




The Charles Darwin Foundation
for the Galapagos islands

Conflict in the Galápagos Islands
Analysis and Recommendations for Management
January 1997

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A. Abstract

Disputes and conflict are normal and should be anticipated under any circumstances. In settings undergoing such rapid economic and demographic change as the Galapagos Islands, disagreements and misunderstandings are particularly common. That situation is compounded by a heterogeneous meld of local, national and international actors who have defined themselves as "stakeholders" with regard to rights and resources, broadly defined.

What make that situation particularly acute are the high costs --ecological, economic, and social-- that will be incurred if:

- existing disputes simply smolder or escalate.
- current, structural inability to reach the sort of agreement needed to manage conflicts persists.
- cynicism and noncompliance with resource management rules continues unchecked.

The current situation is best understood (and can be subsequently managed) as inappropriate, and thus unworkable, patterns of governance within the existing property regime. Understood in this way, there is an alternative that is far less radical than any shift in property ownership or rights and far more predictable than short-term political recommendations. The alternative model is drawn largely from observations of well-managed "common property."

At present resource rights and use patterns in the Galapagos Islands reflect a clash between local interests and state-imposed policies and rules. Rather than simply reviewing problems, dissecting a "failed" system and, later, recommending ways to alter or resuscitate it, we suggest rethinking the entire situation *as if* it were managed as "common property," and building recommendations from there.

Much of the current management dilemma rests on the residents' *sense* of rights to the resource. The residents of the Galapagos have a sense of marginality and, with it, resentment, as a result of government policies. Rules are perceived as alien, imposed, and inappropriate. There is thus little local support for compliance and community self-monitoring. The sentiment pervades nearly all sectors of the population and produces a wide range of negative interests and attitudes.

National, international and local initiatives are currently positioned to permit convergence of a range interests and concerns. This opportunity structure opens ways for:

- 1) broadly-crafted and thus widely accepted rules and;
- 2) local institutions that can help to define, periodically redefine, and monitor resource access and appropriation.

In brief, research in the Galapagos suggests that: 1) previously informal groups have mobilized; 2) these groups can become institutionalized and; 3) strengthening such institutions will provide much of the structure needed to manage current and future conflicts.

We, therefore, strongly recommend:

- 1). Support to enable increased mobilization of the existing gremios;
- 2) Support to move from ad hoc assemblages of these groups to a formal coordinating body --e.g. a council of gremios or some gremio-based advisory board with clear role and specific powers;
- 3) incorporation of that body into the design the reglamento which will follow (or could even precede) the Special Law of the Galapagos
- 4) formally institutionalizing that body into some permanent entity with a role in monitoring and compliance, and periodic rewriting of the rules.
- 5) the specific structure of the coordinating body and way in which they undertake activities should be a part of the process .

B. Schedule

This report summarizes research --interviews and observations-- undertaken in the Galapagos Islands, specifically on the islands of Santa Cruz, San Cristobal, and Isabela. The research was divided into two, three-week periods-- 17 March-9 April 1996 and 3-27 November 1996. The research included:

1. March/April 1996

A. Approximately 65 formal, one-to one interviews with individuals ranging across all occupational and socio-economic levels. Interviews generally ranged from 2-4 hours.

The researcher indicated to those interviewed that information and opinions would remain confidential. As such there is no attribution in this report -- i.e. individuals are neither named in the report nor acknowledged here. Below is a list of some of institutions and groups with which informants are associated. However, informants were encouraged to speak largely as individuals and from personal experience, not as representatives of institutions, agencies or groups.

1. Galapagos National Park Service
2. The Charles Darwin Research Station
3. Ecuadorian Navy (Santa Cruz and San Cristobal)
4. Catholic Church clergy
5. Fishing Cooperatives on Santa Cruz, San Cristobal, and Isabela
6. Independent fishermen
7. Local government officials and staff
8. National Institute of Fisheries
9. Local and National-Level Tour Operators
10. School officials on San Cristobal and Santa Cruz

B. Attendance at two, daylong regular meetings of fishing cooperatives, one on San Cristobal and another on Isabela.

C. Attendance at a two-day workshop on local tourism hosted by the mayor of Puerto Baquerizo, San Cristobal.

D. Observation and informal conversations with residents in the various, old and new neighborhoods and commercial areas of Santa Cruz.

2. November 1996

- Approximately 50 additional interviews and re-interviews with the entire range of organizations and associations listed above, on both Santa Cruz and San Cristobal.
- Numerous random interviews with newly arrived families and individuals resident on Santa Cruz, generally those living on the periphery of the town.
- Participation in the Annual Meeting of the Charles Darwin Foundation, Quito, Ecuador
- Observations of the meetings called by the Special Commission summoned by presidential assistant Dr. Miguel Salem to prepare a Special Law for the Galapagos. Several sets of meetings were held in Quito, as well as in the Islands. This researcher participated in the Quito meetings and those held on Santa Cruz.
- Observation and Participation in community-level meetings. Among these were:
 1. Two evaluators meetings called by the Alcalde of Santa Cruz to review the visit by the Special Commission and to consider responses.
 2. Two meetings of local guilds/associations (gremios) in response to published threats by Manta-based fishing interests against efforts to control fishing within the Galapagos Islands.

C. Methods

Narrative Analysis

This report builds on the detailed surveys and resultant statistical studies undertaken by the Orstrom group. In particular the report extends the research of Andrade (1994) and Grenier (1994) and thus responds to some of their specific recommendations. Andrade (1994:8) writes that "... ya que para futuros estudios que se realicen se deberá considerar estos elementos [the Orstrom research] para lograr un acercamiento optimo con la población lo que consecuente favorecería a la recuperación de datos para trabajar directamente con los pescadores y eventualmente establecer los medios de negociación a través del conocimiento interno de al comunidad." (1994: 8).

The research consisted largely of detailed, open-ended interviews with a wide range of actors representing the various personal and sectoral interests in the archipelago. To a lesser extent, the research also included mainland groups, organizations, government agencies and representatives who influence local perceptions and actions. However, for reasons detailed below, the focus of this report, particularly its recommendations rests on the resident population.

The analysis sought to understand the perceptions and motivations of the various actors. Consequently, the project is not an attempt to define the "true" story or history of the conflict and other events. Rather, the work gathers together various subjective attitudes.

The purpose of the research and the subsequent recommendations is strictly practical. Various attitudes, sentiments, interpretations, and interests have shaped the present conflict. Likewise, these attitudes and interests will either continue to shape any future conflict. More important, an understanding of the interests, needs, and concerns can permit the sort of mutual understanding that can redirect energies toward collaborative and other local approaches to the problems in the Galapagos.

D. Acknowledgments

This applied research project under the auspices of the Charles Darwin Foundation for the Galapagos Islands, with funds from USAID-Ecuador and PL-480. The author is grateful for the logistic and administrative support provided by the Foundation. In addition, I am particularly grateful to the Foundation's Secretary General, Alfredo Carrasco, its President Jorge Anhalser, USAID-Ecuador's Director Thomas Geiger and USAID's Regional Environmental Officer Bruce Kernan. They all provided strong encouragement and total freedom during the research and in preparing this report. The author takes full responsibility for the content --analysis and recommendations-- of this report.

Part I --Conflict Analysis

Disputes and conflict are normal and should be anticipated under any circumstances. In settings undergoing such rapid economic and demographic change as the Galapagos Islands, disagreements and misunderstandings are particularly common. That situation is compounded by a heterogeneous meld of local, national and international actors who have defined themselves as "stakeholders" with regard to rights and resources, broadly defined.

What make that situation particularly acute are the high costs --ecological, economic, and social-- that will be incurred if:

- existing disputes simply smolder or escalate.
- current, structural inability to reach the sort of agreement needed to manage conflicts persists.
- cynicism and noncompliance with resource management rules continues unchecked.

A. Eliminating Stereotypes

1. Galapageños as "sheep."

Following recent episodes of unrest and violence, a widely held impression emerged among people on and off the islands. The residents of the Galapagos Islands, they argued, simply "follow" the "leadership" of charismatic political figures. Consequently, many of those who seek to manage the conflicts (or to help others do so) have focused their attention on these political figures. This strengthens the position of the political actors through increased attention and visibility, and shifts attention further away from local needs and concerns. It thus perpetuates a cycle that, so far, has done little to manage the conflict.

The research results run contrary to the general impression. From the standpoint of the residents, political figures largely provide a voice. People follow "spokespersons" (not to be confused with leaders) in the absence of an alternative.

While these spokespersons expresses much genuine and generalized discontent, they do not accurately channel the specific, underlying concerns and sentiments of the population. Most residents, including many who did not support the highly publicized "actions" (strikes, stoppages and demonstrations) are deeply concerned with existing patterns of decision-making. These patterns are processes from which they are alienated. They resent this and, partly out of frustration, residents have funneled their resentment onto the outcome of decisions --i.e. the rules-- rather than the process --i.e. rules making-- which produced them.

2. Galapageños as "Separatists"

By questioning, rejecting, or violating specific rules, the residents appear to be indirectly challenging the national government's claim over "property rights" to the Islands. This, in turn, has led to the assumption that it is the residents who are the source of all of the problems. If they are not properly monitored they will do as they please, and that will be environmentally destructive.

That assumption, as well as the national government's claim over property has been consistently reinforced, directly and indirectly, by many in the international environmental community. Even though that community often challenges specific government actions and individuals, most of the complaints, requests and suggestions are aimed at the government. All international organizations, largely environmental, focus heavily on the national government and work largely to influence government policy, monitoring practices and enforcement procedures. Many in the local population have noted this. So, the international community also becomes a target for local protest and a perceived source of their conflict. For the residents, the fact that these agencies and organizations may also criticize the government is irrelevant; the international organizations nonetheless treat the government the principal set of actors and policy makers.

Obviously, from a purely legal standpoint both the government and the international community are right. The Ecuadorian government is, and undoubtedly will remain the property owner and resource manager of the Galapagos Islands. All local governing bodies will thus remain "nested" within higher level agencies and institutions.

However, the research indicates that few, if any residents or local groups actually challenge the government's rights. The quagmire, therefore, is not caused by any battle over property and resource rights or other threat to national sovereignty.

B. The Galapagos as Problem of Governance

1. Common Property: A Frame for Analysis

Aspects of well-managed common-property provide a useful frame for interpreting the crisis in the Galapagos Islands, and also provide suggestions for subsequent conflict management. Equally important, the frame extends beyond the analysis of a set of political and economic conflicts into broad ecosystem management. In doing so, it suggests social mechanisms to anticipate future problems and, we suggest, help to prevent the current situation from devolving toward some "tragedy of the commons."

Common property, most broadly understood, exists where a well-defined community collectively exercises property rights over a resource. Individuals or groups who draw on the

common-pool resource, generally refereed to as users or appropriators, are also defined and regulated by the community. Many of the most successfully managed "commons" are situated in small, relatively isolated settings like the Galapagos Islands. More important, however, researchers have noted that many other observers failed to distinguish between areas of "common property" and those of "open access."

Commons, like state and private ownership, have well-defined, widely-understood, and, often, locally-developed rules of access to and appropriation of resources by a clearly-defined community. In areas of open access, by contrast, there is no clearly-defined community or appropriators, and thus no rules to guide use.

At present resource rights and appropriation patterns in the Galapagos Islands reflect a local clash with state-run property regimes. This has resulted in a *de facto* situation where failed efforts to exercise state ownership closely resemble "open access." Rather than simply dissecting the currently failed system and later recommending ways to resuscitate it, we suggest rethinking the situation *as if* it were managed as "common property" and building recommendations from there.

This is not a romantic revisit to the "old days" before the arrival of tourists, the sea cucumber trade, and large-scale immigration. The problem is not one in which old, established, tried-and-true methods have been supplanted by new patterns.

Even if early, well-defined common property management rules could be revealed, the recent and rapid demographic shifts and new patterns of resource use -- ranging from tourism to sea cucumber harvesting-- have radically altered patterns of appropriation. Any effort to resuscitate or reintroduce pre-existing patterns would be fruitless and inappropriate.

Much of the current management dilemma rests on the residents' *sense* of rights to the resource. By contrast to those involved in common property management, the residents of the Galapagos have a feeling of marginality and, with it, resentment, as a result of government policies. These rules are perceived as alien, imposed, and inappropriate. There is, therefore, little local support for compliance and few incentives for community self-monitoring. This has been most noticeable in currently "hot" areas such as marine resources and immigration. However, research indicated that the sentiment pervades nearly all sectors of the population and produces a wide range of negative interests and attitudes.

The suggestion that the situation in Galapagos be understood as one of "common property management" will sound alarms for some government authorities and conservation groups. They will argue that a national park is not "*common property*" and is, quite clearly, *state property*. What's more, many will argue that, to even consider it as such simply invites the sorts of challenges to authority which have provoked and maintained the dispute in the first place. Some have already expressed incredulity and anger at the mention of non-centralized policy making; this occurred in November 1996 when government officials (specifically the Minister of

Tourism and the Sub-Secretaria de Pesca) heard local ideas and recommendations for a "Special Law for the Galapagos" from residents of Santa Cruz.

National and international authorities and institutions point to the fact that they have already developed and worked to implement the rules that govern the lands. With regard to any new laws, they add that they have even consulted with all of the local residents and resource appropriators. These agents and agencies can be expected to suggest solutions that either develop from the new laws and/or from stricter enforcement of legislation in general.

Meanwhile, those who draw on the resources --large and small-scale fishermen, and large and small-scale tour operators-- and others who strain the fragile ecosystem --i.e. all immigrants-- will probably continue doing what they have been doing, legally or illegally. Newcomers will keep on immigrating, largely at will but, if necessary, with guile. Also, despite the residents' expressed desire to avoid more confrontation, they may again resort to violent protest when restrictions are imposed.

How, then, can one argue that they are not the source of the problems? We suggest that their behavior is not simply a matter of obeying or disobeying the law, but rather a response to the ways in which the laws are established, reestablished, annulled or otherwise changed. Residents for all sectors expressed a broad and deep concern with their inability to inform and shape policies that most affect them. They deeply resent the fact that they are marginalized and see as unjust the policies and practices which have produced that alienation. They express this through disobedience, or support for those who disobey.

In summary, we suggest that, to a large extent, it is the *manner* in which rules have been made that frustrates and angers local people, *not simply the rules themselves*. That manner has been exclusion and it has led to a strong sense of marginality. The resultant feeling, in turn, leads the residents to act *as if* the land and marine resources were located in areas of "open access" (detailed below) despite clear state claims and related rules.

At the same time, national government agencies have been generally unable, or unwilling, to enforce their unpopular rules; inadequate facilities prohibit regular monitoring. This leads to easy violation by local users. It also keeps open an unregulated door for entrance by mainland appropriators.

Altering this pattern by responding to deeper concerns, rather than simply beefing up enforcement, can shift negative perceptions and subsequent actions toward new attitudes and more constructive resource management.

A model for a more "positive" role can be drawn from successful efforts at common property management. There is general agreement that successful management often occurs in areas where there are:

- 1) Locally-defined management rules;
- 2) Locally-developed institutions that are accepted and strong and,

3) Higher levels of authority (within which local institutions are nested) which supports local institutions and help to monitor and enforce compliance.

Such conditions are conspicuously absent in the Galapagos Islands. Analysis indicates that, if introduced, they would easily fill a vacuum rather than radically restructure either the national or the local political order. It is in this sense that the analysis considers the Galapagos *as if* the islands resources were under some "common property" regime; the existence of such a structure characterizes many successful common property management regimes, and one could easily be inserted in the Galapagos Islands.

Figure 1 provides a commonly accepted framework for analyzing the use of common pool resources (Oakerson: 1992). In the Galapagos, the research suggests that the nexus of the conflicts lie at the level of local "decision-making arrangements." More specifically, there is an *absence* of essential, local input into decision-making arrangements.

Critical interests, decisions and policies are not localized in the islands. While most local institutions are "nested" within various governance levels, illustrated by Figure 2, in recent critical situations there has been little positive, back-and-forth flow of information and suggestions. This could be eased if tensions between levels of authority diminished. By contrast, in the recent tense situations and conflicts other flows -- e.g. a single thrust down from upper levels of authority or a single push up from local social sectors-- produced no give and take between nested layers. This has exacerbated the conflict.

In brief, the absence of any strong, representative and informed local structure can be regarded as a hole, or vacuum, that exists at a time when a broad response is required. In the recent past local actions and efforts -- ranging from public demonstrations to the Comité por la Paz y Bienestar de Galapagos-- were not sufficiently broad-based to fill the hole.

2. Galapagos: A Critical Time

National, international and local initiatives are currently positioned to permit convergence of a range interests and concerns. Doing so will help balance of information and policy between levels of authority. This opportunity structure opens ways for:

- 1) broadly-crafted and thus widely accepted rules and;
- 2) local institutions that can help to define, periodically redefine, and monitor resource access and appropriation.

Efforts can, and should, be made to take advantage of the situation and to support and sustain local initiatives. This should permit focus on the strengthening of local institutions and rules emanating from them. Such actions will permit efforts toward inclusive forms of

governance which, we suggest, can help to break up the current log-jam and related tensions produced, in large part, by decision-making patterns.

By contrasting the situations before and after the recent elections we illustrate recent events and opportunities. These events are not radical shifts or major social changes but, rather, they are windows of opportunity. These "windows," if unattended, can easily shut again.

3. April-May 1996 -- Elections and Interests

The research plan was designed to observe the situation in Galapagos during a period in which some crisis would activate and highlight the various interests and interest groups in the islands. The period just prior to the June 1996 presidential elections in Ecuador provided such an opportunity. As expected, in April-May 1996, differences among many of the various stakeholders in the islands and on the mainland were quite noticeable. Likewise groups interests were highlighted by their efforts to influence politicians and, conversely, by politicians' and their supporters' efforts to obtain votes. The competition between political parties and candidates was largely personal and sectoral. Nevertheless, during the campaign more substantive disagreements also surfaced. They revealed the various stakeholders' perspectives and concerns over many of the specific issues listed here.

1. Rules for Fishing
2. Zoning of the Marine Reserve (for both fishing and tourism)
3. Tourism
4. Training and Participation in Tourism by Locals
5. Solid Waste Recycling
6. Quarantine
7. Migration
8. Local Infrastructure and Governance

Research, therefore, focused largely on ways to define sectoral interests and to demonstrate links and conflicts within and between national and local interests. This generated a series of accounts --individual narratives and summaries of meetings. Originally, they were to make up the final report. It was to be a conflict analysis that first presented the perspectives of the various actors in critical contexts, then showed how these attitudes manifested themselves in subtle and oblique ways and, finally, outlined the antagonisms, alliances and other relationships that these attitudes and interests produced.

4. Refocusing Conflict Analysis: Seeking a Common Concern

Following the initial research and shortly before the elections, a flurry of draft legislation began emanating from the mainland. Each bill approached many of the above issues through an

anticipated "Special Law for the Galapagos" and its related rules and regulations. In June 1996, three such bills were before the Ecuadorian congress; none passed. Had they done so, the research suggests that, without local input into the subsequent rules and regulations, the Law would have accomplished little more than generate either further conflict or, simply, noncompliance. This was due, in part, to the concerns that spanned and included the various specific interests. This led to a shift in the research focus away from the interests which defined or separated the groups toward those which did, or could, serve to link the population in terms of **shared** problems.

5. A Common Concern: General Patterns of Management and Governance

Research undertaken during March-April 1996 indicated that the single, most widely expressed concern has been lack of participation. Despite efforts and pronouncements by some actors to narrow this broad sentiment to one which would place human needs above or in contrast to the fragile ecosystem, the research suggested that local concerns over participation, or rather lack of it, relate more to the **process** of "rules making" than to the specific rules.

The majority of the population recognized that it is a part of an ecosystem that is dependent upon sustaining the Galapagos Islands' present and future biophysical uniqueness. While many are angry with one or another individual and institution, nearly all are uniformly proud of their geographic "place" in the world and recognize the need to maintain it.

Unlike nearly all of the themes listed above, views on participation are not polarized. Consequently, participation does not generate the sorts of opposing interpretations and solutions expressed when residents discuss their specific interest areas. So, at that time, the overall recommendation was drafted in terms of a "project," outlined here.

6. The Conflict Management Project-- July 1996

The project recommended drawing on the broad, shared sentiment of exclusion as a means to focus on specific disputed issues. Considering the range of interests that **resentment** manifests and circumscribes, we suggested that the archipelago's problems did not lend themselves to a single or even a set of solution but rather to a **process** which can manage inevitable heterogeneity and contradictory interests. Likewise, assuming that conflicts would continue to arise, the project sought a flexible, long-term, local, response mechanisms and institutions.

The project was designed to respond to the most widely agreed-upon "concern" by:

- 1) designing and developing a forum for generating informal "working relations" and related "rules" that could respond to the range of problems outlined above.
- 2) working to institutionalize that forum and thus address the region's structural inability to manage conflicts.

The third, long-term, aim was to build upon the project's immediate focus on the Galapagos and use that experience and training to provide a basis for future training and course work by students, middle-level practitioners, local governing agencies and individuals, and others needed for:

- long-term compliance with rules created for the Galapagos Islands and other areas where potentially competitive stakeholders exist in fragile ecosystems
- developing recourse procedures for actual or perceived violations
- improving methods for monitoring, assessing and managing these and similar social conflicts.

The overall recommendation -- institutionalizing broad-based participation as a pattern of governance-- remains unchanged.

Other, more immediate events, however, have modified the original plan. At present, one of the project staff's tasks --to "design and develop" the forum needed to create local institutions for discussing interests and managing conflicts-- may be unnecessary.

That first step has been taken, and thus provides an opportunity to move more quickly toward institutionalization. It has been initiated by local, formal civic sectors. They, in turn, have sought and received support through the expanded outreach of the Galapagos island-based Charles Darwin Research Station. If maintained, strengthened and subsequently institutionalized, the opportunity structure can provide the population with a chance to easily and efficiently channel existing interests and opportunities. In sum, the scope of work envisioned by original project design has been reduced. The first steps may have become unnecessary in light of recent local events and initiatives. That opportunity structure emerged during the November 1996 research period.

7. November 1996: Another "Special Law" for the Galapagos

As outlined earlier, the idea of a set of laws recognizing and responding to the unique situation of the Galapagos has been raised on a number of occasions. In July of 1996, however, the stimulus for such laws increased. A visit to Ecuador by members of UNESCO indicated that the archipelago, an UNESCO World Heritage Site, might fall into the category of "World Heritage Site in Danger of Extinction." The decision was to be made at UNESCO's early December 1996 meeting in Merida, Mexico.

On 31 October 1996, the president's special assistant convened the first meeting of a special commission to draft a law in anticipation of the Merida meetings. The commission, working with a legal team, would then work to draw up and present the Special Law at the Mexico meeting.

The commission was composed of the following individuals and government agencies.

- Ministerio del Medioambiente
- Ministerio de Turismo
- Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
- Ministerio de Defensa Nacional
- Subsecretaria de Pesca
- Diputado Eduardo Veliz
- Franklin Sevilla, representing the alcaldes of Galapagos
- International Organizations (2 delegates)

Initial meetings were held in Quito on November 7 and 8. Beginning on Saturday November 9 the commission traveled to the Galapagos for five days. On the islands of San Cristobal and Isabela they met with residents as a single large assembly. Though the researcher was not present, observers reported that these meetings were conducted as a single large assembly to which all sectors were invited and in which each could speak. These meetings thus resembled many of the previous ones; questions and answers ranged broadly and randomly, and interactions were frequently rancorous.

By contrast, on Santa Cruz the visit was managed differently. Two days prior to the visit by the commission, the Alcalde of Puerto Ayora called a preliminary meeting. He suggested that each local associations, *gremio*, be allocated a space of time, roughly one half hour, to make their presentation before the commission. The participants were as follows.

1. Cooperativa de Pescadores de Puerto Ayora Galapagos
2. Asociacion de Marineros Mercantes de Galapagos
3. Sindicato de Choferes
4. Asociacion de Tour de Bahia y Buceo
5. ASOGAL representative
6. Cooperative COTRANSLI
7. Asociacion de Guias
8. Gremio de Ganaderos
9. Gremio de Maestros Mecanicos
10. Gremio de Carpinteros y Conexos
11. Gremio Interprofesional de Artesanos
12. Gremio Adatur
13. Gremio TV y Radio
14. Gremio Asociacion de Hoteleros
15. Frente Unida por la Paz y Bienestar de Galapagos
16. Camera de Turismo

Also included in the list of presenters were hospital workers, electrical energy staff, and two recently formed NGOS.

Following this mayor's meeting, some of those who attended the meeting, while applauding the Alcalde's procedural gesture, nonetheless suggested that additional planning was necessary. These gremio leaders wanted to make sure that while each gremio reviewed its

specific interests, the presentations as a whole demonstrated a broad and unified position. So they met again and prepared a joint strategy.

On Tuesday November 12 the commission met independently with each gremio from early morning till late evening. Each made its presentation in an orderly fashion and all were, in general, quite specific. Throughout the meeting, there was an independent 4-person "advisory/observation" group that provided continuity as the various gremios made their presentations.

While outlining their specific needs, there was much purposive overlap of general concerns. This repetition openly frustrated and sometimes angered the fatigued members of commission. The gremios, however, insisted that it was important to reinforce earlier suggestions and demonstrate their common concerns.

After the commission returned to the mainland, drafting of legislation began. However, no new law resulted from this initiative. At the Merida meeting, a final decision on the status of the Galapagos was postponed. By contrast, at a local level the preparatory and actual meetings were particularly significant. These meetings, as well as two subsequent ones helped to create the opportunity structure mentioned earlier.

a. The Review Meeting

On Thursday November 14 the alcalde reconvened the gremios to review their meeting with the commission. Though the discussion shifted back and forth between highly specific and very general needs, there was consensus on several points.

1. The commission members had been arrogant and condescending.
2. Local input would have little impact on the design of the laws.
3. The commission had already decided what the law should contain.
4. The meetings were, therefore, simply hoops through which the commission passed.
5. Despite these perceptions and in addition to the written materials submitted to the commission, local opinion and a summary of needs should be formally reiterated and submitted to the commission.
6. Local concerns should be prioritized and that top priority should be given to issue of marine resources and immigration.
7. All subsequent or related legislation --basically the *reglamento* that would follow the laws-- should include direct participation, not simple consultations, by the local stakeholders.

b. The Pronouncement by the Manta Fishermen

On Tuesday November 19, 1996 two Guayaquil newspapers published articles reporting on an angry meeting held by commercial and artisanal fishermen from Manta. The fishermen said that they would halt any and every efforts made by any civilian (i.e.. anyone other than the Navy) to either detain or even observe their fishing activities in Galapagos Islands. In addition, they declared their opposition to INEFAN under whose direction sat the Galapagos National Park (and its patrol vessel). Finally, and in response to some very critical TV reporting the popular TV host (and former presidential candidate) declared Freddy Ehlers their "enemy."

This was a clear challenge to the Galapagos fishermen and the National Park. Both, in different ways, were working to control illegal industrial fishing and to extend the limits of artisanal fishing/marine reserve within the archipelago.

The Santa Cruz fishing cooperative reacted to the article by calling yet another meeting of the island's gremios. They met as a group on Friday evening and their concern obtained the broad support of the other gremios. They then selected representatives of several gremios to draft a response. On Saturday night they video taped the formal signing session. At that ceremony representatives of 17 distinct gremios, representing the entire spectrum of "interest groups" on the islands, signed a joint statement in support a broad conservation initiative for the Galapagos, not simply a defense of local interests or an attack against the Manta fishermen. They then sent the letter and the tape off to Freddy Ehlers. On Sunday evening, at the beginning of Ehlers' TV program, he read parts of the letter and declared support for conservation of the Galapagos. He also stressed that the statement from the islands was not the retort of a single interest group but, rather, one that reflected broad sectoral consensus on the island.

c. Significance.

These meetings were significant and revealing, symbolically and practically, in several ways.

1. The gremios were civic organizations (existing or nascent), formally tied neither to government nor political parties.
2. In several cases individuals with shared interests but no formal ties coalesced into formal gremios in response to the opportunity provided meetings --i.e. individual "interests" became "interest groups."
3. Though several of the gremios were already formed and active, they had never mobilized in such a heterogeneous assemblage before.
4. There was wide agreement regarding the interrelated, indeed symbiotic, nature of their interests -- e.g. at the meeting when someone raised the question of perceptions of self-interest on the part of the fishermen several other gremios chimed in and declared that they were all affected by such actions and thus "self-interested."
5. The widely held concern over local participation was formally expressed through an ad hoc union of recognized civic bodies.
6. Such agreement opened the way for a subsequent institutionalization of that ad hoc assemblage.

7. The broad conjunction of interests set the stage for more focused agreement on specific issues.

8. The movement, for the first time, gained the fishermen strategic alliances with national and international environmental concerns. Previously, such groups stigmatized them.

In summary, the importance of the meetings was not the events or the outcomes but the coordinated manner in which nearly the entire body of the island's civic society mobilized itself. Such meetings were qualitatively different for previous ones. Earlier mobilizations -- ranging from the paros of the fishing cooperatives to the marches by the *Comite por la Paz y Bienestar de Galapagos*-- had served to divide the population. For example, many of those who formed the *Comite por la Paz y Bienestar de Galapagos* did so in reaction to the fishermen who rose in protest. Consequently, in the eyes of the fishermen the *Comite* became the "elites" while for the *Comite* the fishermen became troublemakers. The meeting brought the community together in a unified manner, produced joint documents based on consensus and won support from strategic allies.

The same forces, initially mobilized for defense, can now be channeled toward more proactive construction in a broad range of related contexts. In brief, the initial steps outlined in the earlier project have begun as an independent and broad-based local initiative. The recommendations that follow build on those local efforts.

Examples of the more focused work such collaboration may take in the future are illustrated by some of the recent joint initiatives involving staff of the Charles Darwin Research Station and the leadership of the *Cooperativa de Produccion Pesquera de Galapagos de Santa Cruz*. Following the removal of the inspectors from *Dirreccion Nacional de Pesca*, the cooperative requested technical assistance and support from the Galapagos National Park and the Charles Darwin Research Station, both of whom responded favorably. On October 10-11 they held their first joint planning session. Such work could easily be expanded to include creating a set of "ground rules" for one of the area's most hotly debated and previously divisive set of interests -- fishing and other marine resources. Equally important, such a collaborative approach to rules-making can help to set a precedent for similar rules-making with other interest groups.

In brief, research in the Galapagos suggests that: 1) absent or weak local institutions help accounts for many of the past problems in the Galapagos; 2) opportunities, national and local, to alter that situation are appearing; 3) previously informal groups have mobilized; 4) these groups can become institutionalized and; 5) strengthening such institutions will provide much of the structure needed to manage current and future conflicts.

Part II -- Recommendations

A. New Forms of Governance

Based on the analysis outlined in Part I we recommend support for a general process which:

- draws the *gremios* and government institutions into new "working relationships,"
- allows them to proceed toward local "rules-making" and finally,
- moves them toward a long-term institutionalization of the *gremios* onto a formally recognized civic body.

Some coordinated group --e.g. a council of *gremios*-- can then provide direct input into any subsequent changes and modifications of the rules. The same body can also serve to inform and assist in the monitoring and other aspects of compliance.

The process, most likely, will be slow and will require considerable give and take by the numerous interest groups. The alternatives are either a very strict enforcement program or a new set of rules. Enforcement will be costly and will invite limited enforcement; it will most likely be regarded as punitive and will thus invite violation. New rules, in turn, run a high risk of being viewed by many as yet another unilateral and uninformed mandates to be ignored or protested.

The specific "end" of increased local participation and control in the Galapagos could take a variety of forms -- ranging from an informal advisory group to a specific adaptation or variation on a "polycentric" form of governance. The primary goal of this research project, however, is to suggest means toward such ends. These are reviewed below as indirect methods of conflict management. Here we give only brief consideration to a set of alternative ends.

a. Advisory Board

A local, broad-based "advisory group" drawn largely from the *gremios* and will be the easiest and quickest mechanism to introduce. Such a council will require little modification of the existing governing institutions, and will thus minimize resistance. An advisory council requires only that representatives of higher governing levels "decentralize" a bit and give the civic bodies a formal voice. However, there are several obvious constraints.

- Higher level representatives can exercise vetoes. This runs the risk that locals will not be taken seriously.
- Higher level representatives are often more concerned with how their superiors view their work than how they are judged locally.
- Advisory boards rarely have access to or control over budgets.
- Some locals may have access to higher level officials at a national level, allowing them greater local influence. At a local level this can lead to a series of patron-client ties rather than a consensus-based input.

By openly discussing such problems and then developing local mechanisms for checking and balancing higher officials, an advisory board can minimize the risk of "tokenism."

b. "Polycentric" governance

Fully "polycentric" governance systems minimize local representatives of national agencies in favor of formal, non-central (i.e. local) structures whose authority is limited but nonetheless independent, particularly with regard to certain forms of rules-making and rules-enforcement. This allows each locale a degree of creative latitude to determine and control the system that meet its specific needs. In any of these systems, the degree of authority varies widely.

In the Galapagos, such a system would give a stronger role to the various associations, gremios. They would acquire some formal or quasi-formal status, largely in term of rules-making and rules-monitoring. However, introducing such a system will require considerable restructuring, and national-level acceptance. That may prove difficult at this early stage.

Some will question the ability of many of the local citizens to effectively govern. However, cases from other developing countries suggest that considerable untapped administrative talent often exists at the local level. Observations in Galapagos strongly support this observation. For example, despite many expressed concerns with the educational system, by national standards the artisanal fishing community in the Galapagos is perhaps the most highly educated. Moreover many have considerable management experience as well as fishing skills.

While the talents of this and other groups can be improved with additional training (we recommend, below, that such training be part of future support to Galapagos), existing capabilities should not be underestimated or dismissed. On the contrary, this talent should be actively recruited and supported through the indirect conflict management/institution building techniques outlined below.

B. Approaches to Conflict Management

Though the current situation is marked by violent protest which has sparked much of the national and international concern, we suggest that conditions need not be interpreted or approached as a classic "conflict" in which two or more individuals or groups struggle for the same end or good, and where there will be a single winner and loser. The situation in the Galapagos is best understood as a diverse series of interests, needs, and concerns. This confluence has either surfaced or resulted from rapid demographic and economic change, as well as broad political restructuring of the local governance system, and individual manipulation of that system.

In terms of long-term "conflict management," this difference in approach is significant. Rather than jumping to "resolve the conflict" permanently, or to introduce formal conflict management skills, the approach recommended here focuses on indirect methods. It can easily build from the proposed institutional structure --e.g. a council of gremios.

These groups, with a minimal amount of third-party assistance, would focus first on the sorts of diverse interests, needs and concerns outlined in Part I. Third-party can then assist in the design of specific Alternative Dispute Resolution methods. This approach will:

A. Overall Method -- Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)

What is Alternative Dispute Resolution, or ADR? Recently, the approach has become widely recommended. As such, it is often touted as a panacea to conflict resolution. However, in the broadest sense, ADR is simply and alternative to costly and acrimonious court-based litigation. Beyond that, practitioners take a wide variety of approaches.

For the Galapagos we suggest, a distinction between "interest-based" and "needs-based" approaches to negotiation.

B. Two Methods of Indirect Negotiation

1. Interests and "Interest-based Negotiation."

This approach recognizes that both parties in a dispute may have different interests regarding the desired outcome of the dispute. Both parties are encouraged to focus on their distinct interests, seek to understand the other party's interests, and to negotiate from that point. As with all negotiation, both parties are encouraged to give and take, and to work towards a mutually acceptable outcome. Neither party "wins" nor "loses;" the success of the outcome rests on whether or not the parties regard the outcome as satisfactory. The negotiation generally assumes that there is a specific goal to be achieved, and that someone will somehow get some identifiable object(s) through the negotiations --e.g. fishing rights, access to tourist revenues, government funds, or salary increases. "Interests" can also include improved long-term or otherwise on-going relations between the parties. These, by contrast to pure power-based actions, are often factored into each party's sense of acceptability.

Galapagos Islands and Mainland "Interests"

In the Galapagos we suggest that interest-based approaches are most appropriate for understanding and dealing with relations between local groups and those at a national and international level. The "interest-groups" affecting the Galapagos include the following:

1. National Government

- A. Government Bodies
 - 1. Administration
 - 2. Congress
- B. Government Agencies
 - 1. Dirreccion National de Pesca
 - 2. INEFAN
 - 3. Marina
 - 4. Merchant Marine Service

2. Local Government

- A. Governor
- B. Consejo Provincial
- C. Alcaldes
- D. Consejo Municipal

3. Mainland Economic Interests

- A. Industrial Fisheries
- B. Tour operators -- ASOGAL

4. National and International Environmental Organizations

- A. Fundacion Charles Darwin (as lobbying body, apart from its direct and indirect role with regard to the Estacion Cientifica Charles Darwin and affiliated scientists).
- B. Fundacion Natura
- C. World Wildlife Fund
- D. The Nature Conservancy
- E.. IUCN
- F. UNESCO

Relations between several of these mainland groups --principally the government and economic interests-- and those on the islands rest largely on specific, often short-term "interests" rather than deeper needs and concerns. For many of them the islands are an object, a source of political or economic capital. Their "interests" thus lie in how much of can be obtained, largely in the short term and with little concern for long-term relations.

By contrast to these interests, those of the national and international groups are less immediate and instrumental. Most environmental groups have an expressed interest in the long-term maintenance of the islands' endemic biological diversity. This interest, we suggest, is best served through direct and indirect support for the results of "need-based" negotiation among groups and institutions resident in the islands, rather than any direct negotiation or intervention. In addition and for reasons outlined earlier, many of those on the islands have assumed a somewhat cynical attitude with regard to the interests of outside environmental groups.

Thus, for nearly all mainland groups, an approach that focuses on negotiations between these groups and islanders may not be productive in terms of either short-term or long-term solutions. To illustrate:

- 1) Many actors are government appointees whose tenure in office is short-lived. With a focus more towards Quito politics, their interests are often unpredictable and shifting.
- 2) Other mainland actors have short-term economic interests. While their interests are relatively predictable, they are unlikely to change as a result of negotiation. Likewise if some agreement is obtained through pressure, compliance is difficult to monitor.
- 3) In both cases, analysis of "interests" does not flow easily toward the sort of recommendations that can be successfully implemented as long-term, conflict and resource management mechanisms.

In brief and largely with regard to political and economic interests, the ability to establish mechanisms for long-term management which includes the cooperation of these interest groups is questionable and may result in a process of frustrated "second-guessing" and/or constant reaction to shifts in political and economic initiatives. Similarly, compliance with any agreements would be questionable and difficult to monitor.

b. Needs and Concerns, and "Needs-based Negotiation"

This approach focuses on basic needs and concerns -e.g. identity, justice, recognition, respect, and dignity. The failure to meet these needs is understood as the underlying stimulus for many conflicts, particularly those involving groups in which some sense of asymmetry -- status or culture-- often blocks or complicates relationships and mutual understanding.

Needs-based analysis suggests that specific "interests" may not be the ultimate source of the conflict. Specific interests may simply mask more profound sentiments that, if not addressed, will perpetuate the dispute. In such cases:

- successful "negotiation" or agreement requires knowledge of these needs and concerns,
- parties must accept the legitimacy of the concern,
- any hope for compliance and other aspects of long-term conflict management must either satisfy these needs or create dispute management mechanisms that are sensitive to them.

This approach thus shifts the discussion toward common "problems." In many cases the problem is that, as one group works to meet its needs, it knowingly or unknowingly threatens the needs and concerns of another group. While the result is a conflict, the parties can be better understood to be sharing a problem rather than, for example, simply competing for scarce resources.

The difference is significant in that the approach to "conflict management" or "negotiation" can thus shift the focus to joint problem solving. Here actors mutually benefit by working with each other. Rather than gaining by quickly resolving the conflict, they both gain by solving the problems.

Galapagos

Many on the islands now recognize that they share a series of problems which, to a certain extent, they have wrought on each other. At the same time many recognize that they all share a single concern with regard to mainland interests -- marginality.

Their situation thus contrasts with many mainland interests, some of whom benefit economically and/or politically amidst the confusion of conflict. Continued conflict helps them to pursue their interests. Many of the residents, by contrast, see little benefit from prolonging the conflict. They recognize that it is in their interest to end that conflict jointly.

Research to date suggests that a focus on the island population itself will:

- 1) reveal genuine needs and concerns
- 2) reflect long-term interests which, though varied, coincide in the need for a sustainable ecosystem.
- 3) permit far greater and more effective interaction toward joint problem solving as a means to negotiation
- 4) enhance mutual understanding
- 5) identify interests that can easily flow into recommendations that can be implemented
- 6) suggest methods by which subsequent compliance can be anticipated or controlled.

In brief, the possibility of creating a mechanism for long-term conflict and resource management, one that draws heavily on the local knowledge of the various interest groups and appropriators, is stronger within the island population.

In addition, groups and social sectors currently exist, and others have been recently mobilized and have shown a capacity to work jointly. There is thus no need to create new groups; existing ones can be linked and will provide greater strength than, for example, newly-formed non-governmental organizations which often fill such space in the absence of local civic organizations.

Social Sectors

The social sectors of the islands can be roughly divided into the following categories.

1. Agriculturists and cattle raisers
2. Fishermen and fishing boat owners
3. Merchant Marine
4. Tour guides
5. Tour operators

6. Tour boat owners
7. Restaurant, shop and hotel owners
8. Service workers
9. Tourist craft artisans
10. Craftsmen (carpenters, plumbers, mechanics)
11. Taxi and bus owners and drivers
12. Research scientists and support staff
13. Local government officials and bureaucrats
14. Regional and national officials and bureaucrats
15. Government employees
16. Teachers

Though several these sectors have established formal associations, gremios, many were inactive. In addition, they rarely acted in any coordinated manner.

Consequently, during critical periods such as visits by mainland bodies or assemblies to discuss critical issues, concerns were voiced by individuals but often did so by invoking sectoral interests and presenting themselves as spokespersons. This, in many instances, contributed more to the conflict than to its management. Currently, and largely as result of recent mobilizations, informal sectors have become more formal "interest groups," or gremios.

They include the following.

1. Cooperativa de Pescadores de Puerto Ayora Galapagos
2. Asociacion de Marineros Mercantes de Galapagos
3. Sindicato de Choferes
4. Asociacion de Tour de Bahia y Buceo
5. ASOGAL representative
6. Cooperative COTRANSLI
7. Asociacion de Guias
8. Gremio de Ganaderos
9. Gremio de Maestros Mecanicos
10. Gremio de Carpinteros y Conexos
11. Gremio Interprofesional de Artesanos
12. Gremio Adatur
13. Gremio TV y Radio
14. Gremio Asociacion de Hoteleros
15. Frente Unida por la Paz y Bienestar de Galapagos
16. Camera de Turismo

These groups represent a legitimate and efficient voice. Moreover they are bodies that can be regularly mobilized and coordinated for a range of future work. The dispute management techniques outlined below can serve as a frame for such mobilization. Conversely, without the

formal participation of these groups, efforts at indirect conflict management will become little more than a series of short-term exercises with individuals.

In brief, the gremios can benefit from collaborative, short-term processes. It will provide them with a means to express needs and coordinate responses. If such processes are to become anything more than uncoordinated "conflict management" exercises and to move toward institutions, they will require participation by recognized, formal bodies such as the gremios.

Urgency

There is a high risk that, unless the energy in the islands is channeled quickly toward a common problem and genuine concern, the observed enthusiasm will dwindle and dissipate. The methods outlined below will thus strengthen the long-term institutional capacity of the groups while simultaneously addressing their immediate concerns.

2. Joint Problem Solving

One of the goals of the research was to identify issues which groups shared rather than simply focusing on their differences. By extension, the recommendations stress joint work on shared concerns within the population. Concerns thus become joint problems. Solving the problems, in turn, becomes a means toward conflict management. The "working relations" which develop permit the groups to move current problems toward establishing long-term social mechanisms for future problem solving as an approach to inevitable future conflicts.

Joint problem solving as a form of negotiation is often undertaken in meetings that focus primarily, or at least initially, on mutual understanding needs and concerns.

In the Galapagos this approach can move quickly. The gremios have already undertaken some of the mobilization and have begun to approach "working relations" through pervious, collaborative work. That experience in "joint self-defense" has decreased tensions noticeably and now presents an opportunity structure for more pro-active planning and rules-making. A joint, or rather multi-party focus on the creation of the rules and regulations related to the Special law for the Galapagos is already seen as a joint problem. A joint effort to solve that problem is logical next step. In addition, by demonstrating that islanders themselves can and will make rules they will demonstrate to themselves that they can satisfy some of the basic needs and concerns which underlie many of the conflicts.

Local empowerment will also provide a means to sound resource management. Rules determined by those familiar with the resource base could be the most appropriate. In addition, if and when some stakeholders appear to be acting in a short-sighted or self-serving manner, a social mechanism which brings together the various stakeholder groups as some formal, legitimate, and recognized body, such as the gremios, also provides the sort of checks and balances needed for designing and monitoring broad resource management rules. The

collaborative body itself thus serves to create an institutional capacity which can confront problems of compliance with existing rules or the needs to create new rules as new situations arise. In brief, local knowledge will inform to creation of rules and enable more successful monitoring.

The initial approach recommended is, in fact, quite simple. It is one that channels existing interests in new directions, creates means to institutionalize them simply through regular direct action and, in the process, establishes a long-term means to manage resources and conflicts related to them. It is not a radical change in the current form of governance. Nor does it suggest or recommend the introduction of any new organizations into an already complex social order, but rather seeks to strengthen and enhance existing civic bodies.

D. Activities

1. Joint Rules-Making as Joint Problem Solving.

The logic behind this activity has been reviewed above. Local rules-making can now take a variety of directions, focusing on a broad range of locally identified or locally-accepted problems. For some issues --e.g. migration-- the stakeholders will need to include almost all sectors of the population. In other areas --e.g. fishing-- stakeholders are more specific; fishing rules meetings would include, minimally, the fishing cooperatives, the boat owners' associations, the Charles Darwin Research Station, the National Park staff and perhaps the Institute National de Peskier.

However, needs should be prioritized. This, again, is not a matter to be determined externally. Local groups have already used the gremios to identify a range of specific problems and interests. These, in turn, have been prioritized. The most urgent problems, as defined during the November 1996 meetings are:

- rules and regulations to guide the marine reserve
- control over immigration
- creation of local institutions, and conversely, efforts to decentralize existing controls.

The expressed interests and priorities will be the interests most easily mobilized. The work in these areas, if successful, can serve to establish rules for problem that, in the eyes of the population, are less urgent. Throughout the process, collaboration alone will serve to decrease tensions and the risks of factionalism which served to divide the islands, or to allow them to be divided by political interests.

2. Training

While we are recommending that practical "joint problem solving" as the best approach to the current situation in the Galapagos, there have also been requests for some formal sessions and training in conflict management. These can easily be offered to interested parties rather than made conditional on any support or otherwise pressed on people. Most of the training can now be provided locally. Specifically, the *Center for the Mediation of Social Conflict* at the Universidad San Francisco de Quito has been working to refine skills in each of the general areas reviewed above. Likewise contacts exist with a variety of Quito-based organizations and individuals that could provide technical assistance. We anticipate that the Center and others can provide workshops in 1) general principles of conflict management and 2) methods of joint problem solving.

We also recommend that one or more local individuals be selected for advanced training. Several local individuals/leaders have already expressed an interest in understanding conflict management and its relation to natural resource management in the Galapagos. Consequently, we are not looking to create leaders or direct interests. Both exist already. Nor is training seen as an

effort to persuade existing leaders that they should be interested in civic work or the problems of conflict. The training would be a response to existing civic groups and would meet their expressed needs.

In summary, the current situation in the Galapagos Islands need not be viewed as a conflict or set of conflicts that must be externally resolved or managed. Similarly, future management of the archipelago's unique biological resources need not be understood as actions taken to control the practices of the local population. We have suggested that the problems and challenges are not solely in the eyes of the outside observer but are fully understood by most local groups. They are not only proud of their "place" but understand the need to maintain a balance premised on maintaining the biological diversity.

Many of the violations and resultant conflicts have been voiced, and thus interpreted, as competition over scarce resources and thus conflicts over access. In many cases, particularly those involving interests external to the islands this is true. However, on the islands a focus on violations, as well as local responses to resultant monitoring and sanctioning efforts, often masks the deeper concerns of the population. These, more than short-term interests have sparked many of the actions. Conversely recent initiatives to take charge of, or at least actively participate in the future planning suggest a means toward conflict management and to resource management as well. The recommendations included here build on these local initiatives simply by encouraging support for local institutions to continue this process. This does not require radical restructuring. On the contrary, the process of linking local input into the existing national governance structure is quite easy. Opportunities currently exist to quickly move in that direction. This will help to breach the serious gap and multiple misunderstandings which currently distances many local stakeholders from external authorities.

This opportunity structure opens ways for:

- broadly-crafted and thus widely accepted rules and;
- local institutions that can help to define, periodically redefine, and monitor resource access and appropriation.

In brief, research in the Galapagos suggests that:

- previously informal groups have mobilized;
- these groups can become institutionalized and;
- strengthening such institutions will provide much of the structure needed to manage current and future conflicts.

We, therefore, strongly recommend:

- 1). Support to enable increased mobilization of the existing gremios;

- Support to move from ad hoc assemblages of these groups to a formal coordinating body --e.g. a council of gremios or some gremio-based advisory board with clear role and specific powers;
- incorporation of that body into the design the reglamento which will follow (or could even precede) the Special Law of the Galapagos
- formally institutionalizing that body into some permanent entity with a role in monitoring and compliance, and periodic rewriting of the rules.
- the specific structure of the coordinating body and way in which they undertake activities should be a part of the process .