

Analysis**THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
AND NONPROLIFERATION:
SKEPTICS AT THE HELM**

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[This article was originally published in
Russian in Yaderny Kontrol, No. 3, Vol. 7,
 May-June, 2001]

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Nine months in, it is still early to summarize the Bush Administration's approach to nonproliferation, for several reasons.

First, many of the key people are not yet in place, due to the long US nomination and confirmation process. It may be the end of the year before all of the assistant secretaries and deputy assistant secretaries – often the real shapers of day-to-day nonproliferation policy – are in office.

Second, every administration's approach evolves after it comes to office. What makes sense in the heat of the campaign trail may not mesh with the realities of international politics. President Reagan, after all, came to office attacking past arms control agreements and proposing defenses, and ended up negotiating START I and being forced by the Senate to leave the ABM Treaty largely intact. From Russia to North Korea, the Bush team is already smoothing off the sharp edges of their early rhetoric, and putting more emphasis on engagement. We are not likely to hear again accusations that Russia is 'willing to sell anything to anyone for money' – however much many on the Bush team may be thinking it.

Third, nonproliferation policy (as opposed to arms control policy) has not been a major focus of the Bush administration's first months in office. Though the Bush team now takes pains to say that missile defense is one

of the elements in a comprehensive strategy to deal with the spread of weapons of mass destruction, its place at the top of the priority list is obvious. President Bush and his team have focused countless statements on missile defense and their desire to get 'beyond' the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. A substantial number of statements can be found expressing their disdain for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and their desire to pursue further nuclear arms reductions through unilateral steps more than negotiated, verified treaties¹. But when it comes to their nonproliferation approach, there are far fewer actions and official statements available from which to shape a cogent description.

Fourth, proliferation issues inevitably compete with other foreign policy considerations – from promoting trade to building strategic relationships – in relations with other major powers. As the specific competing issues change, the resulting balance with nonproliferation priorities will change as well. To take just one example, debates over whether to impose or continue sanctions against particular countries or entities within countries – India over its nuclear tests, Iraq over its refusal to comply with the Gulf War cease-fire resolutions, Russian entities over sensitive technology cooperation with Iran and others, Chinese entities over their sensitive technology exports, and so on – inevitably bring in a host of other factors, specific to the state of relations with the particular country involved at a particular time².

Fifth, changes in nonproliferation approaches from one US administration to the next are inevitably more a matter of shifts in emphasis than of radical U-turns. Continuity and change coexist. Every administration has its nonproliferation pessimists and optimists, and its proponents and skeptics of each of the particular approaches and proposals that arise – from strengthened safeguards, to expanded export controls, to regional deals to address particular nonproliferation problems, to various kinds of offensive and defensive forces to respond to the proliferation that does occur. Continuity is reinforced by the vast infrastructure of permanent civil servants responsible for

carrying out much of the government's nonproliferation activities, all of whom remain in place, with their pre-existing policy preferences, even as the thin layer of political appointees at the top changes hands. Thus, the broadest strokes of US nonproliferation policy – support for the Nonproliferation Treaty and the safeguards system; the focus on key regional proliferators as the central aspect of the problem (with the exclusion of Israel as a topic for concern or discussion); the desire to convince all the other suppliers to enforce export controls comparable to those of the United States; support for regional nonproliferation arrangements as long as they do not unduly constrain US options – tend to remain unchanged from one administration to the next.

Sixth, because the approach is still being shaped, it is potentially still subject to influence. Officials newly in office, with a 'clean sheet of paper' to start from, tend to be far more willing to entertain new ideas and proposals that may come in from outside the government, from other governments, or from within the government bureaucracy. If Russia, to take but one example, were to make use of the good feeling generated by the Bush-Putin summit to put forward specific proposals for rebuilding the US-Soviet nonproliferation partnership that existed for much of the Cold War, the Bush administration might well be eager to accept. Thus, a variety of influences could still shift the priority the new administration attaches to nonproliferation and the specific approaches they focus on.

Nevertheless, it is very clear that the new administration of George W. Bush brings with it a new nonproliferation team with a new approach. The Republican Party has effectively two camps on foreign policy. The *engagement* advocates emphasize the importance of building strong alliances, working with potential adversaries to lessen threats and the risks of conflict, and even, for some purposes, relying on international institutions such as the United Nations. This is the wing of the party that negotiated the SALT, START, and ABM treaties, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, and other important arms accords (President Bush's

father and Senator Richard Lugar are prominent current members of the engagement group within the party). The *unilateralist* camp, by contrast, emphasizes the preeminent importance of American military strength, is deeply suspicious of attempts to engage and improve relations with likely adversaries, and is particularly suspicious of treaties or international institutions that might limit American strength or freedom of action (Senators Jesse Helms and Jon Kyl, among many others in the current Senate, are prominent proponents of this school of thought). Of course, a wide range of positions exist between these two extremes (The term "unilateralist" has become a negative epithet, and one the Bush team is now quick to deny – so the remainder of this article will describe this latter camp as the "American preeminence" school of thinking).

So far, while the engagement camp clearly has the upper hand on some issues in the new Administration – such as trade – there is a continuing tug-of-war between the American preeminence school and the engagement advocates on nonproliferation policy. A clear majority of the key nonproliferation appointees named so far are committed members of the American preeminence school. Key nonproliferation officials of the new team bring to their new posts a belief that proliferation is inevitable, and can only be managed and defended against; a deep skepticism over the value of negotiated agreements representing compromises with states such as North Korea; and an even deeper skepticism about the ability of global regimes and norms to contain the most dangerous proliferation threats (Interestingly enough, when it comes to the balance between proliferation and other economic and strategic interests with a particular country, it is typically the engagement camp that nonproliferation advocates find themselves arguing against; the American preeminence advocates typically argue for taking a tough line against any proliferation activity, even if it means interfering with trade or other interests). What all this will mean for the various aspects of nonproliferation cooperation with Russia in particular is still being decided – but after the Bush-Putin summit in Slovenia,

the signs offer significantly more reason for hope than they did even a few weeks before.

Proliferation Pessimism: The New Team's Proliferation Beliefs and Prescriptions

For the reasons just noted, actions officials take in office may differ from those they recommended previously. Nevertheless, it is instructive to examine the nonproliferation prescriptions the Bush team offered before coming to power.

Consider, for example, Robert Joseph, the Senior Director for Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense on the National Security Council staff – the top official specifically charged with nonproliferation in the White House. A strong proponent of missile defenses³, Joseph previously directed the Center for Counterproliferation Research at the National Defense University⁴, served as the US Commissioner to the ABM Treaty Standing Consultative Commission, and was a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense charged with policy on US nuclear forces and arms control in the Reagan years (Service in the Weinberger Pentagon is a common item on the resumes of Bush administration national security officials). Given that Joseph is charged with coordinating all nonproliferation policy, that his views are roughly in the center of the spectrum of Bush administration thinking on nonproliferation (or even somewhat to the left of that spectrum), and that he has been unusually articulate and specific in public testimony outlining his judgments and policy prescriptions, his statements to Congress in the couple of years before taking office provide a useful starting point for describing the basic approach of the new team.

In testimony in early 1999, Joseph outlined six key conclusions about proliferation⁵:

1. 'Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are a permanent feature of the international environment,' which 'cannot be disinvented' or eliminated.
2. Further proliferation of these weapons is inevitable, and cannot be stopped. 'The knowledge and the technology to build them will spread even further [...] barriers to both acquisition and use have actually eroded in recent years [...] we live in a world in which additional states will seek

these weapons. Experience suggests that they will be successful.' Even for 'terrorists and other transnational groups,' 'obstacles to acquisition and use of these weapons' are 'eroding,' while 'growing numbers' of these groups are seeking nuclear, chemical and biological weapons 'to kill large numbers of people'.

3. 'NBC [nuclear, chemical, and biological] weapons have substantial utility. They are seen as valuable tools by state and non-state actors alike,' and in particular as 'effective instruments to overcome the conventional superiority of the United States'.
4. 'The threat of retaliation or punishment that formed the basis for our deterrent policy in the Cold War is not likely to be sufficient.' Deterrence of regional adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction will be 'less stable and more likely to fail' than in the Cold War context because factors, such as 'mutual understandings, effective communications, and symmetrical interests and risks [...] simply do not pertain with states like North Korea.'
5. Given that proliferation is inevitable and deterrence may fail, 'it is essential that the United States acquire the capabilities to deny an enemy the benefits of these weapons,' including 'passive and active defenses as well as improved counterforce means.'
6. At the same time, 'an overwhelming retaliatory capability remains critical to US security policy.' 'Our nuclear weapons are the single most important instrument we have for deterring NBC use against us by rogue states.' (Joseph has long advocated maintaining a threat to retaliate against chemical or biological attacks with nuclear weapons, which would require dropping or modifying political commitments the United States has made to negative security assurances).

While this statement did not discuss any steps that might be taken to slow or stop proliferation, Joseph explored those possibilities in some detail in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in early 2000⁶. In those remarks, Joseph argued that 'we must re-double our efforts' to stop or even reverse proliferation – but warned that it was important to 'establish realistic goals' for what such efforts could achieve,

and argued again that states that sought to acquire weapons of mass destruction were likely to succeed. He argued that:

1. 'The first line of defense is preventing proliferation at its source,' through 'denying access to sensitive technologies, materials, and expertise.' He identified 'national and international export controls and cooperative threat reduction programs such as with Russia', as the key tools in this highest-priority area. On export controls in particular, he urged 'a concerted effort, at the highest levels' to organize tighter and more comprehensive controls both nationally and internationally.
2. Controlling international exports of sensitive technologies is likely to require both 'leading by example' and 'more direct means'. In particular, 'the application of sanctions will be required to deal with supplier countries like Russia and China, both of whom have dismal records in assisting nuclear weapon and missile programs of other states.'
3. Arms control agreements have a much more limited role in nonproliferation, and 'early nonproliferation arms control treaties were comprised of at least three parts idealism for every part realism'. Joseph lumped the NPT with the BWC among treaties 'without effective verification and enforcement provisions', implicitly condemning the IAEA safeguards system as ineffective⁷.
4. The global norms represented by treaties such as the NPT, BWC, and CWC 'continue to make an important contribution', by providing most states with a framework and incentives to stay within the regimes, and 'these norms should be maintained and strengthened'. But 'these treaties have little impact on those states that do not respect international norms [...] States like North Korea and Iraq have a demonstrated record of flaunting norms and manipulating verification measures, such as IAEA safeguards.' 'International unwillingness to 'confront the limitations of norm-building as a basis for policy' has caused 'harm to the cause of nonproliferation'⁸.
5. There is no need for the United States to accept additional constraints on its own forces and freedom of action to strengthen these norms; to move in that direction would be to allow 'the lure of arms control idealism' to prevail over 'hard-nosed

security judgments'. In particular, the United States already has 'an outstanding record' in meeting its Article VI obligation to negotiate in good faith toward disarmament, and has 'no apologies to make'. 'Proposals for elimination or radical reductions in nuclear weapons would undermine our national security and international stability in a way that would likely fuel proliferation,' because states that once relied on the US nuclear deterrent might be tempted to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. Such proposals 'must be resisted and their underlying arguments must be refuted'. Similarly, as noted earlier, his arguments for relying on threats of nuclear use to deter chemical or biological attack would require modifying (or ignoring) past US negative security assurances, made in an attempt to strengthen global nonproliferation norms.

6. In particular, 'there is no evidence that the Test Ban Treaty will reduce proliferation.' None of the key regional proliferators' programs would be significantly restrained by the treaty. To the contrary, 'the CTBT could actually lead to more proliferation' because it would undermine the credibility of the US deterrent umbrella.
7. Finally, Joseph argued, 'Because membership in these international conventions bestows legitimacy and, at least for the NPT, access to sensitive materials and technologies, my recommendation for dealing with states such as North Korea, Iraq, and Iran is not to seek their participation in these conventions but rather to keep them out.' On Iran in particular, Joseph complained that 'there is no more bitter irony than to listen to Russian officials tell us that Iran, as a member in good standing of the NPT, is not only deserving but entitled to the dual use technology that Moscow has contracted to sell it, and that we know will be helpful to further Iran's nuclear weapons program.'

A key element here is that in the balance between the supply side and the demand side of nonproliferation policy – between attempting to deny potential proliferators access to critical technologies, and attempting to build security and political conditions that reduce the number of countries that want weapons of mass destruction – Joseph effectively takes the existence of widespread

demand as an unchangeable fact of international life, and thus the focus of his recommendations is entirely on the supply side (One senior administration official, in an off-the-record briefing on the Bush administration's nonproliferation policy, mentioned the need to focus on 'demand side' measures – but then went on to specify that what he meant by that was efforts to interdict shipments of sensitive technologies and materials after they had left the country of origin).

The basic beliefs reflected in these statements about the inevitability of proliferation, and many of the resulting policy prescriptions, are widely shared among senior Bush administration national security and nonproliferation officials. Joseph and these other officials agree that it is important to try to stop proliferation where that is possible, but their deep pessimism over the prospects for doing so inevitably leads them to a shift in relative emphasis from preventing proliferation to greater focus on responding to it and managing its consequences.

Nevertheless, as the administration has had more time in office to get its people in place and its feet on the ground, and especially since President Bush's May 1 speech on missile defense, there has been a marked shift toward a more nuanced tone on nonproliferation and missile defense. Administration officials now emphasize that they want to carry out a more comprehensive and integrated strategy to deal with the spread of weapons of mass destruction, combining strengthened nonproliferation efforts with counterproliferation and missile defense – with missile defense only one element of that comprehensive approach. The relative emphasis on the pieces of the individual elements of such a comprehensive strategy, however, remains clear: in Bush's May 1 speech itself, there is a total of one sentence on nonproliferation, surrounded by pages of material on missile defense.

But it is not at all obvious that the nonproliferation presumptions and prescriptions shared by Joseph and the other members of the new team are correct. The evidence of the last five decades of nonproliferation efforts suggests that Joseph's overwhelming proliferation pessimism is

misplaced⁹. There are today well over a dozen countries that have embarked on nuclear weapons programs and then stopped them – successes of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Indeed, depending on whether one believes that North Korea succeeded in acquiring nuclear weapons before its plutonium production was frozen, the world today has either the same number of states with nuclear weapons capability as the world of 15 years ago, or one fewer (since South Africa dismantled its bombs). Today there are only a tiny number of countries that do not already have nuclear weapons capabilities that have both a potential capability and an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. With hard work (especially in ensuring that nuclear weapons materials remain under control) and some luck (especially changes in the governments and policies of Iraq, North Korea, and Iran) the international community can hope that this number will still be unchanged 15 years from now¹⁰. If it has increased 15 years from now, it will likely be by one or two. In short, there is no uncontrollable tide of nuclear proliferation. Similarly, while it is undeniably true that there are a substantial number of states working on chemical and biological weapons, and there are certainly states that have made significant progress in their chemical and biological programs in recent years, overall the lists of states with such programs today are surprisingly similar to the lists of 15 years ago – and the CWC has brought at least some states to commit to dismantle their chemical stockpiles and open themselves to far-reaching inspections.

Nor is there any compelling reason to believe that 'the threat of retaliation' will not be effective in deterring regional actors from using weapons of mass destruction against the United States and its forces and allies¹¹. While the leaders of some states may not be *rational* in US eyes, it is difficult to imagine a leader sane enough to be able to seize and maintain power in a major state who would not be deterred by the prospect of having himself, his regime, and all of his regime's sources of power destroyed – the certain result of an attack on the United States with a missile armed with weapons of mass destruction. Adolf Hitler is the archetype of the irrational, insanely aggressive dictator – yet though the Nazis invented nerve gas, Hitler never used it. He was deterred by the

threat of retaliation – even before nuclear weapons existed.

With respect to norms, few analysts ever argued that Saddam Hussein or Kim Jong Il would be deterred from attempting to acquire nuclear weapons by the existence of a global norm. Rather, as Joseph agrees, such norms help reinforce the restraint of the vast majority of states. Just as crucially, they make it possible to build coalitions to oppose the efforts of states such as Iraq and North Korea that attempt to violate generally agreed norms. Keeping such states out of the regimes would mean that they were violating no commitments in pursuing their weapons programs, which would probably make it impossible to build an effective international coalition to oppose those programs.

A final point where many nonproliferation advocates and Joseph would part company is on what the United States needs to do to maintain and strengthen these norms. The nonproliferation regime is fundamentally based on the consent of the governed: to strengthen safeguards, improve export controls, or confront a violator requires the support of a large fraction of the parties to the regime (most of whom are non-nuclear-weapon states), and that support will only be forthcoming if they see there is something in it for them. In particular, if the United States is unwilling to accept any constraints on its own power and freedom of action, it is hard to see how other parties can be convinced to accept more stringent constraints on their own. The Director-General of the IAEA, for example, has described the US Senate's rejection of the constraints on future US nuclear weapons development represented by the CTBT as a 'devastating blow' to efforts to convince non-nuclear weapon states to sign up to expanded inspections¹². The Bush administration appears to want to have it both ways – to assert that they support maintaining and strengthening the NPT regime, while opposing many of the steps that have made its maintenance and strengthening possible. In the NATO communiqué issued during Bush's trip to Europe, for example, the administration expressed its 'determination to contribute to the implementation of the conclusions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference'¹³ – yet the reality is that the administration has specifically rejected virtually all of the specific points in that document that would constrain the United

States, including the unequivocal commitment to eliminating nuclear weapons, ratification of the CTBT, preservation and strengthening of the ABM Treaty, ratification of the New York ABM Treaty protocols, completion of ratification and entry into force of START II, negotiation of START III, and ensuring the irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions¹⁴. This approach makes it significantly more difficult to challenge other states over their questionable compliance with NPT requirements.

Organizations and People

As the saying goes, 'the people make the policy'. The people chosen for key nonproliferation positions in the Bush administration so far generally share a deep skepticism over what efforts to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction can accomplish¹⁵. The organizational structures in which those people work also have an important effect on which policies will end up getting top priority. Here too, the new approach is evident: the Bush administration has sought to reorganize in order to better integrate efforts to prevent proliferation with efforts to respond to proliferation once it occurs, but in the process has created structures that inevitably will place more emphasis on missile defense and other responses than on the first line of defense – stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction before it occurs.

The White House. President George W. Bush appears to have had few deeply ingrained foreign policy beliefs prior to running for office, and in areas such as nonproliferation, he relies heavily on his foreign policy advisers. On nuclear security, he has made it clear that his first priority is missile defense, but has also said positive words about engagement with Russia and others to prevent proliferation. He has leaned in both the engagement and American preeminence directions at different times, on different subjects. His summer trip to Europe and meetings with President Putin seem to have helped move him toward more emphasis on nonproliferation engagement – while maintaining the core priority on missile defense. So far, on issues ranging from missile defense to global warming, Bush appears to be willing to spend time listening, but not to actually change US positions: it is not yet clear whether this is just unilateralism 'wrapped in conciliatory rhetoric,' as Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) put it, or represents a genuine willingness

to adapt US approaches to accommodate the security needs of other states.

Vice President Dick Cheney, by contrast, is clearly a committed member of the American preeminence camp – and has played a key role in choosing hawkish members of that camp for critical national security positions elsewhere in the government, especially in the Department of Defense. Cheney's chief of staff, Lewis *Scooter* Libby, is also his national security adviser, and was chief counsel for the congressional Cox committee that charged China with large-scale nuclear espionage. A former senior official at both Defense and State whose career was originally launched in part by Paul Wolfowitz (now Deputy Secretary of Defense), Libby's views closely parallel Cheney's. Libby is pulling together a substantial team for the Vice President, whose daily work is closely integrated with the President's people, including the National Security Council (NSC) staff. Eric Edelman, in particular – an aide to Strobe Talbott and an ambassador to Finland in the Clinton administration – handles a broad range of national security issues, including matters relating to nonproliferation.

At the NSC, the locus for coordinating security policy throughout the government, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley appear to fall between the engagement and American preeminence camps. Rice is a Russia expert who served on the NSC staff in the first Bush administration and played a key role in US policy toward the reunification of Germany, among other matters. She was Bush's principal foreign policy adviser during the campaign, and he relies on her very heavily – though she has emphasized that the NSC's role should be to coordinate policy, and that the country 'cannot have two Secretaries of State'. Hadley was an Assistant Secretary of Defense in the first Bush administration, who played a leading part in discussions in US-Russian discussions of missile defenses at that time. Rice has a daily discussion of key international issues with Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and chairs the meetings of the *principals committee* – the group of cabinet secretaries in national security areas that meet as needed to make top-level policy decisions. Hadley chairs the *deputies committee* –

the next step down from the principals. Of all the senior Bush administration appointees, Hadley appears to be among the most committed to a strong nonproliferation policy going beyond just missile defense – but it is clear that he, too, places much higher emphasis and priority on negotiating a deal on missile defense. Gary Edson, who handles international economic issues as both a deputy national security adviser and a deputy economic adviser, has been playing an important role on export control policy.

Joseph, whose views were outlined above, is the senior White House official focused specifically on proliferation issues. Joseph's directorate, known as Nonproliferation and Export Controls in the Clinton administration, is now Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense. Substantively, this means that missile defense has been added to this directorate's purview – in part because of Joseph's personal interest in and expertise on missile defense¹⁶. What this means, in effect, is that the attention of the senior director and some of the directorate's staff will be focused primarily on missile defense – along with that of the President and the rest of the senior White House staff. The total available person-power to focus on all nonproliferation issues worldwide – nuclear, biological, chemical, missile – is effectively down to three people (two on general nonproliferation issues and one on export controls). Similarly, policy on Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union, once handled by another senior directorate with a similar staff, has been given to a single director for Russia and another for the rest of the former Soviet Union under the Eurasian directorate (cutting the available person-power by perhaps 60%). In short, after years of complaining (correctly) that there was too little leadership from the White House on nonproliferation in the Clinton administration, especially on *loose nukes*, the Republicans have created a structure that will ensure that there will be less in their administration.

Under Joseph, the two key people who are handling nonproliferation issues that affect Russia are Thomas Maertens and Richard Falkenrath. Maertens, a foreign service officer once posted in the science section of the US embassy in Moscow, is a hold-over from the Clinton years, but is nonetheless somewhat skeptical of the management and

approaches taken in many of the US-Russian cooperative nuclear security programs built up during those years. He has been given overall charge of the ongoing NSC review of these programs (about which more below). Falkenrath, previously an assistant professor at Harvard University, is more enthusiastic about the need to work with Russia to control proliferation threats, and co-authored a book on that subject¹⁷ – but the only part of that agenda for which Falkenrath has responsibility is oversight of the HEU Purchase Agreement. Maertens and Falkenrath also have a wide range of responsibilities for nonproliferation issues elsewhere in the world. Export control issues are handled by Maureen Tucker, a career Department of Commerce official who is a holdover from the Clinton administration.

The State Department. Secretary of State Colin Powell, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is the senior Bush administration official who most clearly represents the engagement camp – as befits a Secretary of State (before the campaign was in full swing, Powell had even endorsed the CTBT¹⁸). Despite holding what appears to be a minority view in the Bush administration on some key nonproliferation issues, Powell appears to have been quite successful in getting State's approach on regional nonproliferation problems such as Iraq and North Korea approved, over initial opposition from the American preeminence school (both issues are described below). Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, also in the engagement camp¹⁹, is very close to the Secretary and seems to be shouldering an array of high-profile roles, including on nonproliferation matters. It was Armitage, for example, on a trip to Korea, who announced that talks with North Korea would restart within a matter of weeks – even before the President's official statement on that subject.

Nonetheless, the usual press caricature of State Department doves at war with Defense Department hawks paints far too simplistic a picture²⁰. In particular, the new Undersecretary of State for International Security and Arms Control, John Bolton, is a hawk who has rarely (if ever) seen an arms control or nonproliferation agreement he liked. Bolton, who has also advocated refusing to pay the US dues to the United Nations and recognizing Taiwan as an independent state, is a close ally of Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), who described him as 'the kind of man with whom I would want to stand at Armageddon.'²¹ Until the shift

of control of the US Senate to the Democrats, Helms, as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had enormous power over the State Department, controlling its budget, the confirmation of its senior officials, and consideration of all international treaties, and he used that leverage to ensure a senior slot for Bolton. Helms reportedly attempted to get Bolton appointed as Ambassador to the United Nations – despite Bolton's repeated dismissal of the organization and opposition to meeting US legal obligations to pay its dues – but settled for the appointment as Undersecretary. Although Bolton had what Senator John Kerry (D-MA) described as a 'confirmation conversion', describing himself as a moderate on arms control issues in his confirmation hearings, his nomination was intensely controversial, with Senate Democrats opposing his anti-arms control record; the 43 votes against his confirmation in the Senate were more than were cast against either John Ashcroft for Attorney General or Gale Norton for Secretary of the Interior, both of whom were cast by opponents as right-wing ideologues.

During the Clinton administration, Helms succeeded in forcing the abolishment of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, whose functions were folded in to the State Department -- reducing the total person-power devoted to nonproliferation, and the access of nonproliferation advocates to the top levels of government. In principle, therefore, the whole arms control and nonproliferation policy operation at State is under Bolton. In the Powell-Armitage State Department, however, the assistant secretaries generally report directly to them, somewhat reducing the control of the Undersecretaries. Currently, the Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, Robert Einhorn, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Avis Bohlen, are still holdovers from the Clinton administration, and no names of replacements have been put forward. But now that Bolton has been confirmed, it seems clear that these officials' days in office are numbered. As at the NSC, the bureau responsible for Russia and the other former Soviet states has been folded into the Europe desk, reducing its relative importance and priority.

The Defense Department. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has been a dedicated hawk, opposed to virtually all arms control and nonproliferation agreements, throughout his national security career, and he has put

together a remarkably hard-line team at the Pentagon. In his first tour as Secretary of Defense during the Ford Administration, Rumsfeld managed to sabotage Henry Kissinger's effort to complete the SALT II treaty (by convincing the Joint Chiefs of Staff to withdraw their support when Kissinger was already in Moscow)²². Rumsfeld's deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, has also been a hawkish arms control critic for many years -- though a major part of his early government career was four years at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the 1970s, working on arms control and nonproliferation negotiations. Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz have reportedly formed a team to manage defense policy - and, presumably, to oppose any new agreements that would unduly constrain US forces and freedom of action. The three have worked together extensively in the past: Rumsfeld was Cheney's boss as White House chief of staff in the Ford administration and picked Cheney to succeed him when he went to the Pentagon, and Wolfowitz served as Undersecretary of Defense in Cheney's Pentagon in the first Bush administration.

The nominee for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith, is still more hawkish and opposed to agreements that constrain the United States or compromise with potential adversaries. During the Reagan years, he served as a deputy to Richard Perle, the renowned *prince of darkness* of the Reagan Pentagon (who remains an influential outside adviser to the Bush administration, though not a government official). Since then, while working in his private law practice, Feith played a key role in the opposition to the Chemical Weapons Convention, and has been a principal proponent of the legally absurd argument that there is no need to withdraw from the ABM Treaty because the treaty ceased to exist when the Soviet Union ceased to exist, and has been serving on the board of Frank Gaffney's Center for Security Policy, an organization dedicated to opposing virtually every arms control and nonproliferation initiative proposed. The nominee to be Feith's deputy, Stephen A. Cambone, is a strong missile defense advocate who served as director of strategic defense policy in the Pentagon during the first Bush administration.

Further down the chain, the key position related to nonproliferation policy is the newly re-created job of Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy - in charge of

dealing with arms control and nonproliferation negotiations, among other matters - for which the nominee is J.D. Crouch II. Crouch served for several years as an aide to Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-WY), who at the time was among the most hawkish members of the US Senate, an intense advocate of abrogating the ABM Treaty and most other major agreements with the Soviet Union. Like Feith, Crouch until recently served on the board of Gaffney's Center for Security Policy, and strongly opposed the Chemical Weapons Convention, along with most other arms control and nonproliferation agreements of recent times. Crouch is known, among other things, for criticizing the first President Bush's decision to withdraw US nuclear weapons from South Korea, and recommending that the United States begin bombing North Korea by a date certain if North Korea did not completely and verifiably dismantle its WMD infrastructure²³. Peter Rodman, the nominee for Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs - a post that deals with regional conflicts and regional security issues - will likely be an important player in dealing with the various regional proliferation *hard cases*, and has a more moderate record.

While the American preeminence advocates at the Pentagon take a hard line on arms control, they are likely also to support hard lines that might be endorsed by nonproliferation advocates. They are likely to favor the imposition of sanctions on countries or entities accused of proliferation wrongdoing, and the maintenance of stringent export controls on a wide range of high-technology items. Similarly, on the matter of US opposition to reprocessing weapons-usable plutonium in various countries - modified in the Bush administration's energy policy, as discussed below - the view of many on the Republican right is as anti-plutonium as the view of the Democratic left, suggesting that Defense may take a hard line against any suggestion, for example, that South Korea or Taiwan be allowed to reprocess US-origin spent fuel. This anti-plutonium view is not universal on the Republican right, however, as there are others who are so enthusiastic about the future of nuclear energy that they are happy to endorse reprocessing.

The Department of Energy. Perennially dysfunctional, and with foreign affairs as only one of its many missions, the Department of Energy is always the weak sister of each administration's national security team, and the Bush administration is no exception (For example, as was also true in the Clinton Administration, the regular consultations between the National Security Adviser and the Secretaries of State and Defense on the national security issues of the day do not include the Secretary of Energy).

In the wake of spy scandals at the end of the Clinton administration, Congress forced a reorganization of DOE in which the weapons complex and the nonproliferation efforts were pulled out as a separate National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) within the DOE structure. Congress' hope was that this would lead to more effective management of the US nuclear weapons stockpile, and a better ability to protect critical secrets. Nonproliferation, while included in NNSA's mission, was clearly a distant third priority, and has remained so. Gen. John Gordon, previously the deputy director of the CIA, became the first head of NNSA, and there was bipartisan agreement that he should stay on for several years to get the new agency launched, regardless of who won the election. As a result, there has been less change from the latter part of the Clinton years in key nonproliferation policies and personnel at DOE than elsewhere in the government.

Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham, a former Senator, has had very little prior experience in nonproliferation, but has indicated some interest in promoting DOE's nonproliferation programs. So far, however, Abraham has few staff outside the NNSA to help him work through this agenda - the main exception being Paul Longworth, previously a Republican staffer for the Senate Armed Services Committee. The Deputy Secretary of Energy, Francis Blake, was vice president of General Electric and has little experience in national security and foreign affairs matters. The Undersecretary of Energy, Robert Card, was previously the president of the company managing the cleanup of the Rocky Flats plutonium site, and is expected to focus primarily on the

civilian side of DOE - though he has been a key player in the administration's review of policy on the HEU Purchase Agreement.

That leaves the main action on nonproliferation with Gordon and his team at NNSA. Gordon supports DOE's nonproliferation programs, including the cooperative efforts with Russia, but it is clear that strengthening the US weapons complex and keeping the secrets are far higher on his agenda; Congress has made it clear that if NNSA does not perform those missions well, DOE will lose its management of the weapons complex entirely, having it shifted to the Defense Department or an entirely independent agency. Within NNSA, there are deputy administrators for both the defense program and the nonproliferation effort (with the same rank as assistant secretaries in other departments). The Deputy Administrator for Nonproliferation and National Security has not yet been officially named, but former START negotiator Linton Brooks is widely reported to be in line for the job. Brooks has long experience in US-Soviet negotiations during the Cold War, remains a believer in negotiated arms control agreements (a minority view on the Bush team), and appears to lean more toward the engagement than the American preeminence camp. Gordon's special assistant for nonproliferation matters, Steve Aoki, is a former State Department and National Security Council official with long experience in international nuclear nonproliferation efforts. In addition, Gordon has now established a strategic planning group for NNSA, under John Harvey, a former Pentagon weapons official, which is working with the nonproliferation programs and other efforts within NNSA to prepare an overall plan for NNSA's activities for the next several years.

The Department of Commerce. The Commerce Department has an important nonproliferation role because it plays a key part in administering export controls. Secretary of Commerce Donald Evans was Bush's campaign chairman and is a personal friend of the President's, which will give Commerce extra clout in the inevitable interagency export control disputes. The new Undersecretary of Commerce for Export Administration, Kenneth Juster, was a senior State Department official in the first Bush administration, and has a reputation for pragmatism. While Juster does not have an extensive export control background, his law practice has involved a wide range of international business issues. Beneath Juster,

the Assistant Secretary for Export Administration is James J. Jochum - formerly Republican counsel to the Senate Banking Committee, where Jochum played a major role in drafting new export control legislation that was attacked as unduly loosening a broad range of controls in an effort to promote US exports, and was ultimately blocked by the chairmen of four different Senate committees²⁴. This suggests that in the new Bush administration, the Commerce Department, as is traditional, will represent a pro-business, pro-export point of view.

The Intelligence Agencies. While President Bush has kept George Tenet as Director of Central Intelligence for the time being, the CIA has reorganized its proliferation-tracking effort. The new Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center, established in March of this year, combined previous centers focusing on nonproliferation, on arms control verification, and on intelligence on foreign weapons systems, for a total of some 500 analysts - potentially a substantial increase in the person-power available for tracking proliferation, if they are deployed more for that purpose than for arms control verification²⁵. The new center is headed by Alan Foley, a long-time Soviet weapons analyst who had directed the Arms Control Intelligence Staff - a group renowned in recent years for raising concerns over whether Russia was complying with the test ban and whether the test ban could be verified.

A New Nonproliferation Approach Unfolds Actions, as the saying goes, speak louder than words. The key policy nonproliferation-related policy issues the Bush administration has acted on so far have included arms control and nonproliferation agreements, export control legislation, particular regional proliferators, the nuclear fuel cycle and its contribution to proliferation, and cooperation with other major nuclear weapon states, such as Russia and China.

Arms control and nonproliferation agreements. Arms control and nonproliferation are inextricably linked through Article VI of the NPT, which makes progress toward arms reductions and nuclear disarmament a nonproliferation obligation of the nuclear

weapon states. For a Russian audience, there is no need to repeat the basic outlines of the Bush team's approach to US-Russian arms control -- missile defenses going far beyond the ABM Treaty (with Russian agreement if possible, and without Russian agreement if necessary), and further reductions in nuclear forces through unilateral and reciprocal steps more than through negotiated and verified treaties. This approach was clearly stated even before the Bush team took office - though it is notable that Bush's May 1 speech on missile defense included far more emphasis on consultation with Russia and US allies than had been present before. How real this focus on consultation will be remains to be seen, but it is clear that for the moment at least, those who advocated abrogating the ABM Treaty immediately have not won the day. The shift in control of the Senate to the Democrats, and the almost universally negative reaction around the world to the consultations following Bush's May 1 speech, will make unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty more politically difficult. And there are some within the administration who are quietly suggesting that the current emphasis on unilateral steps on nuclear forces might be supplemented in the future with a return to negotiated and verified agreements to confirm some of those unilateral steps.

Nonetheless, as Joseph noted in the testimony quote above, the Bush team believes the United States should adopt whatever nuclear posture best serves its security, without reference to Article VI obligations, as the United States, in their view, has already fully met its Article VI commitments. Certainly there appears to be little chance the United States will ratify the CTBT during this Presidency, whatever the pressure may be from other participants in the nonproliferation regime. Even more certainly, the statement of all 5 nuclear-weapon-states at the last NPT review conference, which expressed their 'unequivocal commitment' to achieving complete nuclear disarmament, and their support for the CTBT, the ABM Treaty, and START III, among other items, no longer reflects the policy of the US government.

Similarly, in the area of biological weapons, the Bush administration has undertaken a prolonged review of policy toward the proposed compliance protocol for the

Biological Weapons Convention, and has reportedly concluded that the United States cannot support the current protocol. There is now too little time to negotiate the substantial changes the Bush administration's review would seem to call for before the current November deadline. The reported results of the review seem to lean in the direction of simply walking away from the effort to create verification mechanisms for the BWC, but such a step would come at a considerable political cost, among US allies in Europe and elsewhere²⁶.

Export control legislation. The key export control issue the Administration has faced so far is the new post-Cold War version of the Export Administration Act, now being debated in Congress. The existing Export Administration Act, which provides the statutory authority for US export controls, is outdated and will expire this year unless extended. On January 23, 2001, a group of Senators reintroduced the new version of the law that had been drafted in the previous Congress. This version attempted to focus controls more narrowly on those technologies whose exports could most threaten international security, while also increasing penalties for violations. Critics charged, however, that the Senate Banking Committee, with its pro-business bent, had gone too far in loosening controls and making it difficult for those within the government who might oppose an export to stop it²⁷. The Bush administration had to scramble to come up with a position on the legislation before its key export control appointees were all in place. Ultimately, the Administration insisted on three key changes: (1) giving the Defense Department a greater role in export control decision-making (including a requirement that the Secretary of Commerce refer all license applications to the Secretaries of Defense and State, and that the Department of Defense be notified of any proposed changes in the classification of controlled commodities); (2) the creation of a process allowing any department that opposes an export to escalate the issue to an interagency panel and ultimately to the President; and (3) giving the President authority to continue controls over key items whose export would undermine US national security, even if these would otherwise be subject to the law's requirement that any technology that a sensitive country could easily buy from other sources, or is available on the mass market in the United States, be decontrolled. With these

amendments, President Bush called the legislation 'a good bill' and urged that it be passed and sent to him for signature²⁸. This episode suggests that on export controls, while the pro-business, pro-export forces within the administration are quite strong, the advocates of stringent controls over key technologies related to WMD can win some important battles.

North Korea. Engagement with North Korea is one policy arena where Powell appears initially to have been more forward-leaning than the President's early inclinations, but then to have won at least a limited victory in the end. On March 6, just as South Korean President Kim Dae Jung was arriving in Washington, Powell remarked that the administration planned to 'pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off' with the negotiations to freeze North Korea's missile and weapons of mass destruction programs²⁹. This was exactly what Kim, who has staked the future of his government on an effort to warm relations with North Korea that depends on US help, wanted to hear. In a press conference the next day after meeting with Kim, however, President Bush expressed skepticism over whether North Korea was abiding by agreements already reached, warned of the difficulties of verifying any deal with North Korea, and pointedly did *not* indicate that talks would continue any time soon³⁰. Pyongyang, in its own inimitable style, responded by canceling reconciliation talks with Seoul and describing the United States as 'a cannibals' nation'³¹.

But then, after a quiet period of internal policy review and behind-the-scenes infighting, it was announced that talks would indeed resume. This was first announced by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who also indicated that Washington would strongly support Kim Dae Jung's *sunshine policy*³². In the days before the announcement that talks would resume, Pyongyang had begun to send conciliatory signals again, with Kim Jong Il telling a visiting European Union delegation that he would unilaterally extend the missile testing moratorium at least through 2003, and suggesting that he would be prepared to travel to South Korea if the conclusion of the US policy review was

favorable. But after the announcement, displaying Pyongyang's usual desire to tack back and forth between accommodation and threat, the North threatened to withdraw from the Agreed Framework over delays in building the promised reactors – though a closer reading of the statement suggested that the withdrawal and resumption of the previous nuclear program was only threatened years in the future *if* at that time sufficient progress had not been made, in essence a reminder to the United States of what North Korea could do if the United States did not live up to its obligations³³.

President Bush's own statement on the results of the administration's review of policy on North Korea did not come until June 6³⁴. While the statement called for renewed discussions, it was heavily influenced by the American preeminence advocates, who had fiercely opposed the Clinton administration's approach of using positive financial incentives to *buy out* the North Korean nuclear and missile programs. The statement listed a series of US demands:

- 'improved implementation' of the 1994 Agreed Framework (which administration officials explained referred in part to convincing North Korea to open its facilities to full IAEA inspections sooner rather than later);
- 'verifiable constraints on North Korea's missile programs and a ban on its missile exports';
- 'a less threatening conventional military posture'.

But the statement offered little in the way of specific incentives for North Korea to agree, indicating only that North Korean agreement would result in expanded 'efforts to help the North Korean people', an easing of sanctions, and unspecified 'other political steps'. No specific mention was made of compensating North Korea for the lost revenue from halting its missile exports, or of launching its civilian satellites in return for a halt to its indigenous missile program, as had been discussed in the Clinton administration – or of diplomatic recognition, another key item on the North Korean agenda. Predictably, while North Korea did agree to resume discussions, it attacked Bush's list of agenda items, adamantly refused any discussion on

limiting its conventional forces until all US forces withdrew from the peninsula, and proposed instead that the talks should focus on US compensation to North Korea for delays in the reactor construction project³⁵.

Ultimately, restarting the nuclear and missile talks was not a very difficult choice. Three tougher calls await the Bush team down the road: how much to offer the North Koreans in return for a verified end to their missile program and exports; whether to agree to step-by-step accords on specific issues given the North Korean rejection of their proposed comprehensive approach including conventional forces; and what to do when, as seems nearly inevitable, the Agreed Framework runs into trouble (Construction delays and North Korean foot-dragging over opening the suspect sites to inspections and removing the plutonium-bearing spent fuel – both required before the reactors are built – both seem virtually certain³⁶). If the approach to the talks continues to be focused mainly on sticks and not carrots, the engagement advocates' victory in restarting discussions may come to naught.

Iraq. Iraq is another case where a nonproliferation approach first launched by Powell came under sharp criticism from more hawkish factions in the administration and Congress, but then, after a period of quiet, re-emerged as the official policy. Powell's February trip to the Middle East focused on a plan for easing sanctions on Iraqi trade in civilian goods, while strengthening controls over transfers of military-related goods, in an effort to rebuild international support for the sanctions regime³⁷. Although Powell's suggestions received a positive reception in Middle Eastern capitals, hawks at home criticized Powell's plan as weakening the sanctions against Iraq without getting anything in return. A variety of factions continued to call for renewed efforts to help the Iraqi opposition overthrow Saddam Hussein, despite the disorganization and ineffectiveness of the Iraqi opposition forces. But by May, Iraq policy had re-emerged on the front pages, with Powell's approach being negotiated as a joint British-American proposal to the Security Council³⁸. It appears that Powell's initiative may be enough to

save what had been a collapsing sanctions regime – and may help plug what had become a gaping oil-smuggling loophole providing huge unmonitored revenues to the Iraqi regime – but whether any of this will result in the return of UN weapons inspectors in the foreseeable future remains very much in doubt.

Iran. With Iran, even more than with Iraq and North Korea, US policy is focused on much more than just weapons of mass destruction – issues from oil to terrorism to the Middle East peace process are also prominent on the agenda. While the Iranian presidential campaign was underway, the Bush administration largely took a wait-and-see approach – but no major initiatives seem to have resulted from Khatami's overwhelming reelection victory. The big debate in the United States (and within the Bush administration) was over whether to drop the unilateral sanctions against Iran and Libya imposed in the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. Congressional Republicans were sponsoring a five-year renewal of the sanctions, but the major oil companies were lobbying furiously to oppose the renewal – under the banner of an organization called *USA Engage*, with Clinton-era Commerce Department export control chief William Reinsch as one of its top officials³⁹. Many of the senior officials of the Bush administration have close ties to these companies. Brent Scowcroft, Bush's father's national security adviser, also weighed in advocating an end to sanctions and an opening to Iran⁴⁰. Nevertheless, with Iran topping the State Department's most recent list of state sponsors of terrorism, Bush said he had no plans to lift sanctions anytime soon⁴¹. The Bush administration appears to be just as concerned as the Clinton administration over Russian entities' nuclear and missile cooperation with Iran – a topic Bush raised in his summit with President Putin.

South Asia. On South Asia, the advocates of engagement – especially with India – are in the driver's seat within the Bush administration. The US tilt toward India – already manifest in the Clinton administration – has become even more palpable. For an administration that prides itself on being balance-of-power realists, the choice between a country of over a billion

people with a thriving economy and a huge military machine, or a tiny country with a collapsing economy and a modest military force, is effectively no choice at all (Indeed, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage has described the administration's foreign policy as being focused on managing the rise of two great powers – China and India – and the decline, at least for the near term, of another – Russia⁴²). Pakistan's status as a military dictatorship, its support for Afghanistan's *Taliban*, and its role as a breeding ground for jihadist terrorism offer additional rationales for the pro-India tilt, though the United States had little trouble supporting Pakistani dictatorships when it served US interests to do so. The nominee for Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, was one of Bush's senior foreign policy advisers during the campaign, and is a seasoned pro-engagement hand; the nominee for Ambassador to Pakistan, Wendy Chamberlain, by contrast, is a knowledgeable expert on both terrorism and narcotics, with a relatively low political profile. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage flew to India shortly after President Bush's May 1 missile defense speech to consult on US missile defense plans; Pakistan was prominently not on the agenda.

Nuclear energy and the nuclear fuel cycle. During the Clinton administration, the United States had been quite critical of the proliferation hazards of reprocessing and recycling plutonium in the nuclear fuel cycle, announcing that it would not itself reprocess for either nuclear power or nuclear explosive purposes, and would oppose reprocessing in regions of proliferation concern. The Clinton team attempted to negotiate a 20-year moratorium on plutonium reprocessing with Russia, though time ran out before the deal was cut.

The Bush team brings a much more enthusiastic attitude toward the future of nuclear energy, and the Bush Administration's energy policy statement, released in mid-May, includes a recommendation that 'the United States should reexamine its policies to allow for research, development and deployment of fuel conditioning methods (such as pyroprocessing) that reduce waste streams and enhance proliferation resistance,' and should collaborate with countries that have 'highly developed fuel cycles and a record of close cooperation' to 'develop reprocessing and fuel treatment

technologies that are cleaner, more efficient, less waste-intensive, and more proliferation-resistant,' while continuing to 'discourage the accumulation of separated plutonium, worldwide'⁴³. This language was apparently included after only the briefest discussions with the nonproliferation and fuel cycle experts within the government. While the new language is more positive toward reprocessing than the Clinton Administration's take on the subject, it appears to maintain a requirement that only those reprocessing approaches that might be more proliferation-resistant than the traditional PUREX technology, and would not lead to additional accumulation of separated plutonium, would be pursued⁴⁴. A wide range of issues about what this new approach will mean in practice remain to be resolved – in particular, whether Russia counts among the countries with 'a record of close cooperation' with whom joint R&D should be pursued, and whether the opposition to accumulation of separated plutonium will include a continued effort to get Russian agreement to a reprocessing moratorium.

Nonproliferation cooperation with China. During its eight years in office, the Clinton team succeeded in extracting from China a wide range of new nonproliferation commitments, ranging from not exporting missile technology going beyond the Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines to cutting off assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and strengthening China's domestic controls over sensitive exports. Implementation of these commitments, however, was an ongoing issue requiring regular discussions and continuing cooperation. Unfortunately, the poor state of US-Chinese relations since the Bush team came to office – with the spy-plane incident, fierce disagreements over missile defenses, and arms to Taiwan – combined with the relatively low priority the Bush administration has assigned to the detailed work of nonproliferation regime-building, has resulted in a substantial gap in the discussions, raising new questions over whether China will continue to implement its commitments. It is not clear, in particular, whether the Bush team has fully considered the implications for Chinese supplies to Pakistan of a situation in which both the United States and Russia are palpably leaning toward India, with Russia supplying a wide range of military and nuclear technologies. Some Chinese officials are asking why, if the United States feels free to go back on commitments it finds inconvenient

(such as the ABM Treaty), China should not do the same. Nevertheless, ultimately both China and the United States see a substantial interest in improving relations, and it appears likely that down the road, renewed cooperation on nonproliferation will be one part of that agenda.

Nonproliferation cooperation with Russia. It is fair to say that US-Russian nonproliferation cooperation under the Bush administration did not get off to an auspicious start. During the campaign, Bush had emphasized the importance of the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction programs, and pledged that 'I'll ask the Congress to increase substantially our assistance'⁴⁵. This campaign promise was immediately broken, however, when Bush proposed a budget for fiscal year 2002 that cut funding for the most urgent programs to ensure that potential bomb material was secure and accounted for⁴⁶. The announcement of a far-reaching review of these programs was widely interpreted as directed toward canceling or scaling back key efforts in line with the budget cuts. NNSA chief Gordon was forbidden from traveling to Russia in February to coordinate next steps on key programs with Russian officials, as the new administration had not yet settled on a policy with respect to these efforts.

Worse, top administration officials immediately began to attack Russia's nonproliferation record, with CIA Director Tenet describing Russia as among the world's worst proliferators of sensitive technologies⁴⁷, Rumsfeld calling Russia an 'active proliferator', Wolfowitz warning that Russia seems 'willing to sell anything to anyone for money'⁴⁸, and even Powell saying that US policy toward Russia 'shouldn't be terribly different than the very realistic approach we had to the old Soviet Union in the late 1980s'.⁴⁹ These statements came despite Russia having given the new administration a substantial nonproliferation gift just as the Bush team came to office – the decision to suspend the deal to send isotope-separation lasers to Iran. Later, President Putin's decision to fire Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeny Adamov – who had come to be seen as public enemy number one by many US nonproliferation officials – and to replace him with Alexander Rumyantsev

could also be read as a substantial step toward addressing US concerns⁵⁰. Contrary to the advice of some engagement advocates within the administration, however, the Bush administration failed to seize that opportunity to engage with Rummyantsev on a renewed agenda of nuclear security cooperation.

But after this rocky start, matters have improved substantially in the lead-up to and aftermath of the Bush-Putin summit. Bush's May 1 speech marked a sharp shift toward the language of conciliation. The Bush team has clearly judged that with the Senate now in Democratic hands and the Europeans skeptical, the best road to their objective of missile defense lies through agreement and cooperation with Moscow. Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and the others have clearly been told to rein in their tongues. The summit built a renewed spirit of cooperation that appeared to exceed either side's expectations, and laid a positive foundation for moving forward with a nonproliferation cooperation agenda. The attitude of some Bush administration officials, in effect, is: if Russia and the Europeans are so concerned about a US missile defense, they had better offer more help in forestalling the threats such a defense would be needed to address. Putin's suggestion that the two sides' security services should work together to interdict illicit shipments of missile technology, to take just one example, is potentially a positive idea that could be further developed⁵¹.

Moreover, contrary to initial expectations, the review of threat reduction programs appears to be endorsing most of them to continue largely as before, and even considering some new initiatives. Administration officials have indicated privately, for example, that a new initiative on joint research and development of proliferation-resistant nuclear energy systems – much along the lines President Putin suggested in his Millennium Summit speech – will be among the new initiatives proposed. At the same time, Congress appears to be on a path toward correcting many of the worst mistakes made in the Bush administration's initial budget proposal: the House Appropriations Committee, for example, has voted to increase funding for both the material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) program and the *Nuclear Cities Initiative* compared to the Bush administration's request⁵².

A number of key nonproliferation issues of special interest to Russia remain to be decided. Now that the Duma has approved the law on import of spent nuclear fuel, the only thing standing between Minatom and billions of dollars of revenue is the US government – because nearly all the fuel that countries might be interested in shipping to Russia has US obligations attached to it, meaning it cannot be shipped to Russia without US approval and a US-Russian agreement for nuclear cooperation. Such an agreement will certainly require a deal of some kind on Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran – but the Bush administration has only begun to consider what specific deal it will want, and what else it might demand in these negotiations. The administration has officially stated that it will oppose any reprocessing of US-obligated fuel imported into Russia. Similarly, the Bush administration is still considering whether to approve the new contract approach for the HEU purchase agreement the *US Enrichment Corporation* has proposed, or some other concept for stabilizing that crucial agreement. What approach the Bush team will take to working with Russia to retool the closed nuclear cities is still being hotly debated; the existing *Nuclear Cities Initiative* has made only modest progress to date, and in its current form seems to have little political support in either Washington or Moscow. And no one has yet figured out what to do about the failure of the G-8 to come up with sufficient funding to implement the recent agreement on disposition of excess plutonium.

If both sides move forward with nonproliferation cooperation in the aftermath of the Bush-Putin summit, there is much to be done. The several US-Russian groups that had been discussing steps to strengthen export controls have not met since the Clinton administration. The two sides need detailed discussions to come to a better common understanding of where the most serious proliferation threats lie and what can be done to address them. More could be done to accelerate efforts to secure and account for nuclear materials; to dismantle excess nuclear weapons; to stabilize, accelerate, and expand the HEU purchase agreement; to build a better joint approach to downsizing the nuclear weapons complexes and providing alternative employment for nuclear weapon workers who are no longer needed; to put the agreement on reducing

excess plutonium stockpiles on a firm financial and technical footing; to reduce chemical weapons stockpiles and convert chemical and biological infrastructure; and more⁵³.

At the height of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union built an extensive partnership to pursue their common interest in preventing proliferation – working together to forge the Nonproliferation Treaty and the IAEA safeguards regime, and to stop the nuclear weapons programs of key regional states. With compromises on both sides, such an active, constructive nonproliferation partnership could be rebuilt, much to the benefit of the security of both countries and the world.

Looking Toward the Future

What we have in the Bush administration's nonproliferation team is *not* a case of the fox guarding the chicken coop – it is more a case of a chicken-coop guard who doubts whether chicken coops really have much value, and expects the chickens will ultimately get eaten by foxes in any case. The new team – still being assembled – brings a new approach to the nonproliferation problem, and a new skepticism regarding what can be done to stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction. It is an approach based more on technology denial, and on preparing US military forces to respond to proliferation after it occurs, than on regime-building and negotiation toward common security. It is one piece of a foreign policy approach based on balance-of-power realism, not on liberal institutionalism. But it is also an approach that is still evolving, and will continue to do so for some time to come. There remains a substantial chance to build a serious US-Russian nonproliferation partnership, working to address both sides' security interest in preventing proliferation.

¹ The best available description of the underlying intellectual rationale for rejecting all future negotiated, verified constraints on US nuclear forces is in a report signed by several senior Bush administration security officials before they took office: *Rationale and Requirements for US Nuclear Forces and Arms Control* (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, January 2001, available at <http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/pdf/nippnukes.pdf>). For a useful summary and critique of the Bush

administration's approach to arms reductions, see J. Mendelsohn, "Is Arms Control Dead?". *Issues in Science and Technology*, Spring 2001.

² For a good discussion of the history of this inevitable tension between proliferation policy and other factors, see P. Clausen, *Nonproliferation and the National Interest: America's Response to the Spread of Nuclear Weapons*. NY, HarperCollins, 1993.

³ See, for example, R. Joseph, "The Case for National Missile Defense," *Journal of Homeland Defense*, October 2000.

⁴ See the Center's web page, at <http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/centercounter/index.htm>.

⁵ R. Joseph, testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, March 23, 1999. Joseph numbered these as five conclusions; I have separated the first two (that weapons of mass destruction are here to stay, and that they will inevitably proliferate) into two separate conclusions for clarity.

⁶ R. Joseph, testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 21, 2000.

⁷ Fortunately, this appears to be one area where the Bush administration's approach already appears to be at variance with the impression one would draw from Joseph's testimony. Rather than lumping the IAEA safeguards system with the verification-free BWC, the administration has made a strong statement to the IAEA Board of Governors expressing its support for the safeguards system and efforts to strengthen it.

⁸ The idea of global nonproliferation norms is a particular focus of the new team's skepticism. For example, Steven A. Cambone, a long-time missile defense advocate who is the nominee for Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, devoted nearly his entire statement at the same hearing to a critique of norm-building as a focus for nonproliferation policy. See S. Cambone, "Elements of a Modern Non-Proliferation Policy," testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 21, 2000.

⁹ For a quite different Republican perspective, see L. Dunn, "On Proliferation Watch: Some Reflections on the Past Quarter Century," *Nonproliferation Review*, Spring/Summer 1998.

¹⁰ For an interesting argument along these lines, see T. Graham, "Nonproliferation: The Case for a Theory of Victory," *Arms Control Today*, September 1991; an updated version is available in T. Graham, "Proliferation Threats: Growing, Shrinking, or Changing?". 2001, June 18.

¹¹ For a useful critique of the idea of the undeterrable rogue state, see R. Litwak, *Rogue States and US Foreign Policy: Containment After the Cold War*. Washington, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000.

¹² *Washington Post*, 2000, June 15.

¹³ Final Communiqué: Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held in Budapest, Press Release M-NAC-1(2001)77, May 29, 2001.

¹⁴ See 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Final Document, NPT/CONF.2000/28, May, 2000.

¹⁵ For a useful updated list of those with jobs subject to Senate confirmation, see "Confirmation Status of Presidential Appointees to Nonproliferation-Related

Positions,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies.

¹⁶ Oddly, though the title is “Homeland Defense” and not just “Missile Defense,” defense against mass-destruction terrorism is *not* under Joseph’s directorate, but under Richard Clarke’s directorate with other terrorism issues.

¹⁷ G. Allison, O. Coté, Jr., R. Falkenrath, and S. Miller, *Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material*. Cambridge, MIT Press, 1996.

¹⁸ The statement that Powell signed, along with fellow former Chairmen John Shalikashvili, William Crowe, and David Jones, is available at <http://www.clw.org/coalition/jcs0198.htm>.

¹⁹ Unlike his boss, however, Armitage opposed the CTBT, telling an official US Information Agency interviewer on behalf of the Bush campaign, ‘we’re not in the business of ratifying treaties that are unverifiable.’ Unlike many other senior Bush administration national security officials, however, Armitage did not rule out a modified test ban in the future, saying ‘a Republican administration would be much more inclined to negotiate a treaty that actually would hold water and might have verification measures that would withstand scrutiny.’ See “From the Campaigns: A Republican View: Managing Relations with Russia, China, India: An Interview with Ambassador Richard Armitage,” US Information Agency, 2000.

²⁰ *New York Times*, 2001, March 26.

²¹ See “Council for a Livable World Opposes the John Bolton Nomination,” Council for a Livable World, 2001, April 11.

²² *New York Times*, 2001, January 8.

²³ For a summary of positions and quotes from Feith and Crouch, see “Bush Pentagon Nominees: Feith and Crouch,” Council for a Livable World, May 2001.

²⁴ Jochum’s profile on the Bureau of Export Administration’s website describes him as having played ‘a significant role in drafting and negotiating’ S. 1712, the revised version of the Export Administration Act. For a critique of the bill by a hard-line export control advocate, see G. Milhollin, “The Export Administration Act in 2000,” testimony to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 23, 2000.

²⁵ *Washington Post*, 2001, March 12.

²⁶ *New York Times*, 2001, May 20. See also Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, “US Policy and the BWC Protocol”. *The CBW Conventions Bulletin*, June 2001.

²⁷ See, for example, G. Milhollin, op. cit., and *Los Angeles Times*, 2001, March 4.

²⁸ See, for example, discussion in R. Shelby, “Additional Views,” in *The Export Administration Act of 2001*, Report of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate to Accompany S. 149, Senate Report 107-10, 107th Congress, April 2001; and Kenneth I. Juster, Undersecretary of Commerce for Export Administration, House Committee on International Relations, May 23, 2001. For a non-partisan summary of the bill and associated issues, see I. Ferguson, “The Export Administration Act: Controversy and

Prospects”. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2001, March 26.

²⁹ *Washington Post*, 2001, March 7.

³⁰ *New York Times*, 2001, March 8.

³¹ *New York Times*, 2001, March 15.

³² *New York Times*, 2001, May 10.

³³ The full text of the North Korean statement of May 16, 2001 can be found at the Korean Central News Agency website,

<http://www.kcna.co.jp/calendar/frame.htm>.

³⁴ “Statement by the President,” June 6, 2001.

³⁵ This statement of June 18, 2001, is also available at <http://www.kcna.co.jp/calendar/frame.htm>.

³⁶ For a useful discussion of what exactly the Agreed Framework requires over the next few years, and scenarios for its future, see M. May, ed., *Verifying the Agreed Framework*, UCRL-ID-142036, CGSR-2001-001 (Stanford, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Center for Global Security Research and Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation, 2001).

³⁷ *New York Times*, 2001, February 27.

³⁸ *Los Angeles Times*, 2001, May 17.

³⁹ *Financial Times*, 2001, May 23.

⁴⁰ *Washington Post*, 2001, May 11.

⁴¹ *Washington Post*, 2001, April 20.

⁴² See “From the Campaigns,” Armitage interview, op. cit.

⁴³ National Energy Policy Development Group, *National Energy Policy*. Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, May 2001, p. 5-17.

⁴⁴ Further muddying the water, the Clinton administration’s policy was enshrined in a Presidential Decision Directive, and such directives remain in force unless specifically revoked – meaning that the old policy is also still in force.

⁴⁵ George W. Bush, speech at the Reagan Library, November 19, 1999.

⁴⁶ For a detailed analysis of the budget cuts for nuclear security programs, see W. Hoehn, “Analysis of the Bush Administration’s Fiscal Year 2002 Budget Requests for US-Former Soviet Union Nuclear Security: Department of Energy Programs”. Washington, DC: Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, 2001, April 18.

⁴⁷ G. Tenet, “Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World,” testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 7, 2001.

⁴⁸ *Sunday Telegraph (London)*, 2001, March 18.

⁴⁹ *New York Times*, 2001, March 15.

⁵⁰ *Moscow Times*, 2001, April 2.

⁵¹ *New York Times*, 2001, June 19.

⁵² Budget documents released by the House Appropriations Committee, June 2001.

⁵³ For an extensive discussion of what more should be done to secure, monitor, and reduce stockpiles of plutonium and HEU, see M. Bunn, *The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material*. Washington DC: Nonproliferation Project, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Managing the Atom Project, Harvard University, 2000.