drama and fiction. Although the older meanings of *qíng* still exist, the term now primarily refers to love. Li discusses the stylistic variations in the expression of love in the Ming play *Peony Pavilion* 牡丹亭 and the Qing novel *The Story of the Stone* 石頭記, while I discuss the psychology underlying the treatment of *qíng* in *The Story of the Stone.*

As it stands, the present collection gives some glimpses into the history and the many usages of a fascinating concept that has played a central role in Chinese culture for almost two and a half millennia. The papers bear witness to the extremely diverse interpretations of this concept at all historical stages, and at the same time show the high degree of continuity throughout the period covered.

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THE ETHICS OF RESPONDING PROPERLY

THE NOTION OF *QÍNG* 情 IN EARLY CHINESE THOUGHT

MICHAEL PUETT

Scholars have long wrestled with the problem of finding the precise meaning of the term *qíng* 情 in early Chinese texts. Until recently, most scholars translated the term as "emotions", or "passions"–meanings that the term clearly possessed in later periods. Several recent analysts, however, have argued against such a traditional reading, claiming that the term had no such connotations in the early period. For example, A.C. Graham has gone so far as to state:

> Although the word *qing* is very common in pre-Han literature I should like to risk the generalisation that it never means 'passions' even in the *Xunzi*, where we find the usage from which the later meaning developed.[1]

He argues instead that the basic meaning of the term is "what is essential" or "genuine", and that the meaning of "passions" only develops in the Song period.[2] Some hints of this shift, however, can already be detected in the *Xúnzǐ* 荀子 and the *Lǐjì* 禮記 ,where, Graham argues, the term for the first time came to be imbued with emotional connotations: "In these texts, but nowhere else in pre-Han literature, the word refers only to the genuine in man which it is polite to disguise, and therefore to his feelings."[3]

This paper has been improved tremendously from the invaluable comments by Eric Hutton.

[1] A. C. Graham, "The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature", in *The Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies*, New Series, 1967, 6.1-2. Reprinted in Graham, *Studies of Chinese Philosophy*. (Singapore: The Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1986), page 59.

[2] Graham, "The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature", pages 59-65.

[3] Graham, "The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature", page 64.

Chad Hansen, however, has argued strongly against such a view:

> Graham's explanation that *qing* somehow goes from meaning "reality" (cum "essence") to meaning "passions" is also unsettling. It still requires that the term shifted from referring to something metaphysical and objective (reality, essence, or the facts) to referring to something subjective and psychological (passions).... Postulating such a radical meaning change also violates the principle of humanity's call for explanation on analogy to us. Our words would hardly be intelligible if they arbitrarily changed meaning so radically while no one seemed to notice.[4]

Since Hansen does not believe that such a shift is possible, he argues that one must find a "single, unified meaning" to the term.[5] His proposal is that *qíng* refers to "reality feedback",[6] or "reality input"[7]:

> *Qing*, in sum, are all reality-induced discrimination or distinction-making reactions...[8]

These reactions can include things like "pleasure, anger, sadness, fear, love, hate, desire", but the term itself refers to the reality feedback, not the emotional states themselves.[9]

This single, unfied meaning holds for all early Chinese texts, Hansen argues. Hansen does, however, allow for some historical change in the way that *qíng* was utilized: even though the basic meaning of the term remained constant, the attitude toward *qíng* slowly evolved over the course of the Warring States period. His argument, in a nutshell, concerns the perceived relationship between *qíng* and *yù* 欲 ("desires"). In terms of basic meaning, he argues, the two terms are quite different:

[4] Chad Hansen, "*Qing* (Emotions) in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought", in Joel Marks and Roger T. Ames, *Emotions in Asian Thought: A Dialogue in Comparative Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), page 195.

[5] Hansen, "*Qing* (Emotions) in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought", page 183.

[6] Hansen, "*Qing* (Emotions) in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought", page 196.

[7] Hansen, "*Qing* (Emotions) in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought", page 201.

[8] Hansen, "*Qing* (Emotions) in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought", page 196.

[9] Hansen, "*Qing* (Emotions) in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought", pages 196-197.

> *Qing*...were theoretically distinguished from *yu* by being presocial bases for the application of terms, while *yu* may be natural or socially induced attitudes toward the things as named.[10]

Qíng, in other words, are presocial, *yù* are socially induced. However, over the course of the Warring States period there was a "gradual narrowing" between the two concepts, caused by a "growing skepticism" as to whether *qíng* are really free from conventional, linguistic distortion.[11]

As with Graham, Hansen portrays Xúnzǐ as the pivotal figure in this development. But, unlike Graham, Hansen does not believe that Xúnzǐ started a shift in the term's meaning. Instead, his importance comes from the fact that Xúnzǐ "effectively closes the gap"[12] between the two terms: "For Xunzi, *qing* and *yu* are alike in that they disrupt ritual, conventional order."[13]

This philosophical assertion about the equivalence of *qíng* and *yù* explains the later shift in the term's meaning. According to Hansen, the crucial event in this shift occurred with Buddhism, which introduced into China an "Indo-European psychology" based upon emotions and passions.[14] And because of the particular connotations that *qíng* had been given by Xúnzǐ, it became the term that was used to translate the concept of "passion":

> The domination of authoritarian Confucianism (and its offspring, Legalism) when Buddhism first reaches China gives us the outline of an explanation why Buddhist translators would have adapted *qing* to refer to our familiar Western *feeling*-concepts. *Qing* threaten the order of ritual for Xunzi as passions or emotions disturb reason for Buddhists and Greeks.[15]

Since Xúnzǐ and his followers had presented *qíng* in a negative fashion, it was natural, claims Hansen, that translators would use that same

[10] Hansen, "*Qing* (Emotions) in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought", page 202.

[11] Hansen, "*Qing* (Emotions) in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought", pages 202-203.

[12] Hansen, "*Qing* (Emotions) in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought", page 203.

[13] Hansen, "*Qing* (Emotions) in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought", page 203.

[14] Hansen, "*Qing* (Emotions) in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought", page 203.

[15] Hansen, "*Qing* (Emotions) in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought", page 203.

term when faced with the problem of how to translate "passions" or "emotions" into Chinese.

Graham and Hansen, then, agree that "emotions" or "passions" was not one of the meanings of *qíng* in the early period. Indeed, both argue that the term had only one meaning in the early period, and that a separate meaning of "passion" arose only later. Graham marks this shift as beginning, albeit to an extremely limited extent, with Xúnzǐ; Hansen sees Xúnzǐ as crucial in defining *qíng* and *yù* as related, but the shift in the basic meaning of *qíng*, according to Hansen, occurs only with the introduction of an Indo-European psychology by Buddhism.

In terms of the actual definitions proposed by Graham and Hansen, it should be stated at the outset that there is indeed substantial textual evidence that would seem to support each of these readings. Although each of the scholars in question provides strong evidence in support of their readings, the best examples can be found (not coincidentally, as I will argue below) in the early Han. In terms of Graham's reading, one can refer to the *Xìcí* 繫辭. We are informed there that one of the reasons Fúxī created the trigrams was,

> 以類萬物之情
> ... in order to categorize the *qíng* of the myriad things.[16]

Graham's reading of *qíng* as "essential qualities" would clearly work well here.

And support for Hansen's view is easy to come by as well. One finds the following statement in the *Huáinánzǐ* 淮南子:

> 夫人之所受於天者耳目之於聲色也口鼻之於芳臭也肌膚之於寒燠其情一也
> Generally speaking, in what humans receive from Heaven, the *qíng* of the ears and eyes relating to sounds and colors, the mouth and nose to fragrance and foulness, the flesh and skin to cold and warmth are all one.[17]

[16] *Zhōuyì*, "Xìcí," B/2.

[17] *Huáinánzǐ*, "Shuzhen", 俶真, Sibu beiyao 四部備要 edition (hereafter SBBY), 2.11a; Chinese University of Hong Kong, Institute of Chinese Studies, Ancient Chinese Text Concordance Series (hereafter cited as ICS), 2/16/6-2/16/7.

Qíng, in this formulation, are the ways that humans relate to the world, or, more explicitly, the ways in which particular faculties relate to external stimuli. Hansen could, quite plausibly, cite such a passage in support of his "reality feedback" definition.

Similarly, one finds the following passage from the *Huáinánzǐ:*

> 夫七尺之形心知憂愁勞苦膚知疾痛寒暑人情一也
> Generally speaking, in regard to the [human] form of seven *chǐ*, the heart understands anxiety, sadness, weariness, and bitterness, and the skin understands sickness, pain, cold, and heat: the *qíng* of humans are one.[18]

Here, the term is used to refer generally to the "fundamental" aspects of humans, aspects which include the height of a person and the way one experiences heat and cold. This would certainly support Graham's reading of *qíng* as referring to the "essential qualities" of something. Clearly, the meaning of the term here is not restricted to "emotions".

And support for Hansen's view is easy to come by as well. Again from the *Huáinánzǐ*:

But, if both of these interpretations seem to have some validity, then can we at least say that both authors are correct in their rejection of the traditional reading of the term as referring to emotions or passions? Here too, I would argue that such usages can be found in the early Han. I quote here from one of Dǒng Zhòngshū's 董仲舒 memorials to Hàn Wǔdì 漢武帝: "Human desire (*yù*) I call *qíng*" 人欲之謂情.[19] I will argue below, in opposition to Hansen, that Dǒng Zhòngshū is indeed defining *qíng* as "emotions" or "passions".

It would appear, then, that each one of the major scholarly attempts to define a basic meaning of the term has some validity: textual evidence can be cited in support of each of these views. The wide disparity of scholarly opinion as to the meaning of the term, then, is due not to a poverty of scholarly expertise. At the same time, none of these definitions seems to account for all of the meanings of the term.

[18] *Huáinánzǐ*, "Xiūwù", 修務 19.11a; ICS 19/207/24.

[19] *Hànshū* 漢書, Zhonghua shuju 中華書局 edition, 26.2515.

Instead, I will argue, this disparity of opinion is due to the nature of the object of study. I will propose that the term *qíng* has a broad semantic range, including such meanings as basic tendencies, inclinations, dispositions (including emotional dispositions), and fundamental qualities,[20] and that this breadth of semantic range is precisely why the term came to be so important in early Chinese thought: during the fourth through second centuries BC, for reasons that will be discussed below, thinkers found it helpful to utilize the term *qíng* and re-define it for their own purposes. The term was, as Lévi-Strauss would say, "good to think".[21]

Instead, then, of seeking a single, unified meaning of the term in all early Chinese texts, I propose that we turn the question around and ask why it is that certain thinkers at a certain time chose to utilize the term, and how and why they exploited, enhanced, and shifted the meanings of the term for their own purposes. In other words, the goal should be less to find some "basic meaning" of the term than to reconstruct the debate within which the term came to be seen as useful, within which the meanings of the term were contested, and within which those meanings came to be imbued with so many complex resonances and connotations.

This may also help us to provide a more adequate explanation of how the meaning of the term changed over time: instead of trying to find the moment when the term changed in meaning from X to Y, we may find instead that the term always had a broad semantic range, and that various meanings were developed and reinterpreted over the course of a gradually unfolding debate.

A full analysis from this perspective would require a study of all of the debates surrounding *qíng* from the fourth century BC on. Although such an exercise lies well beyond the limits of this essay, I do hope to make a small contribution to such an endeavor here by analyzing one specific line of the debates within which *qíng* came to play a crucial part: the debates from the fourth through second centuries BC over whether or not traditions from the past should be followed. As the forms of political ideology associated with the Zhou state

[20] This breadth of semantic range has already been brilliantly demonstrated by Christoph Harbsmeier in his contribution to this volume.

[21] See Lévi-Strauss, *Totemism*, translated by Rodney Needham (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963) p. 89.

became discredited (or at least unconvincing), thinkers during this period began to turn to alternate bases on which to root their arguments. For many figures, this resulted in a search for cosmological patterns in terms of which particular visions of the state and of human action could be legitimated. But several thinkers were interested in resting claims of legitimation, as well as critiques of existing practices, in terms of the sage–the sage who, in any given context, will know what actions to take.

These figures thus appealed to the terms that could be helpfully used to discuss those human faculties which, if used properly, would enable the practitioner to become a sage. Several such terms became important during this time–words such as *xìng* 性 (human nature) and *xīn* 心 (heart or mind). And *qíng* was another such term. As a word with a broad semantic field including various internal qualities, *qíng* came to be employed by different figures who wished to exploit particular shades of meaning in the term.

In tracing this debate, I will begin with a discussion of the *Xìng zì mìng chū* 性自命出, a text from the Guōdiàn 郭店 tomb that attempts to develop an ethical position in part based upon the notion of *qíng*. I will then take a brief look at how Xúnzǐ uses the term. I will argue that Xúnzǐ's usage is indeed important in the development of the significance of the term, although not in the way that Graham and Hansen have argued. I will conclude with a discussion of the ways in which the term was utilized in the early Han. Here too, I will read the texts in context, attempting to see how the authors of the works were reacting against earlier usages, and how their particular usages fit into their larger goals. As we shall see, most of the various meanings that analysts have assigned to the term were utilized during this period, but always for specific reasons within this larger debate.

The Xìng zì mìng chū

The *Xìng zì mìng chū* is one of the texts from the Guōdiàn tomb.[22]

[22] My understanding of the *Xìng zì mìng chū* text has been greatly enhanced by the the discussions that ensued in the Guōdiàn Reading Group that I organized at Harvard University over the summer of 1998. I would like to thank all of the participants of the reading group, and in particular Sarah Allen, Peter Bol, Erica

The tomb itself dates to around 300 BC, so the text presumably belongs to the late fourth century BC.[23] It is of particular interest to us for the light it sheds on the early debate surrounding the term *qíng*.

The text opens with a strong claim concerning the nature of humanity:

> 凡人唯（雖）又（有）眚（性），心亡奠志，走（待）勿（物）而句（後）复（作），走（待）兌（悅）而句（後）行，走（待）習而句（後）奠。
> In general, although humans possess nature (*xìng*), their mind is without a fixed purpose. It depends on things and only then becomes active; it depends on pleasures and only then is moved; it depends on repeated study and only then becomes fixed.[24]

If humans do not have a fixed purpose, their nature will simply be moved by external forces: they will be stimulated simply by sensing an object and will be activated simply through pleasures. It is only through repeated study that the minds of humans can move beyond this and develop a fixed purpose.

These points are elaborated in the immediately succeeding lines:

> 悬（喜）惹（怒）悗（哀）悲之𡊁（氣），眚（性）也。及其見於外，則勿（物）取之也。眚（性）自命出，命自天降。
> The *qì* of joy, anger, sorrow, and sadness are given by nature (*xìng*). When it comes to their being manifested on the outside, it is because things have called them forth. Nature (*xìng*) comes from the decree (*mìng*), and the decree is handed down from Heaven.[25]

Part of the endowment of humans—traceable ultimately back to Heaven—is that we possess the *qì* 氣 of emotions. And, again, it is by reacting to things that these forms of *qì* become manifested.

Thus far, the text is strongly emphasizing the passivity of humans in relation to the world, and is claiming that this remains true until the purpose of the mind can become fixed. At this point, the reader might assume that the authors would next introduce a discussion of how the mind overcomes this passivity and controls the nature through something like ritual, mental techniques, etc. Instead, the text introduces the notion of *qíng:*

> 衍（道）司（始）於青（情），青（情）生於眚（性）。司（始）者近青（情），終者近義。
> The way (*dào*) begins in *qíng*, and *qíng* is born from nature. At the beginning one is close to *qíng*, and at the end one is close to propriety.[26]

Although the text is not explicit, it appears to be positing *qíng* as the ways that humans relate to the world. If *xìng* consists of the actual nature with which we are endowed, such as the fact that humans have the *qì* of happiness, sadness, etc., then *qíng* is the consequent way that *xìng* is brought out in response to different aspects of the world. For example, the fact that one has the *qì* of sadness is part of one's *xìng*; but the fact that one will grow sad in a given circumstance

Brindley, Jack Chen, Stephen Chou, Shari Epstein, Natasha Heller, Christopher Nugent, Sarah Queen, Benjamin Schwartz, Tu Wei-Ming, and Susan Weld. Various portions of my argument concerning the *Xìng zì mìng chū* were also presented at the Warring States Working Group meeting in October 1998, at the University of Michigan in January 1999, and at the Association for Asian Studies meeting in March 1999. My thanks as well for all of the helpful comments that I received on these occasions.

[23] For a discussion of the Guōdiàn find itself, see "Jīngmén Guōdiàn yī hào chǔmù", 荊門郭店一號楚墓, *Wénwù* 文物 (1997) 7: 35-48. Since the time when this essay was written, an enormous outpouring of scholarship has developed concerning the Guōdiàn materials. The following are some of the most helpful: *Dàojiā wénhuà yánjiū* 道家文化研究 17 (1999): *Guōdiàn Chǔ jiǎn zhuānhào* 郭店楚簡專號. *Zhōngguó zhéxué* 中國哲學 20 (1999): *Guōdiàn chǔjiǎn yánjiū* 郭店楚簡研究. *Guōdiàn Chǔ jiǎn guójì xuéshù yántǎohuì lùnwén jí* 郭店楚簡國際學術研討會論文集 (Wuhan: Hubei renmin chuban she, 2000). Sarah Allan and Crispin Williams, editors, *The Guodian Laozi: Proceedings of the International Conference, Dartmouth College, May 1998* (Berkeley: The Society for the Study of Early China and Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 2000). Dīng Sìxīn 丁四新, *Guōdiàn Chǔmù zhújiǎn sīxiǎng yánjiū* 郭店楚墓竹簡思想研究 (Beijing: Dongfang chuban she, 2000). Guō Yí 郭沂, *Guōdiàn zhújiǎn yǔ xiān Qín xuéshù sīxiǎng* 郭店竹簡与先秦學術思想 (Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chuban she, 2001).

[24] *Xìng zì mìng chū*, strip 1, *Guōdiàn chǔmù zhújiǎn* 郭店楚墓竹簡 (Beijing:Wénwù, 1998), p. 179.

[25] *Xìng zì mìng chū*, strips 2-3, *Guōdiàn chǔmù zhújiǎn* , p. 179.

[26] *Xìng zì mìng chū*, strip 3, *Guōdiàn chǔmù zhújiǎn*, p. 179.

is due to one's *qíng*. In this sense, the text is positing a definition of *qíng* very similar to the meaning proposed by Chad Hansen: the responses that one has in particular circumstances. Indeed, perhaps the most accurate–albeit very ungainly–translation of the term would be something like "dispositional responsiveness": one's disposition to respond in certain ways. Unlike Hansen's proposal, however, there is clearly a strong emotional connotation to the term: *qíng* here refers to one's emotional disposition, to the ways that one's emotions will be pulled out in particular circumstances.

Insofar as activity begins in *qíng*, in the ways that the *xìng* interacts with the external world, the Way starts with *qíng*. The Way, therefore, is apparently being defined in terms of movement: the Way begins when movement begins, and movement begins with *qíng*–with the interaction, in other words, of nature and things. However, as is already clear from the opening lines of the text, the authors believe that one's dispositional responses to the outside world are insufficient, and the text accordingly brings in the issue of self-cultivation: one begins with *qíng*, but one must devote oneself to working toward *yì* 義, propriety. *Qíng*, in this text, is how one would spontaneously respond to a situation, while *yì* is how one ought to respond. One of the central issues for the text, therefore, is to explain how humans can move from *qíng* to *yì*. As the text will argue later, acting with propriety will result in a higher form of the Way.

The argument continues:

> 智（知） [青（情）者能] 出之，智（知）宜（義）者能內（納）之。
> Those who understand [the *qíng* are able to] express it, while those who understand propriety are able to internalize it.[27]

Qíng involves simply expressing one's nature in circumstances, while propriety involves internalization. This formulation immediately, however, raises one of the crucial points for the text: propriety does not result from overcoming or even controlling one's *qíng*. It is rather an

[27] *Xìng zì mìng chū*, strips 3-4, *Guōdiàn chǔmù zhújiǎn*, p. 179. (Accepting Qiú Xīguī's recommendation for reading the missing graphs, *Guōdiàn chǔmù zhújiǎn*, p. 182, footnote 3.)

internalization, and, as we will see, a refinement, of the *qíng*. Indeed, value judgments themselves properly come out of *qíng*:

> 好亞（惡），眚（性）也。所好所亞（惡），勿（物）也。善不□□□，所善所不善，埶（勢）也。
> Likes and dislikes are nature; that which one likes and that which one dislikes depend on the things. Deeming things good [and deeming things bad are *qíng*], that which one deems good and that which one deems bad depend on circumstance.[28]

What will be found good or bad depends on circumstance, and is thus associated with *qíng*. Here again, the text is not claiming that *qíng* is bad and needs to be overcome: humans should not stop with *qíng*, but the process of self-cultivation simply involves refining that which comes through *qíng*.

The obvious question then comes down to how one can cultivate oneself so as to move from *qíng* to this higher level, yet to do so without losing one's *qíng*. This question is addressed in the next section. The text begins by reiterating the claim that humans must learn to use their minds:

> 四悔（海）之內其眚（性）弋（一）也。其甬（用）心各異，孝（教）臾（使）然也。
> As for everyone within the four seas, their nature is one. That they are different in the way they use their minds is brought about by education.[29]

The text then turns to describing how this is achieved. It first gives a taxonomy of different ways that nature is moved:

> 凡眚（性）或𢦚（動）之，或迮（逢？）之，或交之，或萬（厲）之，或出之，或荼（養）之，或長之。凡𢦚（動）眚（性）者，勿（物）也；迮（逢？）眚（性）者，兌（悅）也；交眚（性）者，古（故）也；萬（厲）眚（性）者，宜

[28] *Xìng zì mìng chū*, strips 4-5, *Guōdiàn chǔmù zhújiǎn*, p. 179. My reading of the missing graphs here is based upon the evident parallel of the lines.

[29] *Xìng zì mìng chū*, strip 9, *Guōdiàn chǔmù zhújiǎn*, p. 179.

（義）也；出眚（性）者，埶（勢）也；羕（養）眚（性）者，習也；長眚（性）者，衍（道）也。
In general, as for one's nature, some [things] move it, some entice it, some link with it, some discipline it, some bring it out, some nurture it, some let it grow. In general, that which moves nature is things, that which entices nature is pleasure, that which makes links with nature is intention, that which disciplines nature is propriety, that which brings nature out is circumstance, that which nurtures nature is repeated study, that which causes nature to grow is the Way.[30]

Each of these is then defined:

凡見者之胃（謂）勿（物），快於己（己）者之胃（謂）兑（悦），勿（物）之埶（勢）者之胃（謂）埶（勢），又（有）為也者之胃（謂）古（故）。義也者，群善之蓋（蘊）也。習也者，又（有）以習其眚（性）也。衍（道）者，群勿（物）之衍（道）。
In general, what is seen I call things; those that bring happiness to oneself I call pleasurable; the circumstance of things I call circumstance; activity I call intention. Propriety is the compiling of the myriad [things deemed] good. Repeated study is bringing repeated study to one's nature. The Way refers to the ways of the myriad things.[31]

Following this taxonomy, the text then defines what is peculiar about human action:

衍（道）四述（術），唯人衍（道）為可衍（道）也。其參（三）述（術）者，衍（道）之而已。
As for the Way's four techniques, only the human way can be way-ed [i.e., only the human way involves a fixed purpose]. As for the other three techniques, the person is moved and that is all.[32]

[30] *Xìng zì mìng chū*, strips 9-12, *Guōdiàn chǔmù zhújiǎn*, p. 179.

[31] *Xìng zì mìng chū*, strips 12-14, *Guōdiàn chǔmù zhújiǎn*, p. 179.

[32] *Xìng zì mìng chū*, strips 14-15, *Guōdiàn chǔmù zhújiǎn*, p. 179. This passage, I might add, sheds interesting light on the opening line of the *Lǎozǐ* 老子. The line is usually read as, "The Way that can be spoken of is not the enduring Way", This is certainly a possible reading, and we will see later in this paper that the authors of the "Fànlùn xùn" chapter of the *Huáinánzǐ* interpret it this way as well. However, when read in light of the *Xìng zì mìng chū*, the *Lǎozǐ* line could be read as saying, "The Way that can way-ed is not the enduring Way". That is to say, there is a more enduring Way than the path forged by human intentionality. It is possible, in other words, that these lines from the *Xìng zì mìng chū* and *Lǎozǐ* were written in opposition to each other. (Considering the impossibility of assigning absolute dates to either text, however, there is no way to determine which text is responding to which, or whether both are responding to a third, now-lost, text.)

Only the human way involves more than simply passive responsiveness, for only the human way involves a purpose fixed by the mind. Although the text does not specify what the three other techniques are, they presumably include the forms of passive responsiveness that the text mentioned earlier.

The text goes on to explain how this way can be achieved. It begins by explicating the formation of the crucial traditions which should be followed:

時（詩）、箸（書）豊（禮）、樂、其司（始）出皆生於人。時（詩），又（有）為為之也。箸（書），又（有）為言之也。豊（禮）、樂，又（有）為垦（舉）之也。
As for the poems, documents, rites, and music, their first expression was generated among humans. With the poems, there were activities and they put them into practice. With the documents there were activities and they spoke of them. With the rites and music, there were activities and they raised them.[33]

Each of these four traditions, in other words, arose out of earlier practices. Certain events occurred, such as the conquest of the Shang, and these were then spoken about. Such speeches came to be known as the *Documents*. These events could also be re-enacted; these were the *Poetry*. (A possible example here would be the cycle of poems from the *Poetry* concerning the Zhou conquest.) The emotions involved in those actions could also be "raised up" in the form of music and rituals. Thus, for example, the "Wǔ" 武 , a piece of music celebrating the Zhou conquest, was composed to raise up the martial emotions

[33] *Xìng zì mìng chū*, strips 15-16, *Guōdiàn chǔmù zhújiǎn*, p. 179.

involved with the conquest. (The piece is mentioned later in the *Xìng zì mìng chū* as an exemplary piece of music.[34])

In all of these cases, the sense seems to be that particular actions were taken at some point in the past, and that these actions were seen as exemplary and were therefore discussed, re-enacted, and raised up. Following this, the sages (or possibly just "the sage"–Confucius) organized these traditions:

> 聖人比其類（類）而侖（論）會之，雚（觀）其之遂而迮訓之，體其宜（義）而即慶之，里（理）其青（情）而出內（入）之，肰（然）句（後）復以𡍮（教）。𡍮（教），所以生悳（德）于宇（中）者也。豊（禮）复（作）於青（情）……
>
> The sages compared their categories and arranged them, analyzed their order and appended admonishments to them, embodied their propriety and put them in order, patterned (*lǐ* 理) their *qíng* and both expressed and internalized them. As such, they were brought back for use in education. Education is the means by which one generates virtue within. The rites arise from the *qíng*...[35]

The sages took the worthy traditions from the past, organized them, patterned (*lǐ*) their *qíng*, and thereby made them available to educate the latter-born.

The text is thus making a strong argument for why the four traditions of *Poetry*, *Documents*, *Rituals*, and *Music* should be utilized in education. These traditions, organized by the sages, originated from the exemplary actions of the past, and the latter-born, by training themselves through these traditions, can refine themselves as well. The following sections of the *Xìng zì mìng chū* contain explicit examples, primarily drawn from music, to demonstrate how this self-cultivation occurs.

The authors of the *Xìng zì mìng chū*, therefore, have utilized the term *qíng* as a means of defending their support for following the *Poetry*, *Documents*, *Rituals*, and *Music*. The practices are defined as arising out of the exemplary actions of humans, and these actions are

[34] *Xìng zì mìng chū*, strip 28, *Guōdiàn chǔmù zhújiǎn*, p. 180.

[35] *Xìng zì mìng chū*, strips 16-18, *Guōdiàn chǔmù zhújiǎn*, p. 179.

themselves rooted in the basic emotional dispositions of man. Accordingly, the traditions are defined as that which allows for a refinement of, but never a loss of, the basic qualities of humanity. *Qíng*, in other words, becomes the basis of the ethical system in the text: by defining it as the inherent emotional disposition of humans, the authors are able both to explicate the emergence of the traditions of *Poetry*, *Documents*, *Rituals*, and *Music* and to defend their importance.

Usages of Qíng *in the* Xúnzǐ

It is with this usage in mind, I would argue, that Xúnzǐ's claims become more readily explicable. This is not, of course, to say that Xúnzǐ necessarily read the *Xìng zì mìng chū*. But the ideas found in the *Xìng zì mìng chū* may help us to understand some of the background context out of which Xúnzǐ was operating. Indeed, I will argue that Xúnzǐ's argument is actually closer to the *Xìng zì mìng chū* than might at first appear the case.

To begin with a passage from the "Róngrǔ" 榮辱 chapter:

> 人之情食欲有芻豢衣欲有文繡行欲有輿馬又欲夫餘財蓄積之富也然而窮年累世不知不足是人之情也
>
> It is the *qíng* of man that, for food, he desires to have grass- and grain-fed animals; for clothing he desires to have them ornamented and embroidered; for traveling he desires to have carriages and horses. He moreover desires the wealth of surplus resources being accumulated. However, when going through long stretches of time in poverty he will not be aware that there is something lacking. This is the *qíng* of man.[36]

[36] *Xúnzǐ*, "Róngrǔ", SBBY, 2.12b; Harvard-Yenching Sinological Index Series (hereafter cited as HY), 11/4/60-11/4/62. My translations of Xúnzǐ have been aided by the following works: *Hsün Tzu: Basic Writings*, translated by Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); *Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works*, three volumes, translated by John Knoblock (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988-1994); *Hsün-tzu*, translated by Hermann Köster (Kaldenkirchen: Steyler Verlag, 1967). On Xúnzǐ's overall philosophy, see Paul Rakita Goldin's *Rituals of the Way: The Philosophy of Xunzi* (Chicago: Open Court Press, 1999).

Xúnzǐ then goes on to argue that humans gradually learn to moderate their desires in order to prolong their lives and increase their happiness. The passage demonstrates clearly Hansen's argument that, for Xúnzǐ, *qíng* and *yù* are related. As Anthony C. Yu has argued in relation to another passage, Xúnzǐ is placing *qíng* and *yù* "on one continuum".[37]

Given the fact that *qíng* must be controlled, Xúnzǐ argues,

> 況夫先王之道仁義之統詩書禮樂之分乎……夫詩書禮樂之分固非庸人之所知也……以治情則利
> How much more are the way of the former kings and the ordering of humanity and propriety [found in] the distinctions of the *Poetry*, *Documents*, *Rituals*, and *Music*.... Now, the distinctions of the *Poetry*, *Documents*, *Rituals*, and *Music* are assuredly opposed to that which the common man understands.... If you use them to regulate the *qíng*, there will be benefit.[38]

If it is beneficial for man to control his *qíng*, then how much more beneficial it is for man to follow the ancient kings, who discovered the proper way for society to be organized. Accordingly, Xúnzǐ concludes, one should regulate *qíng* by studying the principles discovered by the sages and transmitted in the *Poetry*, *Documents*, *Rituals*, and *Music*.

As in the *Xìng zì mìng chū*, the argument here is being developed in terms of the relationship between *qíng* and the *Poetry*, *Documents*, *Rituals*, and *Music*. At first glance, however, the argument would appear to be directly opposite that given in the *Xìng zì mìng chū*. In the *Xìng zì mìng chū*, these four traditions were presented as growing out of *qíng*, and, for the latter-born, following the four traditions was presented as refining one's *qíng*. Here, the two are presented oppositionally: *qíng* are described in fully negative terms, and the sages are defined as having created textual traditions to overcome and control the *qíng*.

This negative usage of *qíng* is why, as mentioned above, Graham sees passages such as these as marking the beginning of the semantic shift of the term, and why Hansen sees such passages as marking the

[37] Anthony C. Yu, *Reading the Stone: Desire and the Making of Fiction in Dream of the Red Chamber* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), page 58.

[38] *Xúnzǐ*, "Róngrǔ", 2.13a; HY 11/4/66-12/4/71.

conflation of *qíng* and *yù* that would later allow for the semantic shift under the influence of Buddhism. However, I would question an explanation of this passage made either in the form of a claimed semantic shift from "essential" to "emotion", or in the form of a single, unified meaning as proposed by Hansen.

The crucial questions to tackle here are how and why Xúnzǐ is defining *qíng*, the ways that the sages initially generated proper traditions, and the means by which the latter-born should use these traditions to control their *qíng*.

> 生之所以然者謂之性性之和所生精合感應不事而自然謂之性性之好惡喜怒哀樂謂之情情然而心為之擇謂之慮心慮而能為之動謂之偽
> That by which someone is at birth as he is, I call nature. The part of nature that harmonizes with the delicately fitting stimulus and response it generates and is spontaneous and without interference, this I also call nature. The likes, dislikes, pleasures, anger, sorrows, and joys of nature I call *qíng*. The *qíng* being thus, the mind makes them choose; this I call thinking. When the mind thinks and is able to make them move; this I call artifice (*wěi* 偽).[39]

"Artifice" is thus a product of the mind working upon the *qíng*. Although this clearly prioritizes the mind over the *qíng*, the *qíng* do not appear to be presented as negatively as in the quotations above.

Elsewhere, Xúnzǐ presents the *qíng* in even favorable ways:

> 天職既立天功既成形具而神生好惡喜怒哀樂臧焉夫是之謂天情耳目鼻口形能各有接而不相能也夫是之謂天官心居中虛以治五官夫是之謂天君財非其類以養其類夫是之謂天養順其類者謂之福逆其類者謂之禍夫是之謂天政
> With the work of Heaven established and the accomplishments of Heaven completed, the form prepared and the spirit born, likes, dislikes, pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are stored within: these I call the Heavenly *qíng*. The ears, eyes, nose, mouth, and body each have that with which they connect, but they cannot substitute for each other: these I call the Heavenly faculties. The mind resides

[39] *Xúnzǐ*, "Zhèngmíng", 正名 16.1a-1b; HY 83/22/2-83/22/4.

within the central emptiness so as to rule the five faculties: this I call the Heavenly ruler. Making into produce what is not of one's kind in order to feed one's kind: this I call the Heavenly nurturance. Those who accord with their species are called fortunate, and those who oppose their species are called unfortunate; this I call the Heavenly governance.[40]

This passage, from the "Tiānlùn", stresses the degree to which *qíng*, along with the faculties and mind, are of Heaven. As such, he goes on to argue, they must be nurtured, not rejected:

暗其天君亂其天官棄其天養逆其天政背其天情以喪天功夫是之謂大凶聖人清其天君正其天官備其天養順其天政養其天情以全其天功如是則知其所為知其所不為矣則天地官而萬物役其行曲治其養曲適其生不傷夫是之謂知天
To darken one's Heavenly ruler, bring disorder to one's Heavenly faculties, discard one's Heavenly nurturance, disobey one's Heavenly governance, turn one's back on one's Heavenly *qíng*, and thereby destroy the Heavenly accomplishments: these are called great inauspiciousness. The sage clears his Heavenly ruler, rectifies his Heavenly faculties, prepares his Heavenly nurturance, accords with his Heavenly governance, nourishes his Heavenly *qíng*, and thereby brings completion to the Heavenly governance. If he does so, then he knows what he is to do and not to do. Heaven and Earth then perform their functions and the myriad things serve him. His movements are fully ordered, his nurturance fully appropriate, and his life is without injury. This is called knowing Heaven.[41]

The emphasis has shifted entirely from the statements quoted above in which Xúnzǐ presented the *qíng* as simply needing to be controlled. Here, the *qíng* are Heavenly qualities that must be nurtured; to turn against them is folly. And certainly no conflation is implied here with *yù*. In direct contrast to the usages discussed above, *qíng* here refers to those fundamental dispositions that are natural to and inherent

[40] *Xúnzǐ*, "Tiānlùn", 天論 11.10a; HY 62/17/10-63/17/13.

[41] *Xúnzǐ*, "Tiānlùn", 11.10b; HY 63/17/13-63/17/16.

in all humans, and the sage is simply he who nurtures such dispositions so that humans can be what they properly ought to be.

In such contexts, Xúnzǐ is employing the term in much the same way as it was used in the *Xìng zì mìng chū*: *qíng* are those emotional dispositions which will be nurtured and aided by the traditions of past sages. Indeed, Xúnzǐ at times will go so far as to say that it is precisely because he is cultivated that the sage can maintain *qíng* and yet still be regulated:

聖人縱其欲兼其情而制焉者理矣
That a sage can abandon himself to his desires, fulfill his *qíng*, and yet be regulated, is due to his being patterned (*lǐ*).[42]

It is by being patterned that the sage is able to fulfill his *qíng* and yet be properly regulated. This, in essence, is the argument of the *Xìng zì mìng chū* as well. And even the terminology here is similar: when the authors of the *Xìng zì mìng chū* discussed the sages' organization of the past traditions (which were, for the authors, a consequence of the *qíng* of particular circumstances), they were described as "patterning (*lǐ*) their *qíng*".

In these contexts, then, Xúnzǐ is making a larger claim about the rituals and traditions of the ancient sages, and it is one that is reminiscent of the *Xìng zì mìng chū*. Although Xúnzǐ wants to claim, unlike the authors of the *Xìng zì mìng chū*, that rituals and traditions are an artifice, he also wants to claim that they are, in a fundamental sense, correct: they may be artificial, but they are not arbitrary.[43]

Thus, when Xúnzǐ speaks of patterns (*lǐ*), he is speaking of the patterns that the sages properly brought to the world of nature. As he argues in the "Wángzhì" 王制 chapter:

故天地生君子君子理天地君子者天地之參也萬物之摠也民之父母也無君子則天地不理禮義無統上無君師下無父子夫是謂

[42] *Xúnzǐ*, "Jiěbì", 解蔽 15.8a; HY 81/21/66.

[43] For a fuller discussion of Xúnzǐ's emphasis on a non-arbitraty notion of artifice, see my article, "Nature and Artifice: Debates in Late Warring States China concerning the Creation of Culture", in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 57.2 (December 1997), pages 471-518.

之亂君臣父子兄弟夫婦始則終終則始與天地同理與萬世同久夫是之謂大本

Therefore, Heaven and Earth gave birth to the gentleman. The gentleman gives patterns (*lǐ*) to Heaven and Earth. The gentleman forms a triad with Heaven and Earth, is the summation of the myriad things, and is the father and mother of the people. Without the gentleman, Heaven and Earth have no pattern, ritual and righteousness have no unity; above there is no ruler or leader, below there is no father or son. This is called the utmost chaos. Ruler and minister, father and son, older and younger brother, husband and wife begin and then end, end and then begin. They share with Heaven and Earth the same pattern, and last for ten thousand generations. This is called the great foundation.[44]

Heaven and Earth are thus defined as generating the gentleman, while the gentleman then gives patterns to Heaven and Earth: the generation of patterns by the sages is the teleological completion of the process begun by Heaven and Earth. The work of the sages is a continuation and completion of the work of Heaven.

And the same point, I would argue, holds for Xúnzǐ's treatment of *qíng*. A true fulfillment of a human's natural disposition requires the creation of artifice. The artificial patterns created by the sages serve ultimately to allow humans to realize fully their natural potential.

But how then do we account for this seeming ambivalence in Xúnzǐ concerning the term *qíng*? Why does he in some places emphasize the degree to which *qíng* must simply be controlled through the artifice of ritual, while elsewhere he emphasizes the degree to which such artifice in fact allows for a proper nourishment and fulfilling of *qíng*? Why, in other words, if his full argument is so similar to the *Xìng zì mìng chū*, does he spend so much time emphasizing the artifice of the rituals and the degree to which they must control the *qíng*?

The explanation, I would argue, has to do with the changing debate within which Xúnzǐ was operating. By the early third century BC, several figures had begun to turn to the term *qíng* precisely as a means of arguing that the traditions of the past need not be followed. For example, one finds in the "Nèi piān" 內篇 of the *Zhuāngzǐ* 莊子

[44] *Xúnzǐ*, "Wángzhì", 5.7a-7b; HY 28/9/65-29/9/67.

usages of *qíng* like that in the *Xìng zì mìng chū*, but with the precise opposite implication. In one passage, a certain Qín Yì is narrated as criticizing people mourning the death of Lǎo Dān:

必有不蘄言而言不蘄哭而哭者是遁天倍情

There were certainly those who spoke without wishing to speak, those who cried without wishing to cry. This is to flee Heaven and turn one's back on *qíng*.[45]

The passage builds a dichotomy between the following of traditional rituals and the following of one's *qíng*: one who follows one's *qíng*, the text is implying, will not simply follow traditional customs for behavior. Heaven and *qíng* are thus linked, and both are presented as being in opposition to custom.

It was perhaps in response to notions such as these that Xúnzǐ emphasized so strongly the degree to which rituals were indeed an artifice–an artifice that was necessary to avoid the excesses that would come from following our *qíng*. But such a position also creates a problem: if Xúnzǐ wants to claim that the ancient rituals are artificial constructs of the sages, then why is it not acceptable for sages to arise now and create new artificial constructs? Why, in other words, should the traditions of the ancient kings be followed at all? To solve this possible problem, Xúnzǐ needs to argue that the ancient rituals are in fact correct–that they are the proper ones for humans to follow, and that it is not necessary to invent new ones. Xúnzǐ's move, therefore, is double-fold: he needs to argue that the ancient traditions are an artifice, but that they are proper for all times and must be followed.

And this explains the ambivalence for Xúnzǐ surrounding a term such as *qíng*. Xúnzǐ will define the mind, *xīn*, as something that, properly cultivated, will be able to generate the proper ritual order. As a polemic against those ideas at the time that would turn to *qíng* in opposition to ritual precedents, Xúnzǐ will then define *qíng* as those dispositions that need proper guidance and control by the artificial rituals of the sages. But he will on other occasions emphasize that such artificial rituals are proper by claiming that they allow for a nurturing of the fundamental qualities of man. In such places, *qíng* is

[45] *Zhuāngzǐ*, "Yǎng shēng zhǔ" 養生主 (chapter 3), SBBY, 2.3b; HY 8/3/17.

used much more to refer to those basic dispositions that allow humans to be properly human. Such a usage of *qíng* allows Xúnzǐ to root sagely activity in the mind, while still emphasizing the "naturalness" of the artifice of the mind.

The term *qíng*, therefore, occupies an ambivalent place in Xúnzǐ's thought, and, I have argued, this ambivalence arises from his larger project. He needs not only to demarcate the radical difference between the artifice of the ancient sages and the natural guidelines supported by so many other texts, but also to claim that the artifice of the ancient sages is, in some sense, fitting and proper for humans. At times, therefore, it is rhetorically advantageous to underline the difference between artifice and *qíng*, claiming that the teachings of the ancient sages involve controlling the basic dispositions of humans, and at times it is advantageous to argue that such teachings allow for a proper fulfillment of those dispositions.

Uses of the Term in the Huáinánzǐ

If part of Xúnzǐ's ambivalence concerning the term *qíng* can be explicated as a reaction against those attempts to utilize the term in opposition to the following of precedent, then the usages of the term in several chapters of the *Huáinánzǐ* show an even more radical development of precisely those tendencies that concerned Xúnzǐ so deeply. In two of the chapters that I will be discussing here, the "Jīngshén xùn" 精神訓 (chapter seven), and the "Fànlùn xùn" 氾論訓 (chapter thirteen), *qíng* becomes one of the primary terms that is utilized to argue strongly against the following of earlier precedent. I will accordingly ask why this usage of the term emerges and what claims are being made through such a usage.[46]

The "Jīngshén xùn", chapter seven of the *Huáinánzǐ*, is a lengthy discussion of the human self and the consequent ways in which the self must be cultivated.[47] One of the crucial claims of the chapter is

[46] My understanding of the usage of *qíng* in the *Huáinánzǐ* has been helped tremendously by the analysis given by Griet Vankeerbergen in her dissertation, *The Huainanzi and Liu An's Claim to Moral Authority* (Princeton University, 1996).

[47] My understanding of this chapter, and my translations of specific passages, have been aided greatly by the interpretation and translations offered by Harold Roth

that a sage follows *qíng*, rather than any kind of textual authority or cultural artifice.

The first claim in this larger argument occurs near the beginning of the chapter:

> 聖人法天順情不拘於俗不誘於人
> The sage models himself on Heaven and follows *qíng*. He does not adhere to custom, he is not seduced by men.[48]

The immediate move of the chapter is to claim an alternate basis of authority than tradition or custom: the sage is one who models himself upon Heaven and *qíng*. As in the *Zhuāngzǐ* passage discussed above, *qíng* is associated with Heaven, and placed in opposition to custom.

The text goes on to argue how one must cultivate oneself in order to achieve such a state. The goal of this cultivation is to bring oneself into accord with the patterns, or *lǐ*:

> 精神盛而氣不散則理理則均均則通通則神神則以視無不見以聽無不聞也以為無不成也
> When the quintessential and the spirit are flourishing and the *qì* is not dissipating, then one will be patterned (*lǐ*). When one is patterned, one will be balanced. When one is balanced, one will penetrate. When one penetrates, one will be spiritual (*shén*). When one is spiritual, one will thereby see without anything not being seen, one will thereby hear without anything not being heard, and one will thereby act without anything not being completed.[49]

The goal of the cultivation process is to make oneself patterned, and thus fully resonant, fully responsive, and fully able to act successfully.

Such a state is defined, among other ways, as according with *qíng* (*shì qíng* 適情):

in his "The Inner Cultivation Tradition of Early Daoism", *Religions of China in Practice*, edited by Donald S. Lopez (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 123-128 and 142-148, and by Claude Larre, *Le Traité VII du Houai Nan Tseu: Les Esprits Légers et Subtils Animateurs de L'Essence.* (Paris: Institute Ricci, 1982).

[48] *Huáinánzǐ*, "Jīngshén xùn", SBBY, 7.1a; ICS 7/54/28-7/55/1.

[49] *Huáinánzǐ*, "Jīngshén xùn", 7.2b; ICS 7/55/23-7/55/24.

聖人食足以接氣衣足以蓋形適情不求餘
The sage eats sufficiently so as to connect his *qì* and dresses sufficiently so as to cover his form. He accords with his *qíng* and does not seek what is superfluous.[50]

The sage simply knows what to do: he eats the proper amount and clothes himself in the proper way without seeking superfluities. This state of reacting properly in situations is a result of according with his *qíng*. Such a usage of the term clearly accords with that found in the *Xìng zì mìng chū*.

But note that, as defined here, one of the consequences of according with one's *qíng* is that one will not seek what is superfluous—exactly one of the reasons that Xúnzǐ calls, in the "Róngrù" chapter, for the mind to control the *qíng*. Here, *qíng* is not only granted normative status, but the rituals and measures that Xúnzǐ would call to regulate the *qíng* would, it is implied, be listed here as superfluities. Indeed, the text goes on to make this point directly:

衰世湊學不知原心反本直雕琢其性矯拂其情以與世交故目雖欲之禁以度心雖樂之節之以禮……外束其形內總其德鉗陰陽之和而迫性命之情故終身為悲人
A decaying age amasses learning, but does not understand making the heart originary and returning to the basis. They carve and polish their nature, constrain and oppose their *qíng* so as to link up with the age. Therefore, although the eye desires something, they restrain it with measures. Although the heart enjoys something, they modulate it with ritual... Outwardly they bind their form, and inwardly they manage their potency. They manacle the harmony of yin and yang and oppress the *qíng* of nature and fate. Therefore, during their entire lives they are lamentable.[51]

Although the object of the critique is not spelled out, the text later singles out the "Ruists" as the main culprit.[52]

In opposition to this, the text advocates the following:

[50] *Huáinánzǐ*, "Jīngshén xùn", 7.10a; ICS 7/59/16-7/59/17.

[51] *Huáinánzǐ*, "Jīngshén xùn", 7.11b; ICS 7/60/6-7/60/8.

[52] *Huáinánzǐ*, "Jīngshén xùn", 7.12a; ICS 7/60/13.

達至道者則不然理情性治心術養以和持以適樂道而忘賤安德而忘貧性有不欲無欲而不得心有不樂無樂而不為無益情者不以累德而不便性者不以滑和故縱體肆意而度制可以為天儀
He who penetrates the utmost Way, is not like this. He patterns (*lǐ*) his *qíng* and nature and brings order to the techniques of the mind. He nourishes them with harmony and supports them with what is appropriate (*shì*). He delights in the Way and forgets pettiness; he rests in potency and forgets poverty. As for his nature, there is that which it does not desire, but there is no desire that is not attained. As for his heart, there is that which it does not find joyous, but there is no joy that is not enacted. He who has nothing being added to *qíng* does not thereby bind potency, and he who does not make use of nature does not thereby gloss over harmony. Therefore, he lets go of himself and releases his thoughts, and the standards and measures can thereby become the model for all under Heaven.[53]

Instead of constraining and opposing the *qíng*, the authors are advocating a "patterning" of the *qíng* and nature (*lǐ qíng xìng* 理情性). The term here, *lǐ*, is the same as that used earlier in the chapter to describe the state achieved after the mind has successfully gathered the quintessential and spiritual in man. It is also the same term used by Xúnzǐ to describe the patterns that the sage creates–the patterns that allow the sage to fulfill his *qíng* and bring order to Heaven and Earth. And, of course, patterning one's *qíng* was the same phrase used in the *Xìng zì mìng chū* to describe the sages' acts of organizing the past traditions of sagely actions.

Precisely like the *Xìng zì mìng chū*, then, the text is calling for the practitioner to refine his *qíng*, and thereby to be able to act properly. Ironically, however, this position is presented as being antithetical to the following of textual traditions, and is explicitly presented in opposition to the Confucians. And, similarly, the text is using terminology quite reminiscent of at least parts of the Xúnzǐ, but, again with the opposite implication. In the *Xúnzǐ*, patterns (*lǐ*) are defined as the artifice given by man that will allow nature to be properly ordered. In the "Jīngshén xùn" chapter of the *Huáinánzǐ*, the patterns are presented as the natural patterns with which the sage hopes to come into accord.

[53] *Huáinánzǐ*, "Jīngshén xùn", 7.11b-12a; ICS 7/60/9-7/60/11.

And textual precedent and rituals are thus associated with an artifice that must be rejected.

The chapter thus roots legitimacy entirely in self-cultivation and cosmological understanding, rather than in transmitted textual authority. The sage is not one who has mastered a body of transmitted teachings from antiquity but is rather one who always acts properly insofar as he has brought his *qíng* in accord with the proper patterns of the universe. And the method for so doing involves not following transmitted teachings but rather cultivating oneself and refining one's *qì*.

A similar point is made as well in the "Fànlùn xùn", chapter thirteen of the *Huáinánzǐ*.[54] The "Fànlùn xùn" opens with a lengthy argument as to why sages must act in accordance with the changing times, and therefore cannot base their actions on what previous sages have done.[55] Thus, the text claims, the five thearchs and the three monarchies, "...changed in accord with the times" 因時變.[56]

Accordingly, the text concludes, it is wrong to seek guidance from textual authority:

> 王道缺而詩作周室廢禮義壞邇春秋作……皆衰世之造也……誦先王之詩書不若聞得其言聞得其言不若得其所以言得其所以言者言弗能言也故道可道者非常道也
> When the way of the kings splintered, the *Poetry* was created. When the house of Zhou was neglected and rituals and propriety fell to waste, the *Spring and Autumn Annals* was created... Both are products of ages of decline... To recite the poems and texts of the former kings is not as good as hearing and attaining their words. And hearing and attaining their words is not as good as attaining that about which they spoke. As for attaining that about which they spoke, speaking cannot speak it. Therefore: "The Way that can be spoken is not the enduring Way."[57]

[54] For a fuller discussion of the "Fànlùn xùn," see chapter four of my *The Ambivalence of Creation: Debates Concerning Innovation and Artifice in Early China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).

[55] See *Huáinánzǐ*, "Fànlùn xùn", 13.1a-2a; ICS 13/120/3-13/120/17.

[56] *Huáinánzǐ*, "Fànlùn xùn", 13.3a; ICS 13/120/25. The "three monarchies" refers to the Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties. The "five thearchs" refers to the five rulers who preceded the Xia dynasty. Who precisely these rulers are varies from text to text.

Unlike the *Xìng zì mìng chū*, which presented textual traditions as an organization of the earlier actions of the sages, the authors here present such texts as simply products of an age of degeneracy–simply attempts by the latter-born to recapture the attainments of the earlier sages. And, the authors argue, the attempt was foolhardy anyway, since words cannot explain what the early sages attained.

Moreover, since times change, one ought not seek to imitate the actions of the past sages anyway:

> 天下豈有常法哉
> How can all under Heaven have constant models?[58]

If however, textual precedent should not be the guide of the sages, then what should? Like Xúnzǐ, the text tries to root sagely action in the natural faculties. However, as we saw, Xúnzǐ did so in a way that emphasized the enduring importance of the ancient texts of the sages. But, if there is no universal artifice that should be followed through the ages, and if texts are denied the possibility of expressing authorial intent, then what should guide the actions of the sages? As with Xúnzǐ, the "Fànlùn xùn" argues that such guides should be located in something internal to the sage, but, in contrast to the Xúnzǐ, the text uses *qíng* as one of those anchors:

> 天下莫易於為善而莫難於為不善也所謂為善者靜而無為也所謂為不善者躁而多欲也適情辭餘無所誘惑循性保真無變於已故曰為善易
> Nothing under Heaven is easier than doing good, and nothing is more difficult than doing what is not good. That which I call doing good is being still and not acting consciously. That which I call doing what is not good is being frenzied and increasing one's desires. According with *qíng* and discarding what is superfluous, one will be without that which entices or deludes; following nature

[57] *Huáinánzǐ*, "Fànlùn xùn", 13.3b; ICS 13/121/8-13/121/13.

[58] *Huáinánzǐ*, "Fànlùn xùn", 13.4b; ICS 13/121/26.

and preserving the authentic, one will not alter what is within oneself. Therefore, I say: doing good is easy.[59]

Qíng is what is within oneself and, if it is accorded with properly, can provide a natural basis for always, spontaneously, undertaking correct actions.

Both of these chapters of the *Huáinánzǐ* thus utilize the term *qíng* to refer to the ways in which one will naturally and spontaneously react to given circumstances. As such, Hansen's definition of "reality feedback" is, for these usages, not unhelpful–as long as we keep in mind that such a "reality feedback" is thought of as a disposition to respond spontaneously and resonately. Such a usage, clearly, accords with that seen in the *Xìng zì mìng chū*. But the overall argument of the text is reminiscent of passages in texts like the *Zhuāngzǐ*, only here developed into a full politico-ethical argument as to the full autonomy of the sage from tradition and custom. As a term employed to refer to the affective dispositions of humans in contingent circumstances, *qíng* becomes one of the crucial bases on which the authors can define an atraditional definition of sagely authority. The notion of *qíng*, in other words, provides a ground for ethical activity in a way that allows the authors to deny any need for following the past.

Such statements, of course, are being made during the early portion of Hàn Wǔdì's reign (141-87 BC), when issues of empire and the degree to which one should or should not follow precedents from the past were coming to a head.[60] It is not surprising that it is within this context that one will find some of the more extreme statements concerning these issues, and thus some of the more extreme usages of the term *qíng*.

Dǒng Zhòngshū

It is perhaps in response to such rejections of textual precedence that some of Dǒng Zhòngshū's arguments can be explicated. Dǒng Zhòngshū was committed to the importance of following the traditions

[59] *Huáinánzǐ*, "Fànlùn xùn", 13.18b-19a; ICS 13/129/13-13/129/15.

[60] These issues are discussed in more detail in chapter four of my *The Ambivalence of Creation*

of Confucius–particularly the *Spring and Autumn Annals* 春秋–and he too was a major figure in the debates developing in the early portion of Hàn Wǔdì's reign.[61] The memorials he composed to Wǔdì were, among other things, admonitions for the emperor to begin basing Han statecraft on the principles laid out in the textual traditions organized by Confucius. And it is precisely here that one finds some of the strongest critiques of the notion of *qíng*:

> 天命之謂命，命非聖人不行；質樸之謂性，性非教化不成；人欲之謂情，情非度制不節。是故王者上謹於承天意，以順命也；下務明教化民，以成性也；正法度之宜，別上下之序，以防欲也。
>
> Heaven's command I call the mandate; the mandate can only be put into practice by a sage. One's substance I call nature; nature can only be completed through education. Human desire I call *qíng*; *qíng* can only be modulated (*jié* 節) through standards and regulations. It is for this reason that a king above is attentive to upholding the intent of Heaven so as to accord with the mandate, and below endeavors to clarify and educate the people so as to complete their nature. He corrects the appropriateness of the laws and standards and distinguishes the hierarchy of upper and lower so as to restrain their desires.[62]

The argument is in some ways reminiscent of the teleological claims we noted in the *Xìng zì mìng chū* and in strands of Xúnzǐ's thought: Dǒng Zhòngshū is emphasizing the necessity of human action in fulfilling and completing the process begun by nature. First of all, Heaven grants a mandate. but the sage must use it. Secondly, humans are granted a nature, but this nature can only be completed if it is transformed through education. And, finally, humans are given desires. But here the argument shifts away from a teleological one and more toward the vocabulary used in other parts of Xúnzǐ's arguments: the

[61] On Dǒng Zhòngshū, see Sarah Queen's extremely helpful *From Chronicle to Canon: The Hermeneutics of the Spring and Autumn Annals, According to Tung Chung-shu* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Griet Vankeerbergen also has an excellent discussion of Dǒng Zhòngshū and the *Huáinánzǐ* in her dissertation, *The Huainanzi and Liu An's Claim to Moral Authority*, pp. 378-399.

[62] *Hànshū*, 26.2515.

goal is not to fulfill one's *qíng* properly but rather to restrain and control it. And Dǒng Zhòngshū goes so far as to define *qíng* as simply desires. *Qíng* in this formulation does not refer to what is fundamental in humans, nor does it refer to one's spontaneous responses in situations. It rather refers to nothing other than desires, i.e, passions, and these must simply be controlled.

Like the authors of the *Xìng zì mìng chū*, and like Xúnzǐ, Dǒng Zhòngshū is attempting to defend the textual traditions of the ancient sages. By the early Han, however, the notion of *qíng*–the very term on which the *Xìng zì mìng chū* based its argument for following textual traditions–had come to be defined in explicit opposition to such concerns. It is perhaps in response to such developments that Dǒng Zhòngshū defined *qíng* as simply "desires", and thus as something that required complete control and restraint. Gone here is not only the support of the term seen in the *Xìng zì mìng chū*, but even the ambivalence seen in Xúnzǐ. Here, *qíng* is defined as nothing but desires.

Conclusion

Over the period covered in this paper, we have noted a fascinating shift in the usage of *qíng*. In the *Xìng zì mìng chū*, *qíng* was the crucial term that allowed the authors the means of defending earlier traditions as being both natural and necessary. With Xúnzǐ, we noted an ambivalence in the usage of the term: at times, Xúnzǐ defined *qíng* as simply emotions that must be controlled through the artifice of rituals, and at other times he presented such artifice as being precisely what was necessary to nourish properly and fulfill the *qíng*. By the time we get to Dǒng Zhòngshū, however, the term had come to be downgraded even more. *Qíng* came to be defined as nothing but desires that require constant restraint and regulation.

Much of the impetus for this shift, I have argued, came from the debate within which these figures were operating. If *qíng* was the term that the authors of the *Xìng zì mìng chū* saw as most beneficial to their program of supporting traditions from the past, that same term came to be utilized as well by figures who wished to make the precise opposite claims. Indeed, by the time one gets to the early

Han, the term had been picked up in portions of the *Huáinánzǐ* to argue that one ought not follow precedents at all: insofar as *qíng* involved one's spontaneous responses, one need only refine oneself to become ever more resonant, and ever more in accordance with *qíng*, to be able to act properly. It is in response to positions such as these, I have suggested, that Dǒng Zhòngshū came to define *qíng* in purely negative terms.

Looking over this debate, it is clear that many of the definitions modern scholars have attributed to *qíng* did indeed appear, but it is only by the early Han that these various definitions came to be distinguished clearly. As we noted, the usages that appeared in the *Xìng zì mìng chū* were associated generally with a sense of idealized emotional dispositions, but any attempt to translate *qíng* in such a text as either simply "reality response" (with no affective sense) or simply "emotions" would be misleading. By the time we get into the intense debates that characterized the early Han, however, these definitions do become distinguishable. The usage of *qíng* in the "Jīngshén xùn" and "Fànlùn xùn" chapters of the *Huáinánzǐ* does come in some ways close to "reality response", while the usage in Dǒng Zhòngshū can indeed be translated as "passions".

But the fact that these definitions do not become tightly distinguished until so late should show how incorrect it would be to read any of them as what Hansen would call the "single, unified meaning" of the term. And it would be equally unconvincing to read the early Han usages as reflecting a simple semantic shift in the term from meaning X to meaning Y. Instead, these various usages represent the ways that the term, which clearly had a broad semantic range to begin with, had come to be employed and utilized in these debates. As a consequence of the development of these debates, specific shades of meaning came to be emphasized by particular thinkers in opposition to those shades utilized by other thinkers, thus leading to a gradual refinement of and distinction between various connotations in the term.

Insofar as I have been focusing exclusively in this paper on the debate surrounding the following of traditions and the reasons and ways that the term *qíng* was utilized in this debate, I have by necessity discussed only a limited number of texts. A full study of the semantic range of *qíng* in early China will require analyses of more texts and

more of the debates within which the term was utilized, as well as full analyses of those other terms against which *qíng* was often defined–terms such as *xìng* (nature) and *yù* (desires). But I do hope I have made a small contribution to such a study by analyzing at least some of the rich ways that the term *qíng* was employed, defined, and debated in the early period, and by pointing out that some of the specific definitions of *qíng* discussed by recent scholars as representing the basic meaning of the term in fact emerged in the course of that debate itself.