

Matters of Culture: Cultural Sociology in Practice

EDITED BY

Roger Friedland and John Mohr



CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Culture and continuity: causal structures in socio-cultural persistence

Orlando Patterson

The claim is frequently made that the past powerfully influences the present. Laymen and scholars alike constantly assume or assert that a given behavior or cultural pattern or belief is the persistence of a similar, previously existing pattern, or the consequence of conditions that existed in some earlier period. Thus, the historical sociologist, Charles Tilly, observes that "we bear the nineteenth century like an incubus," a continuity he finds agreeable in its "strong markings" on our urban landscape and the practices of everyday life, but deplorable in the way it encumbers our social thought (Tilly, 1984).

Continuities, however, are often as vehemently denied. One of the best-known cases is the controversy over the origins of African American gender and familial relations. A long tradition of African American scholarship from W. E. B. Du Bois, through Franklin Frazier, to Kenneth Clarke, had explained the distinctive gender and familial patterns of African Americans as, in part, a continuity from the slave past. However, after the Moynihan Report summarized these views in a policy report in the sixties, the ideological and scholarly tide turned sharply away from this claim of continuity toward a denial of any such connections (Rainwater and Yancy, 1967). More recently, there has been a swing back to the affirmation of continuity, not only in scholarly work, but also in legal arguments and popular culture. Thus, some legal activists in the slave reparations movement have rested their claims on the persistence of socioeconomic damages from the slave era; and a cover story in *Newsweek*, prompted by the Spielberg film, *Amistad*, led off with the assertion that slavery is "America's original sin . . . dogging our steps forward, projecting in black against the sunlight of democratic ideals" (Alter, 1997).

Regardless of where the truth lies, what is noteworthy is that none of the many scholars involved with this and similar controversies about the influence of the past has examined the grounds on which either the assertion or denial of continuity from the past can be made. An abundance of evidence from the

past and the present is often cited, but just how the present is linked to the past remains unproblematic.

It is the objective of this chapter to explore this problem. After a brief reflection on the reasons why sociologists have neglected the problem, I explore some of the key theoretical issues relating to the problem of continuity, arguing that causal structures underlie all such claims. I then briefly examine how sociocultural processes are related to their contexts, paying special attention to the problem of contingencies which originate in, but are not identified with, their contexts, before exploring four basic kinds of sociocultural continuities. I conclude with a brief summary and a discussion of the main implications of our analysis.

Why sociology [and history!] neglects continuity

Sociologists and historians are, of course, aware of the fact that "most social practices," as Sewell notes, "tend to be consistently reproduced over relatively extended periods of time" (Sewell, 1996: 842). However, with some important exceptions to be noted later, most either take this overwhelming continuity for granted, finding little of theoretical interest in it, or, when they do approach it, especially via studies of institutionalization, they stop frustratingly short of the critical question of what exactly are the processes that constitute continuity.

Space constraints permit only the briefest discussion of the reasons for this neglect. One reason is the predominance of social constructionism in sociology. Its key notions are the relativism, contingency, and socially produced nature of social phenomena. In most versions, such an approach, by emphasizing the fluidity and meaning-dependent nature of social reality, is clearly antithetical to a concern with continuity. However, as Ian Hacking (1999: 19–34) recently emphasized, there are several versions of social constructionism involving different degrees of commitment to its philosophical and moral assumptions. Ironically, one of the earliest and best-known sociological works on social constructionism – that of Berger and Luckmann – was very concerned with the problem of continuity, with what they called the "awesome paradox" of how human activity is capable of creating a world of stable social objects (Berger and Luckman, 1967: 47–128); but equally mysterious is the problem of how these objects become things in themselves and maintain, for sometimes centuries – as is true of elements of Christianity, of the western culture of freedom, and of central features of American civil society – recognizable patterns of identity.

The second reason is an ingrained intellectual and ideological bias among many in the discipline against efforts toward an understanding of the nature of stable social entities and what explains their continuity. It is well known that sociologists who attempt to explain social problems such as ethnosomatic

("racial") inequality in terms of cultural continuities risk ostracism and occasional intellectual abuse. This bias originated partly in the reaction to what Tilly has called the "pernicious postulates" of nineteenth-century thought, especially its pseudo-evolutionary pretensions and problematic functionalism that culminated in the Parsonian system (Tilly, 1984; but see Alexander and Smith, 1993: 151–155). But it persists today, ironically, as a chronic disciplinary prejudice – a dogmatic anti-continuative intellectual continuity! Its counterpart is an entrenched transformational bias in the discipline. Most historical sociologists are relentlessly focused on the explanation of change: revolutions, peasant revolts, strikes, riots, movements of all kinds, are the standard fare of nearly all sociologists concerned with the past. So strong is this bias that even when a scholar has important things to say about stability he is careful to frame his argument in terms that signal his concern for change. William Sewell, for example, concludes his valuable analysis of social structure with the insightful statement that "structures can combine depth with great power and, consequently, can shape the experience of entire societies over many generations" (Sewell 1992: 26). Agreed! Nonetheless, and no doubt with a wary eye at his sociological audience, Sewell earlier in the same paper felt obliged to criticize "the language of structure" because it "lends itself readily to explanations of how social life is shaped into consistent patterns, but not to explanations of how these patterns change over time" (Sewell, 1992: 2–3).

Remarkably, this flight from continuity is as pronounced among professional historians – where we would least have expected it – as among their sociological counterparts. The historian Judith Bennett laments that among her professional colleagues, especially since the 1970s, "'transformation' is the accepted or even canonical story; 'continuity' is troublesome, worrisome, and even dismissible" (Bennett, 1997). As is true of sociology, the vogue for history as transformation sprang in part from a necessary reaction against the essentializing and universalizing tendencies of earlier histories, which either denied the agency of women and other oppressed groups and classes, or overemphasized continuities in problematic ways. A quote from D. C. Coleman nicely reflects current orthodoxy in history, as in sociology: "Change is the great temptress; continuity appears to be the bore to be avoided" (Coleman 1977: 91, cited in Bennett, 1997). Not only is continuity boring, however, but it is at odds with the dominant conception and method of historical writing which is "driven by the power of narrative, by the telling of stories that contain crisis, adjustment and resolution – without vast and clear differences between the past and the present, it seems that historical context – and with it the work of historians – might come to mean very little" (Bennett, 1997).

The closest that sociologists come to addressing the issue of continuity is in studies of institutionalization, especially the persistence of organizational

forms. Arthur Stinchcombe's (1965) classic exploration of "internal tradition-alizing processes," and of what he termed the "liability of newness," is still one of the most illuminating approaches to the question of continuity, and its relation to change, in the literature. More recent scholarship by organizational sociologists, especially those working in the neo-institutionalist framework, has significantly contributed to our understanding of the problem posed by Stinchcombe four decades ago: the ways in which history "determines some aspects of the present structure of organizations" (Dobbin, 1994; Fligstein, 2001).

Nonetheless, even the newer generation of historically oriented institutionalists tend to circle the problem of continuity rather than address it directly. Their emphasis has been on what Stinchcombe called "the motivation to organize," and on the groups that favor persistence, the vested interests that are served by it and the conditions favoring or reducing the "liability of newness." What is rarely addressed, and with a notable few exceptions (Abbott, 1999; Alexander and Smith 1993; Gerschenkron, 1968; Jepperson, 1991) remains largely unproblematic, is the nature of the "tradition" that is carried, the problem of what exactly is meant when we make the claim that a similarity or identity of form persists or is transmitted from one group to another, or from one period to the next. Thus DiMaggio and Powell (1983) in their influential paper on institutional isomorphism, which explicitly attempts "to explain homogeneity" rather than variation, in organizational forms, never actually explain what constitutes isomorphism between structures; it is simply taken for granted that we know what is meant when the claim is made that two structures are similar or isomorphic.¹

The process of homogenization involves the spatio-temporal diffusion of a given social pattern that is assumed to remain stable. But this assumption is extremely problematic, both for the social entity that is the original model as well as for the imitators adopting it (Lillrank, 1995). What seems to be isomorphic may in fact be only isomeric or, worse, merely homologous, given the fluid and often ambiguous nature of social patterns and practices, not to mention the complexities of transmission processes. It is precisely these problems of spatio-temporal identity and the other main types of continuity in the social universe that this chapter addresses.

Some theoretical considerations

A continuity refers to any object, structural process, or type of event that persists between two or more periods of time. It entails something that persists and some mechanism that accounts for persistence and these are the central theoretical issues to be dealt with in this part. I propose to argue that all claims of

continuity – except those that are wholly invented – are really claims about the persistence of causal processes, and this is true even of persistence in the identity of objects.

Social scientists concerned with the continuity of social processes encounter at least four kinds of causal processes that I will call *identities* or *self-determining processes*, *direct processes*, *hierarchical processes*, and *post-inception* or *hysteretic processes*.

Identities or self-determining processes: an object persisting through time may be seen as a self-perpetuating or self-causing process. Following a tradition initiated by Russell (1948) but significantly modified by Quine (1950) and others, I take identity to be a "time-laden process," best understood with the metaphor of a stream. Each observation of an object is a temporal stage in its identity stream. The identity itself is the summation of all such moments, each being only a "time-slice" in a continuant process (Lewis, 1983). The object-stage at a given moment may be provisionally conceived as a "quasi-permanent" complex of related attributes. However, these attributes not only change values, but are shed and new ones included over time. None is essential although at given identity stages some may be more important than others (Hookway, 1988).

The "quasi-permanence" or continuity of identities, Russell argued, is due to a special kind of causal persistence that he sometimes calls intrinsic causation (Russell, 1948: 504). Identities are self-causing in that later phases of an object are held to "grow out of" or are caused by earlier phases. This is obviously true of biological objects (for example, embryo into adult), but we are inclined to agree with those who argue that it holds for most things – including social objects – with any identity through time (Armstrong, 1980: 67–78; Nozick, 1981: 35).

While identities have an objective reality, their boundaries are in good part socially determined or imputed. We observe existing patterns and epistemically demarcate, and socially construct them, both to explain them and to structure and control our environment (Hausman, 1998: 274; Putnam, 1991: 113–116). Such epistemic work is done in three ways: through the use of stereotypes which acknowledge the vagueness of boundaries that may go no further than family resemblances (Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Rosch, 1978; Wittgenstein, 1953); through the classical use of crisp sets of sharply defined categories (Pinker, 1997: 127, 2000: ch. 10); and by the symbolic processes of ritual enactments in secular and religious life, the human body being a major symbolic source (Douglas, 1966, 1986; Turner, 1995; White, 1992: 312–316; Zerubavel, 1993: chs. 2–3).

Direct processes shift the focus from the quasi-permanent identity of objects to the external link between such objects, as well as events, over time. Following

Lewis (1973, 2000), we view causation in counterfactual terms – “Event C causes event E if and only if there is a chain of dependencies running from C to E” (Lewis, 2000: 191) – and we do so in full awareness of the thorny theoretical issues involved, especially the persistent problems of trumping, preemption, and transitivity (Collins, 2000; Schaffer, 2000) as well as the need to take account of the fact that all causal claims are relative to the context of the problem at issue and to our notions of normalness (Hart and Honor, 1985: 32–41).

Hierarchical processes or multiple causal chains derive from the fact that an antecedent causal factor can generate several consequences, each of which may later become the causal ancestor of subordinate chains of consequences. With such chains we have a vertical network of causal influences, some of which may be more important than others; knowing where to draw the line is always problematic. If the causal chain is too short we end up with explanations that are likely to be not only trivial – as Lieberman (1997) warns – but inappropriate. With strong theory we can make more meaningful connections but, as Elster (1978: 184–185) observes, our conclusions are then more open to question.

Post-inception or hysteretic processes embrace several sub-classes of causal processes. All have in common the following kind of development. An event or object is generated in period T_1 by causal factors peculiar to period T_1 . In the adjoining period, T_2 , the event or object persists, but now it is due to an entirely different set of causal factors peculiar to T_2 , and so on to period T_n . Thus between T_1 and T_n there has been an uninterrupted continuity of the object or (recurring) event in question, yet no apparent continuity in the set of factors causing it.

The two most important features of post-inception causal lines are their unpredictability and irreversibility. Nothing in the original or preceding cause on the nodes of the chain can predict subsequent causes since these seem to emerge either adventitiously or through some still to be understood process of causal attraction by the effected object.

The best-known sub-class is path-dependent processes, which will be discussed at greater length later. Another is the causal blowback in which the anticipation of a development, such as an economic downturn, brings it about (Kenney, 1979: ch. 1; Zellner, 1979). The final sub-category of this class of causal lines is self-interested regeneration. People benefiting from the existence of a given complex will devise means of perpetuating it even after it has outlived its uses or the original set of factors accounting for it. Organizational inertia is a classic instance of this.

I have, elsewhere, discussed one of these processes at some length in my case study of Jamaican lower-class familial patterns which have persisted from slavery to the present as a result of quite different sets of causal forces following

each other from one period to the next over the past 160 years (Patterson, 1982).

Periodicity and the problem of weak and strong contingencies

Before we are ready to draw out the implications of the discussion above for the universe of sociocultural continuities, we must first address the conceptually prior problem of periodicity and its relation to continuity. This is necessary because very often when we try to establish a claim of continuity we are really more interested in showing that a given context or period has strongly influenced another period or some object in that period. We might, for example, be interested in exploring the extent to which the Puritan era left its mark on modern American values, or the period of antebellum slavery on modern “race” relations or certain practices of Afro-Americans.

Periods leave their marks on later ones through their influences on the qualitative objects, structures, and events that originated in them and persist into later periods. However, before we can make the claim that a period’s influence has been mediated by these persisting entities and effects, we must first demonstrate that there was some intrinsic connection between the period in question and the originating entities or event which verify the claim of periodic continuity.

This is necessary because the mere existence of an originating entity or event within a period does not justify the claim that it mediates the influence of the period in question at a later time. It may have originated in a previous or different context, but continued to exist during period X, X being merely an uncontaminating historical conduit for the object. The Episcopalian Eucharist, Roman Catholic mass, and many of the central rituals and beliefs of Haitian Vodou or Jamaican Cumina, are cases in point.

More problematic and interesting, however, are those cases that stand in stark contradiction to Tilly’s (1984: 79) claim “that the time and place in which a structure or process appears make a difference to its character.” It sometimes happens that a historical process originated in, but was a wholly contingent element of, a given period, so that it cannot be claimed that its persistence transmits any influence from it. As Gordon Leff (1971: 42) observed, many “events happen which need not happen and which could frequently have happened differently.” Such contingencies are, in a sense, *sui generis*, supervening in an established order. Contingencies introduce the play of human agency, of freedom, in history and culture. They may be the causal antecedents of later outcomes, sometimes even important ones, but they themselves are wholly adventitious in their appearance, bearing no particular mark of their context. For this reason, the later outcomes of the causal chains they set in motion cannot be claimed as continuities of the originating period.

To take an extreme case, the creation of the state of Israel occurred within the murderous context of Naziism. Nonetheless, we are reluctant to say that Israel is the legacy or effect of Nazi Germany or that this regime decisively influenced its character, and for good reason. While Naziism was a major aspect of the context out of which it emerged, it in no way necessitated or caused it. The state of Israel was envisioned long before Nazi Germany, and it is possible to imagine a range of possible worlds in which it might have been realized through determined human agency in conjunction with a favorable concatenation of other events.

The same goes for any number of other events and cultural objects. Jazz, for example, was largely the product of contingent forces and supreme human agency in the Jim Crow environment of lower-class and lower-caste New Orleans where it first made its appearance. Indeed, it is the very contingency of its origins, its transcendent supervision in the social nightmare of the old South, that made it so rapidly emerge as the first truly great all-American art form, as distinct from such other cultural creations as the slave songs and spirituals of the slave period, or the folk and urban blues of the rural, segregated South, or the blue-grass music of Appalachia, all of which are highly contextual and are meaningfully treated as legacies of their appropriate periods and contexts (Levine, 1978).

We naturally recoil from the idea that Israel was in any way a legacy or product of the Nazi terror, or that jazz was the product of racism, but we do so mainly on moral grounds. I am suggesting a more rational basis for our rejection of all such claims – the view that what emerges from the contingencies of a given context cannot be taken as a legacy or effect of that context.

The cases above are examples of what may be called strong contingencies, in contrast with a second set of weak contingencies, so called not because of their unimportance, but because they are usually minor events in their originating contexts, so minor that, as Paul David (1988: 11) observes, they “appeared not only insignificant, but entirely random in character.” Nonetheless, they have major consequences in outcomes appearing later, as in path dependent processes. In a nutshell: strong contingencies, and their later outcomes, are unidentified with the contexts in which they emerged, in spite of seemingly strong counterfactual evidence to the contrary. Weak contingencies, and their contexts, have powerful identifying connections to later outcomes, in spite of seemingly weak counterfactual evidence to the contrary.

Four types of continuities

I distinguish between four types of continuities based partly on the kind of causal processes involved and the domain of the sociocultural universe to which they pertain: qualitative, structural, event, and commemorative.

Qualitative continuities

These are persisting cultural objects or quasi-permanent identity streams in the sociocultural domain. What we observe at any given moment will be a bounded complex of inter-related qualities, but it is only a socio-temporal stage, a sampled occurrence of many closely similar, adjoining occurrences of this complex along the historical line that constitutes, in its entirety, the identity of the cultural object in question (Burger, 1976: 75).

I am firmly in the school of social thought that views culture as an information system and specific cultural objects as packages of information, or native models of behavior, values, and ideals (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; D'Andrade, 1995; Goodenough, 1989; Keesing, 1987). They must be distinguished from actual behavior, for which they provide blueprints. The interaction between models and performance is reciprocal. The point is best made with the familiar metaphor of an open software package and its relation to long-term usage. Models guide behavior; but behavior, over the long run, leads to adjustments in models; for example, the various editions of a software package in response to the demands and tinkering of end-users. And, in the same way that in the physical human-made world everything ultimately has a software dimension – is the embodiment of some information package – so it is that ultimately all areas of social life are cultural in that they are embodiments or enactments of iterated cultural models responding to social uses. Material and other artifacts are simply the embodiment of cultural software. Social structures – from informal routines to highly structured organizations – are more fluid, and interactive, enactments of cultural models. Note that the software (culture), hardware (structural enactments) metaphor includes a critical feature of all cultural processes missed, or downplayed by analogous images such as “schemas” or “toolkits” (Swidler, 1986), namely, the fact that they are all rule-based, though varying in degrees of tightness (Emmett, 1966). Further, this approach allows for an even greater play of human agency. I can write anything with my Word Perfect software, from Jamaican short stories to American sociological abstractions. It is a highly rule-bound instrument; but it is a powerfully enabling set of rules. It is stable, predictable, and has a clearly defined identity, but it is not static; and it is collectively constructed and reconstructed. As Alexander and Smith (1993: 158) note, “cultural codes are elastic because individuals can ad-hoc from event to code and from code to event,” but not so elastic that they lack causal influence.

The software metaphor also gets around the thorny problem of cultural coherence (Swidler, 2001: 181–186). The fact that people are often contradictory, confused, and downright incoherent in their views and rationalizations is not inconsistent with a conception of cultural models as rule-based and coherent.

My word-processing software is very coherent – except when it occasionally crashes. It is what I do with it that is too often contradictory. A sociology of culture should be careful not to operate at so particularistic a level that it gets entangled with the minutiae of ordinary social intercourse – this is the province of ethnographers and novelists. The difference is similar to that between what linguists do and what language journalists pontificate about in the Sunday papers.

Qualitative cultural objects are causally self-perpetuating. They are “chronically reproduced” identities that “owe their survival to relatively self-activating social processes” (Jepperson, 1991: 145). What this means in practical sociological terms is that they are normative, taken-for-granted, social processes that are believed in, valorized, and acted on simply because they have always been there, or are believed to have always been there, and are among the social things that make life meaningful and “real.” As Lynne G. Zucker (1977: 726) pointed out some time ago, “it is sufficient for one person simply to tell another that this is how things are done. Each individual is motivated to comply because otherwise his actions and those of others in the system cannot be understood . . . the fundamental process is one in which the moral becomes factual.” Processes vary in the degree to which they are encultured, that is, rule bound and self-perpetuating. They are most encultured when they become institutions. This immediately raises the question of how such self-reproducing complexes are transmitted.

Although sociologists have neglected this problem, it is one focus of the landmark work of Boyd and Richerson (1988: ch. 3) on cultural processes. The main mechanism, they show, is through social learning, defined as “the transmission of stable behavioral dispositions by teaching or imitation.” Integrating the findings of social learning theory and socialization studies within their own theory of culture as a dual transmission process, Boyd and Richerson present a powerful case for cultural persistence or, to use their own language, for cultural inertia, in the face of environmental variation, for why “history should explain a significant fraction of present behavior and a common past should cause significant similarities between societies.” Their argument is summarized as follows:

Because they have many effects that are spread over a long period of time, it is difficult for individuals to determine the best choice by trial and error; because the consequences of alternate choices depend on a complex, variable, hard to understand environment, it is difficult for individuals to deduce the optimal behavior. The result is that a reliance on individual learning [i.e. trial and error] will lead to frequent errors. If this intuition is correct, and if the social learning theorists are also correct that information can be acquired easily and accurately by social learning, then . . . a strong dependence on cultural transmission usually provides a better way to acquire beliefs about the environment than a strong dependence on individual learning. (Boyd and Richerson, 1988: 117)

Because of the structuralist and transformative bias of most historical sociology, there are only a few studies that systematically unravels the historical paths by which cultural continuities originate, become institutionalized or self-causing, are transmitted from one period to another and causally interact with social organization, and it is striking how many of these few are by non-sociologists (see, for examples: Bennett, 1996; Degler, 1977; Greif, 1998; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Reed, 1972; Wood, 2001). Let us briefly examine one of the finest examples of this small group of studies exploring the interaction between cultural processes and what Hall and Soskice (2001) call “behavioral logics,” over a long period of time: Eiko Ikegami’s (1997) brilliant study of the samurai tradition of honorific individualism in Tokugawa and later Japan. Honorific individualism was an integral part of the samurai honor culture that emerged during the medieval period “as a sense of warrior pride” by men fiercely devoted to the defense, management, and expansion of the sovereignty and familial honor of their *ie* (house) or landed estate and its position in the competitive ranking system of the broader society.

The Tokugawa regime removed the unstable militaristic foundation that originally generated samurai honorific individualism, but the new leadership shrewdly preserved the ethic and redirected it toward its own ends of state formation and sociocultural consolidation. The samurai were “tamed” into loyal bureaucrats and servants of the state. It was during this period that status, power, and occupation were given objective and external expression in the enactments of elaborate public ceremonies as well as sumptuary rules and other symbolic instruments legitimized by the state. This domestication of the warrior class and its ethic naturally generated tension, sometimes verging on disorder, and hence the need for control, out of which emerged an overarching, self-reproducing identity. The samurai expressed their sense of mutual resistance in the cultural identity known as the ethic of *ichibum*, which Ikegami (1997) translates as “‘one part’ of the core of a person’s pride that cannot be compromised.” She observes further:

The spirit of *ichibum* was observed in various political milieus during the Tokugawa period. *It was this sense of honor that provided an ethical impetus for all kinds of early modern ideologies regardless of their behavioral manifestations.* If anything, the culture of honor increasingly became a prized moral resource through its provision of idioms for the expression of spiritual and social individuality in the cultural setting of the Tokugawa samurai – a setting in which unconditional loyalty and obedience received an ever stronger emphasis. (*italics added*)

With the Meiji restoration we find yet another radical change in the social context of samurai honorific individualism, this time the abolition of the samurai as a class along with most of their privileges. Nonetheless, as Ikegami (1997) shows, the “legacy of the samurai honor culture remained,” and precisely because it was

decoupled from its social creators it could be more creatively and expansively used as a powerful cultural resource by the modern Japanese state. And use it they did, in the promotion of the secondary traditions of Japanese nationalism, militarism, imperial expansion, and later in the development of the special form of Japanese business organization and culture with its distinctive emphasis on loyalty and collective solidarity. So successful was the use of this resource in the modernization period that it became conventional wisdom among Japanese and western scholars that most of the modernizers were from the samurai class, a view that has been challenged by more recent revisionist scholars (Yamamura, 1977: ch. 7).

Here we have a prime example of an identity stream as a self-perpetuating causal process. We see clearly what quasi-permanence means in cultural terms: the interrelation of qualities that constituted the Japanese culture of honor, its spirit of *ichibum*, went through important changes from one period to another, responding to the changing environment even as the environment itself changed reciprocally to enable its persistence. Today, the Japanese culture of honor remains pervasive in its capitalist system, accounting for much that is distinctive and successful (as well as problematic) in this most modern of economic macro-cultures.

Identity persists through many sources of change. One source, as indicated earlier, is inherent in the very nature of culture and its reciprocal relation to behavior. People tinker with their cultural models in the course of using them and adapting them to their own purposes, although in so doing they have to adjust to other people's tinkering. Changes are also introduced in the process of transmission. Those who teach often misinterpret or offer idiosyncratic versions of the model. Naïve learners often misunderstand what they have been taught. And variations are also introduced in the process of learning through observations of the behavior of role models. There are also the deliberate attempts at change by cultural innovators and deviants. And, finally, there are those new variants of a complex that emerge as a result of unplanned trial and error (Boyd and Richerson, 1988: ch. 4). Through all these changes, however, it is possible for identities to continue by means of the joint interplay of epistemic imputation, symbolic manipulation, and some constancy in the resemblance of objectively real bundles of attributes "out there" in the shifting stuff of social reality.

Structural continuities

Layers of structural analysis A structure is a system of relations. It is a quite straightforward concept and there is no need to get entangled in frightful sociological metaphysics when we talk about it. In the broadest terms, it is any persisting, relatively stable system of interacting elements. Following Russell

(1948: 271), we say that two observed systems of interaction have identical structures if there is a direct correspondence in all the fields of relations that constitute them. Underlying all structural continuities are hierarchical causal chains.

All but the most elementary structures tend to be nested in broader systems and can be viewed on different levels of analysis. Hannan (1992) has observed, correctly, that social structures are usually only partly nested in each other, in that different levels – elementary interactions, informal groups, formal organizations – may sometimes interact, but may also singly generate outcomes at the highest systemic or macro-levels. We are inclined to agree with him, too, that the endless agonizing about the integration of micro- and macro-relations may be a waste of time. The discipline lacks the capacity to deal with more than two levels and, in any event, levels are so loosely coupled that analytic failure at lower, micro-levels may not preclude quite robust theorizing at the macro-level. He notes that this was true of Darwin, whose macro-theory of evolution survived his erroneous micro-theory of (blending) genetics. It is not unreasonable to assume that the same may hold for sociology.

In both sociology and neo-institutional economics significant progress has been made in reconciling human agency and structure and in avoiding the twin dangers of oversocialized holism, on the one hand, and undersocialized reductionist individualism, on the other (Alexander and Smith, 1993; Granovetter, 1985; Groenewegen and Vromen, 1999; Sewell, 1992). Agents and structural processes mutually reinforce and constitute each other in ongoing, relatively stable reproductive patterns. A striking convergence of views has also emerged in both fields, often independently, that in complex modern societies it is institutions, and especially organizations, that mediate between different levels, and function, as Samuels (1994) has most forcefully argued, as transmission mechanisms between them (see also Jepperson, 1991). Ann Swidler's (2001) fine recent study of love in America, well illustrates the ways in which the institution of marriage mediates between different levels and "logics" of the wider culture.

There are many ways to interpret and analyze such structures. I draw attention to three basic layers. First, we refer to the surface structure of objects, and what is meant here is simply the stable interrelations that are observed to exist between objects or events. The patterns in the sounds people make; the way they are combined to form symbols; and the stable arrangement of these symbols into sentences, constitute the surface structure of language. To speak a language we must have an implicit knowledge of its surface structure or grammar, and the same holds for our performance of all other areas of culture and social interaction (Pinker, 2000). However, we can move either downward to deeper layers of structure, or outward to higher, emergent or macro-layers. It is usually the case

that the deeper or the higher we move, the more stable (or quasi-permanent) the structures, but also the less aware of them are native performers of the surface object or event being explained (Lieberson, 1985: 107–115).

The exploration of the continuities that are deeper structures has long been the preoccupation of linguists and one school of symbolic anthropologists, as well as psychologists. Underlying syntactical structures reaching down to a Chomskian universal grammar; the search for the deep structures of myths famously associated with the work of Lévi-Strauss; and the use of component analysis and other reduction techniques to probe latent psychological states or structures are among the better known examples of the search for latent quasi-permanent continuities (Mohr, 1998).

Eschewing psychological reductions, network methods and analyses would seem to offer the best prospects for the sociological exploration of deep structures and, indeed, that was the explicit goal of the approach in its early days. The aim, as one network scholar recently put it, was to find some kind of synchronization in which “certain patterns on the structural level” are found to coexist on a regular basis “with a specific texture of events on the contact level at the same time” (Krempel, 1990). Unfortunately, network studies have yet to live up to this promise.

It is the exploration of outer, emergent structures that have drawn the lion's share of sociological interest. How structures operate, especially at lower, more accessible levels, has been the subject of considerable theoretical attention, some of which I have already mentioned. Jonathan Turner's (1989: ch. 11) synthesis strikes me as the most illuminating. He has persuasively argued that they emerge through the overlapping mechanisms of categorization, regionalization, normalization, ritualization, routinization, and the stabilization of resource transfers.

I will briefly discuss here mainly intra-societal emergent structures, although there are far grander levels (Tilly, 1984: ch. 4). Labor markets and class inequality more generally, as well as racial and gender stratification and discrimination, are classic instances of structural continuities that have different behavioral and cultural outcomes in different periods.

Brinton and Kariya's (1998) richly textured study of the labor market for elite graduates in Japan nicely illustrates how continuities at different macro-levels overlay surface variations. In response to threatened sanctions from government following public criticisms of the closed-door recruitment process, whereby certain firms exclusively hired from certain universities in a mutually beneficial arrangement that was judged unfair to many Japanese graduates (the *reserved school* system), outward changes were made in the recruitment process. Nonetheless, in spite of these changes there remain “considerable continuity in the recruiting relationship between particular prestigious universities

and employers.” This continuity is explained by a shift toward a new outward pattern – reliance on alumni–student relations – which completely subverted the other new pattern of meritocratic recruitment that the firms rather cynically instituted in response to public pressure. However, behind the institutional continuity of the reserved school system is an even more enduring continuity in Japanese culture: the propensity to operate through exclusive collective groupings based on a system of mutual trust and loyalty that can be traced all the way back to the medieval era. This pattern of mutual trust is reinforced, on the individual level, by the persisting, if modernized, culture of honor shared by the top officers of the interacting universities and businesses.

A vast body of literature has demonstrated the persistence of class as a principle of social organization in western societies and its changing sociocultural consequences (Dahrendorf, 1965; Hall, 1997; Grusky and Sorensen, 1998; Portes, 2000). The problem with most sociological studies of class is that they aim at too high a level of aggregation. As Grusky and Sorensen (1998) have sensibly observed, if sociologists aimed at more modest levels they would discover “deeply institutionalized groupings” such as those that emerge from the socioeconomic domain. Such institutionalized groupings are precisely the social expressions of persisting, hierarchical causal processes, and it is here that we see most clearly the ways in which institutions act as transmission mechanisms between levels of social phenomena.

Hierarchically linked, structural continuities accompanied by surface changes are also strikingly demonstrated by the history and current socioeconomic status of women. As Judith Bennett (1997: 73–94) shows, it is essential to distinguish between the experiences of women – what may be called the surface level of women's social life – and “transformations in women's status.” For example, in the fourteenth century, when women dominated brewing, it was “low-skilled, low-profit, low-status work – that is, work then seen as appropriate for a woman.” By the seventeenth century, brewing had become a highly skilled, profitable, and very prestigious craft, now suitable mainly for men. Women were still working in the trade, but in the unskilled, low-status, and low-paying areas. In other words, Bennett concludes, beneath the radical changes in the brewing industry and in the surface experiences of women, was one unrelenting continuity: the persistence of women's work as low status, low skill, and low profit. Today, over four centuries later, a leading sociologist of gender can still lament in a recent article that the wage-gap and all its ramifications remains one of “the most enduring manifestations of sex inequality in industrial and postindustrial society” (Reskin, 1991). A common explanation of this gap among sociologists is the high level of job segregation in modern industries (Bielby and Baron, 1984). However, Reskin (1991) observes that job segregation is of limited explanatory value precisely because it is too close to

the surface of what is being explained. This more basic cause is one of the most ancient continuities in human history: "men's desire to preserve their advantaged position and their ability to do so by establishing rules to distribute valued resources in their favor" (Reskin, 1991: 143).

Much the same holds for our explanation of the surface realities of ethnosomatic ("racial") inequalities. According to Lieberman (1985), the traditional explanation that the persistent income gap between Afro-Americans and Euro-Americans has been due to the educational differences between them is superficial because changes in the former are not commensurate with declines in the latter. When educational access was denied Afro-Americans this may indeed have been a significant proximate cause, but with access to education, he argues, Euro-Americans have found other ways of maintaining their superordinate position. While this explanation certainly holds for the post-bellum South up to the eve of the Civil Rights movement, it carries far less weight in explaining ethnosomatic inequalities over the past half century. Since the late 1950s, education has proven to be a major factor in reducing the income gap between African Americans and Euro-Americans. And a recent study suggests that the skills gap between the groups explains nearly all the income discrepancy between them (Jencks and Philips, 1998). Racism and racial discrimination persist, but educational attainment now trumps it as an explanation.

What this suggests is the time-sensitive nature of causal structures: conditions that were causally important in one period may lose their causal potency in a later one, or vice versa.

Associative and non-associative structural continuities There is a complex relationship between enduring structural processes and the surface manifestations, especially sociocultural objects, associated with them that raises contentious social and political issues. It is often the case that a persisting configuration of structural factors is causally associated with persisting patterns of behavior that, however, are not institutionalized. In other words, they never become self-generating qualitative or cultural continuities. Once the structural factors that generate them are discontinued they cease to exist. I call these associative structural effects or continuities. Most forms of deviant behavior are of this nature. The association of prostitution with the structural forces of poverty is a case in point, well illustrated by their joint history in Cuba. Thus, prostitution was rampant before the revolution, became nearly extinct during the more economically secure decades of Soviet subsidies after the revolution, and then, almost on cue, has rapidly returned with the economic troubles that began after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the termination of its economic aid.

Some scholars who explore the relationship between culture and poverty are basically arguing for what I am here calling associative structural continuities (Rainwater, 1970; Wilson, 1997). At their best, the works of Oscar Lewis (1959, 1966) did make a strong case of such continuities. Problems began only when he and others attempted to make the case that these structurally generated patterns could, and did, become institutionalized, that is, non-associated. There is no dead horse that sociologists and policy analysts love to flog more than this one (Burton, 1992; Katz, 1989; Leacock, 1971; Valentine, 1970). While I do not wish to reprise the debate here, it now seems that the extreme attacks on all attempts to explore the relationship between culture and poverty amounted to sociological overkill and political bias. The truth of the matter is that there are well-documented associations between the structural condition of poverty and distinctive behavioral patterns, a fact acknowledged even by the most severe of critics (Valentine, 1970).

It is not unreasonable to suggest that an associative structural continuity can, under certain circumstances, become non-associative, self-perpetuating cultural continuities. Indeed, it is very likely that this is an important way in which many (non-controversial) cultural patterns originated. What bedevils this debate is the all or nothing approach of both advocates and critics of "the culture of poverty." The term "culture of poverty" should perhaps be avoided, along with its implication that the totality of a class's subculture is entirely the product of class position. But so, too, should the equally totalistic view that no area of the behavior of the poor is a cultural adaptation to their present or former condition that has become self-perpetuating. Some attitudes, and patterns of thought and behavior among some groups – some of which may be problematic, some desirable – may be cultural continuities, or they may simply be associated structural continuities pure and simple, or they may be associated structural continuities in the process of becoming dissociated and institutionalized into cultural continuities. Deciding what they are is a matter for empirical verification, as Herbert Gans (1962: 244; 1965) wisely observed years ago, not something to be decided by theoretical or ideological fiat.

An understanding of the factors accounting for the effects of persisting structures and the ways they are associated with social objects on the surface is best found in fine-grained sociohistorical and field-based studies of localities. Thus, the British social historian, Peter Laslett (1980), and his collaborators, have demonstrated the existence of generations of bastardy in certain parts of England from the Middle Ages through to modern times; a clear case of non-associative, cultured practices growing out of formerly structurally associative ones. In America, the regional sociologists Susan Hanson and Geraldine Pratt (1995) have provided several instances of sustained associative structural effects in their detailed historical geography of the Massachusetts city

of Worcester. For example, they have found a long tradition of deep antipathy toward collective bargaining in Worcester, which stands in stark contrast with vigorous support for trade unions in Boston and other cities of the state. "The Worcester of the past," they argue, "shines through the Worcester of the present," in the presence of a distinctive configuration of structural continuities in Worcester's social economy. These are its ethnic diversity; the plurality of skills and industries that made union organizations difficult; the fact that ethnic and geographic communities have always coincided with occupational differences, creating further problems of union organization; extreme gender segregation at the workplace; and a socially close-knit, politically united business and civic leadership. Closely associated with these structural continuities is a tradition of extreme hostility to unionism on the part of both the local bosses and workers, undermining any kind of working-class solidarity and radical leadership (Hanson and Pratt, 1995).

What is true of Worcester may hold for the ghettos of America. As William Julius Wilson (1997) frequently comments on his years of study of unemployment and joblessness in the African American ghettos of Chicago, there is a world of difference between being unemployed in a neighborhood where the unemployment rate is the national norm of 5 percent, and one in which the vast majority of persons of working age are unemployed. When work disappears, when unemployment persists from generation to generation, a small but significant proportion of those not employed fall from the categories of being unemployed (i.e. with no job but actively seeking one) or discouraged worker (no longer in the labor force but still would like to work) and become unemployable or what Marta Tienda and Haya Stier (1991) call the "shiftless." At that point, and for this small group only, what we are calling a pattern of associative structural effects phases into what begins to look like a weakly institutionalized kind of non-associative continuity, at least in the Chicago communities studied by Tienda and Stier (1991) as well as Wilson (1997). Whether or not such early signs of institutionalization are to be found in other African American ghettos such as those of Boston and New York is a matter for empirical research.

Event continuities

Events figure prominently in all theories of causation and, hence, any explicit or implied notion of continuity. Indeed, for philosophers such as Quine (following Russell) all objects are ultimately held to be constituted entirely by events (Hookway, 1998: 100–104). All this may come as a surprise to most sociologists whose structuralist bias, as Harrison White (1992: 76–77, 135–136) has wryly observed, often leads them to disdain events. However, because of the discipline's transformationist bias, even those scholars who call for greater attention

to events commit the serious error of defining them as sociohistorically important only when they are momentous and are so considered or constructed by agents (Abbott, 1992; Griffen, 1992; Abrams, 1982; Sewell, 1966a, b). This restriction is a serious conceptual flaw, for the simple reason that consequential events are often themselves quite minor and may even be wholly neglected when they occurred. A proper sociological theory of events must allow for the possibility that all events are potentially important.

An important distinction should be made from the start. When we claim that an event is the cause of an outcome we may be referring to the event as a concrete object in its entirety, or as Hart and Honore (1985: ch. 5) have emphasized, to "the *fact* that an event was of a certain type or possessed a certain feature causally relevant to the outcome." The distinction, often referred to as one between token (or singular) and type (or property) causation, has grown in importance among students of causality, controversy focusing on the question of which is more fundamental (Galvotti, 2001). I am inclined to agree with Judea Pearl (2000: 310) that the really important question is "what tangible claims do type and token statements make about our world and how is causal knowledge organized so as to substantiate such claims?" My own view is that this is the fundamental difference between qualitative and positivistic sociologists rather than a preference for the use of statistical methods which are now equally amenable to qualitative and quantitative approaches. Positivists tend to refer to causally relevant attributes of events, in contrast with more cultural and case-oriented sociologists who tend to refer to the entirety of the concrete event as the causal antecedent.

Recent studies of lynching in the post-bellum South well illustrate the distinction. The historical sociologists Stewart Tolnay and E. M. Beck (1992) have recently added to a long line of scholars who have treated lynching as a recurring series of events. However, there are many detailed treatments of particular lynchings which explore them as complex, unique social objects (McGovern, 1982). And I, along with others, have recently examined them comparatively as cultural objects, attempting to uncover their quasi-permanent qualities and internal structure (Patterson, 1998).

It is interesting that the one major attempt at theorizing continuity in the social sciences emphasizes events rather than social objects. Unfortunately, Alexander Gerschenkron's (1968) classic paper betrays not only his economist disciplinary bias in that he has nothing to say about the kinds of cultural and structural continuities we have discussed so far, but a disquieting subjectivism. "At all times and in all cases," he asserts, "continuity must be regarded as a tool forged by the historian rather than something inherently and invariably contained in the historical matter" (Gerschenkron, 1968: 38). Concentrating on the problems of continuity and discontinuity in economic change, he distinguishes between

five ways in which we use the term continuity. It may mean simply growth or constancy of direction, such as the development of institutions and ideas; or the periodic recurrence over time such as cycles and stages in which the causal mechanism from one stage to another remains constant; or endogeneity, which largely derives from the scholar's approach to his material; or length of causal regress, meaning continuity as a long causal chain.

It is the fifth meaning that most interests him, namely, continuity as stability of the rate of change in things such as price and national income, and he focuses on constancy of a low rate of change. Discontinuity then, means an increase in the rate of change from previously low levels. Although Gerschenkron has many useful insights to offer, on some of which we will draw later, this view of continuity is far too narrow, even for the domain of economic events. Continuities in events are found not only in constant rates, but in the variance profiles of regular recurrences. There is, for example, a variation of seasons each year; but the unfailing regularity of their variation comes as close to our notion of a continuity as anything else, and it is odd that Gerschenkron would want to exclude these from our conception of continuity.

Continuities underlying recurring events Let us begin with the standard distinction between recurring and unique events. Both may entail continuities, though in different ways.

Continuities are found in the patterns that underlie the surface rates and direction of recurring events. This is true even of the trends and cycles uncovered in the time-domain approach which employs models that attempt to predict the present as a regression on the past, although what emerges from such studies is an admittedly weak version of continuity. We are on surer footing with frequency domain approaches which attempt to explain the behavior of the series in terms of underlying periodic and structural variations in some other phenomena driving it (Shumway and Stoffer, 2000). When, for example, we explore whether there is an underlying warming trend in global temperature measurements, we are searching for continuities beneath the surface variations of the climate. Similarly, continuous cycles in the price of cotton in the American South during the first half of the century persistently drove the rate at which African American men were lynched.

However, there are major potential pitfalls in the use of time-series events, involving a distortion of history as a temporal process and of any meaningful notion of continuity. Larry Isaac and Larry Griffin (1989) have drawn our attention to these problems, although they themselves go on to commit a serious error in their remarks concerning the nature of continuity. After reviewing a large number of such studies in sociology and economics they concluded that nearly all these studies work with a wholly ahistorical conception of time.

Among the many historical and methodological problems noted by Isaac and Griffin in what are often considered landmark studies in historical sociology are: neglecting the time-ordered nature of the series' units in their treatment of missing data; unwarranted linearity in their estimation equations; obviating the search for time-sensitive parameter estimates by the usually untenable assumption that time-series coefficients are stable over the entire period – sometimes spanning a century and a half – for which their equations are estimated; arbitrarily "slicing into" history and ending the series at the convenience of the researcher in wanton disregard for the substantive significance of the starting and ending dates in question; and using coefficients from one part of the series to "predict" values in the dependent variable in another stretch of the series in total disregard for sometimes major structural changes that have taken place between the two stretches of time in question.

I fully endorse these criticisms by Isaac and Griffin (1989) as well as their plea for the historicization of quantitative methodology, for taking periodization and structural context seriously, and for sensitivity to the play of the contingent in history. I also agree with them that this is not a problem of quantitative analysis, per se, but of ahistorical theorizing and often improper statistical procedures.

However, Griffin and Isaac undermine an otherwise excellent paper by completely confusing continuity with ahistoricism, failing to see how change and continuity are inextricably linked. Ahistoricism, they assert incorrectly, is manifested "in the emphasis on the continuity of history or the history of continuity. Here history is conceived to be the continual unfolding of the same underlying historical communality. Such a preoccupation with the continuity between past and present tends to homogenize or average away the difference between 'then and there' and 'here and now'" (Griffin and Isaac, 1989: 876). With such a naive and distorted view of continuity – as simply the absence of change – it is no wonder that Isaac and Griffin are convinced that the goal of historical sociology is to "explain social change" (1989: 882). Second, their position fails to acknowledge the role of underlying structural continuities beneath surface changes. Third, they are unaware of how causal processes can establish continuous links between wholly different objects, assuming that continuity must mean continuity of the same thing or of recurring events.

Continuities from non-recurring events: path-dependency Continuities emerge from non-recurring events in two ways: through the persisting effects of initial events or, more properly, initial sequences of events, on the later course of events, better known as path-dependency; and through the operation of causal chains. This sub-section discusses path-dependency; the next takes up the role of continuity in causal chains.

"A path-dependent process," writes a leading authority on the subject (David, 1993), is one in which systems "cannot shake off the effects of past events," and the task of the researcher is to understand "the reasons why particular sequences of events in the past are capable of exerting persisting effects upon current conditions; [of] how adventitious, seemingly transient actions may become so magnified as to exercise a controlling (and sometimes pernicious) influence over matters of far greater economic and social significance." The classic example from economic history is the QWERTY keyboard layout, which is a relatively inefficient system that was deliberately designed to slow down typing speed by the early producers of the typewriter. Nonetheless, we are locked into the old technology and still continue to use this system (David, 1995). Other examples are the choice and persistence of water-cooled instead of gas-cooled nuclear reactors, the concentration of particular industries in certain cities, such as the auto industry in Detroit, and the adoption of the VHS over the more efficient Sony BETA format in VCRs.

Economic historians became interested in path-dependent systems because it appears to contradict a few well-established economic principles, although such claims have recently been strongly contested or qualified. Competitive market forces fail to reward and select out the most efficient technology due to the switching costs of learning and installing the better system. And the law of diminishing returns is upended by what appears to be an inertial network effect: people adopt the technology because many people already know how to use it; and because many people are comfortable with it, producers stick with it. Economists refer to these feedback effects as network externalities, the triumph of the crash-prone Microsoft operating system being the favorite modern example (Garrouste and Ioannides, 2001; Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995; Magnusson and Ottosson, 1997; North, 1997).

It is important to understand that path-dependency means more than is implied by the phrase, "history matters," or even that given patterns of behavior are outcomes of their past. This is all true, but trite. It is, rather, a stochastic process in which the outcome is strongly determined or "locked in" by initiating conditions, and in which each point or branch in the sequence of events leading to the outcome is a function of previous transition states of the system. This is what is meant by calling it a non-ergodic process – each transient state is unique and the outcome is unpredictable, the classic instance being the evolutionary process in biology (David, 2001). Two other features of such processes are to be noted. One is extreme sensitivity to small changes in the originating variables, a process best known to sociologists in tipping point patterns of ethnosomatic ("racial") segregation, where one move by a Euro-American or African American can result in white flight and the "catastrophic" transition of a neighborhood. The other is irreversibility: once the selection process is

completed it is locked in and can usually only be changed by concerted public action – which is why Microsoft had to be sued by the government.

While path-dependency processes are more clearly recognizable with economic data, they are found in all areas of social life and have attracted considerable interest among political scientists and historical sociologists. However, there is a real danger among non-economists of claiming to identify path-dependent processes where none exists; that is, of confusing it with what amounts to ordinary cultural processes. Thus, I wholly disagree with Lars Magnusson and Jan Ottosson (1997: 1–9) that path-dependency can be identified as "genuine rule following" whether in the form of the selection of information in situations of uncertainty or just plain, inertial rule-following independent of situational constraints. Rule-following is the essential feature of what we have earlier called qualitative continuities. It is what happens when behavior becomes normative and what makes cultural complexes self-reproducing. Thus the persistence of the British system of measurement in the USA and UK instead of the more efficient metric system is not, as is often claimed, a path-dependent outcome, but a straightforward cultural persistence (Grabher, 1995).

So far, I have emphasized the need to distinguish path-dependent from purely cultural processes. However, path-dependent processes can become cultural and often do. What is the difference? When the practice in question is learned behavior that is passed down from one generation to the next. This is what happened with the QWERTY typewriter layout. It may now be happening with the Microsoft operating system. These can sometimes be of long duration as Avner Greif (1998) shows in his study of the cultural orientations of Maghribi and Genoese merchants during in the late Middle Ages. In the contemporary world, the plantation economy is a classic path-dependent outcome of Caribbean economic history which, as many noted Caribbean economists have shown, is now a powerful cultural model that continues to shape and explain many of the problems and failures of industrialization in the region. So powerful is it, that it has survived nearly a half century of a communist "revolution" in Cuba that began with the explicit aim of removing all traces of the plantation and its humiliating vestiges of slavery (Beckford, 1972, 1975).

Non-recurring events: direct causal chains Let us now consider the final way in which events are implicated in continuities. If an event, Y, in a later period can be shown to be the outcome of a series of non-recurring events initiated by an event, X, in an earlier period, we are entitled to claim that a continuity exists between them. The continuity, which may be direct or hierarchical, is constituted by the causal chain that links them.

Let me give an example. The radical cultural transformation of Jamaica during the 1970s may seem to have absolutely nothing to do with the Italian

fascist conquest of Ethiopia in the 1930s (Barrett, 1997; Brodber and Greene, 1981; Chevannes, 1995; Nettleford, 1972). Nonetheless, this brutal imperial conquest, and the exile of the young and attractive Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia suddenly thrust the formerly obscure African kingdom and its monarch into prominence. Lower-class Afro-Jamaicans of the 1930s, who had suffered centuries of British slavery, colonialism, and denigration of all things African, and were then going through mass unemployment during the worst years of the Great Depression (which devastated the Caribbean sugar industry), suddenly learned that there was a great and ancient kingdom in Africa with an emperor who claimed a lineage that not only far surpassed that of the British colonial emperor in ancestry, but also traced its roots back to the biblical Queen of Sheba. It was not long before a cult of the emperor emerged among the Afro-Jamaican poor, and then a syncretic, millenarian religion blending elements of Hebrew Old Testament history with its emphasis on exile with a new vision of Ethiopia as an earthly heaven and the emperor as a living God.

Like many millenarian cults, it survived a major crisis during the late 1950s when prophecy failed and the Emperor did not turn up to take them back on the day appointed by their local leader (Patterson, 1964, 1965). The cult attracted many of the newly emerging popular singers of the late 1950s and early 1960s, most notably Bob Marley and his group, the Wailers. Its close identification with reggae music and the success of that music internationally finally won the admiration of radical middle-class political leaders, especially Michael Manley, son of one of the founding fathers of the Jamaican nation. Reggae singers and the Rastafarian cult were a decisive factor in the political victory of Michael Manley's party in the 1972 elections (Waters, 1989). In repaying his political debt to the cult, Manley not only gave it the legitimacy it sought (it was, for example, allowed equal free time on the National radio station with the established churches) but encouraged a massive rehabilitation of Jamaican cultural symbols, shifting from its traditional bias in favor of cultural complexes of British ancestry as well as light complexion, to a celebration of Africa, the African heritage, and dark complexion, in Jamaica (Anglès, 1994; Panton, 1993). We have, in this way, established a causal chain between the radical, left-wing cultural revolution of Jamaica in the 1970s and the conquest of Ethiopia during the 1930s.

This kind of continuity is similar to what Gerschenkron (1968: 29) called the causal regress, and his qualifications about when it is appropriate are worth repeating. First, to be meaningful, it should entail "more than simply the fact that the existence of any given complex of events at any given time can be conceived as having been occasioned by events preceding it in time," since such connections are "inherent in the very concept of history" (Gerschenkron, 1968: 29–30). To go beyond such truisms, the historian must make the "concrete"

research decision to "single out a certain occurrence as the 'beginning' of the causal chain . . . In all cases it will be his task to make the selection plausible in terms of the specific strength of the cause chain that is attached, link by link, to the 'original' cause. He will have to show how it compares and intertwines with other chains that run in the same direction" (Gerschenkron, 1968: 29–30). In other words, all good counterfactual explanations must be guided by an explicitly developed theory or argument. In doing so, Hart and Honore's criterion of relativity to the contexts of both the case in question and the perspective of the enquiry is decisive. For example, I did not go back to the founding of fascism in Italy because it was irrelevant to my inquiry. But that was the easy part. More problematic is the fact that I could have traced the causal tree much farther back in Jamaican history. For example, I could have decided that the denigration of things African in colonial Jamaica and the yearning of lower-class Afro-Jamaicans for pride in something African had to be explained, in which case the chain would have had to go all the way back to the introduction of slavery in Jamaica during the seventeenth century.

Quite apart from the question of where to begin the historical chain, however, is the more serious problem of competing theories. There was, for example, a long tradition of cultural nationalism in Jamaica, which increased in momentum with independence in 1962, having its roots in intellectual and artistic circles that were independent of the Rastafarian movement. This other movement had close links to the People's National Party of Michael Manley, his own mother, the British-born sculptor Edna Manley, being a powerful early force in its development. A counterfactual argument could be made for a causal chain running along strongly bourgeois nationalist lines to some point in the forties as the source of the cultural revolution of the 1970s in Jamaica. Michael Manley's family background and his education at the radical London School of Economics where he came under the influence of the liberal radical thinker, Harold Laski, and the British trade union movement, were sufficient to account for his radical leanings. His promotion of lower-class Afro-Jamaican culture, in this scenario, was more determined by astute political calculations.

In spite of the enormous popularity of backward causal chains, their complexity and potential precariousness are not often appreciated. Every node on such chains involves a counterfactual open to challenge. Might the Jamaican working classes have discovered Ethiopia and developed the cult of Selassie without the fascist invasion of Ethiopia? Would Manley have won the culturally decisive election of 1972 without the strong support of the reggae singers and culture-conscious urban lumpenproletariat? A reasonable case could be made for any of these counterfactuals.

These problems are even more acute when we are dealing with complex chains. An extreme case in point is Fernand Braudel's (1985–87) huge and

unwieldy three-volume study of Mediterranean civilization and the rise of capitalism between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries. This elaborate study might serve as a classic example of how not to explore the continuities of history through elaborate causal chains, every node and branch of which stands open to question (Tilly, 1984: 65–74).

Commemorative or "invented" continuities

We come finally to the problem of invented continuities, which is peculiar to the social universe. People are not only conscious of their past and very concerned about how it is interpreted, but are highly invested in the notion that there is continuity between them and their ancestors, as well as between their lives now and life as lived in the past. This raises important epistemic as well as ontic issues pertaining to history and collective memory (David, 1988: 13–14).

There is a lively tradition of scholarship on collective memory, going back to Halbwachs (1980), which we do not have the space to discuss here at any length. Barry Schwartz (1996) recently distinguished between two broad bodies of research. There is, first, a strongly instrumentalist tradition which sees collective memory as an ever changing construction that serves the interests of the present generation. Commemorative icons, official histories, historic parks and monuments, holidays and other ritualized occasions, as well as what Connerton (1989) calls bodily practices are adapted to the needs of each generation. At its most extreme, this view sees the past as a malleable resource completely at the mercy of present needs and values. The second body of scholarship is no less constructionist, differing mainly in its view that there are competing constructions of collective memory rather than the generalized memory of the Halbwachs School. There are two strands of this second school: one approaches the subject from a neo-Marxian, conflict perspective, best represented by Eric Hobsbawm (1992) and his associates in their studies of the invention of tradition in British society. The second is a pluralist branch which sees collective memories emerging from a diversity of cross-cutting interests. Perhaps the best example of this branch is Joseph Rhea's (1997) excellent study (published after Schwartz's review) of the struggle for collective cultural representation by America's ethno-racial minorities.

I wish to draw attention to the two main ways in which the problem of collective memory intersects with those raised by the study of continuities. The first is the potential tension between native and scholarly claims of continuity; the second has to do with the treatment of collective memory itself as a kind of continuity.

First, invented continuities constitute one (problematic) means of collective commemoration and it is important that we distinguish it from other such means

as well as cultural processes in general. Most of the ways in which societies collectively remember, and what they select for commemoration, present no special problem for the historian or historical sociologist, as Alon Confino (1977) recently emphasized. In other words, selectively idealizing and mythologizing the past is a normal cultural process, true of all societies. We either suspend disbelief in such matters, or see them as belonging to the domain of faith and belief and not subject to the dictates of reason. For these and other reasons, I have serious problems with Hobsbawm's (1992: 2–3) view of invented tradition, as "a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past." The problem with this definition and Hobsbawm's subsequent attempt to defend it, is that it applies to pretty nearly all areas of culture and fails to discriminate a meaningful analytic set. All enduring social customs seek "the sanction of precedent, social continuity and natural law as expressed in history" (Hobsbawm, 1992: 2). Least persuasive of all is the argument that invented traditions differ in "the use of ancient materials to construct invented traditions of a novel type for quite novel purposes" (Hobsbawm 1992: 6). The adaptation of old traditions to new uses is an important and long-recognized aspect of all cultural life, in all periods. All secular and religious pageantry is collective play and ritual, and an element of make-believe is always involved. It really does not matter whether the cultural objects used on such occasions are historically accurate or have been culturally decontextualized. There is a willing suspension of disbelief on such occasions and the question of invention is simply inappropriate in our consideration of them.

To be sure, the historian has an obligation to distinguish between fact and dogma, both in his or her interpretation of secular history as well as in accounts of the history of the religion in question (Scholem, 1971). The distinction becomes especially important where believers over-reach and attempt to impose their dogmas as historical truth on non-believers, for example, the attempt of some Southern fundamentalists to teach the biblical version of creation instead of, or as an alternate theory of, evolution.

What then is left of invented traditions? What category of cultural life can be meaningfully included under such a category? My view is that the term is non-redundant and analytically useful only in reference to those cases where a set of *secular* practices and beliefs are defined by their practitioners as traditional and demonstrably false claims are made about their past, especially about the continuity of the tradition from a previous period of practice. In such cases we are no longer willing to suspend disbelief about claims of authenticity. If we are actors or participants of the practice, we believe them to be true, or have been duped into believing them to be authentic, and are offended if someone

questions their authenticity. If we are not practitioners, we are offended by the deception and cry fraud. When, further, such beliefs are presented as the authentic record of history rather than fanciful idealizations or mythmaking and are taught in schools as true history, we have a fully developed invented tradition.

One of the case studies in Hobsbawm's and Ranger's (1992) collection satisfies this narrowed definition, and indeed may be viewed as paradigmatic. This is the Highland tradition of Scotland, which Trevor-Roper shows to be shot through with fraudulent claims and deceptions, *especially about history and continuity*. The whole thing was a "retrospective invention," in which the history of the relation between Ireland and Scotland was completely inverted, "culminating in the claim that Scotland – Celtic Scotland – was the 'mother nation' and Ireland the cultural dependency" which is the complete opposite of the historical facts (Trevor-Roper, 1992: 14). Not only was history fraudulently "stolen from the Irish," but even the most distinctive and symbolically cherished artifact of Highland culture – the kilt – turns out not to be of ancient Scottish origin, but something dreamt up by an enterprising English Quaker from Lancashire sometime during the 1720s! A modern, American example is the Afrocentric interpretation of African American history which advocates have succeeded in imposing on several of the nation's secondary school systems.

There is a second way in which the study of continuities intersect with that of collective memory. We can treat the processes of collective memory like any other cultural process and then ask whether there are continuities and discontinuities in them. In so doing, however, we step right into one of the most heated controversies in collective memory studies. As we previously noted, scholars working in the Halbwachs tradition are inclined to see the processes of collective memory to be themselves in flux, beliefs about the past changing from one generation to the next. Another group of scholars, however, tracing their ancestry back to Durkheim, have insisted that societies can maintain their identity and stability only by preserving some continuity in their conceptions of the past and this is achieved "by periodic commemoration rites whose function is not to transform the past by bending it to serve the present, but to reproduce the past, to make it live as it once did" (Schwartz, 1991). People need an "available past" that is stable and self-sustaining as well as an enduring "constitutive narrative" if they are to constitute a viable "community of memory" (Schudson, 1989: 222).

Schwartz nicely adjudicates between these two extremes in coming to a position similar to what we have advocated earlier in this chapter. He shows how the commemoration of George Washington over the centuries has changed in some respects from one period to another to meet changing collective needs, and yet there were striking continuities across generations having "a logic and

force of [their] own," that undermine the radical constructionist position. There is no anomaly in the simultaneity of continuity and change for, as we have seen, it is normal for cultural processes to change even while maintaining their identities: in the commemoration of Washington "there remains an assemblage of old beliefs coexisting with the new, including old beliefs about the past itself" (Schwartz, 1991: 234). The extreme constructionists and advocates of generational change have badly underestimated "the present's carrying power," Schwartz correctly observes, and have failed "to see that the same present can sustain different memories and that different presents can sustain the same memory" (Schwartz, 1991: 234).

This eloquent statement holds true not only for the objects and processes of collective memory, but for all cultural objects and processes, and I can think of no better way to segue into my own final remarks.

Conclusions

In this chapter I have drawn attention to the dimension of continuity in social analysis. I have argued that the neglect of and ingrained bias against this subject are the result of ignorance about the nature and mechanisms of continuity and the necessary relationship between continuity and change.

One of the main reasons for the misunderstanding of continuity is the limited view that it is primarily about the persistence of identity or of similar objects between periods. While this is certainly an important kind of continuity, I have shown that it is only one of several ways in which continuities exist over time. Further, I emphasized that identity through time does not mean the persistence of an essence, or a fixed set of attributes, but rather a "time-laden" stream of potentially changeable attributes with a quasi-permanent internal causal (relational) structure.

It may be objected, at this point, that if continuities are basically causal processes (other than cultural objects), then they appear to be nothing more than traditional explanations in sociology. This is an easily made error because of the common misconception, especially among quantitative sociologists, that most explanations in the discipline are causal. In fact, they are not. Sociologists have come to rely heavily on statistical models that predict dependent or outcome variables based on patterns of association in non-experimental data. A prediction, especially one based on atemporal data, is not a causal statement. As Clogg and Haritou – among others – (Clogg and Haritou, 1997; Kim and Ferree Jr., 1981) have recently reemphasized: "Finding models that predict well or fit the data well has little or nothing to do with estimating the presence, absence, or size of causal effects" (Clogg and Haritou, 1997: 110). To their credit, mainstream neo-classical economists have long recognized the importance of the distinction

between models that are functional relations between variables in which effects are mathematically derived from ahistorical independent variables, on the one hand, and models that explain an effect as the outcome of a causal process, on the other; and at least since Milton Friedman have explicitly embraced the former over the latter (Cowan and Rizzo, 1996).

I would like to conclude by emphasizing a few practical implications of what I have just summarized. First, now that we understand how attributes may change, even as identities persist, we should be careful how quickly we dismiss the operation of continuities simply on the basis of appearances. The more quasi-permanent internal causal structure may remain stable, even when one or more attributes of an identity has either been shed or ceases to be important. I have shown elsewhere, for example, that, between the period of slavery and late into the share-cropping era, many of the cultural complexes of slavery persisted in the attitudes and practices of Euro-Americans and African Americans and in their interactions; and, indeed, that several of these cultural complexes persist to this day. We often fail to recognize these because in many cases a persisting cultural complex may be expressed in behavioral attributes that seem very different from those that appeared important in the earlier period (Patterson, 1998). The fact that African Americans had high marriage rates during the share-cropping period, in contrast with their currently low marriage rates, does not prove that there was a decisive break with the gender and familial relations of the slave past, as is so often simple-mindedly claimed by sociologists and historians of the African American family. Marriage is merely one attribute of the complex of cultural relations that constitute gender and familial patterns. Furthermore, behind these changes may have been powerful persisting environmental forces (for example, racism, economic and cultural exclusion, and the relentless effort to emasculate, and demonize, the African American male, all originating in, and bearing the mark of slavery) and equally powerful persisting cultural models learned while surviving the brutal challenges of the slave period. Examples include: the importance of paternity in defining manhood and the refusal to consider resources in making the decision to have a child, among men; and the absolute importance of motherhood in giving meaning and purpose to life, and to ensure racial survival, among women. What is true of African Americans, is also true of Euro-American Southerners, among whom slavery was an equally powerful "molder of peculiarly southern attitudes and social development," and of deeply ingrained continuities, as Carl Degler (1977) and others have shown. We also saw how the seeming changes in the economic situation of women over several centuries masked powerful underlying continuities in occupational status, skill level, and relative income.

Second, it should now be clear that when we ask a question such as how the institution of slavery influenced some area of modern life, the answer is

not necessarily found in the identification of cultural patterns that are similar to those found during the period of slavery. Continuities may, and usually do, exist where there are no similarities in cultural objects. This is because of the operation of continuities through causal chains. By these means, one cultural complex or event in one period can have a relation of continuity with an entirely different object or type of event in a later period. In the case of path-dependent processes we have seen how practices in a later period can remain trapped in an irreversible zone of reinforcing externalities that are the outcome of a wholly adventitious sequence of initiating events in an earlier period. The economies and industrial relations of modern Jamaica and Cuba are profoundly different from the plantation economies and labor relations of the slave past; yet, it is possible to demonstrate striking causal chains of continuity between past and present. A recent study of labor relations in Jamaica, for example, finds attitudes toward managers and authority in the workplace which can be traced directly back in a dismal causal chain through the post-emancipation plantation system to the patterns prevailing during slavery (Carter, 1977).

Third, in the discussion of structural continuities I drew attention to the special problem of the extent to which sociocultural objects are associated with them (are therefore structurally induced) or have become non-associated and self-perpetuating. It is hoped that my discussion of the nature of cultural objects will be of some use here. A good deal of the heat surrounding discussions of the so-called "culture of poverty" springs from simple-minded notions of cultural processes, as well as equally simplistic ideas about cultural and structural continuities. By now it should be clear that there is nothing static about cultural processes, that indeed they often change faster than structural ones.

Ironically, many sociologists and social historians imagine that an analysis which finds that behavior is structurally associated is more "progressive" than one which suggests non-association and self-sustaining identity. But the opposite, we now see, may well be the case. It is much harder to change structural processes and continuities than cultural ones. Thus, in a single generation the vast, oppressive system of cultural complexes we know as Southern Jim Crow – from institutions of legal repression to gratuitous petty insults – was undermined and largely removed. But the class system of the South continues, indeed has grown more entrenched judging by recent figures on inequality of income – with class divisions among African Americans greater than among Euro-Americans.

I close by emphasizing what should already have been apparent. My objective has not been to downplay the role or importance of change in human affairs and history. I do not seek to replace one bias with another, but to restore some balance to our attempts at understanding how the past matters. Change and continuity are two sides of the same temporal coin, whether we approach the

matter psychologically or philosophically or historically. Psychologists have long known that our sense of time comes from both the things that happen in time and the intervals between them (Fraise, 1964: ch. 5). Change entails the end of a continuity and hence the persistence of some object that sheds or acquires one or more (or sometimes all) properties. The two are so intimately bound up, so constitutive of each other, that there is a danger of circularity when we try too hard to decipher them apart from each other. "Time is not just an abstract beast," complains the philosopher Newton-Smith, "but also is a most promiscuous beast who regularly couples with equally elusive partners," such as change, entropy, continuity, and causality (1980).

These are very big issues, which we will gladly leave to the philosophers. For practical intellectual purposes, historians and sociologists will do well to remember what the historical sociologist, Berkhofer (1969: 238–239), wisely observed many years ago, that "the analysis of change in the fullest sense must . . . involve a study of continuity," and that "this would seem to mean that change as sequence must be measured against continuity as setting and duration" (Berkhofer 1969: 238–239).

Notes

I would like to thank Professors John Mohr, Steven Pinker, and Ann Swidler for their extremely valuable comments and criticisms of earlier drafts of this chapter. All remaining deficiencies, however, are entirely my own.

1. In a personal communication, Paul DiMaggio has, with his usual graciousness, acknowledged that their paper "focused on the diffusion of particular structures while bracketing the issue of identity, touching upon it only lightly through the notion of 'legitimacy.'"

References

- Abbott, Andrew. 1992. "From Causes to Events." *Sociological Methods and Research* 20:428–453.
1999. *Department and Discipline*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Abrams, Philip. 1982. *Historical Sociology*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Alexander, Jeffrey C. and Philip Smith. 1993. "The Discourse of American Civil Society: A New Proposal for Cultural Studies." *Theory and Society* 22:151–207.
- Alter, Jonathan. 1997. "The Long Shadow of Slavery." *Newsweek* December 8.
- Anglès, Eric, Chris Hensley, and Denis-Constant Martin. 1994. *Les tambours de Jah et les sirènes de Babylone: rastafarisme et reggae dans la société jamaïcaine*. Paris: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques; Centre d'Études et de Recherches Internationales.
- Armstrong, D. M. 1980. "Identity Through Time," in Peter Van Inwagen, ed. *Time and Cause*. Boston, MA: D. Reidel Publishing. Pp. 67–78.
- Barrett, Leonard. 1997. *The Rastafarians*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- Bazzoli, Laure and Veronique Dutraive. 1999. "The Legacy of J. R. Commons' Conception of Economics as a Science of Behavior," in John Groenewegen and Jack Vromen, eds. *Institutions and the Evolutionary Capitalism*. Pp. 52–77.
- Beckford, George. 1972. *Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in Plantation Economies of the Third World*. New York: Oxford University Press.
1975. *The Caribbean Economy: Dependence and Backwardness*. Mona, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research.
- Bennett, Judith M. 1996. *Ale, Beer and Brewsters in England: Women's Work in a Changing World, 1300–1600*. New York: Oxford University Press.
1997. "Confronting Continuity." *The Journal of Women's History* 9/3:73–94.
- Berger, Peter and Thomas Luckmann. 1967. *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge*. New York: Anchor Books.
- Berkhofer, Jr., Robert F. 1969. *A Behavioral Approach to Historical Analysis*. New York: Free Press.
- Bielby, W. T. and J. N. Baron. 1984. "A Woman's Place is With Other Women," in B. F. Reskins, ed. *Sex Segregation in the Workplace: Trends, Explanations and Remedies*. Washington: National Academy Press. Pp. 27–55.
- Boyd, Robert and Peter J. Richerson. 1988. *Culture and the Evolutionary Process*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Braudel, Fernand. 1985–1987. *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Century*. 3 vols. New York: Harper and Row.
- Brinton, Mary C. and Takehiko Kariya. 1998. "Institutional Embeddedness in Japanese Labor Markets," in Mary C. Brinton and Victor Nee, eds. *The New Institutionalism in Sociology*. New York: Russell Sage. Pp. 181–207.
- Brodber, Erna and J. Edward Greene. 1981. *Reggae and Cultural Identity in Jamaica*. St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago: Department of Sociology.
- Burger, Thomas. 1976. *Max Weber's Theory of Concept Formation*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Burton, C. Emory. 1992. *The Poverty Debate*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Carter, Kenneth. 1997. *Why Workers Won't Work*. London: Macmillan.
- Chevannes, Barry. 1995. *Rastafari: Roots and Ideology*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Clogg, Clifford and Adamantios Haritou. 1997. "The Regression Method of Causal Inference and a Dilemma Confronting This Method," in Vaughn R. McKim and Stephen P. Turner, eds. *Causality in Crisis*. P. 110.
- Coleman, D. C. 1977. *The Economy of England, 1450–1750*. London, England: Oxford University Press.
- Collins, John. 2000. "Preemptive Prevention." *The Journal of Philosophy* 97:223–234.
- Confino, Alon. 1977. "Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method." *American Historical Review* 102:1386–1403.
- Connerton, Paul. 1989. *How Societies Remember*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Cowan, Robin and Mario Rizzo. 1996. "The Genetic-Causal Tradition and Modern Economic Theory." New York University, C.V. Starr Center – Working Paper 9529.
- D'Andrade, Roy. 1995. *The Development of Cognitive Anthropology*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Dahrendorf, Ralf. 1965. *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- David, Paul A. 2001. "Path Dependence, Its Critics, and the Quest for 'Historical Economics,'" in Garrouste and Ioannides, eds. *Evolution and Path Dependence in Economic Ideas*. Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar. Pp. 15–40.
- David, Paul. 1985. "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY." *The American Economic Review* 75/2:332–337.
1988. "Path Dependence: Putting the Past Into The Future of Economics." Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, Technical Report No. 533.
1993. "Historical Economics in the Longrun: Some Implications of Path-Dependence," in G. D. Snooks, ed. *Historical Analysis in Economics*. London: Routledge. Pp. 29–40.
- Degler, Carl N. 1977. *Place over Time: The Continuity of Southern Distinctiveness*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press.
- DiMaggio, Paul and Walter W. Powell. 1983. "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields." *American Sociological Review* 48:148.
- Dobbin, Frank. 1994. *Forging Industrial Policy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Douglas, Mary. 1966. *Purity and Danger*. London: Routledge.
1986. *How Institutions Think*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Elster, Jon. 1978. *Logic and Society: Contradiction and Possible Worlds*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Emmet, Dorothy. 1966. *Rules, Roles and Relations*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Fligstein, Neil. 2001. *The Architecture of Markets*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Fraisse, Paul. 1964. *The Psychology of Time*. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode.
- Galvotti, Maria. 2001. "Causality, Mechanisms and Manipulation," in Maria Galvotti, Patrick Suppes, and Domenico Constantini, eds. *Stochastic Causality*, Stanford, CA: CSLI Publication. Pp. 1–13.
- Gans, Herbert. 1962. *The Urban Villagers*. New York: Macmillan.
1965. "Subcultures and Class," in Louis Ferman, et al. *Poverty In America*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Garrouste, Pierre and Stavros Ioannides, eds. 2001. *Evolution and Path Dependence in Economic Ideas*. Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar.
- Gerschenkron, Alexander. 1968. "On the Concept of Continuity in History," in Gerschenkron, ed., *Continuity in History and Other Essays*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Pp. 11–39.
- Goodenough, Ward. 1989. "Culture: Concept and Phenomenon," in Morris Freilich, ed. *The Relevance of Culture*. New York: Bergin and Garvey. Pp. 93–97.
- Grabher, G. 1995. "The Elegance of Incoherence: Economic Transformation in East Germany and Hungary," in E. Dittrich, Gert Schmidt, and Richard Whitley, eds. *Industrial Transformation in Europe*. London: Sage.
- Granovetter, Mark. 1985. "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness." *American Journal of Sociology* 91:481–510.
1998. "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," in Mary C. Brinton and Victor Nee, eds. *The New Institutionalism in Sociology*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Pp. 77–104.
- Griffen, Larry. 1992. "Temporality, Events, and Explanation in Historical Sociology." *Sociological Methods and Research*. 20:403–427.
- Groenewegen, John and Jack Vromen. 1999. "Implications of Evolutionary Economics: Theory, Method and Policies," in Groenewegen and Vromen, eds. *Institutions and the Evolution of Capitalism: Implications of Evolutionary Economics*. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. Pp. 1–16.
- Grusky, D. B. and J. B. Sorensen. 1998. "Can Class Analysis Be Salvaged?" *American Journal of Sociology*. 103:1187–1234.
- Hacking, Ian. 1999. *The Social Construction of What?* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Halbwachs, Maurice. 1980. *The Collective Memory*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Hall, J. R., ed. 1997. *Reworking Class*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Hall, Peter and David Soskice. 2001. "Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism," in Peter Hall and David Soskice, eds. *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hannan, Michael T. 1992. "Rationality and Robustness in Multilevel Systems," in James S. Coleman and Thomas Fararo, eds. *Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and Critique*. New York: Sage Publications. Pp. 120–136.
- Hanson, Susan and Geraldine Pratt. 1995. *Gender, Work and Space*. New York: Routledge.
- Hart, H. L. A. and Tony Honore. 1985. *Causation in the Law*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Hausman, Daniel. 1998. *Causal Asymmetries*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hobsbawm, Eric. 1992. "Introduction," in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Hobsbawm, Eric and Terence Ranger. 1992. *The Invention of Tradition*. New York, Cambridge University Press.
- Hookway, Christopher. 1988. *Quine: Language, Experience and Reality*. Polity Press.
- Ikegami, Eiko. 1997. *The Taming of the Samurai*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Isaac, Larry W. and Larry J. Griffin. 1989. "Ahistoricism in Time-Series Analyses of Historical Process: Critique, Redirection, and Illustrations from U.S. Labor History." *American Sociological Review* 54:873–890.
- Jencks, Christopher and Meredith Phillips, eds. 1998. *The Black White Test Score Gap*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

- Jepperson, Ronald L. 1991. "Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism," in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds. *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Pp. 143-161.
- Katz, Michael. 1989. *The Undeserving Poor*. New York: Pantheon.
- Keesing, Roger. 1987. "Models, 'Folk' and 'Cultural': Paradigm Regained," in Dorothy Holland and Naomi Quinn, eds. *Cultural Models in Language and Thought*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kenny, David. 1979. *Correlation and Causality*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Kim, Jae-On and G. Donald Ferree, Jr. 1981. "Standardization in Causal Analysis," in Peter Marsden, ed. *Linear Models in Social Research*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Pp. 22-43.
- Krempel, Lothar. 1990. "Interpersonal Structure and Contact," in Jeroen Weesie and Henk Flap, eds. *Social Networks Through Time*. Utrecht: ISOR. Pp. 65-90.
- Laslett, Peter, ed. 1980. *Bastardy and its Comparative History*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Leacock, Eleanor Burke, ed. 1971. *The Culture of Poverty: A Critique*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Leff, Gordon. 1971. *History and Social Theory*. New York: Anchor Books.
- Levine, Lawrence. 1978. *Black Culture and Black Consciousness: Afro-American Folk Thought from Slavery to Freedom*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lewis, David. 1973. *Counterfactuals*. Oxford: Blackwell.
1983. "Survival and Identity," *Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1*. New York: Oxford University Press.
2000. "Causation as Influence," *Journal of Philosophy* 97:182-197.
- Lewis, Oscar. 1959. *Five Families: Mexican Case Studies in the Culture of Poverty*. New York: Basic Books.
1966. "The Culture of Poverty," *Scientific American* 215:19-25.
- Liebertson, Stanley. 1980. *Piece of the Pie*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
1985. *Making it Count*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
1997. "The Big Broad Issues in Society and Social History," in V. R. McKim and Stephen P. Turner, eds. *Causality in Crisis?* Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Pp. 378-379.
- Liebowitz, S. J. and S. E. Margolis. 1995. "Path Dependence, Lock-In and History," *The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 11:205-226.
- Lillrank, Paul. 1995. "The Transfer of Management Innovations from Japan," *Organization Studies* 16:971-989.
- Magnusson, Lars and Jan Ottosson. 1997. *Evolutionary Economics and Path Dependence*. Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar.
- McGovern, James R. 1982. *Anatomy of a Lynching: The Killing of Claude Neal*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press.
- Mohr, John. 1998. "Measuring Meaning Structures," *Annual Review of Sociology* 24:345-370.
- Nettleford, Rex. 1972. *Identity, Race and Protest in Jamaica*. New York: William Morrow.
- North, Douglas. 1997. "Some Fundamental Puzzles in Economic History/Development," in W. Brian Arthur, S. N. Durlauf, and D. A. Lane, eds. *The Economy as an Evolving Complex System II*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Nozick, Robert. 1981. *Philosophical Explanations*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Panton, David. 1993. *Jamaica's Michael Manley: The Great Transformation (1972-92)*. Kingston, Jamaica: Kingston Publishers Limited.
- Patterson, Orlando. 1964. *The Children of Sisyphus*. London: Hutchinsons.
1965. "Ras Tafari: Cult of Outcasts," *New Society* 1:15-17.
1982. "Persistence, Continuity and Change in the Jamaican Working Class Family," *The Journal of Family History* 7:135-161.
1991. *Freedom in the Making of Western Culture*. New York: Basic Books.
1998. *Rituals of Blood: Consequences of Slavery in Two American Centuries*. New York: Basic Books.
- Pearl, Judea. 2000. *Causality*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Pinker, Steven. 1997. *How the Mind Works*. New York: Norton, 1997.
2000. *Words and Rules: The Ingredients of Language*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Portes, Alejandro. 2000. "The Resilient Importance of Class: A Nominalist Interpretation," *Political Power and Social Theory* 14: 249-284.
- Putnam, Hilary. 1991. *Representation and Reality*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Quine, W. V. 1950. "Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis," *The Journal of Philosophy* 47/22:623-624.
- Rainwater, Lee. 1970. *Behind Ghetto Walls: Black Families in a Federal Slum*. Chicago, IL: Aldine.
- Rainwater, Lee and William Yancey. 1967. *The Moynihan Report and The Politics of Controversy*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Reed, John Shelton. 1972. *The Enduring South: Subcultural Persistence in Mass Society*. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath.
- Reskin, Barbara F. 1991. "Bringing the Men Back In: Sex Differentiation and the Devaluation of Women's Work," in Judith Lorber and Susan A. Farrell, eds. *The Social Construction of Gender*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Pp. 141-161.
- Rhea, Joseph T. 1997. *Race Pride and the American Identity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Rosch, Eleanor. 1978. "Principles of Categorization," in Eleanor Rosch and Barbara Lloyd, eds. *Cognition and Categorization*. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Pp. 27-47.
- Rosch, Eleanor and Carolyn B. Mervis. 1975. "Family Resemblances: Studies in the Internal Structure of Categories," *Cognitive Psychology* 7:573-605.
- Russell, Bertrand. 1948. *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits*. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Samuels, W. J. 1994. "Part-Whole Relationships," in F. M. Hodgson, M. Tool, and W. J. Samuels, eds. *The Elgar Companion to Institutional and Evolutionary Economics*. Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Schaffer, Jonathan. 2000. "Trumping Preemption," *The Journal of Philosophy* 97/4:165-181.

- Scholem, Gershom. 1971. *The Messianic Idea in Judaism: And Other Essays in Jewish Spirituality*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Schudson, Michael. 1989. "The Present in the Past Versus the Past in the Present." *Communication* 11:105-113.
- Schwartz, Barry. 1982. "The Social Context of Commemoration: A Study of Collective Memory." *Social Forces* 61:374-402.
1991. "Social Change and Collective Memory: The Democratization of George Washington." *American Sociological Review* 56:221-236.
1996. "Memory as a Cultural System: Abraham Lincoln in World War II." *American Sociological Review* 61:908-927.
- Sewell, William H. 1966. "Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology," in Terrence McDonald, ed. *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
1992. "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency and Transformation." *American Journal of Sociology* 98:1-29.
1996. "Historical Events as Transformation of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille." *Theory and Society* 25:841-881.
- Shumway, Robert H. and David S. Stoffer. 2000. *Time Series Analysis and Its Applications*. New York: Springer.
- Stevenson, Renda. 1995. "Black Family Structure in Colonial and Antebellum Virginia: Amending the Revisionist Perspective," in M. B. Tucker and C. Mitchell-Kernan, eds. *The Decline in Marriage Among African Americans*. New York: Russell Sage. Pp. 27-56.
- Stinchcombe, Arthur L. 1965. "Social Structure and Organizations," in James G. March, ed. *Handbook of Organizations*. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally. Pp. 153-193.
- Swidler, Ann. 1986. "Culture and Action: Symbol and Strategies." *American Sociological Review* 51:273-286.
2001. *Talk of Love: How Culture Matters*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Tienda, Marta and Haya Stier. 1991. "Joblessness and Shiftlessness: Labor Force Activity in Chicago's Inner City," in C. Jencks and P. Peterson, eds. *The Urban Underclass*. Washington, DC: Brookings. Pp. 135-154.
- Tilly, Charles. 1984. *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Tolnay and Beck. 1992. *A Festival of Violence: An Analysis of Southern Lynchings, 1882-1930*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Trevor-Roper, Hugh. 1992. "The Invention of Tradition: The Highland Tradition of Scotland," in Terence Ranger, ed. *The Invention of Tradition*. New York: Cambridge University Press. P. 14.
- Turner, Jonathan H. 1989. *A Theory of Social Interaction*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Turner, Victor. 1995. *The Ritual Process*. New York: Aldine.
- Valentine, Charles. 1970. *Culture and Poverty: Critique and Counter-Proposals*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

- Waters, Anita M. 1989. *Race, Class and Political Symbols: Rastafari and Reggae in Jamaican Politics*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- White, Harrison C. 1992. *Identity and Control: A Structural Theory of Action*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Wilson, W. J. 1997. *When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor*. New York: Vintage.
- Wittgenstein, L. 1953. *Philosophical Investigations*. New York: Macmillan.
- Wood, Stewart. 2001. "Business, Government, and Patterns of Labor Market Policy in Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany," in Peter Hall and David Soskice, ed. *Varieties of Capitalism*. New York: Oxford University Press. Pp. 247-274.
- Yamamura, Kozo, ed. 1977. *The Economic Emergence of Modern Japan*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
- Zellner, A. 1979. "Causality and Econometrics," in K. Brunner and A. Melzer, eds. *Three Aspects of Policy and Policymaking: Knowledge, Data and Institutions*. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
- Zerubavel, Eviatar. 1993. *The Fine Line*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Zucker, Lynne G. 1977. "The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence." *American Sociological Review* 42:726.