

Appendix Table 1: Randomization Check for Card Treatment

	N (1)	Means		Difference Between Treatment and Control	
		Control (2)	Treatment (3)	No Controls (4)	Stratum Fixed Effects (5)
Log consumption	5,718	13.11	13.11	0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
PMT Score	5,720	12.79	12.79	0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Household Head Years of Education	5,693	7.14	7.28	0.14 (0.18)	0.16 (0.13)
RT Head Years of Education	570	7.95	8.34	0.39 (0.31)	0.45 (0.27)
Village Distance to Kecamatan	572	6.48	7.27	0.79 (1.16)	0.51 (0.97)
Percentage of agriculture households in RT	572	0.07	0.07	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)
Log Number of Households in RT	572	4.20	4.28	0.08* (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)
Number of Primary Schools per 1,000 Households	572	2.74	2.62	-0.12 (0.12)	-0.12 (0.11)
Log village size	572	4.02	3.95	-0.07 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.06)
Number of Religious buildings per 1,000 Households	572	4.88	4.75	-0.12 (0.32)	-0.04 (0.22)
Joint test Chi square				9.38	12.10
Joint test P-value				0.81	0.60

Note: This table provides a check on the randomization for the main card treatment. The data come from the baseline survey. Columns 2 and 3 report the averages of the row outcomes in the control and treatment groups, respectively. We then provide the difference in means with no controls (Column 4) and with strata fixed effects (Column 5). Joint significance Chi square tests across the multiple outcomes are reported. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Appendix Table 2: Randomization Check for Card Variations

	(1)	Public – Standard Information (2)	Cards to all - Bottom 10 (3)	Price - No Price (4)	Coupons - No Coupons (5)
Log consumption	3,779	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)
PMT Score	3,780	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)
Household Head Years of Education	3,765	-0.15 (0.17)	0.01 (0.17)	-0.03 (0.18)	-0.11 (0.18)
RT Head Years of Education	376	-0.17 (0.39)	0.36 (0.37)	0.12 (0.38)	-0.52 (0.38)
Village Distance to Kecamatan	378	-1.25 (0.92)	1.49 (1.81)	3.73* (2.03)	2.11 (1.71)
Percentage of agriculture households in RT	378	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Log Number of Households in RT	378	0.04 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)
Number of Primary Schools per 1,000 Households	378	-0.12 (0.16)	0.06 (0.13)	0.14 (0.14)	-0.21 (0.14)
Log village size	378	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.08)
Number of Religious buildings per 1,000 Households	378	-0.25 (0.32)	-0.21 (0.26)	0.66** (0.29)	0.16 (0.30)
Joint test Chi square		11.90	14.41	14.91	23.99
Joint test P-value		0.61	0.42	0.38	0.05

Note: This table provides a check on the randomization for card variations. The data come from the baseline survey. All of the differences presented are conditional on strata fixed effects. In the last two rows, we additionally report the joint significance Chi square tests across the multiple outcomes in each columns. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 3: Reduced Form Effect of Card Treatment on Card Receipt and Use, By Follow-Up Survey

	Eligible Households			Ineligible Households		
	Received Card (1)	Used Card (2)	Knows own status (3)	Received Card (4)	Used Card (5)	Knows own status (6)
<i>Panel A: Follow-Up 1</i>						
Card Treatment	0.29*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.05 (0.04)
Observations	2,225	2,225	2,224	897	897	897
Control Group Mean	0.07	0.04	0.37	0.08	0.03	0.32
<i>Panel B: Follow-Up 2</i>						
Card Treatment	0.28*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)	0.01 (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
Observations	1,778	1,778	1,778	1,756	1,756	1,756
Control Group Mean	0.05	0.07	0.24	0.03	0.05	0.39
P-Value of Difference	0.719	0.873	0.137	0.740	0.565	0.782

Notes: This table provides the reduced form effect of belonging to the card treatment group on card receipt, use, and knowledge by eligibility status, by survey round. Only households sampled using comparable sampling frames in each survey wave are included in each regression. Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom ten treatment are dropped from the sample and we reweight the treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same. Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the treatment, sub-district fixed effects and dummy variables for the previous experimental design. We also provide the difference between survey waves. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 4: Reduced Form Effect of Card Treatment on Card Receipt and Use, Varying Controls

	Eligible Households			Ineligible Households		
	Received Card (1)	Used Card (2)	Knows own status (3)	Received Card (4)	Used Card (5)	Knows own status (6)
<i>Panel A: No Controls</i>						
Card Treatment	0.28*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)
<i>Panel B: Adding Month Fixed Effects to Table 2 specification</i>						
Card Treatment	0.28*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.02** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.04* (0.02)
<i>Panel C: Adding Additional Baseline Controls to Table 2 specification</i>						
Card Treatment Controls and Additional Controls	0.28*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.02** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.04* (0.02)
Observations	5,693	5,693	5,691	3,619	3,619	3,619
Control Group Mean	0.06	0.06	0.30	0.05	0.05	0.35

Note: This table replicates Table 2, but with varying sets of controls. In Panel A, we omit all control variables. In Panel B, we add month fixed effects to the specification in Table 2, while we additionally include the 10 baseline variables from Appendix Table 1 in Panel C. Standard errors are clustered by village.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 5: Reduced Form Effect of Card Treatment on Card Receipt and Use, Regional Heterogeneity

	Eligible Households			Ineligible Households		
	Received Card	Used Card	Knows own status	Received Card	Used Card	Knows own status
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Card Treatment x Java	0.38*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.04** (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.04)
Card Treatment x Off Java	0.23*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
<i>Difference:</i>						
Treatment Java - Treatment Off Java	0.15*** (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)
Observations	5,693	5,693	5,691	3,619	3,619	3,619
Control Group Mean	0.06	0.06	0.30	0.05	0.05	0.35

Note: This table provides the reduced form effect of belonging to the card treatment group interacted with region on card receipt and use by eligibility status. Java is a dummy for the 96 villages located on the island of Java, and Off-Java is a dummy for the remaining 372 villages. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up survey. Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom ten treatment are dropped from the sample and we reweight the treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same. Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the treatment, the interaction with region, sub-district fixed effects, survey sample dummies and dummy variables for the previous experimental design. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 6: Reduced Form Effect of Card Treatment on Rice Purchases and Price, Varying Controls

	Eligible Households				Ineligible Households			
	Bought in the Last 2 Months (1)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (2)	Price (Rp.) (3)	Subsidy (Rp.) (4)	Bought in the Last 2 Months (5)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (6)	Price (Rp.) (7)	Subsidy (Rp.) (8)
<i>Panel A: No Controls</i>								
Card Treatment	0.00 (0.02)	1.25 ^{***} (0.27)	-49 (33)	7,310 ^{***} (1,487)	-0.09 ^{***} (0.03)	0.09 (0.21)	-5 (36)	525 (1,149)
<i>Panel B: Adding Month Fixed Effects to Table 3 Specification</i>								
Card Treatment	0.01 (0.01)	1.20 ^{***} (0.24)	-60 ^{***} (18)	7,134 ^{***} (1,367)	-0.07 ^{***} (0.02)	0.07 (0.19)	-39 [*] (23)	559 (1,041)
<i>Panel C: Adding Additional Baseline Controls to Table 3 Specification</i>								
Card Treatment	0.01 (0.01)	1.20 ^{***} (0.24)	-60 ^{***} (18)	7,136 ^{***} (1,373)	-0.07 ^{***} (0.02)	0.07 (0.19)	-37 (23)	555 (1,044)
Observations	5,693	5,690	4,880	5,690	3,619	3,619	2,283	3,619
Control Group Mean	0.83	5.30	2,263	28,781	0.68	3.42	2,272	18,428

Note: This table replicates Table 3, but with varying sets of controls. In Panel A, we omit all control variables. In Panel B, we add month fixed effects to the specification in Table 3, while we additionally include the 10 baseline variables from Appendix Table 1 in Panel C. Standard errors are clustered by village.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 7: Reduced Form Effect of Card Treatment on Rice Purchases and Price, Regional Heterogeneity

	Eligible Households				Ineligible Households			
	Bought in the Last 2 Months (1)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (2)	Price (Rp.) (3)	Subsidy (Rp.) (4)	Bought in the Last 2 Months (5)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (6)	Price (Rp.) (7)	Subsidy (Rp.) (8)
Card Treatment x Java	0.04* (0.02)	1.70*** (0.40)	-60** (28)	10,214*** (2,409)	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.10 (0.24)	-38 (32)	-482 (1,435)
Card Treatment x Off Java	-0.00 (0.02)	0.94*** (0.31)	-60** (24)	5,508*** (1,661)	-0.08*** (0.03)	0.17 (0.26)	-37 (32)	1,167 (1,425)
<i>Difference:</i>								
Treatment Java – Treatment Off Java	0.05 (0.03)	0.76 (0.50)	-0 (36)	4,706 (2,925)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.27 (0.36)	-1 (45)	-1,648 (2,021)
Observations	5,693	5,690	4,880	5,690	3,619	3,619	2,283	3,619
Control Group Mean	0.83	5.30	2,263	28,781	0.68	3.42	2,272	18,428

Note: This table replicates Table 3, but with varying sets of controls. In Panel A, we omit all control variables. In Panel B, we add month fixed effects to the specification in Table 3, while we additionally include the 10 baseline variables from Appendix Table 1 in Panel C. Standard errors are clustered by village.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 8: Reduced Form Effect of Card Treatment on Rice Purchases and Price, By Follow-Up Survey

	Eligible Households				Ineligible Households			
	Bought in the Last 2 Months (1)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (2)	Price (Rp.) (3)	Subsidy (Rp.) (4)	Bought in the Last 2 Months (5)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (6)	Price (Rp.) (7)	Subsidy (Rp.) (8)
<i>Panel A: Follow-Up 1</i>								
Card Treatment	0.02 (0.02)	1.19 ^{***} (0.35)	-22 (24)	7,046 ^{***} (1,969)	-0.08 [*] (0.04)	-0.08 (0.43)	1 (35)	-482 (2,405)
Observations	2,225	2,223	1,800	2,223	897	897	519	897
Control Group Mean	0.82	5.74	2,262	31,921	0.67	4.11	2218	22,944
<i>Panel B: Follow-Up 2</i>								
Card Treatment	0.00 (0.02)	0.79 ^{***} (0.28)	-97 ^{***} (29)	4,886 ^{***} (1,510)	-0.11 ^{***} (0.03)	-0.05 (0.18)	-44 (33)	-158 (982)
Observations	1,778	1,778	1,576	1,778	1,756	1,756	1,115	1,756
Control Group Mean	0.85	4.96	2,286	26,090	0.68	2.95	2,306	15,464
P-Value of Difference	0.665	0.276	0.023	0.299	0.460	0.950	0.317	0.896

Note: This table provides the reduced form effect of belonging to the card treatment group on card receipt and use by eligibility status, separately for the first and second follow-up survey. Only households sampled using comparable sampling frames in each survey wave are included in each regression. Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom ten treatment are dropped from the sample and we reweight the treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same. For each household, the variables for amount purchased, price and subsidy are averages over the past four months; the current month is dropped if the interview occurred before the 25th day of the month. The amount and subsidy are set equal to zero if the household does not purchase any Raskin rice, whereas the price is calculated among purchasing households. Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the treatment, sub-district fixed effects, survey sample dummies and dummy variables for the previous experimental design. We also provide the difference between survey waves. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 9: Reduced Form Effect of Card Treatment on Rice Purchases and Price, Conditional on Purchase

	Eligible Households			Ineligible Households		
	Amount Purchased (Kg)	Price (Rp.)	Subsidy (Rp.)	Amount Purchased (Kg)	Price (Rp.)	Subsidy (Rp.)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Card Treatment	1.210 ^{***} (0.255)	-60 ^{***} (18.2)	7,189 ^{***} (1,449)	0.562 ^{**} (0.225)	-37 (22.8)	3,364 ^{***} (1,245)
Observations	4,884	4,880	4,884	2,286	2,283	2,286
Control Group Mean	6.26	2,263	33,982	5.07	2,272	27,292

Note: This table provides the reduced form effect of belonging to the card treatment group on card receipt and use by eligibility status, for the households that report buying subsidized rice. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up surveys. Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom ten treatment are dropped from the sample and we reweight the treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same. For each household, the variables for amount purchased, price and subsidy are averages over the past four months; the current month is dropped if the interview occurred before the 25th day of the month. The amount and subsidy are set equal to zero if the household does not purchase any Raskin rice, whereas the price is calculated among purchasing households. Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the treatment, sub-district fixed effects, survey sample dummies and dummy variables for the previous experimental design. Standard errors are clustered by village.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 10: Effect of Only Distributing Cards to the Bottom 10 Percent on Card Receipt and Use, Including Other Sub-treatments as Controls

	Bottom 10 Households			Other Eligible Households			Ineligible Households		
	Received Card (1)	Used Card (2)	Knows Own Status (3)	Received Card (4)	Used Card (5)	Knows Own Status (6)	Received Card (7)	Used Card (8)	Knows Own Status (9)
Card to Bottom 10	0.24*** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)
Cards to All	0.25*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.27*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.08** (0.04)	0.04** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)
<i>Difference:</i> Bottom 10 – All	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.24*** (0.03)	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Observations	3,683	3,683	3,683	2,968	2,968	2,966	3,619	3,619	3,619
Control Group Mean	0.07	0.07	0.32	0.06	0.06	0.28	0.05	0.05	0.35

Note: This table provides the reduced form effect of belonging to the bottom ten and all cards treatment groups on card receipt and use, by eligibility status, as compared to the control group. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up survey. Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the two treatments, sub-district fixed effects, all other treatments (public information, price, and coupons), survey sample dummies, and dummy variables for the previous experimental design. We also provide the difference in the two card treatments. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 11: Effect of Only Distributing Cards to the Bottom 10 Percent on Rice Purchases and Price, Including Other Sub-treatments as Controls

	Bottom 10 Households				Other Eligible Households				Ineligible Households			
	Bought in the Last 2 Months (1)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (2)	Price (Rp.) (3)	Subsidy (Rp.) (4)	Bought in the Last 2 Months (5)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (6)	Price (Rp.) (7)	Subsidy (Rp.) (8)	Bought in the Last 2 Months (9)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (10)	Price (Rp.) (11)	Subsidy (Rp.) (12)
Cards to Bottom 10	0.02 (0.02)	0.20 (0.41)	-33 (29)	1,293 (2,328)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.13 (0.38)	-26 (40)	948 (2,154)	0.02 (0.04)	0.45 (0.29)	-31 (32)	2,550 (1,601)
Cards to All	-0.01 (0.02)	0.14 (0.43)	-37 (31)	1,121 (2,411)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.64 (0.43)	-67* (36)	4,055* (2,420)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.45 (0.33)	-34 (35)	2,605 (1,812)
<i>Difference:</i> Bottom 10 – All	0.03 (0.02)	0.06 (0.37)	5 (22)	172 (2073)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.52 (0.33)	41 (28)	-3,107* (1,841)	0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.23)	2 (25)	-55 (1,248)
Observations	3,683	3,682	3,188	3,682	2,968	2,966	2,507	2,966	3,619	3,619	2,283	3,619
Control Group Mean	0.84	5.43	2271	29,457	0.82	5.15	2,252	27,941	0.68	3.42	2,272	18,428

Note: This table provides the reduced form effect of belonging to the bottom ten and all cards treatment groups rice purchases, by eligibility status, as compared to the control group. For each household, the variables for amount purchased, price and subsidy are averages over the past four months; the current month is dropped if the interview occurred before the 25th day of the month. The amount and subsidy are set equal to zero if the household does not purchase any Raskin rice, whereas the price is calculated among purchasing households. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up survey. Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the two treatments, sub-district fixed effects, all other treatments (public information, price, and coupons), survey sample dummies, and dummy variables for the previous experimental design. We also provide the difference in the two card treatments. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 12: Effect of Distributing Cards with Coupons on Card Receipt and Use, Including Other Sub-treatments as Controls

	Eligible Households			Ineligible Households		
	Received Card (1)	Used Card (2)	Used Coupon (3)	Received Card (4)	Used Card (5)	Used Coupon (6)
Cards with Coupons	0.25 ^{***} (0.04)	0.10 ^{***} (0.03)	0.06 ^{***} (0.02)	0.04 ^{**} (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 [*] (0.01)
Cards without Coupons	0.26 ^{***} (0.04)	0.10 ^{***} (0.04)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.04 [*] (0.02)	0.04 [*] (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)
<i>Difference:</i>						
Coupons – No Coupons	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.06 ^{***} (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)
Observations	5,693	5,693	5,693	3,619	3,619	3,619
Control Group Mean	0.06	0.06	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.01

Note: This table provides the reduced form effect of belonging to the Coupons and No Coupons treatment groups on card receipt and use, by eligibility status, as compared to the control group. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up survey. Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom ten treatment are dropped from the sample and we reweight the treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same. Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the two treatments, sub-district fixed effects, all other treatments (public information, price, and cards to bottom 10), survey sample dummies, and dummy variables for the previous experimental design. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 13: Effect of Distributing Cards with Coupons on Rice Purchases and Price, Including Other Sub-treatments as Controls

	Eligible Households				Ineligible Households			
	Bought in the Last 2 Months (1)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (2)	Price (Rp.) (3)	Subsidy (Rp.) (4)	Bought in the Last 2 Months (5)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (6)	Price (Rp.) (7)	Subsidy (Rp.) (8)
Cards with Coupons	0.01 (0.02)	0.54 (0.40)	-26 (27)	3,469 (2,223)	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.13 (0.29)	13 (32)	-717 (1,559)
Cards without Coupons	-0.01 (0.02)	0.27 (0.41)	-56* (31)	1,860 (2,322)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.47 (0.33)	-29 (35)	2,706 (1,791)
<i>Difference:</i>								
Coupons – No Coupons	0.03 (0.02)	0.27 (0.34)	30 (25)	1,609 (1,898)	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.60** (0.23)	41 (26)	-3,423*** (1,261)
Observations	5,693	5,690	4,880	5,690	3,619	3,619	2,283	3,619
Control Group Mean	0.83	5.30	2,263	28,781	0.68	3.42	2,272	18,428

Note: This table provides the reduced form effect of belonging to the Coupon and No Coupon treatment groups on rice purchases by eligibility status. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up survey. Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom ten treatment are dropped from the sample and we reweight the treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same. For each household, the variables for amount purchased, price and subsidy are averages over the past four months; the current month is dropped if the interview occurred before the 25th day of the month. The amount and subsidy are set equal to zero if the household does not purchase any Raskin rice, whereas the price is calculated among purchasing households. Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the two treatments, sub-district fixed effects, all other treatments (public information, price, and cards to bottom 10), survey sample dummies, and dummy variables for the previous experimental design. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 14: Effect of Printing Price on Cards on Card Receipt and Use, Including Other Subtreatments as Controls

	Eligible Households		Ineligible Households	
	Received Card (1)	Used Card (2)	Received Card (3)	Used Card (4)
Cards with Printed Price	0.25 ^{***} (0.04)	0.15 ^{***} (0.03)	0.05 ^{**} (0.02)	0.07 ^{***} (0.03)
Cards without Price	0.26 ^{***} (0.04)	0.10 ^{***} (0.04)	0.04 [*] (0.02)	0.04 [*] (0.02)
<i>Difference:</i>				
Price - No Price	-0.01 (0.03)	0.05 [*] (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Observations	5,688	5,688	3,615	3,615
Control Group Mean	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.05

Note: This table provides the reduced form effect of belonging to the price and no price treatment groups on card receipt and use, by eligibility status, as compared to the control group. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up survey. Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom ten treatment are dropped from the sample and we reweight the treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same. Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the two treatments, sub-district fixed effects, all other treatments (public information, coupons, and cards to bottom 10), survey sample dummies, and dummy variables for the previous experimental design. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 15: Effect of Printing Price on Cards on Rice Purchases and Price, Including Other Subtreatments as Controls

	Eligible Households				Ineligible Households			
	Bought in the Last 2 Months (1)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (2)	Price (Rp.) (3)	Subsidy (Rp.) (4)	Bought in the Last 2 Months (5)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (6)	Price (Rp.) (7)	Subsidy (Rp.) (8)
Cards with Printed Price	-0.01 (0.02)	0.94** (0.42)	-68** (32)	5,667** (2,395)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.38 (0.32)	-58 (37)	2,463 (1,760)
Cards without Price	-0.01 (0.02)	0.29 (0.42)	-50 (31)	1,953 (2,328)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.41 (0.33)	-33 (35)	2,358 (1,813)
<i>Difference:</i> Price - No Price	-0.00 (0.02)	0.66* (0.37)	-19 (24)	3,715* (2,063)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.23)	-25 (25)	105 (1,272)
Observations	5,688	5,685	4,876	5,685	3,615	3,615	2,281	3,615
Control Group Mean	0.83	5.30	2,263	28,781	0.68	3.42	2,272	18,428

Note: This table provides the reduced form effect of belonging to the price and no price treatment groups on rice purchases by eligibility status. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up survey. Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom ten treatment are dropped from the sample and we reweight the treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same. For each household, the variables for amount purchased, price and subsidy are averages over the past four months; the current month is dropped if the interview occurred before the 25th day of the month. The amount and subsidy are set equal to zero if the household does not purchase any Raskin rice, whereas the price is calculated among purchasing households. Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the two treatments, sub-district fixed effects, all other treatments (public information, coupons, and cards to bottom 10), survey sample dummies, and dummy variables for the previous experimental design. We also provide the difference in the two card treatments. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 16: Effect of Printing Price on Cards on Rice Purchases and Price, Conditional on Public Information

	Eligible Households				Ineligible Households			
	Bought in the Last 2 Months (1)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (2)	Price (Rp.) (3)	Subsidy (Rp.) (4)	Bought in the Last 2 Months (5)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (6)	Price (Rp.) (7)	Subsidy (Rp.) (8)
Cards with Printed Price x Public Information	-0.01 (0.02)	0.55 (0.54)	-42 (33)	3,216 (3,022)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.35 (0.36)	-26 (38)	-2,016 (1,969)
Cards without Price x Public Information	0.00 (0.02)	1.02** (0.44)	-18 (31)	5,708** (2,503)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.28 (0.34)	-35 (35)	1,720 (1,822)
Cards with Printed Price	0.01 (0.02)	1.23*** (0.40)	-49* (29)	7,249*** (2,304)	-0.07** (0.03)	0.25 (0.28)	-38 (31)	1,654 (1,545)
Cards without Printed Price	0.01 (0.02)	0.36 (0.36)	-40 (25)	2,416 (1,982)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.09 (0.28)	-4 (29)	-560 (1,479)
<i>Difference:</i> Price and Public – Price and Standard	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.68 (0.85)	7 (55)	-4,033 (4,809)	0.049 (0.064)	-0.602 (0.576)	12 (60)	-3,669 (3,129)
Observations	5,688	5,685	4,876	5,685	3,615	3,615	2,281	3,615
Control Group Mean	0.83	5.30	2,263	28,781	0.68	3.42	2,272	18,428

Note: This table provides the reduced form effect of belonging to the price and no price treatment groups on rice purchases by eligibility status, conditional on public information. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up survey. Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom ten treatment are dropped from the sample and we reweight the treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same. For each household, the variables for amount purchased, price and subsidy are averages over the past four months; the current month is dropped if the interview occurred before the 25th day of the month. The amount and subsidy are set equal to zero if the household does not purchase any Raskin rice, whereas the price is calculated among purchasing households. Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the two treatments, interactions of the two treatments with public information, sub-district fixed effects, survey sample dummies, and dummy variables for the previous experimental design. We also provide the difference in the two card treatments. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 17: Effect of Printing Price on Cards on Minimum and Maximum Prices in the Village

	All Households			Eligible Households			Ineligible Households		
	Average Price (Rp.) (1)	Min Price (Rp.) (2)	Max Price (Rp.) (3)	Average Price (Rp.) (4)	Min Price (Rp.) (5)	Max Price (Rp.) (6)	Average Price (Rp.) (7)	Min Price (Rp.) (8)	Max Price (Rp.) (9)
Cards with Printed Price	-52** (22)	-45* (24)	-92** (43)	-53** (23)	-8 (24)	-120*** (39)	-57** (28)	-63** (26)	-58 (36)
Cards without Printed Price	-22 (21)	-25 (23)	-10 (46)	-31 (22)	1 (23)	-94** (42)	-20 (25)	-24 (24)	-21 (34)
<i>Difference:</i> Price – No Price	-30 (24)	-20 (25)	-82* (48)	-22 (25)	-10 (25)	-26 (44)	-37 (27)	-39 (25)	-37 (37)
Observations	1,096	1,096	1,096	1,073	1,073	1,073	922	922	922
Control Group Mean	2,263	2,055	2,581	2,261	2,082	2,514	2,260	2,160	2,374

Note: This table provides the reduced form effect of belonging to the price and no price treatment groups on average, minimum, and maximum prices in the village, as compared to the control group. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up survey. The average price is calculated as the average price in the village separately for each survey wave, using only information from households that actually purchased Raskin (where price is observed). Columns 1-3 examine village average, minimum, and maximum price calculated over all surveyed households; Columns 4-6 calculate over only eligible households; and Columns 7-9 calculate over only ineligible households. Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the two treatments, sub-district fixed effects, and dummy variables for the previous experimental design. We also provide the difference in the two card treatments. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 18: Effect of Public Information on Seeing the Eligibility List, Dropping “Do Not Know” Answers

	Eligible (1)	Ineligible (2)	Village officials (3)	Informal Leaders (4)
<i>Panel A: Respondent has seen the list</i>				
Public Information	0.14*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.06)	0.14*** (0.05)
Standard Information	0.02* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.04 (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)
<i>Difference:</i>				
Public - Standard	0.12*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.16** (0.06)	0.12** (0.06)
Observations	5,379	3,443	485	375
Control Group Mean	0.07	0.06	0.34	0.14
<i>Panel B: Respondent believes that stated category of individuals has seen the list</i>				
Public Information	0.48*** (0.07)	0.38*** (0.05)	0.21*** (0.06)	0.34*** (0.07)
Standard Information	0.11* (0.06)	0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.06)	0.10 (0.06)
<i>Difference:</i>				
Public - Standard	0.36*** (0.07)	0.37*** (0.06)	0.18*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.07)
Observations	5,530	5,324	5,661	5,151
Control Group Mean	0.53	0.28	1.78	0.87

Note: This table replicates Table 8, but drops the observations if the individual answered “do not know.” In Panel A, the sample is the stated category in the column and the outcome is a dummy indicating whether the individual has seen the eligibility list. Panel B includes all survey respondents. The outcome is whether the respondent believes that individuals of the stated category have seen the list; the variable is scaled between 0 and 3, where 0 corresponds to “have not seen the list” and 3 corresponds to “most have seen the list.” Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up survey. Each regression is estimated by OLS and includes sub-district fixed effects, survey sample dummies and dummy variables for the previous experimental design. We also provide the difference in the two card treatments. Standard errors are clustered by village *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 19: Effect of Public Information on Beneficiary Status Knowledge, by Eligibility Status

	Eligible (1)	Ineligible (2)	Village officials (3)	Informal Leaders (4)
<i>Panel A: Respondent is Eligible</i>				
Public Information	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Standard Information	0.00 (0.01)	0.04** (0.02)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
<i>Difference:</i>				
Public - Standard	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)
Observations	38,915	21,071	2,560	2,468
Control Group Mean	0.66	0.31	0.59	0.62
<i>Panel B: Respondent is Ineligible</i>				
Public Information	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
Standard Information	-0.00 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.05 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
<i>Difference:</i>				
Public - Standard	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.08* (0.04)
Observations	25,625	13,684	1,602	1,747
Control Group Mean	0.67	0.34	0.58	0.67

Note: This table replicates Table 9 by eligibility status of the respondent. The outcome is whether the individual correctly identified other households in their village within each of the categories listed in the columns. “Do not know” answers are coded as zero. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up survey. Each regression is estimated by OLS and includes sub-district fixed effects, survey sample dummies and dummy variables for the previous experimental design. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 20: Effect of Public Information on Card Receipt and Use, Including Other Sub-treatments as Controls

	Eligible Households		Ineligible Households	
	Received Card (1)	Used Card (2)	Received Card (3)	Used Card (4)
Public Information	0.32 ^{***} (0.03)	0.16 ^{***} (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Standard Information	0.26 ^{***} (0.04)	0.10 ^{***} (0.04)	0.04 [*] (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
<i>Difference:</i>				
Public - Standard	0.06 [*] (0.03)	0.06 ^{**} (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Observations	5,685	5,685	3,619	3,619
Control Group Mean	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.05

Note: This table provides the reduced form effect of advertising treatment groups on card receipt and use, by eligibility status, as compared to the control group. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up survey. Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom ten treatment are dropped from the sample and we reweight the treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same. Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the two treatments, sub-district fixed effects, all other treatments (price, coupons, and cards to bottom 10), survey sample dummies and dummy variables for the previous experimental design. We also provide the difference in the two card treatments. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 21: Effect of Public Information on Rice Purchases and Price, Including Other Sub-treatments as Controls

	Eligible Households				Ineligible Households			
	Bought in the Last 2 Months (1)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (2)	Price (Rp.) (3)	Subsidy (Rp.) (4)	Bought in the Last 2 Months (5)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (6)	Price (Rp.) (7)	Subsidy (Rp.) (8)
Public Information	-0.01 (0.02)	1.11 ^{***} (0.42)	-87 ^{***} (28)	6,649 ^{***} (2,363)	-0.07 ^{**} (0.03)	0.40 (0.32)	-57 [*] (32)	2,379 (1,773)
Standard Information	-0.01 (0.02)	0.29 (0.42)	-51 (31)	1,978 (2,337)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.40 (0.33)	-34 (35)	2,367 (1,801)
<i>Difference:</i>								
Public - Standard	-0.00 (0.02)	0.82 ^{**} (0.36)	-37 [*] (22)	4,671 ^{**} (1,996)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.24)	-24 (25)	12 (1,324)
Observations	5,685	5,682	4,872	5,682	3,619	3,619	2,283	3,619
Control Group Mean	0.83	5.30	2,263	28,781	0.68	3.42	2,272	18,428

Note: This table provides the reduced form effect of advertising treatment groups on rice purchases, by eligibility status, as compared to the control group. Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom ten treatment are dropped from the sample and we reweight the treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same. For each household, the variables for amount purchased, price and subsidy are averages over the past four months; the current month is dropped if the interview occurred before the 25th day of the month. The amount and subsidy are set equal to zero if the household does not purchase any Raskin rice, whereas the price is calculated among purchasing households. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up survey. Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the two treatments, sub-district fixed effects, all other treatments (price, coupons, and cards to bottom 10), survey sample dummies and dummy variables for the previous experimental design. We also provide the difference in the two card treatments. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 22: Effect of Public Information on Card Receipt and Use, By Follow-Up Survey

	Eligible Households		Ineligible Households	
	Received Card (1)	Used Card (2)	Received Card (3)	Used Card (4)
<i>Panel A: Follow Up 1</i>				
<i>Difference:</i>				
Public – Standard	0.06 (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.02)
Observations	2,210	2,210	897	897
Control Group Mean	0.07	0.04	0.08	0.03
<i>Panel B: Follow Up 2</i>				
<i>Difference:</i>				
Public – Standard	0.03 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Observations	1,777	1,777	1,752	1,752
Control Group Mean	0.05	0.07	0.03	0.05
P-value of Difference	0.396	0.985	0.000	0.242

Note: This table reports the difference between coefficients for public and standard information in an OLS regression of the two treatments, sub-district fixed effects, survey sample dummies and dummy variables for the previous experimental design separately for each survey wave. The main coefficients are not reported but are available from the authors upon request. Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom ten treatment are dropped from the sample and we reweight the treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same. We also provide the difference in difference between public and standard information between the two survey waves. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 23: Effect of Public Information on Rice Purchases and Price, By Follow-Up Survey

	Eligible Households				Ineligible Households			
	Bought in the Last 2 Months (1)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (2)	Price (Rp.) (3)	Subsidy (Rp.) (4)	Bought in the Last 2 Months (5)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (6)	Price (Rp.) (7)	Subsidy (Rp.) (8)
<i>Panel A: Follow Up 1</i>								
<i>Difference:</i> Public – Standard	0.03 (0.03)	0.94* (0.54)	-38 (30)	5,459* (3,031)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.49)	-52 (41)	28 (2,708)
Observations	2,210	2,208	1,785	2,208	897	897	519	897
<i>Panel B: Follow Up 2</i>								
<i>Difference:</i> Public – Standard	0.02 (0.03)	0.69* (0.36)	-13 (30)	3,695* (1,990)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.26)	-12 (38)	-561 (1,358)
Observations	1,777	1,777	1,575	1,777	1,752	1,752	1,112	1,752
P-value of Difference	0.815	0.658	0.483	0.577	0.559	0.877	0.454	0.838

Note: This table reports the difference between coefficients for public and standard information in an OLS regression of the two treatments, sub-district fixed effects, survey sample dummies and dummy variables for the previous experimental design separately for each survey wave. The main coefficients are not reported but are available from the authors upon request. Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom ten treatment are dropped from the sample and we reweight the treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same. For each household, the variables for amount purchased, price and subsidy are averages over the past four months; the current month is dropped if the interview occurred before the 25th day of the month. The amount and subsidy are set equal to zero if the household does not purchase any Raskin rice, whereas the price is calculated among purchasing households. We also provide the difference in difference between public and standard information between the two survey waves. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 24: Does Advertising Affect Subsidy Only Through Card Receipt? Implied Instrumental Variables Estimation, First Stage and Reduced Form

	First Stage: Received Card		Reduced Form: Subsidy (Rp.)	
	Public Information (1)	Standard Information (2)	Public Information (3)	Standard Information (4)
Public Information	0.30 ^{***} (0.02)		9,334 ^{***} (1,677)	
Standard Information		0.24 ^{***} (0.02)		4,190 ^{**} (1,641)
Observations	4,001	3,959	3,999	3,957
Control Group Mean	0.06	0.06	28,781	28,781

Note: This table provides the first stage and reduced form and reduced form regressions for the IV estimates in Table 11. In the first two columns, the endogenous variable received card is regressed on the public and standard information treatments respectively. Column 1 omits households from villages randomly assigned to the standard information treatment, and Column 2 omits households from villages randomly assigned to the public information treatment. Columns 3 and 4 present the reduced form regression of subsidy received on public and standard information treatments respectively. Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom ten treatment are dropped from the sample and we reweight the treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same. For each household, the subsidy is an average over the past four months; the current month is dropped if the interview occurred before the 25th day of the month. The subsidy is set equal to zero if the household does not purchase any Raskin rice. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Figure 1: Public Information Poster



Note: This is an example of the poster used in the public information treatment to provide information within the village about the arrival of Raskin identification cards in the village and how to use them. On the bottom left of the poster is a copy of an identification card, and the picture shows a household showing their Raskin card to an official and purchasing a bag of Raskin (in official packaging). This poster was used in villages assigned to the follow combination of subtreatments: cards distributed to all eligible households, price, and no coupons. There were eight variants of the poster to reflect the various combinations of the subtreatments: with and without price, with and without coupons, and distributed to all eligible households or only to the bottom 10 percent. The top of the poster can be translated as follows: “Do you want to buy Raskin? Use your Raskin card!” The bottom right of the poster says: “1. Households eligible to purchase Raskin can be found on the official listing (DPM); 2. Households on the official listing will receive Raskin cards; 3. Raskin cards must be used when purchasing Raskin.”