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TOWARDS A MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL SECURITY REGIME?

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Regional security regimes come in different flavors. They usually emerge from recognition by a group of regional states that they stand to enhance their security by cooperating with one another, either to regulate their own conflicts or to ward off an extra-regional challenger. It is not necessarily the case that *only* regional states can sustain such a regime, with NATO a prime example. NATO is focused on protecting the security of democratic Europe, and even though it binds Europe to the United States in a transatlantic partnership, still there exists a high level of security coordination among the European members of NATO, who are also linked together in the machinery of the European Union.

The Middle East, by contrast, has no equivalent of NATO or the European Union. More than half a century after decolonization, it remains fragmented, with low levels of cooperation among its constituent parts and a high degree of dependence for security on external actors such as the United States and (increasingly) Russia.

This chronic fragmentation made possible the success of Zionism in transforming a small community into a powerful nation-state in less than a century. This is not to detract from the grit of Israel's founders, or the ingenuity of Israelis today. Their achievements in the security field are the stuff of legends. However, they always had the advantage of working against a weak and divided adversary. Zionists learned from experience that security came from a combination of reliance on outside Western powers and self-reliance for those instances when a supportive power might be preoccupied or unreliable. At no time did they regard the region itself as anything other than inhospitable and a source of *insecurity*.

To understand why Israel has put so little store in regional security, it is necessary to go back in history and examine the abortive attempts undertaken over time to include Israel, and before that the Jewish community in Palestine, in some sort of regional order. This survey will take us back to the earliest years of political Zionism, through the gestation and establishment of the state, via decades of war and peace treaties, up to the present day. The story is one of repeated failures, but a parallel story of repeated successes, as Israel reinforced its level of security through reliable sources beyond its immediate geopolitical environment.

Since the past does not predict the future, this chapter will end with a review of present prospects. At this moment, many observers do believe there has never been a better chance of creating a functioning regional security regime than today.

Pre-state attempts at regional security

When political Zionism first appeared on the world stage, Palestine had long been part of one of the world's most durable regional security regimes: the Ottoman Empire. Palestine had spent almost 400 years under Ottoman dominion, most of them as a minor province useful to the Ottoman state as a buffer blocking the eastward expansion of Christian or Western powers.

Theodor Herzl, founder of modern political Zionism, thought that a Jewish home in Palestine could be fostered through an agreement with the Ottoman sultan, who would grant a charter to the Zionists in return for economic and political support. This plan came to naught: the Ottoman Empire, by then weakened through military defeats and geographic contraction, had come to rely increasingly on the loyalty of its Muslim subjects, who would have regarded any such concession to Jewish Zionists as a betrayal of Islam.

Failure of overtures to the Sublime Porte left Herzl and the Zionist movement in limbo, awaiting the final dissolution of Ottoman power and the collapse of the regional order. "Some day I shall probably get the charter," wrote Herzl in his diary in 1902, "that is, provided we don't get it until after Turkey is divided, from the powers."¹ Herzl did not live long enough to witness that scenario, but he clearly anticipated it. To take root and thrive, Zionism would need the patronage and protection of extraneous Great Powers prepared to impose their will on the region from the outside. This was the guiding assumption of most Zionist diplomacy before the First World War. For this reason, he assiduously cultivated all of the European powers that might eventually claim Palestine as their share of the spoils. Zionism thus developed on two tracks, as a popular movement of Jewish self-reliance and as a political organization devoted to seeking an overarching shell of Western protection. The Zionists were thus led to prefer a region organized not from within, but from without.

The opening for implementing this strategy finally came as part of the denouement of the First World War, which brought about the demise of the Ottoman Empire and ended in Palestine's incorporation within the British Empire, nominally as a League of Nations mandate. The post-war regional security regime would be European, not Middle Eastern, and would rest upon British and French power. A group of Zionists in Britain, led by a Russian Jewish immigrant, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, had the foresight to imagine that the war might end just this way, and secured from Britain an advance promise to support the establishment of a "Jewish national home" in Palestine. It would indeed be under Britain's aegis and security umbrella that Zionism would achieve critical mass. In 1917, in all of Palestine there lived only 60,000 Jews, who comprised but a tenth of the overall population. Thirty years later, that number had increased tenfold, and Jews were a third of the population.

Throughout this interwar and Palestine mandate period sporadic efforts were made to accommodate Zionism within some local security framework, which the British hoped to construct, and which would have relieved Britain of both the expense and trouble of direct control. The first instance occurred in 1918–1919, when the British encouraged Weizmann to reach an understanding with their principal Arab protégé, the Emir Faisal, then leading the British-backed Arab Revolt against the Ottomans. Weizmann set out for the desert east of the Jordan River to meet with Faisal. A photograph of the two men standing together in June 1918, Weizmann dressed incongruously in Arab headdress (and a linen suit), would become the iconic representation of this earliest attempt at Jewish–Arab rapprochement. In Paris the following January, the two even signed an agreement of cooperation between the Zionist and Arab national movements.

Had Faisal been given the expansive Arab kingdom he thought the British had promised his family, and which Faisal imagined he would rule from Damascus, the agreement with Weizmann

might have become operational. Under its terms, the Jewish community in Palestine would have enjoyed some measure of national independence, in partnership with a much larger Arab state or federation. The British and French ultimately refused, however, to open enough space for Faisal to realize his kingdom. Faisal "came to a complete understanding with us," wrote Weizmann, "and would no doubt have carried this understanding into effect if his destiny had shaped as we at that time expected it would. Unfortunately . . . he was unable to realize his ambitions."² After the Faisal–Weizmann agreement fell into abeyance, Zionism continued to rely on Britain and its willingness to employ force in opposition to a growing Arab nationalist demand for independence, including in Palestine.

During the 1930s, Zionists and Arab nationalists held a new round of parleys, again encouraged by the British, as Britain once more contemplated ways to reduce its footprint in the region. By then, David Ben-Gurion had assumed a leading role in conducting Zionist diplomacy, alongside Weizmann, and both of them had a succession of meetings with Arab leaders, Palestinian and other. Assorted intermediaries also busied themselves with proposals for Arab–Jewish rapprochement. This time the new regional framework was envisioned as some sort of British-sanctioned Arab federation. Even Winston Churchill, in 1941, thought regional integration worth exploring:

If such a basis were reached, it is possible that the Jewish State of Western Palestine might form an independent Federal Unit in the Arab Caliphate. This Jewish State would have to have the fullest rights of self-government, including immigration and development.³

These initiatives as well ultimately proved fruitless: first, because of rivalries among Arab leaders; second, because no Arab leader was prepared to extend more than limited autonomy to the Jews in the framework of a pan-Arab state. The Zionists, for their part, insisted upon their own sovereign state in loose federation with its neighbors, and on the basis of shared economic interests. This, again, was more Jewish self-rule than any Arab leader was willing to entertain, and so the Zionists remained locked in their dependence on a foreign power, Britain, at a time when Britain's own power was waning, as was its commitment to the Zionist project.

Never were the Jews more alone in the world than in the early 1940s. The British had set aside their commitment to Zionism with the White Paper of 1939, limiting Jewish immigration and land purchases. No other Great Power offered its patronage at a time when the great concentration of Jewry in Europe, and Zionism's demographic reserve, was being cast into the flames by the Nazis. Perceiving Britain's weakness, Arab nationalists began to imagine their own new post-war regional order – without the British and without the Jews.

In the wake of the Second World War, the dominant security ethos of Israel would be forged in the fire of the Holocaust and would be based on the assumption – reaffirmed by fresh history – that Jews were in fact a people who dwelt alone. This led to three conclusions: it would be a mistake to assume the consistent support of any friend; a Jewish state would have to provide its own defense; and no security architecture could be allowed to substitute for Jewish power.

This approach was vindicated in 1948, when Israel declared its independence and was attacked by virtually all of its Arab neighbors. The Jews essentially won the war on their own. Fortunately, their Arab opponents were disorganized; had they not been, the outcome might have been very different. Israel achieved an astounding victory over a ramshackle Arab coalition that collapsed under the stress of war. But it did so in a manner so humiliating that it insured Israel's pariah status for decades to come.

Post-1948 attempts at regional security

Isolated and boycotted by the Arab world, the new State of Israel under Ben-Gurion's leadership set out with determination to forge a chain of relationships with powers extraneous to the region, in its two-fold pursuit of both weapons and recognition. Partners in the early years included the Soviet Union and France. Closer to home, Israel courted states and movements on the periphery of the Arab Middle East. These included Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia, as well as various minorities opposed to Arab or Muslim supremacy, such as the Maronite Christians of Lebanon and the Kurds of northern Iraq. "There is no need for us to establish an alliance immediately," Ben-Gurion wrote about these relationships in 1958. "But promoting ties of friendship and cooperation – even if secret for now – in areas of science and economics . . . has great value."⁴ This would later be called "the periphery doctrine," but it constituted little more than an ever-shifting series of bilateral ties. In the meantime, Israel was excluded not only from such Arab structures as the Arab League but also from its Western-sponsored alternatives, first and foremost the 1955 Baghdad Pact.

Time and again, Israel's Arab neighbors attempted to organize coalitions, pacts and unions against it. This included, most ominously for Israel, the United Arab Republic (UAR), which unified Egypt and Syria under one command, beginning in 1958. But all of these formations eventually broke up (the UAR did so in 1961), so that in 1967, Israel didn't face enemies embedded in a fully articulated network of mutual security. Instead, the Arab states constituted a mosaic of competing and conflicting interests, without central coordination or even consultation. The Arabs were less than the sum of their parts – and the parts were not exactly models of efficiency, either.

The defeat Israel inflicted on the Arabs over six days in June 1967 represented the turning point in the Middle East geopolitical and security equation. One Jewish state, acting alone, defeated a coalition of Arab states primed for battle by 20 years of intensive pan-Arab and anti-Israel indoctrination. The defeat of 1967 was even more humiliating than 1948, prompting a major reassessment among many Arabs, some of whom concluded that it was not Israeli expansionism that posed a threat to the Arabs but, if anything, Israel's exclusion and isolation. Were Israel somehow incorporated in the region, it could therefore be contained and transformed into a "normal" neighbor. Israel would remain temperamentally aggressive, no doubt, and still alien to its Arab surroundings; but no longer so deeply threatening and destabilizing. In any case, "as a practical matter, the Arabs cannot destroy Israel," announced the Egyptian diplomat Tahsin Bashir, "any more than Israel can destroy the Arabs."⁵

Egyptian president Anwar Sadat was the first to translate this line of reasoning into actual, concrete policy. In 1973, he waged a limited war (in a very loose military partnership with Syria), with the purpose of restoring Egyptian land and honor, both so damaged in 1967. Sadat, however, then sought to go one step further by leveraging Egypt's modest military achievements into a broad peace offensive that would take both Egypt and Israel out of their cycle of perennial wars, and open before Israel a path to regional integration.

When Sadat came to Jerusalem in November 1977 and posed with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin before the cameras, it was the first such historic photo-op since the Faisal-Weizmann meeting in 1918. Israel, Sadat promised, had a place in the security structure of the region. Its status would not be as a tolerated minority and not as a Jewish autonomy, but as a fully sovereign state and Middle Eastern state actor.

But what form might this integration take? After all, since 1967, Israel had gained new prestige in American eyes, with Washington coming to regard Israel as a valuable asset in its own great power drive for regional dominance in opposition to the Soviet Union. Once more,

Israel was encouraged to seek its security not in its relations with its immediate neighbors, but with a distant superpower that insisted on building its own alliance of proxies and clients in the region. Because Israel was too strong to be excluded, as the Arabs now admitted, the United States sought to join Israel and its Arab clients together into one US-led regional security system through something that became nominally known as the “peace process.”

The first objective of this open-ended process was the finalizing of borders and the conclusion of bilateral peace agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors. This took years of patient negotiations, with differing levels of US involvement, but it eventually yielded full peace treaties between Israel and Egypt (1979) and Israel and Jordan (1994). A less comprehensive Oslo agreement was also reached between Israel and the PLO (1993). In parallel, the United States promoted an even more ambitious vision of regional security cooperation on everything from counter-terrorism to water. After the sight of Israeli and Arab leaders shaking hands and smiling before the cameras became fairly commonplace, Israel’s ever-optimistic visionary Shimon Peres, in a moment of enthusiasm, announced the advent of “the new Middle East.”⁶

Yet this development never blossomed into a full-blown regional security regime. There were two reasons. First, the Arabs remained divided among themselves over relations with the United States and over the peace with Israel. Egypt and Jordan were in; Syria and Iraq were out; Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states sat on the sidelines. Even in Egypt and Jordan, both countries that had concluded peace treaties with Israel, significant domestic opposition to “normalization” limited the scope for cooperation. Periodic eruptions of Israeli–Palestinian violence only further fueled this opposition, providing a convenient pretext for keeping Israel at arm’s length.

Second, and just as important, Israel’s strategic ties to the United States continued to deepen. While the “special relationship” expanded into every possible field, its security dimension loomed over everything else and incorporated not just hardware but strategic planning. As Israel came increasingly under the American umbrella, its regional partnerships remained confined largely to the realm of counter-terrorism, with very little joint consideration given to the larger-magnitude threats the region might face.

Israeli security in an era of regional insecurity

In 1957, Middle East analyst Majid Khadduri, in asking why all previous attempts at regional organization of the Middle East had failed, concluded it was “the underlying factors in Middle East society which have constantly militated against building up a regional security structure.” He attached especial significance to “The Balkanization of the Middle East” (by which he meant the post–First World War partition of the Ottoman provinces into separate states) – a phenomenon that he considered to lie “at the root of the regional security problems.”⁷

If that were true in 1957, is it not even truer today? In recent years, the Middle East has undergone a second wave of Balkanization, fragmenting the states that existed 60 years ago into still smaller entities. The regional map has become a patchwork of older states, failed states, newer semi-states and sub-state upstarts. This Balkanization has transformed Israel’s geopolitical environment and changed realities along its borders.

- Proceeding clockwise, from the Mediterranean, one begins in Lebanon, site of a past civil war, where there has been a continuous erosion of central governing authority, never especially strong in the first place. The Iranian-backed *Hizbullah* acts as a state within a state, commanding independent military capabilities of state-like magnitude. So powerful has it become, that it has risen to the top of Israel’s own list of military threats;

- The disintegration of Syria has created another vacuum on Israel's borders. Israel at one point had seriously entertained ceding the Golan Heights in return for "peace" with Syria. Had it done so, the civil war for Syria would have unfolded on the very cusp of the upper Galilee. Syria, once a strong state, has become a weak one, owing its very existence (in truncated borders) to Russian intervention in the air and Iranian intervention on the ground. Meanwhile, the area adjacent to Israel's border has become contested space between regime and opposition;
- To the east, the Palestinians have broken themselves into two antagonistic geographic enclaves, in the West Bank and Gaza. The effect of the secession of *Hamas*-ruled Gaza has been to reduce the legitimacy of the Ramallah-based government of the Palestinian Authority. Effectively, it has also put paid to any prospect of a negotiated Israeli–Palestinian agreement, for lack of a credible Palestinian interlocutor. There is no Palestinian state, but there are two distinct and separate nuclei of one, in bitter rivalry with one another;
- As for Egypt, for a frightening moment in 2011, a surge from below imperiled the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty, the very foundation of regional order. An Islamist president briefly assumed power, and a mob stormed Israel's embassy in Cairo, leading Israelis to wonder whether Egypt after Mubarak might also go the way of Iran after the Shah. Fortunately, events took a different turn following the restoration of military rule. Yet few doubt that at some point the struggle for Egypt will resume; meanwhile, a remnant of that struggle continues between the regime and its Islamist opposition in the Sinai, just over the border with Israel.

Can a viable regional security regime realistically be expected to arise on such fractured foundations? There certainly exists no known precedent for such an outcome. Within this Arab cauldron the more powerful non-Arab states – Israel, Turkey and Iran – act militarily beyond their borders in a routine way. The only European analogies for this situation that come to mind date from before the Second World War.

The US and the regional balance of power

From this brief historical survey of efforts at regional security in the Middle East, one set of conclusions emerge in full relief. The region itself generates insecurity, not security. Different and differing parts are in a perpetual state of disharmony. Only outside powers have ever succeeded in orchestrating something like an alliance – and that, too, only within very circumscribed limits. Not surprisingly, then, Israel continues to look beyond its neighbors and elsewhere for security and for alternative, supplementary sources of power.

These extra-regional sources include, most significantly, (1) the United States, (2) American Jews, (3) friendly European powers, especially Germany, and (4) rising powers such as India and China.

True, Israel seeks active cooperation with Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority in the field of counter-terrorism, in order to guarantee quiet on its own borders. And it keeps a line open to Gulf Arab states in the hope they might moderate the conduct of different factions among the Palestinians. In the final analysis, however, Israel (like the "moderate" Arabs) still looks to Washington to come up with "a plan." The expectation in Jerusalem persists that at there are still Americans who believe that the United States can, should and must play a forward game in the Middle East and that at the end of the day the United States will make good on its commitments to defend its allies, proxies and clients, whatever the cost.

Is there any prospect of this changing? The answer depends primarily on the future orientation and policy choices of the United States, on the degree of Iranian aggressiveness and on the interaction between them. There is a general preference among all of America's partners in the Middle East for the United States to play a proactive role in the region. On the other hand, this presents a paradox of sorts. For when the United States acts with resolve, it actually creates a disincentive for Israel's potential Arab partners to upgrade their own bilateral official or tacit relations with Israel. The reason is that American willingness to bear the burden for regional stability and security inevitably encourages Middle Eastern clients to see Washington as the first and only necessary address for dealing with security challenges. The United States may lecture its clients that they must do more on their own, and do it together with one another, but why should America's Arab allies make plans with Israel, if the United States has planes in the air and boots on the ground?

In the past decade, however, America's role in the Middle East has become less predictable, and its own attitude toward playing a global role more erratic. In retrospect, the 2003 Iraq War represents the high watermark of American involvement in the region. Thereafter, the Obama Administration began a deliberate policy of retrenchment, while the Trump Administration, seeking to undo the legacy of the Obama years, has demonstrated a similar wariness against any deeper entanglement in the Middle East. Clearly, the sharpest break with Obama policy has been over the Iran nuclear deal, from which Trump has withdrawn. Whether the American exit from the deal will lead to an escalation of conflict with Iran, or merely substitute for it, only time will tell.

Washington's erratic conduct in recent years is being met by Iranian persistence in pursuit of regional dominance. There is no active zone of conflict in the region in which the Iranians do not play a role, whether behind the scenes or out in front. From Lebanon to Yemen, from Iraq to Syria, from the Persian Gulf to the Gaza Strip – the Iranians continue to invest money, men and *matériel* in a drive for region-wide influence. In effect, the Iranians are seeking to create their own broader regional security regime. This Iran-centered regime would serve their national interests in partnership with clients (most of them Shiite) who are determined on both religious and political grounds to overturn traditional Sunni dominance in the Arab lands.

In the 40 years since Ayatollah Khomeini's 1979 revolution, Iran has managed to create a wedge extending from Iran and the Persian Gulf, through Iraq and Syria, and into Lebanon fronting on the Mediterranean Sea. Ironically, the two most formidable obstacles to the territorial contiguity of this wedge – Saddam Hussein and the Islamic State (ISIS) – have been neutralized or removed, not by Iran but by the United States. Iran is opportunistically taking full advantage of the American "war on terror" to build its own security architecture in places where the United States tore down rogue regimes and left a vacuum.

Uncertainty about the American role and an intensification of Iran's interventions from Syria to Iraq to Yemen have combined to evoke an unprecedented degree of open and favorable signaling between Israel and Saudi Arabia, America's other privileged "special relation" in the Middle East. Something similar is occurring between Israel and the United Arab Emirates. The idea that Israel might be integrated in an anti-Iranian security alliance – including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while coordinating policies as well with Egypt and Jordan – is regarded as arguably the single most important shift in regional geopolitics in the past decade.

A 2018 *U.S. News & World Report* listing of the world's most powerful countries opened with the usual litany of global powers (the United States, China and Russia), followed by Europe's traditional three leaders (Germany, the United Kingdom and France), followed by Japan. But rounding out the top ten, in order, were Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.⁸ When Egypt and Jordan are added to the group, it possesses a combined GDP four times that

of Iran, and combined defense spending that is five times greater than Iran's. Were these five states to coordinate their security policies, they could pose a formidable blocking counter to Iranian ambitions.

How would their "new Middle East" differ from its predecessor of a generation ago? That earlier version – with the European Union as inspiration and model – assumed as a precondition an Israeli–Palestinian final status settlement, culminating in Israel's "normalization" and regional economic integration. The proposed new constellation would be quite different. The security dimension would trump the economic one, and it would rest not on the promising incentive of regional economic cooperation but on the threat of Iranian imperial ambition. Similarly, an Israeli–Palestinian settlement would no longer be a prerequisite for progress, nor would there be any imperative for public validation in ceremonies held on the White House lawn. It would be an invisible war alliance, and its very invisibility would serve to insulate it from public opinion. This would be a secret deal among states and regimes for self-preservation, not an open embrace for peace and prosperity.

As of this writing, it is impossible to predict how far the recent and emerging trend might progress. This largely covert alliance will likely last as long as perceived American weakness and the perceived threat of Iranian hegemony persist. If both become long-term trends and do in fact harden into fixed patterns of conduct, then this covert alliance might also harden into fixed patterns of interaction. Europe during the long Cold War divided into east and west; the Middle East, during a long cold war, might divide into north and south, with Israel integrating into the southern tier of opposition to the Iranian-led northern tier.

Here might very well be the nucleus of a regional security regime, not on the European Union model, but of the Cold War variety. (It might resemble the Cold War even more if the United States consistently backs the southern tier and Russia the northern). The closest parallel would be the period from the late 1940s through the early 1960s, when the Western and Soviet blocs were still testing one another, from the Berlin blockade through the U-2 overflights to the Cuban crisis. These events helped forge the Western alliance, tighten cooperation, establish red lines and assure the success of containment policy. To be sure, they also came at a huge material and psychological cost, and at several tense moments of acute crisis (1956, 1962, 1973) might have easily and quickly escalated into full-scale and even non-conventional war.

Fortunately, the Middle East is not an arena of nuclear rivalry, at least not yet. If outside powers do retain a lingering and central role in the region, it surely lies in the area of nonproliferation. They have a responsibility to engage, not only for the sake of the region but for their own security, and for that of the international system. Israel does possess a nuclear capacity, but is also the only state in the Middle East functioning as an advanced Western liberal democracy. Were other Middle Eastern states ever to achieve the same level of accountability to their peoples, they too might claim to be trustworthy stewards of a bomb. Barring that eventuality, it must be assumed proliferation would be profoundly destabilizing and dangerous. Consequently, the one favor the United States, in particular, can do for the Middle East is to spare it the nightmare scenario of domino-like proliferation across the region, beginning (but not ending) with Iran.

Back to the future: Weizmann–Faisal revisited

The literature on regional security in the Middle East resembles the literature on the "peace process." Most of it is completely divorced from reality. This is so even when it acknowledges that the Middle East is a special case, and that regional integration will be a gradual process.

Yet just as a stable status quo has become the working substitute for the "peace process," so might a stable status quo substitute for a regional security regime. This status quo is imperfect,

and its operations are punctuated by occasional crises. Nevertheless, its basic operating mechanisms tend to prevent the escalation of those crises, and perhaps such an informal coalition in support of the status quo and regional stability now constitutes the best of all possible worlds. Of course, reinforcing the status quo will require a growing degree of cooperation between Israel and its potential Arab partners. Indeed, the more crises they navigate together, the more solid their relationships might become.

For Israel, in the meantime, regional relations will still take a back seat to its "special relationship" with the United States, its privileged ties to Europe and its burgeoning economic cooperation with East and South Asia. Nevertheless, as Israel enters the next phase of its history, between its 70th anniversary and its centennial in 2048, its demonstrated permanence is likely to open more doors for regional cooperation. Most of them will be back doors, but one or two front doors may open as well, leading perhaps to another round of peace treaties. The most likely candidates are the most successful of the Arab states, in the outer belt astride the Persian Gulf.

Should that scenario play out, it would bring to final fruition that early encounter between Chaim Weizmann and the Emir Faisal, the Mecca-born son of Arabia's potentate of a century ago. Among the present-day Arabian emirs perhaps there is one who would commit to standing before the cameras and next to an Israeli leader. After all, everything has changed: the Jews in their land number not 60,000 but more than six million, a hundred-fold increase. Now they form not a small minority community, but a sovereign state and a regional power. Were that breakthrough to happen, a regional security regime might no longer seem far-fetched to Israelis. Otherwise, the likely scenario is more of the same.

Notes

- 1 Theodor Herzl and Raphael Patai, *The Complete Diaries*, Vol. 3 (trans. Harry Zohn). New York: Herzl Press, 1960, p. 1229.
- 2 Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann*. London: H. Hamilton, 1949, p. 294.
- 3 Churchill memorandum, "Syrian Policy," *British National Archives*, May 19, 1941, PREM 3/422/2.
- 4 Ben-Gurion to Abba Eban, May 20, 1958, quoted by Michael Bar-Zohar, *Ben-Gurion*, Vol. 3 (Hebrew). Tel Aviv: Zmora-Bitan, 1987, p. 1325.
- 5 Quoted by Milton Viorst, *Sands of Sorrow: Israel's Journey From Independence*. New York: Harper & Row, 1987, p. 19.
- 6 Shimon Peres (with Arye Naor), *The New Middle East*. New York: Henry Holt, 1993.
- 7 Majid Khadduri, "The Problem of Regional Security in the Middle East: An Appraisal," *Middle East Journal* 11, no. 1 (Winter 1957): 12.
- 8 "2018 Best Countries Rankings: Power," *U.S. News and World Report*. www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/power-rankings.