Phil. 262: Intuitions and Philosophical Methodology
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The Gettier Literature: Some Accounts of Knowledge

Several representative attempts at analyzing knowledge:

1. *the "traditional" analysis of knowledge*: S knows that *p* iff:
    i.   it is true that *p*,
    ii. S believes that *p*, and
    iii. S is (adequately) justified in believing that *p*.

2. *the no-false-grounds analysis of knowledge*: S knows that *p* iff:
    i.   it is true that *p*,
    ii. S believes that *p*,
    iii. S is justified in believing that *p*, and
    iv. all of S's grounds for believing that *p* are true.

3. *Goldman's causal theory of knowledge*: S knows that *p* iff:
    i.   it is a fact that *p*,
    ii. S believes that *p*, and
    iii. S's belief that *p* is causally connected in an appropriate way with the fact that *p*.

4. *Nozick's tracking theory of knowledge*: S knows that *p* iff:
    i.   it is true that *p*,
    ii. S believes that *p*,
    iii. if it weren't true that *p*, then S wouldn't believe that *p*, and
    iv. if it were true that *p*, then S would believe that *p*.

5. *Nozick's modified tracking theory of knowledge*: S knows that *p* iff there is some belief-forming method M such that:
    i.   it is true that *p*,
    ii. S believes that *p* via M,
    iii. if it weren't the case that *p* and S were to use M to arrive at a belief as to whether (or not) *p*, then S wouldn't believe that *p* via M, and
    iv. if it were the case that *p* and S were to use M to arrive at a belief as to whether (or not) *p*, then S would believe that *p* via M.

6. *the no-defeaters analysis of knowledge*: S knows that *p* iff:
    i.   it is true that *p*,
    ii. S believes that *p*,
    iii. S is justified in believing that *p*, and
    iv. there is no true proposition such that, if S were justified in believing that proposition, then S would not be justified in believing that *p*.

7. *Swain's no-defeaters analysis of knowledge*: S knows that p iff:
    i.   it is true that p,
    ii. S is justified in believing that p (that is, there is a true body of evidence e such that S is justified in believing e and e justifies the proposition that p),
    iii. S believes that p on the basis of his justification, and
    iv. S's justification for the proposition that p is indefeasible; that is, that there is an evidence-restricted alternative F* to S's epistemic framework F such that:
        a. "S is justified in believing that p" is epistemically derivable from the other members of the evidence component of F*, and
        b. there is some subset of members of the evidence component of F* such that:
            I. the members of this subset are also members of this subset are also members of the evidence component of F, and
            II. "S is justified in believing that p" is epistemically derivable from the members of this subset.

F* is an evidence-restricted alternative to an epistemic framework F iff:
    A. for ever true proposition that q such that "S is justified in believing that not-q" is a member of the evidence component of F, "S is justified in believing that q" is a member of the evidence component of F*,
    B. for some subset G of members of F such that G is maximally consistent epistemically with the members generated in (A), every member of G is a member of F*, and
    C. no other propositions are members of F* except those that are implied epistemically by the members generated in (A) and (B).