14

Comparisons Across Empires: The Critical Social Structures of the Ottomans, Russians and Habsburgs during the Seventeenth Century

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Introduction

In the veritable industry that has been engendered by studies of empire, theoretically informed comparisons have remained scarce. Two tendencies dominate the recent studies of empire. First we have erudite typologies of what empire is or is not according to a favourite set of criteria used by the scholar,[1] and the second remains within the domain of eloquent political narratives of particular empires or a parallel telling of the fate of different entities.[2] Another approach focused on the subaltern populations dominated by empire remains interested in comparative work, though from a particular point of view more embedded in cultural studies than social scientific analyses. The domain has largely been abandoned to policy analysts.

As we have become engaged in the study of empire, we have been captivated by many historical empires' ability to rule over diverse social systems and peoples, sometimes even with contradictory schemas and approaches patched together in one seemingly comprehensive whole. Though we have all agreed that more research is needed into the mechanisms governing imperial polities, we rarely carry through in a comparative framework. In this chapter we demonstrate the significance of imposing rigorous and interesting comparative frameworks across empires. We observe a range of social outcomes as responses to the general crisis of the seventeenth century. A conjunction of rural economic dislocation, political unrest and revolutionary changes in the means of organised violence provoked imperial states towards varying degrees of action and intervention. We aspire to understand the divergent responses of three similar and contiguous imperial polities by comparing the nature of their imperial rule.

The rise of widespread banditry in the Ottoman Empire and enserfment of the peasantry in the Russian Empire during the seventeenth century crisis is contrasted to the second serfdom and the religious counter-reformation crisis

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in the Habsburg Empire. While all three empires experienced an economic and resource-based crisis in the seventeenth century, the Ottoman and Russian states actively intervened in their societies to reshape social relations, to take advantage of the social structural arrangements and their relations to elites. The distinctive and deeply consequential social formations of banditry and serfdom emerged from state strategies to cope with the crisis and meet the demands of mobilising society for warfare based on large infantry armies. The Habsburg dynasty did much less to reshape social relations. Rather, monarchs concentrated their efforts in an attempt to unify the empire under Catholicism, while the nobility independently pursued localised enserfment. How do we explain the puzzle of differing responses as well as different levels of imperial state involvement in the management of crises? In this paper, we sketch an answer that is based on a comparative analysis of the nature of state society relations and the imperial regime types.

We argue that the prebendal regime of the Ottoman state and the mixed patrimonial-feudal regime of the Russian state made it possible for these polities to interfere and remodel state society relations and reinforce certain groups to the detriment of others. The Ottomans relied on an established, effective, flexible and highly developed central administration, while in Russia, the challenges of the seventeenth century necessitated the rapid creation of a new bureaucratic order controlled by a literate, differentiated central administration. In the Ottoman Empire, the agrarian crisis led landless and uprooted peasants to join bands of roaming bandits, a process which was promptly instrumentalised by the state as bandits were mobilised into the Ottoman army, centrally or via the provincial officials. In Russia, where the general crisis was compounded by the chaos of the Time of Troubles, political agitation from the declining and impoverished military servitors provided the critical pressure to complete the enserfment of the peasantry. Enserfment helped the state to diffuse political tensions after the rebellion of 1648, and ultimately welded landholders together in support of the emerging autocracy. In both cases, the state was instrumental in shaping and enforcing these sociocultural outcomes. In the Habsburg lands, the much less centralised feudal regime managed the crisis in a different manner. Though less significant, banditry happened in the Habsburg lands as well. However, more noteworthy was the callous enserfment of the peasantry by the nobility. Unable to organise complex social-structural responses to the seventeenth century crisis, the Habsburg monarchy pledged to uproot the effects of the Reformation, imposing Catholicism on the Protestant nobles. They chose cultural unity over issues of class relations.

This explanation points in the direction of the original social structural arrangements that defined the imperial regimes. Various means of empire building through marriage, treaties and conquest led to particular state-society relations and distinctive social structures. We examine how the organisation

and practice of landholding, the intensity of patron-client ties in agrarian class relations, the degree of state penetration and mediation of the rural networks of production and exchange, and the methods of revenue extraction and military mobilisation shaped the responses and strategies of these imperial states during the crisis of the seventeenth century. It is then important to further explore such relations and their consequences as they unfolded in the seventeenth century. We will explore briefly the nature of the crisis that befell the Eurasian continent in the seventeenth century. Though we know that the 'seventeenth century crisis' has been discussed at length, we choose to summarise the basic findings that are comparable across cases and underplay the debates. We will then explore the differences in state-society relations in the three empires to follow with an analysis of the different responses to the crisis.

This comparison has several merits. Even though a complete and detailed comparison of the three cases along every aspect of the state society responses to the crisis of the seventeenth century is practically impossible, this comparison sheds new light that will foster research. First, it will certainly serve as a corrective and an elaboration of the comparative framework once provided by Perry Anderson. On the Ottoman case Anderson reproduced the simple decline thesis of his time to strip the Ottomans from any adaptive capability, therefore condemning them to inaction even before the crisis of the seventeenth century. On the Habsburg and Russian cases, he combined the two empires into the same category: an eastern variant of absolutism where the political system was just the repressive arm of the feudal class, simply a device for the consolidation of serfdom. We not only show differences in the nature of the political systems between the two empires, but we also trace its consequences in the different paths through which serfdom took form in the two lands.[3]

Though some comparisons have been made of the effects of the seventeenth century crisis with western and eastern cases, they have not taken into consideration these three contemporaneous land-based imperial structures that were in continuous relations across borders, and affected by each other.[4] Much comparative work remains resolutely Eurocentric and teleological, although Victor Lieberman has written an interesting essay critiquing the 'Orientalist mode' of historical comparison which assumes western trajectories as normative and compresses non-western societies into static and uniform categories coloured by colonial and imperialist historiography.[5] Especially since the question of variation in the outcomes of crises has been explored for Western Europe, it is now necessary to determine the reasons for the variation across empires. It will also bring to bear the different ways in which social and economic crises brought about different processes of state society relations and degrees of intervention rather than assuming the non-feudal structures of the east to be typical of despotism, as the Ottoman and the Russian have more often been labelled. Although these empires pursued dramatically different policies,

we find that the Ottoman and Russian states were much more involved in actively structuring the social order and controlling outcomes than their more feudal European counterpart.

The crisis of the seventeenth century

The fiscal and economic difficulties and social upheavals of the mid-seventeenth century experienced across the Eurasian continent were for a long time discussed and acknowledged as a 'General Crisis'. [6] The notion of crisis, however, has engendered significant debate around its causes, whether economic or political as well as its consequences, and more recently on whether we can even talk about a crisis. What is clearer now is that most of the regions of the European continent experienced some sort of economic and political adversity that was clearly interdependent, though not the same everywhere[7] and certainly not as short-lived and contained as a 'crisis', but rather as protracted and gradual unfolding of economic (price revolution, stagnating productivity while the population increases rapidly) and political (rebellions and uprisings, or wars as in the Thirty Years War) changes. Simultaneously and related, the seventeenth century witnessed the growth of the state and while many have studied the rise of the absolutist state in Europe as state formation, Niels Steensgaard linked the growth of the state to the symptoms of the economic crisis.[8] In Europe then the rise of the absolutist state has been closely related to the intensification of warfare.[9] Since it was the rural classes that paid for the growth of the state especially in terms of the size and provision of armies, we can surmise that part of the economic and rural predicament on the land can be explained by the needs of the state.[10] Warfare, taxation and state making in the context of population changes dramatically shaped rural relations and upheavals in most countries.[11]

The 'military revolution', which occurred in most of Europe between the mid-sixteenth and mid-seventeenth centuries, was revolutionary not in its rapidity, but in the fundamental transformation it helped to drive in state society relations.[12] For western societies, there has been considerable analysis of how military reform during this period often resulted in constitutional conflict between the centralising state and provincial gentry, the dislocation of traditionally influential military classes, the regimentation of society, and the rise of rationalised bureaucracies.[13] At the heart of the military revolution was the replacement of small cavalry forces composed of military servitors, as in the Ottoman and Russian Empires, or traditional feudal clients, as in the Habsburg Empire, with huge gunpowder infantry armies supported by a centralised state. The military revolution was of great importance to the strategies the state pursued in coping with the disruptions and dislocations of the seventeenth century. When war making was the primary activity of the state, changes in the

means of warfare were deeply consequential for state-society relations, particularly when reforms threatened entrenched social and cultural structures. By the time of the Thirty Years War in the first half of the seventeenth century, traditional armies had become fodder for new line-formation, musket-based infantries, and each empire, in order to survive, had to adapt.[14]

The three empires we consider, the Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian, all experienced significant fiscal and economic downturns at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries. In each case, the fiscal difficulties also affected the rural populations where essential relations of production were transformed. Similarly, despite notions of a despotic and static state imposing solutions on an inert society, the Ottomans and Russians survived the military revolution only by creatively responding to social and political pressure and organising significant rearrangements of the agrarian social order, leading to economic, fiscal and political transformation in these empires.

In the Habsburg lands, the decades after the 1600s experienced a deep crisis of an economic and political nature. The Habsburg lands were hit hard by the wars with the Ottomans (between 1593 and 1606), that brought increased taxes and rural devastation, especially in Hungary. Yet, more generally, the Habsburgs were affected by their awkward intermediate position in the trading order of Europe, leaving the empire more vulnerable and less developed than others. The expansion of other European countries towards the Atlantic sea trade had affected their inland trade with the Habsburgs. American silver and gold hurt the mining industry while the Scandinavian increase in copper mining hurt the copper and iron industry. The three structural effects of these were the ruralisation of the towns, the conflict between landlords and their peasantry and the internal differentiation within the magnate class. In each of these crises, the role of the imperial state had been minimal, with its priority remaining a Catholic consolidation through the realm and the accommodation of the nobility to ensure their loyalty. Thus when the nobility independently pursued localised enserfment, the monarchy mostly allowed such outcomes.

In the Ottoman Empire, the severe fiscal and economic crises felt by the state and society was once thought to be directly the result of the price movements that affected the empire from Europe. While some of the fiscal crisis can be related to the price revolution, its effect seems to have been very short-lived.[15] Much more important was the growing military and therefore fiscal needs of the empire, the geopolitical constraints of increasing the revenue flow to the state treasuries as well as rapid population growth that had started in the sixteenth century. Both the state and the people had a difficult time maintaining the war of 1593–1606 against the Habsburgs and the continued warfare with the Safavids from 1579 to 1590 and more intensely from 1588 to 1610.

For a state engaged in multiple wars, the demands of the military, taxation and resources become deeply significant. The Ottoman state experienced a fiscal crisis and the empire felt that on the land. The scarcity on the land, the strains on state revenue and the ensuing conditions of elite competition led to fragmentation of the rural social order, the flight of the peasantry, and re-nomadisation. These developments were harmful to the local commercial activities and were compounded by the changes in the trade routes from the overland routes to the maritime ones controlled by the British and the Dutch. Vagrancy, poverty, joblessness coexisted in the Anatolian countryside leading to the formation of roving armies of bandits and mercenaries. It is with these units of vagrant peasants turned soldiers that the Ottoman state clashed and negotiated to manage critical wars on both the eastern and western fronts.

Russia entered the seventeenth century in a state of profound economic and political turmoil. In the late sixteenth century, the 'economic progress attained earlier in the century was reversed'.[16] Droughts, famine, epidemics, flight from the countryside and other factors coincided with a dynastic crisis after the death of Ivan IV's son in 1598, leading to civil war between contending factions and pretenders. Even as the political crisis was being resolved, class tensions exploded in massive peasant rebellions.[17] This was Russia's 'Time of Troubles', and it marks the beginning of a dramatic century of crisis.[18] This period of absolute chaos was a legacy in part of the tensions and resentment built up under the despotic and at times arbitrary reign of Ivan IV (1547–84). In Russia political crisis, foreign intervention and rebellion compounded the general economic malaise and agrarian dislocation of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century. At the turn of the century, a three-year crop failure decimated the peasantry. Perhaps a third of the population starved to death, and cannibalism was rampant in the countryside.[19] After the liberation of Moscow from foreign interference and the establishment of the Romanov dynasty in 1613, the Russian state confronted the social tensions unleashed during this period of transformation and dislocation. In addition, Russia's strategic posture shifted away from military campaigns in the south and east. In the Smolensk war (1632–34) and the Thirteen Years' War (1654–67) Russia confronted the West with new intensity and was forced to rapidly modernise, having fallen behind both the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires in military strength. With the memory of the devastation of the Time of Troubles still fresh, the young Romanov dynasty was acutely sensitive to social unrest. Faced with fugitive peasants and declining social status, the cavalry servitors consolidated as a class and used their political clout to conclusively enserf the Russian peasantry after the rebellion of 1648. In Russia, the general crisis of the seventeenth century was made more acute and more revolutionary because of the general underdevelopment of the state and military, and the severe political and social crisis which erupted during the Time of Troubles.

To sum up, we agree with most of the literature on the crisis of the seventeenth century that a general downturn in economic and political fields upset the state society balance established across these three empires since their inception. From 1550 to 1650 state centralisation, the birth of modern warfare and economic transformation left the three empires in a serious predicament exerting pressures on their populations. While we cannot assess the depth of the crisis in each empire, we can make some comparative arguments. First, the effect was not homogeneous in any one empire. Certain regions fared better than others; some urban areas adapted while others sank into agrarian modes of production. As to the agrarian regions, the nature of state-society relations and practices of landholding, the strength of rural relations and depth of state penetration of rural social networks made a difference in how the state was able to mediate, control, and modernise during the crisis of the seventeenth century.

Second, all three empires faced military transformations since they were affected by the military revolution and engaged in warfare across boundaries where technological developments in one place affected the other. During the Thirty Years War, the Habsburg armies were transformed. A military aristocratic complex emerged, where those who had resources and connections to the court were able to construct regiments from mercenaries for hire and conduct war. During the war Ferdinand II finally found his dependency on entrepreneurs such as Wallenstein to be too demanding, and after the Thirty Years War he established a standing army (1649). The importance of this for the state was the monarch's ability to send his army to the field without the meddling of the provincial diets. Despite that, the Habsburg army was only organised into a coherent whole in the eighteenth century. The Ottoman and Russian Empires, on the other hand, engaged in a much more severe military transformation which altered their previous organisational arrangements. These differences need to be underscored and unpacked further, though we will do this after we describe the varying outcomes for each empire.

Analysis: imperial rule in comparative perspective

Origins of empire

The most widely accepted explanations for the different outcomes in each empire have been made in isolation, where specialists have tried to understand the particular dynamics of the crises together with the patterns of rule. They have neither asked the question of why one type of outcome rather than another or thought about comparative cases that might enlighten social analysis.

The enduring puzzle of different responses of imperial states to similar crises remains important. After all, despite some variation, the Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian Empires were large-scale, diverse, land based, contiguous agrarian

political formations where much of the resources were collected through rural agricultural modes of production. They were comparable in their apparent expansion, and though they were at different stages of their expansion, they were imbued with imperial ambitions. Furthermore, each maintained authority over their population through the legitimation of a supranational ideology that included a religious claim to be protectors of Christendom or Islam, and an elaborate ideology of descent and lineage. And politically, each of these states maintained control through divide-and-conquer strategies, keeping elites separate, distinct, and dependent on the central state. Such control also entailed vertical integration into the state, but accompanied by fragmentation at the horizontal level of social arrangements. If these empires were similar along so many dimensions, then why were their responses to the crises of the seventeenth century different? Why were the Ottoman and Russian states so proactive and responsible in reshaping the balance of their society, even though such a solution was detrimental to particular groups, especially the peasantry? And why was the Habsburg state so intent on letting the nobility respond rather then the state itself, encouraging submission on the ground?

The answer we argue lies partly in the early styles of emergence and consolidation of empire and partly in the different systems of rule that became institutionalised overtime. In the next two sections we show that the Habsburg Empire differed substantially in the early patterns of consolidation, where their expansion through marriages tied the hands of the rulers. The Ottoman and Russian Empires, on the other hand, expanded by warfare and conquest, both subjecting populations to their will and making alliances to incorporate and assimilate conquered elites. The differences, we show have important consequences for the autonomy and central power of each state. We then move to discuss the different styles of imperial rule, state-society relations and the nature of agrarian relations to understand the particular outcomes in each society.

The Habsburg Empire emerged not only from the Holy Roman Empire, but more generally from a tradition of medieval Christian Europe where the Catholic religion, its institutions and its values were fully fused with the political order, and as descendants of the Holy Roman Empire, the Habsburgs saw themselves as the guardians of all Christendom. Though the election of the first Habsburg to the German imperial crown occurred in 1273 the effective rise of the monarchy as a contender in European affairs happened when Maximilian I (1493–1519) consolidated the empire through a series of marriages, the most important with Spain and Burgundy, followed by Ferdinand's (1520–64) union of the Austrian lands with Hungary and Bohemia in 1521. Ferdinand in many ways finalised an initial phase of consolidation of the Habsburg Monarchy in East-Central Europe, bringing together the hereditary lands and the eastern crowns. The relationship between these two segments of empire was loose,

awkward and divided, constraining any attempt by the monarch at centralising. The limits of such an expansionist policy based on marriages is summarised by Ingrao: '...the subjects of these unions were sometimes incompatible, or at least unwilling to surrender their individual rights and independence to the dominant partner. Indeed, before they could receive the homage of their new subjects, the Habsburgs invariably had to swear to respect their privileges and autonomy-a constitutional nicety that would have been unnecessary had they acquired them by conquest'.[20]

This emerging Eastern European entity, described as 'a mildly centripetal agglutination of bewilderingly heterogeneous elements', by R. J. W. Evans, was culturally, geographically and structurally diverse. Yet it was also a classical example of feudal and indirect rule that grew by incorporating various crown lands. Especially in the historically independent and established kingdoms such as Bohemia and Hungary, regional autonomy and the retention of rights based on the existing diets helped reproduce the feudal social structures that already existed. In Bohemia, an ethnically mixed region made of five principalities, the predominantly Czech nobility initially maintained their rights until they were mostly eliminated during the White Mountain struggle and replaced by Austrian Catholic nobility. Early industry, trade and vitality, moreover, distinguished the Bohemian lands. In many regions where land was not amenable to agricultural production, alternatives had developed making Bohemia a leader in manufacturing and economic wealth. Hungary, the other main segment of the newly formed east-central Habsburg monarchy was fiercely independent, maintaining considerable constitutional liberties with the kingdom's bicameral diet and Chancery maintaining authority over the Hungarian lands. A form of Austrian or Habsburg absolutism did not succeed at this time since the Bohemian and the Hungarian kingdoms were too strong and independent. Even after the suppression of the Czech nobility, the Hungarian estates remained far too powerful for a more consolidated state enterprise.

The varied and diverse nature of the multifarious state-regional elite arrangements provided concessions and granted privileges to the peripheries in return for allegiance, preventing the consolidation of a coherent state structure. Habsburg monarchs relied heavily on various nobilities to ensure the collection of the contribution, to control the peasantry, administer justice and rule their own crown lands to maintain traditional order and traditional feudal values. In return the crown contributed to the maintenance of seigniorial wealth, inheritance, power and prestige, maintaining quasi-serfdom and stifling urban and bourgeois development when necessary to favour the nobility. The Habsburg army – an estate-based military force drawn from contingents permitted by individual landlords and in unreliable numbers for a limited length of service – proved insufficient; by the time he died Ferdinand (1564) had secured an army of only 9000 soldiers.[21]

By contrast to the Habsburgs, the Ottomans' expansion came through warfare, conquest and policies of local brokerage where Turcoman leaders made consequential alliances across frontiers with Christian leaders and warriors. Ensconced between the decaying fringes of the Byzantine empire and the various post-Seldjoukite political formations each vying for regional power and control of territory, the Ottomans emerged because of their syncretic, loose and multifarious traditions of their past. They had come as representatives of Turcoman, Mongol and Islamic traditions, with each of these balancing the weight of the other. Therefore unlike Catholic Habsburgs, Ottomans started in a relatively light Islamic ideological grounding as well as with a warring and conquering army where marriage alliances were only used after war to consolidate bonds that had been forged in the process of subjugation.[22] It is only after Ottomans made major inroads in the Islamic world in the sixteenth century that Islam became more rooted in the identification of the Ottoman state. Thereafter the Ottoman sultans both proclaimed Islam to be the state religion and worked hard to bureaucratise Islam into the administrative apparatus of the state.

The Ottoman expansion was carried out on multiple fronts, advancing towards the west as well as against the fellow post-Seldjouk principalities. Regions were distinguished and administered according to their proximity and adaptability. The first style of rule represented a secure relationship with the region of assimilation, for example, the Balkans and Anatolia, similar in many ways to Russian Ukraine, were regions perceived as open to incorporation. In the Balkans, direct control occurred by the reign of Beyazid I (1389–1402) whereas, by contrast, the more entrenched local Anatolian dynasties were not subdued until the reign of Mehmed II (1451–81) and even the time of his grandson Selim I (1512–20). The second set of regions, further away from the centre, were administered as military and economic outposts. The faraway Arab provinces, Egypt, Yemen, Abyssinia, Lahsa, Southern (Basra) and Northern (Baghdad) Iraq, northern Libya, Tunis and northern Algeria had been assigned governors and governor generals, and revenue collection was locally administered by tax farmers, thereby providing a salary for the officials, a revenue to maintain a local army as well as a surplus to send the central treasury.[23] The similarly more distant Balkan provinces of Moldavia, Wallachia, Transylvania, Dubrovnik were never fully conquered and assimilated, and thus were granted self-government in return for an annual tribute to the treasury of the empire.

In general, vassalage, initiated with the first Balkan conquests, allowed local landowners to remain on land, maintain their religion and become Ottoman vassals and see themselves as privileged Christians. The benefit of vassalage was that it left the local leadership in place, but as vassals who had to participate in the Ottoman campaigns and fight alongside the sultans. This early pro-

cess fit with the policy of accommodation (*istimalet*), a strategy of encouraging local populations and nobilities to accept the new rule through incentives, and concessions, before they become fully incorporated.[24] At a later stage, having provided proof of loyalty during war, vassals would become fully Ottoman, their land converted to fit the Ottoman land system and their participation guaranteed through the tight oversight of a central administration.

The Ottomans early on had established a central slave-based army (the Janissaries) and used the cavalry (the *sipahis*) as their regional landed units who pushed at the frontiers. Their military as such was much more centralised and organisationally more sophisticated than the Habsburgs who had to wait until the eighteenth century to consolidate their army. The Ottomans strived at what Max Weber has called a prebendal form of imperial rule, where a patrimonial household was able to establish centralised control over nonhereditary landed cavalrymen who performed military service in return for the use of the land. The establishment of a prebendal cavalry army along regional lines (though there was a central cavalry as well) was a way to balance the power of the sultan's patrimonial army, the janissaries. By contrast to the Habsburg antagonism between Austrian imperial elites and the regional aristocratic elites, the Ottoman central administration furthered strong vertical integration of the regional land holding and military elites into the state. In the Ottoman system, regional and assimilated elites saw the state as the centre of rewards and advancement, and perceived their participation as beneficial to their own future. As such, a political culture of loyalty to the state was widespread among elite members of society. The absence of any rooted Ottoman aristocracy with hereditary rights facilitated the centralised control exercised by the Ottoman state.[25]

The Russian Empire developed patterns of state-society relations that were intermediate between the feudalism of the Habsburgs and the prebendalism of the Ottomans. The origins of the Russian Empire lie in the mid-fifteenth century. Like the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, the emerging Russian imperial state was legitimated by a supranational religious ideology as the defender of the Eastern Orthodox Christian faith. Russian religious independence from Byzantium began in 1448 when upheavals made a unified Church politically necessary, and therefore an autocephalous Orthodox metropolitanate was tentatively established by Moscow.[26] With time, this autonomy was legitimated and embraced as part of the imperial project, and the Orthodox faith came to serve as 'both the cultural underpinning of the regime and as a principle in terms of which Russia was able to define itself as a nation'.[27] Poor in resources and lacking a sophisticated tradition of classical civilisation, the Grand Princes of Moscow nevertheless managed to organise a dramatically successful and ruthlessly centralised state. By the early sixteenth century, a distinct ideology and imagery of autocracy tempered by networks of kinship and clan solidarity

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within the Boyar elite had emerged.[28] Similar to the Habsburg Empire, Russia had a group of dominant hereditary elites, the great Boyar clans, whose relation to the central administration was constructive rather than oppositional, a sort of 'oligarchic and bureaucratic' element operating behind the 'screens' of autocracy.[29] The Russian state was powerfully centralised though quite small and lacking the bureaucratic, technical and cultural sophistication of the Ottoman Empire. Still both states administered prebendal service land systems to support their provincial cavalry army, creating distinctive patterns of tenure and state-society relations in both empires.

After a series of dynastic wars during the mid-fifteenth century, the Grand Princes of Moscow decisively established and enforced their dominance over the various principalities of *Rus* in the latter half of the fifteenth century. The rise of Moscow, an unlikely outcome in ways, has been attributed to the 'skilful manipulation of the warrior elite' and a conjunction of social and political factors which eliminated significant challenges to the centre from alternative sources of power.[30] Ending the traditional autonomy of the princes and the decentralisation of the military at a remarkably early moment, Ivan III (1462–1505) consolidated central authority and brought all the major Muscovite princes along with their boyar supporters to the imperial court in Moscow for direct service supervised by the Grand Prince.[31] The devastation of the Black Death and the dynastic struggle depleted the numbers and resources of the petty princes and nobility, allowing the Grand Prince to consolidate central control with relatively little struggle. Elites participated in and supported centralisation, and Russia developed an elite culture of obligatory state service.

Perhaps the most critical aspect of emergence that occurred during Ivan III's reign was the subjugation and final annexation of Novgorod, because it placed the Muscovite state in a new and enduring military strategic position and led to innovations in property relations with 'momentous consequences'.[32] No longer threatened from three sides, Russia's expansion was defined by its southeastern frontier with the Kazan, Nogai and Crimean Tatars, and a western frontier facing Sweden, Poland and Lithuania.[33] Marking the end of appanage domination under the 'mongol yoke', the annexation of Novgorod province around 1480 set in motion modes of conquest and patterns of state society relations which would define Russian society until the fundamental transformations of the seventeenth century.[34] Most important was the establishment of the *pomest'e* system of cavalry service lands. After gaining control of Novgorod, thousands of elite landholders were deported to the imperial centre opening up millions of acres of land; this land was distributed to the newly recruited military servitors of the central state.[35] Ivan III, having successfully centralised the state, became 'the father of the *pomest'e* system', a practice of provincial landholding and cavalry military mobilisation remarkably similar to the Ottoman *timar* system.[36]

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The annexation of Novgorod established patterns of conquest and consolidation, and under Ivan III (1448–1505) and his son Vasilii III (1505–33), Moscow's territory tripled in size as the Grand Princes gathered the lands of *Rus*. The distribution of pomest'e service lands was used to secure the loyalty of the provinces to the central state, a style of rule that would create intense pressures during the crisis of the seventeenth century and the military revolution. The pomest'e service land system grew in military importance and numerical strength, and by the seventeenth century the pomest'e servitors would play a crucial role in the political and social developments. Expanding through conquest and subjugation, the Russian Empire evolved a hybrid of hereditary and service land tenure systems, creating unique tensions and social relations in the agrarian order. Despite its material and cultural limitations, the Russian Empire emerged into the early-modern world as a centralised autocratic state fused with the 'power elite'[37] of the hereditary Boyar clans.

The patterns of expansion of these three, contiguous, land-based empires powerfully shaped the dynamics of consolidation and centralisation of state power and the contours of the agrarian social and economic order. In feudal patterns of the Habsburg case, expansion and imperial control was extended through marriages, unions which produced confusing entanglements as central authorities promised and to some extent were forced to respect traditional and local rights of princes and other petty potentates. Due to these limitations, the central state left revenue collection, military mobilisation, and control of rural land and labour in the hands of local lords and princes. The Ottomans, on the other hand, had a highly sophisticated and consolidated centralised state, which controlled both a standing army and a prebendal service land system to support its provincial cavalry. Lacking any significant hereditary nobility, elites in conquered territories were gradually assimilated into the Ottoman land system. Landholding elites participated in this system by seeking patronage and favour, giving the state impressive control over the agrarian social order. Finally, in the Russian Empire, a conjunction of social and political factors led to early centralisation, although the apparatus of the state remained primitive and quite limited. As the empire expanded through conquest and ruthless subjugation, state patronage proved more fruitful than the Russian soil, and landholders, including both elite Boyars at the centre and the state created military service class in the provinces, became tightly fused to the central state. Control of labour, not land, would be the most important aspect of contention. As we will examine next, these different modes of expansion and consolidation unfolded into distinct patterns of state society relations in each empire, which would in turn both constrain and enable state responses to the crisis of the seventeenth century.

Social structure and the state: land, labour, property and power

Emerging from distinct patterns of expansion and consolidation, the organisation of property, production and power in rural relations in the Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian Empires helped determine the manner in which each state chose to respond to the economic/military crisis of the seventeenth century. The Habsburgs relied on a strong feudal nobility and the combination of a relatively weak and less centralised state. Lacking the social penetration and mediation of the Ottomans and Russians, the Habsburgs focused on alternative ways of strengthening their hold. From the beginnings of the reign of Ferdinand II through the middle of the century, they relied on centralisation through religious unification and responded to crisis through the further empowerment of the nobility in their estates. The Ottomans who had managed to construct a more centralised state responded to the crisis by absorbing the different trends on the land, adapting their military policies, making participation in the regional armies more open. The Ottomans possessed a much more fluid rural social structure and their ability to adapt and negotiate their policies to find ways to reign in and incorporate banditry into state centralisation was a remarkable feat. Russia relied upon a combination of a centralised and relatively autonomous state, dominant hereditary elites and a large service class. Faced with hybridity and tension, definitions of property rights and the boundaries of land tenure systems were questioned and remade as the state tried to control and appease various groups. Tensions and trajectories which emerged from sixteenth century practices would shape the state's response to the general crisis, and helped determine the social outcomes of enserfment and a rigidly stratified society dominated by an autocratic state.

The Habsburg Empire, a good example of feudal and indirect rule, grew by incorporating various crown lands through key marriage alliances. They granted autonomy to some, such as the Hungarian estates that preserved their medieval prerogatives, while crushing and replacing other nobility, for instance, substituting the Bohemian nobility with its German counterpart. There was no effective imposition of centralised Austrian or Habsburg rule, but rather limited Habsburg intervention in the Austrian, Bohemian and Hungarian regions. Relations with the Austrian, Hungarian and Bohemian domains were different partly due to the strength of the existing social and political structure in each place and partly due to the larger international relations. Hungary and Bohemia had been established kingdoms with their own entrenched and powerful nobilities. Moreover, their internal and external relations were complicated. Bohemia was made of five principalities, and definite regional mixes were part of this complexity. Bohemia was also more advanced than many regions in terms of its manufacturing and mineral producing capacities. On the other hand, Hungary was divided between

Habsburg, Ottoman and semi-independent Transylvanian sections which made it difficult to fully control and allowed the centre only partial control, and in fact, nominal rule. The Czechs were more incorporated, especially after the Battle of White Mountain, which led to the establishment of a foreign aristocracy. The segmented rule of each region fit the imperial style of dynastic rule. To some extent, the protection of the patrimonial rights of the Habsburgs relied on stressing loyalty to the emperor and his family.[38] Well connected aristocratic families of various origins, Catholics or Protestants converted to Catholicism, eventually emerged and cooperated and coordinated with the dynasty, loosely united through family networks and a Catholic Baroque culture. The state's authority and supremacy was based on its landed support.

When we discuss the nature of Habsburg rule and the state society structures that ensured this rule, we have to at least differentiate between the Austrian, Czech and Hungarian lands. Such distinctions complicate the agrarian picture, and even with such distinction, we inevitably fall short of the full view. The Austrian (hereditary) lands remain the most controversial in historiographical terms since here the contention of how much the Habsburg imperial rule helped shape rural relations is not fully resolved. On the one hand, the traditional arguments see the Habsburg centre as not really involved in local rule. In the Austrian lands, the provincial governments were the units of authority within which the provincial estates were embedded. The estates in the Austrian lands included the clergy, nobility and town, and sometimes a few peasant representatives. However, as R. J. W. Evans argues: 'In practice, since the prelates were largely assimilated, the towns largely ignored, and the peasants a marginal and incohesive force, it was nobles who dominated, either as a single, consolidated estate, or more often as separate estates of lords and knights'.[39] Provincial diets were the centre of bargaining with the crown, 'alternately discussing the princely propositions and advancing their own grievances, haggling over taxes and approving recruits'.[40]

On the other hand, more recent arguments have made a case that in hereditary lands the state extended its power to the level of individual peasant households, dramatically shaping the nature of rural relations and the reaction of the peasantry. Calling this process of state intervention, the bureaucratisation of family and property relations, Hermann Rebel argues that the state altered the peasant family structure, regulated the relationship between peasant tenant and noble landlord and made the peasant into an agent of the state.[41] No doubt the imperial state wanted to control the wealth of the region and the peasantry 'became the football with which princes and nobility played the games of state-building and status maintenance'.[42] Yet, such practices led to rural trajectories of social differentiation that were to become crucial in the increasing ruralisation and impoverishment of the peasantry.

Even though such transformations no doubt took place in some locales, it is difficult to generalise from this region to the rest of the empire. The nature of rural relations and state society interaction in the Bohemian and Hungarian regions of the empire were different. Even in regions where the Habsburgs destroyed the nobility, they did not really alter the existing feudal relations. This was the generalised mode of rule in Eastern and Central Europe, a form of Eastern absolutism that developed partly in relation to Western forms of absolutism and partly from internal pressures to consolidate control over the peasantry.[43]

More common was separate deal making with regional elites, in which the Habsburgs provided concessions and granted privileges in return for allegiance. The Bohemian example is a case in point. The Habsburgs were content to rely on Bohemian wealth, allow the region political autonomy, and give the indigenous nobility the right to put their own official into the government. In fact, Ingrao argues that the Bohemian estates enjoyed greater autonomy, extensive legislative and administrative powers than in the Austrian parts of the empire.[44] What did this estate autonomy mean for rural relations? First, even though they were legally serfs the old Bohemian aristocracy had showed a degree of paternalism and care for their peasants.[45] The partial restriction of peasant mobility in Bohemia dates to the post-Hussite Wars period with the legislation of 1487, the Bohemian nobility's pursuit of profit, the market attractions and the slow but increasing control over the peasantry. By the late sixteenth century, the Bohemian peasants were legally bound to the land and the precedent for the deterioration of their position was set. Hungarian independence from the Habsburg centre was even stronger since it relied on the strength of its diet, its independent Chancery as well as the strength of the aristocratic landowners. The agrarian relations in Hungary had been largely determined after the major peasant revolt in 1514, the Dozsa revolt, which was suppressed, and triggered the enserfment of the Hungarian peasantry. Though the National Diet of 1547 provided serfs with the right to migration, the general trajectory for the Magyar peasants was one of gradual and increasing conditions of enserfment and poverty. The Hungarian aristocrats and the lower gentry both exploited and mistreated the peasants who were by far the worst off in the Habsburg Empire.[46]

In every region, Habsburg monarchs relied heavily on the various nobilities to ensure the collection of the Contribution, to control the peasantry, administer justice, rule their crown lands and maintain traditional order and traditional feudal values. In return, the crown contributed to the maintenance of seigniorial wealth, inheritance, power and prestige, maintaining restrictions on peasant life, and stifling urban and bourgeois development to favour the nobility.[47] This feudal compact between the monarchy and the regional landed elite maintained the resource base of the empire, yet at the

same time impacted the towns and especially the peasantry who would soon be forced into a second serfdom. Such a compact was beneficial to maintaining imperial state-elite stability, yet it was in the long run not beneficial to economic development.

The crown strived for a coherent and integrated state structure, but it could never fully achieve this within the powerful feudal constraints of the empire. The Habsburgs moved over time towards an autocratic state centred in Vienna, with an increasingly German centred aristocratic culture, yet without full integration. The main reason for the lack of integration was the strength of the Hungarian nobility, which never lost its privileges. The Hungarian nobility was neither integrated nor easily defeated by a military force. Therefore, even as the House of Habsburg emerged as a strong European force, internal state-elite struggles over centralised control continued. As R. J. W. Evans writes, Habsburg rule in Austria, Bohemia and Hungary 'subsisted on a community of interest between dynasty, aristocracy, and the Catholic church [where] loyalty became a calculation, not a sort of disembodied idealism'.[48]

The Ottoman Empire by contrast to the Habsburg imperial domains, had developed a different landholding system, the *timar*, based on another set of property relations and understandings derived from Islamic law and also Byzantine practice in the Balkans. In the beginning of the sixteenth century about 90 per cent of the land was state-owned (*miri*), the result of a Near Eastern understanding of the conqueror's eminent domain and establishing the use of land for the best interests of the Islamic state. In the core regions of the empire, the Balkans and Anatolia, the timar system became established as the principle form of landholding, based on a land grant issued by the state to a member of the cavalry, a *sipahi*. The allocated land that covered a certain number of villages and was organised along income categories remained in the hands of the sipahi for a limited amount of time. In return, the cavalryman was responsible for administering the domain for the state, collecting taxes and raising a retinue to fight in the provincial army. In that sense, the Ottoman landholders, from the lower level timar holder to the governor and governor-general (who also acquired lands in a similar fashion) were servitors of the state and agents who supervised the use of the land for the state. The Ottoman system left no room for a western feudal class with hereditary rights and privileges.

Although some hereditary practices were present early on in Anatolia and the state had to co-opt this strong hereditary elite, state centralisation allowed the service-based, non-hereditary principle to prevail.[49] Another aspect of the timar was rotation, an administrative device used by the Ottomans to regulate access to office. State agents had a limited tenure in any locality, averaging around three years, a practice which was an effective mechanism of central control, securing the lack of entrenchment on land and preventing local patron-client ties from forming. Since the local timar officials could be

dismissed, sent out on rotation and shuffled into different districts with each rotation, this system of landholding promoted dependence and service to the state. [50] As a result, even the fierce competition for the limited numbers of landholdings was understood as meritocratic rather than state manipulation.[51] The competition between timar holders, the divisions among them as well as their inability to remain in one area long enough to build resistance gave the state an inordinate amount of control.

The movement and fluidity of state-regional elite relations in the timar system was buttressed by the stability of tenure at the level of the peasantry. The family farm unit (the *cift hane*) was the basic unit of agricultural production, defined as a plot of land of sufficient size and productivity for the maintenance of the household and the payment of taxes to the state. In this arrangement, individual peasant household conditions, independence and little communal solidarity differentiated the Ottoman land relations, especially compared to the Habsburg, and as we shall see, the Russian Empires. The state's interest in limiting mobility was only related to facilitating taxation and even then the Ottoman countryside was flexible, with peasants abandoning their villages for other regions or becoming nomadic, creating a symbiotic flow between sedentary and nomadic modes of rural production.

Peasant relations with the state were regulated through the parallel and independent institution of the local courts where peasants came for justice and to register their complaints. Even though the local magistrate was also rotated according to an internal schedule, peasants made frequent use of the courts, which functioned to deflect anger away from the local tax-collecting patrons and acted as a safety valve, diffusing and mediating class tensions. This became increasingly necessary as timar holders hired multiple intermediaries to collect taxes and moved towards complete professionalisation as an army rather than an agrarian administrative element. However, emphasising their military role eventually undermined the position of the timar holders because cavalry forces would become outdated with the military revolution. Rotation, peasant transhumance and autonomy, as well as alternative institutions made the Ottoman countryside and Ottoman state society relations adaptable. The result was that remarkably weak patron-client ties characterised Ottoman agrarian relations. As Inalcik observes, the foundation for the Ottoman rural social structure 'appears to have been centralist state control over land possession and family labour. An imperial bureaucracy had systematically to struggle to eliminate encroachments of local lords, while concomitantly striving to prevent its own provincial agents from transforming themselves into a provincial gentry'.[52] These weak ties were the outcome of the state's strategies for the administration of rule in the provinces of the empire. As such they were more the result of unintended consequences of their rule, rather than conscious strategies of rule.

The traditional timar landholding system certainly operated as the main administrative and military tool of the state in the core regions. However, such an administrative system was impossible to establish, regulate and maintain across the vast territorial and transportation barriers of the empire. Instead, revealing their flexibility, the Ottomans negotiated the modes of rule and the agricultural organisation differentially with new subject elites. Significantly, the principle against heredity was maintained over long distance. Regions were assigned governors and governor-generals, and revenue collection was locally farmed out to tax farmers, thereby providing a salary for the officials, a revenue to maintain a local army as well as a surplus to send the central treasury.[53] In the more distant and unassimilated tribute paying principalities of the Balkans like Moldavia, Wallachia, Transylvania, Dubrovnik, the interests of the Ottomans were such that they allowed hereditary princes the freedom to rule as they pleased though in return they demanded political-military obligations expressed by the formula: 'be friend of our friends and enemy of our enemies'.[54] Yet, before long they would interfere in the politics of local rule in both Wallachia and Moldavia. Even though the regions where tax farming and alternative arrangements operated were widespread, the larger timar structure remained the backbone of the Ottoman land system in the core provinces of the empire, shaping their understanding of rural relations and accommodating to the multiple variations assessed at the local level.

During the sixteenth century, we can already hear about the initial tensions in the social structural arrangements of Ottoman rule. In the advice literature of the sixteenth century, Ottoman pamphleteers warn of the problems with just rule, the breakdown of the army and issues of improper training.[55] The pamphleteers interpreted many adjustments in rule as a sign of retreat from traditional institutions and therefore decline. They were displeased that the distinction between the *askeri* (military-ruling class) and the *reaya* (the flock-the people) did not hold any longer and that all kinds of people could become soldiers. While the rigid divisions between groups might have been more fiction than reality since the early beginnings of Ottoman rule, such fluidity of movement was perceived as one of the potentially explosive trajectories of the empire. Rather one of the important developments of this period would be the empire's response to the military transformations of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. First, the timar holders were the members of the regional elite most affected by the military transformation. Second, the various layers of regulation, taxation and the significant numbers of intermediaries contributed to the murkiness of the Ottoman agrarian layout, providing for the production of multiple losers and winners preventing patterns of class consolidation in response to change. Third, peasant responses varied considerably from moving, leaving the land, joining religious schools to various internal

processes of differentiation where the social stratification of the rural classes became increasingly pronounced.

Russia's rural social structure was characterised by a unique hybridity between the hereditary lands of the Boyar elite and the service lands of the pomest'e cavalrymen. While the Habsburg land system relied on strict adherence to the hereditary rights of the feudal nobility, and landholding in the Ottoman Empire was definitively shaped by the state controlled timar system, in the Russian Empire a dominant hereditary elite coexisted, at times uneasily, with the pomest'e service land system. Whatever tensions may have existed, however, were generally subsumed under the principle of compulsory state service for all landholders, begun under Ivan III and finally codified in the mid-sixteenth century by Ivan IV. In Russia, all landholders were required to serve in a hierarchy subordinated to tsar and god.[56] Even the most powerful elites debased themselves before the Grand Prince or Tsar in rituals of subordination, calling themselves slaves of the sovereign. Although these rituals were shocking to Western observers who depicted Russia as the most abject despotism, the relations between state and society were more complex and negotiated.[57] Despite this dominant cultural and legal regime of obligatory state service, property rights and relations between different forms of tenure reveal complexities and tensions within the structure of rural life in Russia.

The nature of property rights in Russia for hereditary landholders has been much contested. Views have reached either the extreme of contending that Russia had absolutely no system of private property whatsoever, or of claiming that private property was held on a similar basis to the fee simple system of Western Europe.[58] More reasonable is Valerie Kivelson's suggestion that 'landholders worked out an idiosyncratic concept of property holding that did not fit either end of the classical either/or debate'.[59] The indeterminancy of property rights and the coexistence of two distinct modes of tenure would structure the demands made upon the state during the crisis of the seventeenth century, as status conscious and economically pressed service landholders would press the state for conversion of the conditional pomest'e lands into hereditary *votchnina* holdings. The crisis of the seventeenth century would precipitate a decisive rearticulation of property relations in the Russian Empire, whereas property relations remained more stable in both the Habsburg and Ottoman lands.

After the reign of Ivan III (1462–1505), the conditional pomest'e land grant became the most important, if not initially the predominant form of land tenure.[60] Similar to the Ottoman sipahi, the Russian cavalry servitors, called *pomeshchiki,* were responsible for arming themselves and appearing at annual musters and collecting taxes from the peasants on their pomest'e. Like the Ottoman timar holders, the Russian service class 'was not a landed gentry which voluntarily came to the aid of the government when asked', existed, rather 'at the sufferance of the state'.[61] The rank, status and resources of the

cavalrymen were entirely dependent on state service. Unlike the strict military caste privileges of the sipahi, however, the pomest'e holders were originally drawn from diverse social and regional sources. Although rotation was not a practice in the pomest'e system as in the timar system of the Ottoman Empire, the state still exerted considerable control over the middle service class. Far from the feudal gentry of the Habsburg Empire, service lands could not be sold or mortgaged; a cavalrymen who attempted to exit his estate by alienating his lands would be beaten with a knout and his lands returned to him.[62] The middle service class remained the state's 'creature', divided by a 'jungle-like atmosphere' of competition for service lands that weakened group cohesion,[63] until the seventeenth century, when it eventually emerged as a status conscious class able to mobilise and shape state action.[64]

During the sixteenth century, we can notice trajectories which would burst into the open during the crisis of seventeenth century leading to essential restructurings of rural relations. Although the military servitors lacked cohesiveness as a class, they were able to secure impressive privileges and acquired pretensions to status traditionally reserved for the Boyar elite. State consolidation in the sixteenth century allowed officials to act with greater independence, and Ivan IV (1547–84) issued reforms and policies which benefited the servitors and expanded the pomest'e land system. The interests of the servitors and the state coincided in opposition to the Boyars, monasteries and other private landholders. Both the state and its servitors desired to reduce private, hereditary ownership and increase the domain of the pomest'e landholding system.[65] Although Ivan IV's experiment with the *Oprichnina* was disastrous in most respects, many Boyar estates were expropriated in favour of the pomest'e system with the result that 'service land holding became the predominant form of tenure' and it appeared in the 1580s as if hereditary landownership might expire altogether.[66] However, Ivan IV's actions should not be construed as class warfare in favour of the servitors against the magnates; rather, these 'developments were in favour of the state, which required a general levelling of privileges of the upper and middle service classes'.[67] Further, as the state demanded more revenue, the needs of servitors and officials coincided in developing more efficient and precise methods of taxation and control of peasant taxpayers.[68]

Along with these changes in property relations came expanding privileges and autonomy for the service class. Most significantly was the intensification of rural class relations, as peasant producers and service landholders were entwined in ever-tighter nets of exploitation and dependence. Violating established restrictions on relations between state-servitor and peasant, Ivan IV permitted the pomeshchiki to set the level of the rent on their service lands and to extract revenue themselves. This increased exploitation because it placed the landholder and the state in competition in expropriating resources from the peasant. It also made the cavalryman's interest in his holding personal, marking

a turn away from prebendalism towards a more western style of patron-client relations.[69] Even more significantly, pomest'e landholdings were consolidated in one locality, instead of being spread across the empire in fragmented pieces, making patron-client relations more intimate and exploitation more intense.[70] A significant result of these changes in the pomest'e system in the late sixteenth century was that cavalrymen became less interested in waging war and more inclined to supervise their estates and extract revenue.

Through the sixteenth century, the Russian peasant was not yet enserfed, although his mobility was considerably more restricted than in the Ottoman Empire. Tendencies towards enserfment were evident as early as the end of the fifteenth century, but paralleling the transformation of pomest'e holdings, it was not until the seventeenth century that the real revolution in rural relations took place.

One of the most central facts of life for peasants in Russia was the system of collective responsibility. Although there were significant regional differences, throughout the Muscovite period records show the centrality of this institution,[71] and its origins have been traced back to Mongol influence in Kievian Rus' in the thirteenth century.[72] Just as Islamic legal notions of property rights and land use were crucial in shaping the structure of Ottoman rural relations, so too the principle collective responsibility would provide a basis on which a particularly vicious and deeply entrenched serfdom could develop in Russia. The state cadastres, which assessed the tax-value of the land a commune encompassed, were updated very infrequently. Based on these assessments, peasants were held collectively responsible for paying a set tax which did not change until a new census updated the cadastres. If a family fled, the remaining peasants would have to assume the tax burden. Thus peasants were systematically driven to form bonds of social solidarity to simply survive the taxation regime based on collective responsibility.[73] Collective responsibility had deep roots in Russia, and became embedded in state strategies for controlling the population. Despite administrative growth, 'the country remained understaffed and undergoverned', and with this recognition, 'Muscovite leaders built on indigenous traditions of collectivism and mutual responsibility to develop complex systems through which to co-opt the population into the process of its own subjugation'.[74]

Long before the crisis of the seventeenth century, the state had demonstrated a willingness to limit peasant mobility and subordinate the cultivators to the landholders. In response to labour dislocations and widespread desertion of agricultural land, the state issued a decree sometime between 1448 and 1470 limiting peasant movement to St George's Day (*Iur'ev Den'*) in the late fall after the harvest when debts would have been repaid and taxes collected.[75] This rule became the general law for all peasants in the law code (*Sudebnik*) of 1497.[76] The condition and position of peasants remained relatively stable through most of

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the sixteenth century. After 1592, complete immobility was extended to all peasants on a temporary basis in an effort to deal with the growing agrarian crisis, a measure which was significantly weakened by a statute of limitations on the retrieval of runaways and by the chaos that erupted during the time of troubles. By the time Russia entered the critical period of the seventeenth century, the state had made itself comfortable with the notion of regulating and restricting peasant mobility. Peasant mobility and legal personality were reduced during the seventeenth and early eighteenth century to such a degree that Russian serfs became little more than slaves.

Discussion: divergent responses to the crisis of the seventeenth century

We have so far examined the manner in which the nature of imperial rule, state society relations and the agrarian social structure of each empire lay down some of the tracks for diverse trajectories of responses to the deep crisis of political and material circumstances. Before we elaborate on the unfolding of these processes in each case, some comparative points can be highlighted. First, the enserfment of the peasantry as one of the most significant outcomes of the crisis binds together the Habsburg and Russian Empires. However, banditry in the Ottoman and serfdom in the Russian Empires are also equivalent in the sense that they were social outcomes that were obtained through active state intervention in the rural class relations. The Habsburg Empire remains more of an anomaly since there the central state had less impact on the remodelling of agrarian relations and the rise of a harsh form of second-serfdom. Second, the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires experienced a steady stratification of the peasantry through the crisis, with a clear pattern of differentiation between winners and losers, while through the same period in the Russian Empire the peasantry experienced a levelling effect with steady movement of all towards loss of freedom. Finally, looking at the overall patterns of transformation within each imperial continuity, we can observe that in different ways, the Habsburg and Russian centres were much more cognisant of the necessity for a cultural project of unification than the Ottomans. The way out of the crisis for the Ottomans reflected their more ambiguous attitude towards large-scale projects of unity and homogeneity. The Russian and the Habsburgs were clearly more similar in this. Such differences become clear in the comparative narratives that we provide in this final segment.

The Ottoman and Russian Empires remain the two cases where the agrarian order was significantly transformed by the economic and the military crisis of the period. Both states were affected by the military revolutions afoot and were faced with the urgent need to reform their manner of fighting. The necessity for men and a new understanding of warfare meant that agrarian

class relations would be tampered with to fashion the new army. Not only was this done through state intervention, and in both cases the imperial state was intimately involved in the formulation of change, but in the Russian case, the service class was much more successful at imposing its own preferences on the state, while in the Ottoman case, the service class was slowly dismantled, fragmented and became unable to act on its interests.

The central challenge to the Ottoman state during the crisis of the seventeenth century came in the form not of peasant or elite movements rebelling because of agrarian conditions, but as banditry. Armed gangs, often decommissioned from the state's military campaigns, roamed the countryside, available for hire and engaging in pillage to survive. Ottoman strategies of incorporating the peasantry and rotating elites kept both groups dependent on the state, unable and unwilling to rebel. The bandits were also a product of state-society relations, the agrarian tenure system and the lack of fixity on land. Even when these troops had turned to banditry, they remained focused on gaining resources from the state rather than on rebelling. That the state was willing and able to effectively control and manipulate these bandits through various deals, bargains and patronage, attests not to the weakness of the state, but to its strength and ability to manipulate the rural social order to its own central benefit.

In the Ottoman Empire, the transformations of the timar system in the late sixteenth century and the strategy of allowing banditry to become an alternative source of military energy for the empire was initiated during the time of crisis. While this, as we have said earlier, has been typically regarded as one of the first signs of Ottoman decline, it was in fact an alternative means of development under onerous conditions of fiscal and military requirements. Even though timar holders were the elites most damaged by the transformations of the seventeenth century, the system continued to exist and adapt in ways that made sense for the period. No doubt the timar holders were most affected by the decline of traditional warfare that made the group less essential for the state, increased competition for scarce resources and divided them into layers of winners and losers, and in their vulnerability, they often even turned on each other. This created a consolidation of land in the hands of the largest timar holders whose connections and resources saved them from the fate of the smaller holders who perished.[77] Additionally, the length of land tenure increased as timar holders struggled to hold onto their land. Instead of rotation and engaging in war, timar holders paid the state a yearly fee, transforming state controlled land tenure into a form of tax farming.[78] Cavalrymen not only experienced pressure from above as wealthier holders consolidated and converted to tax farming, but also from below as the state recruited peasants and commoners into its new army.

To Ottoman strategists, the need for musketeers was evident for much of the sixteenth century, and became painfully pressing during the war with the

Habsburgs from 1593 to 1606.[79] The reluctance of the cavalrymen to carry muskets led the state to rapidly expand the janissary corps, whose numbers increased dramatically from less than 8000 men in 1527 to 53,499 in 1669.[80] The Ottoman state increasingly dismissed timar holders who were no longer useful and awarded their land to any soldier, no matter his origin, rank or title for fighting with the Ottoman army. In addition to their military obsolescence, the timar holders were increasingly replaced in their duties as tax collectors. The economic crisis of the seventeenth century led the state to rely on more direct taxes collected by palace agents, effectively bypassing the timar holder. The unity of the service class in the Ottoman Empire disintegrated, as wealthier members benefited and less well connected members declined. Tax-farming became an important means of extracting revenue, and timar lands were granted indiscriminately to whomever served the Ottoman state.

The peasantry was also deeply affected by the social and economic forces of the seventeenth century. The *cift-hane* land-labour unit of family production was the foundation for the entire Ottoman agrarian order.[81] The economic crisis of the seventeenth century posed a serious challenge to this structure, as peasants sought flexibility and the state attempted to maintain stability.[82] Mobility and stratification were two outcomes of the demands for flexibility. Furthering the fragmentation of peasant solidarity, Ottoman peasants were increasingly stratified, as wealthier peasants with larger plots of land hired poorer peasants with less land.[83] Peasants had been paying taxes on a stratified system of high, medium and low resources, but with the rural crisis, any collective responsibility disappeared to promote stratified and more individualistic responses. Nevertheless, the overriding fact of peasant life was its fluidity. Peasants often had the option of moving to other villages, and villagers took the easy way out by exiting when times became difficult, demonstrating no intent to mobilise for collective action. As such, the countryside adapted to the crisis, with exit and movement and the state did not attempt to keep the peasantry tied to the land.

The structure of peasant life made it possible for banditry to develop and spread in this time of crisis. Peasants could easily pay an exit fee (*cift bozan akcesi*) and leave behind their land and tax obligations to join 'pockets of free-floating vagrant individuals in the villages'.[84] While the timar holders were refusing to take up modern weaponry, firearms became common in the countryside as rural life was militarised. Bandits (*celalis*) were drawn from the populations affected by the transformation of rural life in the seventeenth century, including vagrant peasants, unemployed soldiers, members of official retinues and religious students.[85] Banditry became generalised, but at the same time was the outcome of state strategies to cope with the restlessness of rural society and to meet the military demands of musket-based infantry warfare. Bandits then were the result of state construction, a strategy deployed to foil

class-based initiatives and efficiently supply a large cadre of military recruits.[86] Hardly the champions of an oppressed peasantry as depicted in romanticised interpretations, peasants were the primary victims of banditry's violence and exploitation, a form of violent, informal taxation implicitly accepted by the state. Furthermore, the Ottoman state, by bargaining with bandit chiefs and incorporating them along with their retinues into the imperial structure, made banditry a source of strength and power.[87] Bandits provided an outlet for rural social pressures, which in most European states erupted in violent peasant rebellion. The Ottoman state's skill as a bargainer and dealmaker, however, manipulated relations so that bandits became a source of strength and flexible stability. Contrary to interpretations, which see the demise of the timar system and the rise of banditry as a crucial first step in the decline of the Ottoman Empire, bargaining produced flexibility and durability, not decline. The Ottoman Empire's strategy was successful in eliminating serious dangers of armed insurrection or rebellion.[88] Obviously such arguments underscore the need for us to reconsider the periodisation of Ottoman decline, to reassess forms of state transformation and adaptation, even if these were temporary.

In Russia, the enserfment of the peasantry was a strategy deployed by the state to mediate and control the pressures unleashed by rural dislocation and the military revolution. The Russian Empire's response to the crisis of the seventeenth century reflected the dynamics produced by its hybrid system of land tenure, the willingness of the state to regulate peasant mobility, and the relative underdevelopment of the Russian bureaucracy and military. In order to understand the activity of state and society in response to the challenges of the seventeenth century, it is crucial to remember the devastating social and political effects of the Time of Troubles in Russia; it deepened agrarian restlessness and dislocation and made the newly established Romanov dynasty particularly sensitive to social unrest. Additionally, Russia was slow to modernise its military because of the unique intensity of 'socio-economic and political upheaval' at the moment when Russia had to modernise in order to survive.[89] In response to the refusal of the middle service class cavalry to register as infantrymen in 1630, Russian officials opened the 'new formation regiments' to irregular social groups, such as the Tatars and Cossacks.[90] This proved insufficient however, as warfare demanded ever-larger infantry forces, and the service class, instead of adapting to military change, secured increasing control over land and labour. Thus, during the Thirteen Years War (1654–67) the state imposed mass conscription, drawn largely for the peasantry, drafting by the end of the war over one hundred thousand men into the new army.[91]

The military service class played a critical role in shaping state action in the seventeenth century. During the Time of Troubles, there was 'a definite qualitative change' in the status and class consciousness of the military servitors.[92] Within the dual system of property relations, the servitors eventually

'acquired perquisites and an accompanying cast of mind' typically reserved for hereditary elites. As their military obsolescence became ever more evident, and service landholders came to rely more on land and labour than on military service for support, they mobilised and placed effective political pressure on the state to establish themselves as a closed caste, transform service lands into hereditary holdings and, most importantly, decisively enserf the peasantry. As Valerie Kivelson has described it, the pomeshchiki emerged as a salient political force during Ivan IV's *Oprichnina* and achieved significant influence 'during the Time of Troubles and the early decades of Romanov rule'.[93] Whereas the timar holders in the Ottoman Empire were divided and peasants and other elements incorporated into the fighting forces, in Russia a 1603 decree prohibited the children of slaves, peasants and clergymen from holding pomest'e lands. The servitors succeeded in gradually eroding the nonhereditary principle of service land tenure by obtaining laws which required the transfer of service lands to family members, and during the intense chaos of the Time of Troubles, pomest'e lands were issued, incoherently, on an explicitly hereditary basis. Reflecting the growing ambiguity between the essentially distinct hereditary and service modes of tenure, decrees in 1634 and 1638 referred to 'familial service lands', as absurd contradiction.[94] Although it would not be until the reign of Peter I that service lands were officially abolished, decrees in 1676–77 essentially recognised the revolution in landholding which had taken place, effectively eliminating the pomest'e and extending the rights of the *votchnina* to the military servitors. This transformation reflected, in Richard Hellie's words, 'a complete reversal' of land tenure policy, 'from the dominance of the pomest'e at the expense of the votchnina in the second half of the sixteenth century to the near extermination of the pomest'e by the votchnina a hundred years later'.[95] The crisis of the seventeenth thus precipitated a revolutionary transformation of land tenure on behalf of the service class.

Even more remarkable was the transformation of rural labour in the decisive enserfment of the Russian peasantry. Although restrictions on mobility were extensive before the seventeenth century, the enserfment of the Russian peasantry reached a critical point during the rebellion of 1648. Under pressure from the mobilised and status conscious cavalry servitors, the law code of 1649 repealed the statute of limitations on the recovery of fugitive peasants who frequently escaped the severe exploitation of the petty landholders to the more lax estates of the magnates. This marked the apex of pomeshchiki political influence, as they were able 'to wring the ultimate concession', of final enserfment 'from a reluctant state and an actively opposed boyar aristocracy'.[96] While fluidity and increased stratification characterised Ottoman peasant life in the seventeenth century, the late sixteenth century 'began [the systematic] homogenisation of the Russian peasantry' and serfdom accelerated this process during the second half of the seventeenth century.[97] Russia's response to the

demands of the military revolution and the crisis of the seventeenth led to the imposition of a rigid social order. This 'social regimentation and stratification' was an 'extreme case of rapid, thorough-going social division'.[98] The obsolete cavalry servitors succeeded in securing privileges and property rights similar to the dominant hereditary nobility in controlling land and labour, while for peasants, the possibility of 'moving legally no longer existed'.[99] Already in the seventeenth century, peasants became legally exchangeable labour commodities, marking a process in which human beings came to be treated increasingly as chattel.[100] Enserfment was not a 'natural' by-product of objective economic forces so much as 'a series of conscious acts' by a centralised state under pressure from rebellious and class conscious military servitors.[101] Agrarian dislocation and military backwardness aggravated the challenges of the seventeenth century, and enserfment was a crucial strategy to control rural labour and ease elite tensions. Enserfment 'cement[ed]' the petty service landholders to the state and the hereditary elites; after 1648 the petty landholders would never stir 'to oppositional action again'.[102] In mediating elite tensions and modernising its military, Russia paid 'a tremendous price' in human life and dignity, and 'serfdom was certainly one of the costs of the survival of the Russian state'.[103]

But enserfment was only one facet of a general transformation of Russian society in the seventeenth century. The rebellion of 1648 not only provided the agitation military servitors needed to demand the full enserfment of the peasantry, it also marked transformation of governmentality and emergence of a rigidly stratified bureaucratic order. The organisational and bureaucratic requirements of a large infantry army promoted a 'culture of technicality in state activity' marked by a rapid increase in formal documentation, rationalised procedures and state penetration into society.[104] As Valerie Kivelson writes, 'the rebellion of 1648 erupted at a critical moment in Muscovite history, when traditional and bureaucratising discourses clashed' in defining Russia's political culture.[105] Fundamentally driven by the state's response to the military revolution within the constraints of general crisis of the seventeenth century, 'a new, bureaucratic culture quietly arose in state circles behind a carefully maintained facade of traditionalism'.[106] By 1648 the 'effects of innovation could no longer be hidden, and the fierce conflict pitted an old vision of the social order against the new', as status conscious cavalry servitors attempted to secure their place in the emerging modern state.[107] The new, depersonalised bureaucratic state not only succeeded in mobilising large infantry armies; it also penetrated and regulated everyday life in new ways. Any group who violated the 'newly emerging vision of a static social order' – such as vagrants, wondering minstrels and free Cossacks – were subjected to legislation which attempted to 'register these undisciplined groups, tax them and recast them into one of the officially acknowledged categories of people: peasants, townspeople or soldiers'.[108] The state's response to the crisis of the seventeenth century and the military revolu-

tion catalysed 'the destruction of old social and political understandings ... [and the emerging] forms of social organisation became important legacies to the centralised, reformist state of Peter I'.[109]

The Habsburg Empire is comparable to the Russian case through the importance of a state absolutism project. While the Russian state was permeated with elements of governmentality and a central bureaucratic culture that they believed was necessary to survive through the crisis and beyond, the Habsburgs adopted a strategy of 'confessional absolutism' as the solution to the diversity of internal responses to the crises and a cultural approach to the unification of the elites with whom rested the key to the survival of a central Habsburg state. In the process, however, the monarchy's inability to enter the realm of agrarian relations in many regions of the empire, and their eagerness to please the nobility facilitated the rise of a phenomenon called 'second serfdom', in its persistent and supplementary harshness for the concerned peasantry. Furthermore in every region, they also allowed a small class of peasants to become the agents of their brethren's exploitation, dramatically shaping rural relations for the centuries to come.

The Thirty Years War was devastating to the peasantries of each region of the empire. All over the Habsburg Empire, the first half of the seventeenth century was a period of destruction, but also a period during which the nobility made concerted attempts at expanding their trade in agricultural commodities, expand their estates and increase their commercial involvement. Everywhere in the empire, the nobility tried to profit at the expanse of the peasantry, using enserfment, taxation and the dreaded *robota* (compulsory labour services) to further their own interests. For the peasants of Bohemia whose enserfment had started already after the Hussite Wars, this last war was ruinous. The devastation of the war, the destruction and loss of life, the spread of disease and lawlessness happened as the war proceeded. In the devastation that resulted from war, the nobility were able to seize the lands that had been abandoned and force the peasants to settle and therefore reconstructed a labour force. Especially after the White Mountain defeat, when the Bohemian aristocracy was replaced by 'a foreign' Catholic nobility, all the old patron-client compacts, the few restraints that had been observed went away. Since these new landowners had no previous ties to the peasantry, they found it easy to repress them. Such repression was facilitated by the constitutional transformation that provided the new Bohemian elite with complete freedom over the peasantry, which were no longer under the jurisdiction of the state.[110] The second serfdom that ensued was made even more onerous by the numerous and increasing exactions, services and fees as well as the robota, the obligation of peasants to perform services on the landlord's land.

If the enserfment of the Bohemian peasantry was dreadful, by all accounts, it was worse in Hungary. Similar to Bohemia, but earlier, in 1608, a law was

passed that essentially altered the fate of the peasantry in Hungary. This law transferred the jurisdiction over the peasantry from the state to the authority of counties in Hungary, so that until the mid-eighteenth century, the central government had no authority in rural relations. When the misery of rural relations was exacerbated by the crises in the seventeenth century, peasants paid for the devastation. They provided labour to repair fortifications, they were tied to the land so they provided steady and fixed labour and they remained poverty stricken. It is only after the Thirty Years War, under the rule of Leopold I (1658–1705) that we see attempts at monitoring the peasant situation in Hungary.[111] By contrast to Bohemia and Hungary where legislation provided the nobility with the ability to alter rural social structure to fit their needs, the Austrian portion of the empire experienced more state intervention. Here the presence of large, market-oriented agriculture and what others have labelled 'feudal capitalism' with a free peasantry provided the conditions for the state to intercede to push for more peasant exploitation. That the state had rearranged the social and familial relations in this region during the prior century had the effect of strong differentiation within the peasantry. Therefore, instead of enserfment, especially in Upper Austria, we see deep cleavages within the peasantry, which then become the basis of the rebellion of 1625. Such stratification was compounded by the religious reaction of a strong Protestant population against the policies of the Counter-Reformation emphasised by the Habsburg monarchy. In fact, the rebellions of this period in the Hereditary lands of the Habsburg Empire can be explained by the deeply unequal rural structure and the religious opposition to the policies of the state.

For the Habsburg monarchy, the nature of its earlier arrangements dictated the choice of their involvement and priorities. First, the continuation of strong and dependable feudal relations was of primary importance. Thus, in every struggle, for example between the towns and the nobility, between the peasants and the nobility the Crown chose to support the latter. While the towns had been strong revenue generators for the Crown, during the seventeenth-century crisis, they were overwhelmed by competition by the nobility and abandoned by the state too weak to counter the nobility. Similarly, the monarchy was adamant about protecting the wealth and the privileges of the noble families over the peasantry since it relied on them for the collection of taxes and administration of the provinces. Second, they believed that Catholic unity and uniformity would create a nobility and population loyal to the Crown. There is no doubt that the cultural unity the Habsburgs strived for was the result of the strong state-church association and the geopolitical position of the monarchy at the time of emergence. As the Habsburg Empire emerged from the Holy Roman Empire, Habsburg Christianity embodied a strong perspective of the unity of church and polity, and was firmly grounded in the belief in the exclusive domination of Christianity. The very establishment and proliferation

of these Christian churches outside the Catholic Church, with the acquisition of a variety of lands and diverse populations turned the Habsburg Empire into a veritable confessional mosaic. Added to such confessional differences was the fact that such differences were enshrined further in the structure of state society relations since the dynastic alliances left rather weak ties of vertical integration. We can say then the structural problems of an early dynastic alliance based expansion and segmentation was to be resolved through imposed cultural unity. The result was that with the reign of Ferdinand II and throughout the Counter-Reformation, persecution became excessive and strident, a policy of the crown intent on consolidation and centralisation with religious unification necessary to ensure loyalty to the crown. In what Bireley calls 'confessional absolutism' centralisation, the princely predominance over estates and the advancement of Catholicism became unified into one coherent policy of statemaking.[112]

Conclusion

The comparison of these three empires as they adapted and transformed themselves in response to the material and political crises of the seventeenth century presents us with at least three sociological conclusions. First, this chapter emphasised the degree to which the particular nature of imperial emergence, the manner in which state society relations congealed at initial moments of incorporation and the structuration of relations of rule and production provided the tracks upon which change could be motivated. That is whether imperial formation was effected by dynastic alliances or warfare and assimilation, the particular strength of the imperial state vis-à-vis societal actors partly determined solutions to the crisis. The path dependency that we observe here and recount for each of the empires was significant, though it should also not be perceived as limiting. Here we have tried to provide a long-term and slow-developing process analysis of institutional change and political outcomes. We have done so by paying attention to the unfolding of processes of change within the existing constraints and opportunities.

We have also emphasised in comparative perspective the ability of imperial states to adapt to crises and react and work with the social structural and institutional understandings in their realm to allow for transformations that maintained them for many more centuries. Such analyses are increasingly important as we try to move away from a decline thesis in imperial studies and study imperial transformations as continual iterations of state society arrangements in response to the challenges (external as well as internal) of rule. The Ottoman Empire seems to have demonstrated the most flexibility, and though this willingness to adapt, negotiate and bargain may have allowed it to pursue a different yet successful route towards state centralisation in the short run,

in the long run, it seems the strategies of the Habsburgs and Russian Empires resolved the conflicts of empire more completely, and turned these empires into strong and viable imperial entities for the centuries to come.

Finally, the outcomes of the crisis of the seventeenth century were in no way insignificant or temporary. In each empire, these outcomes shaped the centuries to come and instituted new solutions that were reproduced. The most significant example of this was the Russian Empire. Serfdom acquired an importance in the Russian Empire that it assumed nowhere else in Europe, and its impact on the course of Russian history can barely be overemphasised. The commune outlasted serfdom, and was not entirely destroyed until Stalin imposed collectivisation in the 1930s. The homogenisation and repression of the Russian peasantry during enserfment provided the foundation for the unique ideology and practices of the peasant commune. Collective responsibility, land redistribution and elements of a sort of rough, patriarchal democracy were fundamental and unique practices of the Russian peasant commune.[113] In the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, similarly, the agrarian structure remained a significant aspect of imperial rule, fought over by different social and national groups as empires began to transition into other forms of political organisation.

Notes

1. The best example of this is Maier (2006).
2. The best example in this category is no doubt Lieven (2001), most recent Burbank & Cooper (2010).
3. Anderson (1974).
4. For instance, Downing (1992) remains focused on the West, with only brief sections on Russia, Japan and China emphasising difference, separation and the failure to develop 'medieval constitutionalism', 26–55.
5. Lieberman (1999: 22).
6. Parker & Smith (1978); Aston (1965).
7. Steensgaard (1974 and 1990).
8. Steensgaard (1978 and 1976).
9. Tilly (1990).
10. Steensgaard (1978).
11. Tilly (1975); Mousnier (1970); Porchnev (1972); Avrich (1972); Brenner (1976); Clark (1985).
12. The original outline of the thesis is in Michael Richards (1967) ('The Military Revolution, 1560–1660'), a reprint of a 1956 lecture. Also in this tradition, see Parker (1988); Downing (1992); Rogers (1995).
13. Poe (1996: 604).
14. Asch (1999).
15. See Pamuk (2001).
16. Hellie (1971: 93).
17. Avrich (1972: 10–17).

18. The classic treatment is Platonov (1970). See further Dunning (1997), a discussion of Jack Goldstone's influential model of early-modern state crisis. Dunning points out that Russia is somewhat unusual, and has been passed over in many works on the crisis of the seventeenth century, but argues that the 'Time of Troubles' is evidence that Goldstone's model does in fact apply to Russia.
19. Hellie (1971: 107).
20. Ingrao (1994: 6).
21. Kann (1974: 132).
22. Inalcik (1980); Kafadar (1995); Lowry (2003).
23. Inalcik (1973: 107); Agoston (1993: 17).
24. Inalcik (1954; 1991). Such tactics were widespread among empires, especially as David Laitin (1991) identifies for the Russian and Soviet empires.
25. Barkey (1996 and 1994).
26. Alef (1961).
27. Raeff (1984: 2–3).
28. Keenan (1986); Kollman (1987).
29. Keenan (1986: 132).
30. Keep (1985: 13); Hellie (1971: 27).
31. Alef (1983); Crummey (1987); Hellie (1971: 26).
32. Crummy (1987: 90).
33. Hellie (1971: 21).
34. Hellie (2005).
35. Hellie (2005: 90; 1971: 27).
36. Hellie (2005).
37. Crummey (1983: 5).
38. Sugar (1963).
39. Evans (1979: 166).
40. Ibid.
41. Rebel (1983).
42. Ibid.: 4.
43. Anderson (1974).
44. Ingrao (1994: 11–12).
45. Wright (1975).
46. Kiraly (1975).
47. Ingrao (1994: 43) provides the following figures for the middle of the seventeenth century: 'just thirteen Hungarian magnates controlled 37 percent of the kingdom's villages, while the eighty-two aristocrats who sat in the Bohemian and Moravian diets controlled 62 percent of their crownlands' peasantry'.
48. Cited in Wank (1997: 102).
49. Inalcik (1994: 104–15).
50. These arguments are made clearly in Barkey (1994 and 1996).
51. Inalcik (1994: 116); Barkey (1994: 37).
52. Inalcik (1994: 145).
53. Inalcik (1973: 107); Kunt (1983); Imber (2002: 107); Agoston (1993: 17).
54. Panaite (2003).
55. Many texts have been discussed in relation to the work of pamphleteers. For the sixteenth century, two are significant: Grand Vizier Lutfi Pasha's *Asafname* and Mustafa Ali's *Nushat-I Selatin*. Both were produced at this time and discussed the situation in the Ottoman Empire, see Howard (1988).

56. Kivelson (1997: 650).
57. Ibid. For an interesting debate on the nature of the Muscovite state, see Poe (2002); Kivelson (2002).
58. Weickhardt (1993: 665); Pipes (1994: 530). Weickhardt contends that 'Russia gradually developed a concept of private property for land' similar to practices in Western Europe, and that limitations on private landownership protected the Boyar clans, not the state. Richard Pipes, on the other hand, argues that the 'patrimonial' regime of the tsars, unlike any state in the West, freely violated human and property rights by appropriating 'the estates of their subjects at will ... because they considered all the land of the realm to be ultimately theirs'.
59. Kivelson (2002: 495).
60. Blum (1961: 174–80).
61. Hellie (1971: 33).
62. Ibid.: 33.
63. Ibid.: 37.
64. Ibid.: 33.
65. Ibid.: 40.
66. Ibid.: 41.
67. Ibid.
68. Kivelson (1997: 648).
69. Hellie (1971: 45).
70. Ibid.: 46.
71. Ibid.: 121.
72. Dewey (1988: 249–70).
73. Hellie (1971: 121).
74. Kivelson (1997: 653–55).
75. Hellie (1971: 84).
76. Ibid.
77. Barkey (1994: 63–64).
78. Ibid.: 67–68.
79. Ibid.: 69.
80. Ibid.: 69–70.
81. Inalcik (1994: 143–53).
82. Barkey (1994: 109).
83. Ibid.: 110.
84. Ibid.: 144.
85. Ibid.: 141.
86. Ibid.: 178.
87. Ibid.: 195.
88. Barkey (1991).
89. Paul (2004: 37); Poe (1998: 248).
90. Paul (2004: 23).
91. Ibid.: 23–34.
92. Hellie (1971: 48).
93. Kivelson (1994: 199).
94. Hellie 1971: 56–57.
95. Ibid.: 57.
96. Kivelson (1994: 199–200).
97. Hellie (1971: 102).
98. Poe (1996: 613).

99. Hellie (1971: 144).
100. Ibid.: 120.
101. Ibid.: 145.
102. Kivelson (1994: 200).
103. Hellie (1971: 258).
104. Poe (1996: 616).
105. Kivelson (1993: 733).
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.: 734.
108. Ibid.: 749–50.
109. Stevens (1995: 5).
110. Wright (1975: 244–46).
111. Kiraly (1975: 269–71).
112. Bireley (1994).
113. Atkinson (1990).

Bang_14_Chapter 14.indd 262

5/5/2011 2:50:26 PM