frequent requests for service and their strategic position in the community, there is a sense that the police provided too little "service." They offer too little in the

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way of courtesy and help to elderly women locked out of their houses, and too few alternatives to a woman whose husband has just beaten her. They fail to be energetic and responsive in identifying and referring drug addicts to treatment. And they fail to inform family counselling services when they intervene regularly in the quarrels of a particular family. In short, the police miss an inexpensive opportunity to improve the services provided to citizens by their government. If the police were trained to provide basic services or if they were simply informed about available social services and given credit for making referrals, the ability of the government to serve citizen needs would be significantly increased.

Fourth, there is increasing hostility between the police and the communities the police are intended to protect. To some extent this is a result of the performance failures cited above. In the view of the communities, the police fail to protect them and fail to provide services they desire. Consequently and unsurprisingly, they feel angry about the police. But to some extent, the community is a cause of the poor performance as well. Community failure to alert the police to the occurrence of crime, to give information about offenders, and to provide moral support to police on the job is reflected in ineffective and overly aggressive police performance. Because communities often do not accept the authority of the police, they react badly to police intervention, in consequence of which the police become increasingly reluctant to go out of their way to provide personal services. Thus, the growing hostility between communities and the police exacerbates police performance problems which, in turn, leads to increased hostility.

Admittedly, these failures are by no means universal and may, in many instances, have been exaggerated in transitory political climates. But ample evidence of failure remains, and even where evidence is lacking, widespread belief in police failure is apparent. Whatever the reality, evidence and belief together were sufficient to spur a national movement for reform.

This case considers the efforts of one police organization--the New York City Police Department (N.Y.P.D.)--to address at least some of the problems outlined above. In particular, the case examines the prospects in 1973 for implementation of what came to be known as "the full service model of policing." The case includes a brief discussion of reform efforts leading up to the development of the full service model and a detailed description of the N.Y.P.D. personal system--the principal vehicle for implementation of the model.

Reform Efforts in the New York City Police Department: 1968-1972

Reforms Under Howard Leary: 1968-1970

In the late 1960's, the performance failures outlined above encouraged many local police administrators to search for innovations that would improve performance without interfering substantially with existing police procedures. To some extent, reform-minded chiefs were assisted in these efforts by the publicity surrounding the submission of the National Crime Commission's report recommending increased professionalization of the police. To a greater extent, they were aided by the flow of federal money from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration that was established in response to the Crime Commission report. In 1968-1970, public concern about police performance and available money combined to prompt the New York City Police Department to undertake two improvement projects, both closely related to the idea of a "service orientation" for the police.

In April, 1968 LEAA awarded a grant to the N.Y.P.D. for the study and redesign of its recruit training procedures. As stated in the report summarizing the study's findings:

The project staff ... sought to evaluate the major requirements of the New York City Police Department in education and training. These requirements were evaluated in light of training concepts and standards recommended by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, in relation to progressive educational philosophies and practices, and in relation to the historical experience and operational structure of the New York City Police Department.

The Police Training and Performance Study (as the report was titled) concluded--among other things--that in order to respond effectively to the demands presently placed on policemen by citizens, police must have a knowledge of interpersonal behavior and a familiarity with human relations skills. The study therefore advocated the extension of recruit training to include courses in the behavioral sciences.

In response to this report, the Police Academy curriculum was in fact altered. In February 1970, recruit training was extended from four to six months. Two three-unit college courses (one in psychology, one in sociology) taught by civilian instructors at the John Jay College for Criminal Justice in New York City were added to formal classroom instruction. This came to be known as the "Prelect Program." On September 28, 1970 the first recruits to participate in the Prelect Program, a class of 350, graduated from the Police Academy.

The second improvement program involved specialized training for police intervention in family quarrels. Several detailed studies of police service calls discovered that these "disturbance" calls constituted a surprisingly large fraction of the police calls for service. More importantly, it was noted that these calls often took a long time to service, that they were rarely productive, and that the intervening police often became victims of the disputants. Indeed, it became clear that two-fifths of all police injuries and one-fifth of all police fatalities occurred during such incidents. Finally, it was noted that the policemen's routine behavior in responding to these calls often aggravated the situation. Wilson analyzed the problem as follows:

When he walks into a room where a fight is under way ..., the possibility of danger makes the patrolman suspicious and apprehensive. To those fighting ..., the patrolman seems "hostile" or "edgy" and if, as is often the case, the citizen has no intention of attacking the officer, he sees the patrolman as "unjustifiably" suspicious, hostile, or edgy. If the citizen then showed his resentment, the officer is likely to interpret it as animosity and thus to be even more on his guard. Both sides may be caught in an ascending spiral of antagonisms.

Given the importance of these calls in the workload of the police, and the role of routine police behavior in aggravating the situation, interventions in family quarrels seemed like an ideal target for improved training and new procedures. Consequently, in 1969, the N.Y.P.D. gave permission to Drs. Morton Bard and Bernard Berkowitz of the City University of New York to conduct a federally financed experimental program in family crisis intervention. The 30th precinct, an area of Harlem containing about 85,000 residents, was chosen for the deployment of a specially-trained family crisis intervention unit (F.C.I.U.). Eighteen volunteers participated in 160-hours of training in crisis intervention. Then, for a period of twenty-one months all radio calls dealing with domestic disputes that were received while the F.C.I.U. was on duty were dispatched to the F.C.I.U. radio car, which also handled generalized patrol functions in the precinct. A total of 1375 interventions were recorded, involving 962 families. During this period the total number of family dispute interventions in the precinct rose, as did total homicides, total assaults, and family homicides. However, there were no homicides in the 962 families served by the F.C.I.U., nor were there any injuries to F.C.I.U. officers during the interventions. The service time for the calls was distributed as follows:

<u>Minutes</u>	<u>% of Interventions</u>
1-30	17.9
31-60	49.0
61-90	23.5
91-120	6.5
121+	3.1

In only 1% of the encounters was physical force necessary to restrain any of the participants.

The F.C.I.U. experiment was generally viewed as a success and attempts were made to incorporate some of the training techniques into the Academy program. Recruit training now includes seven hours of instruction in family crisis intervention. In addition, an eighteen-page handbook entitled "Police Response to Family Disputes" was distributed to all members of the Department in September 1969.

Taken together, these programs seemed to show the potential for significant improvements in police behavior. The experiments showed that it was possible to alter the training of patrolmen, that new procedures could be devised to make the police more effective in responding to certain kinds of calls, and that differences in police behavior could increase community satisfaction with police services.

Reforms Under Patrick Murphy, 1970-1972

In October, 1970 Patrick Murphy succeeded Howard Leary as Police Commissioner. He could hardly have arrived at a less auspicious time. Shortly after Murphy's taking office, the Department was subjected to the investigations of the Knapp Commission. The ensuing disclosure of incidents involving police corruption served to increase public distrust for the Department and to lower the morale among the police themselves. In addition, a "hiring freeze" was in effect for the police department from April, 1970 until January, 1973. As attrition took its toll, the police had to achieve "productivity gains" to compensate for the manpower losses. "Productivity gains" took the form of transferring uniformed patrolmen out of comfortable headquarters and back onto the street. Not surprisingly, these gains were accompanied by morale losses.

Despite the loss of public confidence, the decrease in morale within the Department, heated opposition from the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association (P.B.A.), and the fact that during his entire term as Commissioner there were no additions to the uniformed force, Murphy pushed forward with many innovative ideas in police administration, most of which were designed to reduce corruption or improve the enforcement capabilities of the police. The reforms included the following:

- The creation of a plainclothes patrol detail in each precinct during high crime hours. These "anti-crime" squads comprised less than 5% of the patrol force but accounted for 32% of all felony arrests in the city;
- The establishment of Neighborhood Police Teams (NPT) in thirty precincts throughout the city. The teams included about twenty patrolmen and a single sergeant who had constant, round-the-clock responsibility for a small geographical area. By allowing the police to become intimately familiar with the area, and by fixing responsibility with a particular sergeant, Murphy hoped to improve all aspects of the police operations;
- The establishment of an Organized Crime Control Bureau to centralize efforts against gambling and narcotics;
- The decentralization of authority and accountability--precinct commanding officers were held directly responsible for the behavior of the officers in their command and also for the allocation of precinct resources;
- The reorganization of detective staffs into specialized teams investigating only particular classes of crimes--burglary/larceny, rape/assault, homicides, and robbery;
- The establishment of a criminal justice bureau to monitor activity within the criminal justice system, especially the actions of judges and prosecutors;
- The consolidation of intelligence gathering under a Criminal Investigation Bureau.

Donald F. Cawley

In implementing these sweeping reforms, Murphy was assisted by Donald F. Cawley, a man he had promoted over many others to be Chief of Patrol, one of the most powerful line positions in the Police Department. (See the organizational chart in Appendix A) Born in Queens on September 14, 1929, Cawley had entered the N.Y.P.D. in 1951 at the suggestion of his father-in-law, a retired New York City policeman. Cawley served his first years in precincts in Queens and Brooklyn, becoming a sergeant in 1959. In 1961, he was assigned to the office of the First Deputy Commissioner (a position concerned primarily with vice activity and internal corruption) and became a member of the Gambling Inspection and Review Board, working under the supervision of Lieutenant William H. T. Smith. (Patrick Murphy, then a captain, was also a member of the Review Board.) Cawley was promoted to Lieutenant on December 21, 1962, to Captain on November 29, 1966, and to Deputy Inspector only three weeks later, on December 19, 1966. Commissioner Howard Leary, however, brought him no higher up the ranks. (All promotions above the rank of captain are made by the Commissioner.)

When Murphy took office, he and Cawley were personal friends. Cawley's old boss, William H. T. Smith, became First Deputy Commissioner on October 26, 1970. Cawley soon ascended to similar heights. On December 23, 1970, less than three months after Murphy took office, Cawley was appointed Inspector. In slightly over nineteen years, he had attained a rank which--on average--is not reached until after about twenty-seven years service. Five months later, Murphy designated Cawley as commanding officer of the Inspections Division, the unit under which Cawley and Murphy had served as members of the Gambling Inspection and Review Board. Cawley again found himself working under Smith.

The following month he became commanding officer of the 6th Patrol Division, one of the highest crime areas in the city--the 25th, 28th, and 32nd precincts in Central Harlem. The division encompassed nearly a quarter of a million residents--75% black, 18% Hispanic, 7% white. The homicide rates for the three precincts (using those crimes reported to the police) ranked first, second, and eighth among all city precincts. In this setting Cawley tried to de-emphasize arrest statistics and concentrate police efforts on community relations. His orientation toward crime prevention, as opposed to law enforcement, reflected the client-oriented approach then gaining acceptance in the Department. On July 19, 1971 Cawley was quoted as saying:

A police service--that's how the Police Department has to be looked upon--not as a force, but as a service.

As Chief of Patrol, Cawley was instrumental in realizing many of Murphy's policy initiatives--among them the NPT concept and anti-crime units. Moreover, he made consistent efforts to rid the Department of its "militaristic" image, particularly through changes in organizational nomenclature: under Cawley, the Patrol Services Bureau became the Field Services Bureau; the monthly publication "Patrol Perspectives" was renamed "Police Perspectives"; the designation "Patrolman" was replaced by "Police Officer"; the term "police service" appeared frequently in department communications in lieu of "police force."

Since Cawley was Murphy's protege and had achieved a general reputation for competence, it came as little surprise when on April 12, 1973 Cawley was named by Mayor Lindsay to succeed Commissioner Murphy, who was leaving to direct the Police Foundation, a research organization in Washington, D.C. As in his appointment to Chief of Patrol, Cawley was named over more than seventy more senior department members. On May 7, 1973 Donald F. Cawley became thirtieth Police Commissioner of New York City and, at the age of forty-three, its youngest.

On March 7, 1973, about one month prior to Cawley's being named to succeed Murphy, Lindsay had unofficially stated his intention not to seek a third term as mayor. Since traditionally the Police Commissioner does not survive a change of mayors, Cawley could look forward to only eight months in office. He could serve then either as a "caretaker" Commissioner or he could assume Murphy's style of innovation, for the sake of whatever changes could be wrought. Cawley made his position clear when he was named as Murphy's successor:

We've worked hard for two and a half years instituting changes and reversing attitudes. We have programs on the drawing board that I am going to put into effect and build to a point that what we have done will be irreversible.

As to whether he would submit his resignation to a new mayor at year's end, Cawley was non-committal: "Any decision down the road will be made at the time."

On April 11, 1973 Lindsay held a press conference to publicly announce his decision not to seek a third term. When Cawley was officially sworn in by Mayor Lindsay on May 14, 1973, Cawley repeated his earlier statement concerning resignation in 1974: "I'll make that decision when the time comes." However, the weight of historical precedent was against Cawley. He came to be seen by the press, and by his Department, as a lame duck.

The Full Service Model: 1973

The origins of official Police Department commitment to the service model of police work can be traced to two unlikely advocates: Ellen Mintz, a Ph.D. in Psychology, and Georgette Sandler, a Ph.D. in Sociology. Both were professors on leave from City University working full time in the Office of Programs and Policies. Even more surprising, both came to figure prominently in the story of the "service model" as a result of their participation in women's liberation activities.

Mintz and Sandler had become involved in the police department as a result of the August 26, 1972, Women's March for Equality down New York's Fifth Avenue. Included among the demands of the marchers was the creation of an Office of Women's Advocate within the Mayor's office. Lindsay agreed to allow a group called The Women's Advocacy Committee (WAC) to investigate the status of women in city government, and Mintz and Sandler took on the responsibility of studying the Police Department for this committee. While the city provided no financial assistance to them, the mandate of the mayor enabled them to obtain cooperation from the Police Department.

An initial report, "Statement on the Integration of Women into the New York City Police Department," was submitted by WAC to Commissioner Murphy in early March 1972. The report was based on meetings with personnel at Police Headquarters, the Academy, and a number of precincts, as well as observations accumulated during about 180 hours on patrol tours in the busiest sectors of the city at the busiest times of day. Mintz's and Sandler's findings dealt primarily with a purported 1% quota imposed on the hiring of women and the perpetuation of the "machismo ethic" in the Department due to the exclusion of females. The report observed that, at most, only 15% of police work dealt with law enforcement and yet a "masculine value system" led officers to view their job as one of employing "force." Mintz and Sandler identified a range of undesirable consequences of this "masculine value system":

- a police image of insensitivity and brutality;
- a resentment of the police as alien to the community and the personal needs of its members, leading to a mutual lack of communication and cooperation;
- poor quality performance in essential services;
- reduction in accessibility of police to people as a result of their "masculine image";
- instigation of violence and brutality both initiated by and directed at police.

The report recommended expanded recruitment and hiring of women. (Recall that during this period there was a freeze on the hiring of uniformed police.)

A final and more elaborate paper, entitled "Report to the Mayor on Activities of the Women's Advocacy Committee Within the New York City Police Department" was completed on August 25, 1972 and submitted to Mayor Lindsay shortly thereafter. It called for the elimination of the 1% quota, suspension of the hiring freeze with respect to women, and the integration of women into full patrol duties and into the command structure of the Department. The rationale for such actions was stated in terms of exploiting the present stereotype of women as non-aggressive and verbally--not physically--responsive to conflict situations.

Ostensibly, no immediate action was taken on the WAC report. In January 1973, however, Drs. Mintz and Sandler were offered, and accepted, salaried positions in the Police Department as "coordinators for training and evaluation" within the Personnel Bureau. Feeling that they had not been merely co-opted and that there was some receptivity to ideas of a service re-orientation of policemen, if not to the idea of full integration of women into the Department, they sought to develop formally the notion of a "service model." [See Appendix B for a brief summary of their description of the desired performance by service-oriented policemen.]

In describing the full service model, the two women were careful not to imply any de-emphasis of law enforcement functions. It would have been easy for their proposals to be interpreted as enhancing "service" at the expense of "law enforcement" functions, and the criticism they would attract by appearing to lessen the importance of "real police work" could easily have spelled defeat for their ideas. They thus felt compelled to include such clarifications as the following:

*Officially the Personnel and Staff Services Bureau

In describing the service model, it is important to emphasize that it constitutes an approach to any work that is done within the Police Department. Nor should the model be confused with service aspects of police work. Rather, it should be viewed as an orientation to whatever function one performs at any level of the organization.

One of the first individuals within the Department to receive a written formulation of the service model was Cawley, at the time Acting Chief Inspector in addition to being Chief of Patrol. In responding on February 12, 1973 to the written document drafted by Drs. Mintz and Sandler, he referred to the service model concept as "the fresh breeze that has been long needed in police role identification." Cawley instructed the commanding officer of the Patrol Services Bureau's Research and Development Section, Deputy Inspector William J. Cotter, to involve himself and two staff members ("two of our brightest and most knowledgeable superiors"--Cawley) in briefings with the two doctors and further discussion of the service model.

On March 2, 1973 the Mintz and Sandler proposal was presented to a conference of those of the rank Assistant Chief Inspector and above (i.e., the thirty or so highest ranking members of the Department--the so-called Group I). Cawley and First Deputy Commissioner William H. T. Smith came out immediately in support of the service model idea. The other top commanders more or less followed suit, although they evidenced some confusion as to what a "service model" might imply and the "gut" reactions of several were clearly only lukewarm. (Commissioner Murphy is reported to have given his tentative support to the idea, somewhat perplexed as to its real meaning.)

The proposal was presented on paper through the use of a "man model," which cast the police officer as a "front-line crisis specialist" who:

Contrary to the technically-oriented, man-of-action, letter-of-the-law image... is able to serve clients through the application of human relations skills and better coordination with community resources.

The misunderstanding of the "man model" was evident in a memo from Cotter to Cawley on March 4, which followed four conferences between Cotter's staff and the two doctors. Cotter advised "that the Service Model be implemented as far and as rapidly as possible" and yet displayed a misinterpretation of its intent by saying:

The definition of "good police work" by superiors will require a shift toward service, away from law enforcement.

On the same day, Cawley forwarded the Patrol Services Bureau's endorsement of the service model to Seymour Bernstein, the Director of Police Personnel. Cawley described the model as:

An opportunity to shake loose from traditions that have led to the present mis-orientation of police personnel... We concur completely in its format, grid, areas of implementation, and goals.

In a separate memo to Bernstein also dated March 14, Cawley suggested further consideration of the plan in the April Group I conference, establishment of a work committee to begin planning an implementation strategy, and discussions with the Deputy Commissioner for Public Information to determine how to obtain "full-blown press coverage of this exciting departure from traditional police views and practices." He added, almost parenthetically, at the end of his memo:

The above suggestions assume that the Police Commissioner has formally approved of the proposal.

Cawley apparently saw himself as the guiding force behind the service model. Also, it was apparently his support that sustained the proposal through its early consideration.

Through late March and early April the seven division commanders (for Manhattan North, Manhattan South, Brooklyn North, Brooklyn South, Queens, Bronx, and Richmond) were surveyed for their reactions to the service model proposal. The responses forwarded to Cawley were generally favorable, with reservations as to whether it meant that service was to be pursued at the expense of law enforcement. The reactions ranged from unqualified approval:

It constitutes an extraordinarily promising path for the improvement of the delivery of police services...
(from Assistant Chief Inspector Anthony V. Bouza, Bronx, on April 13);

to doubt as to its practicality given existing Department resources:

Part of his (the police officer's) abruptness today is a desire to get back to availability status and keep his response time down. If we increase response time, perhaps we should be talking about hiring more bodies...
(from Assistant Chief Inspector Cornelius J. Behan, Brooklyn South, on April 2).

A series of memos to Bernstein highlighted other possible problems in the proposal, including potential conflict among its goals. Captain Joseph D. McNamara, Commanding Office of the Long Range Planning Section of the Office of Programs and Policies, commented on May 2:

One aspect of improved police service is to provide fast response for public requests for police assistance. But, achieving the objective of fast response requires that we impose bureaucratic restraints which impede the attainment of job satisfaction, community relations, and professionalization objectives for officers.

An April 6 memo from Chief Inspector John L. Keenan, Manhattan South, also expressed concern for the "antipathy of recent years between unions and top command" as a barrier to implementation. Relations with the line organizations--Patrolmen's Benevolent Association (PBA) and the Sergeant's Benevolent Association (SBA)--were presently being aggravated by a Department proposal to have all uniformed officers wear nameplates over their breast pockets. [The "higher-ups" in the Department cited the fact that, of the ten largest American cities, only Cleveland and New York did not require such identification. The PBA and SBA claimed that the officers and their families would thereby become vulnerable to harassment from irresponsible citizens.]

Similar apprehension was also voiced on April 16 by Deputy Inspector James McEvoy, the commanding officer of the Personnel Bureau's Labor Relations Office. He commented that if the service model implied an expansion of the functions to be served by police officers, it would be taxing an already overburdened force. He further stated that the "distance" between the police and the community, which the service model was intended to reduce, existed for reasons "much deeper and graver" than could be overcome by substituting courtesy for abruptness.

Several individuals were skeptical of the efficacy of improved training methods as a means of implementing the model. William J. McCarthy, Deputy Commissioner for Organized Crime Control, stated on April 6:

It would be naive for us to believe that a six-month recruit training program, no matter how well-planned, constructed, or given, can overcome or eradicate present personnel selection deficiencies.

The belief that more attention should be given to recruitment and selection, rather than training, was echoed by Peter S. Ring, director of the Personnel Bureau's Employment Division.

These notes of skepticism were, however, largely outweighed by positive remarks. It was generally known that the plan had the support of both Cawley and Smith. As Chief of Patrol and First Deputy Commissioner respectively, these were two of the most influential men in the Department. Also, on March 19, shortly after the first presentation of the service model at the Group I conference, Murphy had announced his decision not to serve out the remainder of the year. Cawley was being given an odds-on chance of becoming Murphy's successor and he in fact became the Commissioner-designate on April 12. It seemed unlikely that any of the Department officials would risk antagonizing someone on whom their career fortunes might be dependent.

On April 19 a conference was held between Mintz, Sandler, Bernstein, and representatives of the Patrol Services Bureau and the Public Information Division. In the words of Deputy Inspector Cotter:

The purpose of the conference was to decide how to publicize (for internal and external consumption) the Department's and your [Cawley's] commitment to the service model.

It was suggested that the service model and the "functional management model" (an experimental precinct organizational structure) receive attention in press conferences and Department publications ("Open Door," the Commissioner's publicity vehicle, and "Spring 3100," the Department magazine). In addition, as Cotter explained in a memo to Cawley on April 20:

Some catchy nomenclature for the Service Model and Functional Management Models will be required to identify the new programs with your administration.

On May 10, three days after becoming Commissioner, Cawley requested a briefing from Bernstein on service model implementation. On the same day he instructed the First Deputy Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner for Press

Relations, the Assistant Commissioner for Programs and Policies, the Chief of Operations, the Special Counsel to the Commissioner, the Personnel Director, Mintz, and Sandler to discuss the amount of "in house work" necessary to implement the proposal. In his words: "The introduction of the service model would be timely."

Bernstein, in a memo to Cawley on June 11, proposed the designation of a project director to coordinate the implementation of the service model and the establishment of a command-level task force to work out the details. On June 12 Inspector Fitzsimons sent a memo to Cawley, proposing that the responsibility for implementation be assigned to his Office of Programs and Policies. This Office, which had been established on September 18, 1972, originally reported to an Assistant Commissioner for Programs and Policies. However, the Assistant Commissioner, Dale M. Landi, left his position in June 1973, at which time Fitzsimons--the head of the Office--began reporting directly to the Police Commissioner. As Fitzsimons explained his interest in assuming responsibility for the "full service model":

This office represents you directly and has unique advantages for program analysis and coordination.

He also suggested that Mintz and Sandler be transferred from Personnel to Programs and Policies.

On June 29 Cawley designated the service model for inclusion into the Department's twelve-month Master Plan. Some of the other Master Plan projects mandated by Cawley at that time were the functional management plan, improved techniques for screening 911¹ calls, intensified minority recruitment, and an expansion of the field training officer program (to handle the over 3000 new Academy recruits in the coming year). Cawley's anticipated date for the completion of service model implementation was September 1, 1973, with selection of a project director by July 15, 1973. The project was assigned to the Office of Programs and Policies. Also as suggested by Fitzsimons, Mintz and Sandler were transferred to his command and became temporary "project managers," pending the appointment of a project director.

The Personnel System of the New York City Police Department

The proposal advanced by Mintz and Sandler was a complicated one, involving the general psychology, behavior and attitudes of patrolmen. To a large extent, these attributes were shaped by forces outside the control of any reform movement: by the psychology of the individual policemen, by the tradition and culture of police organizations, or by the objective demands of situations routinely encountered by the police. The only apparent administrative tool for influencing the general "style" of the police was the personnel system--the set of organizational units and procedures that recruited, selected, trained, evaluated, and sanctioned individuals within the Police Department.

In attempting to use the personnel system to promote a "service" orientation, Mintz and Sandler faced a formidable task. The system was comprised of diverse components controlled by different units of the Police Department. Moreover, many of the components moved in response to various pressures other than those Mintz and Sandler could exert, even supported by Cawley. Descriptions of the

¹The police emergency telephone number.

several components of the N.Y.P.D. personnel system are presented below. [See also the 1969 organizational chart of the N.Y.P.D. in Appendix A.]

1. Career Structure--(Defining the career possibilities in the organization; includes restrictions on entry, promotional paths, and requirements for leaving the organization; includes both formal and informal career patterns.)

An organization's career structure has an impact on the type of individuals it attracts, the motivation of those employed, and the managerial control of supervisors within the organization. Restrictions on entry into and exit from the organization significantly affect the character of the organization's pool of human resources. Formal career paths (established by the hierarchy of positions) and informal career paths (established by custom and a hierarchy of prestige) determine goals for employees and circumscribe their tenure in the organization.

The N.Y.P.D. maintains two quite distinct career structures--the civilian career structure and the sworn police officer career structure. The civilian structure is controlled by the City Department of Personnel and consists of a series of positions which are filled on the basis of Civil Service examination scores and seniority. The hierarchy of civilian positions is as follows:

Administrative Manager
Senior Administrative Assistant
Administrative Associate
Administrative Assistant
Supervisor Clerk--Supervisor Stenographer
Senior Clerk--Senior Typist--Senior Stenographer
Clerk--Typist--Stenographer

When a Civil Service exam is given for a particular position, only those persons occupying positions immediately below in the hierarchy may take the exam and be ranked according to their scores. An open competitive exam is held on the rare occasions when a new position is created or when there is a dearth of eligible Civil Service employees.

The career structure for the sworn police officer is much more important and deserves much more detailed consideration. At the lower end of the career structure for sworn police officers, a choice may be made between the Civil Service section and the Detective Bureau. All sworn personnel begin as patrolmen or patrolwomen. After that, they may choose to remain in the Civil Service hierarchy and take exams for the positions of Sergeant, Lieutenant and Captain, or they may enter the Detective Bureau and become either a 1st, 2nd or 3rd Grade Detective. Promotion and entry in the Detective Bureau is at the discretion of the Chief of Detectives. The size of the Detective Bureau is limited by the number of Detectives' Gold Shields, which because of their relative scarcity are coveted symbols of prestige. Persons in the Detective Bureau may return to the Civil Service promotion ladder by taking the Civil Service exam for an appropriate position. The hierarchy of positions and the number of personnel in each as of 1969 is given below:

<u>Position</u>	<u>Number of Personnel</u>
Chief Inspector	1
Chief of Detectives	1
Chief of Staff	1
Chief of Planning	1
Supervising Assistant Chief Inspector	1
Assistant Chief Inspector	14
Deputy Chief Inspector	22
Inspector	43
Deputy Inspector	75

CIVIL SERVICE			
Captain	278		
Lieutenants	895	<u>Detectives</u>	
Lieutenants (Commander of Detectives)	74	1st Grade	283
Lieutenants (Special Assignment)	16		
Sergeants	2,030	2nd Grade	780
Sergeants (Special Assignment)	22		
Sergeants (Supervisor of Detectives)	95		
Patrolmen/Patrolwomen	25,217	3rd Grade	1,734
Patrolmen (Special Assignment)	71		

Data developed by the Personnel Records section of the Department in July, 1968 indicated the following average number of years for the majority of the force to reach superior rank status:

To attain the rank of Sergeant:	11.6 years
To attain the rank of Lieutenant:	15.9 years
To attain the rank of Captain:	19.2 years
To attain the rank of Inspector:	26.7 years

As the above data indicates, only 3,569 members of the uniformed police out of 28,857 were serving in superior officer ranks in 1969. The average patrolman does not rise above that rank during his entire career within the Department.

The highest rank within the Civil Service structure is Captain. Positions above that are filled at the discretion of the Commissioner and he may freely promote or demote persons occupying such positions, provided only that he not demote someone above the rank of Captain to a rank lower than Captain. There is no lateral entry for any of the positions listed above. One must have worked up the promotional ladder within the Department in order to be eligible for a higher position. That ladder, with the option of detective or non-detective work at the bottom, thus defines the Department's formal career path.

Within that formal ladder there exist numerous informal career paths leading from one position to another, sometimes within the same rank. An example is the pattern normally leading up to the position of plainclothes Lieutenant in the Public Morals Section of the Operations Division. Before one is placed in that position it is usually necessary to have served as a patrolman in an

"active" sector, to have done well in a sensitive assignment, to have a clean record, and perhaps to have shown some supervisory skill. These requirements are not officially laid down in the Department Manual or elsewhere. Yet they are known and accepted by most police officers and given credibility by promotional and transfer decisions of the Personnel Bureau and commanders of units. Thus, there is competition for some positions in the Department not because of better pay or because the position in itself commands a great deal of prestige, but because it is a necessary step on the path to a more distant position with greater prestige or greater compensation.

2. Classification--(Describing and categorizing positions within the organization; setting standards; promulgating job descriptions; setting appropriate pay levels; monitoring the system to assure compliance.)

Classification is important in defining the specific levels within the organization's career structure, in giving coherence to the compensation scheme and in preserving a merit system of advancement. The City Department of Personnel is responsible for all of the City's employees and is thus ultimately responsible for the classification of personnel in the N.Y.P.D. community. Day-to-day supervision of the existing classification system, however, takes place in the N.Y.P.D.'s Personnel Bureau and recommendations for classification changes usually come from that Bureau.

There are three major classification functions that must be performed in the N.Y.P.D.:

1. Standards must be set for the ranks or grades which are suitable for each position. Deputy Commissioners, for example, must be civilians. The Chief Inspector is the highest ranked police officer, usually a four-star chief. Heads of some bureaus may be civilians, but most are two- and three-star chiefs. The Commissioner has some discretion to select the rank of officers chosen to command divisions within administrative bureaus. The standards and responsibilities of each of the positions in the Department are defined in the Police Department Manual.
2. Positions in the sworn section of the Department must be made to correspond with appropriate civilian Civil Service positions. The City Department of Personnel monitors the relative responsibilities and compensation of civilian and sworn personnel.
3. Detective division positions must be defined to correspond to positions in the uniformed police section of the Department. 3rd Grade Detectives are paid a little more than patrolmen but less than Sergeants. 2nd Grade Detectives are paid the same as Sergeants. 1st Grade Detectives are paid the same as Lieutenants.

Sometimes the classification scheme results in one officer supervising another who is better paid. For example, Sergeants often supervise 1st Grade Detectives. This is an example of a disjunction between the Department's pay hierarchy and its authority hierarchy and it has traditionally been the source of some irritation.

3. Recruitment--(The task of bringing human resources into the organization; making known the personnel needs of the organization to relevant publics; developing programs to enhance the attractiveness of employment in the organization; supervising prospective employees through initial screening so that desirable candidates are not lost.)

Recruitment in the N.Y.P.D. is formally the responsibility of the Department of Personnel for New York City. That Department in cooperation with the City Civil Service Commission determines when the Civil Service exam for police officers is given. It also advertises the date of the exam as it does other exams--through the news media, through neighborhood associations and through other city agencies.

Recruitment is not a budget line item for the N.Y.P.D. The Deputy Commissioner of Press Relations works with the City Department of Personnel in coordinating the advertising of the exam. Since 1967 there has been a Recruiting Unit within the Personnel Bureau of the N.Y.P.D. This Unit has four members and is primarily concerned with recruiting minority candidates on existing Civil Service lists.

There are two important aspects to the task of recruiting police officers. One is to encourage qualified and interested candidates to take the Civil Service test. The second is to get those candidates who pass the Civil Service test to return and go through the preliminary selection process before entering the Police Academy. A recent Rand study showed that a significant percentage of those passing the Civil Service test disappeared afterwards. Of particular interest is the fact that 60% of minority candidates passing the Civil Service test never showed up for the subsequent selection procedures.

The basic requirements for entrance into the N.Y.P.D. were set forth in the following manner in a recent publication:

Young men who apply for employment in the New York City Police Department do so by submitting a brief preliminary application to the City Department of Personnel, the central hiring agency. They must be high school graduates or possess a high school equivalency diploma or acceptable G.E.D. certificate.

Physically, their height must be 5'7", a figure recently reduced from 5'8" in the hope of qualifying some of the many shorter Puerto Rican residents. Vision must be 20/30 in each eye without glasses and they must be otherwise without a history of any permanently debilitating disease. They must be 21 years of age at time of appointment and less than 29 at date of following application.

They must pass a written examination similar to an intelligence test and a physical exam which tests agility and strength. The grade achieved on the written exam establishes the place on the eligibles' list; the physical is merely qualifying.

Those candidates who pass the qualifying physical examination are given the Police Department's PA-15 Form to complete. This is a detailed, twelve-page form requiring such information from the candidate as all residences since elementary school, all traffic summonses issued on the candidate, all arrests, and all police investigations of the candidate not resulting in arrest. The completed PA-15 Form is used by the officers assigned to investigate the character of candidates before their Police Academy training and their appointment as probationary policemen. The objective of the background investigation is to obtain "proof of good character," which is considered an absolute prerequisite to appointment. In determining the candidate's worthiness to be a police officer, the investigators use interviews with the candidate's relatives and friends as well as the responses to Form PA-15.

If there is a hiring freeze, an individual may wait two to three years before his name is reached on the Civil Service list. When an exam is given, the recruitment list from the last exam is voided and replaced by the new list. Seldom, if ever, does the City Department get through the top half of the list of eligibles before a new list comes into effect.

4. Selection--(The process of making distinction among potential employees by some means so that those lacking ability or characteristics thought necessary for employment can be removed prior to being hired; includes determining the criteria and instruments by which candidates are screened as well as the application of those criteria and instruments.)

It is probably best to think of the selection process in the N.Y.P.D. as beginning when a prospective police officer confronts the eligibility standards for taking the Civil Service exam and ending when the candidate ends the twelve-month probationary period which begins with his entrance into the Police Academy. Throughout this period, a number of individuals and organizations are involved in the selection process, including the City Department of Personnel, the Personnel Bureau of the N.Y.P.D., the Police Academy, and patrolmen and supervisory officers in the precincts.

The procedures used for screening out police officers include the following:

- a. Preliminary eligibility standards
- b. Civil Service exam
- c. Medical and physical exam
- d. PA-15 Form
- e. Background investigation
- f. Police Academy--The candidate spends the first six months of his probationary period at the Police Academy. There are three basic types of selection instruments employed there: academic tests, physical tests, and psychological tests. A candidate must generally display repeated failures or major behavior problems before he is dismissed.
- g. Initial field experience--After leaving the Academy, the candidate is assigned to a precinct and is generally placed on patrol with a veteran cop. He fills out daily activity sheets which reflect how he spent his time during his shift. During the six-month probationary period in the field, any extraordinary behavior observed by the candidate's Supervising Sergeant is reported to the Precinct Commander. If these

reports are serious or frequent enough, the Precinct Commander may recommend to the Personnel Bureau that the candidate be released. The candidate usually spends this six-month stretch in one precinct, but occasionally in two.

The attrition rate among candidates for the position of patrolman decreases absolutely and proportionately as the candidate moves through the process. Preliminary eligibility standards eliminate the largest number of applicants, followed by the Civil Service exam, then the medical and physical test, the PA-15 Form and the background investigation. Once a candidate enters the Police Academy, his chances of becoming a full-fledged police officer twelve months later are very good indeed.

5. Training--(The attempt to make or encourage employees or prospective employees to acquire certain skills or to internalize certain beliefs and attitudes; includes both initial training, whose main purpose is indoctrination, and in-service training, which is aimed at employee development, e.g., learning new skills, improving managerial ability, etc.)

The term training as used in this section refers to the would-be police officer's formal exposure to classes, instructors, and to some sort of pre-determined curriculum.

Training in the N.Y.P.D. is of two types--initial and in-service training. The first part of the initial training is a six-month stay at the Police Academy. The Academy is within the Personnel Bureau and has its own commanding officer, who has a great deal of control over the structure of the Academy, the selection of its instructors, and, most importantly, the content of its curriculum. The material given to the recruits at the Academy and the lesson plans of the instructors for each class must be approved by the commanding officer. Most of the instructors are uniformed police officers.

The curriculum of the Police Academy has been one of the most variable components of the personnel system. The changes that occurred in 1968-1970 have already been mentioned (e.g., extension from 4-6 months and the addition of courses in psychology and sociology taught by civilian instructors). However, there were additional changes in the curriculum during Murphy's tenure as commissioner. Indeed, the Recruit Training Syllabus was revised twice in the three-year interim--first in July 1971 and again in January 1973. Classes became co-educational; audio-visual aids and participatory classroom techniques came into wide use. Increased attention was given to unarmed self-defense and to the use of deadly physical force. The issuance of service revolvers now came after eighteen weeks of Academy training (not at the outset) and only after the recruit scored 100% on a written examination testing his (or her) understanding of the use of force. As a response to the Knapp investigations, four days of workshop sessions were devoted to "ethical awareness." Added emphasis was placed on field training (three weeks in a precinct under the guidance of a field training office) and community awareness. Finally, citing the Prelect Program as furthering one Academy goal--the civilization of recruit training--the Syllabus further explained:

Another main goal is to convince the recruit that he must assume the "service role," i.e., the role of community representative for safety, and security, rather than the role of military overseer of a section of the city.

There is no formal training program for the six months after a probationary police officer leaves the Police Academy. The Personnel Bureau ostensibly supervises the recruit during this period, but actually it does little more than help coordinate the assignment of recruits and compile any reports of recruit problems during this period.

The in-service training that a police officer receives can be divided into two types--managerial and technical. Managerial training is required before an officer assumes a new supervisory job, such as those of Sergeant, Lieutenant or Captain. This training is supervised by the In-Service Training Unit of the Personnel Bureau.

Technical in-service training takes place both at the Academy and in the operational units of the Department. There is a Specialized Training Unit within the Academy which offers courses in criminal investigation, security techniques, and other areas pertinent to performing particular kinds of tasks. Such specialized training is required before working in certain divisions of the N.Y.P.D., for example, in narcotics or plainclothes units. Further technical training takes place in the various field units of the Department. There is a training officer designated in each of the Department's Bureaus and in each area of the Patrol Bureau. The substance and form of area-level training is determined initially by the individual field unit and its supervising training officer, but all decentralized training is supervised and coordinated by the In-Service Training Unit.

6. Placement--(The task of matching available talent with the needs of the organization; implies knowledge of what an individual's strengths and weaknesses are, and knowledge of what positions need to be filled within the organization.)

Placement of personnel can be thought of as requiring two types of activity--first, collecting information about individuals and about the personnel needs of the organization, and second, assigning the proper individuals to the proper positions within the organization. The latter activity is obviously closely connected with the processes of evaluation and compensation/punishment which will be discussed below.

Collecting information about members of the N.Y.P.D. is a complex task involving a number of organizational units. The central information-gathering unit is the Personnel Services and Records Division of the Personnel Bureau which maintains both general personnel records and disciplinary records. The general personnel records include miscellaneous information about each officer, including available data on an employee's skills, training, background and education. These records are open to individual police officers. Disciplinary records include a history of all official Department charges and disciplinary actions against an officer. Access to these records is on a need-to-know basis, usually requiring clearance with the commanding officer of the Personnel Bureau. The Deputy Commissioner of Trials and the Police Commissioner have access to these files. The individual police officer does not.

The Personnel Bureau maintains a further set of records which include all official evaluations made of an officer, as well as any informal complaints or allegations made against him by citizens or members of the Department. These records are primarily used by the Personnel Evaluation and Development Unit when employees are being considered for transfer or promotion. They may also be used by the Department's Internal Affairs Division when it is conducting an investigation. Employees are not allowed to see these records.

Finally, the Central Records Division in the Personnel Bureau keeps records of lost property, accidents, arrests and crimes.

As the first step in the placement process, initial assignments are given to new recruits coming out of the Police Academy. These assignments are generally determined by the manpower needs of the various precincts and are sometimes influenced by the judgment of the commanding officer of the Police Academy. Individual police officers may submit transfer requests through their commanding officer to the Personnel Bureau. These requests are matched with notices of openings or requests for additional personnel directed to the Bureau by other commanding officers. If there is an opening, a transfer is usually granted, unless there are indications in the employee's record that he is unsuitable for the position for which he is applying.

When an officer is being considered for advancement, his record is reviewed by the Bureau's Screening Unit. Adherence to the Civil Service eligible list for Sergeant, Lieutenant and Captain is the rule and few exceptions are made. If an officer is passed over on the list, he may complain to the Commissioner, institute a grievance proceeding with the Deputy Commissioner of Trials, or complain to parties outside the Department (the City Civil Service Commission, the Mayor's Office, the City Department of Personnel).

The Personnel Bureau is also responsible for filling civilian positions in the Department, but there is no special unit to perform that task. Civilian employees must take city-wide Civil Service exams to advance in position. Placement and advancement are thus controlled by the City Department of Personnel. The Police Department does keep records of evaluations of civilian employees. These may be reviewed by the City Department, but barring an unusually bad evaluation, the Civil Service list is followed.

7. Evaluation²--(This involves gathering information about employees' performance, making judgments as to an individual's strengths and weaknesses, and determining whether an employee should be rewarded or punished; implies formulating criteria for making such judgments.)

The evaluation of a new recruit which takes place during his probationary period serves a quite different function from subsequent evaluations. The purpose of evaluation during probation is to ascertain whether the recruit should become a police officer at all. Once a police officer passes beyond the probationary period, evaluations are designed primarily as feedback devices to instruct the policeman about the way the police department wants him to perform. Indeed, given the importance of evaluations in determining individual careers, it becomes potentially one of the most powerful devices for communicating with officers. However, precisely because of its power, it tends not to be reliably used by supervisors. The difficulty of using this instrument in a reliable way to control behavior is illustrated by the stormy history of evaluation procedures.

Prior to the late 1950's there was no formal performance appraisal system in the N.Y.P.D. In the late 1950's, evaluation forms for supervisors (i.e., sergeants and above) were introduced. The form was the same for all ranks and required the rater to evaluate each subordinate semi-annually with

²Most of the material in this section was excerpted from Police Performance Appraisal in New York City, KSG Case C26-74-028, Harvard University.

respect to seven criteria, using a scale of unsatisfactory, average, above average, outstanding, or not observed. The criteria were: 1) leadership, 2) judgment, 3) job knowledge, 4) dependability, 5) job attitude, 6) relations with people, and 7) manner. Each was briefly described--"judgment," for example, was defined as:

the demonstrated ability to make sound decisions, use foresight, think clearly, arrive at a logical conclusion, even under stress.

Comments were required only for "outstanding" or "unsatisfactory" ratings on any factor. In addition, there was an "overall evaluation" item. The rater was also required to specify the rank position of the ratee among those under his supervision, e.g., 2 of 6, and to suggest further action (promotion, increased responsibility in present rank, retention in present assignment, or transfer). There was no requirement for the rater to discuss the evaluation with the ratee or even to inform the ratee of the ratings given.

In 1966 an item entitled "integrity", was added to the form. Also during the 1960's a semi-annual evaluation form for detectives was introduced. The form included the seven criteria listed above except leadership, along with an overall evaluation. Note that at no time up until the late 60's had patrolmen or policewomen been evaluated through written forms. Thus, 80 to 90 percent of the uniformed force was not subject to any formal appraisal process.

This latter fact was recognized in the Police Training and Performance Study (December 1969). The study advocated the extension of performances evaluation to the patrolman level to secure

the inevitable improvement in the quality of the service delivered by personnel who are aware that their behavior is being observed and measured.

In November, 1971 a Performance Evaluation Section (PES) was formed within the Career Development Division of the Personnel Bureau. (Evaluations had previously been administered by a Personnel Evaluation and Development Unit, a first-level staff organ within the Personnel Bureau.) In March, 1972, two major changes were made in the evaluation program. First, superior officers were divided into middle managers (sergeants and lieutenants) and executive managers (captains and above), and separate forms were designed for each group. Second, for the first time, evaluation forms for patrolmen were introduced. The forms were virtually identical with the forms for sergeants and lieutenants. They included nine performance criteria: integrity, judgement, job knowledge, initiative and drive, courtesy, work quality, leadership, appearance, and professional attitude. Each factor was evaluated on the basis of a one to five scale. The categories on each scale were explained by short behavior examples. For instance, "judgement" could be rated according to the following scale:

- Logic and thinking are unusually sound. Behavior is always consistent with known facts.
- Decisions made are above average in their soundness and are consistent with all facts and established procedures.
- Gives adequate consideration to all known facts before acting and actions are consistent with the apparent facts. Decisions need only routine check on part of supervisor.
- Often fails to consider all facts at hand. Is inclined to jump to conclusions and act without due regard to all sides of an issue.
- Fails to consider all obvious facts in a situation before acting, or fails to act in accordance with the facts at hand. Needs close supervision.

There was no overall evaluation item, but the rater was required to comment on the ratee's greatest strength and his area of greatest need for improvement and to make a recommendation for future assignment.

Included in the patrolmen/policewomen form was the rank ordering of each rater into the upper 25%, middle 50%, or lower 25% of the group of subordinates of similar rank and assignment with which the ratee was evaluated. In addition, the supervisor (normally a sergeant) was required to indicate the specific rank position of any patrolman/policewoman placed in the upper quartile. Thus, a sergeant evaluating a group of twelve radio car patrolmen had to specify whether each subordinate was in the top three, the middle six, or the bottom three of the group. He further had to determine the rank order of the top three. While sergeants and lieutenants were themselves not subject to forced percentile distributions, they were ranked according to their position in the group being evaluated by their superior officer. Thus, a sergeant might be ranked 4 of 6 by his lieutenant.

The evaluation had to be discussed with the ratee, who was then required to sign the form. The evaluation was also reviewed by the commanding officer of the rater. Both the rater and the reviewer were given space to make comments.

The form used for "captains and above" called for specific narrative comments on the ratee with respect to: ability to plan and organize; ability to communicate with peers, superiors, and subordinates; technical and administrative knowledge; initiative in implementing policy; and ability to motivate subordinates. Furthermore, the rater had to comment on the individual's greatest strengths and weaknesses and his overall performance and to recommend further assignment of the ratee. As with the sergeants/lieutenants form, there was a rank order item, but no percentile distribution. As with all other ranks, an appraisal interview was required, and the form was to be signed by the rater, the ratee, and the reviewer.

The forms used earlier for detectives were revised in November, 1972. Ten criteria were included: investigative effectiveness, knowledge, motivation, integrity, information, judgment, reliability, adaptability, leadership and relations with people. Each was briefly defined. The performance scale for each criterion included "improvement needed," "average," "above average," "superior," and "outstanding." The rater also was required to identify

strengths and weaknesses, to recommend further assignment, to specify rank order in the detective squad, and to make an overall evaluation. The detective was also judged on a scale of one to seven according to: number of arrests, quality of arrests, case preparation and court presentation, assigned cases cleared by arrest and overall evaluation of arrests. Again, there was provision for an appraisal interview and review of the evaluation by the rater's commanding officer.

With the introduction of these new forms, a procedure was established whereby a ratee could appeal any evaluation. Grounds for appeal consisted of either: (1) factual error, (2) misinterpretation of instructions, or (3) bias or prejudice on the part of the rater. If a disagreement over the evaluation could not be resolved at the appraisal interview, the ratee was to note his intention to appeal when he signed the form and then to request an interview with the reviewer, most often the precinct commander. The reviewer would then discuss the evaluation jointly with the rater and ratee and attempt to settle the disagreement. If the reviewer's decision was unsatisfactory, a final appeal could be made (in the case of captains and above) to the Personnel Director or (in the case of lieutenants and below) to the Personnel Officer of the Area Command (e.g., Patrol Borough Manhattan North) or the Bureau concerned. The final decision would then be submitted in writing to the appellant and his commanding officer.

By far the most controversial aspects of the new forms were the rank order and percentile distribution items. Many patrolmen refused to sign the forms, claiming that their superiors had shown favoritism in the ratings. One quarter of the forms submitted in early 1972 had to be returned because they were improperly completed. While in some cases headings were incomplete or boxes were not checked, the refusal of the ratee to sign the form was a frequent reason for return. (Up to 60% of the forms from some commands were submitted unsigned.) Some ratees felt that placement in the lower quartile was a punitive measure taken by superiors in an attempt to transfer or otherwise harass subordinates. Those who perceived themselves as adequate performers and yet were assigned to the lower 25% found the experience a blow to their ego, and their morale consequently dropped. It was difficult for a ratee to substantiate any charges of favoritism against a superior and thus an evaluation could not be easily appealed. Officers noted that conditions varied greatly from precinct to precinct and that the quality of manpower from squad to squad also varied. Thus, one could be judged in the lower quartile in one situation, when comparable performance elsewhere would earn a spot in the upper quartile.

Patrolmen feared that once placed in the bottom quartile, they would find themselves in the same position in subsequent evaluation periods (due to the rater's distaste for having to justify moving others into the lower 25%). Patrolmen also felt that too much emphasis was being placed on "activity"--summonses and arrests--and that one's chances for promotions or investigatory assignments were hurt if you did not "produce," even though you were otherwise doing commendable work.

Raters also were critical of the ranking scheme. It was difficult to call a member of one's squad in for an appraisal interview and inform him of his position in the bottom 25%. For this reason, the appraisal interview was often dreaded (and sometimes even omitted) by raters. Supervisors also complained that the stigma of being in the lower 25% caused some subordinates to "go dead." Performance in such instances actually declined.

Raters made some attempts to subvert the rank distribution system. They placed fewer than one-fourth of their subordinates in the lower quartile.³ Fearing that outstanding performers would be transferred out of their commands to other heightened assignments if placed in the upper quartile, raters deliberately placed them in the middle 50%. Another tactic was to define the duties of one's subordinates so narrowly that any group having similar duties numbered less than four. Since rank distributions were not required for groups less than four, this enabled the rater to avoid the quartile rankings.

Noting the confusion over the new evaluation forms and the resistance with which they were received, the PES made attempts to train personnel, as both raters and ratees, on the principles of the evaluation system. An "Evaluators' Guide" for raters was distributed in September, 1972; performance appraisal was explained in recruit training; in February, 1973 a field training team from the PES began giving instruction on a daily basis through visits to precinct commands. Starting in April, 1973 a thirty-minute program was televised over the city's closed-circuit channel (WNYC) as part of the Department's division-level training. The program dealt with four questions about performance evaluations: "What are they?", "Why are they needed?", "How are they used?", and "What is my role in the evaluation system?" The procedure was also thoroughly explained in pre-promotional training, especially for sergeants-to-be. Fifteen hours of the seven week pre-promotional course was devoted to developing one's skills as a rater. So many forms had been completed incorrectly that it was necessary to explain the simple mechanics of filling them out. Attention was also given to evaluations in management courses taught at the Academy to selected superior officers.

There was considerable evidence of leniency on the part of raters. With nine criteria, each judged on a one-to-five scale, the range of scores for patrolmen, policewomen, lieutenants, and sergeants was 9 to 45. The arithmetic mean was 27. Statistics compiled on sergeants as raters showed a mean rating of 32; for lieutenants, it was about 34. Disproportionately high scores were found especially for those in administrative or specialist-type assignments.

Speculation as to the causes of rater leniency centered about the following issues:

- the anxiety to maintain a working relationship with one's subordinate;
- the rationalization that ratings "don't really mean anything anyway";
- the feeling that "other supervisors don't play the game, so why should I penalize my men?";
- the fear that low ratings will reflect poorly upon the rater;
- the "halo effect," i.e., allowing oneself to be unduly influenced by a single positive performance trait;

³ Newly assigned or relatively inexperienced individuals were often placed in the lower 25% regardless of their progress on the job. Supervisors found it easier to confront such personnel at an appraisal interview. It was shown that an officer with less than five years service and new to a command faced a 70% probability of placement in the lower quartile.

- undue consideration given to seniority ("I don't want to ruin his chances for a promotion"), to age ("I realize he's just coasting until his twenty years are up"), or to marital status ("I know he's got a large family and that job security is important to him").

Those raters who were identified as consistently lenient in their ratings were counseled by members of the PES. It was expected that with normal turnover of subordinate personnel, there would be occasional sub-standard performers under a rater's supervision. If, therefore, the ratings given over time by any superior officer did not include any low (below average) ratings, it was suspected that the rater was being lenient. He would be advised that his pattern of rating had come to the attention of the PES and counseled as to the proper approach to performance appraisal. (This was explained as telling the rater to "Call them as you see them" and not to allow considerations unrelated to the performance of assigned duties intervene in one's judgments.)

Efforts were made to prevent the placement of clearly less than one-fourth of one's subordinates in the lower quartile. For instance, a rater having nine subordinates evaluated together was informed that the only acceptable breakdown of his personnel into percentile groupings was either a 2/5/2, 3/4/2, or a 2/4/3 combination (these corresponding to upper quartile/middle 50%/lower quartile). Similar acceptable combinations were issued for all groups from four to twenty-five in number.

The PES identified other possible sources of distortion in the ratings. These, while not necessarily contributing to the upward bias of evaluations, were felt to cause inaccuracies just as serious:

- a desire to avoid unpleasant tasks, causing raters to give little attention to the evaluations and often to simply rate an individual either average or above average on all factors;
- a hesitancy to render extreme judgments on any factor ("central tendency");
- a tendency to rate an individual as he was, not as he is ("rational bias");
- a tendency to rate according to one's own expectations, not with respect to the performance of others in comparable assignments ("contrast error");
- a tendency to confuse two or more of the performance criteria and to give similar ratings on both, when in fact they refer to distinct factors ("association error"); and
- a tendency to allow oneself to be unduly influenced by a single negative performance trait (negative "halo effect").

Within a year of the introduction of the new forms, it had become clear that further revisions were necessary. On February 28, 1973 Captain William Rose, the Personnel Supervisor of PES, sent a memo to the Director of Police Personnel in which he noted:

While the concept of forced ranking and quartile distribution was originally wrought to identify superior and sub-standard performers as well as compel raters to document their perceptions and obviate the natural inclination not to single out exceptional and, particularly, marginal individuals, it has failed in all respects.

Early dissatisfaction with the new forms had led the PES to consider possible changes even before the end of 1972. It was clear that the system of rank order and percentile distribution would have to be scrapped. It was also clear that if the evaluation system was to be effective, more effort would have to be devoted to orienting personnel as to the philosophy and the mechanics of the program.

Through the first six months of 1973, work proceeded in the Personnel Bureau on the construction of new evaluation forms. What evolved was an entire evaluation "package" which included not only the revised forms, but also an evaluation guide for the rater suggesting proper rating procedures and handbooks stating sets of specific questions that a rater should consider in evaluating personnel on any performance criterion.

The proposed package was submitted to Commissioner Cawley in mid-July. It was subsequently approved, with minor alterations, and the forms were scheduled for use in the fall of 1973. In developing the new package, the PES sought to standardize as much as possible the performance criteria used for each rank, to set explicit performance standards, to simplify the administration of the forms, and to coordinate the evaluation procedure with Departmental rewards and goals, especially the service re-orientation of personnel. In this regard, it was thought desirable to shift performance indicators away from the "numbers game" of arrest/summons activity toward particular skills which officers employ in the servicing of a variety of citizen calls. Thus, isolated incidents would no longer dominate the appraisal process.

Under the new scheme, the same evaluation form was used for both detectives and police officers (by this time the titles "patrolman" and "police-woman" had been replaced by the single designation "police officer"). As before, there was a single form for sergeants/lieutenants and one for captains and above. To ease the administrative burden on superiors and to reduce the volume of paper handled by the PES, evaluations were changed to an annual basis. (There was some talk as to whether the floors in the PES office at 280 Broadway could withstand the weight of additional filing cabinets.)

The forms included eleven individual criteria and an overall evaluation, each rated on a scale of "well above standards," "above standards," "meets standards," "below standards," or "well below standards." The rater was also to recommend further assignment for the subordinate. The ratee signed the form only if he wished to appeal the evaluation. The rater was required to signify that the form had been shown to and discussed with the ratee. (This was apparently an attempt to avoid the problems arising previously when forms were submitted unsigned by the ratee.) There was again provision for review by the rater's commanding officer.

The criteria included in each form were somewhat different. Exhibit 1 displays the eleven traits contained in each of the three forms. Each trait was briefly elaborated on the form. The rater received an evaluation manual (e.g., "Dimensions for Police Officer and Detective") which for each trait listed a series of about a dozen specific questions which the rater might ask himself in the appraisal.

For instance, the criterion "judgment-decision making" on the police officer/detective form was followed by:

Are all available factors weighed before judgments are effected?
Are decisions based on a correct assessment of available facts?

Exhibit 2 shows the entries in the police officer/detective evaluation manual relating to the trait "judgment-decision making." (For some criteria, the questions listed for police officers were different from those for detectives.) It was suggested that each rater first judge the ratee according to the evaluation manual "dimensions." This would enable him to more accurately assess the subordinate on that particular criterion. The raters were instructed to evaluate all of their subordinates on one criterion and then to proceed to the next criterion, again rating all subordinates, until all criteria were completed. This process was intended to prevent the "halo effect" and also to bring the rater to view each individual's performance relative to that of other comparably-assigned personnel.

Exhibit 1

Criteria for Performance Evaluation

Criterion	Police Officers and Detectives	Sergeants and Lieutenants	Captains and above
Appearance	X	X	
Communication skill	X	X	X
Service-oriented	X		X
Community relations	X	X	X
Human relations-impartiality	X	X	
Judgment-decision making	X	X	X
Police ethics	X	X	X
Self image	X	X	X
Stability-flexibility	X	X	X
Street knowledge	X		
Applied knowledge		X	X
Work analysis	X	X	
Administrative skill			X
Evaluation skill		X	X
Personnel (i.e., leadership)			X

Note: A Pennsylvania University Study of police performance appraisal found the ten most frequently used criteria to be, in order of descending usage:

- work quality
- work quantity
- initiative
- work knowledge
- judgment
- relations with co-workers
- dependability
- appearance
- attitude
- ability to follow directions

The frequencies with which these traits were used on the forms submitted to the Penn State study group ranged from 90% for "work quality" to about 50% for "ability to follow directions."

Exhibit 2

Questions to be asked in Rating:

(Police Officers and Detectives)

JUDGMENT - DECISION MAKING

Does this officer avail himself of all relevant information possible before making a decision?	5 4 3 2 1
Are decisions and actions in accord with command policies and concerned with community response?	5 4 3 2 1
Does this officer consider alternatives and implications of actions? (e.g., use of deadly physical force)	5 4 3 2 1
Is this individual able to establish correct priorities?	5 4 3 2 1
Are this officer's decisions logically sound, as opposed to emotional or impulsive?	5 4 3 2 1
Is this officer able to integrate personal decisions with those of peers and supervisors in order to coordinate his/her functions with command goals?	5 4 3 2 1
Can this individual make decisions under stress?	5 4 3 2 1
Does this officer assimilate information readily permitting him/her to get to the crux of matters quickly?	5 4 3 2 1
Does this individual make decisions within a reasonable time?	5 4 3 2 1
Is this officer's judgment exercised with the welfare of the people involved as the primary concern?	5 4 3 2 1
Is this officer able to exercise restraint?	5 4 3 2 1
Does this individual use discretion in making the ultimate decision of arrest?	5 4 3 2 1
Does this police officer maintain personal resolve to make decisions despite past errors in judgment?	5 4 3 2 1

The most significant revision in the evaluation procedure, however, was the elimination of the rank order and percentile distribution items. This was, as noted previously, the most highly criticized aspect of the old forms. In its place, the PES substituted a procedure called "central computation of comparable performance" (CCCP). Each rater was asked to group his subordinates according to designated responsibilities. For instance, a sergeant might divide his squad into uniform patrol, plainclothes patrol, and clerical duty. The forms would be submitted to the PES and the evaluations for those with comparable assignments would be grouped together. The percentile distribution of ratings (ranging numerically from 11 to 55) would then be determined using this larger statistical base. The percentile ranking would not be reported to either the rater or ratee. It would be released only to those Department commanders seeking personnel for special assignments.

The CCCP system was viewed as a means of generating a rank ordering of personnel while avoiding the unanticipated and undesirable consequences of the previous method. It also addressed the problem of rater leniency in the evaluation of certain categories of individuals (e.g., those in administrative and specialist assignments) by establishing rank on the basis of Department-wide subgroups.

An additional feature of the new evaluation process was that precinct commanding officers were required to identify the two most effective and the one least effective member of his command. It was felt that this would serve the Department's need to isolate both outstanding and marginal performers without having to contend with the reluctance of low-level superiors to identify their best subordinates for fear of losing them. For instance, a precinct commanding officer has generally 200 to 300 individuals under his supervision. The transfer of several of his best performers would not seriously impair the effectiveness of his command. He thus has no strong incentive to conceal his top personnel. A sergeant, on the other hand, with perhaps only eight or ten subordinates, stands to suffer considerably if his best one or two individuals are lost. His interest in maintaining the performance of his squad is also pronounced due to his expectation of remaining in his present position for a long period of time. A sergeant typically remains at that rank for over four years, and he will generally remain in the same precinct command over that period. Precinct commanders, however, are subject to much greater turnover. Their vested interests, therefore, are not as great.

One anticipated advantage of the new forms was their degree of standardization and the ease with which the information could thus be stored and retrieved by computers. For instance, it might become necessary to identify prospective field training officers from the pool of police officers presently under precinct commands. If it were decided that these candidates should be particularly strong in "judgment-decision making," "police ethics," and "street knowledge," a computer could be used to select a group of officers rated consistently high in this combination of traits. Ratings could also be easily accessed for Interview Boards considering candidates for promotion.

There was some question as to whether, in de-emphasizing "numbers," sergeants would be able to make judgments on ratee performance on the basis of actual observation. This requires that sergeants accompany their subordinates on a large number and a great variety of service calls. This need for more extensive sampling places greater demands on sergeants.

Some consideration has been given by the PES to peer evaluation. These are presently used in the Academy among recruits. The prevailing notion appears to be that while peers should not be formally evaluating each other, superiors should take into account the feelings of a subordinate's co-workers in judging his performance.

Also at a very primitive state is the development of community response measures. At this point, however, no technique of "sounding out" citizens has been formulated.

8. Compensation, Rewards, Punishment--(A system of rewards and sanctions and some credible means for effectuating them, formally or informally; creates incentives affecting employee behavior.)

The compensation/punishment scheme of the police department is extremely complex. It includes monetary and non-monetary rewards. Some sanctions are distributed almost entirely by unambiguous rules, and some leave more discretion to supervisors. Some sanctions (such as patrol assignments) are almost entirely informal. In trying to get a handle on the reward system, it is useful to identify sanctions controlled at each level of the organization.

By far the most important departmental rewards are promotion decisions. The rules regulating promotions have previously been mentioned. Promotions most subject to the discretion of the Commissioner and superior officers are those to the position of detective and those for ranks above Captain. Promotion to the ranks of Sergeant, Lieutenant and Captain, as has been mentioned above, is controlled largely by Civil Service procedures, including performance on competitive exams and seniority.

Almost equally important is the "Detective's Gold Shield." Since only a limited number of Detective assignments are made, and since detectives spent almost all their time on "real police work," these assignments are very highly valued. Assignments are made at the discretion of the Chief of Detectives as the basis of recommendation from precincts, divisions and borough commands.

Other special assignments such as working in the commissioner's office, plainclothes duty in the Public Morals Section, or working in an "active sector" have significant value to large segments of the patrol force. Most of these assignments are made by the head of the specialized unit upon recommendation from line commanders and with the approval of the Commissioner.

The last remaining types of departmental awards are awards given for bravery and devotion to duty. Most of these awards are given on the basis of recommendations by an officer's superiors. Some, such as the Meritorious Police Duty and Excellent Police Duty awards, are automatic, being based on arrests of a certain type within a time period, giving a gallon of blood, and other specified criteria.

Departmental penalties which are imposed after finding charges against officers to be true are basically probation and dismissal. A multitude of charges may be brought against an officer, ranging in seriousness from assault, AWOL

or cooping⁴ to lost shield, morals and sick out of residence.⁵ These charges may be initiated by citizens, other police officers or internal investigative units, primarily the Internal Affairs Division. In addition, division commanders frequently make use of undercover policemen or "shoeflies" to monitor police officers and report breaches of Department regulations, such as cooping. These "shoeflies" are naturally objects of resentment among their peers.

Once formal charges are brought against an officer, he is suspended from the force without pay until the case is completed. The charges are investigated by the Inspection Services Bureau, and if substantiated, the case against the officer is presented by the Advocates Section of the Office of the First Deputy Commissioner. Defense counsel may be provided by the Personnel Bureau if requested. The Deputy Commissioner of Trials, who is almost always a lawyer, hears and decides each case. If the officer is dismissed, he automatically loses any accrued pension benefits. Because of the severity of this sanction, officers are seldom dismissed from the Department. Charges must be of the most serious sort and must be proved with substantial evidence in order for the officer to be fired. Usually, officers accused of major offenses will resign before being fired. Any officer who is dismissed may appeal the decision according to Article 78 of the City Charter. Of course, charges may also be brought against an officer by the District Attorney's office.

Probation is a much more common punishment. Probationary officers are monitored by their immediate superiors and by the Personnel Bureau. Probation usually is for one month to a year in duration. An appeal procedure exists within the Department for the Commissioner to reverse a probation sanction, but there is no appeal outside the Department.

All corruption investigation is centralized in the Internal Affairs Division of the Inspection Services Bureau. IAD investigations are secret and the Division is generally feared among police officers. However, it is not greatly respected, first, because it pits police officer against police officer, a violation of the "all for one, one for all" tradition, and secondly, because it has gained a reputation for trying to pin petty offenses on officers and for failing to investigate major offenses. Generally, reporting of corruption is not encouraged by anyone in the Department.

On the precinct level, the precinct commanders control a number of rewards and sanctions including transfer recommendations, preferred assignments, excuses from tours of duty and the "cop of the month" award for the precinct. The precinct commander may also punish a patrolman on his own authority by eliminating vacation days or by assigning a man to a different or unpleasant detail or tour of duty. Causing or preventing transfer is also thought to be an important lever, but its value often depends on the particular preferences of the patrolmen.

Supervising sergeants immediately supervise patrolmen and exercise different degrees of leniency in allowing violations of Department rules. They are authorized to make formal reports of violations of Department regulations. These reports can damage a patrolman's chances of being transferred or promoted and thus constitute a credible threat. The sergeant's real power, however, is limited by the fact that he needs good working relationships with his men and may himself fear that his subordinates will make unfavorable reports to his superiors.

⁴ Sleeping in car while on duty.

⁵ Not being at home after phoning in sick.

In addition to those already mentioned, there is a range of rewards and punishments which may be imposed by patrolmen on one another. A patrolman who fails to conform to the expectations of his peers is subject to the possibility of anything from simple ostracism to being abandoned or neglected in a dangerous situation. Admittedly, the latter type of sanction may be rarely exercised, but the threat of it is enough to make patrolmen want to keep the likelihood of it to a bare minimum. Besides a need to survive, patrolmen need to have the approval of their co-workers, and threats to the fulfillment of that need may create powerful incentives.

9. Socialization--(The informal process of internalizing norms, beliefs, and attitudes which are part of the organization's culture; usually a continuous process; may not have uniformity within the organization.)

Socialization, broadly defined, begins as soon as an employee is exposed to the organization and its members. It consists of verbal and non-verbal signals (perceived by the employee) as to what kind of behavior is good or bad, desirable or undesirable. These signals may come directly from peers, immediate co-workers, or direct supervisors; or they may come indirectly from superiors once or twice removed, peers in other parts of the organization, written material issued by the Department, or through observation of the Department's use of rewards and punishments.

Within the N.Y.P.D., the important participants in the socialization process beyond the initial training period include:

1. Peers, partners--A patrolman on the beat has a need to be accepted and a need to survive. His partner and his peers become teachers and he can readily see the wisdom of listening to them. Beyond listening, he has a strong incentive to accept the values of his peers because he needs their approval and because he needs assurance or their readiness to help him when he is in trouble.

A new recruit may well find that veteran police officers adhere to norms and beliefs contrary to those taught at the Academy and based upon independent traditions developed over a long period of time in the field. The strength and tenacity of these traditions makes peer pressure an important and a potentially troublesome element in the socialization of new members of the N.Y.P.D.

2. Direct Supervisors--Police officers also have incentives to accept the norms preached or practiced by their direct supervisors, since supervisors have control over the type of assignments they receive, over their ability to transfer, and over a host of minor matters which contribute to or detract from the police officer's satisfaction with his job.
3. Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners, Bureau Chiefs--These high officials affect the general tone and environment of the Department both directly by their words and actions and indirectly through the actions of their staff and subordinates. The rumor of any action taken at this level is quickly disseminated throughout the Department.


4. Personnel Bureau--By formulating evaluation guidelines used by supervisory personnel, this Bureau plays a crucial role in defining behavior patterns and in shaping the expectations of supervisors and subordinates.
5. PBA--This and other policemen's associations allow officers to meet and get to know some of their peers from across the Department. This encourages a spread of the beliefs and attitudes which are most likely to affect the officers' behavior.

The Mintz-Sandler Implementation Plan

As "project managers" responsible for the implementation of the "full service model," Mintz and Sandler soon came under heavy pressure to develop an implementation plan. In response, they prepared an extraordinarily ambitious program to modify almost all aspects of the existing personnel system. Their objective was to "confront police with a consistent set of expectations from the day of recruitment to the day of retirement." In their view, it was only through such a wholesale attack on the personnel system that they could achieve their objectives. An outline of their proposed plan is presented in Appendix C, which you should examine carefully.

Clearly, the scope of their ambition exceeds their capabilities by a substantial margin. You should consider two questions:

- 1) If Mintz and Sandler had very strong positions in the department, where should they concentrate their efforts in trying to implement the "Full Service Model" and what level of success should they anticipate?
- 2) Given the actual position that Mintz and Sandler occupy, where should they concentrate their efforts and what are the likely limits of their accomplishments?



*Officially the Patrol Services Bureau, later renamed the Field Services Bureau.

APPENDIX B

A Brief Summary of the Mintz-Sandler Description
of the Full Service Model

The full description of the Mintz-Sandler full service model comprises fourteen pages of extremely detailed specifications of desired police behavior. To allow you more time to study the implementation plan presented in Appendix C, the following summary of the full service model is provided in lieu of the complete description.

Mintz and Sandler organized their descriptions of desired police behavior under four general headings: professional orientation, human relations orientation, community relations orientation, and law enforcement orientation. Each orientation was defined and its sub-dimensions specified, examples of conforming behavior were provided, and a method of measuring conformity was indicated. The four orientations and their sub-dimensions, together with some of the explanatory material, are presented below.

I. Professional Orientation

Definition: Characterized by independence in decision-making which is guided by a code of ethics and the systematic application of a body of knowledge. Above all, however, the professional gears his actions to the needs of his clients and gets his primary satisfaction from the effective servicing of those clients. Finally he views himself as one who is responsible to himself and his public in the discretion he exercises.

Sub-Dimensions:

- A. Service (client) oriented--concerned with providing service to victim or complainant--perceives self as helper.
- B. Objectivity--impartial in treatment of citizens.
- C. Self-Image--strong self-image, not easily threatened or antagonized--self-assured in dealing with others.
- D. Emotional Maturity--is aware of and acknowledges his/her own emotions, but does not allow them to interfere with performance of duties.
- E. Discretion--acknowledges own discretion in decision-making and accepts responsibility for decisions.
- F. Job Knowledge--initiative and innovativeness.
- G. Police ethics--integrity is above question.

Appendix B (continued)

II. Human Relations Orientation

Definition: An awareness of interpersonal dynamics expressed by a utilization of verbal, emotional, and social interaction skills. The primary focus of interactions is to provide satisfaction of the client's variety of needs and to represent an accessible source of support, strength, and authority.

Sub-Dimensions:

- A. General Style--presence supportive--offers assistance.
- B. Verbal Skills--enjoys talking to people--focuses on defusing potential arrest situations and gaining cooperation of all those involved verbally.
- C. Emotional Skills--gives consolation and emotional support both verbally and by body language (gesture, actions, facial expressions).
- D. Social Interaction Skills--shows an understanding and awareness of people and human motivation.
- E. Citizen Response--evokes a positive, open response from people during interactions rather than hostility, fear, mistrust or distance.

III. Community Relations Orientation

Definition: A collaborative approach to law enforcement which recognizes the role of community cooperation in effective police service. Awareness of the needs and special problems of the community.

Sub-Dimensions:

- A. Seeks positive interaction with community.
- B. Seeks to develop awareness of community and its culture.
- C. Responsive to and takes seriously opinions of community.
- D. De-emphasizes police/civilian distance and differences and in-house differences.

Appendix B (continued)

IV. Law Enforcement Orientation

Definition: Characterized by a recognition that the power & authority vested in the police officer is a responsibility to be exercised in consideration of the need of the individual citizens (victim & criminal alike) and the best interest of society. Law enforcement in the context of a service model explicitly defines the pursuit of 'law & order' as feasible only as a joint effort of the police and the citizens of the community.

Sub-Dimensions

- A. Authority--gives respect to get respect.
- B. Attitudes toward citizens--impartial in treatment of citizens--does not allow personal, ethnic, class or male/female bias to influence treatment of citizens.
- C. Application of Law (Discretion)--acknowledges own discretion in decision-making and accepts responsibility for decisions.

APPENDIX C

Full Service Model Implementation Plan

TASK RESPONSIBLE PARTY OUTPUT DATE

1.0 Definition and dissemination of operational goals. Document defining basic objectives of FSM prepared by OPP and approved by Police Commissioner. Last two weeks in July

1.1 Define basic objectives of full service concept. OPP Document to describe basic concept and its application to various commands. August

1.2 Disseminate Police Commissioner's statement of objectives to all higher commands. OPP

1.3 Line of full Service Model Report from each of the following commanders concerning definition of what full service concept means in that command and plan for implementation. August

- a. P.C.
 - b. IDC
 - c. DCOCB
 - d. DCCA
 - e. Dir, Personnel
 - f. Chief of Operations
 - g. Chief of Inspectional Services
 - h. Chief of Field Services
 - i. Chief of Detectors
 - j. CO, SOD
 - k. CO, Traffic
 - l. CO, SSB
 - m. CO, Communications
 - n. CCRB
 - o. OPP
1. COs shall be responsible for:
 - a. establishment of command level Task Force within their commands.
 - b. designation of member of command level Task Force to act as liaison with reference to service model implementation.
 2. Command level Task Force shall:
 - a. develop service model oriented objectives for commands.
 - b. locate existing areas in which implementation shall proceed.
 - c. analyze and modify existing programs, policies and practices to bring them in line with full service model goals.
 - d. Identify obstacles, design and recommend new projects addressing themselves to the implementation of the Service Model.
 - e. Report findings and assist in implementation of recommendations.

TASKRESPONSIBLE PARTYOUTPUT

<u>TASK</u>	<u>RESPONSIBLE PARTY</u>	<u>OUTPUT</u>	
2.0 Recruitment	Personnel Bureau		
2.1 Revise entry process		Statement of basic plan for changes and project plan for possible revision of:	Last two weeks in July
2.1.1 Prepare planning document		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. civil service tests 2. background investigations 3. psychological screening 4. educational requirements 5. candidate review board <p>Document addressing itself to relevant issues including:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. education 2. "people" orientation 3. aptitudes 4. interaction skills 5. verbal vs. physical criteria 	Last two weeks in July through November
2.1.2 Revise Police Officer exam		Revised Police Officer test based on measurable full-service model traits, ready for use.	Last two weeks in July through November
2.1.3 Revise background investigation procedures		Revised investigation addressing itself to issues such as:	August through November
		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. community involvement history 2. interpersonal interaction skills 3. possible elimination of unsubstantiated arrest history 4. de-emphasis of private life 5. violence proneness relevance of 6. previous employment - e.g., working with people, outdoor work, variable hours. 	

<u>TASK</u>	<u>RESPONSIBLE PARTY</u>	<u>OUTPUT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
2.1.4 Develop battery of psychological tests		Battery of tests ready for screening of all candidates who have passed medical, civil service tests and background investigation. Tests should focus on at least the following areas: frustration tolerance, aggression, flexibility and self-image.	August through October
2.1.5 Develop full service oriented guidelines for Candidate Review Board	D.C.L.M.	Instructions to be distributed and used by all Candidate Review Board members in evaluating cases.	August
2.2 Revise recruitment procedures	Personnel Bureau	Document presenting recommendations and project plan for recruitment publicity and recruitment outreach.	Last two weeks in July
2.2.1 Prepare comprehensive recruitment plan			
2.2.1.1 Prepare publicity materials promulgating "new kind of cop" image	Personnel Bureau D.C.P.O.	Prepare literature, press coverage and advertising plan for full scale publicity campaign. Remove from circulation all literature inconsistent with full-service goals for immediate use.	August through September
2.2.2 Undertake recruitment efforts	Personnel Bureau		
2.3.1 Prepare plan		Submit plan for locating target populations and describing utilization of resources available to reach them.	August
2.3.2. Conduct recruitment campaign		Percentage increases in recruitment of minorities, women and college graduates to take exam.	September through October

TASKRESPONSIBLE PARTYOUTPUT

3.0			
3.1	Restructure syllabus	C.O.T.D.	Coherent integrated syllabus consisting of appropriate modules ready for use by the Training Division.
3.1.1	Develop overall organization	C.O.T.D.	Integrated outlines of all modules in training syllabus, together with statement of general approach.
3.1.2	Submit first four completed modules	C.O.T.D.	Four integrated modules ready for use by instructor.
3.1.3	Submit ten additional completed modules	C.O.T.D.	Ten integrated modules ready for use by instructor.
3.1.4	Submit remaining completed modules	C.O.T.D.	Remaining integrated modules ready for use by instructor.
3.1.5	Submit transition plan to new syllabus	C.O.T.D.	Plan for changing from current reconstructional methods to use new syllabus.
3.1.6	Implement new syllabus	C.O.T.D.	Use new syllabus with incoming recruitment class.
3.2	Review and possibly revise Training Division staffing procedures		

July

August

Last week in August through first two weeks in September

Last three weeks in September

September

October through December

TASKRESPONSIBLE PARTYOUTPUTDATE

3.2.1 Describe possible shortcomings in current staffing including FTO's

C.O.T.D.

Documents which addresses the following questions:

Last two weeks
in August through
first two weeks
in September

1. Should uniformed officers be supplemented by civilian instructors? To what extent? In what fields?
2. What rotational policies should be employed to keep uniformed and civilian instructors in touch with precinct work?
3. Are current staff consistent with full service concept?
4. What incentives can be developed to attract high level institutional staff and FTO's?

3.2.2 Implementation plan and schedule

1. Hiring for new and existing staff.

October

3.3 Review In-Service Training Vehicles

C.O. Mgmt. Trng.

2. Develop rotational policies
3. Develop re-orientation plan

Re-oriented management training syllabus, developed along full-service model lines, ready for use in pre-promotion training as well as in field.

3.3.1 Management Training

3.3.1.1 Analyze management implications of full service model. Describe possible shortcomings re: full-service model

C.O. Mgmt. Trng.

- a. Set of guidelines and criteria with which to re-orient management training.
- b. Document describing shortcomings of existing training.

Last two weeks
in July through
first two weeks
in August

3.3.1.2 Submit re-oriented syllabus for superiors

C.O. Mgmt. Trng.

Pre-promotion syllabus ready for use by instructor.

August

TASK

Appendix C (continued)

RESPONSIBLE PARTY

OUTPUT

DATE

3.3.1.3	Devise orientation program for ranks above Captain	C.O. Mgmt. Trng.	Programs for ranks above Captain for use in T.D. and field.	Last two weeks in August
3.3.1.4	Devise ongoing orientation program for superiors in all field and staff positions	C.O. Mgmt. Trng.	De-centralized and centralized programs for dissemination of full-service model at all management ranks.	Last two weeks in August through first two weeks in September
3.3.1.5	Screen instructional staff	C.O. Mgmt. Trng.	Service oriented management training staff.	Last two weeks in August
3.3.1.6	Implement all new management programs	C.O. Mgmt. Trng.	Ongoing full-service oriented management training.	Last two weeks in September through first two weeks in October
3.3.2	Specialized and Operative Training	Appropriate Unit Heads	Re-oriented specialized training syllabi, ready for use in T.D. as well as field.	
3.3.2.1	Assign unit heads task of developing full service model guidelines and criteria for evaluating and re-orienting their courses	C.O. Specialized Training	Set of guidelines for re-orienting specialized training courses.	Last two weeks in July through first two weeks in August
3.3.2.2	Submit revised syllabi	C.O. Specialized Training	Revised syllabi, ready for use in instruction.	Last two weeks in August through first two weeks in September
3.3.2.3	Screen instructional staff	C.O. Specialized Training	Service-oriented specialized.	Last week in August through first two weeks in September
3.3.2.4	Implement new specialized training curricula		Ongoing full-service oriented specialized training.	Last two weeks in September through first week in October

Appendix C (continued)

<u>TASK</u>	<u>RESPONSIBLE PARTY</u>	<u>OUTPUT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
3.3.5 Division Level Training	CO, Division Level Training	Full Service oriented TV cassettes and lesson plans for use in division level training.	Last two weeks in July through first two weeks in August
3.3.3.1 Develop full service guidelines for programming all division level training	CO, Division Level Training	Set of guidelines for division level training.	August through first week in September
3.3.3.2 Develop new themes for TV cassettes in addition to existing tapes (e.g., Hostage, Ambush, etc.)	CO, Division Level Training	At least three cassettes dealing with service themes.	September
3.3.3.3 Orient all precinct training officers and Field Service Area Training Captains	CO, Division Level Training	Orientation program for Training Officers and Captains.	
3.3.3.4 Develop lesson plan for dealing specifically with full service model	CO, Division Level Training	Division level orientation to full service model.	Last two weeks in September through first week in October
3.3.3.5 Write all lesson plans and make all TV cassettes with full service orientation	CO, Division Level Training	Lesson plans and TV cassettes with full service orientation ready for use in decentralized training.	August through October
3.4 Unit Training	CO, Unit Training	Structured unit training program dealing with local needs and conditions, with full-service orientation.	
3.4.1 Orient patrol sergeants to guidelines developed for division level training	CO, Unit Training	Program for patrol sergeants teaching them how to apply full service model to training re: local conditions.	Last two weeks in July through August
3.4.2 Develop syllabus relevant to each command	CO, Unit Training	Syllabus ready for use by patrol sergeants.	Last two weeks in August through first two weeks in September

OUTPUTRESPONSIBLE PARTYTASKDATE

F.S.B.

3.5 Roll Call Training

3.5.1 Describe possible shortcomings of existing roll call training

Document addressing itself to shortcomings of roll call training re: full service model.

Last two weeks in July

3.5.2 Submit implementation plan for full-service model in roll call training

Last week in July

3.5.3 Orient Precinct CO's and staff representatives to full-service model guidelines developed for division level training

Program for Roll-Call trainees teaching them how to apply full-service model to roll call briefing.

August

3.6 Training Bulletins

C.O.T.D.

Full-service model training bulletins ready for distribution.

3.6.1 Establish full-service model guidelines for tone, content and style of all training bulletins

Set of guidelines ready for use in writing all future training bulletins.

First two weeks in August

3.6.2 Submit three training bulletins incorporating new guidelines for review

Three full-service oriented training bulletins.

Last two weeks in August through first week in September

3.6.3 Implement guidelines in all training bulletins

Full-service oriented training bulletins distributed to all appropriate parties.

September

4.0 Performance Evaluation

DPP, Career Dev. Section

Full service based on new evaluation system, including new criteria, community and peer input, ready for use in next evaluation period.

Completed in September

4.1 Develop means for surfacing full-service model based evaluation criteria

DATEOUTPUTRESPONSIBLE PARTYTASK

<u>TASK</u>	<u>RESPONSIBLE PARTY</u>	<u>OUTPUT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
4.1.1 Develop full service model based evaluation criteria	DPP, Career Dev. Section	List of criteria and dimensions.	Last two weeks in July
4.1.2 Develop indices for analysis of service functions	DPP, Career Dev. Section	Qualitative and Quantitative formulae comparable to arrest activity statistics to be used by C.O.s in analyzing service functions.	First three weeks in July
4.1.3 Develop community response measures	DPP, Career Dev. Section, DCCA	Plan for incorporating community response into performance evaluations.	Last three weeks in August
4.1.4 Develop peer response measures	DPP, Career Dev. Section	Plan for incorporating peer measures into performance evaluations.	August
4.1.5 Implement new evaluation system	DPP, Career Dev. Section	Evaluation system integrating superior officer, peer and community rating of performance. To include clearly defined statement of consequences of rating and plan addressing itself to training and rating of evaluators, orientation of ratees - ready for ongoing implementation at least three months before installation of new system.	August and September
4.2 Develop mechanism for evaluating total units	Chief of Inspectional Services	Develop inspection and evaluation methods which determine the extent of implementation of full service concept in line commands	
5.0 Reinforcement		Plan for expanded reward system recognizing full service orientation to the job. Should contain new rewards, redefined allocation of existing rewards, and shift in emphasis from negative to positive sanctions.	

Appendix C (continued)

<u>TASK</u>	<u>RESPONSIBLE PARTY</u>	<u>OUTPUT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
5.1 Use reward system to reinforce desired behavior	IDC		Last two weeks in July through August
5.1.1 Issue order with reference to new policy on allocation of rewards	PC	Management Directive	August
5.1.2 Publicize receipt of rewards/awards based on new criteria	IDC	Plan for internal publicity of reward allocation	Last two weeks in August through first week in September
5.2 Internal Communication	OPP, Mgt. Dir.	Orders consistent with full service model	First three weeks in August
5.2.1 Development of Guidelines consistent with full service model	OPP, Mgt. Dir.		
5.3 Orient public to new police			
5.3.1 P.R. campaign	DC, PI	Plan for public relations campaign	Last two weeks in July through first week in August
5.3.2 Improve contacts with public via Central communications (911)	Comm. Div.	New procedures for taking 911 calls	Last two weeks in July through first week in August
5.3.3 "Humanize" appearance of officers	DCA	New uniform designs; liberalize hair regulations; new RMP cars	Last two weeks in July through first three weeks in September