

**Two Faces of Gender Consciousness? Feminist and Christian
Conservative Women**

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President George W. Bush's nomination of John Roberts to the Supreme Court touched off a fierce fight between U.S. women's groups in the summer of 2005. The National Organization of Women (NOW) and other pro-choice women's groups held rallies and press conferences, and paid for advertisements to vehemently oppose Roberts, based on his record of opposing reproductive rights for women. Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) claimed to speak for all women when she opposed Roberts based on his perceived opposition to the court's ruling in *Roe v. Wade*. Feinstein said in late August, "As the only woman on the [Judiciary] committee, I have an additional role to play in representing the views and concerns of 145 million American women during this hearing process." Immediately following Feinstein's remarks, Concerned Women for American (CWA) and other pro-life conservative women's groups lined up to support Roberts and held a "Women for Roberts" press conference at the National Press Club on August 24. Connie Mackey of the Family Research Council noted her own gender identity in her support of Roberts and said, "Senator Feinstein, woman to woman, I ask you to employ the same courtesy for Judge Roberts's hearing and confirmation afforded Sandra Day O'Connor, who was confirmed 96 to 3."¹

A parallel struggle is currently playing out over whether the FDA will allow emergency contraception (EC, also known as the "morning after pill") to be sold over-the-counter in drugstores, rather than requiring a doctor's prescription. On this issue, CWA, a multi-issue women's group, asked its members to urge the FDA to "protect women and girls" by refusing to make EC available without a prescription. In direct opposition, the NOW, also a

¹ Jim VandeHei, "Group Defends Roberts's Right Record: Conservatives Answer Critics that Point to Reagan-Era Remarks." *Washington Post*, August 25, 2005. P. A03.

multi-issue women's group, stated that the FDA would be "failing women" if it continued to require a prescription for EC, and staged a protest outside the FDA offices.

The battle lines could not be more clearly drawn; and yet, both the feminists and the conservative women claim to speak on behalf of women as a group. Since the development of ideas about group consciousness in the late 70s and early 80s, scholars have for the most part assumed all gender consciousness to reflect a feminist orientation. However, the existence of non-feminist – and indeed, antifeminist – women's groups seems to contradict this assumption. The literature describes gender consciousness as a combination of factors, including a group identity centered on gender, a system-wide focus, and a collective action orientation. The conservative women's groups we've noticed fulfill all these requirements. CWA, for example, had 500 prayer/action chapters and a membership list of roughly a half million strong in 2005, although precise membership estimates are not available. Known as "the grandmother of the contemporary Christian Right," CWA was founded in 1979 by Beverly LaHaye (Wilcox 2000). Its agenda is focused on matters of special concern to women, and in recent years it has added foreign policy to its concerns. In 2001, CWA was officially recognized at the U.N. as a non-governmental organization (NGO). The organization has sent representatives to the World Summit for Children and the World Conference on Racism hoping to shape policy consistent with their core principles. CWA has been at the forefront of efforts by the Christian Right to offer a strong counter to the National Organization for Women (NOW) and other feminist groups. CWA is not alone in its agenda oriented around women's issues but from a conservative perspective. Phyllis Schlafly's Eagle Forum agrees with CWA in many policy arenas. On the issue of abortion,

CWA is also joined by Feminists for Life – a conservative, pro-life group that is mobilized around the belief that abortion harms women.²

This then poses a test of the conventional wisdom: if all gender consciousness is feminist, then how could groups like the CWA that are opposed to feminism, mobilize on behalf of women as a group?

The puzzle suggests that the possibility of a conservative gender consciousness merits study. This paper takes up the question of whether conservative Christian women merely have appropriated the language of gender consciousness for political ends, or if there is a type of gender consciousness that has gone unrecognized in the previous literature.

Literature Review

In the literature prior to the late 1970s, there was little differentiation between the concepts of group identity and group consciousness. The idea of group consciousness in this early literature was associated mainly with identification with a political group, which scholars now understand as the definition of "group identity" (Verba and Nie 1972; Miller et al 1981, 494; Gurin 1985). Our understanding of group "consciousness" has evolved to include much more than simple self-identification. In one of the primary defining articles on the subject, in 1981 in *AJPS*, Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk identified four components of group consciousness: 1.) *group self-identification*, which is subjective rather than objective, and carries with it a sense of group loyalty; 2.) *polar affect*, defined as "a preference for the members of

² It should be noted that not all conservative women groups are founded upon a commitment to Christianity as is CWA.

one's own group (ingroup) and a dislike for those outside the group (outgroup)" (Miller et al 1981, 496), which can develop even in the absence of conflicts of interest, so long as the ingroup and outgroup are clearly defined; 3.) *polar power*, or the politicizing of the ingroup's relative power, influence, or resources as compared to the outgroup, leading to group-wide satisfaction or dissatisfaction; and 4.) *system-blame*, the belief that a larger system is responsible for group members' relatively lower (or higher) position of power or influence, rather than placing the blame on individual members of the ingroup (Ibid).

Together, these four psychological components form an ideology that has important political implications for members of both dominant and subordinate groups. For subordinate group members, Miller et al explain (1981), group consciousness shifts their ideology away from a situation in which they accept their relative deprivation and toward one where they collectively express a sense of grievance and injustice, and challenge the system that they perceive as illegitimately benefiting the outgroup. For dominant group members, group consciousness leads to a diametrically opposed political ideology, one that "justified advantage, gives legitimacy to their social status, and provokes action aimed at securing permanence for their position" (Ibid; see also Mansbridge 2001).

Examining gender has been one of the primary applications of group consciousness theory. The generally accepted account of gender consciousness includes several components. First, an individual woman must identify herself as a member of a disadvantaged group (women). As Bruce and Wilcox put it in (2000), "Social movement organizations begin by trying to convince potential members that they share a common identity, and that identity has political implications... Once a group identity is in place, social movement organizations

attempt to turn that into group consciousness" (18). To have gender consciousness, then, the woman must view her gender identity as an important part of her overall identity. And she must acknowledge the structural disadvantages for women within the overall gender system; that is, she is system-blaming rather than individual-blaming. "Most theorists argue that group consciousness requires that an individual believe that members of the group are disadvantaged by social, political, or economic structures, and that this disadvantage comes from systematic discrimination, not from individual failures" (Bruce and Wilcox 2000, 19). Once the individual is focused on systemic problems, most scholars of group consciousness stress the individual's belief that collective action among group members is necessary to address common grievances (Klein 1984; Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981; Gurin, Miller, and Gurin 1980; Miller, Hildreth and Simmons 1986).

Gender consciousness, like other types of group consciousness, is thus not a given for members of a group; neither women nor blacks have gender or black consciousness simply because of their gender or race. Neither, as Patricia Gurin has pointed out, is it static. Rather, Gurin found that gender consciousness among women increased significantly during the period 1972 and 1983, which she attributes to feminist movement organizing (Gurin 1985, 143). Indeed, "consciousness raising" was such an important goal of the feminist movement that the National Organization for Women (NOW) published several editions of a "CR" guide between 1972 and 1983. Gurin further writes that women's gender consciousness increase was "particularly pronounced with regard to [women's] discontent about the relative political power of women and men and their views about the legitimacy of gender disparities" (Ibid, 144). That is, the increase in women's gender consciousness was explicitly political – and indeed, the discontent she describes was manifested in the decade-

long collective mobilization for the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the U.S. Constitution.

However, in Gurin's work, as in most of the previous literature, "gender consciousness" is equated with feminist consciousness, even though there have been women-led opposition movements to every wave of feminism in this country. The feminist ERA struggle, for instance, was successfully blocked by mobilization by antifeminist women. This paper seeks to expand the conversation on gender consciousness by exploring how such consciousness can produce political conservatism as well as liberal feminism among women.

Conventional wisdom assumes that once a woman has a gender consciousness, she will be automatically liberal, in the sense of espousing feminist principles. Patricia Gurin wrote explicitly in 1985, "In our definition of group consciousness, collective action is geared to change, and in this sense gender consciousness is feminist" (Gurin 1985, 146). The belief that change can only occur in a liberal direction, however, is misguided. Conservative women's groups, which rely on both gender consciousness and collective action, seek change in the opposite direction. Similarly, Sue Tolleson-Rinehart's *Gender Consciousness*, one of the most important works on the subject, inherently assumes that gender consciousness can be equated with feminist consciousness.

In exploring gender differences in support for war and militarism in *AJPS* in 1993, Conover and Sapiro add to the definition of "gender consciousness." Drawing on Cook and Wilcox (1992), Conover and Sapiro find support for the theory that it is not women's gender or status as mothers that leads to their antimilitarism, but instead it is their feminism. Here,

they draw a careful distinction between "gender consciousness" and "feminist consciousness," and define the latter as: "an awareness of and sensitivity to the unequal and gendered nature of society (empirical sexual equality) and a commitment to ending the inequalities (normative sexual equality)" (Conover and Sapiro 1993, 1084). This definition, however, is not opposed to any clear definition of "gender consciousness" – and indeed, from the other literature, seems to be basically the same thing.

D.L. Hughes and Charles W. Peek in "Ladies Against Women" (*Political Behavior*, 1986) use the idea of group consciousness to explain differences in political participation between what they call "traditional-role" women (what we in this article call Christian conservative women) and "modern gender-role" women (feminists). "By underscoring women's shared grievances," they explain, "feminism may promote greater gender group consciousness among modern-role women which, like the group consciousness of blacks, may act as a mobilizing mechanism" (Hughes and Peek 1986).

One other study on the topic, Mueller and Dimieri's exploration of the internal consistency of attitudes among pro-ERA and anti-ERA activists in Massachusetts, suggests another possibility: perhaps the early scholars were correct in associating women's group consciousness with feminism, as the feminist movement of the 1960s and 70s worked hard to make this a logical connection. Mueller and Dimieri show that the group consciousness of the pro-ERA activists (members of the Boston Chapter of the National Organization for Women) was quite internally consistent, in the sense that the activists shared a high degree of agreement on gender issues, while the antifeminist activists showed less internal consensus within their group (Mueller and Dimieri 1982). However, the advent and significant political

force of conservative women through the 1980s and especially 1990s suggests that perhaps a new type of gender group consciousness has emerged that has not been discussed much in the literature.

It appears from a review of the previous literature that most scholars equate gender consciousness with feminism, or at least fail to explore the possibility of conservative, antifeminist group consciousness among women. Feminism has been seen as the logical outcome of gender consciousness, in the same way that the civil rights movement is widely perceived as a logical outcome of the black consciousness movement of the 1960s and 70s. In each case, there is a logical fallacy: liberalism is not the only direction that is indicated in an enhanced awareness of one's own identity as a member of a racial or gender group. For both the civil rights movement and the feminist movement, there have been powerful backlashes led by members of the group in question. These conservative black and women leaders also demonstrate clear evidence of black consciousness or gender consciousness, but use it to draw diametrically opposed conclusions. For more than two decades now, conservative black leaders have spoken in the language of black consciousness to spread a message of resisting government handouts, opposing affirmative action, and strengthening the black community from the inside out rather than outside in.

In a parallel way, conservative women leaders have formed organizations to combat mainstream feminism and oppose nearly all the feminists' goals, yet have done so for reasons and in ways that clearly constitute "gender consciousness." The leaders and members of these women's groups clearly identify themselves as members of a disadvantaged group, they view their gender as a crucial part of their overall identities, and they blame a larger system

for the problems that women face. Interestingly, the system they identify is quite different from the one blamed by feminists. For feminists, the systemic culprit is male domination of women, often described as "the patriarchy" (Dworkin 1983; MacKinnon 1989; Luker 1984). Conservative women, however, assign blame to feminism itself, which for them includes the sexualization of women in the media, liberalized attitudes toward sex, abortion, and the generally falling social status of housewives and motherhood (CWA 2005). Conservative women tend to believe in a fundamental difference between the sexes, rooted in biology, and leading to men and women being suited for different roles in life. For these women, to call their gender consciousness "feminist" would be an insult; feminism, in their view, is responsible for women's degraded status. Feminism is the "big lie of the century," Eagle Forum founder Phyllis Schlafly has said. She believes women have been treated well since the turn of the 20th century. In her opinion, the feminist movement is not fighting for equality - it is fighting for preferential treatment. A popular title within Christian conservative circles is *The Feminist Mistake: The Radical Impact Of Feminism On Church And Culture* (2005) by Mary Kassian which is in response to Betty Friedan's book *Feminine Mystique* which ignited feminist sentiment in the 1960s and 70s.

An ethnography by sociologist R. Marie Griffith (1997) is one of the few studies that attempts to make sense of the Christian conservative woman's identity that opposes feminism but supports women. Griffith offers a critique of "historical treatments of women's piety [that] have tended to present a flattened version of modern religious nonfeminists" (Griffith 1997, 5). After spending two years observing a charismatic Christian women's group, Griffith discovers that even while abiding by the doctrine of submission and traditional gender roles espoused by conservative Christianity, charismatic women have a

strong sense of gender identity. "Evangelical women accept and even celebrate these disciplines, not because they believe they have been manipulated by power-hungry men but because such disciplines and the boundaries they engender make them feel like true women: feminine, valuable, mighty women with a unique and crucial role to play in the sacred drama of redemption" (Ibid, 202-203). She goes on to say, "Their resistance to the notion that their own ideals of womanhood are culturally rather than divinely constructed derives from their faith in a God-ordained, hierarchically ordered universe and is further fueled by an abiding distrust of feminists, who seem from this perspective to have abandoned female identity for something closer to maleness" (Ibid, 203).

While few scholars have integrated the existence of conservative women's groups into their theories of gender consciousness, several have noted that a sizable subgroup of the larger group "women" do base their identities around their roles as wives and mothers. Jane Mansbridge (1986) in particular notes the power that organized housewives had in defeating the Equal Rights Amendment in the early 1980s. Kristin Luker uses the issue of abortion to explore what she calls the different "worldviews" between pro-choice feminist women and the pro-life women activists she studies (1984). Andrea Dworkin went even further, addressing an entire book to the question of explaining what she calls "right-wing women" (Dworkin 1983). Her theory is that conservative women, or "antifeminist" women, necessarily lack gender consciousness: "Antifeminism is the politics of contempt for women as a class" (Dworkin 1983, 197).

The awareness of a conservative subgroup of women is by no means new; Duverger discussed in 1955 how housewives will cling to more traditional views when women around

them acquire more nontraditional lifestyles. Lee Ann Banaszak and Eric Plutzer draw on this idea in their 1993 *APSR* piece on contextual determinants of feminist attitudes in Western Europe. They studied feminist attitude differences across subgroups of women, paying particular attention to the divorce rate and percentage of women working in the areas in which their subjects live. Their hypothesis, that married homemakers live in areas with a high divorce rate and high percentage of women working, was satisfactorily borne out by the data. They wrote: "Domestic women become increasingly conservative as more of their female neighbors become economically active" (Banaszak and Plutzer 1993, 153). To explain, they suggest that "this appears to be a classic example of status politics, with those being left behind by rapid social change adopting an especially conservative posture" (Ibid, 155; on status politics and gender, see also: Lipset 1964, Conover and Gray 1983, Petchesky 1984, Marshall 1986 and 1984, and Klatch 1987). In an essay in *Radical Women* (1998), Susan Marshall argues that conservative women have been politically successful in recent years not in spite of the groundwork laid by feminists, but because of it.

Gurin, too, recognizes that not all women choose to pursue a career outside the home. Although she doesn't explore the point fully, Gurin noted in 1985 that traditional gender roles "are not without rewards for women" (Gurin 1985, 145). She explains: "some women derive their social status and prestige entirely from their roles as wives and homemakers, which provide protections, meet dependency needs, and even allow flexibility and control when traditional arrangements work out ideally" (Ibid). The orientations of these women, she says, predispose them to view disparities between the sexes, such as unequal pay, as a consequence of women's and men's different roles in life, rather than as a legitimate problem requiring social action. However, even after recognizing this, Gurin assumes that women

who have gender consciousness and engage in collective action to improve the status of women will be feminist.

Gurin's article, like many on gender consciousness, uses national survey data measuring the attitudes of women and men on different questions, without attempting to separate the group of women into smaller subgroups (see also Gurin, Miller, Gurin 1980). This method, we believe, masks important differences and strongly-held opinions between important subgroups of women, namely liberal versus conservative women. Instead, like Banaszak and Plutzer did for comparative politics, we will attempt to isolate subgroups of gender conscious women and compare them, to uncover important differences that have gone unnoticed in previous works in American political science.

As Bruce and Wilcox point out in reference to the existence of anti-government African-American conservatives, "[T]he *social group consciousness* (black consciousness) does not directly imply a particular political remedy" (Bruce and Wilcox 2000, 7). They suggest drawing a division between *social* and *political* group consciousness. "Social consciousness based on race, age, gender, or religion may take on different political meanings as contending social movements compete to define the nature of the grievance, the nature of the social or policy remedy, and the type of collective action" (Ibid).

The social/political group consciousness distinction is a useful one; it neatly solves two problems in the previous literature. First, it eliminates the need for the awkward category of "group consciousness sympathizers," those who do not belong to a specific social category, but nonetheless sympathize with its supposed goals (such as male feminists). With a

social/political split, it is easier to explain and refer to the presence of men who support feminism and whites who support the civil rights movement goals: they may not have the "social group consciousness," but they share the same "political consciousness" as those in the disadvantaged group. Second, the social/political split allows us to recognize that not all self-conscious members of a certain social group (such as women) share the same political leanings, despite a possible shared group consciousness.

This project explores whether there is a type of gender consciousness that has gone unacknowledged in previous works – namely, a gender consciousness among Christian conservative women. This type of gender consciousness would be decidedly opposed to a feminist brand of gender consciousness. We can observe prominent groups on the political scene (Concerned Women for America, the Eagle Forum, Feminists for Life) that advertise themselves in the language of gender consciousness and whose leaders and members fulfill the qualifications for having a gender consciousness, despite being opposed to feminism. This study will use NES data from 1992 to test whether gender consciousness can manifest itself in Christian conservative women. We further use the data to ask, if so, where the connections and oppositions exist between feminist gender consciousness and this conservative brand, and whether there are areas of policy agreement arising from a shared gender consciousness between the two groups of women. If Christian conservative women are found to have a gender consciousness, we expect it to be related to the policy positions defended by CWA and other conservative women's group – such as an increased opposition to abortion and gay rights. There is also reason to suspect a decreased level of support for equal right for women, relative to non-gender consciousness subjects, especially as this

relates to roles outside of the home. We expect gender conscious Christian conservatives to see women benefiting most by a society that holds to traditional roles for men and women.

Data and Methodology

This project will use NES data from 1992 to test for the presence of gender consciousness among two self-identified groups of women: feminists and Christian conservatives. The dataset we chose to use is useful for such an investigation, as the 1992 NES included a battery of gender- and feminist-related measures, including ranking questions on gender roles and a feeling thermometer on feminism. The study yielded a sample size of 1327 female respondents.

As was stated previously, we seek to test whether or not women who identify with the Christian conservative movement have a gender consciousness. To begin, it is necessary to isolate those women with the potential for a Christian gender consciousness. We use a feeling thermometer for “Christian fundamentalists” to operationalize our potential Christian conservative women.³ While it could be argued that feelings towards Christian fundamentalists can not capture the allegiance one has for Christian conservatism or the Christian Right, we find that the feeling thermometer is a strong indicator of other characteristics known to be shared by Christian Right enthusiasts. The majority of those that

³ Because there are individual differences in the use of feeling thermometers, scholars argue that some type of adjustment is necessary when comparing thermometer measures across individuals, especially when studying supporters of conservative groups (Wilcox, Sigelman and Cook, 1989). The adjusted feeling towards the Christian fundamentalists and feminists is thus based on an individual’s feeling towards Christian fundamentalists (or feminists) minus their mean feeling towards the following groups: unions, big business, federal government, police, and people on welfare. The mean feeling was uncorrelated with a liberal-conservative measure. A supporter of Christian fundamentalists (and feminists) is one who feels 10 degrees warmer towards the group than their overall mean feeling thermometer rating.

feel warm towards Christian fundamentalists self-identify themselves as born-again and vote Republican. Furthermore, in 1992 the Christian Right had been established for over a decade and most Americans had formulated an opinion on the right-wing activism demonstrated by Christian fundamentalists. It can be assumed that women that felt warmly towards Christian fundamentalists in 1992 had to have some type of sympathy for the platform of the Christian Right which is what this measure seeks to tap. We label these women “potential Christian conservatives” as they have affect for the group of people (CWA-types) that we are most interested in, and they do not identify themselves as a feminist.⁴

Our control group then is those women that have a warm affect towards feminists. Again, we use a feeling thermometer with warmth towards feminists as a means to identifying this group, paired with a simple yes-no self-identification question (“are you a feminist?” yes or no). Women that respond warmly to both groups (feminists and Christian fundamentalists) are removed from the analysis.

Beginning with these two groups then, we first run cross tabulations testing whether or not Christian conservative women have a gender consciousness. Our model uses two measures to establish group gender consciousness. Gender conscious subjects are those that check “women” when asked to check groups they “feel close to – that is people who are most like you in their ideas and interests and I feelings about things.” This relates to gender identity as described above in the literature review. Subjects must also agree that “women need to work

⁴ We remove potential Christian conservative women from our sample that happened to have self-identified themselves as a feminist as we are solely interested in a gender consciousness that manifests itself apart from feminist ideology.

together” (as opposed to “individual effort”) to overcome shared burdens (relates to the collective action element of group consciousness).

Findings

Do Christian conservative women have a gender consciousness? Table 1 displays the results.

Table 1 Here

Using our definition, we find 25 percent of women that hold some affinity to the Christian Right have a gender consciousness. These women do not feel warmth towards feminists, say they are not feminists, and yet feel close to women and believe women must work together to overcome problems. At the very least, we can say that for a small subset of the Christian conservative population gender consciousness can exist apart from a direct affinity for the label “feminist.” It is not necessary to identify one’s self as a feminist or feel warm towards feminists to hold a gender consciousness as a woman.

What we are really interested in, however, is whether or not this gender consciousness manifests itself differently for Christian conservative women compared with feminist women? As we stated earlier, if this gender consciousness is one that is opposed to the feminist agenda we should see gender conscious Christian conservative women being less inclined to favor equal roles for women (relative to other Christian conservative women) and opposed to specific policy positions of the feminist platform such as legalized abortion and greater rights for gays and lesbians, similar to the CWA platform.

Table 2 Here

Contrary to our expectations, the Christian conservative women with a gender consciousness appear more likely to favor equal roles for men and women in both society and family. This

suggests that gender consciousness does not result in less support for equal roles but instead is related to a platform more similar to feminist groups than to CWA, assuming these questions are valid. This is reinforced when we turn to Table 3. Again, we see that gender conscious Christian conservatives view sexual harassment as a more serious problem than do their non-gender conscious counterparts.

Table 3 Here

Gender consciousness is again related to an increased sensitivity to women and their rights in the public sphere.

Perhaps the Christian conservative women that are gender conscious are simply “closet feminists” and agree with all the policy positions of the feminist agenda but refrain from endorsing it outrightly. To examine whether or not this is the case, we compare the attitudes towards abortion and gay rights from the Christian conservative groups. Table 4 and 5 display the results.

Table 4 and 5 Here

We do not find great differences between the Christian conservative groups when it comes to abortion and gay adoption. Gender conscious Christian conservative women are clearly not similar to feminists in their attitudes towards these issues. They are indeed socially conservative and not likely to endorse groups like NOW that campaign strongly for gay rights and pro-choice initiatives.

Conclusions

We do not find evidence that there is a Christian conservative gender consciousness that is founded upon an opposition to the feminist movement. Instead, we find that Christian

conservative women with a gender conscious are more supportive of men and women having equal roles in society and the family than are other Christian conservative women. Moreover, gender conscious women in both the Christian conservative and the feminist groups are more likely to see sexual harassment as a serious problem. The study here lends further support to earlier work that assumes women with a gender consciousness are necessarily feminist in nature.

And yet these gender conscious Christian conservative do not identify themselves as feminist nor do they feel warmly towards feminists as a group. This does suggest reluctance on the part of Christian conservatives to equate their views on equality with a feminist ideology. This could in part be a result of their opposition to abortion and gay rights. While aligning with liberal women on gender equality, they chose to not associate with the movement because of their views on abortion and homosexuality.

What should not be overlooked, however, is that very few Christian conservative women appear to have a gender consciousness, according to the data here. This begs the question as to whether or not CWA and other conservative women's groups have successfully mobilized women based on their gender identity, or if in fact, women's participation in such groups is simply a matter of religious or conservative sentiment. Anecdotally, CWA and conservative women's groups seem to put forth the notion that women share a collective fate and that they are disadvantaged by some elements of society such as divorce laws, pornography and feminism, and that they must band together as women to correct these injustices. Whether or not this raises a gender consciousness amongst conservative Christian women should continue to be the focus of future research.

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Table 1: Two Faces of Gender Consciousness?

	Gender Consciousness (Close to and Collective Action)
Potential Christian Conservatives (164)	25% (41)
Feminists (268)	53% (141)

Table 2: Gender Consciousness and Influence of the Sexes on Society and Family

	Men should have more power and influence		Men and Women should have the same		Women should have more power and influence	
	Society	Family	Society	Family	Society	Family
Christian Conservatives						
No gender consciousness	30% (36)	32% (38)	70% (84)	66% (78)	0 (0)	3% (3)
Gender consciousness	12% (5)	7% (3)	85% (35)	85% (35)	2% (1)	7% (3)
Potential Feminists						
No gender consciousness	2% (3)	2% (2)	95% (120)	95% (120)	3% (4)	4% (5)
Gender consciousness	1% (2)	2% (3)	96% (134)	92% (129)	3% (4)	6% (8)

Table 3: Gender Consciousness and Attitudes on Sexual Harassment

	Sexual Harassment is a very serious problem Is somewhat serious problem Is not very serious problem
Christian Conservatives			
No gender consciousness	28% (33)	49% (59)	23% (28)
Gender consciousness	50% (20)	40% (16)	10% (4)
Potential feminists			
No gender consciousness	38% (47)	47% (58)	15% (19)
Gender consciousness	49% (69)	43% (60)	9% (12)

Table 4: Gender Consciousness and Attitudes on Abortion

	Abortion should never be permitted	Abortion permitted only in some cases	Abortion permitted in other cases	Abortion always permitted
Christian Conservatives				
No gender consciousness	23% (28)	45% (55)	7% (8)	23% (28)
Gender consciousness	27% (11)	34% (14)	12% (5)	27% (11)
Potential feminists				
No gender consciousness	3% (4)	14% (20)	14% (19)	69% (96)
Gender consciousness	5% (12)	15% (40)	12% (31)	68% (181)

Table 5. Gender Consciousness and Attitudes towards Gay Adoption

	Gay adoption should be permitted	Gay adoption should NOT be permitted
Christian Conservatives		
No gender consciousness	8% (9)	92% (110)
Gender consciousness	13% (5)	88% (35)
Potential feminists		
No gender consciousness	53% (64)	47% (56)
Gender consciousness	55% (71)	45% (59)