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Islam in the New World Order

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The year 1991 was also year one of the “new world order.” Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US became the sole great power — a power bent on translating its Cold War victory into a global regime of stability. The world of Islam watched these events with apprehension. The Soviet breakup promised hitherto unimagined opportunities, including the expansion of the Muslim world northward into the newly independent Muslim republics of the former Soviet empire. But in the here and now, the US seemed determined to impose a strict regime of American-style order, whether by persuasion or by force. In 1991, Washington decided both to wage war and make peace in the Middle East in order to consolidate its triumph. In both instances, there were Muslims who issued clarion calls to Jihad, in the name of another truth: the divinely promised primacy of Islam.

THE JIHAD THAT FAILED

The year began under the storm cloud of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, dating from the Iraqi invasion of 2 August 1990. This first crisis of the post-Cold War era had sorely divided the Muslim world, as rival camps coalesced around Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Both sides in the looming confrontation employed the idiom of Islam to justify their actions. Iraq claimed to have seized Kuwait in the collective interest of Islam’s downtrodden masses, and Saudi Arabia claimed to have invited in foreign forces to restore the freedom of the oppressed Muslim people of Kuwait. Some Muslims chose sides in this struggle for Islamic legitimation; others maintained a confused or calculated neutrality. (For the issue of Islam in the debate over the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, see *MECS* 1990, pp. 194–203.)¹

THE CLASH OF THE CONFERENCES

As the 15 January deadline set by the UN for Iraqi withdrawal approached, Iraq and Saudi Arabia made final efforts to persuade the Muslim world of the Islamic virtue of their irreconcilable stands. During the week before the deadline, two conferences purporting to represent the same organization met in Baghdad and Mecca, and passed completely contradictory resolutions on the Gulf crisis. This was not a case of double vision: the organization, known as the Popular Islamic Conference, had been split asunder by the crisis.

The Popular Islamic Conference, headquartered in Baghdad, had been founded by Iraq and Saudi Arabia early in the Iraqi-Iranian War. The Saudi purpose was to lend some of its international Islamic prestige to Iraq at a time when the two states were allied against Iran. Dr. Ma’ruf al-Dawalibi, a veteran Muslim activist in Saudi pay,

headed the organization. (On the Popular Islamic Conference, see *MECS* 1982–83, pp. 243–45; 1984–85, p. 151; 1987, p. 438; 1990, pp. 194–95.)

As the crisis peaked, Iraq decided to turn the Popular Islamic Conference against Saudi Arabia. Iraq sought to convene the organization's members in Baghdad in order to frighten Iraq's adversaries with the specter of Islamic terror. The gathering, held from 9–11 January, drew a mixed bag of participants, including Shaykh 'Abd al-Hamid al-Sa'ih, chairman of the Palestine National Council (PNC); Ibrahim Shukri, leader of Egypt's Labor Socialist Party; and Jordan's minister of religious affairs. Sa'ih set the menacing tone of the gathering: "The world will become the theater of operations targeting American interests."² Saddam Husayn also addressed the conference, but left it to his guests to issue the more vivid threats.³ At its conclusion, the conference called on all Muslims to rise up in Jihad should Iraq be attacked.⁴

Saudi Arabia, for its part, invited the executive council of the same Popular Islamic Conference to Mecca on precisely the same dates, for exactly the opposite purpose of condemning Iraq's violence against Kuwait's Muslims. The executive council met in Mecca from 9–11 January, with Saudi Arabia's most faithful Muslim clients, led by Dawalibi himself, attending. Saudi Arabia's ally, Egypt, sent Shaykh al-Azhar Jad al-Haqq 'Ali Jad al-Haqq and Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali. Not surprisingly, the conferees declared that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait "violated the very principles of Islam," and that those 'ulama who had approved Saddam's actions "are committing a sinful act, particularly after it has become clear to them that he is using Islam as a tool and is not at all committed to its teachings and principles." The rival conference in Baghdad was called "illegal," inasmuch as most of the members of the organization's executive committee had stayed away.⁵

Who spoke for the Popular Islamic Conference? The organizers of the Baghdad conference called the Mecca conference "null and void."⁶ The organizers of the Mecca conference called the Baghdad conference "inappropriate procedurally and legally."⁷ Ultimately, it did not much matter who stood on higher ground. In the international cacophony of resolutions and threats that preceded the war, the verdicts of two gatherings in Baghdad and Mecca counted for little. But the splitting of the Popular Islamic Conference did demonstrate the depth of the division in Sunni Islam on the brink of war.

THE IRRESOLVE OF ISLAM

Some inkling of what might have happened had the crisis been left to Islam's own powers of conflict-resolution could be deduced from the posture of the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), the Jidda-based organization of Islamic states. The invasion of one member state by another had occurred in the very midst of the ICO's annual conference of foreign ministers, underlining once again the division within Islam that had dogged the ICO from its inception. In the subsequent crisis, the ICO ceased to function. (On the ICO's past performance, see *MECS* 1981–82, pp. 283–84, 298–301; 1982–83, pp. 235–37; 1983–84, pp. 158–65; 1984–85, pp. 146–48; 1986, pp. 127–30; 1987, pp. 153–58; 1988, pp. 180–83; 1989, pp. 178–81; 1990, pp. 192–94.)

As an organization supported largely by Saudi and Arab Gulf money, the ICO quickly condemned the Iraqi invasion. However, it did little more thereafter. The ICO secretariat indefinitely postponed the triennial Islamic summit scheduled for January

in Dakar, Senegal, and postponed all activities scheduled for February as well.⁸ Plainly, the organization was overwhelmed by events, and by the role of the organized international community, which leapt to the challenge while the ICO shrank back. One member, Iran, tried to prod the ICO to independent action, issuing an official call on 6 January for an emergency Islamic summit conference,⁹ but nothing came of the initiative. As Hamid Algabid, ICO secretary-general, apologetically explained, the ICO had no security council of its own. Even its long-standing plan for an international Islamic court of justice — to be headquartered, ironically, in Kuwait — remained a paper project.¹⁰

The ICO twice emerged from hiding to claim the Gulf War as a war of Islamic consensus. On both occasions, Algabid convened the bureau of the previous foreign ministers' and summit conferences, in what amounted to small-scale gatherings of foreign ministers. The first of these gatherings met in Jidda on 8 January, just before the air war began; the second met in Cairo on 21 February, just before the land war started. These ICO meetings "strongly condemned" the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Iraq's "attempts to take advantage of the Palestine question to justify its invasion of Kuwait."¹¹

But in the midst of crisis and war, few took notice of the meetings, which merely reiterated past resolutions. Indeed, the ICO could scarcely have been more irrelevant. After the "liberation" of Kuwait, Algabid scrambled to repair the damage by conducting a congratulatory tour of the Arab Gulf states. There he promoted the foreign ministers' conference scheduled for August in Istanbul and the delayed Islamic summit conference, rescheduled for December in Dakar¹² (see below). But the paralysis of the ICO during the crisis left little doubt that member states did not command the resolve or resources to deal effectively with conflict among themselves.

THE ELUSIVE MUSLIM "STREET"

On the popular level, the war produced a swell of conflicting emotions in the Muslim world. Muslims were bombarded by the manipulated images of war and by contradictory appeals made in the name of Islam. While Saudi Arabia had the support of most states in the region, Saddam claimed a following in the so-called "street," among the anonymous masses of the Muslim world, who were urged to rise up against their governments. The Popular Islamic Conference (Baghdad branch) called Muslims to Jihad on 18 January:

Jihad has become the duty of every Muslim east and west of the universe. Topple the coward traitor Husni [Mubarak, president of Egypt], remove the slave of the infidels, the accursed traitor [King] Fahd [of Saudi Arabia]. Oh *mujahidin* everywhere, disperse the ranks of enemies and shake the ground under their feet. Kill them wherever you find them. Urge your governments to declare Jihad against the infidels and apostates. Unseat the miserable rulers who have no dignity, sense of honor, or faith.¹³

Various Islamists echoed this threat. Jordan's *Mufti* declared that "this is a golden opportunity for Muslims to wage Jihad against the forces of the Crusader-Zionist infidels to win the strength of this world and paradise in the hereafter. Is not the current war the hour of Jihad that Muslims have been longing for?"¹⁴ A similar threat issued from Shaykh As'ad Bayyud al-Tamimi, the Hebron-born leader of the

Amman-based Islamic Jihad Bayt al-Maqdis, who had attended the Baghdad conference. He promised, in January, that "fatal attacks" in support of Iraq would begin "within the next few days" against targets both in the West and in the ME, namely in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the West Bank and Gaza.¹⁵

But the Jihad appeal failed to progress from sentiment to deed, from word to action. While the anger against the war among many Muslim activists was undoubtedly sincere, overflowing in angry demonstrations that filled the streets of Algiers, Rabat, Khartoum, Amman, San'a and Lahore, this rage remained diffuse. The world of Islam was too saturated in the counterpropaganda of the anti-Iraq coalition to ignite spontaneously. A commentary in a Jordanian paper the week after the war showed the disappointment of Islamists:

All these calls for Jihad have, at best, continued to be shouts in the air, ink on paper, or hopes welling up in breasts. Of course, the reason is clear: namely, that every committee, thinker, or leader was content with issuing a statement calling for Jihad. This means that the call for Jihad has continued to lack a mechanism to implement it. Enthusiastic individuals do not know how to translate their enthusiasm into action.¹⁶

But while the Jihad appeal proved ineffective, it did sharpen domestic debate. Islamic opposition movements in the Muslim Brethren mold sought to translate rage against the war into leverage against entrenched regimes. It is impossible to survey the full range of responses to the war by Muslim movements and individual activists. Still, it is possible to examine the pattern of responses through four representative examples. (For more information, see chapters on individual countries.)

Algeria and Jordan

In Algeria and Jordan, two states that had moved hesitantly toward political pluralism and whose regimes were challenged by strong Islamic opposition parties, Islamists sought to use the war to domestic advantage. In particular, the Islamists demanded that the authorities train "volunteers," i.e., that they forfeit their monopoly on means of coercion by arming the Islamists.

When the war started, 'Ali Belhadj, second-in-command of Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front (usually known by its French acronym, FIS) demanded that barracks be opened and "the people" be armed for an "Islamic militia." The authorities denied this request, arguing that there were already 1m. reservists (some of whom were indeed mobilized — to defend foreign embassies and government buildings from demonstrators). The FIS threatened that if the government did not act to arm and train volunteers, it would do so itself, through the hundreds of local councils and provinces under its control.¹⁷ Algeria's Islamists saw the war as a chance to break the monopoly on guns held by the Algerian army (the same army which in 1992 used that monopoly in a coup to deny power to the Islamists). In the end, however, the Islamists did little more than vent their anger in marches and slogans. A contingent of 300 Islamist volunteers from Algeria reached Jordan only after the cease-fire.¹⁸

The same demand arose in Jordan: the Muslim Brethren, along with several Islamist members of the Chamber of Deputies urged that the entire population be armed for the Jihad with government armory supplies. The regime responded by claiming that this was unnecessary, since many citizens were already members of the

People's Army or served in the military. Jordan's Islamists had the same aim as those in Algeria: to use the war to undermine the standing of the army and break the regime's monopoly on coercive force. The Islamists claimed that they needed the arms to help defend the country against external aggression by Islam's enemies, should the war spread; their real objective, however, was to shift the domestic balance decisively in their favor. Although this failed, Islamist deputies in parliament did succeed in translating popular support into five cabinet positions during a government reshuffle in January.¹⁹

Significantly, in neither country did Muslim activists answer the Iraqi call to Jihad by committing acts of violence, although they issued many threats against the anti-Iraq coalition. While they condemned the war as an example of the West's callous contempt for Muslim lives, they did not hold up Saddam as a model of Islamic rectitude. The spokesman for Jordan's Muslim Brethren even noted that the Brethren in Iraq were "banned and persecuted," and urged that "Islamic parties be given the freedom to operate in Iraq."²⁰ Lingering doubts about Saddam meant that while Islamists in Jordan and Algeria were prepared to fill the streets, they did nothing to put themselves at risk. This pattern was repeated in other countries as well, most notably in Morocco and Pakistan.

Egypt and the Palestinians

Elsewhere, Saddam's call for Jihad echoed through empty streets. Such was the case in Egypt and in the West Bank and Gaza, where the Islamic movements displayed rather more ambivalence toward the Iraqi cause, while the authorities showed more resolve in blocking manifestations of support for Saddam.

Egypt, as a full partner of the US in the anti-Iraq coalition deploying fighting forces in Saudi Arabia, took the precaution of extending the semester break at its universities, as well as putting problematic mosques under surveillance. The regime also mobilized the religious establishment in a massive campaign to justify Egypt's participation in the war against Iraq. "Does Saddam at all represent Islam?" asked Shaykh Muhammad Mutawalli al-Sha'rawi, a popular television preacher. "How is it that he sends Tariq 'Aziz [Iraq's foreign minister and a Christian] to speak for the Muslims in their conferences?! Does Islam assent to the crushing of a weak state like Kuwait? The West found one Muslim standing against another, and said it would take the side of the weak, to assure its rights. How could we refuse it?"²¹ The regime felt confident that the great majority of Egyptians supported this decision, and that they understood the calculation of national interest that put Egypt in the coalition.

The Islamic opposition apparently reached the same conclusion. It was true that they opposed Egyptian policy: the general guide of the Muslim Brethren, Muhammad Hamid Abu al-Nasr, urged Mubarak to withdraw Egypt's troops from Saudi Arabia. Even if Saddam were a tyrant, said Abu al-Nasr, this did not alter the fact that the millions of Iraqis were "an important part of our Islamic and Arab nation."²² Brethren leader Ma'mun al-Hudaybi declared it "better that we struggle for 20 years to free Kuwait, than for America to intervene or for a foreign foot to be set on Arab soil." Saddam was a Ba'thist dictator, he admitted, but now was not the time to criticize him.²³ The Muslim Brethren reserved their criticism for the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia. But, with the exception of a few protests by students and professionals organized by the Muslim Brethren, antiwar activism remained confined to the columns

of opposition newspapers. Most notably, the Islamists refrained from calls for mass demonstrations.²⁴

The streets were empty in the West Bank and Gaza as well, but for a different reason: when the war began and Iraqi *Scuds* began to fall on Tel Aviv, the Israeli military government imposed a rigid curfew on Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (see chapter on Israel). Although Palestinian Islamists had violated curfews as a matter of course during the Intifada, when the call of Jihad summoned them to strike against Israel from within while Iraq struck from without, they did nothing of the sort.

The Palestinian Islamists of the mainstream Hamas did celebrate the *Scud* attacks. A Hamas statement lambasted US President George Bush as "the head of the infidel alliance of the world evildoers, trying once again to humiliate the Muslims, to plunder their wealth, and to pave the way for the establishment of greater Israel in accordance with the distorted prophecy of the Talmud if, God forbid, the new Crusaders succeed."²⁵ Still, Hamas remained ambivalent about the war, largely because its principal rival, the PLO, had so closely identified itself with Saddam's cause. Hamas responded by nuancing its position in such a way as to distinguish it from the PLO's. Some of its leaders went so far as to question Saddam's sincerity. The linkage of Palestine and the Gulf had been made only after Iraq invaded Kuwait, said Khalil al-Quqa, an exiled Hamas leader. Such linkage had not been Iraq's prior intention, and if Iraq had wanted to champion the Palestinian cause, it could have done so directly, without oppressing the Kuwaiti people.²⁶ After the war, when the restored Kuwaiti regime began to force resident Palestinians out of the country, Hamas reminded Kuwaitis of the sympathy shown by Palestinian Islamists for Kuwait.²⁷

In sum, for Egyptian and Palestinian Islamists there was little to gain at home by close identification with the cause of Saddam. They were prepared to issue statements against the anti-Iraq coalition, and to denounce the war as a "new Crusade" against Islam launched in large measure to benefit the Jews,²⁸ but they did not take their protest to the streets, and to the extent that they supported the Jihad, they appeared to believe that the obligation to act fell upon others. This pattern was also repeated elsewhere, most notably in Turkey and Tunisia.

As the ground war quickly turned into an Iraqi rout, the Jihad bubble burst. While the response of Muslim activists to the war had not been monolithic, and was conditioned by local circumstances everywhere — demonstrating yet again the difficulty of formulating a single Islamic position — still, there had been a collective desire among Islamists to see the West's nose bloodied just once. Iraq's last-minute decision to back down and withdraw, and its rapid collapse, surprised and disappointed many Islamists. Their embarrassment deepened as rumors of Iraqi atrocities in Kuwait were confirmed. Moreover, although Sunni Islamists remained largely indifferent to Saddam's crushing of the subsequent Shi'i rebellion in the south of Iraq, they were appalled by Baghdad's suppression of the Kurds in the north. The general guide of the Egyptian Muslim Brethren, Abu al-Nasr, issued a statement that condemned the "barbaric measures" taken against the Kurds by "the Ba'thist ruler" Saddam Husayn, and called for the creation of an Islamic government in Iraq to replace the Ba'thist regime.²⁹ Muslim Brethren spokesman Hudaybi, who had refrained from criticizing Saddam during the crisis, later spoke out: "Our position is that his regime will never change. Our principle is that acceptance of the Ba'th regime is impossible, because the Ba'th creed clearly opposes Islam."³⁰ An Egyptian Brethren

spokesman summarized the war in this way: "The crazy man known as Saddam Husayn fell into the clutches of American intelligence," by providing the US with a pretext to deploy in Arabia.³¹

Thus ended the improbable romance of fundamentalist Islam with Ba'thist Iraq. In August, the Iraqi authorities indicated their intention to reconvene the Popular Islamic Conference in Baghdad, in order "to draw up a joint strategy to confront international plans against the Middle East."³² But in October, Iraq announced that the gathering would not be convened, because preparations "have not been completed."³³ The real reason must have been Iraq's inability to assure a turnout for an Islamic gathering under its flag. It was an official admission that the Jihad of Saddam Husayn, the man who would be Saladin, had failed.

It had failed not because of the rallying of Islam against him. He had successfully confused and paralyzed a large segment of Muslim opinion, so that even in this greatest of emergencies, it had been impossible to fashion an Islamic consensus. The US, however, neither confused nor paralyzed, provided the backbone of the war coalition. US resolve made it the guarantor of international law and civil order in the domain of Islam.

COALITION ISLAM

Saudi Arabia and Egypt were quick to hold up the outcome of the Gulf War as a confirmation not only of their strategy, but also of their Islamic virtue. The moment had come to reward those Muslim organizations and associations that had stood by them in the battle, and to punish the others. For this purpose, they employed two instruments: Saudi money and Egyptian prestige. Each of these tools alone was imperfect, but in combination they created an impression that the victory over Iraq was somehow also a victory of true Islam.

SAUDI VINDICATION

During the course of the crisis and war, the Saudi decision to rely on foreign arms to defend the kingdom was criticized even by Muslims who had supported Saudi positions in the past, including many who had received Saudi funds. Islamic demonstrations of support for Saddam angered and offended the Saudi royal house, and even raised concerns about the spread of such criticism to Saudi Arabia itself (see chapter on Saudi Arabia). Once Saddam's Jihad had fallen flat, the Saudis set out to settle scores, moving swiftly to slash support for Muslim clients who had wavered when the fate of the monarchy hung in the balance. Prince Sultan, the minister of defense, announced that Saudi Arabia would continue supporting Islamic institutions and societies throughout the world,³⁴ but the criteria for receiving official or semiofficial support stiffened, and many former recipients could no longer meet them. Many of these subsequently denied they had ever received funds from Saudi Arabia. 'Abbas Madani, leader of the Algerian FIS, announced that "we never need, God willing, any state, and if we need money, you [the people] are ready and you will never disappoint us."³⁵ Rashid al-Ghannushi, an exiled leader of the Tunisian al-Nahda Party, declared that "we have not suffered financially from this as we are self-financing — not even the government, our greatest critics, have accused us of getting aid either from Iran or Saudi Arabia."³⁶

But no Islamist completely denied receiving *private* donations from rich Saudis. In the past, representatives of Islamic movements visited Saudi Arabia during the pilgrimage to tug at the heartstrings and purse strings of Saudi millionaires. After the war, the government sought to dissuade Saudi donors from giving to the politically ungrateful. The effectiveness of the campaign, however, could not be monitored, since there were no currency exchange controls in Saudi Arabia, and many wealthy Saudis made their donations from private deposits abroad.³⁷

The Saudis also became selective in their support of Afghan Mujahidin groups, which they had backed almost indiscriminately throughout nearly 14 years of war in Afghanistan. Not all of these groups offered Saudi Arabia support during the war. A small contingent of Mujahidin who joined the anti-Iraq coalition were denounced by leading Mujahidin, for example by Mujahidin leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, who stated that "there are a few individuals who have been sent by some people to appease the US. Perhaps they are people who have never participated in the Afghan Jihad."³⁸ The Saudi Government was also disturbed to learn that some of its own fundamentalist opponents had been trained and sheltered in Afghan Mujahidin bases in Pakistan. The authorities began to shut down the Saudi bank accounts of groups they regarded as extreme.³⁹ Yet as the Afghan resistance approached victory, Saudi Arabia continued to utilize diplomacy, money and intelligence to assure that its chosen Mujahidin gained power — a goal the Saudis were to achieve in 1992.

The Mecca-based Muslim World League (MWL: *Rabitat al-'alam al-Islami*), the missionary body devoted to the dissemination of Saudi Islam, circulated its agents throughout the Muslim world to line up Muslim support for Saudi Arabia during the prelude to the war, issuing dozens of statements and organizing conferences and meetings which were funded almost exclusively by the Saudi Government. (On the MWL's activities during the crisis, see *MECS* 1990, pp. 201–2.) The aftermath of the Gulf War, however, offered the MWL an opportunity to secure significant private funding, something which had always eluded it, for the organization could assure private Saudi donors that their funds would go to charitable causes that had been proven loyal, and not to the war chests of unapproved political movements. MWL Secretary-General 'Abdallah 'Umar al-Nasif launched a campaign to raise money from private sources based on specific themes, such as aid for Muslims of the former Soviet Union, and saving mosques slated for destruction in China.⁴⁰ It was not clear whether these campaigns brought any significant shift in the MWL's resource base, although the organization did approve a new postwar budget of SR38m. for the building of mosques, schools and hospitals abroad.⁴¹ Nasif himself was awarded the coveted Faysal Prize for service to Islam.

EGYPT VICTORIOUS

Egypt's broad Islamic influence had never rested on money. It was based on the prestige of its religious institutions, above all the millennium-old mosque-university of al-Azhar. In the crucible of war, it became clear that the Islamic legitimacy of the anti-Iraq coalition derived largely from articulation by Egypt's religious establishment. Egyptian rhetoric, not Saudi riyals, created a credible Islamic justification for the deployment of foreign and Egyptian forces in Saudi Arabia. With the war over, Egypt decided to consolidate its achievement in the form of an Islamic conference.

The task was entrusted to the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, a subsidiary of

the Ministry of Religious Endowments. Created by Nasser in 1960 in order to promote his brand of Arab-Islamic socialism, the Supreme Council subsequently declined in importance, but in recent years the Egyptian regime revived it as part of an effort to strengthen official Islam. The Supreme Council had convened annual Islamic conferences on various themes since 1988. As recently as 1989, it had held a conference in Baghdad, in cooperation with Iraq, to support Iraq's position in peace negotiations with Iran.⁴² In 1991, Egypt called upon the Supreme Council to mark the victory over Iraq. The fourth conference of the Supreme Council met in Cairo on 25 April, presided over by Muhammad 'Ali Mahjub, Egypt's minister of religious endowments.⁴³

Although the organizers chose the theme of Islamic unity and the future of the Islamic and Arab nation in the aftermath of the Gulf War, they did not invite any Iraqis. The event was a gathering of the victors: 450 moderate Muslim activists (280 of them Egyptians), largely from the religious establishments of the coalition states. They included Shaykh 'Abd al-Wahhab 'Abd al-Wasi', Saudi minister of pilgrimage; Hamid Algabid, secretary-general of the ICO; government officials from Kuwait and the Gulf states; 'Abdallah 'Umar al-Nasif of the MWL; and dignitaries from Egypt's traditional zones of Islamic influence in Black Africa and the Balkans. As a gesture of reconciliation, the conference also invited the Jordanian minister of religious endowments, who attended.

The need to denounce Iraq had diminished, and the conferees instead suggested various ways to heal the wounds of war through (Egyptian-led) cooperation. The resolutions, reflecting Egypt's postwar preoccupations, called for the creation of an Islamic security force (which Egypt would obviously dominate) and an Islamic development fund (with Egypt the greatest beneficiary).⁴⁴ The conference thus worked to confer Islamic legitimacy on Egypt's claims to the gratitude and money of the Gulf states it had defended — claims that would largely be disappointed during the course of the year (see chapter on inter-Arab affairs).

MUSLIM FOREIGN MINISTERS IN ISTANBUL

An ICO foreign ministers' conference placed the final seal of official Islamic approval on the outcome of the war. Iraq had invaded Kuwait in the very midst of the previous foreign ministers' conference, held in Cairo (see *MECS* 1990, pp. 192–94). The ICO had taken an unequivocal stand against the Iraqi move, but the organization had practically suspended its activities during the crisis (see above). Now that the war had ended, the time had come to affirm the consensus of Muslim states, accomplished at the 20th ICO foreign ministers' conference in Istanbul from 4–8 August.

The Istanbul conference quickly turned into an event of collective score-settling against Iraq. Resolutions not only reiterated past condemnations of the invasion, but called on Iraq to pay compensation. The conference also refused to accept Iraq's proposal that the ICO call for the sanctions to be lifted, and determined that the suffering of Iraq's people was "due to the noncompliance of the Iraqi regime with UN resolutions."⁴⁵ Indeed, an official Iraqi spokesman later claimed that Saudi Arabia "and some mercenaries had deliberately sought to peddle an odious draft resolution calling for maintaining the unjust, immoral economic blockade on Iraq and its Muslim people."⁴⁶ Summarizing the climate in Istanbul, Jordanian Foreign Minister 'Abdallah al-Nusur said: "The overall atmosphere in the conference was negative. I

cannot claim that it was positive or that it reflected understanding... the aftermath of the Gulf War still overshadowed the meetings."⁴⁷

While the ICO could celebrate consensus — achieved the more easily for the fact that Iraq had been soundly defeated — still, not all of Islam had been heard at Istanbul. Other more strident voices were not silenced by the war.

OPPOSITION ISLAM

In the aftermath of the war, conventional wisdom assumed that Islamic movements, by recklessly linking their fortunes to Saddam, had misread history, and that Islamic fundamentalism had entered into decline. In the new era of *pax Americana*, so the argument went, political Islam had become an anachronism.

The *Foreign Report*, published by *The Economist*, gave fullest expression to this view in a lead article in April entitled "The Islamic Wave Recedes." The article noted that over the past decade, "a wave of militant Islam began to threaten secular governments throughout the Arab world and to alarm the West." However, "it is now starting to recede," for a variety of reasons. First, there was the "failure" of Islamic fundamentalist parties. Once they had entered parliaments and municipalities, they had failed to "perform economic miracles," a failure that was costing them popular support. Second, Iran had lost interest in "exporting the revolution" to Arab lands, and Saudi Arabia had cut off money to Islamic fundamentalist movements that had backed Iraq in the war. Finally, the disillusionment with Saddam that followed his defeat had carried over to disillusionment with the Islamists who supported him. While the region would continue to see "political ferment" because of failing economies and growing unemployment, according to this view, "the Islamic fundamentalists have lost an opportunity to reap the advantage."⁴⁸

The decline of political Islam was also predicted for individual countries where it had experienced a sudden ascent over the past few years. According to a former Jordanian cabinet minister, "the war in the Gulf was portrayed as one between good and evil by the Islamists, as mainly represented by the Muslim Brethren. When Iraq lost, people were disenchanted with propagators of this line. Mythology had lost to technology, and this is how support for the Brethren declined."⁴⁹ *L'Express* wrote in March: "Saddam's defeat has turned the Algerian political situation upside down," leaving the FIS in the worst position of all."⁵⁰ The FIS, according to *Foreign Report*, was "no longer expected to win power in the parliamentary election scheduled for June... the FIS will be lucky to win a third of the vote in June. It will be kept out of power by a coalition of secular parties."⁵¹

This analysis rested on flawed foundations in every particular. First, the masses of Muslims did not blame Islamic parties for failing to perform economic or other miracles. These were not ruling parties; they did not command national resources. In a few countries, they had controlled municipal budgets for a short time, and in Jordan they had briefly held some ministerial portfolios. But they had not failed, because they had never had the opportunity to succeed or fail. Islam still remained an untried solution, especially for those disillusioned with the record of regimes that had enjoyed absolute control of national resources for a generation.

Second, the revival of Islam was not a product of Iranian subversion or Saudi support. It emerged from deep-seated social and economic grievances that fed a

populist groundswell. Iran and Saudi Arabia sensed this groundswell and tried to capitalize on it, continuing their support of Islamist movements in a more discriminating way after the war. But even if they had ended all such support, this would not have crippled the broad-based movements that drew upon deep sources of popular resentment. These movements felt increasingly self-sufficient, and their dependence on foreign infusions diminished as they shifted increasingly to reliance on a broad populist appeal at home. Even where Iran and Saudi Arabia did cut back on their support of Islamic movements, the populist domestic appeal of those movements was undiminished.

Finally, the defeat of Saddam did not discredit Islam as a solution, nor did it discredit Islam's fundamentalist proponents. Hardly anyone in the region mistook Saddam for a paragon of Islam, and no Islamist regarded Iraq's defeat as the defeat of a true Islamic state. There was disappointment that Saddam had not bloodied the nose of the West, but no disillusionment with Islam, on which Saddam himself had never truly relied. Nor were threatened regimes always in a position to wag their fingers at Islamic movements for choosing to support Saddam. In several countries, the regimes themselves had competed with Islamist movements in professing support for Iraq. Neither King Husayn of Jordan nor the ruling party in Algeria could claim they had shown better judgment than their Islamic oppositions.

In sum, the political dramas of 1991 did not alter the trajectory of Islam in the region — a trajectory which, for deep-seated social and economic reasons, was still generally ascending. The old order had been propped up by the champion of a "new order" — precisely the order that fed the rage, precisely the order which the Islamic revival rose to overturn. This was hardly a formula for disillusionment with Islam. The outcome of the war was too ambiguous in too many ways to purge the region of the passions that stirred fundamentalism.⁵² The events of the second half of the year, which culminated in an overwhelming electoral triumph for the FIS in Algeria that electrified the region, confirmed this assessment. One year after dismissing the fortunes of political Islam, *The Economist* ran this headline: "Islam Resumes its March."⁵³ But had the march ever stopped, had the wave ever receded? The cycle of Islamic revival (if it were indeed a cycle) now seemed much longer: not a decade, but a generation, and possibly more.

THE KHARTOUM CONFERENCE

As Iraq's defeat in war grew inevitable, the many Islamic movements of the Muslim Brethren variety closed ranks to withstand the expected backlash.⁵⁴ A who's who of Sunni fundamentalism met in Khartoum, at an Islamic Arab Popular Conference organized by the authorities from 25–28 April. The event, initiated by Hasan al-Turabi, the fundamentalist Tom Thumb who sat squarely in the ear of Sudan's ruling military junta, reportedly drew over 200 participants from 55 countries.⁵⁵

The Khartoum conference represented a counterforce to the Cairo conference (see above), which convened on precisely the same day. Participants included 'Abdallah Fadil, Iraq's minister of religious endowments; 'Abd al-Latif 'Arabiyyat, the Islamist speaker of Jordan's parliament; 'Abd al-Rahman Khalifa, leader of the Jordanian Muslim Brethren; 'Adnan Sa'd al-Din, leader of a major faction of the Syrian Muslim Brethren; Rashid al-Ghannushi of the Tunisian Nahda Party; Ibrahim Ghawsha, spokesman of the Palestinian Hamas; Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, leader of the Afghan

Mujahidin faction, Hizbe Islami; Muhammad Ahmad al-Sharif, secretary-general of Libya's World Islamic Call Society; Qazi Husayn Ahmad, leader of Pakistan's Jama'ate Islami; Ma'mun al-Hudaybi and Mustafa Mashhur, representatives of the Egyptian Muslim Brethren; and Fathi al-Shiqaqi, leader of the (pro-Iranian) branch of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

But the conference did more than bring together the connected world of Islamic fundamentalism. It sought to link the Islamists with their secular soul mates who had tilted (or toppled) toward Iraq during the war. And so, mingling among the Islamists at Khartoum, were Yasir 'Arafat, George Habash and Na'if Hawatima. Even a representative of Egypt's Nasserists attended — this, despite the well-known history of animosity between Nasserists and the Muslim Brethren. The conference clearly sought to reconcile Islam and Arabism on the basis of their shared repudiation of Western hegemony.

The conferees passed familiar resolutions calling for support of the Palestinian and Afghan causes. More notable was their demand that the West leave Iraq alone, a position taken as an act of defiance in the face of defeat. They called for a lifting of economic sanctions against Iraq, and rejected the demand for the unilateral destruction of Iraq's weapons. Resolutions denounced foreign intervention in Iraq's internal affairs, called for the preservation of Iraq's territorial integrity, and declared 17 January to be an annual day of solidarity with Iraq. Lastly, the conference resolved to establish a general secretariat composed of 15 persons, and an assembly composed of 50 persons which would meet every three years.⁵⁶ Turabi was named secretary-general. In subsequent appearances abroad, Turabi introduced himself with this title, and claimed that the new organization represented an alternative to the ICO.⁵⁷

The Khartoum conference would later be cited by opponents of the Islamists as evidence of the existence of a global Islamic conspiracy. President Zayn al-'Abidin Ben 'Ali of Tunisia, referring to the Khartoum conference, declared that "there is absolutely no doubt that there is a fundamentalist 'international.' The fundamentalist movements stem from the same source and have the same way of exploiting religion.... We know that they are in close contact with one another. Their activities are coordinated from Sudan."⁵⁸ Hudaybi, of the Egyptian Muslim Brethren, put a more benign face on the conference: "In these conferences we meet many Islamic and non-Islamic leaders... the [Khartoum] conference attempted to shed light on the postwar phase, and leaders of various schools participated, including Arab nationalists and non-Islamic movements."⁵⁹ Was there more to the Khartoum conference than met the eye? For example, were Iranians and Algerians active behind the scenes, extending and soliciting support for Islamic revolution? The Khartoum conference raised the question of Sudan's role in the wider world of Islamic fundamentalism, now that Sudan had been recast as an Islamic state. (For the domestic context of the country's Islamic transformation, see chapter on Sudan.)

SUDAN: NET EXPORTER OF REVOLUTION?

As the year progressed, diplomatic and intelligence sources in the West and the ME began to fuel public speculation about Sudan as a regional base of Islamist activism. Turabi himself revealed a plainly pan-Islamic perspective. He spoke of the development of a global trend resting on "the experiences of Iran in the heart of Asia, Sudan in the heart of Africa, and Algeria which is very near to the European

continent."⁶⁰ His favorite lecture subject abroad was "Islam as a Pan-National Movement."⁶¹ Speculation about Sudan's role was also evoked by Sudan's offer of refuge to Islamists exiled from their own countries, as well as by its developing relationship with Iran.⁶²

Specifically, certain rumors asserted that Sudan actively promoted revolution in other states, especially Tunisia and Algeria. Allegedly, Sudan plotted with the exiled Rashid al-Ghannushi, a leader of the Tunisian Islamic opposition, in order to foment a coup in Tunisia. (During 1991, the Tunisian authorities arrested hundreds of Islamists on suspicion of conspiracy.) It also reputedly worked with 'Abbas Madani, leader of the Algerian FIS, to cause disturbances or at least to plan election strategy in Algeria. (Madani was reportedly in Khartoum at the time of the April conference.)⁶³ The reliability of these reports could not be measured. It was known, however, that the Sudanese Government granted passports, including diplomatic passports, to foreign Islamists who lacked travel documents. Ghannushi entered France on such a passport, leading Tunisia to lodge an official protest with Sudan.⁶⁴

Turabi also angered Saudi Arabia, both by his support of Saddam and his criticism of the Saudi monarchy. In the immediate afterglow of the electoral success of the FIS in Algeria, Turabi asked: "If the [Algerian] FLN with all its glorious anti-colonial record was unable to withstand the wave of Islamic revivalism, then what about these regimes in Arabia which neither have an impressive record in patriotic struggle or Jihad, nor have they employed their wealth to the benefit of their people?"⁶⁵

Sudan's relations with Iran also gave rise to speculation. Originally, Sudanese strongman 'Umar Hasan al-Bashir had close ties with Saudi Arabia, but after a visit to Tehran in 1990 he gradually began to move Sudan to the opposite pole of Islam. Iranian President 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, visiting Khartoum from 12–16 December to promote cooperation, stated that "we are determined to establish military and security relations in the future, but for the time being our cooperation concentrates on economic and commercial matters."⁶⁶ But other reports spoke of secret military understandings, and the provision of arms and training by Iran to Sudan. A US official even visited Turabi on the eve of Rafsanjani's visit and warned him of the consequences if any terrorist act were to be traced to Sudan.⁶⁷ Sudan seemed to be playing both sides of its Iranian relationship — intensifying it sufficiently to evoke the concern and attention of the West, but limiting it sufficiently to preclude any Western justification for isolating Sudan.

Had Khartoum really become an axis of worldwide Muslim Brethren activism, based on ties cultivated over decades by Sudan's Islamists? Or was the importance of these ties exaggerated by threatened regimes, always eager to cast their own Islamists as pawns of "foreign paymasters"? Information emanating from Sudan formed an incomplete picture, and Turabi denied that he stood at the center of an international conspiracy of revolution.⁶⁸ Yet the course chosen by Sudan attracted increasing attention from Islamists elsewhere. Palestinian Hamas spokesman Mahmud al-Zahhar, asked whether his movement looked toward the model of Iran, replied: "No, we are not Shi'is. The only country run today in the way we envisage is Sudan. Sudan is very different from what is reported about it in [the] international media. For the first time, it has managed to supply its own needs in grain. Corruption has always played an important part in starvation in various countries."⁶⁹ Not since the Mahdist state of the previous century had Sudan purported to provide a model for wider Islam.

Whether it could attain this achievement again, in the midst of poverty and civil war, remained to be seen.

IRAN AND THE POWER OF ISLAM

The events of 1991 made it impossible for Islamic Iran to be anything but pragmatic. Iran could not afford another war. It stood aside not only when the US-led coalition vanquished Iraq, but also when Saddam Husayn crushed the Shi'i rebellion in southern Iraq. Iranians were distressed by the images of massed American forces on their frontiers and the shell-torn Shi'i holy shrines in Iraq, but Iran's leadership, under President 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, decided that this would not be Iran's fight. (For more on this decision, the internal debate surrounding it, and Iranian foreign policy, see chapter on Iran.)⁷⁰

Iran's neutrality served its national interest, although it did little to enhance Iran's reputation as standard-bearer of Islam in the eyes of Islamists. A few of the Sunni Islamists who tilted far toward Iraq even voiced open disapproval. "Masses of believers, from Indonesia to Morocco, were aligned with Iraq," declared Layth Shubaylat, a prominent Islamist deputy in Jordan's parliament. "Now, of all times, Iran decides to become friends with Saudi Arabia."⁷¹ But Iranian press commentary dismissed such criticism: "The cadre of the Muslim Brethren in Jordan would do well to criticize the US domination over the Middle East and especially over the country in which they live before they choose to pass a judgment on Islamic Iran's policy of neutrality in the recent war."⁷²

Iran's neutrality also disappointed Iraq's Shi'i opposition. After Iraqi forces were expelled from Kuwait and Iraq's Shi'is rose in revolt against Saddam, some looked to Iran for logistical support. After all, Islamic Iran once had waged a lengthy war against Iraq, partly in the hope that Iraq's Shi'is would launch just such an uprising. But that war had ended, and Iran now offered only limited assistance to its Shi'i brethren. "We do not want to intervene in the internal affairs of Iraq," Rafsanjani explained. "Our support only extends to the granting of refuge to Iraqis fleeing their country.... Our export of the revolution is not accomplished through war or the toppling of regimes. We export the revolution only by disseminating the thought of the Imam Khomeyni."⁷³ The Shi'i revolt needed guns, however, not thought, and while Iran did allow Iraqi Shi'i exiles in Iran to provide some tangible assistance to the rebellion, this did not suffice, and Iraq's Republican Guard ultimately crushed the Shi'i uprising (see chapter on Iraq).⁷⁴

In both instances — Iran's neutrality toward the war and the rebellion — it seemed as though Iran under Rafsanjani had given up on its Islamic mission, and now pursued only narrow national interests. But was this the case? In 1991, the full extent of Iran's Islamic vision became clear following the breakup of the Soviet Union. What the West interpreted as a victory for democracy, Iran interpreted as a triumph for Islam. "We heard the sound of the rotten bones of communism and socialism being crushed because Islam revealed their true natures," declared the leader of the Iranian-backed Hizballah during a visit to Tehran.⁷⁵ The collapse of communism as an ideological system left Islam as the only viable alternative to Western materialist capitalism. Under the right guidance, the solution of Islam might be transformed into political and military might.

In the opinion of the Tehran newspaper *Jumhuriyye Islami*, Islam could now be transformed into "a single, effective world power.... Muslim nations should rise up to take their appropriate place in the new global power structure."⁷⁶ On another occasion, the newspaper asked:

Why should the Islamic world, which has one fifth of the world's population, not play a suitable role in decisions on the contemporary world? Why are our part and our role being intentionally ignored in the system that rules the world? Why should the Islamic world not play a part in key decisions on the future of the world and on a world order which is fit for the future world?⁷⁷

The only way to stake a claim to such status was through unity. Only a united Islam could deter Western aggression, argued the newspaper *Abrar*, and that required "a military, political, and economic pact.... For this to succeed, all minor differences over ideological issues and systems of government should be set aside in view of the great danger threatening Islamic countries' national interests and territorial integrity."⁷⁸

Iran's Islamic policy had taken a new tack. For a decade, Islamic Iran had advocated Islamic revolution and appealed to the downtrodden Muslim masses over the heads of their misguided regimes. In practice, however, none of these regimes fell before the masses. Now Iran was prepared to overlook the failings of the regimes — once-fatal flaws were downgraded to "minor differences" — and work with them in order to unite Muslim states into one bloc. Individually, no Muslim state could acquire great power status. Collectively, they could fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Actually, this state-oriented variety of Islamic solidarity had been the policy of Saudi Arabia for nearly 30 years, and had been institutionalized in the ICO. How then did Rafsanjani's vision differ? In fact, he saw Iran supplanting Saudi Arabia as the hub of Muslim solidarity. In his view, the Arab states had stumbled badly in the fratricide that followed Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The Gulf War had undermined their legitimacy and divided them against one another. Saudi Arabia was forced to rely on unbelievers for its defense, and the Arabs had grown so weak that they had accepted the inadmissible: the State of Israel. Perhaps the Arab moment of primacy in Islam might be ending; perhaps the moment of Iran had arrived. Furthermore, now that central Asia and the Caucasus had escaped the grip of the Soviet bear, the geopolitical center of Islam was shifting eastward and northward — in the direction of Iran. In this scenario, Iran would relieve the Arabs of the banner of Islamic primacy and succeed, where they had failed, in transforming Muslim states into a global power bloc. This partly explained Rafsanjani's decision to reach an agreement with Saudi Arabia over the pilgrimage — an agreement which assured that Iran's contingent to the pilgrimage would be the largest. It also explained Rafsanjani's decision to be the first head of Islamic Iran to attend an Islamic summit, and Iran's demand that an upcoming summit be held in Tehran (see further below).

This did not mean that Iran abandoned its support of popular Muslim movements, although it did withdraw its backing for Shi'i revolutionaries who wished to overthrow the monarchies and emirates across the Gulf. But those groups that gave Iran leverage in the Arab-Israeli arena won expanded support, especially Lebanon's Hizballah and the pro-Iranian branch of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Moreover, the list of movements befriended by Iran no longer remained limited to Shi'i revolutionary

groups and small Jihad cells. In recent years, Iran had blazed a trail to the major Islamic movements of the Muslim Brethren variety in Sunni lands, gaining special appreciation from them by standing alone among ME states against the American initiative for Arab-Israeli peace. Iran now rested its Islamic reputation not on its promotion of Islamic revolution, but on its support for Islamic Jihad against Israel, and for the rejectionist groups that waged it. Iran acquired enough credibility on this score to draw many leading Sunni and Shi'i Islamists to an October conference in Tehran, held in opposition to the Madrid peace conference (see below).

Iran, then, had not yet become a state like all other states. In the breadth of its vision, it still deserved to be called Islamic Iran, combining a pursuit of Iranian national interest with Khomeyni's vision of a united Islam. While differences remained within Iran's clerical elite over the balance between Iranian interest and Islamic vision, especially when they pulled in opposite directions, these differences were over the choice of the road, not over the destination.

RUSHDIE IN LIMBO

As if to emphasize the tenacity of Khomeyni's vision, Iran was unwilling to resolve the case of the Indian-born British author, Salman Rushdie. *The Satanic Verses*, Rushdie's postmodernist novel, had evoked a premodernist *fatwa* (religious edict) from Khomeyni in February 1989 calling upon believers to put Rushdie to death for having committed apostasy by blaspheming the Prophet Muhammad in his book. Following Khomeyni's own death, no one in Iran had the authority or will to free the novelist from the grip of this capital sentence. Rushdie's subsequent attempt to void the *fatwa* by professing Islam met with mixed results. Egypt's religious establishment accepted his statements of contrition, but prominent figures in the Muslim world continued to demand that the book be withdrawn, that Rushdie be abducted for trial in Iran, or that he be "executed." (For the genesis of the Rushdie affair, see *MECS* 1989, pp. 173-80; 1990, pp. 177-80.)

Under close guard by Scotland Yard, Rushdie made a growing number of public and media appearances in Britain in order to keep his case alive. In December 1991, he even appeared in New York before a university audience, his first public appearance outside Britain since the *fatwa*.⁷⁹ But his enemies did not relent. The private foundation in Iran which led the campaign against him held a seminar in Tehran on the "dynamism" of the *fatwa* against Rushdie, from 1-3 March. The seminar resolved that the *fatwa* was "irrevocable," and the foundation, which had initially offered \$1m. to anyone who succeeded in taking Rushdie's life, doubled the reward to \$2m.⁸⁰ Rushdie received two grim reminders of the seriousness of the threat in July 1991, when the Italian translator of *The Satanic Verses* was seriously wounded in a knife attack in Milan, and the book's Japanese translator was stabbed to death in Tokyo.⁸¹

Ultimately, the only resolution lay in a diplomatic deal with Iran that might produce a new *fatwa*, possibly in exchange for improved ties. But which Western government would bear the responsibility for securing Rushdie's freedom as its price for expanded trade and ties? The US held that the Rushdie affair was "primarily a British matter because he is a British citizen."⁸² The British, however, had already joined the rush to normalize ties, a haste that took the bite out of its demarches on Rushdie's behalf. As one of Rushdie's fellow authors wrote, "most countries, including his own, Britain, are [already] doing business with Iran, buying its oil and cashew

nuts, and selling the Iranians new cars and wristwatches, and sending them paper and ink so they can print their fatuous laws."⁸³ The freeing of British hostages in Lebanon during the year (see below) did offer some hope to Rushdie. Moreover, the actual propaganda for the *fatwa* was conducted outside the Iranian Government. Still, Islamic Iran had not reached the point where it could or would undermine Khomeyni's *fatwa*, which the West saw as a standing incitement to murder in the name of Islam.

THE REVIVAL OF HIZBALLAH

The pride of Islamic Iran's export of revolution remained Hizballah, the Lebanese Shi'i movement of protest that had been created in Khomeyni's image in 1982. Nowhere had Iran's message been assimilated so thoroughly, and with such direct benefit to Tehran, as in Lebanon.

But from 1988 through 1990, Hizballah had been locked in battle with its Lebanese Shi'i rival, the Amal movement, in a ruthless struggle that pitted Shi'i against Shi'i.⁸⁴ Only in 1991, after that struggle ended, could Hizballah return to the agenda set by Islamic Iran. During the year, Hizballah freed its long-held American and British hostages, winning Iran the gratitude of the West. It also renewed the Jihad against Israel in South Lebanon, earning Iran the respect of all opponents of the peace process.⁸⁵ (For background on Iran's role in Hizballah, see *MECS* 1983–84, pp. 171–73; 1984–85, pp. 155–59; 1986, pp. 139–44; 1987, pp. 165–69; 1988, pp. 191–94; 1990, pp. 182–84. For more on Hizballah's Lebanese context, see chapter on Lebanon.)

Hostage Clearance

For most of the 1980s, Hizballah was involved in the taking of Western hostages in Lebanon, for two principal reasons. First, an embargoed Iran sought money and weapons from Western governments, and regarded hostage-holding as an efficient form of leverage. Hizballah carried out the abducting as a service to Iran. Second, Hizballah sought to free its own members in Western and ME prisons, and took foreign hostages to acquire cards for its own hand. Following the Iranian-Iraqi cease-fire in 1988, the international embargo of Iran loosened and Tehran adopted more acceptable ways of securing finance and weapons. Hostage-holding had become a political burden, and Rafsanjani began to close the hostage file by arranging the release of all French hostages in 1988. These efforts were greatly aided by the escape in 1990 of Hizballah militants held in Kuwait, whose release had been demanded by the holders of American and British hostages in Lebanon. (For background and more details, see *MECS* 1990, pp. 183–84.)

By 1991, there was no longer anything to gain by keeping the remaining American and British hostages, and between August and December they all went free. The last six American and three British hostages included journalists Terry Anderson and John McCarthy, and Anglican Church envoy Terry Waite. Islamic Jihad and the Revolutionary Justice Organization, which held the hostages on Hizballah's behalf, enjoyed one last chance to bask in the limelight and to boast that "we shall always remain in the vanguard of the defenders of the causes of Islam and the Muslims,"⁸⁶ while the publicity surrounding the release of the longest-held hostages did much to enhance the images of Iran and Syria.⁸⁷

Israel still held several hundred Hizballah fighters and the abducted cleric Shaykh

'Abd al-Karim 'Ubayd, whom it had seized to get back its own missing soldiers from Hizballah's hands. For its part, Hizballah admitted to having possession of two Israeli soldiers or their bodies, and was assumed to have control of an Israeli airman. For a while, it seemed as though a larger deal involving Israel was in the works, mediated by Giandomenico Picco, special envoy of UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. Hizballah even provided proof that one Israeli soldier was dead, in exchange for the release of several of the more than 300 Shi'i detainees held by Israel. But there it ended. Iran's organization of political opposition to Arab-Israeli talks, and Hizballah's escalation of its military campaign against Israel's security zone (see below), precluded any overall deal. By the year's close, hope of an exchange of prisoners between Israel and Hizballah had vanished, much to Israel's consternation.

Two German hostages also remained in the hands of Hizballah's affiliates at the end of the year. Both were held to secure freedom for a convicted Hizballah hijacker imprisoned in Germany. The hijacker, Muhammad 'Ali Hamada, had killed an American passenger in the 1985 hijacking of an American airliner to Beirut, which made his release difficult if not impossible. (The two Germans were released in June 1992; Hamada remained in prison.)

In retrospect, the hostage decade cemented the partnership between Islamic Iran and Hizballah. Hizballah's actions followed the example set by Iran in the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran at the outset of the revolution. Not only did keeping hostages in Lebanon bring concessions and publicity, but it also bought the time needed by Hizballah to consolidate its position. Hizballah's verdict was that "hostage-taking, as a message, succeeded in sending certain signals to those concerned and made them call off many of their conspiratorial designs against our people."⁸⁸ As for Iran's rulers, the hostage decade created a bond of obligation toward their Lebanese clients, which assured that even the "moderates" in Tehran would not abandon Hizballah.

The Islamic Resistance

With the freeing of the American and British hostages, attention turned to the future role of Hizballah in Lebanon. In the years when Hizballah had been locked in battle with Amal, Arab mediators had engineered the Ta'if Accords for internal reconciliation in Lebanon. The 1989 agreement, based on a reformed confessionalism, left no avenue for the possible transformation of Lebanon into an Islamic state. It enjoyed the support of Syria and the endorsement of the US, while Hizballah became its most vocal Lebanese critic. "The fact is that the Ta'if decision is an American decision wearing an Arab headdress," declared Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, the spiritual mentor of Hizballah.⁸⁹ No amount of persuasion could induce Hizballah to accept the accord, even the offer of a cabinet portfolio, which it rejected.⁹⁰ Hizballah continued to demand a referendum on the creation of an Islamic state. According to Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli, the movement's secretary-general, "we believe that everyone has the right to choose, through a general referendum, following which the Lebanese would be committed to abiding by the will of the majority (as expressed in such a referendum). It goes without saying that we ourselves would be committed to whatever the majority decides."⁹¹ Muslims constituted a clear majority in Lebanon, and Hizballah believed it could do as well as any fundamentalist party in turning discontent into ballots for Islam.

But for Hizballah, the more immediate problem posed by the Ta'if Accords was its provision for the disarming of all militias, which were to be incorporated wherever possible into the Lebanese army. In March, the Lebanese cabinet ordered the implementation of this decision, and the Lebanese army deployed southward, where it absorbed part of the Amal militia. Hizballah, however, claimed a general exemption from the disarming. "We will not hand over our weapons," declared movement leader 'Abbas al-Musawi. "Lives depend on these weapons."⁹² To justify this refusal, Hizballah emphasized that its weapons were aimed only against Israel. Fadlallah supported the general disarming of militias, but argued that the Islamic Resistance — Hizballah's guerrilla arm in Southern Lebanon — prosecuted the struggle against Israel that the Lebanese army was unable or unwilling to conduct. Hizballah also claimed an exemption for Iran's Revolutionary Guards from the Ta'if provision for the evacuation of all foreign forces from Lebanon. "The Revolutionary Guards are neither a militia nor a paramilitary organization in Lebanon," announced Tufayli. "They are here as experts who came to share their knowledge and experience in a number of spheres with the Lebanese people. They also train Resistance fighters.... When the Islamic Republic [of Iran] decides to withdraw them, they will leave. This matter is not linked to weapons, gunmen, militias, or anything of that kind."⁹³

In fact, for the better part of two years, Hizballah's guns had been turned on Amal, not Israel. Tufayli was asked in April about lack of operations against Israel. "The Resistance was affected by the fighting between the Amal movement and Hizballah over the last two years," he admitted. "Now, following resolution of the problems between ourselves and Amal, I believe the Resistance will be operating more effectively than it has before."⁹⁴ Tufayli was right. As the US-initiative for an Arab-Israeli peace process progressed, Islamic Iran called on Hizballah to mount an offensive against Israel's "security zone" in Southern Lebanon, which was patrolled by the Israel-backed South Lebanese Army (SLA). Fadlallah explained the rationale behind the offensive: "It is not impossible to suppose that the Resistance could inflict such losses on the enemy as to force him to pull out of the strip, just as the Israelis withdrew from the rest of the south between 1983 and 1985 as a result of Resistance operations."⁹⁵ The thinking was that this would spare Lebanon the need to negotiate an Israeli withdrawal in return for peace — a peace which Islamic Iran and Hizballah adamantly opposed. "We do not accept any peace as long as Israel is in existence," declared Hizballah commander Husayn al-Musawi, "and Israel must be obliterated. This means that our struggle has to be continued against Israel."⁹⁶

Hizballah had no intention of accepting any settlement that would emerge from the negotiations. As 'Abbas al-Musawi stated:

In the same way as the May 17th agreement concluded by the Lebanese regime and parliament [with Israel in 1983] was not binding on us, whatever commitments the Arabs and the Palestinians may conclude concerning the issue of Palestine and the sacred sites will not be binding on us as well, and we will seek to confront and abort them at all levels.⁹⁷

Even the Lebanese Government would be confronted, if necessary. According to Tufayli, "we defend the principle of resistance, and we will oppose any attempt to hamper the activities of the resistance fighters, even if such an attempt is made by the Lebanese authorities."⁹⁸

The opening of Hizballah's offensive was signaled by the "election" of 'Abbas al-Musawi as secretary-general of the movement in May 1991 to replace Subhi al-Tufayli, an appointment which marked the shift in Hizballah's priorities. 'Abbas al-Musawi, a cleric schooled in Najaf, had more military acumen than any of Hizballah's other clerics. He had been trained by the Revolutionary Guards, had commanded the Islamic Resistance, and had proven himself a master of operational planning. The chief accomplishments of his tenure included the planning of two "self-martyrdom" (or suicide) bombings: one that killed 12 Israeli soldiers in March 1985, and another that killed eight soldiers in October 1988. Yet he was less identified, at least publicly, with the holding of Western hostages, which therefore won him the ubiquitous tag of "moderate" by the Western press. 'Abbas al-Musawi perfectly personified the decision to free the hostages while escalating the Jihad against Israel.⁹⁹

After Musawi's appointment, Hizballah launched a successful drive to reestablish itself in the south, whence it had been expelled by Amal. Clerics and fighters who had been driven out by Amal in earlier fighting came flooding back into the south. The number and boldness of armed operations against the SLA and Israeli forces increased, while Israeli retaliatory strikes also increased in quantity and extent.¹⁰⁰

Hizballah continued to escape the closing vise of the new order in Lebanon and the world during 1991. It filled the no-man's land between Israel and Syria in Lebanon, maneuvered in the political zone between factions in Iran, and bought time by carefully discarding its American and British hostage cards. But a cloud loomed on the horizon: "When Israel withdraws its forces," said Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Talas, "we'll disarm Hizballah, and that's a promise."¹⁰¹ The beginning of direct Israeli-Lebanese negotiations in October seemed to bring that day of reckoning a step closer.

THE PILGRIMAGE OF 1991

For a decade, the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina had been buffeted by the storm of Iran's Islamic revolution. Iranian pilgrims and Saudi police had clashed bloodily during the decade, and Iran had boycotted the pilgrimage since 1987. But as Iran's priorities shifted, the climate surrounding the pilgrimage began to improve, allowing Saudi-Iranian negotiations for a return of Iran's pilgrims. In late 1990, a sudden cloud appeared on the horizon, as foreign troops massed in Saudi Arabia to wage war against Iraq. But this brief, "Desert Storm" would pass quickly, leaving few marks on the pilgrimage.¹⁰² (For past pilgrimage conflict, see *MECS* 1981-82, pp. 284-88, 301-3; 1982-83, pp. 238, 249-51; 1983-84, pp. 175-77; 1984-85, pp. 161-64; 1986, pp. 149-51; 1987, pp. 172-76; 1988, pp. 177-85; 1989, pp. 182-84; 1990, pp. 189-91.)

Although Iraq and Saudi Arabia waged a bitter propaganda campaign before the war, Iraq did not call for a boycott of the pilgrimage until well after the air war began. On 11 February, Iraq finally announced a boycott in protest against the presence of foreign forces on the "sacred soil" of Arabia. Iraq also sought to persuade other Muslim states to follow its lead, but without success.¹⁰³ Even the Muslim Brethren movement in Jordan, which sided with Saddam in the confrontation, determined that the pilgrimage remained obligatory for all who could perform it, regardless of the nature of the regime that controlled the holy places.¹⁰⁴

The start of the air war over Iraq raised a host of questions about the pilgrimage,

which was to take place in June 1991. Could the pilgrimage, with its complicated logistics and thousands of incoming flights, be conducted in the midst of a war? Would there be a danger of violence, this time by pilgrims supportive of Saddam Husayn's call for Jihad? Saudi and American officials agreed that Saudi Arabia could not wage war and conduct the pilgrimage at the same time, a conclusion that argued for an early and swift land war against Iraq.¹⁰⁵ In the event, Iraq was defeated three months before the pilgrimage season began, in ample time for governments and pilgrims to make their arrangements.

A more familiar question then dominated the politics of pilgrimage: would Iran's pilgrims appear? Since the violent confrontation of 1987, which claimed the lives of several hundred Iranian pilgrims, Iran's pilgrims had absented themselves. Iran's leaders refused to accept the drastic reduction in the quota of Iranian pilgrims imposed by the Saudi authorities, while also rejecting the stringent limits on their political activities which the Saudis sought to enforce. But following Iran's decision to improve relations with Gulf Arab states, a compromise took shape. From the autumn of 1990, direct Saudi-Iranian talks took place on the highest diplomatic level, involving five meetings between Saudi Foreign Minister Sa'ud al-Faysal and Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati. Omani mediation helped to produce a written agreement, signed by the two foreign ministers in Muscat in March, setting the parameters for the return of Iran's pilgrims. (The agreement also provided for restored diplomatic relations, which had been severed in April 1988 over the pilgrimage dispute.)

The agreement resolved the two outstanding issues that had divided Saudi Arabia and Iran. First, it set the number of Iranian pilgrims at 110,000, a figure later raised to 115,000. This was significantly more than the annual quota of 45,000 that Saudi Arabia had imposed for a three-year period after 1987, a measure that had produced a total Iranian boycott. Yet it was also less than the 150,000 Iranian pilgrims who had arrived annually through 1987. Second, Iran would be permitted to conduct one rally in a fixed place in Mecca, where a message from Khamene'i could be read to assembled pilgrims, as Khomeyni's message had been read in the past. This rally had turned into a violent march toward the Great Mosque in 1987; the new agreement included an Iranian commitment to prevent any flow of demonstrating pilgrims from the rallying point.

Two complications briefly endangered this understanding. In April, Khamene'i appointed Khomeyni's son, Ahmad, as his representative to the pilgrimage.¹⁰⁶ It is the task of this representative to set the tone for Iran's pilgrims, and Ahmad Khomeyni had a reputation as a firebrand. He immediately announced that he saw the pilgrimage as an opportunity for "confrontation," not just with America and Israel but with "regional reactionaries."¹⁰⁷ Saudi Arabia, alarmed by the appointment, informed Iran that it put their agreement in jeopardy. The message got through: eight days later, Ahmad Khomeyni resigned (he was needed at home by his mother, he claimed),¹⁰⁸ and a Rafsanjani stalwart, Muhammad Muhammadi-Reyshahri, was appointed in his stead.¹⁰⁹

The second complication, which emerged after the pilgrimage was under way, involved the choice of a site for Iran's rally. The Saudis proposed a number of sites, all of them remote from the heart of Mecca and not easily accessible. The Saudis clearly wished to put as much distance as possible between the rallying pilgrims and the

center of the city. Iran rejected these sites, arguing that their location made it impossible for the rally to draw pilgrims from other countries. At the last minute, the Saudi authorities relented and allowed the rally to gather in a square near the headquarters of Iran's pilgrimage representative, a site which was still a good distance away from the Great Mosque.¹¹⁰

On the eve of the pilgrimage, Rafsanjani and Reyshahri made several statements that set a conciliatory tone for the pilgrimage.¹¹¹ Iran's pilgrims then arrived, and the planned rally took place as scheduled on 18 June. Khamene'i's message, warning against "American Islam" and compromise with Israel, was read without incident.¹¹² At the last minute, Velayati himself arrived as a pilgrim, and during his stay had two audiences with Saudi King Fahd and three meetings with his Saudi counterpart, Sa'ud al-Faysal. "Saudi Arabia's conduct has been proper," he announced, "and we hope that in view of good understanding between Iran and Saudi Arabia we will see the pilgrimage rituals performed more splendidly than ever before in coming years."¹¹³ After the pilgrimage, the two countries raised their diplomatic ties to the ambassadorial level. In addition, Saudi Arabia agreed to receive some 3,000 Iranians a week over a seven-month period to perform the minor (out-of-season) pilgrimage (*'umra*). There were 300,000 Iranians on the waiting list for this pilgrimage.¹¹⁴

Thus ended yet another cycle of Saudi-Iranian confrontation over the pilgrimage — the third such cycle since the Saudis established their rule over Mecca in 1924.¹¹⁵ For some time, Islamic Iran had been moving away from a strategy of revolution in the Gulf to a strategy of persuasion. The past promotion of revolution had only driven the Arab Gulf regimes to seek safety in American arms. The present campaign of persuasion reassured the Arab Gulf regimes, and above all Saudi Arabia, that they faced no threat from Iran, and indeed faced greater dangers from their ostensible protectors — Iraq, most recently, and the US in the future. Iran's revised approach found symbolic expression in the pilgrimage reconciliation. The old pilgrimage prejudices on both sides lapsed into a latent state, from which they could be summoned if and when politics demanded it.

The new animosity between Saudi Arabia and Iraq did not make itself felt in this pilgrimage. Few pilgrims came from Jordan and Yemen, whose governments had tilted toward Iraq, yet neither government boycotted the pilgrimage, and small numbers of pilgrims did arrive from both countries. Even vanquished Iraq finally sent a token delegation of 400 pilgrims at the last minute.¹¹⁶ At the same time, change elsewhere in the world resulted in increased demand for the pilgrimage. The Saudis played host to 4,700 pilgrims from the Soviet Union in the last year of its existence, the largest number ever. In Dagestan, police had to fire over the heads of demonstrators demanding the hard currency necessary for the journey to Mecca.¹¹⁷ Albania, once sealed to the world, was represented by 180 pilgrims. The Saudis clearly derived satisfaction from the smooth operation of the pilgrimage, given the criticism they had endured in recent years. The only event to mar the occasion was the crash near Jidda of an airliner carrying 247 Nigerian pilgrims and a crew of 14, all of whom perished.

ISLAM AND THE PEACE PROCESS

Even before the dust settled in the Gulf, the US launched a major initiative to advance the Arab-Israeli peace process. The defeat of Iraq and the breakup of the Soviet

Union strengthened the hand of American diplomacy, which achieved a breakthrough with the convening of an Arab-Israeli peace conference in Madrid on 30 October. The months that followed witnessed several rounds of bilateral talks in Washington between Israel and Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and a Palestinian delegation. (For the development of the initiative, see chapter on the ME peace process.)

Islam figured prominently in the debate over the admissibility of these talks and over the ultimate prospect of recognizing Israel as part of a peace settlement. Rival interpreters of the faith condemned or condoned the peace talks in the name of Islam, just as they had differed over the foreign deployment in Arabia. Representatives of establishment Islam in the countries that had formed the war coalition generally sanctioned the talks and spoke of the Islamic imperative for peace. The leaders of opposition Islam, joined by Islamic Iran, generally reviled the talks and cited the Islamic duty of Jihad.

ISLAMIC OPPOSITION TO MADRID

The fundamentalist view of the Arab-Israeli conflict remained uncompromisingly theological. Palestine was a land sacred to Islam, a land which had been stolen by the Jews. Not an inch could be alienated. Israel was a cancer in the Islamic world, implanted by imperialism and nurtured by the US. Israel had to be fought, passively through nonrecognition, actively through Jihad. This view was shared by Islamists of all stripes, especially by the many Sunni movements in the Muslim Brethren tradition and by Shi'i movements that adhered to Iran's line.

The approaching Madrid conference evoked dozens of statements and declarations by them rejecting both the conference and Israel's existence. "We view the recognition of the Jewish state as a breach of the pledge to God and His messenger," announced the Muslim Brethren deputies in the lower house of Jordan's parliament.¹¹⁸ "We are the major nation in this region," said Hizballah leader 'Abbas al-Musawi on the eve of the Madrid conference, "whereas the Jews are an alien and temporary entity. It is our judgment that the Jews should leave the region. The state of Palestine will be established over the entire land of Palestine."¹¹⁹ Hamas spokesman Ibrahim Ghawsha affirmed that "no one, whoever he may be, has the right to cede even a single inch of Palestinian territory." Ghawsha also articulated the Islamic view of the historical nature of the conflict — a conflict that would outlive the "new world order":

We think the conflict between the Arabs and Jews, between the Muslims and the Jews, is a cultural conflict that will continue to rage throughout all time.... Algeria fought for 130 years. Even the Baltic states, which were occupied by the Soviets, have had their independence recognized by world states 45 years after they were occupied. The Palestine question is only 40 years old [sic], considering that it came into being in 1948. We are at the beginning of the road. Our adversary needs to be dealt with through a protracted and continuous confrontation.¹²⁰

But if the Muslims lost faith, he warned, their loss of Palestine would become permanent. Islamists saw an irony in the Madrid setting of the conference, for Spain was a land that had once been part of Islam and then had been remade by conquest into a part of Christendom. As the same Hamas spokesman put it, Spain would yet witness the Arabs handing over of the keys of Jerusalem to Israeli Prime Minister

Yitzhak Shamir, just as Spain saw Muhammad Abu 'Abdallah (Boabdil) surrender the keys of Granada to the Christians in 1492.¹²¹

But what of the possibility that negotiations might produce an Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab lands? Islamists prophesied that Israel would never budge. Hizballah's mentor, Fadlallah, declared the negotiations a ploy by which Israel would buy five years in order to absorb masses of new immigrants. "The maximum conceivable Israeli concession would be in regard to the Gaza Strip. I cannot imagine any concession being offered in regard to the West Bank."¹²² Other Islamists went further, arguing that Israel actually had further plans for expansion. "More than ever before," claimed 'Abbas al-Musawi, "Israel is now stating most insolently and frankly that it wants the whole region from the Nile to the Euphrates."¹²³ According to a Palestinian Hamas statement, "America strives to convene a peace conference whose main objective is to liquidate the Palestine question and entrench the false existence of the Zionist entity by establishing the state of Greater Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates."¹²⁴

Islamists appealed for unity to defeat this conspiracy. But it was unclear just how they would unite, and who would unite them.

THE TEHRAN CONFERENCE

In anticipation of the Madrid conference, a new call to Jihad was issued, this time from Tehran, not Baghdad. Islamic Iran set out to become the capital of Islamic steadfastness, mobilizing Muslim movements against the "sale" of sacred Palestine to the Jews. To this end, the Iranian Majlis convened an International Conference to Support the Islamic Revolution of the People of Palestine, which met in Tehran from 19–22 October. The event, timed to precede the Madrid conference by a week, drew over 400 participants from 45 countries. A similar conference for Palestine had been held in Tehran the previous year (see *MECS* 1990, p. 185). However, this new gathering drew far more attention, for it emerged as a counterconference to Madrid.

Iran's leaders clearly regarded the gathering as an event of the utmost importance. Majlis Speaker Mehdi Karrubi presided. The conference was addressed by Ayatollah Khamene'i, President Rafsanjani, Foreign Minister Velayati, Supreme Court President Ayatollah Muhammad Yazdi, Revolutionary Guard Commander in Chief Mohsen Reza'i, and the late Khomeyni's son Ahmad. Reports said that the Majlis appropriated \$20m. for the conference, and that costs eventually reached \$100m.¹²⁵

The credibility of the conference depended on the extent of participation by Muslims from outside Iran, who fell into three categories. The first category included Iran's long-standing clients, most of them Shi'is. Arriving from Lebanon were Fadlallah; 'Abbas al-Musawi; Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban, "emir" of the Iranian-backed Islamic Unification Movement in Tripoli; and Fathi al-Shiqaqi, leader of the branch of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad supported by Iran and based in Lebanon. Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, Tehran-based leader of the Iraqi Shi'i opposition, also attended, as did Kalim Siddiqui, the Pakistani director of the Muslim Institute in London, who had led the campaign against Rushdie in the UK. Participants in this first category added little to the weight of the conference, since they were already frequent fliers to Tehran.

The second category consisted of Islamists usually not in Iran's camp, whom Iran had persuaded to come to Tehran as an act of protest against Madrid. The most

important of these protestors were representatives of the Muslim Brethren in Arab countries. Islamic Iran and the Muslim Brethren had drawn closer in 1990 against the background of the foreign deployment in Saudi Arabia. Leading Muslim Brethren from the Arab world had joined a delegation to Tehran and had participated in a previous Tehran conference on Palestine (see *MECS* 1990, p. 185). The advance of the peace process after the Gulf War brought them still closer together. Jordanian delegates were 'Abd al-Rahman Khalifa, general supervisor of the Muslim Brethren, and 'Abd al-Latif 'Arabiyyat, the Islamic speaker of the Jordanian parliament. Lesser representatives of the Egyptian Muslim Brethren, and its parliamentary ally, the Socialist Labor Party, as well as of the Palestinian Hamas, also attended. Burhan al-Din Rabbani, leader of the Afghan *Jami'at-e Islami* (the Sunni Afghan Mujahidin faction that overran Kabul in April 1992), also participated. Also present was the Sudanese government minister charged with Islamizing his country's culture, 'Abdallah Muhammad Ahmad. The presence of participants in this second category added Islamic credibility to the conference, since they could not be portrayed as clients of Iran.

The third category consisted of representatives of the PLO, Syria and Algeria which had joined the American peace initiative but which sent delegations to Tehran in order to deflect the heat of the conference resolutions. The PLO was represented by Shaykh 'Abd al-Hamid al-Sa'ih, chairman of the PNC, whose task was to defend the PLO decision to sanction a Palestinian delegation at Madrid and prevent any challenge by Hamas to the PLO's representative standing. 'Abd al-'Aziz Belkhadem, speaker of the Algerian parliament and a leader of the ruling party, represented official Algeria and was there to prevent a shift of Iranian support away from the Algerian regime and toward its Islamic opposition. Syria sent an official delegation whose mission was to assure that the conference resolutions did not denounce the states participating in the Madrid conference by name and, in particular, that no criticism be leveled at Syria. In order to accommodate these delegations, Iran convened the conference with the formal purpose of supporting the Intifada, not of denouncing Madrid. Algeria's Belkhadem was thus able to state: "The Tehran conference is not related to the Middle East peace conference. I came here to express support for the Palestinian Intifada."¹²⁶

The rest of the conferees comprised a grab bag: in an effort to pack the conference, Iran welcomed all. Oddities included Walid Junblat, chief of Lebanon's Druze community, who, although hardly an Islamic zealot, had drawn closer to Hizballah and its Iranian sponsors for tactical reasons. Also in attendance was Shaykh As'ad Bayyud al-Tamimi, the octogenarian leader of the Bayt al-Maqdis faction of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, who had hailed Saddam Husayn as caliph earlier in the year, but was veering to another extreme in his search for a hero who would liberate some part of Palestine.

In one respect, the proceedings of the Tehran conference were wholly predictable. Speaker after speaker rejected the very existence of Israel and condemned the US for its attempts to impose the Jewish state upon Islam. Velayati called Madrid "a ridiculous show." To his mind, the only solution lay in the "elimination" of the "Zionist regime" and the return of Palestine to the Muslims.¹²⁷ 'Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, former Iranian ambassador to Syria and godfather of Hizballah, went so far as to declare that the Madrid participants "may be killed with impunity."¹²⁸

Yet the Tehran conference could not conceal the differences among its own participants over Madrid. This produced some acrimonious exchanges. "Hasn't the PLO ganged up with Zionists today?" asked Ahmad Khomeyni in the presence of the PLO delegation under Shaykh al-Sa'ih. "Hasn't 'Arafat joined hands with Bush today?"¹²⁹ A Hamas representative informed the conference that the PLO did not represent all the Palestinian people, and that those Palestinians slated to appear at Madrid were "merchants, seeking cheap publicity."¹³⁰ In a heated exchange, Shaykh Husayn Ghabris, a Lebanese cleric, demanded that Shaykh al-Sa'ih resign from the presidency of the PNC in protest against the decision to go to Madrid.¹³¹ Sa'ih countered by pointing out that the Palestinian people themselves, through the PNC, had opted for participation in the Madrid conference.¹³²

Syria's decision to participate in the Madrid conference also struck a discordant note, although the discord was confined to the media. According to the Syrian media, Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati met with members of the Syrian delegation to the Tehran conference and expressed his "appreciation" for Syria's position on Madrid (a position in favor of participation),¹³³ but according to Iran's media, Velayati told the Syrians that Madrid "serves solely the interests of the Zionist regime."¹³⁴ Whatever the truth, however, no one took Syria to task in the conference itself, even though its decision did not differ in essence from the PLO's.

The final 28-point declaration of the conference called "the Zionist regime" a "fictitious and illegitimate entity" which would have to be "eliminated" through "all-out Jihad." The declaration called for the creation of an Islamic fund to support the Intifada and an Islamic army to liberate Palestine, and urged Islamists in parliaments everywhere to form parliamentary committees for the same purpose.¹³⁵ Yet the declaration did not specifically denounce any state for its participation in the Madrid conference, or the PLO for allowing the participation of West Bank and Gazan Palestinians. Despite its strident tone, the final declaration represented a compromise, demonstrating the obstacles to the formation of any alliance against the US initiative. Nevertheless, the conference did initiate Iran's effort to bring opponents and skeptics of the peace process into some alignment — and into Tehran's own orbit.

The next step involved the transformation of the Tehran conference into a permanent organization. The participants urged the creation of a permanent secretariat that would work to implement the resolutions of the conference.¹³⁶ At the end of the deliberations, Majlis deputy 'Abd al-Vahid Musavi Lari was elected to head this secretariat, which was to have its headquarters in Tehran and branches throughout the world.¹³⁷ Mohtashemi, in his customarily strident tone, declared that the creation of an Islamic army would also be implemented. "This is not mere talk," he announced. "This enormous potential exists and the Iranians are prepared for sacrifice and Jihad, whether in an organized war and a regular army or through qualitative suicide operations all over the world, not just in Palestine, but against the Zionists throughout the world."¹³⁸

The Tehran conference demonstrated the double nature of Iran's policy. Iran professed neutrality during the Gulf War, worked to improve its relations with the Arab clients of the US, and secured the release of the last American and British hostages — policies that served the national interest. Yet Iran also raised the slogan of Islam as a world power, bolstered Hizballah in Lebanon, and appealed to a wide spectrum of radical groups to assault the US-brokered peace process — policies that

asserted the primacy of Islam. By raising dualism to an art, Iran was able to win world praise for its moderation even as it preached Jihad.

ISLAMIC SUMMIT IN DAKAR

By the end of the year, the new world order in the ME looked suspiciously like the old one. No one had paid the ultimate price of political error. Saddam Husayn remained secure behind his praetorian guards, and the emir of Kuwait returned to his palaces. No new borders were drawn, no territory changed hands. Political scientists launched massive projects to scour the ME for seeds of democracy, without any notable success. The ME remained bound up in the old contest between authoritarian states and authoritarian oppositions — a contest conducted largely in the political language of Islam.

The states had long since forged a collective instrument for this purpose: the ICO's triennial summit conferences. These were rituals of solidarity meant to persuade Muslim peoples and the world that Islam was moving toward unity. The summits were intended to show Muslim heads of state bent over one planning table and shoulder-to-shoulder in prayer. But in the divided state of Islam, even this ritual became difficult to carry off. The ICO convened its sixth summit conference in Dakar, Senegal, from 9–12 December, but half the players never appeared.

THE ABSENT ARABS

The first ICO summit ever set in Africa had been scheduled for the fateful month of January 1991, which meant that it had to be postponed. But ICO Secretary-General Hamid Algabid was not willing to postpone it indefinitely, even if the Gulf War wounds had not healed. The ICO's charter called for triennial summit conferences. It was preferable to risk the embarrassment of a divided conference than the ridicule of repeated postponement. Furthermore, the African Muslim states put great store in the selection of Dakar. Even if the Arab states could not agree, could they not set aside their differences to demonstrate Afro-Arab solidarity in Islam? Saudi Arabia had already assisted Senegalese President Abdou Diouf with more than \$130m. for the construction of an appropriate summit facility and adjoining hotel named after Saudi King Fahd.

But King Fahd did not come. Neither did Husni Mubarak of Egypt, Hafiz al-Asad of Syria, Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi of Libya, Zayn al-'Abidin Ben 'Ali of Tunisia or Hasan II of Morocco. Only six of the 21 Arab heads of state attended. The absences arose from the lingering resentments of the Gulf War, and in particular from the presence at the summit of PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat. The absent Arab heads of state had not yet forgiven him for romancing Saddam Husayn, and especially did not wish to be trapped by 'Arafat in an unwanted bear hug before cameras. So they sent their foreign ministers to the Dakar summit in their stead. Senegalese host Abdou Diouf pronounced himself "very disappointed" at the absence of Arab heads of state, since African members of the ICO would see this as "concerted policy by Arab states, no matter what good or bad reasons they gave for their absence." According to Abdou Diouf, "we respect the Arabs more than they respect us, and this sixth summit of the ICO is an example."¹³⁹

Without the full battery of heads of state, the summit could not fulfill its ritual function as a display of unity. Nevertheless, the absent leaders had no intention of turning over the proceedings to the likes of 'Arafat, and their foreign ministers worked to assure the constancy of the ICO position on war against Iraq and peace with Israel. It was a foregone conclusion that Saudi Arabia would push through a resolution for continued sanctions against Iraq, and that Iraq would boycott the summit. The Saudis in particular bore their grudge openly. The Saudi Crown Prince 'Abdallah Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz pointedly shook 'Arafat's hand instead of embracing him, a gesture intended as a rebuke,¹⁴⁰ and exchanged sharp words with King Husayn over Jordan's stand in the Gulf crisis.¹⁴¹

ZIONISM AND JIHAD

The settling of Gulf scores notwithstanding, the conference quickly moved on to the Arab-Israeli peace process, which was restored to the top of the Islamic agenda. Nothing the summit could decide would have the least effect on the outcome of that process, but the debates indicated just how divided the ICO's membership remained. Two issues figured prominently in the deliberations. First, should the summit endorse or repudiate the initiative for the repeal of the 1975 UN General Assembly resolution equating Zionism with racism?¹⁴² Second, should the Dakar summit reiterate or repudiate the declaration and resolutions of the 1981 Mecca summit, which first pledged Jihad for the liberation of Jerusalem? (On the ICO and Jihad, see *MECS* 1980-81, pp. 124, 128-29.)

On the issue of "Zionism is racism," Syria, Iran and the PLO joined together to denounce the attempt to repeal the 1975 resolution, while Egypt and Jordan took a contrary position. In the end, the summit decided to oppose attempts to annul the resolution "until the reasons for its adoption disappear." According to Bangladesh's foreign minister, this decision would not harm the Arab-Israeli peace process: "We would like to see peace first and then anything can be withdrawn. Now the timing is not right. It could come later."¹⁴³ In the event, the reaffirmation of the UN resolution did not prevent 10 ICO members from abstaining from the vote of repeal in the UN General Assembly in New York a few days later.

However, 'Arafat pushed too hard when he asked the Dakar summit to reiterate the pledge of the 1981 Mecca summit, calling for Jihad for the liberation of Jerusalem. Apparently, he had decided to make an issue of the Jihad pledge in order to outflank his own Islamic opposition at home. But a great deal had changed over the previous decade. During those years, Jihad had been invoked too often as a justification for assassination and abduction of both Muslims and Westerners by a wide array of Muslim extremists. Spin control of a Jihad pledge would be more difficult than it once had been. Furthermore, in a world moving toward the dream of global peace, a Jihad pledge would strike Western public opinion as anachronistic, even primitive. Lastly, most members of the ICO supported the Arab-Israeli peace process, a point that would be difficult to reconcile with a Jihad appeal.

The Senegalese successfully carried the flag against 'Arafat's proposal. "The political situation has changed," declared Senegal's Foreign Minister Djibo Ka. "The ICO summit encourages the current Middle East peace process on the basis of the exchange of land for peace."¹⁴⁴ Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin believed it would be "inconsistent to talk about a Jihad to resolve the Middle East problem when the

Middle East peace process has already started."¹⁴⁵ 'Arafat expressed indignation. He could do without money or weapons, so he claimed, "but don't take away the Jihad. Leave us the word." He reminded the summit that "you publicly committed yourselves at the Mecca summit in 1981 to continuing the Jihad for liberating holy Jerusalem and the occupied territories. I am astonished now that you have abandoned this commitment."¹⁴⁶ When Abdou Diouf kept him off the floor during the last debate on the subject, 'Arafat stormed out of the conference. But this was all smoke and mirrors in order to indulge the Palestinian audience at home. In his summit speech, 'Arafat called the negotiations with Israel "an historic and important occasion which should not be countered by complications or provocations."¹⁴⁷ In the end, the conference statement did not mention Jihad. Instead it hailed the Arab-Israeli peace process and called for a "just and global peace on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the land-for-peace formula."¹⁴⁸

In the absence of so many Arab heads of state, many of those who did attend decided to quit early, including King Husayn, who was disappointed that he could not meet with leaders he had wanted to see, and Algeria's Chedli Benjedid, who did not even deliver his speech but had it handed out after his premature departure. Reviewing the summit, *The Economist* opined that "the ICO may be ready to join the non-aligned movement and the Group of 77 in the junkyard of history."¹⁴⁹

IRAN'S SUMMIT BLITZ

Still, the ICO made a striking new convert at Dakar: the Islamic Republic of Iran. Neither the Shah nor Khomeyni had put much store in the ICO, which they had both regarded as a pliant tool of their Saudi rivals. No Iranian delegation at any level had attended any of the previous three ICO summit conferences held since Iran's revolution. But President Rafsanjani thought it possible to use ICO summitry to promote his vision of Islam as an emerging world power.

Rafsanjani therefore took the bold step of attending the Dakar summit as head of state. In the absence of many Arab leaders, he cut the largest figure on the scene, conducting a dizzying series of bilateral meetings, including one with Saudi Crown Prince 'Abdallah, the highest-level contact between Iran and Saudi Arabia since 1979. The Iranian media gave extensive and positive coverage to his doings, portraying him as a wise statesman in the midst of quarreling and petty Arabs. Iran's attitude to ICO summitry now swung to the other extreme, and Foreign Minister Velayati announced Tehran's desire to host the seventh summit of the ICO, scheduled for 1994. Indeed, argued Velayati, this was Iran's "right," since it had never hosted either a foreign ministers' or a summit conference of the ICO.¹⁵⁰ The Saudis, however, perhaps not quite convinced that Iran could be trusted, claimed the right to host the next summit: Rafsanjani would first have to pray in Mecca as the guest of King Fahd. But it was agreed that Iran would host the eighth summit, scheduled for 1997.¹⁵¹

Regarding the Arab-Israeli peace process, there could be no doubt about Iran's preference. Rafsanjani favored a pledge of Jihad for Jerusalem, and Iran expressed "strong reservations" concerning the summit resolution endorsing the peace process.¹⁵² But these reservations were not accompanied by attacks on the ICO itself. Iran even sponsored a new ICO member: Rafsanjani flew into Dakar with an official delegation from newly independent Azerbaijan, which promptly applied for membership. Rafsanjani had executed a remarkable turnabout on the ICO, comparable to the

swing in Iran's pilgrimage policy. The ultimate objective was to share in the control of the ICO and ultimately to turn it around.

In the meantime, however, Saudi Arabia still set the agenda of the ICO's secretariat. At the Dakar summit, Saudi Arabia announced a donation of \$10m. toward the activities of the secretariat,¹⁵³ which was enough to keep Secretary-General Algabid flying, although the organization's membership arrears totaled \$59m.¹⁵⁴ Saudi Arabia also tried to soothe the hurt pride of the African Muslim members, waiving \$310m. in debts owed by eight African members of the ICO.¹⁵⁵ The summit also passed a resolution calling for (Western) compensation to African countries that were stripped of their assets by (Western) colonialism. (A similar resolution had been passed at an Organization of African Unity summit in Nigeria, but it had also asked compensation for the slave trade. The ICO resolution omitted all reference to compensation for slave trading, presumably because this could have been read as obligating Arab Muslims to bear a share of such compensation as well.)¹⁵⁶

It was far too early to tell whether the Dakar summit signaled a subtle shift in the internal balance of Islam. However, Iran's bid did suggest that the ICO — "a pallid creature," in the words of *The Economist*, "without much sense of purpose"¹⁵⁷ — stood to become hotly contested ground, and that Saudi Arabia would need to strive still harder to keep the consensus of Muslim states in its orbit.

In fact, all the Muslim states would have to strive still harder to retain their control of Islam. Away from the conference halls, Islam had become more vital than at any time in recent history. The Islamists increasingly challenged the establishment Islam of governments and put forward a rival vision of a solution to the ills that afflicted Muslim peoples. It was a very different vision of a world order, predicated on perpetual struggle. Ahmad Khomeyni, son of the man who had started it all, encapsulated the vision in one sentence: "After the fall of Marxism, Islam replaced it, and as long as Islam exists, US hostility exists, and as long as US hostility exists, the struggle exists."¹⁵⁸

On 26 December, the FIS in Algeria shocked the world and thrilled Islamists by scoring an overwhelming electoral victory against the ruling party. Although the victory was to be nullified two weeks later by a military coup, the electoral results signaled the daunting breadth of Muslim resentment born on a wave of poverty and youth. Many more Muslim voices now shouted the slogans of unity — but not in unison.

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

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2. AFP, 10 January — DR, 11 January 1991.
3. Saddam's speech, R. Baghdad, VoM, 11 January — DR, 14 January 1991.
4. R. Baghdad, 11 January — DR, 14 January 1991.

5. SPA, 11 January — DR, 14 January; *AAI*, 14 January; al-Tadamun al-Islami, Sha'ban 1411 (February 1991); *al-Rabita*, March 1991.
6. INA, 8 January — DR, 8 January 1991.
7. SPA, 11 January — DR, 11 January 1991.
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10. Interview with Algabid, *al-'Alam*, 22 June 1991.
11. Text of final statement of the Cairo meeting, Egyptian Space Channel, 21 February — DR, 22 February 1991.
12. KUNA, 3 April — DR, 5 April 1991.
13. SWB, 21 January 1991.
14. *Al-Ra'y* (Amman), 23 January — DR, 25 January 1991.
15. AFP, 21 January — DR, 22 January; cf. *The Star*, 24–30 January; Tamimi's interview, *Kull al-'Arab*, 21 January 1991.
16. *Al-Ra'y* (Amman), 22 January 1991.
17. *Al-Afkar*, 1 April 1991.
18. See also Hugh Roberts, "A Trial of Strength: Algerian Islamism," in Piscatori, pp. 131–54.
19. See also Beverly Milton-Edwards, "A Temporary Alliance With the Crown: The Islamic Response in Jordan," *ibid.*, pp. 88–108.
20. *JT*, 13 March 1991.
21. Ramadan address by Sha'rawi, *Kull al-Nas*, April 1991.
22. *Al-'Alam* (London), 26 January 1991.
23. Interview with Hudaybi, *al-Musawwar*, 1 February 1991.
24. See also Gehad Auda, "An Uncertain Response: The Islamic Movement in Egypt," in Piscatori, pp. 109–30.
25. Hamas communiqué, 22 January, *Filastin al-Muslima*, February 1991.
26. Interview with Quqa, *al-'Alam* (London), 26 January 1991.
27. *Sawt al-Sha'b* (Amman), 7 March — DR, 19 March; *al-Dustur* (Amman), 26 March — DR, 27 March 1991. See also Jean-François Legrain, "A Defining Moment: Palestinian Islamic Fundamentalism," in Piscatori, pp. 70–87.
28. E.g., interview with Ibrahim Ghawsha of Hamas, *Filastin al-Muslima*, May 1991.
29. Statement by Abu al-Nasr, *al-Mukhtar al-Islami*, June 1991.
30. Interview with Hudaybi, *ibid.*, August 1991.
31. Interview with Dr. Ahmad al-Mallat, *al-Hilal al-Duwali*, 1 September 1991.
32. *Al-Qadisiyya*, 25 August — DR, 29 August 1991.
33. *Al-Jumhuriyya* (Baghdad), 28 October 1991.
34. R. Riyadh, 26 March — DR, 27 March 1991.
35. R. Algiers, 30 March — DR, 9 April 1991.
36. *ME*, September 1991.
37. *NYT*, 1 March 1992.
38. *Dawn*, 19 February — DR, 21 February 1991.
39. *Al-Jazira al-'Arabiyya*, November 1991.
40. Interview with Nasif, *al-Liwa al-Islami*, 29 August 1991.
41. *Al-Liwa al-Islami*, 25 April 1991.
42. The first conference met in Cairo in 1988 and dealt with the problems of youth. The second conference met in Baghdad in 1989 to discuss the question of peace in Islam. The third conference met in Cairo in 1990 to consider ways to promote cooperation among Muslims.
43. Accounts of the conference, *al-Liwa al-Islami*, 25 April; *Akhir Sa'a*, 1 May; *al-Tasawwuf al-Islami*, June 1991.
44. Text of the resolutions, MENA, 27 April — DR, 29 April; *al-Umma al-Islamiyya*, June; *al-Rabita*, June 1991.
45. *MEI*, 16 August 1991.
46. INA, 4 December — DR, 4 December 1991.
47. JNA, 8 August — DR, 9 August 1991.
48. *FR*, 11 April 1991.
49. *JT*, 4–5 April 1991.
50. *L'Express*, 22 March 1991.

51. *FR*, 11 April 1991.
52. See Martin Kramer, "The Prospects of Islamic Revival," *The Middle East in the Aftermath of the Gulf War: Précis of a Colloquium* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1992), p. 26.
53. *The Economist*, 4–10 April 1992.
54. According to one source, representatives of the major Islamist movements met in Lahore, Pakistan, in mid-February, following Iraq's announcement that it would withdraw from Kuwait. The gathering, convened by Qazi Husayn Ahmad, president of Pakistan's Jama'ate Islami, included representatives from the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian Muslim Brethren, the National Islamic Front in Sudan, al-Nahda Party in Tunisia, the Palestinian Hamas, and the Afghan Mujahidin factions led by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani, and 'Abd Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf. They pledged themselves to the "complete liberation" of Palestine, victory for the Afghan Mujahidin, and support for Kashmiri self-determination. They also denounced the existing borders between states as legacies of imperialism. *Al-Mukhtar al-Islami*, April 1991.
55. Turabi's speech, *al-Islam wa-Filastin*, 28 June 1991.
56. Summaries of resolutions, *al-Inqadh al-Watani*, 29 April; *al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*, 8 May 1991.
57. *MEI*, 1 May 1992.
58. *Le Monde*, 12 July 1991.
59. Interview with Hudaybi, *al-Mukhtar al-Islami*, August 1991.
60. *MEI*, 20 March 1992, quoting Turabi's interview in *al-Quds al-'Arabi*.
61. Report of Turabi's lecture in London, *MEI*, 1 May 1992.
62. For the background of that relationship, see John O. Voll, "Islamization in the Sudan and the Iranian Revolution," in John L. Esposito (ed.), *The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact* (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990), pp. 283–301.
63. *Al-Wafd*, 2 June 1991; *MEI*, 20 March 1992.
64. R. SPLA, 11 April — DR, 16 April 1991. Ghannushi later announced he had returned his Sudanese passport; the Tunisian authorities then claimed he had begun to travel on an Iranian diplomatic passport.
65. *MEI*, 20 March 1992, quoting Turabi's interview in *al-Quds al-'Arabi*.
66. *MEI*, 7 February 1992.
67. *NYT*, 26 January 1992.
68. *Ibid.*
69. Interview with Zahhar, *Ha'aretz*, 23 August — DR, 27 August 1991.
70. See also Said Amir Arjomand, "A Victory for the Pragmatists: The Islamic Fundamentalist Reaction in Iran," in Piscatori, pp. 52–69.
71. *Jerusalem Report*, 6 June 1991.
72. *Kayhan* (Tehran), 3 March — DR, 13 March; IRNA, 3 March — DR, 4 March 1991.
73. Rafsanjani's interview, *Der Spiegel*, translated in *Ha'aretz*, 1 April 1991.
74. See also Amatzia Baram, "From Radicalism to Radical Pragmatism: The Shi'ite Fundamentalist Opposition Movements of Iraq," in Piscatori, pp. 28–51.
75. Interview with 'Abbas al-Musawi, *Kayhan* (Tehran), 18 December 1990 — DR, 2 January 1991.
76. *Jl*, 3 July 1991.
77. *Ibid.*, 9 December — DR, 16 December 1991.
78. *Abrar*, 25 April — DR, 17 May 1991.
79. *IHT*, 13 December 1991.
80. IRNA, 5 March — DR, 14 March; *al-Hilal al-Duwali*, 4 April 1991. The sponsor was the 15th of Khordad Foundation.
81. *IHT*, 13 July 1991.
82. Official quoted by Leslie Gelb, *NYT*, 29 December 1991.
83. Paul Theroux in *NYT*, 13 February 1992.
84. For the dynamics of this intra-Shi'i struggle, see Martin Kramer, "Sacrifice and Fratricide in Shi'ite Lebanon," in M. Juergensmeyer (ed.), *Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World* (London: Cass, 1992).
85. See Martin Kramer, "Hizbullah: The Calculus of Jihad," in M. Marty and R. S. Appleby (eds.), *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Militance, and Economies*

- (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992), *The Fundamentalism Project*, Vol. 3, pp. 539–56.
86. Text of Islamic Jihad letter, *NYT*, 13 August 1991.
 87. Background articles on the releases in *FR*, 13 June, 22 August; *NYT*, 9, 18 August, 13 September, 21 October; *Ha'aretz*, 9 August; *Monday Morning*, 9 December; *ME*, September, November 1991, January 1992. See also Jim Muir's reportage in *MEI* during this period.
 88. Voice of the Oppressed, 16 August — DR, 16 August 1991.
 89. Interview with Fadlallah, *Monday Morning*, 13 May 1991.
 90. Interview with Hizballah Secretary-General Subhi al-Tufayli, *ibid.*, 22 April 1991.
 91. *Ibid.*
 92. Interview with 'Abbas al-Musawi, *al-Hayat* (London), 18 July — DR, 23 July 1991.
 93. Interview with Tufayli, *op. cit.* Later in the year there were reports that Iran had informed the Lebanese Government of its intention to withdraw the contingent in stages; *MEI*, 25 October 1991.
 94. Interview with Tufayli, *op. cit.*
 95. Interview with Fadlallah, *op. cit.*
 96. Interview with Husayn al-Musawi, *KI*, 22 December 1990 — DR, 4 January 1991.
 97. Voice of the Oppressed, 12 December — DR, 12 December 1991.
 98. Interview with Tufayli, *op. cit.*
 99. On Musawi's career, see Martin Kramer, "Musawi's Game," *New Republic*, 23 March 1992.
 100. For comprehensive accounts of Hizballah's offensive, see *JP*, 2 August; *FR*, 5 December 1991.
 101. *NYT Magazine*, 26 January 1992.
 102. For general assessments of the 1991 pilgrimage, see *ME*, May; *al-'Alam* (London), 8 June; *Le Monde*, 22 June; *MEI*, 28 June; *Iran Focus*, July-August 1991.
 103. AFP, 11 February — DR, 12 February 1991.
 104. *Al-'Alam* (London), 11 May 1991.
 105. *NYT*, 10 February 1991.
 106. Letter of appointment, R. Tehran, 6 April — DR, 8 April. He replaced Mehdi Karrubi, who had been Khomeini's representative to the 1987 pilgrimage; *al-'Alam* (London), 20 April 1991.
 107. R. Tehran, 8 April — DR, 9 April 1991.
 108. Letter of resignation, R. Tehran, 14 April — DR, 16 April; *MEI*, 19 April 1991.
 109. Letter of appointment, R. Tehran, 26 April — DR, 29 April 1991.
 110. Velayati and Reyshahri gave an account of these negotiations on Tehran TV, 20 July — DR, 24 July 1991.
 111. *Al-'Alam* (London), 8 June 1991.
 112. Text of Khamene'i message, R. Tehran, 19, 20 June — DR, 20, 21 June 1991.
 113. IRNA, 29 June — DR, 1 July 1991.
 114. IRNA, 9 May — DR, 10 May; R. Tehran, 9 July — DR, 10 July 1991.
 115. Iran boycotted the pilgrimage in 1927 and in 1944–47 in light of Saudi treatment of Shi'i holy sites and Iranian pilgrims. For the previous cycles and their contexts, see Martin Kramer, "Khomeini's Messengers: The Disputed Pilgrimage of Islam," in E. Sivan and M. Friedman (eds.), *Religious Radicalism and Politics in the Middle East* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), pp. 174–97.
 116. INA, 10 June — DR, 10 June 1991.
 117. *NYT*, 14 June 1991.
 118. *Al-Ribat*, 30 April 1991.
 119. Voice of the Oppressed, 31 October — DR, 31 October 1991. Peace could only be achieved, said a Hizballah statement on the eve of the Madrid conference, "by eliminating Israel from existence and liberating all the territories of usurped Palestine." Voice of the Oppressed, 29 October — DR, 29 October 1991.
 120. Ghawsha's interview, R. Monte Carlo, 31 October — DR, 1 November 1991.
 121. Ibrahim Ghawsha, quoted in *Filastin al-Muslima*, November 1991.
 122. Interview with Fadlallah, *Monday Morning*, 19 August 1991.

123. Interview with 'Abbas al-Musawi, *al-Hayat* (Cairo), 18 July — DR, 23 July 1991.
124. Hamas statement of 23 September, *al-Ra'y* (Amman), 24 September — DR, 25 September 1991.
125. *MEI*, 25 October, 8 November 1991. Both accounts suggested that Rafsanjani disapproved of the initiative to hold the conference.
126. Belkhadem's interview, *Ettela'at*, 23 October — DR, 8 November 1991.
127. IRNA, 21 October — DR, 23 October 1991.
128. *Ibid.*, 30 October — DR, 31 October 1991. The remarks were not made during the Tehran conference, but immediately afterward.
129. *Ibid.*, 20 October — DR, 21 October 1991.
130. *Ibid.*, 21 October — DR, 23 October 1991.
131. *Al-Ahram al-Duwali*, 21 October 1991.
132. Sa'ih's remarks, *ibid.*, *al-Ra'y* (Amman), *al-Dustur* (Amman), 22 October 1991.
133. R. Damascus, 22 October — DR, 23 October 1991.
134. IRNA, 22 October — DR, 23 October 1991.
135. Conference declaration, Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 22 October — DR, 23 October; *Ji*, 23 October; *al-Hilal al-Duwali*, 16 November; *Filastin al-Muslima*, November 1991.
136. Conference declaration, R. Tehran in English, 22 October — DR, 23 October 1991.
137. IRNA, 23 October — DR, 24 October 1991.
138. Interview with Mohtashemi, *al-Diyar*, 28 October — DR, 19 November 1991.
139. Interview with Abdou Diouf, *Le Monde*, 10 December 1991.
140. AFP, 12 December — DR, 12 December 1991.
141. R. Cairo, 11 December — DR, 11 December 1991.
142. See Bernard Lewis, "The Anti-Zionist Resolution," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 55 (October 1976), pp. 54–64.
143. AFP, 8 December — DR, 9 December 1991.
144. *Ibid.*, 12 December — DR, 12 December 1991.
145. Interview with Çetin, TRT TV, Ankara, 12 December — DR, 13 December 1991.
146. Algiers TV, 12 December — SWB, 14 December 1991.
147. 'Arafat's speech, VoP (Algiers), 11 December — DR, 12 December; AFP, 10 December — DR, 11 December 1991.
148. MAP, 12 December — DR, 12 December 1991.
149. *The Economist*, 3 January 1992.
150. IRNA, 6 December — DR, 9 December 1991.
151. SPA, 6 January 1992.
152. IRIB TV, 12 December — DR, 13 December; interview with Velayati, R. Tehran, 12 December — SWB, 14 December 1991.
153. Speech by Prince 'Abdallah Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, SPA, 10 December — DR, 13 December 1991.
154. AFP, 10 December — DR, 11 December 1991.
155. SPA, 11 December — DR, 13 December 1991.
156. BBC World Service, 11 December — DR, 13 December 1991. For the origins of Arab apprehension on this score, see Bernard Lewis, *Race and Slavery in the Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
157. *The Economist*, 3 January 1992.
158. Khomeyni's speech, 20 October — DR, 21 October 1991.