The Constituent Foundations of the Rally-Round-the-Flag Phenomenon

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Despite the massive attention heaped on the rally-round-the-flag phenomenon by public opinion scholars, relatively little attention has been paid to its constituent elements. Yet, recent research has found that different groups of Americans respond differently to presidents' activities according to their interests and attentiveness. In this study, I disaggregate public opinion along two dimensions: political party and political sophistication. I argue that in responding to high-profile presidential activities abroad, different groups of Americans weigh various individual, contextual, and situational factors differently. I investigate all major U.S. uses of force between 1953 and 1998 and find that the propensity of different groups to rally does indeed vary according to individual and environmental circumstances. To explain these differences, I employ two models of public opinion. The first emphasizes the importance of threshold effects in explaining opinion change. That is, individuals who are closest to the point of ambivalence between approval and disapproval are most likely to change their opinion in response to external circumstances. The second emphasizes both the propensities of different types of individuals to be exposed to a given piece of information, and their susceptibility to having their opinion influenced by any additional information. My results offer a more nuanced picture of the nature and extent of the rally phenomenon than has been available in previous studies. My findings also hold important implications for other related scholarly debates, such as whether, and under what circumstances, the use of force can successfully divert public attention from a president's domestic political difficulties.

A pair of Gallup polls conducted immediately prior to, and in the aftermath of, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon showed public approval of President Bush's job performance spiking by fully 35 percentage points, from 51% to 86%, the largest "rally-round-the-flag" effect ever recorded.[1] In the days following the attacks, historians and

[1] Source: Gallup Polls, September 7–10 and 14–15, 2001. Other major polling organizations recorded similar postattack approval ratings (e.g., 86% in a September 13, 2001, *ABC News/Washington Post* poll and 84% in a September 13–14, 2001, *CBS News/New York Times* poll).

journalists drew numerous comparisons to the only other foreign attack on American soil in the past century, at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Both were surprise attacks, both produced thousands of casualties, and both brought a previously divided nation together in unprecedented determination to defeat the aggressor and near universal bipartisan support for the president. Yet, in the aftermath of Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, President Franklin Roosevelt's approval rating rose by only 12 percentage points. Why was President Bush's postattack rally nearly three times larger than that of Franklin Roosevelt? The present study is, in part, intended to answer this question.

Ever since Mueller (1970, 1973) introduced the phrase "rally-round-the-flag" to the political science lexicon, it has remained a fixture in the literature on public opinion and foreign policy. Indeed, scholars have repeatedly found that presidents enjoy relatively short-lived spikes in their approval ratings immediately following sudden, high profile foreign policy events (Mueller, 1970, 1973; Brody and Shapiro, 1989; Brody, 1991; Jordan and Page, 1992; Lian and Oneal, 1993; Parker, 1995; Oneal, Lian, and Joyner, 1996). Yet, there is less agreement as to the cause, durability, or significance of the rally effect. Some scholars cite a surge of patriotism when the president focuses the nation's attention beyond the water's edge as the principal cause of the rally phenomenon (Mueller, 1970; Parker, 1995). Others attribute the effect to an absence of elite criticism (Brody and Shapiro, 1989), or of media coverage of critical views in the initial stages of foreign policy crises, when the administration is the media's primary source of information (Brody, 1991). Still others (Oneal et al., 1996) have found evidence that the magnitude of the rally effect depends on the extent of bipartisan support for a president's foreign policy. Beyond debating the causes of the rally effect, scholars have questioned its substantive significance, pointing out that rallies tend to be ephemeral (Brody, 1991) and ineffective as means of improving a president's long-term political standing (Meernik and Waterman, 1996).

Despite the substantial body of research devoted to the rally phenomenon, relatively little attention has been paid to its constituent elements. That is, the vast majority of such studies aggregate public opinion into a single monolithic entity, either rallying or not.[2] Yet, recent research has found that different constituencies typically respond differently to presidents' activities according to their own interests and attentiveness (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, 1991; Krause, 1997; Fornier, 1998; Baum and Kernell, 2001). In this study, I challenge the assumption of a homogenous rally effect by disaggregating public opinion along two dimensions which have proven fruitful in previous studies of heterogeneous public opinion: partisanship and political sophistication. Notwithstanding the patriotism hypothesis, it seems unlikely that heterogeneity among different constituencies would disappear entirely during foreign policy crises. Rather, as in their responses to most other presidential activities, I anticipate that different groups of Americans most likely weigh various individual, contextual, and situational factors differently in evaluating a presidential foreign policy initiative, such as a use of military force. In particular, I argue that political and economic circumstances will weigh heavily in influencing whether and to what extent different groups will rally.

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[2] Two exceptions are Edwards and Swenson (1997) and Hristoulas, James, and Rioux (2000). The former study investigates, at the individual level, the correlates of a rally following a single U.S. use of force early in the Clinton administration. The authors found Democratic identifiers most likely to rally. Though it is difficult to compare my over-time results with results derived from a single event, the logic of their model—that, *ceteris paribus*, those with the greatest propensity to support the president (assuming they didn't do so *ex ante*) are most likely to rally—is consistent with my argument. The latter study divides approval data into four groups: overall, partisan (i.e., Democrats and Republicans), opposition identifiers, and Independent. The authors find some differences in rally effects, but they do not offer theoretical explanations for those differences.

I begin, in the next section, by developing a series of hypotheses concerning who is likely to rally and under what circumstances. In order to understand why we should expect to find a heterogeneous rally effect, I employ two models of public opinion change, each suggesting a distinct set of hypotheses, based on either environmental (i.e., political and economic) or personal (i.e., political sophistication) circumstances. The first, which emphasizes situational factors, focuses on the size of the population available to rally under differing political and economic circumstances. This model, proposed by Kernell and Hibbs (1981), addresses the importance of threshold effects in explaining opinion change. That is, individuals who are closest to the point of ambivalence between approval and disapproval, for whatever reason, are most likely to change their opinion in response to external circumstances (on threshold effects, see also Edwards and Swenson, 1997). The second, which emphasizes the influence of individual characteristics, focuses on the proportion of the public likely to be responsive to a use of force. Numerous studies have found that individuals differ in their responses to information in the political environment, depending on their political sophistication (Sniderman et al., 1991; Iyengar, 1993; Krosnick and Brannon, 1993; Miller and Krosnick, 1996). This latter model, proposed by Zaller (1992), emphasizes both the propensity of different types of individuals to encounter political messages in the environment and their susceptibility to having their opinion influenced by such information, depending on their level of political awareness. Next, in the third section, I discuss the data employed in my investigations. In the fourth section, I present the results of a series of statistical analyses. An appropriate means of detecting the presence of heterogeneity in times-series relationships, introduced by Krause (1997), involves separately performing an econometric analysis for each subgroup that might differ in the way they assess the environment. I employ this strategy throughout my investigations. In the fifth section, I discuss my findings. The final section concludes.

Theory and Hypotheses

Figure 1 outlines the logic flow of the argument. The figure shows how political and economic circumstances, refracted through individual characteristics, determine the availability and propensity of individuals to rally, given a potential rally event. This, in turn, determines the magnitude of any rally effect. In this section, I explicate the model and develop a series of testable hypotheses.

In an effort to explain how different groups of Americans respond to variations in economic performance, Kernell and Hibbs (1981) propose a partisan


Fig. 1. A Model of Heterogeneous Public Opinion and the Rally Effect

"threshold" model of presidential approval.[3] They argue that in determining which economic policies to pursue, presidents must respond strategically to the preferences of different constituencies. A president's support will typically be drawn from both members of his own party and, to a lesser extent, members of the opposition party and Independents. The president's fellow partisans, they argue, typically support a president strongly and in large numbers. Opposition party and Independent approvers, however, will tend to approve more weakly than the president's fellow partisans. In other words, opposition and Independent approvers lie closer to the threshold of approval. By the same logic, larger numbers of opposition and Independent disapprovers will also tend to lie near the threshold. And, due to their relatively weakly held preferences, these are the constituencies who are most likely to alter their evaluation of the president in response to changing economic circumstances, such as higher unemployment or inflation. Hence, a strategic president will treat his fellow partisans as more-or-less "locked in" in their support (Baum and Kernell, 2001) and focus his efforts on appealing to these marginal constituencies. Kernell and Hibbs (1981) find in their empirical tests that opposition party members and Independents are indeed most likely to change their evaluation of a president in response to changing economic circumstances.

Political observers have noted that former president Bill Clinton employed this strategy with great success, most notably in the cases of NAFTA, PNTR with China, and welfare reform. Moreover, the empirical record appears consistent with this view of a president's fellow partisans as relatively more "locked in" to supporting presidents from their own party. Between 1953 and 1998, in the data employed in this study, an average of 72% of Democratic identifiers approved the performance of Democratic presidents. And an even larger number of Republican identifiers, 81% on average, approved of Republican presidents. As the partisan variant of the threshold model anticipates, Democratic and Republican partisans have overwhelmingly and consistently supported presidents from their own party.

Unless politics truly does stop entirely at the water's edge—a dubious hypothesis at best—there is no intrinsic reason to believe that the heterogeneity Kernell and Hibbs found among different partisan groups in their responses to changing external circumstances should be limited to changes in the economy. For instance, it seems likely that different groups of Americans will vary in their willingness to reassess a president's job performance following a use of military force abroad, depending on their location relative to the threshold of approval. Strong disapprovers and approvers are unlikely to reevaluate the president in the face of a use of force abroad, regardless of the outcome. These individuals typically possess sufficiently intense ideologically driven preferences that they will be able to counterargue any signals from political elites suggesting that they should alter their evaluation of the president (Zaller, 1992).

At the same time, the more approvers there are among identifiers of a given political party, the fewer remain available to upgrade their evaluation of the president. A president's own party identifiers are more likely to approve of his performance than are opposition party identifiers or Independents. Indeed, again according to the data employed in this study, since the Eisenhower administration, Democrats' approval of their own presidents exceeds their approval of Republican presidents by an average of 33 percentage points. And this differential pales by comparison to the 47 percentage point gap between average Republican identifier approval rates for Republican presidents relative to Republican approval rates for Democratic presidents.

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[3] Kernell and Hibbs (1981) test several variants of the threshold model, but find the strongest support for the partisan variant, which I emphasize throughout my analysis.

Hence, when a president deploys or employs military force abroad, he is unlikely to gain many converts within his own party, the vast majority of whom already approve of his performance.[4] Rather, the primary source of any rally will be marginal disapprovers, most of whom will be opposition identifiers and Independents.[5] A hypothesis follows from this argument:

H$_1$:   Presidents will receive a larger rally effect among opposition party identifiers and Independents than among their own party identifiers.

It follows in a fairly straightforward manner that the larger the pool of marginal disapprovers, the larger the potential rally for a president if he employs military force. Since presidents' approval ratings tend to rise and fall with the performance of the economy, this implies, somewhat counterintuitively, that presidents are likely to enjoy their largest rallies during poor economic circumstances. After all, during difficult economic times, those individuals located near the threshold of approval are likely to swing over to the disapproval column. These marginal disapprovers are, relatively speaking, ripe for the president's picking. Conversely, if the economy is performing well, a president will most likely enjoy a high approval rating, as marginal disapprovers swing over to the approval column. Under this latter circumstance, a president will have little to gain from a foreign adventure, particularly among his fellow partisans.

H$_2$:   As the economy worsens, presidents will receive a larger rally effect among opposition party identifiers. Conversely, the stronger the economy, the weaker the rally effect among opposition identifiers. Changes in economic performance will have less influence on rallies among a president's own party identifiers.

This latter hypothesis seems less counterintuitive if one recognizes that a rally effect is measured relative to the president's political standing prior to a rally event, not in absolute terms. So a president with a 30% pre-event approval rating who surges by a whopping 10 percentage points, remains fairly unpopular. In contrast, a president who enjoys a 70% pre-event approval rating, whose popularity rises by a modest three percentage points, receives, by this indicator, a far smaller rally effect. Nonetheless, the latter president's political standing is far superior to that of the former president, whose postrally popularity peaks at an unimpressive 40%.

The previous hypothesis can be further narrowed. Kernell (1975) argues that not all economic indicators influence presidential popularity similarly. Kernell found that in the post–World War II era, the public has typically responded far more strongly to inflation than to variations in unemployment.[6] This suggests that if Hypothesis 2 is correct, we should observe a stronger interaction between approval and inflation than with unemployment. Moreover, Republican presi-

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[4] Presumably, marginal disapprovers from the president's party are *at least* as likely as marginal disapprovers from the opposition party, or Independents, to change their opinions (see, for example, Edwards and Swenson, 1997). There are, however, far fewer disapprovers and presumably fewer marginal disapprovers within a president's party than within the opposition party or among Independents. Hence, changes in the evaluations of members of the former group are, at least in most circumstances, less consequential for the overall size of a rally.

[5] For instance, the standard deviation on the change in Democratic identifiers' approval ratings following initiation of a rally event is substantially higher when a Republican occupies the White House (by five percentage points), compared to when a Democrat is in power. For reasons to be discussed later, the difference is much smaller for Republican identifiers and, as one would expect, there is virtually no difference for Independents.

[6] In fact, between 1953 and 1998, consumer sentiment correlates nearly twice as strongly with inflation (−.64) as with unemployment (−.38). (Source: University of Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment, available at HTTP://www.economagic.com.)

dents typically place greater emphasis than their Democratic counterparts on combating inflation relative to unemployment. In contrast, Democratic presidents, due to their larger working-class constituency, typically place a greater emphasis on minimizing unemployment. Hence, the public is less likely to trust a Democratic president to do a good job of managing inflation. This implies that the hypothesized interaction should be strongest during Democratic administrations, because the public can be expected to scrutinize a Democratic president's management of inflation more intensely than they would a Republican president's. A corollary to Hypothesis 2 follows:[7]

H$_{2a}$:   **The effects of inflation on rallies should be stronger during Democratic than during Republican administrations.**

Variations in political circumstances are also likely to play an important role in influencing whether and to what extent a president's approval rating will spike during an overseas military engagement. One important indicator of variations in the domestic political environment is the existence or absence of divided government. One might anticipate that a president would enjoy a larger rally effect during periods of unified government, when the opposition party lacks a high-profile institutional stage from which to criticize the president. As we will see, however, the partisan threshold model suggests we should observe the opposite relationship.

By virtue of controlling congressional leadership positions, the opposition party will attract greater media attention than the minority party, thereby increasing the publicity afforded to its criticisms of the president. Opposition identifiers are thus more likely to receive these relatively high profile signals and respond by lowering their evaluations of the president. Independents, in contrast, are less likely to respond to partisan signals. So their approval ratings are less likely to vary across periods of divided versus unified government. In fact, between 1953 and 1998—in the 834 Gallup polls employed in this study—during periods of unified Democratic government, an average of 36% of Republicans approved of Democratic presidents. This compares to an average of 29% of Republicans approving Democratic presidents during periods where Republicans controlled at least one house of Congress. Similarly, during periods of unified Republican control, an average of 52% of Democrats approved of Republican presidents. This compares to an average approval rating of only 38% among Democrats when the Republicans controlled the White House and the Democrats controlled at least one house of Congress. Among Independents, approval ratings vary by only about four percentage points across periods of unified versus divided government (56% vs. 52%, respectively).[8]

The partisan threshold model predicts that a majority of individuals located near the threshold of approval will be opposition and Independent disapprovers. Hence, the more popular the president is among opposition identifiers and Independents, the smaller the rally effect should be. Since presidents are more popular among opposition identifiers during unified government, the partisan

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[7] A second corollary to Hypothesis 2 is that, *ceteris paribus*, unemployment should matter more during Republican administrations, since voters trust Republicans less than Democrats in this issue area. I expect, however, that any such relationship will be overwhelmed by the overall weaker effect of unemployment on presidential approval. I have therefore elected not to present a separate hypothesis concerning unemployment. Empirical testing (discussed later) confirmed this expectation.

[8] It is important to recognize the limited number of observations during which Republican and Democratic presidents faced unified Republican Congresses. In fact, in my data set, the only incidence of the former was the first two years of the Eisenhower administration (1953–54) and the only incidence of the latter was four years during the Clinton administration (1995–98). Hence, any inferences drawn from these data must be interpreted cautiously.

threshold model suggests they should enjoy larger rallies among opposition identifiers during divided government.[9]

Yet, as noted, previous studies (Brody, 1991; Lian and Oneal, 1993; Oneal et al., 1996) have argued that the magnitude and duration of rallies depends in part on the extent of elite criticism in the early stages of a crisis. One possible implication, contrary to the partisan threshold model's prediction, is that we might anticipate smaller rallies during periods of divided government, when the president's opponents possess a fairly high-profile political stage from which to criticize his policies.

While these two theoretical perspectives appear inconsistent, Groeling (2001) presents a mechanism through which they can be reconciled. He argues that divided government can influence patterns of media coverage of opposition party statements about the president, as well as their likely effects on the public. This is because journalists prefer stories featuring individuals in positions of power. Hence, opposition party statements are more likely to be covered by journalists during divided government, when opposition leaders are more able to influence political outcomes, thereby making their opinions more newsworthy. Groeling, however, also argues that the *content* of opposition party statements affects their newsworthiness. In divided government, the opposition party receives substantial coverage when it attacks the president. Yet, statements by opposition party leaders *supporting* the president are more novel than the usual partisan attacks, and so such statements will attract even *greater* media attention. While during domestic policy debates, such statements are relatively rare—thereby helping explain why presidents' overall approval ratings are lower during divided government—when foreign crises arise, opposition leaders often feel greater pressure to support the commander-in-chief (especially during the Cold War era).

Because they are atypical and represent costly signals, any prominent and unexpected opposition party endorsements of the president are extremely credible, particularly to opposition identifiers (Koeske and Crano, 1968; Dutton, 1973; Eagly, Wood, and Chaiken, 1978; Eagly, 1981; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Groeling, 2001). Hence, while the day-to-day patterns of press coverage during divided government include large quantities of opposition party attacks on the president, these very patterns, combined with journalists' preference for novel stories, may actually enhance the size of rallies during divided government. In other words, divided government has three implications that might lead to greater rallies than under unified government. First, high levels of opposition party criticism prior to a crisis will lower the president's baseline approval level, particularly among opposition identifiers.[10] Second, if opposition party elites rally behind the president during a foreign crisis, the news media will grant them disproportionately prominent coverage. Finally, opposition party statements of support for the president are exceptionally powerful cues for the public, particularly for the large pool of disapproving opposition identifiers during divided government who are potentially available to rally. Taken together, these arguments suggest another hypothesis:

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[9] Nicholson, Segura, and Woods (1999) investigate presidential approval at the individual level using NES surveys between 1972 and 1994. They find that presidents enjoy higher approval ratings during divided government. They argue that due to the prevalence of mixed political informational signals during divided government, the public is less likely to hold the president accountable for policy failures. This argument appears somewhat inconsistent with my proposition concerning the availability of partisan signals during divided government. These individual-level results from 12 NES surveys differ from, and are in some respects orthogonal to, the aggregate-level patterns in this study (based on a larger sample, 834 Gallup polls, and a longer time period, 1953–1998), which indicate that opposition identifiers are *less* likely to approve of presidents during divided government.

[10] It is worth noting that there is an ongoing debate concerning whether presidents' legislative success does (e.g., McCubbins, 1991; Edwards, Barrett, and Peake, 1997) or does not (e.g., Mayhew, 1991) differ across unified versus divided government.

H₃: **Presidents will enjoy their largest rallies among opposition party identifiers during periods of divided government. Divided government will have a smaller effect on the president's own party identifiers. The effect of divided government on Independents is ambiguous.**

Another factor influencing the nature and extent of rally effects is the external strategic environment. The president is the commander-in-chief of America's armed forces and the primary U.S. representative to the world. Moreover, the Constitution grants presidents far greater unilateral power over foreign, relative to domestic, affairs. As a result, the American people typically hold presidents responsible for America's foreign policy to an even greater extent than for domestic policy, where Congress plays a more central role.

Because presidents are able to conduct foreign affairs *relatively* free from the myriad constraints that hinder their ability to implement their domestic agendas, they are better able to influence the public's perception of foreign policy. Hence, *ceteris paribus*, to the extent that the public is focused on foreign rather than domestic affairs, the president is advantaged. This suggests that in times of high public concern over foreign affairs, presidents are likely to be more popular than when the public's focus is inward. (In fact, some empirical evidence, discussed below, supports this conjecture.) This pattern is likely exacerbated by the simple fact that public attention tends to be most strongly inwardly focused in periods of economic distress, at which time an incumbent president is likely to be relatively unpopular. It also seems likely that in periods of intense interest in foreign affairs, the public is unlikely to be "shocked" by a foreign crisis into rallying around the president. Rather, under such circumstances, a potential rally event is relatively more likely to be anticipated and therefore already factored into the public's evaluation of the president. After all, the definition of a rally event presumes that such an event will be sudden and dramatic. Given these patterns, the partisan threshold model suggests that presidents will enjoy their largest rallies when the nation's attention is *not* focused on foreign affairs, because presidents' approval ratings will tend to be lower, and a crisis in such periods is relatively more likely to catch people by surprise.[11] An additional hypothesis follows:

H₄: **The more the public is focused on foreign affairs prior to a rally event, the smaller the rally effect following a use of force. Conversely, the less the public is focused on foreign affairs, the larger the rally effect, particularly among opposition identifiers.**

While variations in partisan interests can help account for differences in the rally effect for different presidents under different circumstances, this one dimension is insufficient to provide a full picture of the rally phenomenon. Clearly, not

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[11] It is possible that any rally-inhibiting effect of foreign policy salience is endogenous to the factor(s) causing the public to rate foreign policy problems highly in the first place or to rate the president highly prior to a given rally event. In other words, for instance, the United States may have confronted some foreign policy crisis—during the course of which a rally event ultimately occurred—which caused the public both to rate foreign policy as an important problem and to rate the president highly even prior to the actual rally event. In fact, virtually any indicator of the state of the international environment—including foreign policy salience—is almost certainly in part endogenous to the circumstances that give rise to a potential rally event. To the extent that this is producing biased coefficients, however, we should be able to mitigate the problem, at least in part, by accounting for the state of the pre-rally-event international environment more explicitly on the right–hand side. Hence, I reran all of the models with additional controls for the three major post–World War II U.S. wars (Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf), the number of U.S. uses of military force per year, and the number of U.S. disputes per year with the Soviet Union. The results indicated that none of these controls significantly affected the key conceptual variables. Hence, they are omitted from the reported results. This suggests these relationships are not wholly, or even largely, endogenous to the state of U.S. foreign policy or the international environment prior to potential rally events.

all members of a given political party are equally likely to respond in a given manner to external events. Beyond identifying their most likely party affiliation, the partisan threshold model does not offer much insight into who exactly is likely to occupy the middle ground, nearest to the approval threshold. Moreover, it is unclear from the partisan threshold model why Independents should be less inclined to rally than opposition party identifiers. Explaining these patterns requires a more nuanced conception of individual differences.

Zaller (1992) developed an informational model that offers additional insight into the composition of this pivotal group. Zaller anticipates heterogeneous responses to political stimuli, depending on individuals' political awareness or sophistication.[12] He argues that individuals at different levels of political awareness tend to react differently to information and to have varying propensities to encounter political information available in the environment. Highly unaware individuals, Zaller argues, tend to be relatively oblivious to political information. As a result, their opinions tend to be stable, even in a relatively information-intensive environment like that surrounding a use of American military force. Since they tend not to receive new information, they have no basis on which to alter their opinions. Highly politically aware individuals are also relatively immune to having their opinions swayed by new information. This is because these individuals have well-formed belief systems (or ideologies) through which they are able to filter new information. This filtering process allows these cognitively sophisticated individuals to, in effect, hear what they want to hear and screen out dissonant information. Moderately politically aware individuals are thus most susceptible to having their opinions altered by new information, because they typically pay enough attention to receive the information, but lack sufficiently well-formed belief systems to screen out or counterargue dissonant messages (see also McGuire, 1973).

Applying Zaller's model to the partisan threshold model, a more complete picture emerges of the types of individuals most likely to occupy the political space near the threshold of approval. These individuals are unlikely to consist of either the least or the most politically aware members of the population. The former group, to the extent that they identify with a political party at all, will tend to be largely oblivious to political events. Hence, their approval or disapproval of the president will most likely vary only modestly, even in the face of a presidential foreign policy success or failure. The latter, the highly politically aware group, will also tend to be located far from the approval threshold. These are political ideologues who tend to approve or disapprove of a president with relatively high resolve. Like their less politically aware counterparts, their approval or disapproval of a president is unlikely to be swayed by external events, albeit for different reasons.

This leaves the middle group, best characterized as moderately politically aware, as most likely to be located near the threshold of approval. Zaller's model suggests that it is these individuals who will account for the majority of any rally effect enjoyed by a president. The corresponding hypothesis is as follows:

H$_5$:   **In the aftermath of a use of force abroad, the largest rally effect will be among moderately politically aware individuals. Rallies among the least and most politically aware individuals will be smaller.**

It is, however, possible to break down this general pattern even further, by recognizing that individuals at the top and bottom of the political awareness

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[12] Zaller (1992:21) defines political awareness as "the extent to which an individual pays attention to politics *and* understands what he or she has encountered" (emphasis in original). While "awareness" and "sophistication" are closely related, they arguably are not completely identical concepts. Nonetheless, for purposes of this study, I employ the terms interchangeably.

scale have, in all likelihood, responded differently to changing environmental circumstances over the past five decades. For instance, elsewhere (Baum, 2002) I argue that with the rise of competition in the mass media due to changing media technologies, television broadcasters have increasingly sought to repackage political information into formats appealing to politically uninterested individuals. As a result, in recent years, the least politically aware members of society have grown more attentive to high-profile political issues, including foreign policy crises, compared to prior decades (Baum, 2000). In contrast, highly politically aware individuals have remained fairly consistent in their attentiveness, since they have always sought out information from whatever sources were available. Hence, to the extent that the least politically aware members of society have become, over time, relatively more likely to be attentive to some political issues, like foreign crises, we might anticipate a reduction in the discrepancy in rallies between the least politically aware individuals and their moderately aware counterparts. In other words, we might anticipate a trend towards larger rallies among less politically aware individuals over time. In contrast, highly politically aware individuals are as likely as ever to successfully counterargue any dissonant information, so they are less likely to have changed. This suggests two corollaries to Hypothesis 5:

H_{5a}:   **Aggregating the entire post–World War II period, the *least* politically aware individuals should rally more, on average, than the *most* politically aware individuals.**

H_{5b}:   **The least politically aware individuals should exhibit the strongest trend towards larger rally effects over time, while highly politically aware individuals should exhibit the weakest such trend.**

Further examination of the partisan characteristics of individuals at differing levels of political awareness suggests that some additional nuance can be added to the prior predictions. This is because individuals at differing levels of political awareness are likely to differ *ex ante* in their propensity to approve of presidents from different parties. Table 1 presents the average levels of approval of Republican and Democratic presidents among individuals at three education levels: grade school, high school, and college.[13] (Throughout my investigations, I employ education as an indicator of political awareness or sophistication. I discuss the validity of this indicator below.)

These data indicate that respondents with a grade school education are, on average, nearly nine percentage points more likely to approve Democratic, relative to Republican, presidents, while college-educated respondents are nearly 11 percentage points more likely to approve Republican, relative to Democratic, presidents. Moreover, while during Democratic administrations the three education groups differ hardly at all in their evaluations of the president, during Republican administrations the average approval rating among college-educated respondents exceeds that of their grade school-educated counterparts by over 17 percentage points. This suggests that during Republican administrations, there are more low-education individuals available to upgrade their evaluation of the president in response to a high-profile foreign policy event.[14]

At first glance, an increased propensity to rally among the least politically aware Americans would appear to advantage Democratic presidents, who are

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[13] These figures are based on the Gallup presidential-approval series employed in this study.

[14] The reasons for the discrepancy between Republican and Democratic administrations are complex. One likely contributing factor is the relatively higher level of political awareness—and hence ideological orientation—of Republican identifiers. As noted, ideologues tend to resist contrary information in the media. Hence, *ceteris paribus*, Republican identifiers are less likely to evaluate a Democratic president positively than Democratic identifiers are to evaluate a Republican president positively.

Table 1. Average Presidential Approval Rates, by Education and President's Party, 1953–98

	President's Party	
Education Level	Democrat	Republican
Grade School	55.5%	46.8%
High School	54.5%	55.8%
College	53.3%	64.0%

traditionally more dependent on this constituency than their Republican counterparts. Yet, because these individuals are far more likely than their high-awareness counterparts to approve of a Democratic president *ex ante*, there are likely to be fewer low-awareness individuals available to rally when a Democratic president engages in a high-profile foreign policy activity. In other words, during a Democratic administration, there are likely to be fewer low-awareness individuals located near the threshold of approval. Since an individual who *already* approves of the president cannot reevaluate upwards in the aftermath of a rally event, this suggests, somewhat counterintuitively, that Republican presidents are more likely to benefit from enhanced rallies among politically unsophisticated members of the public. After all, during Republican administrations, there will be more disapproving low-awareness individuals available to upgrade their evaluation of the president when a rally event arises. At the same time, as noted above, highly politically aware individuals—the group least likely to support a Democratic administration *ex ante*, and hence most available to rally behind a Democratic president—are *least* likely to have changed over time in their propensity to rally. This suggests two additional corollaries to Hypothesis 5.

H$_{5c}$: **There will be an over-time increase in the magnitude of rallies during Republican administrations, with the strongest trend occurring among the least politically aware individuals.**

H$_{5d}$: **There will be no significant trend towards larger rallies during Democratic administrations.**

Taking both the partisan threshold and informational models into account in this manner can yield additional insight, again, due to the differing constituent elements of the major political parties. For instance, as the previous discussion suggests, Democrats, on average, tend to be less politically aware than Republicans. For instance, in the 1996 National Election Study, fully 40% more Democrats than Republicans—237 vs. 169—received the middle score of three on the interviewer's five-point political awareness scale, while 22% *fewer* Democrats received the highest score of five—93 vs. 76. Overall, an average self-identifying Democratic respondent possesses a high school diploma and is located right near the midpoint (3) on the 5-point NES interviewer's political information scale. The average self-identifying Republican respondent, in contrast, has attended at least some college and receives nearly a 4 on the 5-point NES political information scale. Table 2 compares the degree of political awareness of Democratic Party identifiers with that of Republican Party identifiers across 11 different dimensions. In every instance, Republicans possess an advantage over Democrats, ranging from 6% to 23%.

Given the clear difference between average Republicans and Democrats, we can surmise that more Democrats than Republicans are likely, on average, to lie near the threshold of approval. This is because a typical Democrat is more likely

TABLE 2. Republicans Are, on Average, More Politically Informed,
Engaged, Active, and Wealthier Than Democrats

Political Engagement Item	Republican Advantage
Income	+23%
Number of Likes & Dislikes about Presidential Candidates	+22%
Listen to Campaign Discussions on Radio	+16%
Education	+14%
Political Information (Interviewer's Assessment)	+13%
Strength of Feelings about Political Figures	+12%
Read Daily Newspaper	+12%
Read About Campaigns in Newspaper	+9%
Read About Campaigns in Magazines	+8%
Interest in Public Affairs	+7%
Political Efficacy	+6%

Source: 1996 American National Election Study

than a typical Republican to be moderately politically aware, while a typical Republican is more likely to be highly politically aware. (Democrats are also less likely than Republicans to be interested in politics.) A sixth hypothesis follows:

H$_6$: Democratic rallies during Republican administrations will be larger than Republican rallies during Democratic administrations.

Along these same lines, to the extent that more Democrats than Republicans lie near the threshold of approval (since more Democrats occupy the moderate category of political awareness), we should anticipate larger *overall* rallies for Republican presidents, simply because there are more marginal disapprovers available to reevaluate a Republican president. This suggests another hypothesis:

H$_7$: Republican presidents should, on average, receive larger rallies than Democratic presidents (though these differences, averaged across all respondents, will be smaller than the corresponding differences among specific subgroups).

The partisan threshold model explains why a president's fellow partisans are less likely to rally than opposition identifiers and Independents. Yet, thus far, we have not considered whether this model can explain any differences in the propensity to rally between opposition identifiers and Independents. In fact, some insight into this question emerges from the partisan threshold model. The logic behind the distinction between a president's fellow partisans and opposition identifiers is based on the larger number of approvers within the president's party. Individuals who already approve cannot upgrade their evaluation of the president. Since there are more pre-rally-event approvers among the president's fellow partisans, there are less of these individuals available to rally. While Independents are less likely to approve of the president than members of the president's party, they are far more likely to do so than opposition identifiers. Hence, there are typically fewer Independents available to rally.

Zaller's model offers some additional insight into why Independents might be less likely to rally than opposition identifiers. Independents are more likely than party identifiers to occupy the lowest rung of the political awareness ladder. Of the 11 factors listed in Table 2, Independents receive the lowest score on six of the factors and the second lowest score on the other five. Moreover, more Independents, on average, than Democrats or Republicans fail to offer an opin-

ion when asked to evaluate the president (13.4%, compared to 12.0% Democrats and 8.6% Republicans).[15] This suggests that Independents tend, on average, to be less politically aware than party identifiers, particularly Republicans. Hence, while many Independents might tend to be located near the threshold of approval by virtue of their lack of a strong party attachment, some percentage of these individuals will be largely disengaged from the political process, and so less likely than weakly disapproving opposition identifiers to alter their political evaluations in the face of changing external circumstances.[16] Taken together, the partisan threshold model and the informational model suggest a final hypothesis with respect to Independents:

H₈: **The magnitude of, and variation in, rallies among Independents will typically lie in between Democrats and Republicans (with the exception noted in H₃).**

Table 3 summarizes the hypotheses. Later, I test each against presidential approval data from 1953 to 1998. Before doing so, however, in the next section I discuss my dependent and key independent variables, as well as a series of control variables employed throughout my investigations.

Data and Methodology

Mueller (1970, 1973) lists six categories of rally events: sudden military interventions, major military developments in ongoing wars, major diplomatic developments, dramatic technological developments, meetings between the U.S. president and leaders of other major powers, and the start of each presidential term. He argues that for an event to be classified as a potential rally event, it should satisfy three criteria: (1) be international, (2) directly involve the U.S. in general and the president in particular, and (3) be "specific, dramatic, and sharply focused" (1973:209). Oneal et al. (1996:265) further restrict their definition of rally events to "major uses of force during a crisis." This, they argue, ensures that they are "considering only cases that were truly consequential for the U.S. and salient to the public, necessary conditions for a rally. . . ." Following Oneal et al. (1996), I restrict my analysis to major uses of force during a foreign policy crisis.

For my data set, I rely on Oneal et al. (1996), whose data encompasses the period 1950–1988. Rally events from 1989 to 1995 are taken from Fordham and Sarver (2001), who present a list of major U.S. uses and deployments of military force (henceforth referred to as "uses of force") derived from an updated version of Blechman and Kaplan's (1978) data set on political uses of force (see also

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[15] Once again, these figures are based on the data set employed in this study.

[16] One possible alternative explanation for why rallies among Independents might lie between Republicans and Democrats is that Independents are really weak partisan leaners, tending to identify with one of the major parties (Keith, Magleby, Nelson, Orr, Westlye, and Wolfinger, 1992). If so, the magnitude of rallies among weak partisans might naturally fall in between those of their more strongly partisan counterparts. For several reasons, I believe this explanation does not adequately account for the empirical phenomena identified in this study. First, a review of the 1996 NES study reveals that nearly 10% of all respondents identify themselves as leaning towards neither Democrats nor Republicans. This suggests that at least *some* registered Independents are indeed independent. Second, the logic of the partisan threshold model suggests that, *ceteris paribus*, weak partisans ought to lie closer to the threshold of approval than their more strongly partisan counterparts. Hence, if most Independents are really weak partisans, then such individuals ought to be *most* likely to rally, particularly during periods (e.g., divided government or high inflation) when weak partisans are likely to disapprove of the president's performance *ex ante*. Yet, such a pattern does not emerge in the data. Finally, the informational model not only offers an explanation for this empirical phenomenon, but it can also account for differences in rallies across respondents at different levels of political awareness. The "Independents-as-weak-partisans" alternative, in contrast, cannot account for these latter variations. This, in my view, makes Zaller's informational model, *ceteris paribus*, a preferable theoretical argument.

TABLE 3. Summary of Hypotheses

	Hypothesis	Direction of Predicted Effect	Predicted Rally Effect
H_1	Party Identification	N/A	Strongest for Opposition Identifiers
H_2	Economy	Inverse	Strongest for Opposition Identifiers
H_{2a}	Inflation	Positive	Strongest for Republican Identifiers during Democratic Administrations
H_3	Divided Government	Positive	Strongest for Opposition Identifiers
H_4	Salience of Foreign Policy	Inverse	Strongest for Opposition Identifiers
H_5	Political Awareness I (i.e., education)	Positive	Strongest for Moderately Educated Individuals
H_{5a}	Political Awareness II (1953–98 pooled)	Positive	*Least* Educated > *Most* Educated
H_{5b}	Political Awareness Trend I (1953–98)	Positive	Strongest for Least Educated
H_{5c}	Political Awareness Trend II (1953–98)	Positive	Strongest for Least Educated During Republican Administration
H_{5d}	Political Awareness Trend III (1953–98)	None	No Trend During Democratic Administrations
H_6	Dem vs. Rep Administrations	N/A	Democrats During Republican Administrations > Republicans During Democratic Administrations
H_7	President's Party	N/A	Republican Presidents > Democratic Presidents
H_8	Independent Identifiers	N/A	Between Democrats and Republicans

Kaplan and Blechman, 1978), which was also employed by Oneal et al. (1996).[17] Finally, candidate rally events from 1996 to 1998 were compiled by the author.[18] (See Appendix 2 for a complete list of post-1988 rally events employed in this study.)

Coding a rally event is not as straightforward as it might seem. It is unclear, for instance, whether the appropriate rally variable would be a simple dummy variable, coded 1 for the period immediately following the initiation of a potential rally event, or a decay term, which recognizes the gradual erosion of the rally effect (Kernell, 1975). Because I am primarily concerned with short-term spikes in presidential approval following the initiation of a use of force, the dummy variable specification arguably seems more appropriate than a decay term. This is particularly true because, unlike a decay term, a dummy specification does not impose the assumption that all rallies decay similarly, in a linear fashion. Rather, it merely captures the initial spike in approval, which is, after all, what the original definition of the rally effect emphasized. Indeed, preliminary testing indicated that the dummy variable *(Rally)* performs as well as or better than decay terms that assume a gradual erosion of the rally effect over the course of anywhere from three to six months. Hence, I employ the dummy variable throughout my statistical testing. My data includes a total of 834 Gallup polls, of which 66 take place immediately following the initiation of a potential rally event.

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[17] Following Oneal et al. (1996), I code all uses of force that measure levels 1–3 on Blechman and Kaplan's (1978) scale as "major uses of force." Of these, several events that appeared inconsistent with the aforementioned definitions were excluded, either because they represented long-scheduled military exercises (e.g., "Team Spirit" in Korea in March 1990), or a cancellation of a previously scheduled withdrawal of forces, rather than a proactive and unscheduled force deployment (e.g., November 1991 in Korea), or because they clearly did not constitute major uses of force during a U.S. foreign policy crisis (e.g., U.S. support for withdrawal of UN forces from Somalia in January–March 1995, which took place long after the U.S. withdrew its forces from that nation). Recoding some or all of the excluded events as rally events, however, had only a marginal effect on the reported results.

[18] Uses of force since 1996 were identified using a variety of Internet-based timelines of U.S. foreign policy. They were then confirmed using Lexis-Nexis.

To estimate the likely magnitude and visibility of elite criticism of a president's policies, I employ a dichotomous indicator of *Divided Government.* This variable is coded 0 in times of unified government and 1 if the opposition party controls at least one house of Congress. To capture the state of the economy and its influence on rallies, I rely on two of the most widely employed indicators of economic performance, *Inflation* and *Unemployment* (Kernell, 1975; Ostrom and Simon, 1985; Baum and Kernell, 2001).[19] Because the public is unlikely to respond immediately to changing economic circumstances, rather than using current performance indicators, I employ the average of several prior months ($t-2$, $t-3$, and $t-4$).[20] The first variable measures the monthly change in the consumer price index, averaged from two to four months prior to the current period, and the second measures the monthly change in the national unemployment rate, also averaged over the period of two to four months prior to the current period.[21]

Presidents typically enjoy a honeymoon period immediately following their election. To capture the effects of the honeymoon periods, I include another dummy variable, *Honeymoon*, coded 1 during the first three months of each new administration's term in office and 0 otherwise. Following Kernell (1975), for two-term presidents, I treat the first three months of both terms as a new administration (but see Brody, 1991).[22]

Previous research (Smith, 1996; Gaubatz, 1999) has found that the United States is less likely to employ military force in presidential election years. Proximity to a presidential election may also influence a president's approval rating. As an election approaches, presidents will seek to bolster their popularity by introducing popular programs and stimulating the economy. At the same time, the opposition party, in seeking to win the White House, will increase its criticism of the incumbent. Hence, it is unclear whether proximity to an election ought to systematically raise or lower a president's popularity. Nonetheless, to capture any systematic effect that might arise, I include a dummy variable, coded 1 during *Presidential Election Years* and 0 for all other years. The counterforces described above seem likely to offset each other, thereby producing statistically insignificant results.

An additional factor that may influence public reactions to uses of force abroad is changes in demographic patterns within the United States. Iyengar (1993) found that immigrants tend to be more internationally oriented than native-born Americans, due to continued ties to their home countries. This suggests that as the percentage of Americans born abroad has risen over the past several decades, the salience of foreign policy crises for the American people may also, in the aggregate, have increased. A larger foreign-born population may simply be more interested in major events outside the United States. To capture the effects of immigration on public responses to U.S. uses of force abroad, I include a variable, *%ΔImmigration*, which tallies the annual percent change in the number of legal immigrants to the United States.

Previous research (Mueller, 1973; Stimson, 1976; Brody, 1991; Kernell, 1978) has also found that presidents grow less popular over time. Stimson and Mueller attribute this pattern to the inevitable disillusionment of the public with the

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[19] I retested my series, employing the University of Michigan's Index of Consumer Sentiment—which correlates with its Index of Consumer Expectations at .97—in place of inflation and unemployment. The results were comparable to those from the original models. Hence, I report only the models using the traditional macroeconomic indicators.

[20] Varying the number of months included in this average from two to six months did not materially affect the results. Hence, I report only the three-month lag structure, which modestly outperformed the others.

[21] I also tested the monthly change in aggregate national income, but found that it consistently performed less impressively than the other indicators. Hence, it was dropped from the analysis.

[22] Limiting this variable to the first three months of a president's first term in office had no material effect on the key relationships.

president's inability to solve the nation's problems. Other scholars (Kernell, 1978; Brody, 1991) dispute this causal argument. Nonetheless, additional studies (Cohen, 1995) have also found that presidents tend to devote greater attention to foreign policy in their second terms, as the Congress becomes less inclined to follow a lame duck president's lead on domestic affairs. This could potentially influence the rally effect surrounding a given use of force. Hence, I include another dummy variable, *Lame Duck*, coded 1 during a president's second elected term in office and 0 otherwise.[23]

Next, to account for any effects on approval ratings of variations in the salience of foreign policy to the American public, I include a variable, *Salience of Foreign Policy*, measuring the annualized average percentage of the public mentioning a foreign policy issue when asked by Gallup to name the most important problem facing the nation.[24] In my data set, a correlation analysis supports my conjecture that presidents will be more popular when public attention is outwardly focused; *Foreign Policy Salience* correlates positively with overall presidential approval at .39 (.46 for Republican and .33 for Democratic presidents).

Additionally, to account for any unique characteristics of a given president, I include a series of administration dummy variables.[25] Finally, for all models investigating over-time trends, I replace the administration dummies with a Cold War dummy, coded 1 from 1953 to 1988 and 0 from 1989 to 1998. This is intended to account for the possibility that fundamental changes in public perceptions of foreign policy following the end of the Cold War could produce trends in rally effects having little to do with the phenomena under consideration.[26] In addition to these independent variables, I include a series of interaction terms, intended to help discern differences in the rally phenomenon under differing economic and political circumstances.

For my dependent variables, in order to account for extreme differences in the *levels* of approval across different partisan groups, I transform the approval ratings into the difference in the natural logarithms of the presidential approval ratings between the current *(t)* and immediately preceding Gallup poll *(t − 1)*. To capture any heterogeneity in the influence of the various causal variables, I employ separate equations for Democratic and Republican identifiers and for Independents, as well as for respondents with grade school, high school, and college education.[27] Education is clearly an imperfect indicator of political awareness. Yet, numerous studies have found education to be closely related to political knowledge and sophistication and have, in fact, employed it as an indicator

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[23] I also tested an alternative specification of the *Lame Duck* dummy, coded 1 only during the final two years of a president's second term. This variable, however, was consistently outperformed by the four-year version of the dummy. Hence, I include only the latter version in the reported results.

[24] An additional variable tallying the number of disputes with Russia (as identified by the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set) in which the U.S. was engaged at the time of a use of force, proved statistically significant in several variants of the model. This variable was intended to capture the level of tensions between the U.S. and Russia at the time of a given use of force. It did not, however, significantly affect the key relationships and was therefore excluded from the reported results.

[25] It may be the case that larger rally effects in recent years may be attributable to more frequent polling in the early days of foreign crises. Hence, I also tested the various models with an additional variable tallying the number of presidential approval polls conducted in a given year. This variable was intended to account for any possible endogeneity between the trends in the magnitude of rallies and increases in the immediacy of public opinion polls surrounding U.S. uses of force. The variable, however, proved insignificant in nearly every model and had virtually no effect on the key causal variables. Hence, it is excluded from the reported results.

[26] Colinearity prohibits including both the administration and Cold War dummies in the same models. For my trend analyses, I concluded that the possibility of a Cold War effect was of greater theoretical concern than that of any administration-specific effects. The results, however, are comparable regardless of the model specification.

[27] Following Hristoulas et al. (2000), I also tested my models with two additional variants of the dependent variable, based on including only partisan identifiers and opposition party members. These models were tested against the full series. Neither specification, however, outperformed those reported in the next section. Hence, these variants of the dependent variable are excluded.

of these concepts in statistical analyses (Converse, 1964; MacKuen, 1984; Sniderman et al., 1991; Bennett, 1995; Krause, 1997; Fornier, 1998; Ault and Meernik, 2000). Indeed, education level correlates at nearly .50 with respondents' level of political information, in both the 1992 and the 1996 NES surveys. This suggests that education is an appropriate, albeit imperfect, indicator of political awareness. Hence, following prior research, for my investigations, I employ education level as the best-available indicator of political awareness.

Consistent with a majority of the presidential approval literature, I assume an AR(1) autoregressive error structure and include the lagged value of the logged approval rating as an additional control variable. One implication of this specification is that the coefficients on the independent variables represent their immediate, or impact, effect on the dependent variable, rather than a cumulative effect.[28] Where evidence of serial autocorrelation persists even after including the lag of approval, I include autoregressive (AR) terms as necessary.[29] Throughout my analyses, I employ a standard OLS estimator, with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. In order to test each of the hypotheses developed in the previous section, I investigate multiple model specifications. The basic model is as follows:

$$\Delta lnApproval = C + \beta_1(lnApproval_{t-1}) + \beta_2(Rally)$$
$$+ \beta_3(Divided\ Government) + \beta_4(Inflation_{(t-2+t-3+t-4)/3})$$
$$+ \beta_5(Unemployment_{(t-2+t-3+t-4)/3}) + \beta_6(Presidential\ Election\ Year)$$
$$+ \beta_7(New\ Administration) + \beta_8(lnForeign\ Policy\ Salience)$$
$$+ \beta_9(Lame\ Duck) + \beta_{10}(\%\Delta Immigration)$$
$$+ \beta_i(Administration\ Dummies\ or\ Cold\ War) + \epsilon$$

In subsequent tests, I add several interaction terms, including *Rally × Inflation*, *Rally × Divided Government*, *Rally × Salience of Foreign Policy*, and *Rally × Survey Date*. As appropriate for testing each hypothesis, models are repeated for the various partisan and educational subgroups. I now turn to a discussion of my statistical results.

Statistical Results

I begin with a brief discussion of several of the control variables, which are presented in Table A1, in Appendix 1. First, as expected, presidential election years do not appear to differ significantly from other periods, with this variable approaching statistical significance only among Republican identifiers during Republican administrations. For this group, presidential election years are associated with about a 1.4% increase in approval (p < .06). Second, variations in the number of legal immigrants to the United States appears to matter for the approval ratings of Republican presidents but not for Democratic presidents. During Republican administrations, among Democratic identifiers, a 1% increase in immigration is associated with a 14% increase in approval (p < .01). The corresponding increases in approval among Republican and Independent iden-

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[28] Rao and Miller (1971:44–46) discuss the importance of distinguishing between the immediate, or "impact" effect, of a causal variable, and its cumulative (long-term) effect, absorbed through the lagged dependent variable.

[29] These procedures alleviate the problem of serial autocorrelation in nearly all of the reported models. In several instances, however, some evidence of serial autocorrelation persisted despite my best efforts. In each case, additional AR terms had little effect on the magnitude or significance of the coefficients, suggesting that the results are not significantly biased by any remaining autocorrelation.

tifiers are about 7% and 11%, respectively (<.05 and <.001, respectively). Third, also as one might expect, presidents of both parties appear to enjoy higher approval ratings during the first few months of a president's new term in office. The magnitude of this approval bonus for Republican presidents during such honeymoon periods is 7.6% among Republican identifiers (<.01) and 7.3% among Independents (<.01). For Democratic presidents, the corresponding honeymoon bonus is 8.7% among Democratic identifiers (<.05), 4.8% among Republican identifiers (<.07), and 4.6% among Independents (<.01). Finally, lame duck Republican presidents are 2.2% *less* popular among Republican identifiers (<.05), though this variable is insignificant for all other groups.

Turning next to the variables intended to test the several hypotheses, Table 4 summarizes the key findings from my analyses. The table presents four sets of coefficients, or series, each derived from a separate set of models. (The full models are presented in Appendix 1.)

Series 1, which represents the basic model with no interaction terms, tests Hypotheses 1, 6, 7, and 8. Hypothesis 1 predicts that presidents will receive larger rally effects among opposition party identifiers than among identifiers of their own party. Hypothesis 6 predicts that this effect will be stronger during Republican administrations than during Democratic administrations. Hypothesis 8 then predicts that Independents will lie in between. Finally, Hypothesis 7 predicts that Republican presidents will receive larger rallies than Democratic presidents. The results support each hypothesis.

When a Republican occupies the White House, the magnitudes of rally effects for the different groups line up precisely as the partisan threshold model predicts. The average rally among Democrats is 7.9% (<.05). This compares to an average rally of 4.1% among Independents (<.10) and 2.5% among Republicans (<.05). This supports Hypotheses 1 and 8.[30] In contrast, when a Democrat occupies the White House, rally effects are smaller and statistically insignificant, which supports Hypothesis 6.[31] Finally, note that the magnitude of the rally effect among Democratic identifiers during Republican administrations (7.9%) is far larger than among Republican identifiers during Democratic administrations (1.6%). This supports Hypothesis 7.

Turning to the effects of the economy, Hypothesis 2 predicts that presidents will receive larger rally effects during periods of economic distress. Hypothesis 2a then adds that this effect will largely be driven by inflation and will be strongest during Democratic administrations. The six models shown in Series 2 of Table 4 test these hypotheses.

These data offer clear support for Hypotheses 2 and 2a, and additional support for Hypothesis 8. Beginning with Democratic administrations, among Republicans, each additional 1% increase in inflation (averaged over periods $t-2$, $t-3$, and $t-4$ months) is associated with about a 31% post-use-of-force rally in approval (<.01).[32] In contrast, during nonrally periods, among Republicans,

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[30] A Wald Coefficient Test (henceforth "Wald Test") indicated that the null hypothesis—that, during Republican administrations, the three coefficients on *Rally* among Democrat, Republican, and Independent identifiers are statistically indistinguishable—could be rejected at the .01 level of significance (henceforth, "the null hypothesis could be rejected"). It is important to point out, however, that the Wald Coefficient Test in *Eviews* does not allow the inclusion of AR terms. In the presence of serial autocorrelation, this may produce biased coefficients, thereby reducing the accuracy of the test.

[31] A Wald Test indicated that during Democratic administrations, the null hypothesis could be rejected at the .09 level. Once again, however, due to possible serial autocorrelation, the results of this test must be interpreted with caution.

[32] The incremental effect of changes in inflation on the size of rallies is given by the coefficient on the interaction term. Alternatively, the total effect of inflation on approval during rally periods is calculated by adding the coefficient on inflation with that on the interaction term. Finally, the *total* (as opposed to incremental) effect of a rally event on approval at a given level of inflation is calculated by adding the coefficient on the interaction term with that on rally. The other models reported below are interpreted similarly.

TABLE 4. Effect of Using Military Force on Change in Presidential Approval, 1953–98:
Summary of Coefficients on Key Causal Variables and Interaction Terms (Dependent Variable: $lnApprove_t - lnApprove_{t-1}$)

Independent Variables	Democratic Administrations			Republican Administrations		
	Democrat Coef. (Std. Err.)	Republican Coef. (Std. Err.)	Independent Coef. (Std. Err.)	Democrat Coef. (Std. Err.)	Republican Coef. (Std. Err.)	Independent Coef. (Std. Err.)
1. Base Model (No Interaction)						
Rally	.025 (.017)	.016 (.032)	.030 (.025)	.079 (.035)*	.025 (.012)*	.041 (.025)^
2. Interaction with Inflation						
Rally	−.016 (.023)	−.075 (.040)^	−.017 (.038)	.049 (.062)	.049 (.024)*	.051 (.041)
Inflation$_{(t-2...t-4)/3}$	−14.353 (4.414)***	−9.385 (4.436)*	−11.547 (3.310)***	−2.619 (2.913)	−1.531 (1.525)	−1.744 (2.124)
Inflation$_{(t-2...t-4)/3}$ × Rally	12.708 (7.137)^	30.846 (10.108)**	16.052 (12.846)	9.268 (16.796)	−.7.262 (6.704)	−3.133 (11.090)
3. Interaction with Divided Government						
Rally	.029 (.030)	.061 (.050)	.089 (.038)*	−.143 (.040)***	.001 (.017)	−.055 (.044)
Divided Government	.024 (.018)	.066 (.035)^	.042 (.025)^	−.043 (.029)	.009 (.015)	−.018 (.023)
Divided Government × Rally	−.007 (.033)	−.093 (.062)	−.123 (.045)**	.266 (.055)***	.031 (.022)	.113 (.052)*
4. Interaction with Salience of Foreign Policy						
Rally	−.042 (.052)	.089 (.075)	.077 (.056)	−.092 (.072)	−.034 (.020)^	−.062 (.055)
lnForeign Policy Salience	.007 (.022)	−.015 (.032)	−.010 (.026)	.046 (.018)**	.061 (.016)***	.048 (.013)***
lnForeign Policy Salience × Rally	−.028 (.019)	.032 (.029)	.021 (.021)	−.100 (.047)*	−.035 (.015)*	−.060 (.036)^

^ < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001
Note: All models employ heteroscedasticity-consistent ("robust") standard errors.

each 1% increase in inflation is associated with a 9.4% *decline* in approval (<.05). Among Democrats during Democratic administrations, rally events dampen the negative effects of inflation, but less so than among Republicans. Among these respondents, each 1% increase in inflation is associated with nearly a 13% increase in the magnitude of a post-use-of-force rally (<.10). This compares to a 14.4% *decline* in approval associated with a comparable increase in inflation during non-rally-event periods (<.001). The effect of inflation among Independents lies in between that for Republicans and Democrats, further supporting Hypothesis 8. Among Independents, each 1% increase in inflation is associated with about a 16% increase in post-rally-event approval ratings. During non-rally-event periods, however, the same increase in inflation is associated with about an 11.5% decline in approval (<.001).[33]

Turning to Republican administrations, as anticipated, the effects of inflation are far weaker. In fact, neither the base category of inflation nor the interaction term is statistically significant for any of the three groups. This clearly supports Hypothesis 2a. Moreover, additional tests (not shown) indicated that, as anticipated, no significant interaction arises between unemployment rates and approval. The sole exception, consistent with the partisan threshold model, is Republican identifiers during Democratic administrations. For these individuals (see Table A1), a 1% increase in unemployment is associated with a .8% decline in approval of Democratic presidents (<.06).

Series 3 in Table 4 tests Hypothesis 3, which predicts larger rallies among opposition identifiers during periods of divided government. Beginning with Democratic identifiers during Republican administrations, the results—derived by adding the coefficient on the interaction term (.266) with that on rally (−.143)— indicate that if one or both houses of Congress is controlled by the Democratic Party, the president enjoys about a 12.3% rally upon using force abroad (<.001).[34] Consistent with Hypothesis 1, among Republican identifiers, a Republican president receives a modest 3% rally during periods of divided government (<.16). In both cases, the predicted rally effects are larger in magnitude during divided government than during unified government. Combined, these results support Hypothesis 3. Finally, consistent with Hypothesis 8, Independents again lie in between Democrats and Republicans. Among Independents, during periods of divided government, the president receives about a 5.8% rally in the immediate aftermath using force abroad (<.05).[35]

Turning to Democratic administrations, among Republican identifiers, the effect runs modestly in the opposite direction. Among this group, rally events during divided government are associated with about a 3% *decline* in approval of Democratic presidents, though this effect is not statistically significant (<.14). The hypothesized interaction does not arise for Democratic identifiers. Though not supporting Hypothesis 3, this does appear consistent with Hypothesis 6.

The weaker relationships for Democratic presidents, as well as the inverse relationship among Republican identifiers, may, however, be an artifact of the

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[33] In this instance, a Wald Test indicated that during Democratic administrations, the null hypothesis could be rejected at the .11 level. Because, however, this test does not allow corrections for serial autocorrelation, which in this instance *reduce* the magnitude and significance of the differences across groups, the results most likely understate the true significance level.

[34] The effect of a rally event on approval during *unified* government, in contrast, is given by the coefficient on rally. This is distinct from calculating the effect of *divided government* on approval, which, during rally events, is given by the sum of the coefficient on the interaction term (.266) and the base category for divided government (−.043). Finally, the effect of divided government on approval during *non*rally periods is given by the coefficient on divided government.

[35] A Wald Test indicated that during Republican administrations, the null hypothesis could be rejected at the .01 level. Once again, however, serial autocorrelation may be producing biased coefficients in the system of equations specified in *Eviews* in order to conduct the Wald Test.

data. The only period of divided government in the data set in which the Democrats controlled the White House and the Republicans controlled one or both houses of Congress is 1995–98. This may simply offer inadequate variation on the key causal variable to produce a statistically significant relationship. Moreover, potential rally events during this period included several relatively unpopular U.S. uses of force—e.g., Somalia and Haiti—for which President Clinton received little or no rally effect at all. Indeed, Republican distrust of Bill Clinton was such that virtually any foreign policy engagement tended to increase Republican antipathy towards the president.

Not surprisingly, among Independents, Democratic presidents appear to enjoy larger rallies during periods of unified government. The coefficient on the base category for rally events indicates that when Democrats control both the Congress and the White House, a rally event is associated with an 8.9% increase in approval of the president (<.05). In contrast, a rally event that arises while the Republicans control at least one house of Congress is associated with a 3.4% net *decline* in approval of Democratic presidents among Independents (<.01). This, however, again may be an artifact of inadequate variation on the key causal variable.

Turning next to the effects of variations in the overall salience of foreign affairs, the fourth series in Table 4 presents several tests of Hypothesis 4, which predicts that the greater the public's pre-rally-event focus on foreign affairs, the smaller the rally following a use of force abroad. The results in Series 4 indicate that, consistent with Hypothesis 4, greater salience of foreign affairs is indeed associated with smaller presidential rallies. Among Democratic identifiers during Republican administrations, each 1% increase in the percentage of the public mentioning a foreign affairs issue as the most important problem facing the nation is associated with about a 10% decline in the magnitude of a post-use-of-force rally (<.05). This contrasts sharply with a 4.6% *increase* in Democratic identifiers' approval of Republican presidents for every additional 1% of the public mentioning a foreign affairs problem during *non*-rally-event periods (<.01).

Consistent with Hypothesis 1, variations in the salience of foreign policy matter far less among Republican identifiers. Among these respondents, during Republican administrations, each 1% increase in the salience of foreign affairs is associated with a decrease in the magnitude of a post-use-of-force rally of about 3.5% (<.05). Similar to Democratic identifiers, this figure contrasts with a corresponding *increase* of 6.1% for each 1% increase in the salience of foreign affairs during *non*rally periods (<.001).

Among Independents, the influence of foreign policy salience during Republican administrations again lies in between that for Republican and Democratic identifiers, once again supporting Hypothesis 8. For this latter group, each one percent increase in the percentage of the public mentioning a foreign affairs problem is associated with about a 6% decline in presidential approval during rally events (<.10). The corresponding effect during non-rally-event periods is an *increase* in approval of nearly 5% (<.001).[36]

Once again, during Democratic administrations, the effects of variations in the salience of foreign affairs are far smaller and statistically insignificant across all three groups of respondents. While this does not support Hypothesis 5, it is broadly consistent with Hypotheses 6 and 7, which, respectively, predict generally larger rally effects among Democrats during Republican administrations than among Republicans during Democratic administrations and, in general, larger

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[36] In this instance, a Wald Test indicated that during Republican administrations, the null hypothesis could be rejected at the .05 level. For the aforementioned reasons, however, these results must, once again, be interpreted cautiously.

TABLE 5. Effect of Using Military Force on Change in Presidential Approval, 1953–98, by Education (Dependent Variable: $lnApprove_t - lnApprove_{t-1}$)

Independent Variables	Grade School Coef. (Std. Err.)	High School Coef. (Std. Err.)	College Coef. (Std. Err.)
Rally	.040 (.018)*	.043 (.015)**	.029 (.015)*
Presidential Election Year	.0006 (.009)	−.006 (.006)	−.017 (.007)*
Lame Duck	.008 (.009)	−.003 (.008)	−.012 (.008)
Divided Government	.021 (.013)^	.027 (.011)*	.035 (.013)**
New Administration	.032 (.013)**	.039 (.012)**	.056 (.017)***
$Inflation_{(t-2\ldots t-4)/3}$	−4.524 (1.868)*	−4.547 (1.307)***	−4.845 (1.379)***
$Unemployment_{(t-2\ldots t-4)/3}$	−.117 (.107)	−.036 (.087)	−.020 (.100)
%ΔImmigration	.046 (.030)	.036 (.019)^	.030 (.019)
lnSalience of Foreign Policy	.011 (.009)	.010 (.008)	.013 (.010)
Kennedy	.034 (.014)**	.021 (.013)	−.003 (.016)
Johnson	.007 (.013)	−.0001 (.013)	−.016 (.016)
Nixon	−.010 (.012)	−.012 (.011)	−.022 (.014)
Ford	−.016 (.024)	−.006 (.021)	−.008 (.026)
Carter	.039 (.024)	.024 (.022)	.012 (.026)
Reagan	−.033 (.014)*	−.006 (.012)	−.0002 (.013)
Bush	−.005 (.021)	.007 (.016)	−.0005 (.017)
Clinton	.027 (.021)	.008 (.019)	−.005 (.022)
$LnApprove_{t-1}$	−.129 (.022)***	−.108 (.020)***	−.128 (.027)***
Constant	−.082 (.018)***	−.057 (.016)***	−.053 (.016)***
AR(1)	−.421 (.066)***	−.274 (.059)***	−.249 (.053)***
AR(2)	−.278 (.059)***	−.077 (.046)^	—
AR(3)	−.123 (.058)*	—	—
AR(4)	−.099 (.047)*	—	—
Adjusted R^2	.231 (N=804)	.136 (N=812)	.139 (N=817)
F-Statistic	11.968***	7.337***	7.926***
Durbin-Watson Statistic	2.007	2.002	2.008

^ < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001

Note: All models employ heteroscedasticity-consistent ("robust") standard errors.

rallies during Republican administrations. In this instance, the latter relationships appear to have overwhelmed the former.[37]

Thus far, I have considered a variety of tests and found broadly consistent support for the partisan threshold model. I now turn to tests of several hypotheses pertaining to the informational model, shown at Tables 5 through 8. Table 5 presents the results of three models intended to test Hypothesis 5 and 5a. Table 6, in turn, presents three additional models, which test Hypothesis 5b. Table 7 then presents six models, which test Hypotheses 5c and 5d, as well as Hypothesis 7. Finally, Table 8 presents two models intended to further test Hypothesis 7. Hypothesis 5 predicts that rallies should be largest among *moderately* politically aware individuals. Hypothesis 5a then predicts that the least politically aware individuals should rally more than individuals at the highest levels of awareness. Hypothesis 5b further predicts that the least politically aware individuals will

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[37] One alternative explanation for smaller rallies in periods where the public is focused on foreign affairs is offered by Lian and Oneal (1993), Ostrom and Job (1986), and others, who find that the public is less likely to rally in the aftermath of a use of force if the United States is engaged in an ongoing war. To test this possibility, as previously noted, I reran the models intended to test my fifth hypothesis with the addition of a "war" dummy, coded 1 during the Korean, Vietnam, and Persian Gulf wars. The results were essentially unaffected by this variable. I also reran my models with all observations during the three wars excluded. Once again, the reported results were only modestly affected. I then repeated all of these tests with an additional variable, measuring the number of U.S. uses of force per year. The latter tests produced similarly modest effects. Taken together, these tests suggest that the reported results are not an artifact of the public's unwillingness to rally during ongoing conflicts.

TABLE 6. Effect of Using Military Force on Change in Presidential Approval, 1953–98, Interaction with Survey Date (Dependent Variable: $lnApprove_t - lnApprove_{t-1}$)

Independent Variables	Grade School Coef. (Std. Err.)	High School Coef. (Std. Err.)	College Coef. (Std. Err.)
Rally	−.158 (.073)*	−.029 (.063)	−.013 (.064)
Date (in years)	−.0012 (.0005)*	−.0004 (.0005)	−.0002 (.0005)
Presidential Election Year	.003 (.009)	−.005 (.007)	−.014 (.007)^
Lame Duck	.014 (.007)^	.003 (.007)	−.004 (.007)
Divided Government	−.011 (.006)^	.010 (.007)	.026 (.009)**
New Administration	.026 (.012)*	.037 (.013)**	.052 (.016)***
$Inflation_{(t-2\ldots t-4)/3}$	−2.665 (1.478)^	−3.913 (1.192)***	−4.139 (1.379)***
$Unemployment_{(t-2\ldots t-4)/3}$	−.171 (.099)^	−.053 (.089)	−.021 (.096)
%Δ Immigration	.033 (.023)	.044 (.018)*	.036 (.018)*
lnSalience of Foreign Policy	−.0004 (.006)	.007 (.006)	.007 (.007)
Cold War	−.027 (.016)^	−.013 (.011)	−.0009 (.009)
$LnApprove_{t-1}$	−.094 (.018)***	−.110 (.023)***	−.113 (.028)***
Date X Rally	.0025 (.0009)***	.0009 (.0008)	.0005 (.0008)
Constant	.044 (.035)	−.015 (.030)	−.043 (.028)
AR(1)	−.442 (.064)***	−.249 (.051)***	−.256 (.052)***
AR(2)	−.304 (.057)***	—	—
AR(3)	−.147 (.056)**	—	—
AR(4)	−.114 (.046)**	—	—
Adjusted R^2	.228 (N=804)	.133 (N=817)	.137 (N=817)
F-Statistic	14.941***	9.929***	10.267***
Durbin-Watson Statistic	2.009	2.038	2.011

^ < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001

Note: All models employ heteroscedasticity-consistent ("robust") standard errors.

exhibit, over time, the strongest overall trend towards larger rallies. Hypotheses 5c and 5d then predict, respectively, that the largest over-time trend towards larger rallies will occur among opposition identifiers during Republican administrations and that no such trends will emerge during Democratic administrations. Finally, as noted, Hypothesis 7 predicts that, on average, Republican presidents will receive larger overall rallies than their Democratic counterparts.

Table 5 offers clear support for Hypotheses 5 and 5a. Beginning with the former, among respondents with a grade school education, presidents receive about a 4% rally effect in the immediate aftermath of using force abroad (<.05). The corresponding rallies are 4.3% (<.01) among respondents with a high school education and 2.9% (<.05) for college-educated respondents. Hence, the three groups line up precisely as the informational model predicts, with the strongest rally effect among high school–educated respondents. Moreover, the rally effect is larger among grade school respondents than among their college-educated counterparts, thereby supporting Hypothesis 5a.[38]

Table 6, in turn, provides support for Hypothesis 5b. Consistent with this hypothesis, among respondents with grade school education, between 1953 and 1998, the average magnitude of post-use-of-force rallies increased by about 6.4% (<.001). The corresponding effects among high school and college respondents were statistically insignificant increases of 2.3% and 1.6%, respectively.[39]

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[38] Here, a Wald Test indicated that we may reject the null hypotheses that the coefficients on *Rally* for the three education groups are statistically indistinguishable at the .07 level. In this instance, the inability to account for serial autocorrelation reduces the magnitude and significance of the differences across groups, suggesting that the Wald Test results, once again, are most likely understating the true significance of the differences.

[39] A Wald Test indicated that the null hypothesis could, in this instance, be rejected at the .001 level.

TABLE 7. Effect of Using Military Force on Change in Presidential Approval, 1953–98,
Interaction with Survey Date (Dependent Variable: $lnApprove_t - lnApprove_{t-1}$)

Independent Variables	Democratic Administrations			Republican Administrations		
	Grade School Coef. (Std. Err.)	High School Coef. (Std. Err.)	College Coef. (Std. Err.)	Grade School Coef. (Std. Err.)	High School Coef. (Std. Err.)	College Coef. (Std. Err.)
Rally	.176 (.114)	.094 (.121)	.152 (.161)	−.418 (.122)***	−.213 (.093)*	−.190 (.072)**
Date (in years)	−.004 (.003)	−.002 (.003)	−.002 (.004)	−.002 (.0005)**	−.0003 (.0004)	.0001 (.0004)
Presidential Election Year	.008 (.011)	−.002 (.012)	−.009 (.016)	.008 (.010)	.005 (.007)	−.001 (.008)
Lame Duck	.046 (.025)^	.023 (.025)	.017 (.029)	.004 (.008)	−.002 (.007)	−.007 (.008)
Divided Government	.019 (.019)	.017 (.018)	.017 (.021)	−.020 (.021)	−.020 (.019)	−.014 (.017)
New Administration	.045 (.019)*	.038 (.014)**	.050 (.015)***	.017 (.019)	.043 (.020)*	.067 (.029)*
Inflation$_{(t-2\ldots t-4)/3}$	−4.179 (3.188)	−6.032 (2.527)*	−5.961 (3.295)^	−.544 (2.546)	−1.440 (1.652)	−1.906 (1.716)
Unemployment$_{(t-2\ldots t-4)/3}$	−.285 (.248)	.009 (.225)	−.129 (.232)	−.132 (.125)	−.077 (.099)	.006 (.114)
%Δ Immigration	.031 (.041)	.019 (.037)	.004 (.046)	.063 (.037)^	.058 (.023)**	.076 (.028)**
lnSalience of Foreign Policy	−.023 (.014)	−.015 (.013)	−.021 (.017)	.022 (.010)*	.020 (.008)**	.031 (.011)**
Cold War	−.033 (.065)	−.001 (.058)	−.004 (.077)	−.036 (.021)^	−.020 (.015)	−.013 (.013)
LnApprove$_{t-1}$	−.163 (.030)***	−.122 (.027)***	−.121 (.032)***	−.144 (.032)***	−.012 (.035)***	−.171 (.053)***
Date x Rally	−.002 (.001)	−.0007 (.001)	−.002 (.002)	.006 (.002)***	.004 (.001)**	.003 (.001)**
Constant	.139 (.223)	.051 (.204)	.051 (.272)	.087 (.040)*	.016 (.030)	−.020 (029)
AR(1)	−.403 (.064)***	−.310 (.053)***	−.263 (.057)***	−.441 (.083)***	−.259 (.084)**	−.239 (.086)**
AR(2)	−.200 (.061)***	—	—	−.329 (.077)***	−.159 (.062)**	—
AR(3)	—	—	—	−.180 (.072)**	—	—
AR(4)	—	—	—	−.137 (.059)*	—	—
Adjusted R^2	.234 (N=345)	.155 (N=348)	.128 (N=348)	.254 (N=462)	.154 (N=466)	.169 (N=468)
F-Statistic	8.006***	5.531***	4.646***	10.240***	6.661***	7.783***
Durbin-Watson Statistic	2.018	2.014	2.052	2.011	1.95	1.943

^ < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001

Note: All models employ heteroscedasticity-consistent ("robust") standard errors.

Table 8. Effect of Using Military Force on Change in Presidential Approval, 1953–98, by Administration's Party (Dependent Variable: $lnApprove_t - lnApprove_{t-1}$)

Independent Variables	Democratic Coef. (Std. Err.)	Republican Coef. (Std. Err.)
Rally	.038 (.025)	.050 (.021)*
Presidential Election Year	.014 (.020)	−.002 (.008)
Lame Duck	.055 (.056)	−.009 (.010)
Divided Government	.016 (.057)	.003 (.022)
New Administration	.066 (.021)**	.057 (.025)*
$Inflation_{(t-2\ldots t-4)/3}$	−15.050 (5.633)**	−1.706 (1.867)
$Unemployment_{(t-2\ldots t-4)/3}$	−.335 (.354)	−.086 (.110)
%Δ Immigration	.002 (.039)	.073 (.029)**
lnSalience of Foreign Policy	.005 (.021)	.037 (.011)***
Johnson	−.049 (.024)*	—
Nixon	—	−.021 (.014)
Ford	—	.010 (.028)
Carter	.002 (.071)	—
Reagan	—	.005 (.015)
Bush	—	.038 (.019)*
Clinton	−.081 (.064)	—
$LnApprove_{t-1}$	−.264 (.093)**	−.196 (.040)***
Constant	1.129 (.396)**	.839 (.168)***
AR(1)	−.409 (.241)^	—
Adjusted R^2	.309 (N=354)	.098 (N=467)
F-Statistic	12.666***	4.618***
Durbin-Watson Statistic	2.080	2.040

^ < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001

Note: All models employ heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.

Next, looking at Table 7, consistent with Hypothesis 5c, among respondents with a grade school education, the average magnitude of rallies during Republican administrations increased between the Eisenhower and Bush presidencies by nearly 22% (<.001). This compares to increases of about 15.3% among respondents with a high school education (<.01) and 14.5% among college-educated respondents (<.01).[40] And consistent with Hypothesis 5d, during Democratic administrations, the relationships are far weaker and statistically insignificant for all education groups.

This latter result is also consistent with Hypothesis 7, which predicts larger rallies for Republican presidents. Since less-educated Americans are more likely to be Democrats than Republicans, they are more likely to approve of Democratic presidents. Hence, when a Democratic president uses force abroad, there are simply fewer low-education individuals available to upgrade their evaluation of the president's job performance, compared to when a Republican occupies the White House.

The final two models, shown in Table 8, offer an additional test of Hypothesis 7, which predicts larger rallies during Republican administrations than during Democratic administrations.

The results offer some limited additional support for this hypothesis. Overall, Republican presidents receive, on average, a 5% boost in approval following a

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[40] A Wald Test, however, indicated that the null hypothesis could not be rejected. As before, the inability to account for serial autocorrelation reduces the magnitude and significance of the differences across groups, suggesting that the Wald Test results, once again, most likely understate the true significance of the differences.

use of force abroad (<.05). The corresponding increase for Democratic presidents is 3.8% (<.14), a modest difference of 1.2%.[41] In this instance, however, the OLS estimate is conservative. According to the raw data, rallies are about half as large, on average, for Democratic presidents as for Republicans (3% versus 6%, respectively).[42]

While it is tempting to conclude that all of the differences described above might be summarized by noting that unpopular presidents gain larger rallies, this latter result suggests that the story is not so simple. The rather modest substantive difference in aggregate rally magnitude masks far larger differences across subgroups. These differences are likely to matter to varying degrees, depending on the configuration of exogenous circumstances, such as the state of the economy and the world, as well as the existence or absence of divided government. After all, for a president to succeed, he must assemble support coalitions from among the many diverse constituencies in the population. The makeup of these coalitions, in turn, is likely to vary depending on the issues at stake and external circumstances (Kernell, 1978; Baum and Kernell, 2001). It is therefore insufficient to attribute the relationships delineated above solely to the greater aggregate upside potential of unpopular presidents.

Discussion

The results from this study support, to varying degrees, each hypothesis. Overall, this represents strong support for the integrated partisan threshold and informational models. By considering the implications of various economic and political scenarios refracted through these two models, it is possible to paint a clearer picture than has been offered by previous studies of the circumstances under which presidents can expect a substantial rally effect.

First, Republican presidents typically enjoy larger rallies than Democrats following a use of force abroad. But this is not necessarily because Republicans are, or are perceived to be, better stewards of foreign policy. Rather, the true explanation for this difference appears to be the greater political awareness—and hence ideological constraint—of average Republicans. Highly educated respondents are *least* likely to rally. And these respondents are more likely to be Republicans than Democrats. Conversely, moderately aware individuals (measured herein as those with a high school education) are most likely to rally and are more likely to be Democrats than Republicans. It is therefore unsurprising that a majority of the relationships reported above were strongest during Republican administrations.

Second, both Democrats and Republicans are most likely to rally behind a president of the opposition party. In fact, the exception to the previously noted pattern of stronger relationships during Republican administrations consisted of Republican identifiers rallying behind a Democratic president during times of high inflation. The explanation for this seemingly counterintuitive pattern lies in the relatively low approval ratings for presidents among opposition identifiers.

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[41] An *F-Test* indicated that the coefficient on *Rally* is significantly different from zero at the .05 level during Republican administrations. During Democratic administrations, however, the null hypothesis that the coefficient on *Rally* is indistinguishable from zero could not be rejected.

[42] Most of this difference is due to the previously noted unwillingness of Republican identifiers to rally around Democratic presidents. According to the raw data, the average Republican rally for Democratic presidents is essentially zero. This compares to an average rally of five percentage points among Democrats during Republican administrations. This, again, suggests that for the aforementioned reasons, fewer Republicans are located near the threshold of approval and are thus susceptible to being influenced by external events.

There are simply more opposition identifiers available to upgrade their evaluations of the president. All of these relationships are exacerbated in bad economic times.

Third, divided government appears to work to a president's advantage, at least in terms of maximizing the rally effect among opposition identifiers. Once again, the explanation for this surprising pattern lies in the relatively low pre-rally approval ratings for presidents confronting Congresses controlled by the opposition party, combined with the relatively greater media coverage of opposition party statements in *support* of the president when foreign crises arise during divided government. This pattern was strongest for Democratic identifiers during Republican presidencies. The opposite pattern failed to emerge. But this may be an artifact of the relative rarity of Democratic presidents confronting Republican controlled Congresses. During the entire 46-year period included in the present study, this latter configuration arose for only four years (1995–98).

Fourth, for the same reasons, presidents gain larger rallies when the economy is performing poorly, primarily in times of high inflation. Pre-rally-event popularity alone, however, cannot fully explain why this particular pattern emerges. Unlike the prior interactions, in this instance, it is Republican identifiers who react most strongly to variations in inflation during Democratic administrations. This is most likely attributable to an overall greater concern with inflation among the American public during the post–World War II period, as well as the general public suspicion—particularly among Republican identifiers—of Democratic presidents' commitment to fighting inflation. This interaction did not arise with respect to variations in the unemployment rate, which, in these data, had a far weaker effect on presidential approval. The sole exceptions were Republican identifiers' evaluations of Democratic presidents and grade school–educated respondents' evaluations of both Democratic and Republican presidents (but only when the two series were merged in the overall trend models). The former exception is somewhat unexpected. This may simply be the result of greater general Republican hostility towards Democratic presidents. The latter exception is less surprising, since grade school–educated respondents are the group of Americans most likely to be harmed by rising unemployment rates.

Fifth, Republican presidents receive larger rallies—once again, primarily among Democratic identifiers—when public attention is focused on domestic, rather than foreign, affairs. This may result in part from the causes of an inwardly focused public. When public opinion is focused on foreign affairs, this typically signifies general satisfaction with the nation's domestic circumstances. Conversely, when public attention is focused inwards, this typically signifies heightened concern with the state of the nation and, hence, relatively low approval ratings, which, as we have seen, represents an ideal circumstance for a large rally. This may also be attributable, in part, to the relatively lower likelihood that a use of force will be "sudden" or a "shock" in periods where the nation's attention is already focused on international issues. Indeed, as noted, it is possible that a use of force in such periods may be directly related to an ongoing foreign crisis that is the *cause* of the public's focus on international affairs in the first instance.

Taken together, these findings help explain the influence of both individual and environmental circumstances on the rally phenomenon. Merely noting that unpopular presidents receive larger rallies is insufficient either to explain the pattern of rallies observed in the past or to predict the likely magnitude of rallies in the future. Beginning with individual factors, weak disapprovers and moderately politically aware Americans are most likely to rally behind a president when he uses force abroad. On the environmental side of the ledger, since more weak disapprovers are typically found among opposition identifiers

and Independents than among a president's fellow partisans, it is these groups that are most likely to rally. Moreover, since more Democrats and Independents than Republicans occupy the moderately politically aware category, these groups are, in the aggregate, more likely than Republicans to rally. Hence, we should anticipate the largest rally effects among Democratic identifiers during Republican administrations, followed by Independents, also during Republican administrations. Indeed, nearly any circumstance that weakens a president's approval ratings among opposition identifiers and, to a lesser extent, among Independents—including high inflation, divided government, or an internally focused public (for whatever reason)—will also tend to be associated with larger rallies.

Conclusion

Returning to the anecdote with which this study began, we can now answer the question of why George W. Bush received a postattack rally three times larger than that enjoyed by Franklin Roosevelt following Pearl Harbor. The reason, in short, is that President Roosevelt was far more popular than President Bush *prior* to Pearl Harbor. His lofty pre-attack approval rating of 72%—including 66% of the most solidly Republican, upper-class members of the public (Baum and Kernell, 2001)—left only limited room to rally. President Bush's far lower pre-rally approval rating of 51%, in contrast, left far more room to rise. Indeed, the 21 percentage point differential between the two presidents' pre-rally-event approval ratings mirrors almost precisely the 23 percentage point difference in the magnitude of their respective postattack rallies.

The explanation for this discrepancy comes into even clearer focus when one disaggregates President Bush's postattack rally. Indeed, as with most foreign crises, not all Americans rallied similarly. In one *CBS News* poll conducted less than two weeks before the terrorist attacks (August 28–31), the president's job approval rating stood at 83% among Republican identifiers, very near the overall post–World War II average for Republican presidents among their fellow partisans. The corresponding approval ratings among Democrats and Independents were predictably far lower: 26% and 48%, respectively. A *CBS News* poll conducted two days after the attack, on September 13, found the president's approval rating among Republican identifiers rising to 90%, a modest increase of 7 percentage points. Among Democratic identifiers, however, the president's approval rating increased by fully 42 percentage points, to 68%. As the partisan threshold model anticipates, a majority of the postattack rally took place among opposition party members.

These data attest to the continued propensity of the American public to rally around their president in times of crisis. Yet, the rally-round-the-flag phenomenon remains only partially understood. Beyond general agreement that presidents do indeed enjoy sudden, and usually brief, spikes in their popularity in the immediate aftermath of high-profile foreign policy activities, scholars have been unable to agree on either the sources or the substantive implications of the rally effect. Yet, this phenomenon holds potentially critical implications for our understanding of the linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy. The rally effect is central to the debate in the scholarly literature and the popular press regarding whether political leaders ever use military force for domestic political reasons—the so-called "wag the dog" scenario, or diversionary use of force (Levy, 1989). The potential political value to a president of using military force as a distraction from domestic difficulties depends on the willingness of the public to rally. If, as some scholars (e.g., Meernick and Waterman, 1996) maintain, rally effects are politically insignificant, then the logic behind a diversionary use of force quickly collapses.

My results add some additional nuance to the arguments of scholars like Brody (1991), Brody and Shapiro (1989), Oneal et al. (1996), and others concerning the conditions under which presidents are likely to enjoy a rally effect. Indeed, my findings suggest that elite support for the president—especially from the opposition party—while perhaps necessary, is not a sufficient condition for a rally. There must also be *room* for a significant portion of the public to reevaluate the president upwards. And this is most likely during adverse circumstances (e.g., periods of economic distress or during divided government), when pre-rally-event approval levels among marginal constituencies are likely to be depressed *ex ante.* Indeed, divided government may have contributed to President Bush's relatively low pre-attack approval rating—the third lowest of any post–World War II era president at a comparable stage of his presidency.[43] This, in turn, set the stage for the largest rally effect ever recorded, as opposition party leaders lined up in lock step behind the president.

My findings also add an interesting wrinkle to the argument of Morgan and Bickers (1992), who found that presidents are more likely to attempt a diversionary use of force when they are unpopular with their fellow partisans. My results suggest presidents will have relatively few *opportunities* to benefit from such a diversionary use of force. Presidents typically enjoy high approval ratings among their fellow partisans, so, most of the time, they have little to gain by "diverting" the attention of this largely supportive constituency. Given Morgan and Bickers's logic, this suggests diversionary uses of force are likely to be fairly uncommon. Indeed, my findings suggest that for a diversionary use of force to have any significant effect on a president's popularity, domestic circumstances prior to the use of force must be sufficiently dire to prompt a president's fellow partisans to turn against him. Such circumstances are likely to be relatively rare.

While the present study does not directly address the political significance of the rally effect, it has clarified several closely related issues. For instance, my results indicate that popular presidents have little to gain from foreign adventures. Indeed, consistent with the logic of the "wag the dog" scenario, only when a president's popularity is relatively low, for a variety of reasons, can he expect the public to rally behind him following a use of force. Yet, while this evidence can address opportunity and motive, it cannot establish causation.

Similarly, due primarily to the differing nature of the coalitions that form the two major political parties, Republican presidents are more likely than their Democratic counterparts to enjoy significant rallies, especially if the Congress is controlled by Democrats, or when the nation's attention is focused inward. Recognizing this, might a strategic Republican president be more likely than a Democrat to initiate a politically inspired use of force? As noted, we cannot infer intention from the relationships identified in this study. These results do, however, suggest a potentially useful avenue for future research into the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy. By disaggregating public opinion into its constituent elements, and thereby determining which segments of the population are most responsive, or resistant, to presidential efforts to use foreign policy for domestic purposes, it should be possible to improve our understanding of this phenomenon and its political implications.

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[43] Source: http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr010906c.asp

Appendix 1: Full Regression Models

TABLE A1. Effect of Using Military Force on Change in Presidential Approval, 1953–98, No Interactions (Dependent Variable: $lnApprove_t - lnApprove_{t-1}$)

Independent Variables	Democratic Administrations			Republican Administrations		
	Democrat Coef. (Std. Err.)	Republican Coef. (Std. Err.)	Independent Coef. (Std. Err.)	Democrat Coef. (Std. Err.)	Republican Coef. (Std. Err.)	Independent Coef. (Std. Err.)
Rally	.025 (.017)	.016 (.032)	.030 (.025)	.079 (.035)*	.025 (.013)*	.041 (.025)^
Presidential Election Year	.0008 (.015)	−.004 (.020)	−.0008 (.016)	−.021 (.015)	.014 (.007)^	−.002 (.009)
Lame Duck	.011 (.018)	.037 (.033)	.017 (.026)	−.0005 (.017)	−.022 (.009)*	−.016 (.010)
Divided Government	.023 (.018)	.053 (.033)	.025 (.024)	.013 (.034)	.016 (.014)	.007 (.023)
New Administration	.087 (.037)*	.048 (.026)^	.046 (.015)**	.016 (.030)	.076 (.026)**	.073 (.028)**
Inflation$_{(t-2...t-4)/3}$	−12.357 (4.460)**	−7.283 (4.384)^	−10.471 (3.189)***	−2.020 (2.921)	−2.002 (1.620)	−1.938 (2.165)
Unemployment$_{(t-2...t-4)/3}$	−.032 (.294)	−.803 (.427)^	−.168 (.272)	−.070 (.179)	.072 (.091)	−.064 (.123)
%Δ Immigration	.041 (.047)	−.030 (.058)	−.006 (.050)	.144 (.051)**	.074 (.031)*	.105 (.033)***
lnSalience of Foreign Policy	.007 (.024)	−.012 (.032)	−.008 (.026)	.041 (.018)*	.061 (.018)***	.045 (.013)***
Johnson	−.050 (.022)*	−.005 (.026)	−.031 (.020)	—	—	—
Nixon	—	—	—	−.015 (.021)	−.047 (.021)*	−.035 (.017)*
Ford	—	—	—	.045 (.037)	−.041 (.027)	.006 (.030)
Carter	−.021 (.070)	−.031 (.081)	.0003 (.068)	—	—	—
Reagan	—	—	—	−.026 (.026)	.040 (.014)**	.003 (.015)
Bush	—	—	—	.025 (.0032)	.045 (.018)**	.020 (.021)
Clinton	.0003 (.060)	−.134 (.088)	−.064 (.067)	—	—	—
LnApprove$_{t-1}$	−.304 (.070)***	−.124 (.028)***	−.129 (.029)***	−.161 (.036)***	−.559 (.166)***	−.225 (.049)***
Constant	−.045 (.020)*	−.124 (.037)***	−.057 (.028)**	−.104 (.040)*	−.036 (.018)*	−.061 (.027)*
AR(1)	—	−.288 (.069)***	−.342 (.080)***	−.174 (.076)*	−.046 (.123)	−.195 (.086)*
AR(2)	—	−.184 (.070)**	—	—	−.007 (.061)	—
Adjusted R^2	.211 (N=316)	.147 (N=302)	.182 (N=309)	.112 (N=468)	.537 (N=466)	.166 (N=468)
F-Statistic	7.490***	4.453***	5.898***	4.939***	34.688***	7.191***
Durbin-Watson Statistic	1.885	1.988	2.067	2.000	1.625	1.970

^ < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001

Note: All models employ heteroscedasticity-consistent ("robust") standard errors.

Independent Variables	Democratic Administrations			Republican Administrations		
	Democrat Coef. (Std. Err.)	Republican Coef. (Std. Err.)	Independent Coef. (Std. Err.)	Democrat Coef. (Std. Err.)	Republican Coef. (Std. Err.)	Independent Coef. (Std. Err.)
Rally	−.016 (.023)	−.075 (.040)^	−.017 (.038)	.049 (.062)	.049 (.024)*	.051 (.041)
Presidential Election Year	.0007 (.014)	−.006 (.020)	−.001 (.016)	−.021 (.015)	.014 (.007)*	−.002 (.009)
Lame Duck	.013 (.016)	.035 (.033)	.015 (.026)	−.0001 (.017)	−.022 (.008)**	−.016 (.010)
Divided Government	.028 (.017)^	.062 (.034)^	.029 (.024)	.008 (.034)	.021 (.015)	.009 (.023)
New Administration	.079 (.030)**	.051 (.026)*	.047 (.016)**	.015 (.030)	.074 (.025)**	.073 (.028)**
Inflation$_{(t-2\ldots t-4)/3}$	−14.353 (4.414)***	−9.385 (4.436)*	−11.547 (3.310)***	−2.619 (2.913)	−1.531 (1.526)	−1.744 (2.124)
Unemployment$_{(t-2\ldots t-4)/3}$	.016 (.306)	−.770 (.420)^	−.161 (.271)	−.067 (.177)	.073 (.090)	−.064 (.123)
%Δ Immigration	.033 (.041)	−.033 (.056)	−.007 (.049)	.141 (.051)**	.073 (.029)**	.106 (.033)***
lnSalience of Foreign Policy	.007 (.022)	−.011 (.031)	−.007 (.026)	.039 (.018)*	.060 (.018)***	.452 (.013)***
Johnson	−.048 (.018)**	−.002 (.026)	−.030 (.020)	—	—	—
Nixon	—	—	—	−.014 (.021)	−.047 (.020)*	−.037 (.017)*
Ford	—	—	—	.045 (.037)	−.040 (.026)	.006 (.028)
Carter	−.009 (.061)	−.007 (.079)	.004 (.068)	—	—	—
Reagan	—	—	—	−.025 (.026)	.039 (.013)**	.003 (.015)
Bush	—	—	—	.024 (.031)	.044 (.018)**	.021 (.021)
Clinton	−.003 (.055)	−.138 (.087)	−.063 (.067)	—	—	—
LnApprove$_{t-1}$	−.295 (.056)***	−.129 (.027)***	−.132 (.029)***	−.157 (.037)***	−.547 (.152)***	−.226 (.049)***
Inflation$_{(t-2\ldots t-4)/3}$ x Rally	12.708 (7.137)^	30.846 (10.108)**	16.052 (12.846)	9.268 (16.796)	−7.262 (6.704)	−3.133 (11.090)
Constant	−.040 (.019)*	−.124 (.036)***	−.056 (.028)*	−.097 (.042)*	−.040 (.018)*	−.063 (.028)*
AR(1)	—	−.302 (.067)***	−.351 (.077)***	−.178 (.076)*	−.062 (.111)	−.196 (.087)*
AR(2)	—	−.183 (.070)**	—	—	−.016 (.060)	—
AR(3)	−.125 (.101)	—	—	—	—	—
Adjusted R^2	.235 (N=302)	.164 (N=302)	.191 (N=309)	.112 (N=468)	.538 (N=466)	.193 (N=468)
F-Statistic	7.168***	4.690***	5.851***	4.663***	32.804***	6.738***
Durbin-Watson Statistic	1.994	1.992	2.069	2.000	1.626	1.971

^ < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001

Note: All models employ heteroscedasticity-consistent ("robust") standard errors.

TABLE A3. Effect of Using Military Force on Change in Presidential Approval, 1953–98, Interaction with Divided Government (Dependent Variable: $lnApprove_t - lnApprove_{t-1}$)

Independent Variables	Democratic Administrations			Republican Administrations		
	Democrat Coef. (Std. Err.)	Republican Coef. (Std. Err.)	Independent Coef. (Std. Err.)	Democrat Coef. (Std. Err.)	Republican Coef. (Std. Err.)	Independent Coef. (Std. Err.)
Rally	.029 (.030)	.061 (.050)	.089 (.038)*	−.143 (.040)***	−.001 (.017)	−.055 (.044)
Presidential Election Year	.001 (.015)	−.003 (.020)	.0004 (.016)	−.015 (.013)	.013 (.007)^	−.002 (.009)
Lame Duck	.011 (.018)	.036 (.033)	.016 (.026)	−.002 (.014)	−.022 (.008)**	−.017 (.010)^
Divided Government	.024 (.018)	.066 (.035)^	.042 (.025)^	−.043 (.029)	.009 (.015)	−.018 (.023)
New Administration	.086 (.037)*	.043 (.027)	.038 (.016)*	−.004 (.026)	.075 (.025)**	.072 (.028)**
$Inflation_{(t-2…t-4)/3}$	−12.420 (4.495)**	−7.816 (4.367)^	−11.134 (3.156)***	−2.010 (2.585)	−1.932 (1.606)	−1.770 (2.156)
$Unemployment_{(t-2…t-4)/3}$	−.033 (.295)	−.801 (.425)^	−.162 (.269)	−.094 (.156)	.065 (.090)	−.081 (.121)
%Δ Immigration	.041 (.047)	−.029 (.057)	−.004 (.049)	.108 (.042)**	.072 (.029)**	.103 (.032)***
lnSalience of Foreign Policy	.007 (.024)	−.011 (.032)	−.006 (.026)	.024 (.016)	.059 (.017)***	.044 (.013)***
Johnson	−.050 (.022)*	−.005 (.025)	−.030 (.020)	—	—	—
Nixon	—	—	—	−.014 (.018)	−.046 (.020)*	−.036 (.016)*
Ford	—	—	—	.025 (.032)	−.040 (.026)	.006 (.028)
Carter	−.020 (.070)	−.007 (.080)	.011 (.070)	—	—	—
Reagan	—	—	—	−.022 (.022)	.039 (.013)**	.003 (.015)
Bush	—	—	—	.003 (.028)	.043 (.018)**	.018 (.021)
Clinton	.0006 (.060)	−.135 (.088)	−.060 (.067)	—	—	—
$LnApprove_{t-1}$	−.305 (.070)***	−.124 (.028)***	−.128 (.029)***	−.112 (.030)***	−.546 (.154)***	−.221 (.048)***
Divided Government x Rally	−.007 (.033)	−.093 (.062)	−.123 (.045)**	.266 (.055)***	.031 (.022)	.113 (.052)*
Constant	−.045 (.020)*	−.126 (.037)***	−.059 (.028)*	−.025 (.035)	−.028 (.018)	−.035 (.027)
AR(1)	—	−.289 (.068)***	−.351 (.080)***	−.247 (.084)**	−.060 (.115)	−.205 (.087)*
AR(2)	—	−.188 (.071)**	—	−.130 (.060)*	−.016 (.060)	—
Adjusted R^2	.209 (N=316)	.150 (N=302)	.202 (N=309)	.135 (N=466)	.536 (N=466)	.172 (N=468)
F-Statistic	6.936***	4.322***	6.206***	5.262***	32.659***	7.056***
Durbin-Watson Statistic	1.887	1.997	2.066	1.976	1.622	1.974

^ < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001

Note: All models employ heteroscedasticity-consistent ("robust") standard errors.

TABLE A4. Effect of Using Military Force on Change in Presidential Approval, 1953–98, Interaction with Salience of Foreign Policy (Dependent Variable: $lnApprove_t - lnApprove_{t-1}$)

Independent Variables	Democratic Administrations			Republican Administrations		
	Democrat Coef. (Std. Err.)	Republican Coef. (Std. Err.)	Independent Coef. (Std. Err.)	Democrat Coef. (Std. Err.)	Republican Coef. (Std. Err.)	Independent Coef. (Std. Err.)
Rally	−.042 (.052)	.089 (.075)	.077 (.056)	−.092 (.072)	−.034 (.020)^	−.062 (.055)
Presidential Election Year	.007 (.014)	−.004 (.020)	−.0005 (.017)	−.022 (.015)	.013 (.007)^	−.003 (.009)
Lame Duck	.013 (.017)	.038 (.033)	.018 (.026)	−.0008 (.017)	−.022 (.008)**	−.016 (.010)
Divided Government	.024 (.017)	.053 (.033)	.025 (.025)	−.006 (.031)	.009 (.013)	−.004 (.022)
New Administration	.082 (.031)**	.045 (.027)^	.044 (.016)**	.011 (.030)	.074 (.025)**	.071 (.028)**
Inflation$_{(t-2\ldots t-4)/3}$	−13.263 (4.316)**	−7.344 (4.371)^	−10.597 (3.195)***	−.923 (3.003)	−1.563 (1.633)	−1.254 (2.209)
Unemployment$_{(t-2\ldots t-4)/3}$	.013 (.304)	−.790 (.422)^	−.162 (.272)	−.082 (.176)	.064 (.088)	−.072 (.122)
%Δ Immigration	.033 (.041)	−.028 (.059)	−.005 (.051)	.141 (.050)**	.072 (.028)**	.106 (.032)***
lnSalience of Foreign Policy	.007 (.022)	−.015 (.032)	−.010 (.026)	.046 (.018)**	.061 (.016)***	.048 (.013)***
Johnson	−.050 (.018)*	−.006 (.025)	−.032 (.020)	—	—	—
Nixon	—	—	—	−.016 (.021)	−.046 (.019)*	−.036 (.017)*
Ford	—	—	—	.043 (.037)	−.039 (.025)	.007 (.028)
Carter	−.013 (.061)	−.016 (.080)	−.0008 (.068)	—	—	—
Reagan	—	—	—	−.025 (.026)	.039 (.012)**	.003 (.015)
Bush	—	—	—	.018 (.031)	.041 (.017)**	.017 (.021)
Clinton	−.006 (.056)	−.137 (.088)	−.065 (.067)	—	—	—
LnApprove$_{t-1}$	−.288 (.056)***	−.125 (.028)***	−.131 (.029)***	−.155 (.037)***	−.539 (.146)***	−.224 (.049)***
LnSalience of Foreign Policy × Rally	−.028 (.019)	.032 (.029)	.021 (.021)	−.100 (.047)*	−.035 (.015)*	−.060 (.036)^
Constant	−.037 (.019)^	−.131 (.038)***	−.062 (.029)*	−.074 (.041)^	−.025 (.017)	−.044 (.027)^
AR(1)	—	−.288 (.069)***	−.338 (.082)***	−.179 (.077)*	−.070 (.110)	−.193 (.086)*
AR(2)	—	−.189 (.070)**	—	—	−.022 (.060)	—
AR(3)	−.117 (.099)	—	—	—	—	—
Adjusted R^2	.231 (N=302)	.147 (N=302)	.182 (N=309)	.124 (N=468)	.540 (N=466)	.174 (N=468)
F-Statistic	7.018***	4.237***	5.568***	5.126***	33.092***	7.161***
Durbin-Watson Statistic	1.956	1.993	2.065	2.017	1.626	1.980

^ < .10, * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001

Note: All models employ heteroscedasticity-consistent ("robust") standard errors.

Appendix 2: American Uses of Force, 1989–98

Date	Event
8/89	US deploys two aircraft carriers and battleship groups to eastern Mediterranean, Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea after killing of Col. William Higgins in Lebanon.
12/89	US invades Panama.
8/90	Iraq invades Kuwait; US deploys forces to Saudi Arabia.
11/90	US doubles forces in Persian Gulf region.
1/91	Air War against Iraq (Desert Storm, Part I).
2/91	Ground War against Iraq (Desert Storm, Part II).
4/91	Approximately 10,000 US troops enter Northern Iraq.
7/92	Military exercises conducted in Kuwait and Persian Gulf in order to pressure Iraq to comply with UN weapons inspections.
8/92	200 Air Force and Navy aircraft enforce "no-fly zone" in Southern Iraq.
12/92	28,000 US troops deployed to Somalia in "Operation Restore Hope."
1/93	US Troops deployed to Kuwait; aircraft and missiles attack Iraqi targets.
10/93	18 US Army Rangers killed in Somalia in failed ambush at meeting of Aideed and his supporters. Additional troops and aircraft carrier deployed to area.
7/94	US military exercises in Caribbean simulate invasion of Haiti.
9/94	20,000 US troops occupy Haiti.
10/94	Iraq threatens Kuwait; US deploys 36,000 troops to Kuwait, plus ships and aircraft to Persian Gulf.
6/95	Carrier task force, Marine contingent, attack submarine and other ships move into Adriatic after UN observers taken hostage by Bosnian Serbs.
8/95	Troops and ships deployed to Persian Gulf in response to Iraqi threats.
12/95	US-led multinational force (IFOR) deploys to Bosnia to enforce Dayton Accords.
4/96	China fires cruise missiles towards Taiwan; US sends aircraft carrier to area.
10/96	In response to Iraqi violations of no-fly zones, US deploys stealth and B-52 bombers to Persian Gulf for possible strikes against Iraq.
9/97	In response to more Iraqi violations of no-fly zones, US again deploys stealth and B-52 bombers to Persian Gulf for possible strikes against Iraq.
10/97	Iraq ceases cooperating with UN weapons inspectors; aircraft carrier USS Nimitz deployed to Persian Gulf to enforce no-fly zones.
11/97	Aircraft carrier USS Washington deployed to Persian Gulf.
2/98	US deploys aircraft and troops to Iraq; President Clinton delivers nationally televised address to explain why US may launch major attack against Iraq.
8/98	US cruise missile attack against suspected terrorist sites in Afghanistan and Sudan.
11/98	Iraq ceases cooperating with UN weapons inspectors; US deploys troops, ships, and aircraft to Persian Gulf.
12/98	US and UK launch bombing campaign against Iraq, termed "Operation Desert Fox."

☐ = From Fordham and Sarver (2001)

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