Alliances and Civil War

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GOV 40, March 7 2019

The menu

- ► Homework 1. Due today in lecture! ②
- Review
- Regression
- Alliances
- Intro to civil war (time permitting)

REVIEW: AUDIENCE COSTS AND DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Audience costs



- 1. If audience costs are real, they are hard to observe
- 2. Democracies have stronger audiences

ICA 1: Autocratic audience costs?

TABLE 3. Target reciprocation rates by regime type of challenger, 1946–99

Challenger regime type	Reciprocation rate	
DEMOCRACY	.41 (358)	
SINGLE-PARTY	.44 (272)	
HYBRID MILITARY/SINGLE-PARTY	.44 (9)	
MILITARY	.55 (44)	
DYNASTIC MONARCHY	.53 (15)	
MIXED NONDEMOCRACY	.33 (206)	
NONDYNASTIC MONARCHY	.58 (38)	
NONDEMOCRATIC INTERREGNA	.57 (259)	
PERSONALIST	.61 (335)	
NEW DEMOCRACY	.65 (46)	
Total	0.49 (1,582)	


Note: The number of observations is in parentheses,

▶ Democracies do not have an advantage over nondemocracies in which elites can visibly coordinate

Democratic Peace: Mechanisms

- 1. Culture
- 2. Transparency
- 3. Accountability

Democratic Peace: Empirics




- Cold war
- Number of democracies was very small until recently
- Omitted variable (eg., capitalism)

TF ACCOUNTABILITY


TF accountability: Pace

Is the pace of section ...?




TF accountability: Difficulty

How easy or difficult do you find section so far?




TF accountability: Learning

How much are you learning in section?




TF accountability: Amusement

So far, do you find section fun or boring?




TF accountability: Clarity

Do I give effective and clear presentations? (1=unsatisfactory; 2=fair; 3=good; 4=very good; 5=excellent)




TF accountability: The Best

So far, what's the best about section?



TF accountability: The Best

So far, what's the best about section?



TF accountability: The Worse

So far, what's the worst about section? How would you improve it?

12 responses

Section can sometimes be boring as we tend not to cover anything outside of lecture and I have not found the topics we've covered in lecture to be that difficult either so section can seem like a review of topics that are not that difficult anyway.

getting cold called. If someone doesnt raise there hand to answer a question in most cases it is because they dont know the answer. So calling on them anyway makes it awkward for everyone.

Also can we start at 9:15 officially instead? We have a lot of extra time before lecture that I am wasting!

I feel like I would like more opportunities to connect with the material with practice problems and case studies and such

Wish we could apply the concepts to real life situations, or cover new concepts

Sometimes it's gets a little repetitive with the same people

I hope that in future sections, we go over the basics before jumping right in to dense explanations; a review of sorts.

N/A

I feel like I would like more structure in section. Right now, sometimes we are solving equations in the middle of going through slides, so I get a bit confused about where I should be focusing my attention.

ALLIANCES

Alliances in nonhuman primates

Chimpanzee Politics Frans de Waal


POWER AND SEX AMONG APES

foreword by Desmond Morris



Alliance theory

- Alliances signal credibility
- Tradeoff between credibility and control



- ▶ Change in the outcome of war (p_A)
- ► Increase in the size of the BR (we're adding the costs for Country C)

ICA2: Regression Table

TABLE 7. Effects on the Duration of Peace: Post-Cold War

Cox Proportional Hazards Model: Time-Varying Peacekeeping


	All Peacekeeping	UN Peacekeeping	Non-UN Peacekeeping
Peacekeeping	0.32**	0.51*	0.34
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.23)
Victory	0.15	0.24	0.31
	(0.20)	(0.29)	(0.35)
Treaty	0.54	0.87	0.78
	(0.64)	(0.93)	(0.80)
Identity War	2.33	2.36	2.05
	(1.90)	(1.80)	(1.54)
Cost of War	1.43*	1.37*	1.36°
	(0.29)	(0.23)	(0.24)
Duration of War	0.99*	0.99*	0.99
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.01)
Many Factions	0.93	1.04	1.11
	(0.60)	(0.60)	(0.66)
Primary Commodity Exports	9.07	5.52	7.68
	(30.79)	(18.05)	(26.70)
Development	0.999*	0.999**	0.999
	(0.0006)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Prior Democracy	1.02	1.01	1.07
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Government Army Size	1.001	1.001	1.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Number of Subjects	51	51	51
N	122	122	122
Log Likelihood	- 59.00	- 60.10	- 59.15

Hazard ratios are reported. Robust standard errors (cases clustered by country) are given in parentheses. $^{\bullet}p \leq 0.10$; $^{\bullet}p \leq 0.05$; $^{\bullet}p \leq 0.05$; $^{\bullet}p \leq 0.01$; two-tailed test.

The CEF

- 1. The Conditional Expectation Function $\mathbb{E}[Y|X]$. Also known as population regression function.
- 2. For each value of X, it spits out average Y.
- 3. Goal: approximate the CEF
- 4. With our approximation, we can predict average Y for each value of X

The CEF



The CEF


Assume the true CEF is given by a line:


$$\mathbb{E}[Y|X] = \alpha + \beta X$$


- A line is defined by two points:
- $\triangleright \alpha$ is the intercept or constant: the value of Y when X is zero
- $\triangleright \beta$ is the slope
 - ▶ Sign of β : does $\mathbb{E}[Y]$ increase or decrease with X
 - ▶ Magnitude of β : how fast $\mathbb{E}[Y]$ increases or decreases with X
 - "A 1 unit increase in X is associated with β unit increase/decrease in Y"
- ▶ Important: α and β are true parameters that describe the relationship between X and Y in the whole population. We don't know them!


What is regression?


- 1. A way to approximate the CEF using a dataset (= a sample): $\hat{\mathbb{E}}[Y|X]$
- 2. OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) does it for you!














Regression ingredients

- 1. Dependent variable: Y, a.k.a. response variable, outcome, etc.
- 2. Independent variable(s): X, a.k.a. covariates, predictors, treatment variables, etc.
- 3. Control variables: distinction with the variable of interest ("treatment") is conceptual

You get a regression

$$Y_i = \hat{Y}_i + \epsilon_i$$
$$= \hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta}X + \epsilon_i$$

- ightharpoonup Regression splits the outcome Y in a predicted value \hat{Y}_i and a
- ▶ The systematic component is a combination of the predictors X
- ▶ The residual $\epsilon = Y_i \hat{Y}_i$ is everything that's left over: all omitted variables

You get a regression



Stuff in regression tables

- ▶ Point estimates of slope $(\hat{\beta})$ for each predictor and the intercept $(\hat{\alpha})$
- ▶ Uncertainty estimates to see if we reject H_0 or not:
 - p-values (small is good!)
 - Standard error (small is good; if less than half the size of β we're good
- Other stuff

ICA2: Regression Table

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
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CIVIL WAR

ICA 3: Macro trends in Civil Wars



- ▶ Observation 1: # civil wars increases from 1945 to 1990
- ▶ Observation 2: # civil wars spikes after the fall of the Soviet Union
- ▶ Observation 3: # civil wars decreases right after 1991

What have we learned?

- ▶ Review of audience costs and democratic peace
- Alliances
- ► Regression
- ► Intro to civil war